choma, b. l., hafer, c. l., dywan, j., segalowitz, s. j

Political Orientation 1

Choma, B. L., Hafer, C. L., Dywan, J., Segalowitz, S. J., & Busseri, M. A. (2012). Political liberalism and political conservatism: Functionally independent?. Personality and Individual Differences, 53(4), 431-436. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2012.04.012

Abstract1

Political liberalism and conservatism are often conceptualized as opposite ends of the same

continuum. Our question was whether these constructs might be better understood as

“functionally independent” ideologies. We tested whether liberalism and conservatism, as

separable constructs, could be differentially, rather than equally and oppositely, associated with

core psychological components of political orientation. Participants (n=245) completed measures

of liberalism, conservatism, and psychological variables relating to preferences for equality

versus inequality and social change versus tradition. A bi-dimensional model with separate and

moderately correlated liberal and conservative factors best summarized political orientation.

Liberalism was distinctly associated with universal orientation and creativity whereas

conservatism was related to dogmatism.

© 2020. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

1 Final submitted copy does not reflect changes made before publication.


First copyedit complete. Introduction

Is political liberalism the opposite of conservatism? Political orientation – the tendency to

lean more liberal or conservative – is linked with many psychological variables (Carney, Jost,

Gosling, & Potter, 2008; Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009; Janoff-Bulman, 2009; Jost, Glaser,

Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). Much of this work is based on a model of political orientation in

which liberalism and conservatism are considered to be at opposite ends of a single continuum

(Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009; Wilson, 1973). There is evidence that the structure of political

ideology is more complex (see Duckitt, 2001, Duckitt & Sibley, 2009, Feldman, 2003).

Consequently, liberalism and conservatism should relate differentially to psychological variables

usually associated with them. Thus, we compare the conventional uni-dimensional/bipolar model

to a bi-dimensional model in which liberalism and conservatism are treated as functionally

independent factors, and explore whether the bi-dimensional model provides a better fit

concerning relations between political ideologies and indices of core psychological components

of political orientation.

The uni-dimensional conceptualization of political orientation has yielded the most

widely-employed operationalization of political orientation and involves a single self-report item

with response options ranging from extremely liberal to extremely conservative (Jost, 2006). Jost

and his colleagues propose that the bipolar structure, dating back to the French Revolution, is

particularly useful and parsimonious as it is based upon two political perspectives (preference

versus opposition to social change, acceptance versus rejection of inequality) that characterize

those identifying as liberal or conservative in varying cultural and historical contexts (see Jost et

at al., 2009 for a full discussion). Despite the popularity of this approach, the extent to which a

single bipolar liberalism versus conservatism dimension adequately captures peoples’ political


ideology has been questioned. Conover and Feldman (1981) concluded that “liberals and

conservatives view the political world not from different sides of the same coin, but … from the

perspective of entirely different currencies” (p. 204). The structure of political orientation has

often been described as bi-dimensional, the nature of which varies depending on item content

and factor rotation (Ashton et al., 2005; Choma, Ashton, & Hafer, 2010; Choma, Busseri, &

Sadava, 2009; Conover & Feldman, 1981; Stone & Schaffner, 1988; see Duckitt & Sibley,

2009).

One of the most comprehensive bi-dimensional models of political ideology was

proposed by Kerlinger (1984), who argued that liberalism and conservatism were conceptually

and empirically independent. However, in factor analytic studies across different countries he

found moderate negative correlations between liberalism and conservatism. Although such

findings do not support Kerlinger’s proposal of orthogonality, his data demonstrate that

liberalism and conservatism are separable. Sidanius and Duffy (1988) tested Kerlinger’s model

demonstrating that a uni-dimensional/bipolar model summarized political ideology better than a

bi-dimensional orthogonal model with uncorrelated liberal and conservative factors. Yet,

consistent with many of Kerlinger’s results, in an American sample, a bi-dimensional model with

moderately negatively correlated liberal and conservative factors summarized political ideology

better than either the uni-dimensional or bi-dimensional-orthogonal model. Thus, the structure of

political orientation cannot always be adequately described on the basis of a single continuum.

Indeed, there is evidence supporting a uni-dimensional/bipolar model and a bi-dimensional (two

correlated factors) structure of political ideology.

There is a comparable debate concerning affect that could inform disagreements about

the structure of political orientation. Researchers studying affect have debated whether positive


and negative affect are opposite ends of a single continuum (Green, Goldman, & Salovey, 1993)

or distinct dimensions (Tellegen, Watson, & Clark, 1999). To reconcile the competing models,

Cacioppo, Berntson, and Gardner (1999) asserted that opposing effects of positive and negative

affect does not signify that they are themselves reciprocally activated or mutually exclusive.

They noted that separate positive and negative affect factors did not require a dismissal of the

bipolar model, and proposed that exploring the circumstances under which a bipolar versus bi-

dimensional model might best summarize affect was of greater value. According to Cacioppo et

al., evidence that positive and negative affect uniquely predict responses suggests that they could

be “functionally independent” (p. 844). Hence, even though a bipolar model might adequately

summarize affect in certain circumstances, a greater understanding of affect might be gained by

conceptualizing positive and negative affect as separable (even if correlated) dimensions.

Cacioppo et al. (1999) proposed that positive and negative affect were functionally

independent on the basis of research indicating they had unique properties. A corresponding

argument could be made regarding the relationship between liberalism and conservatism. Several

theories have emphasized the distinct attributes of liberal-versus-conservative orientations (e.g.,

Higgins, 1998; Tomkins, 1963). More recently, Janoff-Bulman (2009) argued that political

ideology originates in motivational orientations: Conservatism (vs. liberalism) is associated with

avoidance motivation; liberalism (vs. conservatism) is associated with approach motivation.

Based, in part, on these notions, Choma et al. (2009) demonstrated unique and shared relations

between political orientation, considered as separate factors from low to high for each political

orientation, and the components of subjective well-being: Liberalism uniquely predicted greater

positive affect, conservatism uniquely predicted less negative affect, and both liberalism and

conservatism predicted greater life satisfaction. These data demonstrate how examining political


orientation from a bi-dimensional perspective provides important insights concerning the relation

between political orientation and subjective well-being that are not apparent by examining this

same issue using only a bipolar/uni-dimensional conceptualization of political orientation.

In the domain of moral psychology, Haidt and colleagues (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek,

2009) showed that liberals rely on their moral intuitions relating to harm/care and

fairness/reciprocity. Conservatives rely also on moral intuitions relating to authority/respect,

ingroup loyalty, and purity/sanctity (Graham et al., 2009; McAdams et al., 2008). Lakoff (2002),

a cognitive linguist, asserted that metaphors relating to family life influence individuals’ political

ideology. He proposes that conservatives are more likely to endorse a ‘strict-father’ metaphor,

whereas for liberals, the metaphor is more likely to involve a ‘nurturant-parent’ model.

Considering political orientation from a multi-dimensional perspective (Conover &

Feldman, 1981; Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; Kerlinger, 1984) invites a renewed consideration of how

these dimensions relate to other individual differences within the psychological domain. For

example, preferences for equality/inequality and preferences for social change/tradition have

been identified as the primary components that distinguish liberalism versus conservatism (Jost,

2006; Jost et al., 2003). Preferences for equality and social change characterize liberalism,

whereas acceptance of inequality and preferences for tradition characterize conservatism

(Thorisdottir, Jost, Liviatan, & Shrout, 2007). There is a growing literature supporting this claim,

especially for social change/tradition (Jost et al., 2003; 2009).

Notwithstanding the robustness of this general pattern of differences between liberals and

conservatives, there may be additional subtle distinctions. Hirsh, DeYoung, Xu, and Peterson

(2010), for example, using a bipolar liberal-conservatism scale, found that the compassion facet

of agreeableness correlated positively with liberalism, whereas the politeness facet correlated


positively with conservatism. Their reasoning implies that important distinctions between

liberals and conservatives can be uncovered by investigating which aspects of the two core

components characterize each political orientation.

The Present Study

We tested whether political orientation might be represented by two correlated, but

distinguishable liberalism and conservatism factors. We predicted that when assessed using

multi-item separate measures of liberalism and conservatism, a correlated two-factor (bi-

dimensional) model would provide a better representation of the structure of political orientation

than a uni-dimensional/bipolar model. Second, we evaluated the implications of the hypothesized

bi-dimensional structure for relations between political orientation and indicators of the two core

psychological components of political orientation. If liberalism and conservatism are truly

opposing ends of the same continuum, psychological variables should be related in equal but

opposite ways to liberalism and conservatism when measured separately. If liberalism and

conservatism are separable, however, some psychological variables might be differentially,

rather than oppositely, linked with liberalism and conservatism. There could be some constructs

that are linked distinctly or more strongly (rather than equally and oppositely) with one political

ideology compared to another. Thus, although the single bipolar liberal-conservative dimension

provides a popular way of conceptualizing and measuring political orientation (Jost, 2006), a bi-

dimensional model could extend current understanding of political ideology by allowing

researchers to explore not only how liberals and conservatives may oppose one another, but also

how they may be similar and/or unique.

Our first question was whether an inclusive orientation – one indicator of preference for

equality over inequality – might be particularly relevant for political liberalism. Theorists (e.g.,


Tomkins, 1963) propose that individuals with a liberal orientation believe that “all men are born

free and equal, and should remain so” (p. 406). Research supports that liberals are more tolerant

and egalitarian than conservatives: When allocating aid, liberals tend to assist all claimants when

possible (Skitka, 1999; Skitka, Mullen, Griffin, Hutchinson, & Chamberlin, 2002). Further,

conservatives are more likely to attribute poverty and homelessness to personal causes, whereas

liberals tend to emphasize situational explanations and hold more positive feelings towards the

poor (Cozzarelli, Wilkinson, & Tagler, 2001; Williams, 1984). Thus, liberals tend to be inclusive

in their helping behavior and feelings toward others, suggesting that an inclusive orientation

might be more strongly related to liberalism than to conservatism. Therefore, rather than the

bipolar-based prediction that inclusive orientation would be related to greater liberalism versus

lower conservatism, we predicted that liberalism and conservatism would be differentially (vs.

equally and oppositely) related to an inclusive orientation, such that greater liberalism would

relate to greater inclusive orientation, whereas greater conservatism (high vs. low) would be

unrelated to an inclusive orientation, or, if negatively related, the magnitude of this relation

would be weaker than the link with liberalism.

Our second question had to do with the preference for social change versus

traditionalism. In research based on a uni-dimensional/bipolar conceptualization, greater political

conservatism (vs. liberalism) relates to indicators of preference for traditionalism over social

change; for example, greater dogmatism, greater intolerance of ambiguity, and less openness to

experience (Carney et al., 2008; Jost et al., 2003). Theorists of ideology maintain that liberals are

motivated by novelty-seeking (Tomkins, 1963) suggesting that liberalism especially might be

related to psychological variables like creativity and tolerance of ambiguity, whereas

conservatism might be especially related to the psychological construct dogmatism as


conservatives prefer structure and order (Jost et al., 2003; Thorisdottir et al., 2007). Therefore,

instead of the bipolar-based expectation that conservatism (vs. liberalism) would relate to lower

creativity, intolerance of ambiguity, and greater dogmatism, we predicted that liberalism and

conservatism would be differentially (vs. equally and oppositely) related to psychological

variables associated with social change as opposed to traditionalism, wherein greater liberalism

(high vs. low) would be related to greater creativity and tolerance of ambiguity. (Conservatism

would be unrelated or related negatively, with the magnitude weaker than the link with

liberalism), and greater conservatism (high vs. low) would be related to greater dogmatism and

less tolerance of ambiguity (and liberalism would be unrelated or related negatively, with the

magnitude of the relationship weaker than the link with conservatism).

Method

Participants and procedure

University students (N=245; M age=19.71; SD=3.89; 90% female; 95% White)

participated for course credit. They completed measures of political orientation, individual

differences, and demographic information.

Measures

Scores for each measure were computed by averaging items within each scale; higher

scores indicated a greater endorsement of the characteristics. Means, standard deviations, and

correlations are shown in Table 1.

Political orientation

To assess political liberalism and conservatism separately, participants responded to six

self-placement items indicating how conservative (three items) and liberal (three items) they

were concerning their general outlook, social policy, and economic policy from 1-not at all


conservative/liberal to 9-extremely conservative/extremely liberal (“How conservative/liberal do

you tend to be in general?/when it comes to economic policy?/when it comes to social policy?”)

(Choma et al., 2009).

Equality versus inequality

Inclusive orientation. Participants completed the 20-item Universal Orientation scale

(Phillips & Ziller, 1997) assessing non-prejudice from 1-strongly disagree to 5-strongly agree

(e.g., “When I meet someone I tend to notice similarities between myself and the other person”).

Social change versus traditionalism

Creativity. The three-item Creativity subscale (Ashton & Lee, 2009), assessing

preference for innovation and experiment was administered (e.g., “I would enjoy creating a work

of art, such as a novel, a song, or a painting”) using a scale from 1-strongly disagree to 5-

strongly agree.

Dogmatism. The 20-item Dogmatism measure (Alteyemer, 1996) on a scale from 1-very

strongly disagree to 9-very strongly agree (e.g., “I am absolutely certain that my ideas about the

fundamental issues in life are correct”) was used.

Intolerance of ambiguity. The 16-item Tolerance of Ambiguity scale (Budner, 1962;

e.g., “The sooner we all acquire similar values and ideals the better”) was administered using a

scale from 1-strongly disagree to 5-strongly agree. Higher scores indicated greater intolerance of

ambiguity.


Results

The Structure of Political Orientation

We first evaluated the structure of political orientation. Confirmatory factor analyses

(CFAs) using AMOS 18.0 were conducted to compare the models. Model fit was evaluated using

the chi-square statistic, comparative fit index (CFI), root mean square error of approximation

(RMSEA), and the expected cross-validation index (ECVI) (Byrne, 2001; Hu & Bentler, 1999).

To examine whether political orientation might be summarized by a single liberal-

conservative bipolar dimension (‘Bipolar Model’, Figure 1), we conducted a CFA estimating a

single latent bipolar liberal-conservative political orientation factor with loadings from three

liberal and three conservative political orientation items. To identify the model, the

unstandardized factor loading for the conservative-general item was fixed to 1. Three pairs of

covariances – between the liberalism and conservatism general, economic, and social items –

were included to account for the shared domains (social, economic, general). This model

provided poor fit: χ2 (6)=382.23, p<.001; CFI=.650; RMSEA=.507; ECVI=1.689.

To evaluate whether political orientation might be structured as separate but correlated

liberalism and conservatism dimensions (‘Bi-Dimensional Model’, Figure 2), we ran a second

CFA estimating two correlated latent factors. The first factor, political conservatism, was

estimated with loadings from the three observed conservatism items; this factor was identified by

fixing the unstandardized factor loading for the conservative-general item to 1. The second

factor, political liberalism, was estimated with loadings from the three observed liberalism items;

this factor was identified by fixing the unstandardized factor loading for the liberal-general item

to 1. Three pairs of covariances were again included between the shared domain items as

outlined in the previous paragraph. This model provided excellent fit: χ2 (5)=3.768, p=.583;


CFI=1.00; RMSEA=.00; ECVI=.147. The correlation between the two latent variables was -.52

(p < .001). An additional test indicated that constraining this correlation to 0 (implying

orthogonality) resulted in a substantial decrement in model fit and a poorly fitting model: χ2

(6)=66.62, p<.001; CFI=.944; RMSEA=.204; ECVI=.396. Therefore, whereas the uni-

dimensional/bipolar and bi-dimensional-orthogonal models provided poor fit, the bi-dimensional

model with separate, but moderately negatively correlated conservatism and liberalism factors

provided excellent fit.

Unique Correlates of Political Liberalism and Political Conservatism

Our second goal was to evaluate implications of a bi-dimensional model through

determining whether latent liberalism and conservatism factors, independent of the other factor,

were related to variables reflecting equality/inequality and social change/tradition. To test the

anticipated dissociations, partial correlations were estimated between each latent factor and the

variables of interest (universal orientation, creativity, dogmatism, intolerance of ambiguity).

Given that this approach controls for one latent factor (liberalism) before examining associations

involving the other latent factor (conservatism), it provides a more rigorous test of the unique

associations of interest, compared to either evaluating bivariate relations between either factor

and the variables of interest or a regression approach in which latent liberalism and conservatism

factors are treated as simultaneous predictors.

To test the partial correlations between the latent liberalism factor and each observed

individual differences variable, the latent liberalism factor and the observed individual difference

variables were regressed onto the latent conservatism factor, and correlations were estimated

between each pair of residuals; these residual covariances are statistically equivalent to partial

correlations. To test the partial correlations between the latent conservatism factor and each


observed individual differences variable, the latent conservatism factor and each of the observed

individual differences were regressed onto the latent liberalism factor, and correlations were

estimated between each pair of residuals. (Six univariate outliers were removed.)

Excellent model fit was found in both models. Because these models were

mathematically equivalent, statistical fit was identical: χ2 (29)=38.75, p=.107; CFI=.992;

RMSEA=.038; ECVI=.575. Results are displayed in Table 2. Latent liberalism (controlling for

latent conservatism) was uniquely associated with greater universal orientation, greater

creativity, and less intolerance (greater tolerance) of ambiguity; the partial correlation between

latent liberalism and dogmatism was non-significant. Latent conservatism (controlling for latent

liberalism) was uniquely associated with greater dogmatism; partial correlations between latent

conservatism and universal orientation, creativity, and intolerance of ambiguity were non-

significant.

Discussion

In the present sample, a bi-dimensional model with separate and correlated political

liberal and conservative factors best summarized political orientation, consistent with previous

research examining the structure of political orientation (Choma et al., 2009; Kerlinger, 1984;

Sidanius & Duffy, 1988). The separate factors were moderately and negatively correlated

suggesting that liberal and conservative orientations share substantial variance; yet, they each

possess unique variance – implying that they can be conceptualized and studied as

distinguishable factors.

This conclusion may appear to conflict with frameworks that assume a bipolar structure

ranging from liberalism to conservatism. One resolution is that the degree of bi-dimensionality

versus bipolarity may vary depending on factors such as population and context. Indeed, the


relation between liberalism and conservatism approaches bi-dimensionality in populations of less

politically sophisticated participants, whereas among highly politically sophisticated populations

it approaches bipolarity (Federico, 2007; Sidanius & Duffy, 1988). One implication is that a

more complete characterization of political orientation might be obtained by examining the

structure of political orientation in various contexts, situations, and populations to determine the

circumstances in which it is more likely to represent a single continuum and whether there is a

dynamic reason to why that might occur.

In addition to the CFA results, also supporting the bi-dimensional structure of political

orientation were the differential relations (obtained from partial correlations) observed between

liberalism and conservatism with variables indicative of the core components of political

ideology. What does it mean to control for one ideology when examining relations involving an

alternate ideology? Statistically, if liberalism and conservatism were bipolar, relations between

psychological variables and factors associated with either liberalism or conservatism should not

emerge in partial correlations as the opposing association between the covariate (liberalism or

conservatism) and the psychological variables would be of equal strength. Yet, this pattern was

not observed in the present work. Rather, partial correlations revealed differential relations

involving liberalism and conservatism. Researchers might test whether differential relations

extend to neurophysiological correlates of political orientation.

With respect to equality versus inequality, assessed in the present study through universal

orientation, it seems that an inclusive orientation might be especially related to a strong

politically liberal perspective, but not to the degree of conservatism. Concerning social change

versus tradition – as assessed in the present work through creativity, dogmatism, and intolerance

of ambiguity – individual differences related to novelty (curiosity, tolerance of ambiguity; see


Tomkins, 1963) might be especially related to a politically liberal orientation, rather than the

degree of conservatism. Greater dogmatism was uniquely linked with a conservative orientation,

rather than liberalism. Thus, operationalizing liberalism and conservatism as distinguishable

dimensions had implications for their relations with psychological variables, and demonstrated

several apparent dissociations between these two aspects of political orientation. These patterns

are consistent with those theoretical frameworks wherein it is proposed that liberal and

conservative orientations are associated with unique sets of psychological factors (Graham et al.,

2009; Higgins, 1998; Janoff-Bulman, 2009; Lakoff, 2002; Tomkins, 1963).

The crossing of bi-dimensional liberalism and conservatism factors results in four

quadrants of political ideology: Political liberalism (high liberalism, low conservatism), political

conservatism (high conservatism, low liberalism), indifference (low on both), and ambivalence

(high on both). Collapsing these four quadrants onto a single liberal-conservative continuum

would translate into the high liberalism/low conservatism end, the high conservatism/low

liberalism end, and those in the middle of the continuum whose actual ideological position is

somewhat unclear (see e.g., Tomkins, 1963) and potentially encompasses ambivalence and

indifference. Thus, although not explored directly in the present work, an additional benefit to a

bi-dimensional approach is the ability to decipher what a moderate political orientation might

mean.

Qualifications of our research should be noted. There are variables other than indices of

social change/traditionalism and equality/inequality that might account for people’s endorsement

of certain political ideologies (demographic characteristics, developmental factors, socialization).

The relation between such variables and separate political liberalism and conservatism factors

should be explored. A bi-dimensional model of political orientation was uncovered in the present


sample of Canadian undergraduate students. Given the role of cultural context on the relation

between other political orientation factors (Duriez, Van Hiel, & Kossowska, 2005), examining

whether liberalism and conservatism are functionally independent cross-culturally (and among

other age groups and men, as our sample was predominantly young women) would be especially

informative.

Nonetheless, on the basis of the present research, we conclude that the structure of

political orientation was bi-dimensional with separate but correlated political liberalism and

conservatism factors. Support for a bi-dimensional structure, in combination with the finding that

the liberal and conservative factors were differentially associated with indices of the core

components of political ideology, indicates that political liberalism and conservatism could be

“functionally independent.” Hence, although the prevailing approach in research on political

orientation is to assume a uni-dimensional structure the present data indicate that adopting a bi-

dimensional framework can encompass more nuanced aspects of the relation between liberalism

and conservatism, and permit a greater understanding of political ideology. Without employing

separate measures of liberalism and conservatism investigators cannot fully explore whether

some variables are oppositely and equally, distinctly or differentially, and perhaps even similarly

related to liberal and conservative political ideologies.


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Table 1 Means, standard deviations, and correlations M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

1. LIB-G 5.46 (1.74) --

2. LIB-S 5.54 (1.73) .82* --

3. LIB-E 5.03 (1.70) .74* .76* --

4. CON-G 4.63 (1.75) -.47* -.42* -.40* --

5. CON-S 4.43 (1.81) -.43* -.50* -.36* .79* --

6. CON-E 4.62 (1.72) -.35* -.35* -.45* .74* .68* --

7. UO 3.48 (0.36) .26* .27* .21* -.10 -.17* -.10 .68

8. CRE 3.35 (1.00) .19* .19* .18* -.10 -.16* -.04 .19* .75

9. INTOL 2.72 (0.36) -.14* -.21* -.13* .10 .17* .04 -.31* -.32* .59

10. DOG 3.43 (1.09) -.16* -.19* -.04 .24* .25* .19* -.29* -.15* .39* .91

Note. N=245. *p <.05, two-tailed. Alpha reliabilities are reported in the diagonal. PO= political liberalism vs. conservatism;

LIB=political liberalism; CON=political conservatism; -G=general orientation item; -S=social policy item; -E=economic policy item;

UO=universal orientation; CRE=creativity; TOL=intolerance of ambiguity; DOG=dogmatism.


Table 2 Partial Correlations between Latent Political Liberalism and Conservatism with Indicators of Core Psychological Components Latent Political Liberalism

(controlling for conservatism)

Latent Political Conservatism

(controlling for liberalism)

Universal Orientation .21* .05

Creativity .18* -.01

Intolerance of Ambiguity -.14* .00

Dogmatism -.02 .17*

Note. N=239. * p<.05.


Figure 1. Confirmatory factor analysis results for the bipolar model of political orientation.

Standardized factor loadings, residual correlations, and variance-explained values are shown.

.22

.02

.33

.68

.59

.69

-.85

-.78

-.86

.46

.35

.48

.73

.60

.74

Liberalism-general

Liberalism-economic

Liberalism-social

Conservatism-general

Conservatism-economic

Conservatism-social

Liberal-Conservative

Political Orientation


Figure 2. Confirmatory factor analysis results for the bi-dimensional model of political

orientation. Standardized factor loadings, latent factor correlation, residual correlations, and

variance-explained values are shown.

-.52

-.44

-.40

-.19

.86

.80

.92

.91

.84

.89

.74

.64

.85

.83

.70

.79

Liberalism-general

Liberalism-economic

Liberalism-social

Conservatism-general

Conservatism-economic

Conservatism-social

Political Liberalism

Political Conservatis

m

choma, b. l., hafer, c. l., dywan, j., segalowitz, s. j

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