CASES: LEGAL ETHICSUi vs. Bonifacio

Facts:Lesli Ui filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio on the ground of immorality, for allegedly carrying an immoral relationship with Carlos Ui, her (Lesli) husband.In the proceeding before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Iris attached a photocopy of amarriage certificatethat said that she and Carlos got married in 1985 but according to the certificate of marriage obtained from the Hawaii State Department of Health, they were married in 1987.

Issue:Whether or not Atty. Iris Bonifacio conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred from the practice of law.

Held:NO.The practice of law is a privilege. The barcandidatedoes not have the right to enjoy the practice ofthe legalprofession simply by passing the bar, he must also have a continued possession of good moral character. A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct , which has been defined as the conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the good and respectable members of the community.Lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle their personal affairs with great caution.

Iris Bonifacio was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos, clothed as it was with what she believed as a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. Immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. For such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, it must be grossly immoral, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.

A lawyer is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships but must also behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. Her act of distancing herself on her discovery that Carlos was married proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moralstandard ofthe legalprofession.

On the matter of the falsifiedmarriage certificate, it is contrary to human experience and highly improbable that she did not know the year of her marriage or she failed to check that the information on the document she attached to her Answer were correct.Lawyersare called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts of malpractice.

In re: Cunanan, March 18, 1985

FACTS:RA 972Bar Fluners Act of 1953Objectives: to admit to the Bar those candidates who suffered from:(a) Insufficiency of reading materials and (b) inadequate preparation. By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession.

Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded everywhere to be the exercise of a judicial function. Admission to practice have also been held to be the exercise of one of the inherent powers of the court.If the legislature cannot indirectly control the action of the courts by requiring of them construction of the law according to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by settling aside their judgments, compelling them to grant new trials, ordering the discharge of offenders, or directing what particular steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry.

HELD:In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment a judgment revoking those promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may be so. Any attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as is the case with the law in question.

That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rule promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the admission to the practice of law, is no valid argument. Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides:

Section 13.The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines. Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.

RATIONALE:The public interest demands of legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve officially of those inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a serious social danger. Moreover, the statement that there was an insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly exaggerated.

ZORETA VS ATTY SIMPLICIANO

RONQUILLO vs. ROCO- Easement of Right of WayEasements of right of way may not be acquired by prescription because it is not a continuous easement.FACTS:Petitioners parcel of land was connected to the Naga Market Place and Igualdad St. by an easement of a right of way through the land of the Respondents, which they have been using for more than 20 years. On May 1953, however, respondents built a chapel right in the middle of the road, blocking their usual path to the marketplace. One year after, by means of force, intimidation, and threats, the owners (respondents) of the land where the easement was situated, planted wooden posts and fenced with barbed wires the road, closing their right of way from their house to Igualdad St. and Naga public market.ISSUE:Whether or not the easement of a right of way may be acquired by prescription?HELD: No.Art. 620 of the CC provides that only continuous and apparent easements may be acquired by prescription. The easement of a right of way cannot be considered continuous because its use is at intervals and is dependent on the acts of man.

Minority Opinion (including the ponente):Easements of right of way may already be acquired by prescription, at least since the introduction into this jurisdiction of the special law on prescription through the Old Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190. Said law, particularly, Section 41 thereof, makes no distinction as to the real rights which are subject to prescription, and there would appear to be no valid reason, at least to the writer of this opinion, why the continued use of a path or a road or right of way by the party, specially by the public, for ten years or more, not by mere tolerance of the owner of the land, but through adverse use of it, cannot give said party a vested right to such right of way through prescription.

The uninterrupted and continuous enjoyment of a right of way necessary to constitute adverse possession does not require the use thereof every day for the statutory period, but simply the exercise of the right more or less frequently according to the nature of the use. (17 Am. Jur. 972)"It is submitted that under Act No. 190, even discontinuous servitudes can be acquired by prescription, provided it can be shown that the servitude was actual, open, public, continuous, under a claim of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other claimants'."

CANON 1BOLIVAR VS SIMBOL

SORIANO V. DIZON

Facts:A taxi driver (Soriano) filed an action for the disbarment of Atty. Dizon, on the grounds that Dizon was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, and violated Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.Soriano allegedly fell victim to Dizon, who was found to have:a. Driven his car under the influence of liquor;b. Reacted violently and attempted assault for over a simple traffic incident;c. Shot at Soriano, who was unarmed and not in the position to defend himself (treachery);d. Denied his acts despite positive evidence against him (dishonesty);e. Guilty of dishonesty, claiming to be mauled by the victim (Kawawang driver, binaril na nga, may lakas pa daw mag maul ng attorney na may baril. Hindi din tanga mag rason si Dizon diba?);f. Despite neing granted probation, he did not satisfy his civil liabilities to the victim (Ano ba problema nito?!)

Issues:(1) Is Dizons crime of Frustrated Homicide considered a crime involving moral turpitude(2) Does his guilt to such crime warrant disbarment?

Held:(1) Yes.Moral Turpitude is everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good moralsDizon was obviously the aggressor for having pursued and shot Soriano, not only because of his treachery, but also his intent to escape, betrayed by his attempt to wipe off his prints from the gun. His inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident clearly indicates his non-fitness to be a lawyer.(2) Yes.His illegal possession of fire-arms, and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities all justify disbarment. The court reminds him that in oath and in the CPR, he is bound to obey the laws of the land. The liabilities in question have been sitting for 4 years, unsatisfied, despite it being the condition for his probation (you ungrateful person!)Dizon displayed an utter lack of good moral character, which is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.Manuel Dizon, hereby disbarred.

MARIA ELENA MORENO VS. ATTY. ERNESTO ARANETAA.C. No. 1109. April 27, 2005

Facts: Ernesto Araneta issued two checks to Elena Moreno for his indebtedness which amounts to P11, 000.00, the checks were dishonored. It was dishonored because the account against which is drawn is closed. Thereafter the case was forwarded to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. The Commission recommended the suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months. On 15 October 2002, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Victor C. Fernandez, transmitted the records of this case back to this Court pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b) of the Rules of Court. Thereafter, the Office of the Bar Confidant filed a Report regarding various aspects of the case. The Report further made mention of a Resolution from this Court indefinitely suspending the respondent for having been convicted by final judgment of estafa through falsification of a commercial document.

Issue: Whether or not Araneta should be disbarred due to the issuance of checks drawn against a closed account.

Held: The Court held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment, is a manifestation of moral turpitude. In Co v. Bernardino and Lao v. Medel, we held that for issuing worthless checks, a lawyer may be sanctioned with one years suspension from the practice of law, or a suspension of six months upon partial payment of the obligation. In the instant case, however, herein respondent has, apparently been found guilty by final judgment of estafa thru falsification of a commercial document, a crime involving moral turpitude, for which he has been indefinitely suspended. Considering that he had previously committed a similarly fraudulent act, and that this case likewise involves moral turpitude, we are constrained to impose a more severe penalty. In fact, we have long held that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude. As we said in In The Matter of Disbarment Proceedings v. Narciso N. Jaramillo, the review of respondent's conviction no longer rests upon us. The judgment not only has become final but has been executed. No elaborate argument is necessary to hold the respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a member of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the respondent has proved himself unfit to protect the administration of justice.In Re: FELIPE DEL ROSARIOFelipe del Rosario in his own behalf.City Fiscal Guevara for the Government.R E S O L U T I O NMALCOLM,J.:Thesupplementaryreport on bar examination irregularities of the fiscal of the City of Manila, dealing with the case of Felipe del Rosario, has been laid before the court for consideration and action. It is recommended by the city fiscal that Felipe del Rosario be ordered to surrender his certificate of attorney and that he be forever prohibited from taking the bar examination. An answer to the report has been permitted to be made, in which the court is asked to disapprove the report and to direct the setting aside of the suspension to practice law by the respondent, heretofore ordered by the court.

Felipe del Rosario was a candidate in the bar examination who failed for the second time in 1925. He presented himself for the succeeding bar examination in 1926 and again was unable to obtain the required rating. Then on March 29, 1927, he authorized the filing of a motion for the revision of his papers for 1925 based on an alleged mistake in thecomputationof his grades. The court, acting in good faith, granted this motion, and admitted Felipe del Rosario to the bar, but with justices dissenting. Subsequently, during the general investigation of bar examination matters being conducted by the city fiscal, this case was taken up, with the result that a criminal charge was lodged in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Juan Villaflor, a former employee of the court and Felipe del Rosario. Villaflor pleaded guilty to the information and was sentenced accordingly. Del Rosario pleaded not guilty, and at the conclusion of the trial was acquitted for lack of evidence.

The acquittal of Felipe del Rosario upon the criminal charge is not a bar to these proceedings. The court is now acting in an entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal cases. It is asking a great deal of the members of the court to have them believe that Felipe del Rosario was totally unaware of the illegal machinations culminating in the falsification of public documents, of which he was the sole beneficiary. Indeed, the conviction of Juan Villaflor in itself demonstrates that Felipe del Rosario has no legal right to his attorneys certificate. While to admit Felipe del Rosario again to the bar examination would be tantamount to a declaration of professional purity which we are totally unable to pronounce. The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted everyone who demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of a sound discretion. The standards ofthe legalprofession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself out as a duly authorized member of the bar. (In re Terrell [1903], 2 Phil., 266; People ex rel. Colorado Bar Association vs. Thomas [1906], 36 Colo., 126; 10 Ann. Cas., 886 and note; People vs. Macauley [1907], 230 Ill., 208; Ex parte Wall [1882], 107 U. S., 265.)The recommendation contained in the special report pertaining to Felipe del Rosario is approved, and within a period of ten days from receipt of notice, the respondent shall surrender his attorneys certificate to the clerk of this court.

Donton vs. Tansingco (493 SCRA 1 [June 27, 2006])

Facts: The respondent attorney prepared an Occupancy Agreement recognizing the ownership of a house and lot of Mr. Duane O. Stier, an American citizen disqualified to own land in the Philippines, despite the transfer of title in the name of Peter Donton, a Filipino citizen.Issue: Is the respondent guilty of malpractice?Ans: YesThe Ruling of the CourtThe Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code.A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve defiance of the laws which he is bound to uphold and obey. A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was disqualified from owning real property. Yet, in his motion for reconsideration, respondent admitted that he caused the transfer of ownership to the parcel of land to Stier. Respondent, however, aware of the prohibition, quickly rectified his act and transferred the title in complainants name. But respondent provided some safeguards by preparing several documents, including the Occupancy Agreement, that would guarantee Stiers recognition as the actual owner of the property despite its transfer in complainants name. In effect, respondent advised and aided Stier in circumventing the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of lands by preparing said documents.Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and the Code when he prepared and notarized the Occupancy Agreement to evade the law against foreign ownership of lands. Respondent used his knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful end. Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, or which he may be suspended.In Balinon V. De Leon, respondent Atty. De Leon was suspended from the practice of law for three years for preparing an affidavit that virtually permitted him to commit concubinage. In In re: Santiago, respondent Atty. Santiago was suspended from the practice of law for one year for preparing a contract which declared the spouses to be single again after nine years of separation and allowed them to contract separately subsequent marriages.WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco GUILTY of violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondents personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.SO ORDERED. (Donton vs. Tansingco, 493 SCRA 5-7 [June 27, 2006])JUAN DULALIA, JR. v. ATTY. PABLO C. CRUZ(2007)The primary duty oflawyersis to be well-informed of the existing laws,o keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments, and jurisprudence, and be conversant with basic legalprinciples.Susan Soriano Dulalia (Susan), wife of Juan, applied for a permit in theMunicipal Governmentto build ahigh risebuilding in Bulacan. The permit was not released due to the opposition of Atty. Cruz who sent aletter tothe Municipal Engineers office, claiming that the building impedes the airspace of their property which is adjacent to the Dulalias property. Juan Dulalia (Juan) filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Pablo Cruz (Cruz) for immoral conduct.Juan also claimed that Cruzs illicit relationship with a woman while still married is in violation of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility. Cruz invokes good faith, claiming to have had the impressionthat the applicable provision at the time was Article 83 of the Civil Code, for while Article 256 of the Family Code provides that the Code shall have retroactiveapplication, there is a qualification.ISSUE:Whether or not Cruz violated the Code of Professional Responsibility

HELD:Cruzs claim that he was not aware that the Family Code already took effect on August 3, 1988 as he was in the United States from 1986 and stayed there until he came back to the Philippines together with his second wife on October 9, 1990 does not lie, as ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.Immoral conduct which is proscribed under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as opposed to grossly immoral conduct, connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Gross immoral conduct on the other hand must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legalprinciples. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes.The Court therefore concludes that Atty. Pablo C. Cruz is guilty of violating Rule 1.01 and Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibilityand is suspended from the practice of law for one year.

CANON 2

Director of Religious Affairs vs. Bayot , 74 Phil. 579Facts:Respondentis charged with malpractice for having published an advertisement in Sunday Tribunal on June 13, 1943 which reads as follows

Marriage license promptly secured thru our assistance and the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if desired and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the poor. Everything confidential.

Legal assistance service12 Escolta, ManilaRoom 105, Tel. 2-41-60

Issue:Whether or not the advertisement is ethical.

Held:It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by therespondentof the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchantadvertiseshis wares. Law is a profession and a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practice of merchantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for ayoung lawyeris the establishment of a well-merited reputationfor professionalcapacity andfidelityto trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct. (Canon 27,Code of Ethics.)

LINSANGAN V. TOLENTINO

Facts:A complaint of disbarment was filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan, Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients & encroachment of professional services. Linsangan alleges that Tolentino with the help of paralegal Labiano convinced his clients to transfer legal representation by promising financial assistance and expeditious collection of their claims. To induce them, Tolentino allegedly texted and called them persistently. To support his allegation, Linsangan presented the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail over him to sever his client-atty relationship with Linsangan. Also, he attached respondents calling card:

Front

NICOMEDES TOLENTINOLAW OFFFICECONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICESW/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Fe Marie L. LabianoParalegal

1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 Tel: 362-78206th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Fax: (632) 362-7821Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926) 2701719

Back

SERVICES OFFERED:CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCETO OVERSEAS SEAMENREPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATHAND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMSABROAD.

In his defense, Tolentino denies knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulating of said calling card.

Issue: W/N Atty. Tolentino is guilty of advertising his services

Held: Yes. Atty. Tolentino suspended for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.With regard to Canon 3, the practice of law is a profession and not a business. Thus, lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares. To allow lawyers to advertise their talents/skill is a commercialization of the practice of law (degrading the profession in the publics estimation).With regard to Rule 2.03, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for purpose of gain, either personally or through an agent. In relation to Rule 1.03, which proscribes ambulance chasing (involving solicitation personally or through an agent/broker) as a measure to protect community from barratry and champertry. As a final note regarding the calling card presented as evidence by Linsangan, a lawyers best advertisement is a well-merited. reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct. For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:(a) lawyers name;(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;(c) address;(d) telephone number and(e) special branch of law practiced. Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial assistance. The phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserves no place in the legal profession.

PACANA V. PASCUAL-LOPEZ

FACTSPacana was the Operations Director for Multitel Communications Corporation (MCC). Multitel was besieged by demand letters from its members and investors because of the failure of its investment schemes. Pacana earned the ire of Multitel investors after becoming the assignee of majority of the shares of stock of Precedent and after being appointed as trustee of a fund amounting to Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) deposited at Real Bank. Multitel later changed its name to Precedent.Pacana sought the advice of Lopez who also happened to be a member of the Couples for Christ, a religious organization where Pacana and his wife were also active members. From then on, they constantly communicated, with the former disclosing all his involvement and interests in Precedent and Precedents relation with Multitel. Lopez gave legal advice to Pacana and even helped him prepare standard quitclaims for creditors. In sum, Pacana avers that a lawyer-client relationship was established between him and Lopez although no formal document was executed by them at that time. There was an attempt to have a formal retainer agreement signed but it didnt push through.

After a few weeks, Pacana was surprised to receive a demand letter from Lopez asking for the return and immediate settlement of the funds invested by Lopezs clients in Multitel. Lopez explained that she had to send it so that her clients defrauded investors of Multitel would know that she was doing something for them and assured Pacana that there was nothing to worry about.

Both parties continued to communicate and exchange information regarding the persistent demands made by Multitel investors against Pacana. Pacana gave Lopez several amounts, first 900,000; then 1,000,000 to be used in his case. Even when Pacana went to the states, they continued communicating and he continued sending her money for the case.

Wary that Lopez may not be able to handle his legal problems, Pacana was advised by his family to hire another lawyer. When Lopez knew about this, she wrote to complainant via e-mail, as follows:

Dear Butchie,Hi! Ok ka lang? Hope you are fine. Sorry if I shocked you but I had to do it as your friend and lawyer.------------ I have been informed by Efie that your family is looking at hiring Coco Pimentel. I know him very well as his sister Gwen is my best friend. I have no problem if you hire him but I will be hands off. I work differently kasi. -------- Efren Santos will sign as your lawyer although I will do all the work. -----------Please do not worry. Give me 3 months to make it all disappear. But if you hire Coco, I will give him the free hand to work with your case. -------- I will stand by you always. This is my expertise. TRUST me! ----Candy

When he got back to the country, Lopez told Pacana she had earned P12,500,000.00 as attorneys fees and was willing to give P2,000,000.00 to him in appreciation for his help. This never happened though. Lopez also ignored Pacanas repeated requests for accounting. She continued to evade him.Finally, Pacana filed a case with the IBP for Lopezs disbarment. The IBP disbarred her.

ISSUEWhether or not Lopez had violated Rule 15.03 on representing conflicting interests.

HELDYes! Attorney Maricel Pascual-Lopez was DISBARRED for representing conflicting interests and for engaging in unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct in violation of her Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. Ratio: Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts. Lopez must have known that her act of constantly and actively communicating with Pacana, who, at that time, was beleaguered with demands from investors of Multitel, eventually led to the establishment of a lawyer-client relationship. Lopez cannot shield herself from the inevitable consequences of her actions by simply saying that the assistance she rendered to complainant was only in the form of "friendly accommodations," precisely because at the time she was giving assistance to complainant, she was already privy to the cause of the opposing parties who had been referred to her by the SEC.

Given the situation, the most decent and ethical thing which Lopez should have done was either to advise Pacana to engage the services of another lawyer since she was already representing the opposing parties, or to desist from acting as representative of Multitel investors and stand as counsel for complainant. She cannot be permitted to do both because that would amount to double-dealing and violate our ethical rules on conflict of interest.

Indubitably, Lopez took advantage of Pacanas hapless situation, initially, by giving him legal advice and, later on, by soliciting money and properties from him. Thereafter, Lopez impressed upon Pacana that she had acted with utmost sincerity in helping him divest all the properties entrusted to him in order to absolve him from any liability. But simultaneously, she was also doing the same thing to impress upon her clients, the party claimants against Multitel, that she was doing everything to reclaim the money they invested with Multitel.

ATTY. ISMAEL KHAN V. ATTY RIZALINO SIMBILLO

FACTSA paid advertisement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer was published which reads: Annulment of Marriage Specialist [contact number]. Espeleta, a staff of the Supreme Court, called up the number but it was Mrs. Simbillo who answered. She claims that her husband, Atty. Simbillo was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within 4-6mos provided the case will not involve separation of property and custody of children. It appears that similar advertisements were also published.An administrative complaint was filed which was referred to the IBP for investigation and recommendation. The IBP resolved to suspend Atty. Simbillo for 1year. Note that although the name of Atty. Simbillo did not appear in the advertisement, he admitted the acts imputed against him but argued that he should not be charged. He said that it was time to lift the absolute prohibition against advertisement because the interest of the public isnt served in any way by the prohibition.

ISSUEWhether or not Simbillo violated Rule2.03 & Rule3.01.

HELDYes!The practice of law is not a business --- it is a profession in which the primary duty is public service and money. Gaining livelihood is a secondary consideration while duty to public service and administration of justice should be primary. Lawyers should subordinate their primary interest.Worse, advertising himself as an annulment of marriage specialist he erodes and undermines the sanctity of an institution still considered as sacrosanct --- he in fact encourages people otherwise disinclined to dissolve their marriage bond.Solicitation of business is not altogether proscribed but for it to be proper it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. Note that the law list where the lawyers name appears must be a reputable law list only for that purpose --- a lawyer may not properly publish in a daily paper, magazineetc., nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published the contents of which are likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar.

CANON 3

DACANAY VS BAKER AND MCKENZIE Ponente: AQUINO,J.FACTS:[R]espondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie, which contains the names of the ten lawyers, asked a certain Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client. Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel. He requested that he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie and if not, what is your purpose in using the letterhead of another law office. Not having received any reply, he filed the instant complaint. As admitted by the respondents in their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a professional partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members and associates in 30 cities around the world. Respondents, aside from being members of the Philippine bar, practicing under the firm name of Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates of Baker & McKenzie.ISSUE:Whether or not Baker & McKenzie, an alien law firm, could practice law in the Philippines.HELD:NO. Respondents were enjoined from practicing law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.RATIO:Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court).[R]espondents use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constituted a representation that being associated with the firm they could render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment. This was unethical because Baker & McKenzie was not authorized to practice law here.MAURICIO C. ULEP V. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.

FACTS:This is a petition praying for an order to the respondent to cease and desist from issuing certain advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law.The said advertisement of the Legal Clinic invites potential clients to inquire about secret marriage and divorce in Guam and annulment, and the like. It also says that they are giving free books on Guam Divorce.Ulep claims that such advertisements are unethical and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of lawyers. He, being a member of the bar, is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements. On the other hand, the respondent, while admitting of the fact of the publication of the advertisements, claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but is merely rendering legal support services through paralegals. It also contends that such advertisements should be allowed based on certain US cases decided.

ISSUE:W/N the Legal Clinic Inc is engaged in the practice of law. W/N the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements complained of.

HELD/RATIO: Yes, it constitutes practice of law. No, the ads should be enjoined.Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. When a person participates in a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. And applying the criteria, respondent Legal Clinic Inc. is, as advertised, engaged in the practice of law.

What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law."

The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The only exceptions are when he appears in a reputable law list and use of an ordinary, simple professional card. The advertisements do not fall under these exceptions. To allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack. Hence, it should be enjoined.

IN RE TAGORDA

FACTS:The respondent Atty. Luis Tagorda, a member of the provincial board of Isabela, admits that in the last general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano, which in translation, read as follows:LUIS B. TAGORDA Attoney; Notary Public; CANDIDATE FOR BOARD MEMBER, Province of Isabela. (NOTE.- as notaty public, he can execute for a deed of sale for the purchase of land as required by the cadastral office, can renew lost documents of your animals; can make your application and final requisites for your homestead; and can execute any kind of affidavit. As a lawyer he can help you collect your loans although long overdue, as well as any complaint for or against you. Come or write to him in his town Echague, Isabela. He offers free consultation, and is willing to help and serve the poor.)The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in his home municipality written in Ilocano, which letter reads as follow: I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some people are in the belief that my residence as member of the Board will be in Iligan and that I would then be disqualified to exercise my profession as lawyer and as notary public. Such is not the case and I would make it clear that I am free to exercise my profession as formerly and that I will have my residence here in Echague, I would request your kind favor to transmit this information to your barrio people in any of your meeting or social gatherings so that they may be informed of my desire to live and to serve with you in my capacity as lawyer and notary public. If the people in your locality have not as yet contracted the services of other lawyers in connection with the registration of their land titles, I would be willing to handle the work in court and would charge only three pesos for every registration.

HELD:Application is give to se. 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act NO. 2828, providing The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokets, constitutes malpractice, and to Canon 27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippines Bar Association in 1917, to the case of the respondent lawyer. The law is a profession and not a business. The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension.1. Respondent Tagorda is suspended from the practice of law for 1 month.2. For advertising his services in the Sunday Tribune respondent attorney is reprimanded. CANON 4 AND 5De Roy and Ramos vs. CA [G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988]

Facts:The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitionerscollapsedand destroyed thetailoringshop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal,a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the RegionalTrial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal, the decision of thetrial courtwas affirmed in toto by theCourt of Appealsin a decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987,the last dayof the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the appellate court in the Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution because the same was not filed within the grace period as enscribed inthe presentjurisprudence .

Issue: Whether or not theCourt of Appealscommitted grave abuse of discretion in denying the denied the motion and let the petitioner be bound by the negligence of their counsel

Held:The Court finds that theCourt of Appealsdid not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration. In the instant case, petitioners' motion for extension of time was more than a year after the expiration of the grace period. Hence, it is no longer within the coverage of the grace period. Considering the length of time from the expiration of the grace period to the promulgation of the decision of theCourt of Appealson August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglamentary period. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports ofSupreme Court decisions(G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.

ABAD VS BLEZA

There are two administrative cases against Judge Ildefonso Bleza here.

Case 1

In 1981, a shooting incident in a cockpit occurred where Gregorio Abad, a colonel escaped death. In that incident, Abad had an argument with one Potenciano Ponce and the latters bodyguard, Francisco Sabater Jr. Sabater shot Abad and due to medical intervention, Abad survived. Abad filed two separatecriminal casesagainst Ponce and Sabater. Ponce was acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence (because there were conflicting testimonies) while Sabater was found guilty of frustrated homicide but with mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and lack of intent to kill.Abad, not satisfied with Blezas decisions filed an administrative case against Bleza,

Case 2

Pacifico Ocampo was an employee of the Manila International Airport Authority. He filed an administrative case against one Ricardo Ortiz.

After that, Ocampo alleged that Crisanto Cruz (perhaps a friend of Ortiz? not mentioned in the case), tried to persuade Ocampo not to continue with the administrative case against Ortiz. Ocampo did not accede so allegedly, Cruz filed a separate administrative complaint against Ocampo. In turn, Ocampo filed a civil case against Cruz before Judge Bleza. Ocampo alleged that the administrative case against him was baseless and the same made him suffer embarrassment, mental shock, anxieties, sleepless nights, and loss of appetite.

Ocampo won and Bleza ordered Cruz to pay for damages. Cruz filed an administrative case against Bleza for allegedly knowingly rendering a wrongful decision as Cruz averred that the administrative case was based on Ocampos absenteeism, inefficiency and tardiness which were all on record and same were presented as evidence which were even (allegedly) uncontroverted.

ISSUE:Whether or not Bleza should be disciplined.

HELD:No (in both cases). In the first case, Bleza erred in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to kill in favor of Sabater but such error does not hold him administratively liable.

In Criminal Law, in cases of frustrated homicide there is inherently an intention to kill for if otherwise, it would have been a case of physical injuries. Bleza found Sabater guilty of frustrated homicide hence it is error for him to appreciate lack of intention to kill as a mitigating circumstance.

But as a matter ofpublic policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. Even on the assumption that the judicial officer has erred in the appraisal of the evidence, he cannot be held administratively or civilly liable for his judicial action. A judicial officer cannot be called to account in a civil action for acts done by him in the exercise of his judicial function, however erroneous. Not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his duties makes him liable therefor. To hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position unbearable.

In the second case, the Supreme Court took notice of the fact that it is on appeal before theCourt of Appealshence it is premature to decide upon it. Only after the appellate court holds in a final judgment that a trial judges alleged errors were committed deliberately and in bad faith may a charge of knowingly rendering an unjust decision be leveled against him.

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