can the state system and separatism co-exist?€¦ · shows that the issues of separatism and...

Can the State System

and Separatism

Co-Exist?

October 31, 2017

THE INTER-UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR TERRORISM STUDIES

“Can the State System and

Separatism Co-Exist?”

Table of Contents Dr. David Kanin ................................................................................................................... 1

Dr. Fernando Jimenez ...................................................................................................... 3

Professor Marvin G. Weinbaum ..................................................................................... 7

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Can the State System and Separatism Co-Exist? 1

Dr. David Kanin Adjunct Professor of European Studies, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns

Hopkins University; former senior analyst, Central Intelligence Agency The question “Can the State System and Separatism Co-Exist?” can be answered

easily. Can they coexist? Of course, they always have. When has there been a time when somebody has not been trying to separate from something politically? There has not been a time no one is trying to separate from some political unit. There will always be movements where people living inside a state contest its sovereignty or people want to form a different state.

In this context, all the disputes in Europe right now – Catalonia, Brexit, whatever is

going on in northern Italy – are not threats to the prevailing regional political system. The Catalans want their own state, but of course they also want to be in the European Union.

Nevertheless, together these disputes do present a threat to the creation myths that

have been built up regarding “Europe” since European states Europe destroyed European power in the 20th century. Europeans used to tell the world they were great and powerful and created the state system, and its laws. Those Europeans colonized and otherwise dominated were expected to do as they were told. “Powerhouse of the planet” was a term the Europeans used about themselves and about the little pimple off the nose of Asia they lived in.

They lost that status in the World Wars. Suddenly Europe simply became a theater

with giants on its flanks much more powerful than the Europeans. No one cared any more about, say, the Åland Islands, Alsace-Lorraine, or the Duchy of Teschen.

This was an irrevocable change. The Europeans reacted as individuals do to a

trauma and constructed a new reason to rationalize their importance: Once we were great and powerful, now we are wise, humane, and just. We have lots of courts, we have chosen not to go to war anymore, we have learned our lesson, we have a means of helping everybody else in the world. Learn from our mistakes…but just like before, you have to listen to us. The Catalan issue, Brexit, and other separatist threats are threatening this teleology.

The problem regarding Catalonia, as with issues that destroyed the former

Yugoslavia, is that these conflicts bring up the rhetorical mythology and rub it bare. It shows that the issues of separatism and inter-communal hostility that used to exist still do. Even in the “evolved” Europe, people still do not like other people for racial or ethnic or other reasons.

This undermines the European self-image and the image Europeans want to project.

The state system itself, having been created by Europeans and imposed by them on the rest of the world as an organizing principle is coming under threat. As the West declines – and in my view we are in structural decline – current separatist and autonomist problems bear on these larger questions.

When we shift our attention outside of Europe we turn to separatist problems

different from European issues in kind, not degree. In societies where traditional notions

2 Can the State System and Separatism Co-Exist?

of honor, family, and other things not centrally associated with Weberian state structure or various notions of rule of law, democracy, transparency – the words we use to describe the things that we have invented to describe a supposedly universal international order – barely apply we confront more direct challenges to a world in which we want to believe we remain dominant.

Kurdistan, for example, is not so much about a new state than about Masoud

Barzani’s miscalculation of American support and of his attempt to get away with building on a series of successes he had enjoyed until recently in what used to be called Iraq vis-à-vis the Talibanis and others. In this case, a “state” faces very traditional challenges from families and associated patronage networks. Globally, we see more of these examples than of the European sort of state teleology related to constitutions and rule of law. Locals use Western-style rhetoric in discussions with Westerners, and these words matter to an extent, but outside of the core area of the state system, they do not matter very much.

Those in the U.S. and Europe who are tempting to manage the state system will find

ways of explaining why it still exists in the realist mode, but I suggest to you that it does not. We are seeing basic systemic change. Going forward, the state itself should not be thought of as the center of the discussion; this subject is becoming an object as challengers attempt to change it or bring it down.

States will continue to weaken, but they are not going away. We are going to see

more politics, security, strategy, and economy, decided by, more traditional, less “modern” means than we believed would be the case. Honor and patronage – what we dismiss as informality – remain central to decisions about political structure, decision-making, resource production and distribution.


Dr. Fernando Jimenez Former legal advisor to the Inter-American Development Bank and Governor of the

Basque Country in Spain; President of the Centro Español de Washington DC

If we were to apply the right of self-determination to every people with some differentiated language, the world would have nine thousand more countries -- enough to make it impossible to maintain an appropriate international political order and stability. The general security of the Western Hemisphere undoubtedly would be affected.

Secession is not admitted in most countries. The German Constitutional Court ruled

against an independence referendum in Bavaria in December 2016. The Italian Constitutional Court adopted a similar decision in 2015 on an independence referendum in the Veneto region. Again, on the same grounds, the Supreme Court of Alaska stated that secession is clearly unconstitutional and cannot be put to a state-wide vote. The UK and Canada are the exception since their laws foresee the possibility of a referendum. Not so in Spain, where the Constitution states that Spain is indivisible, and where the constitution that was approved by ninety three percent of the Catalan voters in a nationwide referendum of 1978.

Like in Germany, Italy, and Alaska, the Spanish constitutional court has

unanimously and repeatedly declared that the regional government cannot start a procedure for a declaration of independence of Catalonia.

According to the United Nations doctrine and to international jurisprudence, the

international law related to the self-determination of peoples only allows the right to independence to those peoples under colonial rule or subject to foreign subjugation, domination, exploitation, or communities whose ethnic, religious, linguistic, or cultural identity are repeatedly persecuted by national institutions and their peripheral agents or whose members are subject to systematic and severe discrimination in the exercise of their civil and political rights.

Nothing in the 1966 International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights or in any

other treaty on human rights, nor in international jurisprudence, points to the recognition of a right of subnational territorial communities to pronounce themselves on its independence and separation from the State.

The general norms of international law do not prohibit sovereign states, in

accordance with the principles of self-organization, from having their own legal framework principles and procedures for the separation of their territorial communities. Far from doing so, the clear majority of the states proclaim their unity and territorial integrity as the basic principles of their constitutional order.

The European Union respects and protects the national identity and constitutional

and self-ruling structures of its member states. In addition, European Union law demands for them to respect and enforce the rule of law so that all public authorities are subject to the Constitution, the Law, and its implementation by the courts.

Consequently, since Catalonia is not an entity entitled to the right of separation from

the State, the right to self-determination cannot constitute the legal basis to declare


unilaterally an independent state breaking the peaceful coexistence in which Spain has thrived for the past 40 years. Secession runs contrary to the wishes of most Spaniards to live in a united country.

As you know, the fall of dictatorship culminated with the Constitution of 1978 and

the establishment of a democratic regime. Catalonia was recognized as a nationality and the Catalan language became co-official with Spanish. Catalonia and its culture have become more accepted and included into Spain as a whole. Territorial diversity is essential to Spain and a source of pride and richness. The Constitution recognizes that Spain is made up of different nationalities and it gives our seventeen autonomous communities more self-governance and power than ever before, similar to federal states in the U.S.

Defending the Constitution is not an option; it is a commitment to Democracy. Why has Catalonia, who came together to form Spain in 1492, been suffering the

political behavior of some secessionists plans carrying out an extremely disloyal and relentless campaign to discredit the Nation before the international community, attempting to portray Spain as a despotic state that suppresses the national sentiment, refuses to negotiate with a “peaceful movement” and exploits Catalonia economically?

Allow me to share some pragmatic comments with you: 1. CORRUPTION: Catalonian political elite has been soil from the past three years

by a succession of corruption and conflict of interest scandals. One of the biggest is the money laundering in Andorra and other tax heavens involving the Pujol family. Jordi Pujol, President of Catalonia for more than 30 years, is subject now to criminal responsibilities, and some close members of his family are in jail. Also, there is enough evidence that high authorities of Catalonia have collaborated on a bribery in which three percent of the value of public contracts and awards were paid outside public channels. Prosecution and charges detail this criminal actions.

It is obvious that all the people prosecuted or investigated were looking anxiously for an independent state to get an umbrella of immunity through a new judiciary body arising from an “independent state.”

2. RADICAL parties for the left with connections to Venezuela and other rogue states

are backing the independent objectives. Also, there is evidence that some Islamists are in favor of the separatist cause

through organizations controlled by the secessionists like “New Catalans” that are integrated by people from the Maghreb. In 2012, the Spanish Ministry of Interior had already alerted officials in the government of Catalonia of the presence of some dangerous Salafists in the territory. Out of 98 Salafist mosques in Spain, 50 are in Catalonia.

I am sure you would like to know the current political climate in Catalonia.


Maybe you know that no authority of the Catalan government, not even its President has declared the INDEPENDENCE OF CATALONIA. Moreover, in a twisted turn of events, they found a roundabout way to allow a secret voting process, achieving a decision which could possibly end with criminal responsibilities including rebellion and sedition due to a clear violation of the Constitution and the Jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court.

Within one hour of the illegal voting by the Catalan parliament, Spain’s Prime

Minister announced that he would dismantle Catalonia’s government, suspend its ministers, dissolve its upstart legislature, take over the regional police, close any Catalan so called “embassies” abroad (with a fifty million dollar budget), and announced that there will be regional elections on December 21st.

The Central Government easily won permission for the Senate to take control of

Catalonia invoking Article 155 of the Constitution. Soraya Saenz De Santamaría, Vice President of the Central Government, has been appointed President of the Catalonia Government.

Immediately after these events, European Council President, Donald Tusk tweeted:

“for EU nothing changes. Spain remains our only interlocutors.” The State Department of the USA also came down on the side of Spain (“Catalonia is an integral part of Spain, and the United States supports the Spanish Government’s constitutional measures to keep Spain strong and united”). Germany, Belgium, Italy, UK, France, Portugal, Finland, Argentina, Mexico and most of the Hispanic community countries, and the Vatican supported the constitutional order of Spain, rejecting the illegal Declaration of Independence. The United Nations through its General Secretary declared that any solution must be adopted inside the Constitutional order of Spain. NATO said that the Constitution must be respected. There are only a few exceptions. Of course, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia -- following Bolivarian attitudes -- remain silent.

Main opposition political parties also spoke out against the secessionists and

supported the government. As I explained before, Prime Minister Rajoy urged the Senate to approve Article 155

to prevent Catalonia from being abused. Catalans must be protected from an intolerant minority that is awarding itself ownership of Catalonia and is trying to subject all Catalans to the yoke of its own doctrine.

There has been a corporate exodus as more and more Catalan business leave

Catalonia in the face of poor legal security offered by the secessionists. As of today, close to two thousand companies have left.

Prosecutors are presenting legal actions against the former president, his

counselors, and the president of the Parliament of Catalonia. The prosecutor is asking for a seven million and three hundred thousand dollars bail. The former president is now in Belgium and has retained the same legal office that defended years ago members of ETA terrorist group.


This situation cannot continue. We will adopt all and any necessary measures to ensure that this turmoil ceased. Although the damage is huge, I am still confident on the future.

We have overcome many adversities, and we will surpass this one with the backing

of the Law and the people.


Professor Marvin G. Weinbaum Director for Afghanistan and Pakistan Studies, Middle East Institute

I want to focus on two countries, Afghanistan and Pakistan, because they are

excellent for analytical purposes in undertaking an examination of the topic. They represent two particularly interesting and in some ways contrasting cases of the coexistence of the state and separatist movements. They well demonstrate the centripetal forces of modern state institutions and the centrifugal forces of separatist identity politics, especially ethnic identity.

Pakistan is a classic example of this tension. It is a relatively strong state but a weak

nation. Afghanistan is a weak state and, yes, actually a strong nation. And in its way the country may be anomalous in the state system.

I am always taken aback when not only our president but also previous presidents

have used the term “nation building.” Actually, what they are talking about is “state building.” You cannot do much about creating or strengthening a national identity. This can only develop over time. It is an evolutionary process. We are better, however, at the business of institution building. The international community has had some successes here, but it is a difficult challenge, particularly when you are talking about states like Afghanistan starting from a point where there are few effective institutions.

As many of you know, Pakistan is a fusion of a great many ethnicities, having only

in common a common Islamic identity. Things were further complicated by a founding father who himself was not sure what kind of country he expected to have or even wanted to have – as between secular and religious. And Pakistan continues to suffer from the trauma of the loss of the eastern part of the country, which became Bangladesh. This was an indeed a bloody separation. Bangladesh is interesting because between 1945 and 1971, there is no other example of a sovereign state that was divided because of the success of a secessionist movement. Of course, that speaks to the fact that the state system rests on the notion of inviolable state sovereignty. This stacks the cards internationally against attempts at separatism that might set precedents elsewhere. I might mention here that the aversion toward separatism is strengthened with the example of the creation of South Sudan and the dire consequences of that development.

Although separation is typically depicted as driven by ethnicity and cultural

differences, the underlying basis of it is frequently political. In the case of Bangladesh, Pakistan broke as a result of a power play by the western part of the country to prevent the east, which was at that time more populous, from gaining political control over the country. It was a jerry built system to begin with, a country with two wings separated by India and 1,500 miles apart.

Pakistan today is made up of a population that is about 65 percent ethnic Punjabis

and the rest composed of provinces identified with other ethnic groups: the Sindhis, the Baloch, and the Pashtuns. They have since coexisted with the state. They have successfully held together, in no small part because of the trauma suffered with the loss of Bangladesh. That said, there has been a rebellion going off and on in Balochistan since the mid-1970s. The Sindhis and the Pashtuns have also asserted their identity. It is not so much about separatism but about getting a better deal. Ethnic nationalism


serves as an instrument for getting a fair share of the pie. And the Baloch case is very interesting because it is a separatist movement; the ethnic Baloch actually today make up a minority of Balochistan – the smallest of the provinces in terms of population but the largest in terms of area holding the country’s natural resources In general there is a deep resentment against the Punjabi portion of the population, which is not only the largest but is also the wealthiest province. Not unimportantly this is the part of the country that provides for roughly 80 percent of the personnel of the military. That, of course, figures importantly in terms of the capture of the state’s resources.

Despite these centrifugal forces, the country has kept intact since Bangladesh. Yet

you frequently hear Pakistan labeled a failed state, about to break up. Actually, there is no country that would welcome Pakistan breaking up. The principle reason is that Pakistan’s militant extremist groups would be the major beneficiaries. Pakistanis and others often assert that India wants to see Pakistan’s breakup as a country and pursues polities toward that end. India certainly wants to reduce the threat that it feels Pakistan poses, especially as a nuclear power, but if you worry about conflict, the dangers of conflict rise exponentially with a serious breakup of the state. The military, however, which controls foreign policy and security policy, including the nuclear weapons, has every incentive to keep this country intact. Pakistan is thus guaranteed to remain whole as long as the highly professional military remains strong and cohesive. The military fought desperately against Bangladesh’s succession and would have succeeded in keeping the country together through use of overwhelming force except for India’s military intervention. In trying to hold on to Pakistan east wing, the army did manage to kill off most of the country’s intellectual elite. In all, Pakistan’s army was responsible for killing perhaps as many as 3 million Bengalis.

Now what about Afghanistan? It is really interesting because Afghanistan has all the

ingredients of a country that should be fertile ground for separatism. Many people who do not follow Afghanistan closely, think of the country in terms of it many tribes and ethnic groups and conclude that it cannot exist as a national state and perhaps should be broken up. But as I said early, it is actually a nation, one in which its citizens overwhelmingly think of themselves as Afghans, despite allegiances to other identities. There has never been a separatist movement in the country’s modern history.

Now how do we explain this? It may very well be that it has to do with being a

landlocked country. There is a Tajikistan, there is an Uzbekistan, and there is a Turkmenistan that all border on Afghanistan, so why not think in terms of amalgamation with these countries? But it was never an attractive proposition partly because those three countries, although referring to themselves in those three ethnic categories, had changed so much culturally during the period of Soviet Union rule that they no longer resembled very much those same ethnic groups inside Afghanistan. There

is competition among these ethnic communities; I do not want to suggest that there has not been. But it is over power, particularly power directly related to the capture of resources.

The one seeming exception here is Pashtunistan. That is the idea that emerged in

the 1960s that there should be a separate Pashtun state. The Afghan demand continues to be what many people think is the underline conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan. What happened was that in 1893, the British, using the strategy of divide and rule, decided to split the Pashtun population in half. Half of it would be on the


Afghan side, and half on what was then the British Indian side. (Afghanistan had just at that point consolidated as a modern state, before that, it really was not.) Why divide the Pashtuns? Because tribal Pashtuns were difficult to govern then much as they are now

So what happened was that the Afghan state revived this concept of Pashtunistan

as a separate state. But interestingly, it never contained the idea that if there were a separate Pashtun state, Afghanistan would cede its own Pashtun population to that state. It was always about and continues to be about carving a Pashtun state out of northwest Pakistan. Not surprisingly, the Afghan demand has been deeply resented by the Pakistanis and has been the major irritant historically between them. No Afghan government has ever been prepared to give up on playing this card. Even the Taliban, who are largely Pashtun, showed no inclination to drop the idea of a Pashtunistan when they took over in the 1990s.

So here is a separatist idea that will never come into being but one which continues

to figure very strongly here in the relationship between the two countries. Pakistan is very much insistent the border is settled, and the Afghans seeing this as a border which was colonially imposed and therefore today unjustifiable and illegitimate.

Let me conclude here by saying again that with regard to Afghanistan there is a

danger that despite what I have said here, Afghanistan could in fact split up. It is not that it would break up if it divided up along the normally anticipated ethnic identity lines. It would break up in the course of a chaotic civil war. Because –what so many people fail to recognize and this includes our own policy makers – is that if the Kabul government falls, it is not going to be replaced by a Taliban regime like that when the Taliban had virtually consolidated control of the entire country on the eve of 9/11. The regime would still likely be there today if there had never been a 9/11. By the way, we had no interest--when we did go in there militarily in 2001 – in regime change. It was about getting our hands on bin Laden.

What we are looking at today is that if the Kabul government fails, it is not that the

Taliban will succeed it. The situation is very different than what it was in the 1990s, including the fact that there is now a Pakistani Taliban. As a result, Pakistanis do not want to see, as they did in the 1990s, a victory on the part of the Taliban, certainly not that it monopolize power. What will occur if we see state failure now in Afghanistan is a chaotic civil war where there will be proxy capture. Different elements in the conflict here will gravitate toward Iran, Pakistan, and Russia. India will also be deeply involved. This is the kind of picture that I think we should keep in mind when we hear it said that there be a power sharing arrangement. First of all, unlike the 1990s, there is no single interlocutor such as there once was when Mullah Omar was the unchallenged leaders

of the Taliban. That Taliban does not exist anymore. If there is a civil war, it will pit insurgents against insurgents. It will be in all probability see elements around various warlords, commanders, fighting one another for turf, all very much dependent upon the support of outside powers. So we ought to keep this in mind as the likely outcome of a failed Afghanistan, not a neat breakup.

Let me just conclude with this. Years ago, I was then working in the State

Department and I was sent to talk to the mujahideen – no, actually I was not yet in the department, this came a little earlier, before 1999 – I was sent by USIS to talk to the


various mujahideen parties about the idea of federalism for Afghanistan. But when I suggested that on coming to power in Afghanistan they should consider a federal system, the mujahideen shouted me down. These Afghans said to me “What are you trying to do? Are you trying to divide us? Are you trying to pit us against one another?” The concept of federalism remains literally a dirty word in Afghanistan. It fits our way of thinking so logically only because we tend to think in terms of these larger ethnic or identity blocks.

Academic Centers

Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies (IUCTS)

Established in 1994, the activities of IUCTS are guided by an International Research Council that offers recommendations for

study on different aspects of terrorism, both conventional and unconventional. IUCTS is cooperating academically with

universities and think tanks in over 40 countries, as well as with governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental bodies.

International Center for Terrorism Studies (ICTS)

Established in 1998 by the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, in Arlington, VA, ICTS administers IUCTS activities and

sponsors an internship program in terrorism studies.

Inter-University Center for Legal Studies (IUCLS)

Established in 1999 and located at the International Law Institute in Washington, D.C., IUCLS conducts seminars and research

on legal aspects of terrorism and administers training for law students.

International Advisory and Research Council Honorary Chairman

Prof. Edward Teller * Hoover Institution

Prof. A. Abou-el Wafa Cairo University Prof. Asher Maoz Tel Aviv University

Prof. Jayantha W. Atukorala Sri Lanka Prof. Serio Marchisio Instituto di Studi Giuridcic sulla

Prof. Paolo Benvenuti Universita Di Firenze Communita Inernazionale

Prof. Edgar Brenner * Inter-University Center for Legal Studies Prof. Dr. Herman Matthijis Free University Brussels

Prof. Ian Brownlie Oxford University Prof. Jerzy Menkes Poland

Prof. Abdelkader Larbi Chaht Universite D-Oran-Es-Senia Prof. Eric Moonman City University of London

Prof. Mario Chiavario Universita Degli Studie Di Torino Prof. Yuval Ne’eman * Tel Aviv University

Prof. Irwin Cotler McGill University Prof. Michael Noone The Catholic University of America

Prof. Horst Fischer Ruhr University Prof. William Olson National Defense University

Prof. Andreas Follesdal University of Oslo Prof. V.A. Parandiker Centre for Policy Research

Prof. Gideon Frieder The George Washington University Prof. Paul Rogers University of Bradford

Prof. Lauri Hannikaninen University of Turku, Finland Prof. Beate Rudolf Heinrich Heine University

Prof. Hanspeter Heuhold Austrian Institute of International Affairs Prof. Kingsley De Silva International Center for Ethnic Studies

Prof. Ivo Josipovic University of Zagreb Prof. Paul Tavernier Paris-Sud University

Prof. Christopher C. Joyner * Georgetown University Prof. B. Tusruki University of Tokyo

Prof. Tanel Kerkmae Tartu University, Estonia Prof. Amechi Uchegbu University of Lagos

Prof. Borhan Uddin Khan University of Dhaka Prof. Richard Ward The University of Illinois at Chicago

Prof. Walter Laqueur CSIS Prof. Yong Zhang Nankai University, China

Francisco Jose Paco Llera Universidad del Pais Vasco *Deceased

Director Professor Yonah Alexander

Senior Staff Sharon Layani Lisa Winton

Senior Advisors Michael S. Swetnam

CEO and Chairman, Potomac Institute for

Policy Studies

Professor Don Wallace, Jr. Chairman, International Law Institute

Technical Advisors Mary Ann Culver

Alex Taliesen

Fall 2017 Internship Program Angel Chaverri University of California Santa Barbara Renae Lee University of Maryland

Trev Hadachek American University Charles Murphy American University

Emily Kennedy University of Maryland Isaac Shorser American University

Please contact the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 901 North Stuart Street, Suite 200,

Arlington, VA 22203. Tel.: 703-525-0770 Email: [email protected], [email protected]

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