atca cyber day 2017 slides · pdf filecns/atm & nextgen services communication navigation...
Post on 06-Mar-2018
214 Views
Preview:
TRANSCRIPT
Aviation CybersecurityATCA presents
#ATCACyber
Registration#ATCACyber
Welcome!
FREE WIFINetwork: PSAV-DTCC
Passcode: atca17
#ATCACyber
Peter F. Dumont President and CEO
Air Traffic Control Association
Welcome
#ATCACyber
Steve CarverCyber Committee Chair
Air Traffic Control Association
Opening Remarks
#ATCACyber
Richard MorganDirector
National Airspace Security and Enterprise OperationsFAA Technical Operations Services
Keynote Address
#ATCACyber
2
NASEO Security Roadmap CY 2021 2022+
Collaborative C
yber Oversight and M
anagement of the N
ASId
entif
y
Restricted Intel Comms
Prot
ect
Det
ect/R
espo
nd/R
ecov
er
IRAT Data
Auth Docs
Asse
tsTh
reat
sB
ound
ary
Syst
ems
Even
tsD
ata
Flow
2020201920182017
NCMS
NESG
Edge Defense-in-Depth
NAS System Boundary Protection Integration
Remote Management Access GatewayExternal Identity and Access Management (IAM)
NAS Lab Environment Segregation
Event Collection
Event Monitoring
NARUS
Coordinated Risk Management
POAM Prioritization/ Risk Translation
Standardized NAS Patch Management Reqs./ProcessesCentralized Software and Patch Management (CSPM)
Internal Identity and Access Management (IAM)
Operational Site Risk Assessment
Cyber Situational Awareness
NCO Event Collector Site Expansion/Tech Refresh
NAS System Event Collection Integration
NCO Intelligent Traffic Monitoring (ITM)
NCO NAS Data Flow Validation/Mapping
NCO NAS Data Flow Modeling/Alerting
NCO Event Collection Optimization (filtering, parsing, etc.)NCO Integrated Cyber Monitoring Suite
NCMS NAS Baseline/Maintenance
OMB 14-03 Compliance
Vulnerability Identification
POAM Generation
Cross-Domain NAS Lab Environs
Limited Intel Distribution
Centralized Asset Database (query, reporting, etc.)
Advanced Intel Collaboration
Integrated Intel and Threat Assessment Capability
(NCO, FAA SOC, AEO)FAA-wide Classified Comms
Automated Intel Distribution
NAS Threat Model
Security Enterprise Asset Management (SEAM)
NAS Assets Dashboards
Operational Risk Management
Low Altitude UAS Cybersecurity
#ATCACyber
Panelists: Tim Bennett, DHS
Erin Joe, FBILt. Col. John R. Ladino, USAF
Stephen Van Trees, FAA
Moderator: Jennifer Richter, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP
ATCAAviationCybersecurity
Friday,June23,2017Arlington,VA
LowAltitudeUASCybersecurity
Why Are We Concerned About Cybersecurity and UAS?
n FAA forecasts that US sales of sUAS will be 7 million units a year by 2020n Inherent Qualities of sUAS Can Lead to Security Concerns
● sUAS can fly in unpredictable patterns, they have a low acoustic signature, they can be modified to avoid geofencing restrictions
● sUAS offer a unique level of anonymity, plausible deniability, no required Remote ID and Tracking today, there are no controls at the point of sale, they can be easily assembled at home and built with off the shelf parts, registration is voluntary
n Types of Threats from sUAS● They could be weaponized (ISIS drone attacks disrupted airstrikes in Raqqa.
Domestically, a man was charged in a plot to bomb the pentagon using a model airplane)
● They could be used for illicit activity (delivering drugs)● They can be used in a negligent manner, either ignorantly (White House event) or
willfully
n What do we need to protect? ● Critical infrastructure, power plants, military bases, public gathering places
(stadiums, amusement parks)
Presentedto:
By:
Date:
FederalAviationAdministrationSecurityOverviewfor
UASOperationsintheNAS
ATCA2017
Stephen Van Trees, FAA Aircraft Certification Service
06/23/2017
10FederalAviationAdministration
Agenda:• National Aviation System (NAS)• Unmanned Aircraft System
– Integrated, concern-driven approach– Significance of Multi-agency participation
• Standards and System implementation• Rules and Regulations on UAS
– Example in upcoming FAA advisory material
11FederalAviationAdministration
E-enabled Aircraft Evolution
11
12FederalAviationAdministration
Notional Aircraft Domains
CNS/ATM & NextGen ServicesCommunication
Navigation & Surveillance
Air Traffic Control Centers
GPS & Ground Navigation Aids
Airline Networks
(ACARS)
Internet / Public Networks
Con
trols
1
3
1
2
3
2
Network Security Access Points
Air Traffic Services (ATS) Provider Non-Air Traffic Services Provider
Aircraft Systems Information Security Protection (ASISP)
FAA Air Traffic Services Connectivity
Internal Aircraft Network Security Controls
E-Enabled Aircraft Connectivity including FLS
12
13FederalAviationAdministration
Physical security from UAS• Non-cooperative drones can do harm and even attack value targets. The primary concern here is
detecting/countering non-cooperative drones and protecting targets before any harm.• Jamming & spoofing technologies that hackers might use to cyberattack unmanned aircraft may also
be useful for counter-UAV.
Safety and security risks from UAS to NAS• When a normal UAS operation is interrupted (via cyber/physical threats or loss of command/control),
it may become a risk to NAS, potentially impacting and jeopardizing safety and security of NAS. Theprimary concern is to protect NAS from threats caused by UAS.
Security of UAS cyber space• There are multiple cyber attack vectors that can threaten normal operation of unmanned aircraft
system (unmanned aircraft, ground and air links and infrastructure) – spoofing, jamming, insiderattack, data hacking and manipulations. Detecting//protecting UAS from various cyber attacks maybe the main concern here.
UAS: Safety and Security
Threatto UAS Threatfrom UAS
NAS
Safety
NationSecurity
14FederalAviationAdministration
Detect Inform
Respond Avoid
Preempt Evaluate NationalSecurityRisk
SocietalSafetyIssues
RisktoNAS
EconomicsImpact
RisktoAircraft
PhysicalRisk
Intentional Cooperative
Safety&Security:Government,Industry&Society
DoD DHS FAA OEMs Users
15FederalAviationAdministration
End-to-End Security Goals• Based on government determination of threats to
civil UAS Command and Control– Threats not isolated to ‘C2 Link’ and SC-228– SC-228 has a role in threat countermeasures, however
• End-to-End security needs to be part of an overall Defense in Depth strategy
• Longevity of Security Controls – Overall Risk Management
• End-to-End à These controls are implemented onboard the UAS and at the ‘Control Source’(nowhere in the middle)
15
16FederalAviationAdministration
Topics Addressed in Advisory Circular 20-187 - UAS Link Security• Allowed cryptographic algorithms & strengths
– Key sizes– Algorithm modes– Sunset dates
• Confidentiality, integrity and entity authentication controls for end-to-end link security
• Data origin authentication (per message/frame) & strength
• Implementation flexibility for developers
16
17FederalAviationAdministration
Assurance Level Based Requirements?• Layered security levels (based on UAS type/size or
airspace participation) are possible– Potentially tailor all proposed security requirements for
class of service and/or size of UAS (or its operations in types of controlled airspace)
17
18FederalAviationAdministration
FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016(a.k.a. 2016 FAA Funding Reauthorization Bill)SEC. 2111 AVIATION CYBERSECURITY(a) COMPREHENSIVE AND STRATEGIC AVIATION FRAMEWORK. --
(1) IN GENERAL. – Not later than 240 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the Federal AviationAdministration shall facilitate and support the development of a comprehensive and strategic framework of principles andpolicies to reduce cybersecurity risks to the national airspace system, civil aviation, and agency information systems using atotal systems approach that takes into consideration the interactions and interdependence of different component of theaircraft systems and the national airspace system.
(2) SCOPE.—In carrying out paragraph (1), the Administrator shall—(A) identify and address the cybersecurity risks associated with—
(i) the modernization of the national airspace system;(ii) the automation of aircraft, equipment, and technology, and(iii) aircraft systems
….(Total 5 pages)Reference: https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/636/text#toc-HDBDD3B2849AD44FD86E5E77E4616F085
19FederalAviationAdministration
19
Questions?• Stephen Van Trees• FAA/AIR-132• (202) 267-8546• Stephen.vantrees@faa.gov
Tim Bennett, PMPBorder and Maritime Security Division
Air Based Technologies
21
FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19Mid-Term
FY20 FY21 FY22Long-Term Mission Areas
Air
Bas
ed
Tech
nolo
gies SUASDataProtocols
ISRandSensors
SUASSensors
ModernizationofMissionManagementSystems&DataLink
InnovativeTechnologiesandTacticsforSUAS
Air Surveillance
RAPSPhaseII
SenseandAvoidSystemsforUAS
Tunn
el
Det
ect
RobotsforTunnelInvestigations. Underground
Portand
Co
astal
Surveillance
PortandCoastalSurveillance
UnmannedSystemSensorEvaluationandDevelopment(Surface)
Robotic R&D Plan
22
RoboticAircraftSensorProgram(RASP)
Demonstrate&AnalyzethepotentialimpactsofsmallUnmannedAircraftSystems(sUAS)technologyonmaritime,borderandlawenforcementactivitiesandoutcomestobetterunderstandtherisks,benefitsandlimitationsofoperatingexistingCommercialofftheShelf(COTS)sUAStechnology.Also,providetrainingopportunitiesformaritimeandbordersecurityoperatorstoassesssUASsuppliersystemsundertypicalmaritimeandbordermissionscenarios
NeedStatement
ProjectObjective
• Maritime,customsandborderlawenforcement
• Searchandrescue• Harmagainstofficersafety• Situationalawareness• Hazardousmaterialincidentresponse• Border,ports,waterways,andcoastalsecurity
&counter-terrorism
• Provideincreasedairsupporttoagentsandfirstrespondersasneeded• IncreaseairsupporttoUSCGofficersduringoperationsinthelittoral• ofDHSComponentsandfirstrespondersonthecurrentstateofthe
artinunmannedairplatformssensorsystems• EducatesuppliersonthespecificneedsofDHSComponentsandfirst
responders
Capabilityneedsinoverwatch &intelligencedatafor:
LeadingTo
Approach:• LeverageS&T’sInvestmentsinsUASevaluationsthroughRobotic
AircraftforPublicSafety(RAPS)• SelectsUASsuppliers basedontheinitialassessmentresults,to
performinborderenforcementandmaritimeenvironments• AssessSuppliers’PlatformsusingS&T’srobuststandardized
assessmentmethodologyforsUAS• AnalyzeResultsandDevelopaReport basedonthefindingsofthe
finalassessment
DesiredOutcomes:• Oneyeardemonstrationusingbothfixedandrotary
wingUAS• Creationofaknowledgeresourcedatabase;onetest
reportpersupplierassessedaspartofRASP• Provideinformationaboutperformanceinrealistic
operationaltestscenariosandenvironments;emergencyresponse,beaconresponse,injuredoperator/search&rescue,borderandmaritimesurveillance.
• In-depthinformation&guidanceforfuturesensorsandsUASdevelopmenttomeetborderandlawenforcementrequirements
LeadingTo
23
ResilientGPS
Providequantitative/qualitativeassessmentsofhowcapablyCOTSsUASsystemscanaugmentCBPandUSCGpersonnelintheconductofBMDmissionsinborder/marineenvironmentswhereGPSthreatsarepresent.DocumentspecificattributesandimplementationdetailsofRASPsUAScollectedduringinteractionswithmanufacturers,andprovideanassessmentofvulnerabilitiesimplicitinthedesignoftheseaircraft.Identifytechnologiesandtechniquesthatcouldbeusedtocounter GPSthreatsinfuturesUAS systemsandenhanceresilience.
• Maritime,customsandborderlawenforcement• Searchandrescue• Harmagainstofficersafety• Situationalawareness• Hazardousmaterialincidentresponse• Border,ports,waterways,andcoastalsecurity&
counter-terrorism
• SmallUnmannedAircraftSystems(sUAS)beingassessedinRASPmaritimeandbordersecurityscenariosarenothardenforGPSthreats
• WhenCBPagentsleveragesUASforairsupportinborderregionscouldexperiencesignificantmissiondegradationinresponsetoinexpensiveGPSjammersemployedagainstthem
• VulnerabilitiesofCOTSsUASneedstobeunderstoodanddocumentedsothatsystemscanbemodified
InabilityofcurrentCOTSsUAStoprovideintelligencefor:
Approach:• ExtendpreviousS&T’sInvestmentsfromRASP• AssesscandidatesUASandbaselineexpected
performancethroughmanufactureroutreach,simulationandanalysis,anddemonstrationofjammer/spoofer impact
• ArticulatemitigationstrategiesbasedonchangestosUAS technicalimplementation,TTPandCONOPS
• Synthesizeresultsin aReport basedonassessmentfindings
DesiredOutcomes:• EstablishbaselineperformanceexpectationsforunmodifiedCOTSsUASsubjectedtoGPSthreats
• Provideroadmapofhigh-levelapproachestoincreasesituationalawarenessofthreatsandgeolocate them
• SystemlevelsUASrequirementsthatinformfutureS&Tinvestmentsandacquisitionstrategy
• EngagemanufacturerswithassessmentresultsandnegotiatetechnicalenhancementsonbestperformingRASPsUAStoincreaseresiliencetoGPSthreats
NeedStatement
ProjectObjective
LeadingToLeadingTo
24
DHSFirstResponderElectronicJammingExercise
Demonstrate&AnalyzetheimpactsofElectronicthreatsonSmallUnmannedAircraftSystems(sUAS)technologyanditseffectivenessinsupportingpublicsafetyincludingborderandlawenforcementactivities.Also,providetrainingopportunitiesforbordersecurityoperatorstoassesssUASsuppliersystemsundertypicalbordermissionscenarios
• ProvideancontrolledenvironmenttoevaluateFirstResponderandUASequipmentagainstanumberofcommerciallyavailablejammers
• Assessthetraining,techniquesandproceduresusedbytheFirstResponderwhenencounteringelectronicthreats
• AssesstheeffectivenessofUASsinexecutingFirstResponderScenariosinathreatrichenvironment
• Expectedincreaseinincidentsofjammingduetotheavailabilityoflowcostjammers
• Firstresponderssystemsmaybeeffectedbythesejammers
DHSFirstResponderExerciseatWhiteSandsMissileRangewill:
Approach:• LeverageS&T’sInvestmentsinsUASevaluationsthroughRAPSI/RAPSII
• LeverageS&T’sInvestmentsintheWhiteSandsMissileRangetesting
• ProvideSupplierswithauniqueenvironmenttounderstandandevaluateemergingthreatsfromCommercialOfftheShelfJammingsystems
• AssessSuppliers’PlatformsusingS&T’srobuststandardizedassessmentmethodologyforUASinaJammingenvironment
DesiredOutcomes:• UnderstandingofvulnerabilitiesofUASinajammingenvironment
• Creationofaknowledgeresourcedatabase;developandunderstandingofanygapsintechnologiesortrainingtoovercomejammingandinterference
• EvaluateeffectivenessofUASsystemsinaRFstressedenvironmentinrealisticoperationaltestscenariosandenvironments;emergencyresponse,beaconresponse,injuredoperator/search&rescue,bordersurveillance
• Identifylessonslearnedandanalysisthatwouldleadtoimprovedtechnologiesthatwouldberesilienttoelectronicthreatsorjamming
NeedStatement
ProjectObjective
LeadingToLeadingTo
DRONES, SECURITY, PRIVACY AND RIGHTSSECURITY CONCERNS v. LAW
Section Chief Erin JoeCyber Division
UNCLASSIFIED
FBI Cyber Strategy
• Constant development of FBI technical expertise
• “Shrinking the world” through global partnerships
• Imposing costs on malicious actors• Helping state and local partners to
develop cyber capabilities• Striving to work more effectively
with the private sector
27UNCLASSIFIED
Social Media Romance/Confidence
Cyber Attacks and Trends
DDoS
Theft of IP
Theft of PII, PHI
Point of SaleBreaches
Doxing
False Tax Return Filings
Network Destruction Attacks
Ransomware and Extortion
Business E-mail Compromise
Website Defacements
28UNCLASSIFIED
FBI Liaison Alert System Messages, or FLASHs, provide indicators of compromise to private industry and law enforcement partners.
FLASH Messages
PINs provide background information on trending cyber threats that inform private industry and law enforcement partners’ strategic decision making in the cyber threatscape.
Private Industry Notifications
PSAs provide general information on cyber threats to the public and recommendations for prevention and mitigation of these threats.
Public Service Announcements
Private-Sector Information Sharing Products
UNCLASSIFIED 29
Other Considerations
• Contacting Law Enforcement• Legal Issues and Media• Disruption; Interference with an Aircraft• Balance; Drone Threat v. Response Danger• Information Sharing
30UNCLASSIFIED
Bandwidth Hotspots
31UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED
Unclassified
UNCLASSIFIED
Questions?
32
Section Chief Erin M. Joeerin.joe@ic.fbi.gov703-633-4356 (desk)
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
Headquarters U.S. Air Force
sUAS and Aviation Cyber Security
Lt Col John Ladino, CISSPMilitary-Civil Aviation Integration/Cyber
HQ USAF/A3OJ
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
Office of the Secretary of Defense - Joint Chiefs of Staff – Army – Navy – Marine Corps – Air Force – NORTHCOM
DoD Equities as Air Navigation System User
n 9,808 Fixed Wing Aircraftn 1,498 Transport/Tanker Aircraft
n 5,268 Rotary Wing Aircraft
n 776 Full Sized UAS/RPAn Additional 7,244 Small UAS
34
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
B r e a k i n g B a r r i e r s … S i n c e 1 9 4 7
Aviation Cyber Security
n UAS are part of larger aviation ecosystem
n Need to assess threats from UAS as well as threats to UASn Threats common to air platformsn UAS-specific cyber concerns
35
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
Threat includes broad spectrum of vectors – impacts DoD/USG/Industry
n Expanding UAS/sUAS platform capabilities
n Undefined or poorly defined policy, especially for sUAS
B r e a k i n g B a r r i e r s … S i n c e 1 9 4 7
sUAS Challenges
n Surveillancen Key to ensuring safety of aircraft operationsn Facilitate sUAS flights without impact military ops
n Airspace impacts – Increased potential disruptions by sUAS ops
n Counter UASn Technology to protect critical infrastructure, special eventsn Enable allowable operations and protect against bad actors
36
Drives need for a “UTM” system – ExCom partnership to develop and implement
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
B r e a k i n g B a r r i e r s … S i n c e 1 9 4 7
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
Recognized “Holistic Approach”to Interagency Aviation Cybersecurity
B r e a k i n g B a r r i e r s … S i n c e 1 9 4 7
Interagency Engagement for Aviation Ecosystem Cybersecurity
n DoD Policy Board for Federal Aviationn UAS subgroup and proposed Aviation Security subgroup
n Aviation Governance Coordinating Council (AGCC)n Cybersecurity Working Group
n DoD NextGen Lead Service Officen FAA Interagency Planning Office (ANG-I)
n Aviation Cybersecurity Initiative (ACI)n DHS-led Task Force (DoD, FAA, FBI, DNI) – updates to NSC
38
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
Questions?
Jennifer RichterAkin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP(202) 887-4524jrichter@akingump.com
Lt Col John Ladino, CISSPUSAF Military-Civil Aviation Integration/Cyber(703) 614-1177john.r.ladino.mil@mail.mil
Stephen Van Trees, FAAFAA Aircraft Certification Service(202) 267-8546Stephen.vantrees@faa.gov
Tim Bennett, PMPDHS Science and Technology Directorate(202) 254-8230timothy.bennett@hq.dhs.gov
Erin M. JoeFBI CyberDivision Section Chief (703) 633-4356erin.joe@ic.fbi.gov
NETWORKING BREAK10:45 – 11:15 a.m.
#ATCACyber
FREE WIFINetwork: PSAV-DTCC
Passcode: atca17
#ATCACyber
Larry GrossmanDeputy Director, Information Security & Privacy
FAA
Keynote
#ATCACyber
Presented to:
By:
Date:
Federal AviationAdministration
Federal AviationAdministration
Cybersecurity Update
ATCA Cybersecurity Day
Larry Grossman, FAA Deputy CISO
June 23, 2017
44Federal AviationAdministrationJune 2017
AIS Organizational Structure
45Federal AviationAdministrationJune 2017
FAA Cyber Initiatives
Protect
Detect
Governance• Cybersecurity Steering Committee
• CSC Working Group
• Aviation Systems Cyber Vulnerability Working Group
• Updated Information Security & Privacy Policy (Order 1370.121)
• FAA Cybersecurity Strategy 2017-2022
• NAS Cybersecurity Framework
• CyTF
• Enterprise Security Architecture
• Simulated Phishing Attacks
• Security and Privacy Awareness training
• FAA SOC Transformation
• Vulnerability Scanning
• Continuous Diagnostics & Mitigation (CDM)
• Data Loss Prevention (DLP)
• IR Plan
• IR Exercises
• Multi-Agency Cyber Exercises
• COOP
• Annual ISCP Testing
• Resiliency
Identify
• Enterprise Cyber Threat Model
• Cybersecurity R&D Plan
• High Value Risk process
• ASISP ARAC
• Cyber threat, vulnerability, incident sharing
Recover
Respond
46Federal AviationAdministrationJune 2017
FAA Cyber Initiatives – CSF Aligned
Larry GrossmanDeputy Director, Information Security & Privacy
FAA
Keynote
#ATCACyber
Industry Initiatives in the Ever-Changing Cyber World
#ATCACyber
Panelists: Jonathan Couch, ThreatQuotient
Mark Heck, RaytheonNeil Hyland, ICAO
James Menendez, CGI Federal, Inc.
Moderator: David Almeida, LS Technologies
FlightPrep&Departure En-route/Oceanic Approach&GroundOps
GroundComms (private/internet)SWIM,FICE,etc.(Datacom)CloudInfrastructureIPaddressableA/Gradios
Satcom,GPSA/Gcommerciallinks(A/GSWIM)On-boardsystemsSWIMacrossregions
VoiceComms (NVS),datalinksGroundoperations(AOC),A-CDMUAS/UTMonapproachSWIMacrossstakeholders
UTM
UAS
Transition Transition
FlightPrep&Departure En-route/Oceanic Approach&GroundOps
GroundComms (private/internet)SWIM,FICE,etc.(Datacom)CloudInfrastructureIPaddressableA/Gradios
Satcom,GPSA/Gcommerciallinks(A/GSWIM)On-boardsystemsSWIMacrossregions
VoiceComms (NVS),datalinksGroundoperations(AOC),A-CDMUAS/UTMonapproachSWIMacrossstakeholders
UTM
UAS
Transition Transition
Industry Initiatives in the Ever-Changing Cyber World
#ATCACyber
Panelists: Jonathan Couch, ThreatQuotient
Mark Heck, RaytheonNeil Hyland, ICAO
James Menendez, CGI Federal, Inc.
Moderator: David Almeida, LS Technologies
FREE WIFINetwork: PSAV-DTCC
Passcode: atca17
#ATCACyber
Interactive Tabletop Exercise
#ATCACyber
Peter F. Dumont President and CEO
Air Traffic Control Association
Closing Remarks
#ATCACyber
Steve CarverCyber Committee Chair
Air Traffic Control Association
Closing Remarks
#ATCACyber
Aviation CybersecurityATCA presents
#ATCACyber
Registration
Aviation CybersecurityATCA presents
#ATCACyber
RegistrationTHANK YOU TO OUR TITLE
SPONSOR:
Aviation CybersecurityATCA presents
#ATCACyber
Registration
Aviation CybersecurityATCA presents
#ATCACyber
RegistrationTHANK YOU TO OUR EVENT SUPPORTERS:
www.atca.org/cyber
Engage with ATCA
#ATCACyber
www.facebook.com/AirTrafficControlAssociation
www.facebook.com/AirTrafficControlAssociation
www.twitter.com/ATCA_Now
www.youtube.com/ATCANow
YAPPY HOURDoubletree Lobby Bar
#ATCACyber
Sponsored by:
Join ATCA’s Young Aviation Professionals (YAPs) for
Aviation CybersecurityATCA presents
#ATCACyber
Registration#ATCACyber
Thank you for joining us!
top related