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HIS EMINENCE: CARDINAL RICHELIEU & RELIGIOUS STRUGGLE IN FRANCE

LYDIA K. ETHRIDGE

ADVISOR: DR. LYNN M. LAUFENBERG

“Historians are just as likely to seek new ways of seeing familiar

objects as to go in search of unfamiliar ones to study.”

— Joseph Bergin, “Three Faces of Richelieu: A Historiographical

Essay”1

Perhaps no truer words were ever spoken about the study of the man who guided France

through some of the most tumultuous years of the seventeenth century. Armand-Jean du Plessis,

Cardinal-Duc de Richelieu et de Fronsac (1585-1642), commonly referred to as Richelieu, is

among the many figures of early modern history who, despite having received ample scholarship,

have also been the subject of a great deal of sensationalism. Known to the general public as the

villain from Alexandre Dumas’s The Three Musketeers, Richelieu has come to be seen as a

notoriously malevolent character, not only in the view of the general public, but also in the view

of many scholars. Though English biographies of Richelieu remain few,2 a perusal of some of

the most recent works on Richelieu provides an interesting variety of adjectives describing his

character: “vindictive,” “authoritarian,” “devious,” “calculating and sickeningly obsequious.”3

                                                                                                               1 French History 23.4 (2009): 517-36. French History. Oxford University Press, 2 Nov. 2009. Web. 9 July 2012, 517. 2 Bergin, “Three Faces,” 533. 3 Respectively: Blanchard, Jean-Vincent. Éminence: Cardinal Richelieu and the Rise of France. New York: Walker &, 2011. Print, 3. Stankiewicz, W. J. Politics & Religion in Seventeenth-Century France: A Study of Political Ideas from the Monarchomachs to Bayle, as Reflected in the Toleration Controversy. Berkeley: University of California, 1960. Print, 121. Levi, Anthony. Cardinal Richelieu and the Making of France. New York: Carroll & Graf, 2000. Print, ix. Knecht, R. J. Richelieu. London: Longman, 1991. Print. Profiles in Power, 47.

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This selection of words demonstrates well the general orientation of Anglophone scholarship on

Richelieu.

Modern scholars, in their eagerness to revise interpretations of the Cardinal, have

stripped him of his historical context. An examination of Richelieu, as a high-ranking member of

the Roman Catholic Church, requires greater care than a similar analysis of a purely secular

leader. Richelieu was, at his core, a religious man who lived in a world saturated by religion and

this fact has for too long often been overlooked, especially among Anglo-American historians.4

He is curious in that he thought and believed as a man of the Church with personal religious

feelings, yet endeavored to act as a minister of the State with pressing secular concerns. One

cannot emphasize this perilous (and perhaps paradoxical) balance enough. Richelieu was neither

wholly religious zealot nor secular statesman, but somewhere in-between. Nowhere is this aspect

more clearly illustrated than in his dealings with the Huguenots, the Protestant minority that

emerged in France in the sixteenth century. The conflict which best epitomizes the religious

conflict that raged during the earliest part of his ministry, the Siege of La Rochelle (1627-1628),

will serve as the centerpiece of this analysis.

By examining Richelieu’s ministry specifically through the lens of his domestic religious

policy in the earliest part of his political career, from 1616 to 1629,5 this paper endeavors to place

Richelieu back in his proper context by examining the realities of France during his lifetime and

questioning the extent of his power. To further these ideas, this paper will then turn to a more

specific discussion of Richelieu’s relations with the Huguenots and particularly with the city of La

Rochelle. Throughout, this paper will challenge those allegations that seem in direct

                                                                                                               4 Bergin, “Three Faces,” 532. 5 I selected the year 1616 for the beginning of my analysis of Richelieu’s career as it was the year when Richelieu accepted the position of secretary of state for a brief period. The year 1629 marks the date of the Treaty of Alès, when the conflict with the Huguenots was settled.

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contradiction to the documentary evidence6 of his Letters, Papers of State, and Political

Testament, as well as the Articles of Agreement signed at the rendition of La Rochelle.7

I. RICHELIEU’S FRANCE

When Martin Luther (1483-1546) posted his Ninety-Five Theses on the door of Castle

Church in 1517, he likely did not foresee the long-ranging consequences of his action. He

probably gave no thought to the schisms the document would lead to within Christianity, much

less the political conflicts that would emerge as a result. If he had thought about it, though, he

almost certainly would have given no thought to France.

Yet by 1536, a young French law student, Jean Cauvin (1509-1564), most often referred

to in English scholarship as John Calvin, caused another schism in Christianity by publishing his

own work of doctrine, Institutes of the Christian Religion. The result was a new set of beliefs,

characterized primarily by belief in predestination and total depravity, known as Calvinism. The

religion spread throughout Europe with particularly strong followings in Scotland, the

Netherlands, Switzerland, and France.8 In France, these Protestants formed a religious minority

known as the Huguenots. Early in the movement, the Calvinists constituted about ten percent of

                                                                                                               6 Note on Quotations: Quotations in French have been translated into English to allow for easier and more coherent reading. The original language will appear in the footnotes, however, alongside any notes regarding the translation. 7 Specifically, I have read and translated a small quantity of Richelieu’s correspondence, drawing on those documents cataloged in the Lettres, Instructions Diplomatiques et Papiers d'etat du Cardinal de Richelieu. Comp. Georges Avenel. Paris: Imprimerie Imperiale, 1852-1877. Ser. 1. and Les Papiers de Richelieu: Section Politique Interieure Correspondance et Papiers d'Etat. Ed. Pierre Grillon. Paris: Editions A. Pedone, 1975. Print. For a more detailed listing of the specific documents I have read and translated thus far, see the bibliography. I intend to read and translate further as I continue this research. I relied on Henry B. Hill’s translation of selections of the Testament Politique for this analysis: The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu: The Significant Chapters and Supporting Selections. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin, 1968. Print. The digitized manuscript containing the Articles of Agreement consisted of the document in both French and English: France and Sovereign. Foreign and Commonwealth Office Collection. Manchester: University of Manchester, The John Rylands University Library, 1628. JSTOR. Web. 16 July 2012. 8 Map 13.2 in Spielvogel, Jackson J. Western Civilization. 6th ed. Vol. Since 1300. N.p.: Thomson Wadsworth, 2006. Print, 366.

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the population.9 By 1600, when Richelieu was still an adolescent, the Huguenots constituted a

minority of around 1.2 million, or approximately five to six percent of the population.

Geographically, the Huguenots were primarily concentrated in the south and east of France,

with isolated pockets elsewhere. The religion found its primary following in towns, often

embracing entire communities. Among these bastions of Protestantism were the cities of

Montauban, La Rochelle, and Castres.10

Voltaire (1694-1778) once wrote, “If there were just one religion…, despotism would

threaten; if there were two religions, they would cut each other’s throats….”11 Though Voltaire

was not remarking on the state of France in the mid-sixteenth century, his words could not

describe its situation more accurately. The addition of a new religious group in traditionally

Roman Catholic France caused tensions to rise, especially among the nobility. Between forty

and fifty percent of the French nobility became Protestant, including the house of Bourbon,

which figured high in the line of succession to the throne.12 In 1560, a cabal of Huguenot

aristocrats devised a plan to seize power that involved abducting the new teenage monarch, King

François II, and arresting his chief advisors in the Amboise conspiracy. The attempt failed and

the crown killed the conspirators and their followers and put their bodies on display.13

It was not until 1562, though, that the nature of the Protestant movement in France

transformed from a religious phenomenon, to a political and military issue with the Massacre of

Wassy.14 As the ultra-Catholic Duc de Guise, François, who had been among the targets of the

                                                                                                               9 Spielvogel, 369. 10 Knecht, Richelieu, 64. 11 The quote comes from his work Philosophic Letters on the English (1733), but seems appropriate, especially given he wrote the text while in exile. I have omitted only the phrase “...in England….” 12 Spielvogel, 369. 13 Kelley, Donald R. "Martyrs, Myths, and the Massacre: The Background of St. Bartholomew." The American Historical Review 77.5 (1972): 1323-342. JSTOR. Web. 5 Aug. 2012, 1332. 14 Meyer, Judith P. "La Rochelle and the Failure of the French Reformation." The Sixteenth Century Journal 15.2 (1984): 169-83. JSTOR. Web. 16 July 2012, 171.

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Amboise conspiracy, was passing through the town of Wassy, some members of his party

attempted to enter a barn in which the Huguenots were holding a religious service, but were

repulsed. As events escalated, the duke was struck with a stone. A massacre of the Huguenot

congregation took place, likely at his command, prompting the outbreak of civil war in France.

This period of civil war, known as the French Wars of Religion, was a thirty-year-long

period of fighting within France. Richelieu was born in 1585 on the cusp of the eighth and final

war, the so-called “War of the Three Henrys,” which lasted from 1587 to 1589. In this final

conflict, King Henri III of France, the heir-presumptive to the throne of France, King Henri of

Navarre, and Henri I, Duc de Guise warred over the order of succession to the throne of France.

In 1589, the last man alive, Henri of Navarre, succeeded to the throne of France as King Henri

IV.15

The war officially ended in 1598 when Henri IV issued the Edict of Nantes. The Edict

was a revolutionary document that extended secular as well as religious freedom to the

Huguenots. It was not a mere declaration of toleration for it went beyond granting permission of

something forbidden, as per the legal definition of toleration. Rather, the Edict legally destroyed

the religious unity of the kingdom by granting significant rights to the Huguenots.16 Certainly,

the Edict was nothing in comparison to modern notions of religious freedom, as it preserved the

status of the Roman Catholic church as the official religion and geographically limited the places

Protestantism could be practiced, but it was still a groundbreaking piece of legislation that could

well have set France on the path to being the first nation to grant complete freedom of religion.

This was not to be, however. In 1685, Henri IV’s grandson, King Louis XIV (r. 1643-1715),

                                                                                                               15 Though Henri’s reign began in 1589, he was not coronated until 1594, shortly after his conversion to Catholicism. The nature of this conversion seems to have been for political expediency. He reportedly declared at his conversion, “Paris vaut bien une messe,” “Paris is well worth a Mass.” 16 Turchetti, Mario. "Religious Concord and Political Tolerance in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century France." The Sixteenth Century Journal 22.1 (1991): 15-25. JSTOR. Web. 16 July 2012, 17-18.

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revoked the Edict of Nantes. Its revocation, however, was to some extent inevitable.17 In a

conflict as highly polarized as the Wars of Religion, a series of compromises did little to placate

both parties. Twelve years after the promulgation of the Edict of Nantes, the twenty-fourth

attempt on Henri IV’s life succeeded.18 This occurrence, along with the twenty-three attempts

that preceded it, demonstrates best the discontent that continued to simmer after the

promulgation of the Edict of Nantes.

This France of religious turmoil and political uncertainty was the France in which

Richelieu grew up and developed his worldview. He was around thirteen when the war finally

ceased, only to give way to a period of political tension. He was still a young man when a monk,

in opposition to the crown’s religious policies, assassinated the monarch.19 Richelieu had

certainly witnessed the dangerous outcomes when religion and politics combine. One cannot

ignore the profound influence that Richelieu’s early years had on him and his perceptions of

power and politics, though most scholars have.

By the time Richelieu was truly stepping onto the political scene in 1624, when he

became chief minister of the French King, he was nearing forty years of age and had a wealth of

his own life experiences. Born into the lower echelons of the aristocracy as a third son, Richelieu

was destined for a military career and sent to study in Paris around 1594.20 When his older

brother, Alphonse-Louis, refused the position of bishop of Luçon, a position essentially entailed

to the du Plessis family, Richelieu’s fate changed. No longer relegated to a military career,

Richelieu pursued theological studies before travelling to Rome in 1607 to receive the papal

dispensation necessary to allow him to accept the bishopric despite being below canonical age.                                                                                                                17 Turchetti, 24. 18 Henshall, Nicholas. The Myth of Absolutism: Change & Continuity in Early Modern European Monarchy. London: Longman, 1992. Print, 20. 19 Dunn, Richard S. The Age of Religious Wars, 1559-1715. 2nd ed. New York: W. W. Norton and, 1979. Print, 157. 20 At the time, Armand-Jean du Plessis would not have been called Richelieu as he had yet to inherit his family estate as he would in 1619. For the sake of clarity, however, I am referring to him as Richelieu throughout.

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He spent the next few years in Luçon improving his diocese, which contained a large Huguenot

population, and performing his pastoral duties.21

By 1615, however, his focus had turned to Paris. He had begun to infiltrate the highest

circles of politics, delivering a speech in support of toleration of the Huguenots before the Estates-

General in that year.22 In 1616, the queen mother and regent, Marie de Médicis (1575-1642),

selected him to be secretary of state. He did not hold the position long; shortly thereafter, in

1617, Louis XIII began to exercise his majority and exiled his mother and the majority of her

entourage. The then chief minister, Concino Concini (in office 1610-1617), met a less fortunate

fate. He was shot for “resisting arrest” before a Parisian mob dismembered, disemboweled, and

ate parts of his corpse “with mad delight,” a spectacle Richelieu witnessed as he tried to escape

from the mob himself.23 Richelieu certainly could not have been unaware of the dangers of

politics in Paris after that night.

After two years in exile, Richelieu facilitated the reconciliation between Marie de Médicis

and her son, allowing him to return to court where he began to rise in power again. The king

authorized his elevation to Cardinal in 1622 and in 1624, he was asked to join the king’s council.

Around three months later, Richelieu became chief minister of the French King, an office he

would hold for eighteen years, until his death.

For seventeenth-century Frenchmen, politics and the personal were intrinsically linked.24

Richelieu could not have been more acutely aware of the delicacy of the French state, which a

                                                                                                               21 Sturdy, David J. Richelieu and Mazarin: A Study in Statesmanship. Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. Print. European History in Perspective, 14. 22 Stankiewicz, 93. Stankiewicz actually names the date as 1614, but Knecht and Levi give 1615. It seems the 1614 session of the Estates-General did not end until 1615, hence the confusion. 23 Blanchard, 10. 24 Blanchard, 4.

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reading of his papers makes perfectly clear.25 To borrow Jackson Spielvogel’s phrase, “The line

between order and anarchy was often a narrow one” in early sixteenth-century France.26 Within

such a world of religious tumult, where did the chief minister fit in?

II. TYRANNOUS OPPRESSOR OR SAVIOR OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION?

Richelieu has developed a bipolar image in Anglophone scholarship. The first image is of

a tyrant who imposed religious repression by usurping the monarch who brought him into

power. The second is, essentially, that of the savior of western civilization.27 Though Richelieu

has lost something of his godlike status in the past half-century, Francophone scholarship

continues to project a primarily positive view focused on Richelieu’s important place in the early

development of the French state.28

The second portrait is most widely accepted by modernist scholars such as Henry

Kissinger who devoted most of a chapter to Richelieu in his book Diplomacy. Kissinger praised

Richelieu as “the father of the modern state system” and declared, “Few statesmen can claim a

greater impact on history.”29 Daniel Philpot, in his essay “The Religious Roots of Modern

International Relations” praised Richelieu for his “comprehensive design for a community of

sovereign states.”30 This view of Richelieu focuses more on his achievements in international

politics.

                                                                                                               25 Briggs, Robin. “Richelieu and Reform: Rhetoric and Political Reality.” Bergin and Brockliss 71-97, 95. I will discuss the documentary evidence behind this assertion later in this paper. 26 417. 27 Knecht, Richelieu, 41. 28 Bergin, Joseph, and Laurence Brockliss, eds. Richelieu and His Age. Oxford: Clarendon, 1992. Print, 1-4. I hope to explore the breadth of Francophone scholarship on Richelieu myself in future research endeavors. 29 New York: Touchstone/Simon & Schuster, 1995. Print, 58. 30 World Politics 52.2 (2000): 206-45. Project Muse. Web. 16 July 2012, 237.

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Most recent scholarship, however, has embraced the former view.31 The most scathing of

commentaries appears in W. J. Stankiewicz’s book Politics & Religion in Seventeenth-Century France: A

Study of Political Ideas from the Monarchomachs to Bayle, as Reflected in the Toleration Controversy. Perhaps

the most shocking line characterizes Richelieu as little short of maniacal in discussing his dealings

with the Huguenots: “He reveled in their submission and helplessness.”32 Other portrayals have

been somewhat gentler on the Cardinal’s reputation, but, as demonstrated in the introduction to

this paper, even more moderate recent biographies have continued to embrace a predominantly

negative image of Richelieu. These views most likely stem from the work of Hilaire Belloc,

whose 1930 biography of Richelieu dubbed him the precursor to Bismarck, the Prussian

statesman of the late nineteenth century who forged the German state through a series of

provoked wars justified by the idea of realpolitik. The Catholic scholar further asserted that

Richelieu was focused only on increasing the power of the state, at the expense of religious

principles.33

English exceptionalism undoubtedly contributes to this view. An undeniable sort of pride

rests behind the words of these scholars when they discuss the oppressive and absolutist nature of

Richelieu’s ministry. In 1689, the English cast off its “absolutist regime” in the Glorious

Revolution, becoming, in the English conscience, the leading example of liberty. A century later,

in 1789, France would toil through ten years of its own Revolution. Both the English and the

French have since been at odds over the contrast between their histories and the role their

revolutions played in the development of Western civilization.34 Richelieu has rarely been

                                                                                                               31 In this instance, I define recent scholarship broadly to mean within the last century. 32 Berkeley: University of California, 1960. Print, 113. 33 Bergin, “Three Faces,” 529. 34 Henshall, 2.

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omitted from discussions of the emergence of modern France, which have evoked such bipolar

views of his historical significance.35

The reality of Richelieu’s ministry must lie somewhere in the midst of these two polar

representations. To find this reality, one must consider both the importance of his

accomplishments and the level of political authority the Cardinal wielded. This paper will only

examine these aspects within the context of the 1620s to best apply the conclusions drawn in this

section to later discussion of his domestic religious policies.

What were Richelieu’s contributions to French society? He has long been credited with

laying the foundations of the absolute French monarchy by subduing the nobility and the

Huguenots through the military campaigns of the 1620s.36 Nicholas Henshall went so far as to

assert that Richelieu was “undoubtedly a creator of the absolute power of the crown.”37

Henshall perhaps overstated Richelieu’s role in the movement toward absolutism, for the French

crown had begun moving toward consolidation of power long before Richelieu came onto the

political scene. In the political legacy he left behind, however, he was surely a part of the greater

movement toward the absolutism of the later seventeenth century. Certainly, Richelieu seems to

have promoted the continued aggrandizement of the French monarch. In a letter dated 13

January 1629, Richelieu advises the king on the steps he should take “...if [he] wants to answer to

the most powerful monarch in the world and the most respected prince….” Later in the letter,

he also provides advice on how “to ensure that the king is absolutely obeyed by the great and the

small….”38

                                                                                                               35 Bergin, “Three Faces,” 518. 36 Bergin and Brockliss, “His Age,” 1. I will discuss this aspect in better detail later in the paper. 37 23. Robert Knecht makes a similar statement in Richelieu, 147. 38 "Advis." Plessis, Lettres v. 3, 179-213, 179, 181. Original text: “...si le Roy veult se rendre le plus puissant monarque du monde et le prince le plus estimé….” “Se rendre” proved to be a problematic expression due to its many definitions. However, the manner in which I have translated above seems to best capture Richelieu’s intent, given the context. “Faire que le roy soit absolument obéi des grands et des petits…”

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Though Richelieu certainly played a role in the continued consolidation of the crown’s

power, his attempts to aggrandize the monarchy should not be confused with attempts to seize

power for himself. W. J. Stankiewicz confuses these two goals in referring to Richelieu’s

“authoritarian rule.”39 Yet in his Political Testament, a work of advice written by the Cardinal

toward the end of his life for the king, Richelieu reminds the king that “the authority of a

minister… is not great enough to produce the desired results, for which the immediate voice of a

sovereign with absolute power is required.”40 Clearly, Richelieu was well aware that neither he,

nor any minister, could wield any level of authority without the backing of the sovereign.

Yet even the most powerful of rulers possessed limited power outside of court and

government in the early modern period.41 Richelieu, like every other politician of his era, was

the product of a structured court system with the king as head. He was forced to work within

that system to achieve any semblance of power. Richelieu’s position in government was

contingent on the king’s favor, though such favor was certainly not guaranteed.42 In a letter from

early in Richelieu’s tenure as chief minister, Richelieu reflects this reality by writing, “...I do

everything that I can and must for the service and the glory of the King….”43 Anthony Levi’s

statement in Cardinal Richelieu and the Making of France that Louis was “totally dependent” on

Richelieu is erroneous.44 Louis was not afraid of his ministers--he made that perfectly clear in

ordering the arrest, with orders to shoot at the least resistance, of Concini. Thus, those

biographies that ignore the place of the king in political life wrongfully propagate the idea of

                                                                                                               39 121. 40 37. 41 Sturdy, xii. 42 Sturdy, 32; Knecht, Richelieu, 41. 43 "38." Letter to Louis De Marillac. 11 Apr. 1625. Plessis, Papiers v.1, 179-180. Original text: “...je fais tout ce que je puis et dois pr le service et la gloire du Roy….” The use of “pr” was confusing, but I have translated it here as an short form of “pour.” 44 113.

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Richelieu as a minister who wielded unchecked power.45 The reality of this dynamic is evident in

Richelieu’s letters to the king, in which Richelieu explains his prescribed course of action,

carefully interjecting clauses such as “...if you accept this resolution…”46 as a means of allowing

Louis to make the final decision.47

This clumsy world of early seventeenth-century politics nearly tumbled into chaos in the

1620s when the inability of the Edict of Nantes to affect lasting peace became evident. The

conflicts that ensued serve as the perfect environment in which to analyze the interplay between

religion and politics, as it could only exist with a Prince of the Church guiding domestic policy.

III. WHEN RELIGION AND POLITICS COLLIDE

The religious conflicts of the 1620s were different in nature from those of the preceding

century.48 Those of the sixteenth century had been part of a “deepening cycle of religious

hatred,” to borrow Barbara Diefendorf’s phrasing.49 In this postlude to the French Wars of

Religion, which would culminate in the Siege of La Rochelle from 1627 to 1628, the impetus for

war was not so much religion as politics, though a significant religious dimension lay beneath the

surface. Accordingly, this war ended in the elimination of Huguenots political rights, not

religious rights, in the Treaty of Alès (1629). An examination of this crucial period in Richelieu’s

ministry and the motives that drove the decision to revive religious conflict in France will

hopefully lead to better understanding of the intermingling of religious devotion and secular

concern in the Cardinal’s mind.

                                                                                                               45 Bergin, “Three Faces,” 533. 46 "Allocution." Dec. 1628. Plessis, Lettres v.3, 150-152, 151. Original text: “...si vous prenez cette résolution….” 47 Knecht, Richelieu, 33. 48 Rothrock, George A., Jr. "Some Aspects of Early Bourbon Policy toward the Huguenots." Church History 29.1 (1960): 17-24. JSTOR. Web. 16 July 2012, 22. 49 Beneath the Cross: Catholics and Huguenots in Sixteenth-Century Paris. New York: Oxford UP, 1991. Print, 7.

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For Richelieu, religious devotion and political obedience were inseparable. This view

manifests itself in his publication Principaux points de la foy de l’eglise catholique, in which he

emphasizes the importance of Catholic adherence to the doctrine of obeying the king as God’s

anointed ruler.50 This view naturally put him at odds with the Huguenots on a religious as well

as secular level. Although his religious oppositions certainly influenced him, Richelieu refrained

from forced conversions of the Huguenots.51 He used violence against the Huguenots only when

they gave him political reason to do so.52 In a 1616 letter, Richelieu is explicit regarding the

nature of his objection to the Huguenots cause: “...one must make known to them that it isn’t a

question of religion, but of pure rebellion; that the king wants to treat his subjects of any religion

equally….”53

The political threat the Huguenots posed was both ideological and tangible.

Ideologically, the presence of a second religion in France, any religion at all, was an affront to the

king’s sovereignty. The “Most Christian King,” a style bestowed intermittently upon various

French monarchs since Louis IX (St. Louis, r. 1226-1270), vowed at his coronation (sacre in

French) to extirpate heresy.54 The coronation ceremony was not treated as merely symbolic in

the Catholic Church; it was the literal bestowal of divine spiritual authority upon the new

monarch.55 Safeguarding religious and political concord was one of the French king’s most

important duties and the introduction of Protestantism took away his ability to do so.56 The

                                                                                                               50 Levi, 48. 51 Knecht, Richelieu, 69. 52 Knecht, R. J. "The Reputation of Cardinal Richelieu: Classical Hero or Romaitic Villain?" Seventeenth-Century French Studies 15 (1993): 5-24. Print, 12. 53 "Instructions de M. de Schomberg." Letter to M. de Schomberg. 29 Dec. Plessis, Lettres v. 1, 208-235, 226. Emphasis mine. Original text: “...il fauldra leur faire cognoistre qu’il n’est pas question de religion, mais de pure rébellion; que le roy veut traitter ses subjects de quelque religion que ce soit esgalement….” 54 Knecht, Richelieu, 64. 55 Levi, 48. 56 Turchetti, 16.

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addition of a second religion, different from the king’s, was thus the equivalent of questioning the

king’s authority.

By the 1620s, the Huguenots had become more than a mere thorn in the side of the king.

The Huguenots had developed, in Nicholas Henshall’s words, “...a bad habit of calling of foreign

powers or rebel princes to protect them against Bourbon Catholic initiatives.”57 In essence, the

Huguenots had set up their own “state within the State.”58 They held autonomous political

assemblies, fortified their towns, raised private armies, and even levied unauthorized taxes.59

This was not entirely shocking; most of the places where Protestantism had found a strong

following possessed a significant amount of municipal autonomy. Typically, an oligarchy wielded

power over the city.60 When Richelieu began his Political Testament for Louis XIII in the

1630s, the presence of the Huguenot “state” was the first thing he mentioned, making it clear just

how strongly this aspect bothered him, even after its eradication: “...the Huguenots shared the

state with you….”61

The Huguenot party also continued to be closely allied with the nobility, as it had been in

the sixteenth century. Alliances with nobles showed that “the smolder was still dangerously

capable of bursting into flame,” as Anthony Levi poetically described the situation.62 The fear of

Huguenot alliances with the nobles was not unfounded. In 1615, the Prince of Condé, a high-

ranking Protestant noble, signed a formal alliance with the Huguenots and the immensely

wealthy city of La Rochelle, though the alliance was short lived.63 The nobles and the

                                                                                                               57 22. 58 Herman, Arthur L. "Protestant Churches in a Catholic Kingdom: Political Assemblies in the Thought of Philippe Duplessis-Mornay." The Sixteenth Century Journal 21.4 (1990): 543-57. JSTOR. Web. 16 July 2012, 250. 59 Herman, 250; Henshall 23. 60 Knecht, Richelieu, 146. 61 1. 62 154. 63 Parker, David. "The Social Foundation of French Absolutism 1610-1630." Past & Present 53 (1971): 67-89. JSTOR. Web. 16 July 2012, 68, 80.

15

Protestants in this period developed a symbiotic relationship during the early seventeenth century

that allowed them to draw off each other’s power, creating a formidable threat to royal power.

Armed conflict in France resurged in 1621 when the crown and the Huguenots began

facing off again. This time, both the future of the Huguenot party and the future of absolutism

were at stake. Both sides continued to hold out for a total victory.64 Yet by 1621, the Huguenot

movement was weak and its principal leader, the Duc de Rohan, struggled to find officers to lead

his troops.65 The instigators of this latest conflict were merely a minority that, though able to

engage much of the party in the conflict, also faced frequent defections.66 Meanwhile, the

monarchy’s resources were more extensive than they had been in the 1600s.67

The conflicts of the 1620s culminated in the Siege of La Rochelle in 1627. The attack

was not arbitrary. The city of La Rochelle had become a center of Protestant power that the

crown had struggled with since the sixteenth century. When the first Calvinist Reformed church

was established in the medium-sized port city in 1558, Protestantism spread rapidly. By the early

1560s, a majority of the population had probably already converted. In 1568, the city emerged

as a major political center of the Reformed movement by joining the Huguenot opposition being

led by the Prince of Condé.68 From then, on, La Rochelle would have military confrontations

with the King of France. Charles IX ordered the first devastating siege of the city in 1572.

Nearly forty years later, Louis XIII blockaded the city in 1621 in response to an unauthorized

Protestant general assembly.69 This blockade was part of one of the first rounds of violence that

rattled France in the 1620s.

                                                                                                               64 Rothrock, 17. 65 Parker, 73. 66 Herman, 260; Parker, 73. 67 Rothrock, 22. 68 Meyer, 170-71. 69 Herman, 255.

16

In June 1627, King Charles I of England sent a sizable fleet and 8000 soldiers to La

Rochelle at the behest of the exiled Protestant military leader, the Duc de Soubise, panicking the

city of La Rochelle, who had not invited foreign intervention.70 From September 1627 to

October 1628, the crown of France besieged this important Protestant stronghold. There is no

scholarly consensus as to who led the siege, though a 1628 letter from Richelieu to the king

consists of military instructions for Louis, which may suggest that Louis, in fact, led the military,

though he received advice from his chief minister.71 By the end of the siege, the Rochelais were

eating boiled shoe leather to survive.72 Casualties were astounding; the estimated original

population of 25,000 had been reduced to some 5400.73 In September of 1628, as many as three

hundred people died daily from starvation.74 The severity of the attack was likely as a result of

La Rochelle’s history of rebellion. The crown needed a statement of subordination to royal

authority to have hope of ending these conflicts. Had the king (or his minister) abandoned the

cause, the monarchy would have appeared weak, which may have ensued further conflict. When

La Rochelle finally surrendered, however, the terms of the peace treaty were generous; the

Rochelais were allowed to retain their property and were acquitted of their crimes in exchange

                                                                                                               70 Sturdy, 43. 71 Regarding the siege of La Rochelle in particular, Sturdy contests that Louis led the siege with Richelieu at his side (34). Blanchard and Levi, conversely, believe Richelieu commanded the siege completely independently with Louis departing after a short time at the site of the siege, though their explanations for his departure differ (98; 110). In “Richelieu, the Grands, and the French Army.” Bergin and Brockliss 135-173, 152, David Parrott suggests that Richelieu commanded the army under direct command of the king. The lack of clarity surrounding this issue severely hinders my ability to analyze the siege within the context of Richelieu’s ministry. The document I reference is "Allocution." Dec. 1628. Plessis, Lettres v.3, 150-152. 72 Bell, David A. "Poker Lessons from Richelieu: A Portrait of the Statesman as Gambler." Foreign Affairs 91.2 (2012). Print. 73 Meyer, 180. Naturally, some discrepancy exists over the number of casualties. Levi, perhaps due to a mathematical error, reports 13,000 casualties and a reduction in population from 28,000 to 5400 (112-113). 74 Blanchard, 104.

17

for acknowledging their wrongdoing. They were also granted free exercise of religion within La

Rochelle.75

The monarchy achieved its goal in the Siege of La Rochelle. In 1629, the Treaty of Alès

settled the conflicts with the Huguenots as a whole. Though the Treaty denied the Huguenots

the political, legal, and military powers they had been granted by the Edict of Nantes, it allowed

them to keep their religious freedom. Scholars have too often used the Treaty of Alès as a basis

for the argument that Richelieu was attempting to take away the Huguenots’ religion.76

However, the treaty is perhaps the best proof that Richelieu was not the despot he is often

suggested to be. He could easily have led the king to revoke the Huguenots’ religious freedom,

but he did not. As George Rothrock stated, “The king withdrew from his rebellious subjects

privileges which he judged they had abused.”77 When the treaty is evaluated for what it

preserved, and not for what it revoked, the true spirit of the treaty becomes apparent.

The Huguenots remained a significant religious minority after the Treaty of Alès, though

intolerance became increasingly more common.78 Yet after 1629, the Protestant possibility of

autonomy and revolt were gone, finally allowing for some semblance of domestic stability.79 The

Siege of La Rochelle and the Treaty of Alès thus served as the last major events in domestic

policy before Richelieu’s political focus could be shifted to international affairs.

Probably as a result of the copious scholarship that has been devoted to him, Cardinal

Richelieu has too often been a victim of sensationalized biographies and anachronistic

                                                                                                               75 France and Sovereign, “Articles of Agreement.” 76 See Stankiewicz, in particular. 77 23. 78 Knecht, 80. 79 Herman, 251.

18

interpretations. The benefit of this phenomenon is the opportunity to present a new portrait of

the Cardinal. It is to be hoped that this paper has, by its careful examination of domestic policy

in the earliest years of Richelieu’s ministry, helped to dispel some of the misconceptions that have

arisen about the role religion played in the Cardinal’s power and politics. The research

presented here is not yet complete, particularly regarding primary sources. Due to time

restraints, only ten letters were translated and consulted out of surely thousands of those still in

existence. Access to full versions of crucial legal documents, namely the Edict of Nantes and

Treaty of Alès, was also impossible at this point in the project. Further research will hopefully be

able to include a wider variety of primary sources. Certainly, continued research into the

Cardinal’s power and politics will inspire new ways of seeing His Eminence, Cardinal de

Richelieu.

19

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