airport security: a national security challenge

7/30/2019 Airport Security: A National Security Challenge

1/4

Summary: Border protection

is not just an immigration and

economic issue now, but a

critical national security matter.

Airports are the most essential

component of border security.

There are three basic principles

for a successful airport security

program: comprehensiveness,concentric layer approach, and

risk management. The best

airport security approach is one

that relies on multiple detection

techniques, combining tech-

nology with the human agent.

International Border Security Forum

Policy Brie

Airport Security:

A National Security Challenge

by Raphael Ron

Plac Jana Henryka Dabrowskiego 100-057 WarsawPoland: +48 22 845 63 10F: +48 22 828 21 07E ino@gmus.org

May 2013

BackgroundTe end o the Cold War and theglobalization process that acceler-ated during the 1990s changed thenature o international conicts romsymmetric struggles between statesprotecting their territory and intereststo an asymmetric struggle betweenstates and non-governmental organi-zations, mostly global, with no terri-tory and limited physical assets.

Te 9/11 Al-Qaeda attack on theWorld rade Center and the Pentagonis the most dramatic example o thechange. A small group o terror-ists with a very small budget andvery limited weaponry were able tochange the worlds political land-scape in a way never done beore. Te9/11 attack has elevated the status oterrorism rom a disturbing actorto a strategic threat to national andworld security.

Te importance o protecting thehomeland against the new strategicthreat has become a top priority ormost countries national securityagenda. Border protection is not justan immigration and economic issuenow, but a critical national securitymatter. Airports are the most criticalcomponent o border security.

Airport Security PrinciplesTere are three basic principles or asuccessul airport security program:comprehensiveness, concentric layerapproach, and risk management.

1. Comprehensiveness ensures thatthe security program covers every-thing that is relevant to the task(acility security, access control,perimeter, passenger screeningcargo etc.) in a balanced manner

and across agency lines and thatthe security operation maximizesthe use o available resources. Itcalls or a clear and unied struc-ture o responsibility, authority, andaccountability. Tere is a need orseparation between the regulatingagency and the implementingagency to ensure unbiased supervi-sion and enorcement.

2. A concentric layered approach

assumes that no single layer osecurity is capable o meeting thesecurity challenges. It provides thedepth that improves our abilityto stop or prevent an attack at theearliest possible stage, serving bothground and air security. Te layersare as ollows:

Nationalintelligencehas provento be an extremely eective rst

7/30/2019 Airport Security: A National Security Challenge

2/4

International Border Security Forum

Policy Brief

2

layer. Te capture o the Liquid Bombers plotters is

an excellent example o this. Te next layer is the useofdata stored in various

databases accessible to the government or thepurpose o implementing an Individual Risk Assess-ment to all booked passengers. Te result o therisk assessment should be integrated and possiblycompleted at the airport passenger security processingarea.

Another layer is the airportgroundsecuritysetup,with a robust surveillance system supported byuniormed and plainclothes boots on the ground.

Tis layer should implement a proessional behaviorpattern recognition program throughout the airportin order to detect potential perpetrators and challengethem on security terms. Special attention is paid to thecurbside and at all entrances to the terminal. Airportemployees should play a role in the behavior detectioneort to the best o their abilities.

Te ourth layer is thecheck-incounterwhere thepassenger leaves bags and identication is veried,bags are tagged and delivered to the baggage securitysystem, where it is checked at the appropriate stan-

dard based on the passengers security risk assessmentscore.

Parallel to the bag check, the next layer,thesecuritycheckpoint, is where identity is veried by biometrictechnology (where available). Passengers are directedto dierent lanes according to their risk assessmentscore. High risk assessment score passengers shouldbe interviewed by a specially trained agent beore theyare allowed to proceed to the gate. Behavioral surveil-lance is implemented at the gate area, with specialattention to the boarding process.

On the aircra, the potential presenceofairmarshalsand a crew trained in behavior observation are thenext layer and obstacle or the perpetrator.

Te last and most important layer o protection onboard is thereinforced,bulletproofcockpitdoor(preerably a double door system) and the securityprocedure to keep it closed.

On the ground, a perimeter intrusion detection system(backed up by a quick intervention team) protects theairside against unauthorized access to the ramp or therunways. Additionally, an access control system is used

to protect sterile and other sensitive areas o the airport.

Armed quick intervention teams must be available at alltimes to respond promptly to any development.

Te best example o a multi-layer security programis probably el-Aviv Ben Gurion Airport, where thesurveillance starts at a vehicle checkpoint as you enterthe airport ground and is maintained consistentlythrough various layers described above.

3. Te Risk Management approach is an alternative tothe one-size-ts-all approach implemented in mostairports worldwide. Te main dierence between theone size and the risk management approaches is thatthe one size approach ignores the act that dierentpeople (passengers) represent dierent risk levels. As aresult, the one size approach implements a single levelo security to 100 percent o the population so that itorces the threshold down due to cost, privacy timeand other actors. Using the one size approach, secu-rity checkpoints were challenged many times by realterrorists including on 9/11, the Shoe Bomber, theUnderwear Bomber, the Chechen Black Widows, andmore. It ailed with every challenge. Te only countrythat successully developed and implemented a risk

management solution was Israel, as early as the 1970s.Te Israeli risk management approach was based onindividual passenger risk assessments done throughinterview techniques carried out at the airport prior tochecking in or the ight. In this system, the interviewand document check resulted in risk level classica-tion, which was ollowed by a search level compatibleto the adjudged risk level. In other words, a high riskpassenger was subjected to a much more thoroughsearch than a low risk passenger. Trough the years,with emerging new technologies, many o the inconve-niences involved in the higher end risk searches have

been modied, but the principle o managing the risk byapplying compatible measures remained the backbone othe Israeli solution.

It is during the last ew years that the value o the riskmanagement approach was embraced by other countries,including the United States to some extent. Te U.S. imple-mentation o risk management in airport security policyat this time is limited to voluntary trusted passengerprograms like Pre-Check and Global Entry and to aransportation Security Administration (SA) version obehavior detection.

7/30/2019 Airport Security: A National Security Challenge

3/4

International Border Security Forum

Policy Brief

3

Terrorists love our detection

technology because they can trust

that it will not do what it is not

designed to do.

Detection of Items or Detection of Intentions?

Te one size traditional checkpoint concept is based onthe assumption that we can prevent acts o terrorism bypreventing banned items rom being carried on to theaircra. Tere are many issues that question the validitythis assumption. Te rst and maybe the most importantone is an accumulating number o ailures, despite theconstant eorts to improve the detection technology usedat the checkpoint. Yet, when we examine the reasons or theailure in depth, we nd some undamental weaknesses inthe item detection only approach.

Te rst problem arises when we build a list o banned

items. Te problem with terrorist tool box is that it is ullo unexpected surprises such as improvised weapons andother devices. On the morning o 9/11, we did not considerbox cutters and small knives a threat. Te morning aer,they became the leading threat, and SA agents and otherairport security personnel worldwide were spending mosto their time conscating them. Only lately, as part o amore analytical approach, has SA changed the rules andsmall knives are no longer on the list. SA nally recog-nized that locked cockpit doors have reduced the risk o thesmall knie.

Another example is the liquid issue. Suddenly, aer thegood work o British intelligence, we realized that liquidexplosives are known to terrorists (2006) and they intendedto use them in order to overcome security checkpointscreening. Is this really the case? Have we orgotten thenotorious Ramzi Yusu, the mastermind o the rst attackon the World rade Center in 1993, who successullyexperimented with a liquid explosive bomb on board aPhilippine Air ight in 1994? Have we orgotten the NorthKorean intelligence bombing o a South Korean airlinerwith liquid explosives in 1987, killing all on board?

Te answer to these disturbing questions is that we didnthave the technology to detect liquid explosives at the timeand we were unwilling to give up our security paradigmthat we can secure aviation by use o detection technologyalone, as limited as the technology was and still is.

We are a technology savvy society. We love technologybecause we know we can trust it to do what it is designedto do. errorists love our detection technology becausethey can trust that it will not do what it is not designed todo and never did beore. In a sense, our technology givesthe terrorist a positive eedback on what to expect. Tat

was the idea behind the Shoe Bomber attack in 2001 andthe Underwear Bomber attack in 2009. In both cases,they were proven right. Tey managed to take their devicesthrough the checkpoint undetected. In act, statistics tellus that there has never been a case o stopping an actualterrorist attack through the item detection solution alone.

On the other hand, when we add a human componentthat is able to identiy inconsistencies, raise questions, andlook or answers about the legitimacy o the passenger, theormula becomes much more powerul. You may detecteven an explosive device carried by an innocent passengerwithout his or her knowledge. Tat was the case o AnneMarie Murphy, a pregnant young Irish woman trying toboard an El AL ight to el Aviv carrying a bomb madeby Syrian Intelligence and given to her by her Palestinian

boyriend without her knowledge in 1986. It was throughthe Israeli interview-based procedure that inconsistenciesin her story emerged and led to the detection o the highlysophisticated concealed bomb.

In short, the best approach is one that relies on multipledetection approaches, combining technology with thehuman agent. Tis decreases the level o predictabilityor the terrorist, making that person unsure o what toexpect. With todays advanced inormation technology inthe hands o proessional aviation security personnel andthe ability to conduct interviews with a small number o

selected passengers, the chances o terrorists succeeding ingetting on board with their tools are getting smaller. Tisis the oundation to build on, rening both the technologyavailable and the interview techniques.

Challenges

Although the three-tiered approach outlined above hasbeen proved eective, challenges remain. erroristscontinue to seek out gaps, learning rom the experienceo ailed attempts. In order to remain successul, we need

7/30/2019 Airport Security: A National Security Challenge

4/4

International Border Security Forum

Policy Brief

4

About the Author

Raphael Ron (ra.ron@nasscorp.com) is a leading aviation and

homeland security expert with more than 40 years o security and

counter-terrorism experience worldwide. He is the ormer director o

security at el-Aviv Ben-Gurion International Airport and the Israeli

Airport Authority rom 1997 to 2001. In 2001, ormed New Age Avia-

tion Security and New Age Security Solutions, where he is president

and CEO.

About the International Border Security Forum

Te German Marshall Fund o the United States (GMF) hosts the

International Border Security Forum to enhance understanding

between senior multilateral policymakers and build cooperation on

the most pressing border security challenges. Tis program brings

together political level representatives rom the member states o the

European Union, the United States, Canada, and Israel. Te ormat

o the meetings is an o-the-record conversation among a small,

yet highly selective group o senior policymakers, and designated

senior experts. Te accompanying series o policy brie deepens the

discussion and provides inormation to the larger border security

community.

About GMF

GMF strengthens transatlantic cooperation on regional, national, andglobal challenges and opportunities in the spirit o the Marshall Plan.

GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working

in the transatlantic sphere, by convening leaders and members o

the policy and business communities, by contributing research and

analysis on transatlantic topics, and by providing exchange opportu-

nities to oster renewed commitment to the transatlantic relationship.

In addition, GMF supports a number o initiatives to strengthen

democracies. Founded in 1972 as a non-partisan, non-prot orga-

nization through a gi rom Germany as a permanent memorial to

Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both

sides o the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington,

DC, GMF has ofces in Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara,Bucharest, Warsaw, and unis. GMF also has smaller representations

in Bratislava, urin, and Stockholm.

to ocus on the ollowing areas o continued renement o

technology and procedures:

Develop and implement a real risk-based aviation secu-rity program that will provide an eective solution andthat will also meet our civil rights threshold.

Develop and implement a computerized non-discrimi-natory passenger risk assessment tool.

Establish a behavior pattern recognition programthroughout all airports.

Design checkpoints to accommodate dierent levels osearches in accordance with the passenger risk levels

ound through behavior pattern recognition programsat the checkpoint area.

Revise the structure o responsibility, authority, andaccountability or security at the airport level to adaptto the multi-layered security and risk managementapproach to airport security, including the creation andoperation o a unied command and control center.Ensure separation o regulator and implementer roles.

Create and use an international clearinghouse orinormation sharing that will overcome the reluctanceo states to share security inormation; i not possible,

create bilateral agreements or limited club style solution.

Implement a comprehensive airport security programstarting with a comprehensive threat and vulnerabilityanalysis resulting in a security plan that covers all secu-rity aspects at the airport regardless o agencies bound-aries.

In the nal analysis, there is no silver bullet solution toairport security. Rather, it is a process o continued devel-opment and renement. Te Israeli experience has shown,however, that the right-sized mix o dierent componentsallows airport security proessionals to stay one step aheado the terrorist. While no system is bulletproo, there areabundant data sets now available to help develop moreeective procedures worldwide.