combat operations with firearms volume 2 chapter 1 tactics release 2013-02-14

7/29/2019 Combat Operations With Firearms Volume 2 Chapter 1 Tactics Release 2013-02-14

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/combat-operations-with-firearms-volume-2-chapter-1-tactics-release-2013-02-14 1/60

Volume 2. Operations.

Chapter 1. Tactics.

WARNING:

This media is not created with the intent to describe the legality of whatis expressed in it. The content should not be considered as a legal

advice. The reader is responsible for ensuring any action taken inrelation to this document's content is legal in the reader's jurisdiction.

The document is written for research purpose.

Terms defined

-Operator:“Operator” refers to a person who is engaged in a combat operation.

Operators' action is the subject of this text. The term was chosenpartly because of lack of better words to describe the subject person

of this text. Shooter only means a person who is engaged in a shooting

activity. Also, the person had to be distinguished from militarydefinition of “combatant.”



1. Tactics

Definition: Systematic, logical approach to control probability.

This section will deal with maximizing the probability of operator’s safetyby controlling factors that affect combat operations. Operator should

create conditions, manipulate or utilize things in environments, so thatevents will occur in a manner that is favorable while denying the opponent

from achieving the same.

Before contact, tactics will be primarily involved with keeping operatorsfrom dangers, and if a contact with opponents could not be avoided, making

the contact occur in a manner that the operators have maximum advantage.

Major tactical factors are as follows:

Information

Operation objective / background

All parties involved or potentially involved

Tasking characteristics / efficiency

Human factor

Information processing efficiencyPrecision and speed of action

Capabilities and limitations of human body

Equipment factorCharacteristics of equipments

Limitations / Vulnerabilities

Location of all parties

Effectiveness of gunnery

Utilization of terrain / structures / objects for protection, or other

advantage.

Maneuvering and positioning

Signature control

Legalities



Large part of tactics will involve getting these major factors to be inoperators’ favor while denying opponents to achieve the same.



1.1. Analysis of major tactical factors.



1.1.1. Information.

Basic desired informations:

- Before operations:

Potential problems and potential solutions are the primary concerns.

Operators needs to consider who can be potential opponents, and potentialmethods the opponents might use to endanger them. Situation awareness,

ability to examine surroundings and recognize things of significance tosecurity are required. Equipments needed to deal with potential and known

threats needs to be identified and acquired. What kind of approaches should

be taken to deal with likely threats should be identified and studied.

-During operations:

Environment:

-POEZ

-Shielding: This is an object that can protect you from an opponent's

physical attack or an object that lowers the probability of beingdetected by an opponent.

-Obstacles

-Terrain and structures

-Possible paths for approach to a target area or for escape.

-Hazards(presence of flammable, explosive material, fall hazard,

etc.)

-Artificial device threat(motion sensor activated light, etc.)

Opposition:

-Location

-Actions

-Number

-Weapons



-Equipments(Sensors, communication devices, etc.)

All the above information should be integrated to create a "big picture"

view of the environment which a part of situation awareness.

Collection method:

-Direct: collection through human body sensor, such as eyes and ears. Also

from mechanical sensor devices that are carried by operators.

-Indirect: information sent to operator through communication from remote

source.

Information Load Balancing:

Work load balancing regarding information processing involves planning toreduce the probability of information amount overwhelming an operator. An

operator overwhelmed in that regard would have problems with prioritizinginformation, information filtering, information device operation, and

communication to increase operator safety.

There are limitations in the amount of information that can be collectedfrom sensors. However, even the limited amount of information from limited

sources can exceed the amount that an operator's mind can properly processin a given time frame. Operators need to give consideration to load

balancing and screening of information. The speed of action has to becontrolled to limit the rate new information is received so that critical

information that came in through sensors would not go unrecognized. Forexample, maneuvering faster would increase the rate of information from new

areas revealing in an operator's path and increase the probability of notimmediately recognizing a threat within field of view.

Another problem is with dealing with information coming from multiplesources. If an operator recognized multiple threats emerging visually, the

operator may have less efficiency receiving information also coming throughaudio communicated by anther operator. If an operator is dealing with

visual detection information through eyes and more detection information

through IR or thermal imaging devices, then there are also problems withintegrating or reconciling the information, and also problems with

switching input source back and forth from eyes to such mechanical devices.When audio communication is involved, there can be problems with operating



a radio which can take up mental processing resources. Plan should bedesigned in a manner that such manipulation of communication equipments are

kept to a minimum.

Naturally, operator would shift attention to deal with what is morecritical to be worked on as soon as possible, such as processing a contact

with an opponent that is an immediate threat. When an operator is workingon that task, the operator's capacity to recognize or process any

information that has less relevance to that task would diminish. Thatmeans, an operator should recognize that there can be information the

operator failed to recognize during that task and the operator may have toexamine the situation to see if any information is missed as soon as the

critical task in hand is complete. Simple example of that is an operatorscanning an area to see if there are other threats after handling a contact

with an opponent with gunnery process, or checking if another operator was

trying to tell the operator something if the operator heard a shout. Thisalso means operators should expect delays in receipt of communications by

other operators and plan accordingly, such as not making procedures thatworks under the assumption that no communication is ever missed.

There are also problems with the burden of communicating information anoperator has to another operator while processing information and receiving

new information at the same time. Although communicating while performingother tasks may be necessary in certain circumstances, it should not occur

by design when it can be avoided. There is a mistaken belief thatcommunication is a benefit. Communication is not a benefit, the information

received through communication is a benefit under the assumption that it isrelevant and accurate. However, communication itself is a burden. Any

burden should not exceed the amount that is necessary. Consequently,communications should be done in a manner that maximizes the necessary

information sent or received with minimal effort. Also, tasks should bedesigned in a manner that minimizes the need for communication.

Operators should minimize reliance on receiving information through

communications. An operator taking action to process what is most criticalto one's own safety, such as attacking an opponent that is an immediate

threat, would take priority over communicating information to otheroperators. Because of these limitations, there should not be any assumption

that any information would be communicated immediately or be communicated

at all. Communication equipments can fail, and communications can bemisunderstood. An operator may not recognize that information was sent to

the operator, and information sent can be inaccurate.

Another aspect of load balancing is filtering out unnecessary information.

Use of hearing protection equipment such as ear muffs that filter outexcessive noise not only provides hearing protection, but also help

operators recognize audio signals that is relevant. Also, discomfort andfatigue are items that causes distraction, and distraction places operators



in danger. Those should be kept to a minimum.

Also, necessary amount of relevant information can be obtained more quicklywith less effort depending on the way it is presented. Data fusion, a way

of integrating information into a one or few “big picture,” and moreintuitive form of presentation of data can have that effect. One example of

that is how combat situation information is presented to fighter pilots inmodern fighter aircraft compared to how it was done in the past. In the

past, part of the information would be presented by audio through radio,and number of different parts of the information would be presented through

number of different displays and gauges. The pilot would receiveinformation through radar display, warning sensor displays, radio, etc.,

then integrate that information in one's mind to get an idea of thesituation. Modern fighter aircraft use computer to collect information from

those various sources, such as radar contact information, navigation

information, threat information picked up by sensors, and creates agraphical representation of the tactical situation with all those

information integrated which is presented on a graphical display device.Similar amount of information is conveyed, but the later is more easier andfaster for a pilot to gain situational awareness.

Countering opponents' information collection efforts:

Methods involve misdirection, misinformation, decoy, false alarms, etc.Communication jamming can be involved also.

Operators should also take caution against remote detection devices. That

includes equipments such as surveillance cameras, motion detectors, andother alarm systems. Such devices do not necessarily have to be operated by

opposition. Automatic lights connected to motion detectors are installed inmany houses in U.S. An operator triggering activation of such devices can

be exposed. Information about these should be collected as much aspossible.

1.1.1.1. Information Security.

Operators need to take caution against any information about them being

collected or communication being intercepted by opponents. Informationrelated operator's safety should be guarded from any person who does not

have a legitimate need to know.

Processing/transmission of information through electronic equipment may

have vulnerabilities that needs to be guarded against. Non-encrypted radiotransmissions can be relatively easily intercepted.



1.1.2. Tasking efficiency

1.1.2.1. Human factor.

Operator capabilities required:

-Information collection / processing.

-Weapon skills

-Tactical knowledge

-Mental: Operator must have the mental capability to collectinformation, examine the situation, determine best course of action, and

use deadly force if needed. Operator needs to be able to perform thoseactions while enduring stress of life threatening danger.

1.1.2.1.1. Mind process and limitations.

A person's sensors like eyes, ears, etc., gets signal input from the

environment it is interacting with. It takes time for the person's mind toget that signal and interpret what it means to the person. It also takes

time for the person to then decide a course of action based on that input.And, it takes an additional time for the person to physically move his or

her body to take physical action such as moving or talking, etc.

That is a very simplified model of how information that initiate a task getprocessed through the mind, and the purpose of it is to illustrate that it

time it takes for a person to take action from the time the personperceived the information that triggered the response.

Certain thing in an operator's environment that interacts with an operator

that results in a reaction would have triggered a series of mental process

events: Sensory input of the certain thing in the environment, recognitionwhat that certain thing is, making a response decision, carrying the

response decision in to action. The certain thing can be an entity, such asan opponent, or action or state of an entity, such as opponent's action.

Signal processing would involve stages from sensory input to recognition.From that point, information processing would consecutively go through

stages of recognition, response decision, action in a consecutive manner.Information process of an instance of information input at one point of



time would flow consecutively.

However, each stage of that information processing runs concurrently. Thatmeans while one instance of information input is being processed at

response decision stage, next instance of information input is beingrecognized at the same time. So, all process stages are continuously

running. So, even if an information that warrants a certain action is beinginput at current point of time, the action being carried out at the moment

would be triggered by information input that came in at an earlier point oftime, and the current action may not be what is warranted by information

input that is coming in at current point of time.

According to the diagram above, A response action from Cut A which wasrecognized at T1 does not occur until T3. The operator would be making a

response decision on Cue B while taking action on Cue A and recognizing Cue

C at time unit T3.

This means there is a delay between an information input and a proper

response action. It also means when an operator is responding to ainformation input, the operator is not starting the process from a neutral

state of mind and action, but from the state of mind and action which wasresponding to a prior information input which may take certain amount of

time in order to cease or adjust.

Being aware of this aids operators' realistic assessment of response timewhen interacting with threat. It also gives knowledge that one party's

delay in response for mental process can be used to another party'sadvantage.

This concept is commonly known as OODA loop. OODA standing for observation,

orientation, decision, and action, and introduced by John Boyd. However,there are some misunderstandings of the concept. Contrary to the title, the

whole process is not entirely a loop, although there are some feed back inthe process that forms a loop. And, it's probably not meant to be

understood that way by Boyd. The process involves taking action from anobservation of state, some of which is not a result of an operator's

action. So, it's not all feed back loops. Also, a process can start from aninformation input without the process that started from an earlier

information input being terminated, as explained before. There are somedepiction of OODA loop by some people which consists of a diagram with

observation, orientation, decision, action stage and a single path arrow

connecting the four, forming a loop. This probably reflects those people'smisunderstanding of the concept. The actual OODA diagram is much more



complex, and it is not a simple loop.

There are mental and physical tasks that need to be processed during theoperation. These processes require control. Because the control system of

human body being an analog system that allows interaction betweeninformation and control signal process allocated for each task, other

sensor input, other mental process or state can interfere with criticaltasks.

To deal with such interference, more mental effort to maintain critical

processes and to suppress processes causing interference may be required.The operator should monitor what tasks are running in the mind. Unintended

mental process must be suppressed. The causes of unintended processes arevarious. It can be something simple as irrelevant thoughts. However, it can

also be learned responses that are triggered by certain conditions,

according to how the operator's mind is conditioned. The learning may havebeen done either consciously or subconsciously, but the unintended response

is subconscious which the operator has less control over.Since human mind does not provide a function to erase discrete range ofdata, the problematic process data has to be rewritten or overpowered by

another process. Or the trigger that causes the process to run can benullified by changing association. If the process is not accessed for a

long period, the "imprint" of the data can fade.For similar reason, some learned techniques may require repeated training

in order to prevent the process data from fading.

For fine control of a weapon, or other physical and mental tasking, theability to relax the body and maintain calmness to a certain degree while

being alert is important. The ability to do so under stress of lifethreatening danger differs in degree from individual to individual. Because

of the probability of more effort being required for fine control understress, some may choose to use techniques that are more forgiving to coarse

movements or requires less or no fine movements. It is possible to selectonly the techniques that have less or no fine movements, and expect

success, for reasons such as close distance or other factors in aparticular situation that reduces the necessity of motions with more

precision. However, an operator who chooses to do so is not likely tohandle a situation where precision required is above the level of precision

the techniques the operator is used to provide. The operator who has

stronger control over one’s mental and physical state and is able to stayclam will have more range of techniques that can be employed, and also have

more precision and flexibility with the techniques employed.

1.1.2.1.2. Maximizing information process efficiency.



-Simplify task: Task should be simple as possible. Any step of action onthe process should have a justification for the inclusion in the process.

More steps or actions means increased effort or time consumed whichincreases the risk for the operator. If any action that increases effort or

time consumed is added to the task, it must be something essential or havea benefit that outweighs the risk.

-Minimize number of task at a given time:

Attempt to control the speed, probability and frequency of events thatrequire attention emerging. For example, slow movement for maneuver may

make unrevealed area reveal slowly, making new elements of concern appearat a slower rate. Trying to keep number of tasks processed at the same time

to a minimum, by selectively executing limited number of tasks at a time,may increase efficiency of mental process.

1.1.2.1.3. Precision, speed, effectiveness of task.

Every process or technique is designed to achieve a certain goal.Effectiveness depends on economy of actions to achieve that goal and

overall impact the goal achieved itself has on an operation. Both precisionand speed are necessary depending on the situation at hand, but sometimes

one decreases the other. The goal is not a concern of what is most preciseor what is fastest. It’s a question of what is most effective in achieving

a desired state. Less complex or less fine actions can be executed quicker.Effort should be made to make task, techniques, or other motions less

complex and require less fineness. However, this does not mean all complexor fine motions should be eliminated. It still needs to contain all steps

or actions required to achieve the objective of the task or action, and ifspeed affects precision required to achieve the objective, the speed needs

to be controlled to optimum level.

Whether if a certain task that require complex or fine action is justifiedor not depends on certain factors:

-Ability: Is the operator able to execute the task?

-Necessity: Are there easier, and at least equally effective alternatives?

-Benefit: What benefit does the technique that may be difficult to executegives the operator?

For example, some claims using a sight is too complex of a task. But, ifprecision shot is called for, use of the sight may be the only viable

option in certain situations. If the operator does not have the ability toproperly use the sight, techniques involving the use of sight may be of no



value to the operator. But, that does not relieve the operator from theproblem of having to make a precision shot.

In terms of economy of action to achieve that goal, what is desired is

conciseness. This needs to be distinguished from simplification. The mostcommon error I have observed is simplification used in place of making a

process concise in process or technique design. Conciseness means to reducethe process to its essence of what needs to be done in order to achieve a

goal, getting rid of waste and irrelevant actions. Both a process made moreconcise and a process simplified would be more compact compared to its

original form. The difference is a process made concise retains all theessence of the original goal and what is needed to achieve it while

simplified process may have an expected goal that is degraded compared tothe original.

-Adaptability in technique design:Unnecessary actions need to be minimized and unnecessarily going through

resistance or awkwardness, etc, should be avoided. There is a question ofwhat is the best way to move one's body to do a certain task. The answer

lies in a given situation, intended goal, and principles applied. As far asmoving body goes, for the most part, it's a question of how fast the body

gets into the intended position with with minimal unnecessary movement andbe ready to do what it is required once it gets to the position.

If there is a task that can only be properly completed by doing sub-tasks

in specific sequence, then memorizing and ingraining that sub-tasks insequence will be beneficial. However, the procedure should not be more

specific than it needs to be.

There is a tendency for many people or organizations to create scriptedmotion sequences that is to be followed for as many tasks they can think of

as possible. The problem with that approach is that a certain scriptedsequence of motions efficient in one situation may not be feasible in other

situation when performing the same task. And, some times they createscripted motion sequence just for the sake of having one.

One prime example is feet and leg movement for turning motion when operatorresponds to detected opponents to one's side or rear for aiming. I

recommend to NOT script entire leg motion sequence for that purpose. Inoperations, operator may find oneself standing on variety of different

surfaces. Those surfaces may not be even, may contain obstacles, may only

provide vary limited area for the operator to place one's foot. It's notfeasible to script a foot work for every conceivable surface conditions,

and even if it is attempted, it is unlikely that anything worth the effortwill come out of it.



When someone plans to always turn with the support arm side foot first, the

person may later find oneself standing on a place where doing so would beinefficient, dangerous, or simply impossible because of obstacles

restricting movement.

If an operator is following a rule of always stepping toward the directionthe operator turns to, the operator will likely slam one's knee into a fire

hydrant if there was one right behind the operator as the operatorresponded to a threat emerging from the rear.

Most adult people's mind have stored data regarding how to move one's leg

to turn in variety of different circumstances. A few scripted sequence inmostly suited for a flat ground with no obstacles is highly unlikely to be

of any better quality of a control software than the control software most

adults already developed through decades of their lives.

The above example illustrates that when considering scripted sequence ofmotion for developing technique to perform a task, potential benefit andrisk involved should be examined.

-Utilization of conditioned subconscious response:

Training a person to execute certain actions in certain condition so thatthe person would be conditioned execute the actions on a subconscious level

would usually have best efficiency in executing techniques.

However, that is done under the assumption that the action trained is whatneeds to be done when that condition occurs. There is a risk of the person

executing the actions upon recognizing that condition when those actions issomething that should not be done in that particular situation.

This needs to be taken into consideration when designing a technique and

doing such training to minimize such risks. Avoid automation without aspecific justifiable need that can deprive opportunity to make a decision

to change course of action as required.

1.1.2.1.4. Physical capability and limitations of human.

Physical characteristics:

For example, human eyes can only see things within certain field of view,and objects in peripheral vision are not clearly recognized. Also, it takes

less time for an operator to shift focus from one object to another if theangular distribution of objects are less. Increased weight of the gear may



reduce effectiveness and cause fatigue faster. These limitations should beconsidered while selecting course of action.

Energy preservation:

Keep energy expenditure for only the actions that are necessary. More thespeed and number of actions, higher the energy consumption rate. Keep the

speed and number of actions only to a level that is necessary. Fatigueaffects overall efficiency of actions.

An operator must not be too fatigued for effective reaction to contact at

any point, and any technique or plan employed that does conflicts with thisshould be avoided as much as possible. This also applies to equipment

selection. When a carried or use of an equipment causes fatigue, thereshould be a plan to control the the length or manner of carry and use of

that equipment to keep the degree of fatigue to a level where operator can

still operate with effectiveness.

Environmental control and comfort:One often overlooked aspect is comfort. This is often mistakenly seen asluxury, it is actually an important item. Discomfort is a signal input that

can interfere with sensing necessary information unless that input itselfis relevant. Discomfort is distraction, and distraction is a danger to

operators. Ability to work with certain level of discomfort is a necessity,but not getting rid of any unnecessary discomfort when there is an

opportunity is nothing short of stupidity.

There is a limited range of environmental condition where human can beeffective. More the environment deviates from that range, the effectiveness

gets affected and probability of harm rises. If the degree of deviation ishigh, then there is a probability of injury or death from environmental

effect.

Planning and equipment readiness includes consideration about how to keepan operator in the optimal environmental condition and how to protect the

operator from it when the environment deviates from it.

******More details in Volume 1 Equipments section.

1.1.2.1.5. Control of mental/physical interference generated from perceived

threat:

Perception of a threat that may cause harm causes stress. The level is

higher when the threat is associated with physical harm, death, or loss ofanything that is important enough for someone to engage in combat to guard

it at the risk of physical harm or death. The stress caused by it caninterfere with efficient mental information processing or control over body



movement. This warrants a look at measures to reduce the stress to reducethe interference and overcome existing interference.

Any movement control of the body part is done by determining target

movement, issue control signals to move, track the movement with sensors,and send necessary signals to correct errors of the movement as the mind

determines. This is a continuous feed back loop. All process is runconstantly, but it will take time for a determination in mind to go through

the loop and result in motion of the actual target body part. Problem withthe analog control system our body has with conducting a certain process is

that it allows signals generated by mind or sensor input that is irrelevantto the process to interfere with it. By the analog nature, signals need to

track and command fine movements will be affected more. This problem has tobe dealt with.

More reliance on less error prone sensor is one. For tracking a movement orlocation, the visual sensor is the most accurate and reliable. That is the

reason why motions that requires precision, such as aiming a weapon, aredone visually. More mental effort for issuing command signals and receivingtracking signals, by concentrating on the fine motions required, may also

work, with certain limitations. However, that may consume additional mentalresources.

Also, unintended command signals generated must be suppressed. Flinching

upon weapon fire may be one example of such command signal. Some of thoseare spontaneous actions with low probability of repeating. However, those

unintended command signals can be from a learned response that is triggeredby certain conditions. Operator should be able to detect, diagnose, and fix

the problem.

Having prior knowledge and preparation for potential threat can reduce thestress response, because it gives the operator more probability of control

over the threat situation. It also makes it possible for the operator toassociate the perception of threat with a proper response, and utilize the

signals generated from the perception of the targeted threat as a stimulifor a proper response.

Controlled breathing at moderate phase may also help reduce tension and

gain sense of control over physical excitement. Mental tension under threat

may cause a person to subconsciously pause breathing. Body's reaction toholding breath may cause additional mental and physical tension which can

be reduced by controlled breathing.

Conditioning oneself to scan surroundings in proper frequency for

situational awareness, unless there is a specific thing that warrantsattention, can help counter the effect of stress causing people to get

their attention overly fixated on limited scope and losing situationalawareness.



There is always a probability of injury or death when a person is in an

area where an opponent intending to cause such harm exists. That is causesstress that decreases one's effectiveness in carrying out tasks. If a

person intend to be successful in a combat operation, there need to be anunderstanding that whether if one accepts that risk or not is irrelevant to

the face that the risk exists. Stress needs to be controlled, not throughirrational denial of an existing danger, but through the understanding that

systematically applying proper tactics techniques reduces that risk and useit as a motivator for carrying out the task with conviction. In that sense,

an organization can make a member have conviction by telling the member tohave it. What the person is told to do needs to make sense about why it

would improve one's security.

Use of some methods that are relatively complex compared to other methods

to achieve a same goal that are less complex may be justified if therelatively complex methods would have higher effectiveness when correctly

executed. Also, certain things can only be achieved by use of complexmethods. Stress degrading one's effectiveness affecting ability to performmore complex task more can be a risk with a decision to use those

relatively complex methods. However, if training and research resource isavailable, operators should not let the standard of limiting methods used

to what can be achieved with simple motions or thinking dictate what theycan or cannot do. If a better result can be had with use of more complex

methods, then operators should seek to expand their ability under stress tobe able to perform the complex methods through research and training.

Some people are more calm under that pressure and less affected by the

stress. Those people have better ability to accomplish a given task andsurvive. And, that calmness under pressure can be increased with training.

Putting effort in research and training to perform to a level as high astraining time and resources allow is a better approach than defaulting to

what all average people are assumed to be able to do. Some people can donoting more than scream and run when threatened with violence, and that is

not a plan of action of what a person who intend to be successful in combatoperation can default to. If the standard is "Anyone should be able to do

this under stress..." then there is no limit to how low that standard canget.

1.1.2.2. Equipment factor

For example, a firearm can usually attack only one target at a time, buthas the ability to attack opponents at a distance. The maximum effective

distance varies by type of weapon and the operator’s ability to use it.Operator must have an understanding of these characteristics and



limitations.

******More details in Volume 1 Equipments section.



1.1.3. Effectiveness of combat gunnery

An operator's gunnery capability have a great influence on what actions canbe taken. Even if an operator is placed in a situation where all other

tactical factors are in favor of the operator, it may be of no benefit ifthe operator is unable to execute effective gunnery on the opponents in

that situation.

Operators need to be able to correctly assess how effective their gunnerywould be in a given situation.

******More details in Volume 1 Combat Gunnery section.

1.1.3.1. Effective Range.

Operators need to have an accurate assessment of what kind of standard forgunnery effectiveness is required with a specific firearm and gunneryeffectiveness operators can actually achieve at the current time.

Maneuvering and positioning decision is affected by how to place operatorswhere their gunnery would be effective while that of the opponent would be

low as possible, a process which would be hindered if operators do not havea clear picture of their gunnery capabilities.

For example: If operators are expected to fight opponents who are at 100m

distance, operators would be required to hit targets at 100m distance withsufficient accuracy to deliver hits to part of the target that would likely

be incapacitating. Using a target that is a size of a fully exposed manfacing the shooter would not be a good indicator of whether if operators

have this capability if opponents are expected to be exposed to the samedegree.

If some operators are determined to be capable of effective gunnery range

up to 100m based on their ability to hit any part of a fully exposed massize target, then the effective range they are capable would have to be

rated lower with opponents wearing body armor that effectively protectssome part of the opponent's body.

Military organizations such as that of United States of America have riflequalification programs that shoot up to 250m~300m, and rate their standard

issue rifle range even further than that distance. However, realisticmethod of assessing effective range would bring the actual effective range

very short compared to those distances.

If operators' involved can only deliver effective hits on exposed part of

opponents at 25m, then planning should be done with the consideration thatthey can only deliver effective hits within 25m. This brings up the



importance of gunnery skills. If operators involved can only delivereffective hits at short distances, that would require them to be close to

opponents for effective attack. That increases the risk due to increasedopponent gun fire effectiveness, increased speed of opponent's counter

maneuver upon detection, and many other reasons.



1.1.4. Utilization of protective objects.

There are many types of protective objects. Some are specifically designedand placed in location for the purpose of providing protection, and some

are objects that are not designed for that purpose but can be utilized ormanipulated for that purpose. Some types of barrier objects are mobile,

some can be worn, and some are stationary.

An object may provide protection under certain conditions, but not inanother. For example, certain body armor may protect against most pistol

fired projectiles, but not against more powerful ammunition fired fromother types of firearms.

The protection effect also depends on the geometrical relationship of the

operator, the object, and the opponent. There are following factors to

consider:

-Material and structure of a protective object.

-How much area of the operator is blocked by the object from an attacker's

weapon point of view.

-Opponent’s firearm type and ammunition type

-How far the opponent is from the protective object

Operator needs to know what kind of firearm and ammunition opponent isusing in order to know what kind of object can be used to shield oneself

against it. This is not always possible, so the operator needs to be awareof penetration capabilities of most type of firearms and ammunition

combinations the operator is likely to encounter in addition to knownopponent weapons and consider object that can provide protection from those

as what to use for protection. However, it’s also necessary to have a planof action for when the operator discovers that opponents have more powerful

weapons than anticipated.

Distance from opponent's weapon to object used for protection determineshow much energy of the bullet fired by the opponent is lost before it

reaches the object. As a bullet travels through the air and other

materials, it continuously loses velocity which decreases its kineticenergy based destructive power used for penetration. If the bullet also

possess destructive power based on something other than kinetic energy,such as chemical energy from explosive, that won’t be affected.



Terms Defined:

POEZ: (Probable Opponent Emergence Zone) An area where an opponent mayappear from. More details in Maneuvering ans Positioning Section.

OAZ: (Opponent Alert Zone) An area where opponent's attention may bedirected to in response to opponent being alerted to an operator'spresence. More details in Maneuvering and Positioning Section.

1.1.4.1. Utilizing stationary objects for protection.

If the operator does not know where the opponent is, the operator cannot



know where to maneuver to in relation to a protective object. The idealcase would be finding a protective object which can cover the operator from

all POEZ, which in most situations is not likely to happen. If there aremultiple POEZ in the area, and estimated probability of opponent appearance

of each POEZ is about the same, an operator placing one self so that aprotective object will provide security from most of the POEZ may be the

best course of action.

If probability of opponent appearance of certain POEZ or group of POEZ ishigher than the others, the operator may have to adjust priority of POEZ

the operator want to be protected from accordingly. However from the safetyof the protective object from high priority POEZ, the operator will have

to also watch those POEZ that the protective object is not covering.

However, operators would need to keep a certain distance away from the

protection object. One reason is because of individual space needed for anoperator to execute essential functions such as gunnery process or

maintaining a ready posture. If an operator has one's torso in contact witha wall in front of the operator, there would likely be a problem with theoperator getting the gun in firing position.

Another reason is the related to the effect of incoming rounds fired by

opponents. If a bullet goes through the object, it still may cause adeflection in the bullet's flight path. The deflection may be large enough

to miss the operator if the operator kept certain distance away from theobject and kept the operator's exposure behind the object to a minimum.

Same applies when a bullet is deflected by a protection object. It isusually the edge of a protective object that the operator utilize for

protection while shooting at opponents, and the edge on a protective objectmay be relatively weaker compared to other part of the object. Near that

edge the operator is exposed from will be shot at the most. Same applies toany secondary projectiles created by incoming rounds hitting the protective

object.

In order to have time to react to an emerging opponent, the operator needsto keep distance from potential danger area, such as POEZ. However, an

object that can be utilized to shield an operator may not only cover theoperator from the opponent’s point of view, but it can also hide an

opponent behind it at the same time. So, if an operator is using an object

as a shielding, such as using a corner of a wall for cover, the operatorneeds to keep some distance from what may appear behind the object, and at

the same time be close enough to the object to use the object as ashielding. This is a requirement that contradicts one another. So, the

exact distance from the object has to be decided by assessing the risks and

benefits involved with being closer or being farther. Considering opponentswith weapons that are not designed to be used at a distance, such as blunt

force or edged weapons, the operator would prefer to have a distance thatwill give the operator enough time to respond before the emerged opponent



can advance to the operator and make physical contact. More distance willbe better.

The problem is when opponents have firearms. If both parties are using the

same object between them as a cover, the object may provide better coverfor the party that is closer to it, if other geometrical relationship to

that object is the symmetrical. So, the distance to object used forprotection need to be close as possible for countering opponents with

firearms with some distance kept that would allow operator room to performnecessary tasks and time to react to any opponents with contact weapon

that may emerge from behind the object.

-Momentary exposure technique:

If observation is needed, it is better if it can be done with protectionfrom a shielding object. However, observation or gunnery process may

require exposure from the shielding. The operator can choose to expose only

the necessary portion of the body for a brief period for the observation,being ready to pull it back quickly behind shielding objects. This utilizesthe response lag, the time it takes for opponents possibly present to

perceive the operator and react to it. Examples of situations where thistechnique may be required are when an operator has to be exposed into OAZ

or opponents' view in order to observe an area, or when an operator isexposing oneself from protected area to unexamined area that is so

directionally dispersed that operator would be exposing oneself to part ofthat unexamined area that the operator did not see.



-Exposure Point Movement Technique:

While partially exposed from a protection object to an area, opponents, orother entities an operator is observing, operator can make movement to make

the location of the exposed part of the operator change. Keep in mind thatthe movement can be in any feasible direction, including horizontal and

vertical. When combined with Momentary Exposure Technique, an operator cammake exposed part of the operator appear momentarily in one location from

the protection object and appear at a different location from theprotection object when momentary exposure needs to be done again.

-Technical concerns, side of weapon mount:

When utilizing stationary objects for protection, such as corner of a wall,

while attacking an opponent or examining an area, the operator may need toexpose a part of one’s body and the weapon beyond the side edge of the

object used for protection. Efficiency of the use of protective objectsmay be less with the weapon positioned on the side of the operator’s bodythat is opposite of the side where the edge is on the shielding object.

For example, an operator may have more difficulty utilizing a corner on theleft side of a wall when a long gun is positioned with the stock contacting

the operator’s right side shoulder.

The best way to maximize the use of the corner is to match the side theweapon is mounted to the side the corner is on, but that may require

switching the side the weapon is positioned. There are arguments againstswitching the side weapon is mounted on, in order to maximize utilization

of shielding, when those two sides do not match, which is:

a) Operator may become vulnerable while the switch is being executed.

b) Operator is less accurate while shooting with the weapon mounted on theside the operator is less accustomed to.

The first one is a valid argument. But, there is an emergency transition

technique that can reduce the risk. And, the risk of not switching has arisk of not being able to properly utilize protection offered by the

environment an operator is in and the risk of not being able to properly

point a gun at a target at all in certain circumstances.

The second argument invalid. In order utilize the corner of a protectiveobject with a weapon on the side of the body that is opposite to the side

the corner, the operator has to use a technique that requires awkward

positioning of the weapon, or form a very awkward posture. In worse case,operator in that situation insisting on not changing weapon positioning to

maximize protection would not be getting any protection at all.



Depending on the situation, shooting accuracy with the awkward techniquemay not be any better than shooting with the weapon positioned on the side

the operator usually does not position the weapon. Also, operator shouldtrain to shoot with a weapon positioned on either left or right side for

various reasons, although it may not be necessary for the skill shootingfrom either side be equal. Pistols can be retained on hand of the same side

with more ease because it is not requires to be fixed on one side of theshoulder, and can be aimed with either eye.

Analysis of object to be utilized for protection:

Most objects often available in environment to be utilized for protection

do not have simple solid structure. Some part of it will be constructed ofmaterials with not enough density or thickness for protection, and it may

also have materials that are presents potential hazard to operators.Thickness of the material regarding protection from gun fire would beassessed by the length a bullet has to travel through the material in order

to reach the target, fired from a given direction, so it will changeaccording to what direction the bullet was fired from into the object that

consists of the material.

How a given object is to be utilized will be decided with all the abovepoints in consideration. For example: A vehicle has parts that bullets can

easily penetrate and parts that most pistol and rifle bullets would not beable to penetrate. Most vehicle also have a lot of glass parts which would

create a large volume of secondary projectiles when hit by a bullet, andanyone in the the volume of area such secondary projectiles would cover can

be harmed by it. Gas tank contains fuel and gas vapor filled air that isflammable. So, a vehicle should be utilized in a way that the part with

sufficient density and thickness would be positioned between an operatorand opponents, but areas where secondary projectiles would be a threat need

to be avoided.

Another problem to consider is a material that provides protection beingutilized covered by material that would not provide protection when

operators are using momentary exposure technique or exposing themselves for

a certain duration to observe or attack opponents. The extra thickness ofthe material that does not provide protection requires additional exposure,

corresponding to the thickness of the non-protective material, of theoperators, in order for them to observe or attack opponents. That also mean

additional movement distance when using momentary exposure technique.



Proper way to utilize a given object according to such analysis can often

be different from how people with less knowledge imagines how it should be

done. *****Refer to Volume 3 "The Tactical Critic" section for moredetails.

Mobile/portable objects for protection:

Certain objects that can provide protection may be portable. Using them for

protection during maneuver or fortifying position to improve protection inan area can be an option. However, risk associated with effort required to

move such objects should also be considered.

1.1.4.2. Utilizing body armor for protection.

Balancing degree of protection and weight and bulk:



For reasons that will be explained in Volume 1 Equipments section, armorwith least wight and bulk should be selected as long as it provides

necessary function and protection. One problem with body armor selection isthat higher the level of protection it provides usually the heavier and

bulkier it is. There is a limit to how much weight a human can bear andthere is more limit when the person bearing the weight has to preform

physical operations. Increased weight and bulk would lower mobility andincrease fatigue. Also, the bulk may restrict movement range of an

operator's body. All that is a risk.

Role policy:

Another aspect of body armor use to consider is to define what tacticalrole it has. Tactics and type of body armor that is desirable change

according to what kind of role the user considers a body armor has. Thereare following different approaches:

- To consider it as a failsafe layer of protection when all other means toprotect the operator from gun fire, maneuver and positioning, gunnery on

opponent, utilization of other objects that provides shielding, etc., hasfailed.

- To consider it as a protection that should be intentionally utilized to

give operators an option to expose themselves to gun fire.

If first approach is taken, there is no significant change in whatoperators do to conduct operations except that operators have added

protection when when operators unexpectedly receive gun fire in part of thebody that is protected by the armor. Assuming proper measures are taken to

properly manage possible fatigue and restriction of movement range by bodyarmor, etc., this approach significantly increases benefit at the cost of

negligible risk.

The second approach is taken mostly when operators intends to enter areaswhere they cannot avoid being exposed to opponents' attack, usually because

something about their objective requires it. For example, some operators in

certain position may enter ares that will expose them to opponents' attackin order to quickly reach a room containing a hostage to give the hostage

taker minimum opportunity to harm the hostage. Soldiers may be expected bytheir organization to enter a room, occupied by alert and ready opponents,

in order to clear that room.

No matter how much armor protection an operator has, any exposure is an

unwanted risk. Body armor usually does not cover all part of the wearer'sbody that would result in serious injury or death if it is hit by gun fire.



That makes it very risky to use the second approach. And, that is also thereason why when such approach is taken, operators would choose to take

additional measures to lower the opponents' probability of successfulresponse when they are exposed, such as use of distraction device, etc.,

when given the option. But, it is usually uncertain if those measuresincluding body armor itself would be effective. For those reasons, the

approach is usually not acceptable unless there is an operational objectivean operator is willing to risk death for.

When the second approach is taken, often heavier armor that covers more

area compared to body armors used in connection with the other approach areused. Preferably, that is with the assumption that duration of operations

will be short, but operations may take longer time than expected.

As a standard, the fist approach that consider body armor as failsafe layer

when all other protection measures failed should be taken. And, thereshould be no assumption in tactics or planning that body armors give

operators ability to do something that they were not capable of without thebody armors.

However, if operators involuntarily got in situation where exposure toopponents' attack has already occurred or cannot be avoided, consideration

should be given to how to maximize the effect of body armor worn.

In some circles, people would advocate taking posture to make part of thebody armor covering the front torso in a manner that the line from operator

to opponent shooting at the operator would be perpendicular to the armor.The argument in support of the measure is that presenting maximum surface

covered by the armor to the opponent the operator is exposed to providesmaximum protection.

However, the effect and the risk such measure has needs to be examined.

First, changing posture to place armor in certain direction may prevent theoperator from forming a shooting platform most suited for maximum gunnery

efficiency. If the torso is positioned so that its front will be directlypointed at an opponent, it will require the operator aiming a rifle at the

opponent to straighten the support arm more to hold a same spot on therifle compared to when the torso is an an oblique angle to the opponent

which would make the support arm side shoulder closer to where the support

hand holds a rifle. That may result in hindering the shooter from gettingefficient shooting platform, depending on the type of shooter and weapon.

Although the impact would not be as great in case of using pistol, suchmethod still can prevent an operator from forming a shooting platform the

operator is most efficient with.

Also, the front side of torso that has maximum armor coverage facing a

direction oblique to the operator to opponent line may be beneficialdepending on the circumstances, especially when operator is utilizing



objects that provides protection that only makes part of the operatorexposed.

Body armor does not stop an opponent from attacking an exposed operator

wearing it. Only, incapacitation of the opponent would. So, decreasingefficiency of incapacitating opponent in order to maximize body armor

coverage is a significant increase in risk that needs to be comparedcarefully to what benefits it would bring. However, if the adjustment in

shooting posture can be done to maximize armor coverage with no significantimpact in gunnery efficiency, such as when an opponent the operator is

exposed to is very close, then it may be worth doing so. Like anythingelse, situation changes according to risk to benefit analysis.



1.1.5. Signature Control.

This involves minimizing any signature that will give information toopponents while trying to reduce the effort of opponents minimizing their

signature, and detect opponents' signatures as much as possible. Examplesof signatures are as follows:

-Visual appearance

-Audio-Radio communication signals

-Infra Red-Heat

Reducing detectable signature is usually done by utilization of concealment

or lowering the amount of signature itself emitted from the operator.

Concealment can be anything that hinders the opponent's ability to detectthe operator's signature. Most frequently utilized type is visual

concealment, and the word usually refers to that one. Since there are waysother than eyes for a human to detect signatures, measures against audio,pressure, or temperature sensors can also be concealment. So, concealment

work in one of two ways: Blocking or reducing a signal from getting to theopponent's sensors, or interfering or saturating the opponent's sensor with

noise signals.

One of the things that should be considered while utilizing concealment isthat once an operator's position is discovered opponents can attack the

operator's suspected position even if the opponents cannot directly observethe operator. Operators may have to move to position where there is

protection or move sufficient distance to make opponent hard to estimatethe operators new location to avoid such attack.

Signature control also means revealing that of the opponent. Methods

involve reducing noise to better detect audio visual signature of opponentsand employment of equipments to detect signatures not detectable by human

senses or creating a condition that makes opponent's signature detectableby human senses.



1.1.5.1. Visual signature.

There are number of measures used to control visual signatures. Some ofwhich that will be explained are as follows:

-Blocking operator's visual signature by optical barriers.

-Reduction of operator's visual signature by maneuvering and

positioning in low light areas.

-Creation of low light area for operator to maneuver and position bycontrolling or destroying light sources in the environment.

-Reduction of opponent's probability of operator recognition by

controlling selection of clothing and equipment color and maneuvering

and positioning in areas where background would have lower contrastwith operators clothing and equipment.

-Use of light sources to observe dark areas or hinder opponent'sobservation efforts.

Optical Barriers:

These are opaque objects can block the opponent's view, concealing theoperator. This is the type that is commonly referred to as "concealment."

To utilize these, an operator have to maneuver or position in a manner thatthese would be between the operator and where opponents may be.

Partial optical barrier:

Some objects have spaces that allow some light to go through which will

result in not completely blocking the view of an object behind it.Depending on the geometrical relationship between a parties involved and

the object, one party may easily detect another party by seeing through theopening of that object when that object is hindering the other party's

ability to detect the party that can easily observe that party. One example

of object that can be a partial optical barrier is vegetation. A personstanding by a plant may be able to see through the open space in the space

the plant body occupies to see an opponent, but the probability of for theopponent standing farther from the object to do the same to detect the

person may be low.

This type of object presents a problem that whenever such object is

present, the person who is exposed to that object is potentially exposed toany opponent that may be concealed by that object. This lowers the accuracy



of operators risk assessment when analyzing environment for maneuver orpositioning, etc. For example: Operations in wilderness where there are lot

of plants throughout the area. Even if only one opponent is observed, anyplant in the area can be concealing an opponent who can immediately attack

the observing operator as soon as the operator expose oneself by shootingthe observed opponent. This brings great ambiguity for making threat

assessment.

Color, contrast, and brightness:

Lower the light level where an operator is, harder for an opponent to

detect. Operators should plan maneuvering and positioning in a manner that

they would be in area that is darker compared to areas they need to observeor where opponents may emerge from as much as possible. A person seeking

concealment does not have to be in total darkness for concealment bydarkness to work. If the relative ambient brightness of the surroundingarea is brighter than the operator's location with enough difference to

significantly overpower the light signature of the operator, it can stillwork. Even if an operator's light signature is detected, opponents still

have a problem of recognition. That means even if an observer detects anobject, it is harder for the observer to decide what to do about it if the

observer cannot identify what it is. Clothing and equipment colored withsimilar color to the background is harder to identify. If the outline and

other shape feature is harder to distinguish from the background, it isalso harder for an observer to recognize.

The problem with selecting equipment color to minimize detection is that a

color and its pattern that blends well with a surrounding changes from areato area and even according to time and light conditions. There are multiple

problems and methods to manage that problems, and let's examine a few.

One approach to selecting a color and texture similar to multipleenvironmental background is to get a color and texture that represents a

median average of the color and texture of all expected operation area.This approach is commonly used for many military organizations that has a

very wide range of operation area to cover. However, this method has a

problem that the median the average color and texture does not particularlyblend in well with any particular environment if that of the environment

differs greatly from one to another. However, it is likely to blend in wellcompared to a color and texture that is developed for one particular

environment used in an environment that is different from the environment

it was designed for.

Another approach is to use darker color to help blend in behind a brighterobject and attract less attention. Any color that does not commonly exist



in the background should be avoided. Colors that has a tendency to attractattention should also be avoided, unless it is necessary to make an

operator less distinguishable.

If an observer has objects in foreground and an operator moving in thebackground in area, operator appearing less brighter the foreground objects

would likely lessen the probability of the operator being detected.However, if the operator with dark color equipment gets into a bright area,

the dark color would have better contrast against the background, makingthe operator more detectable. The reason why darker color compared to

median average color may be desirable, even with that risk, is because thatrisk can be controlled and there may be a great benefit because of the

manner of maneuver and positioning required in operations.

For low detection probability, operators may often plan to use darker area

and avoid being contrasted against bright color background for maneuver andpositioning. Especially when objects to protect operator from exposure is

utilized, operator would like to find oneself with an object covering theoperator in the foreground from opponent's point of view with operator inrelative dark if the operator is observed. This would mean it would be

beneficial to use color that is darker than the average color brightness ofthe entire area. However, this is if there is a dark area or objects that

can be used to shield operator available. Some times, there are no suchthings. Also, surface color patterns and attachments to distort the

outlines and visible features appearance so that it would look differentfrom what is expected are also used.

All of these methods are often used in combined manner. Once equipments

with certain color and its pattern are selected, operators' positioning andmaneuver plan should incorporate measures to place the operators where it

is harder for observers to distinguish background from the selectedequipments.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

An operators must also control any alterations to visual appearance of an

area caused by the operator, in addition to direct visual exposure toopponents. An operator's shadow or image reflected on reflective surfaces

can reveal an operator to opponents even if opponents do not have direct

line of sight to the operator.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------



---------------------------------------------------------------------------Active light source needs to be controlled. LED or LCD screen on equipments

emitting light should be controlled. Equipments should be configured in away that it would not emit light when user does not expect it to. Light

emission from illumination devices should be allowed only when necessityout weighs the risk.

When light emission from illumination devices on operator is not in use, or

to minimize its use, ambient light and light sources that existed in theenvironment would be used as much as possible. Environmental light means

ambient light and light from any light sources provided by the environment.It does not matter if the light sources are natural or artificial.

The degree of useful environmental light would be amount necessary torecognize if something that came in visual contact is an opponent or not

and what kind of threat it poses. If the light level is below that, itwould often be necessary to use an illumination device or other mechanicaltool to observe an area.

There can be a situation where light level is only enough for a detection

or recognition of a person or person's action to a degree that is notsufficient in detail or clarity for an operator to act on. If there are no

better alternative observation options, that level of observation may haveto be utilized to the best of what it can provide.

Darkness adaption of human eyes:

With some length of time, human eyes can adjust to see better in darknesswhen in dark. Part of human eyes that senses light are divided in to Cones

and Rods. Cones are mostly responsible for sensing colors and shapes thatis utilized to recognize objects when sufficient amount of light exist.

Rods, when given time to adapt to darkness, can be more sensitive to lightwhich gives a person ability to observe objects to some degree in a light

level that would be insufficient for Cones to work properly. The time,according to my experience, is approximately half an hour. However, the

time it takes for darkness adaption can change, depending on what level of

light or kind of light a person was exposed to prior to the darkness, howlong the exposure to that light level was, etc.

Also, vision through Rod input does not present precise image of observed

objects in shape or color. Also, because Cones and Rods are positioned in

eyes in a manner that Rods are surrounding Cones. When light level isinsufficient for Cones, it would leave a blind area at the center of the

image a human sees which was supposed to be a part that Cones provide theimage. That requires a person with darkness adapted eyes to move the center



of observation point to observe an area by moving off center or peripheralvision area. An object of interest would be observed by placing the object

offset to the center blind area of the image a person sees.

There are many medical literatures, military manuals, and other documentsthat describes much more details. For the purpose of this document, this

section is intended to provide basic information about darkness adaption ofhuman eyes, and to inform that it can be used to recognize surrounding

environment and detect people to some degree in limited circumstances whereno light source is available or use of illumination devices is not

feasible. Although it may be used to detect people, but it probably wouldnot be sufficient for recognition of what party those people belong to or

what their actions are.

This used to consist the bulk of subject of combat in darkness. But, it

carries less significance in this context. Operations where many dynamiclight sources exists in the environment, such as urban areas, has low

probability of giving operators enough time in darkness for their eyes toadapt to darkness. Also, darkness adapted vision still need some degree ofambient light, and would not work in total darkness. It raises risk in

situations where target and a type of threat a target poses need to beidentified because the image provided by darkness adapted vision is not

clear enough for that purpose. And, when attack needs to be done, operatorswould still most likely have to use some sort of illumination device or

other mechanical observation device in order to aim weapons, since theimage provided by darkness adapted human eyes would not be clear enough for

that either.

Except for situations such as some military operations where operators arestaying still in darkness and assuming any person detected in a certain

area can be attacked without recognition effort, its utility is verylimited. Even in a military, soldiers of modernized military spend most of

their time in darkness looking through mechanical observation devices suchas IR camera, or operating illumination devices.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Use of light:

Any light emitting from equipments carried by operators increase risk of

detection. In order to minimize such light emission, operators need to useexisting ambient light as much as possible.



Next thing to consider is activating light devices that are already in theenvironment. Both the light from devices carried by an operator or that

from other illumination deivces in the area may be seen by opponents, butopponents cannot predict operator's movement pattern by observing light

that does not change with operator's movement. Also, light fromillumination devices that originally existed in the area may draw less

attention than light coming from any type of illumination device thatappears to be held by a person.

Regardless of which illumination device that is used, it should be used in

a way that would result in illuminating the area operators need to seewhile illuminating orators as less as possible.

Degree of light on surfaces in surrounding area, not only the degree of

light on operators, also affects probability of operators being exposed.

Even if operator is not illuminated, operators' outline can be clearlyvisible by contrast if the background of operators are bright enough from

observer's point of view.

Opponents may also use the light conditions to their advantage. Operators

need a plan no how to handle encounters with areas where light conditiondoes not allow operators to see what is inside with eyes only.

Use of flashlight:

Most common method of dealing with areas too dark for an operator to seewith eyes only is use of illumination devices such as hand held

flashlights. To use it for aid in area observation is a simple matter ofturning a flashlight on with the beam projected on the area the operator

intend to observe. Most common method is to direct the beam so that thepart of the area an operator wants to observe is directly illuminated by

the beam. However, there is also a method of indirect illumination.When intensity of the light illuminating target object is too bright,

hindering observation, indirect illumination can be used. Indirectillumination can also be used for illuminating objects that operators

cannot directly do so directly. Indirect illumination can also be used to

illuminate an area much wider than the width of the beam if the intensityof the beam reflected from an object the beam is touching is bright enough.

However, it requires an object a beam from the flashlight can be reflectedfrom, with a part of its surface angled on a way that would effectively

reflect beam from flashlight in desired direction.

Beam of light would also illuminate particles in the air in the path of the

beam. This lowers the visibility of any object operator is trying toilluminate with the beam. However, if the flash light is placed more offset



from the operator's ling of sight to the object, so that the operator'sline of sight would have less convergence with the beam, operator would

have less illuminated particles in the line of sight.

Another hindrance to observation is illuminating object behind atransparent and reflective object such as glass wall. Part of the beam

would be reflected, and any beam reflected towards the operator wouldhinder observability. Operator would have to control the position of the

flashlight being used, so that the beam would be offset or in an angle thatreflection would not directly get into the operator's eyes. Another method

is to place the flashlight lens close or directly on the glass so thatflashlight itself would cover most of the reflected light.

Most significant risk use of flashlight poses is that it can alert any

opponent that can see the light from the flashlight either directly or

indirectly that operators are present in the area. For this reason use oflight should be minimized to when it is necessary. If a beam illuminates an

object near by operators, it can result in the operators being indirectlyilluminated. So it must be avoided as much as possible. Moving with aflashlight on may advertise movement pattern of the flashlight bearer to a

person who can see the light.

However, there are situations where it is not avoidable. In completedarkness or when there isn't any sufficient light from other light sources,

turning on an illumination device may be the only way operator can seethings to perform necessary tasks. When a flashlight was turned on,

operators should consider moving away from positions where the light wasturned on, if feasible. Operator can also be on the move while using a

light. In any case, the duration of the light being on should be no longerthan necessary. Operators can keep moving in that pattern to make it

difficult for an observer to predict operator's location by observing lightfrom flashlight.

If a flashlight used by an operator have enough brightness, operators can

use indirect lighting method to illuminate areas they intend to observe.That method will make it difficult for opponent's possibly observing the

beam to predict the exact location of the operator by tracing the beam.

When a protection object is utilized, an operator can use Exposure Point

Movement Technique explained in "Utilization of protective objects"section. It is also possible to make the flashlight and other part of the

operator emerge from different points.

Any combination of the methods to lower probability of detection or being

tracked can be used. An operator can activate the light only for shortduration in an intermittent manner while maneuvering, making the light

activation point less predictable as possible. An operator can also chooseto stop, turn the light on for a short period to observe, then move, then



turning on the light again while trying to make the light activation pointless predictable. While using controlled exposure technique, use of these

measures are important, because deliberate search movement can easilybecome slow and predictable pattern. These measures can be combined into

controlled exposure techniques along with the principles of Exposure PointMovement Technique explained in “Utilization of protective objects.”

In the picture above, the operator is maintaining the same posture whilemaneuvering and examining the area beyond the corner of the wall in front

of the operator. An opponent who is on an area that the operator is aboutto expose oneself to can easily predict the part where the operator would

emerge from, of the object the operator is behind, by tracking the beam.The prediction is more easier if the operator moves in a constant and

continuous manner while keeping the light on.



When operator use intermittent light activation at an irregular pattern,opponent's prediction of exact part where the operator would emerge from,

of the object operator is behind, becomes more difficult. By incorporating

irregular vertical and lateral displacement in light and body positioningbefore and during each time the light is activated would make that

prediction even more difficult.

Use of flashlight can also be combined with Momentary Exposure Technique ,which may also be combined with moving away from last point of lightemission, to prevent opponent's effective tracking of operator's position.

Another way to reduce the effectiveness of opponent's effort to track

operator's position by observing beam from operator's illumination deviceis to use light from illumination devices that is not on the operator's

person. This will be referred to as "Detached Light Source" from now on.Detached light sources can be used to illuminate an area without the light



source constantly being carried by operators while it is on. A light can bedelivered to area with insufficient light where operators intend to observe

by any means feasible. As a simplified example: An illumination device canbe thrown into dark area an operator wants to observe. Another example is a

large flood light placed to illuminate an area operator needs to observewhile operator maneuvers some distance away from the light source. A small

flashlight with sufficient brightness can also be used in the aboveexamples, depending on the circumstances. However, this method can pose

risk if an operator uses one's only illumination device for it. For variousreasons, operators should have more than one illumination tools on them.

Detached light source lowers the effectiveness of opponent's estimation of

operator's location by tracking light from operator's illumination devices,when certain conditions are met. It disassociates operator's time and

location from that of an illumination device which its light is observed by

an opponent. When an area of interest can be illuminated from a locationdifferent from that of an operator, a detached light source placed in that

different location would not reveal the operator's location. However, thereare times when placing a detached illumination device a significantdistance away from operator's point of observation to illuminate an area of

interest is not feasible. In that case, it is still possible for anoperator to place a detached illumination device in a location it can

illuminate an area of interest and move away, then place oneself in pointof observation near the illumination device at a different time. That means

an opponent cannot reliably assume there is an operator near the lightsource, even if the opponent knows an operator would have to be near the

light source in order to observe the area of interest.

However, as mentioned earlier, certain conditions need to be met in orderfor the method to have effect. First, the light from the detached light

source must not illuminate the operator using the light to a significantdegree either by direct or indirect light in a manner that would

significantly increase the probability of operator being detected byopponents who may be in unexamined areas. Any light present would increase

ambient light level by various reflection sources, so ambient light orindirect light increasing illumination on an operator in the area is not

completely avoidable. The method also should not be executed in a mannerthat the light would cast a shadow visible to an opponent who may be in

unexamined areas. And, it should not be done in a manner that would create

a brighter background behind an operator, making the operator's outlinemore pronounced, from point of view of an opponent who may be in unexamined

areas.

There are some problems an operator need to deal with when using detached

light sources. One is how to place a a detached light source in a locationit needs to be in order to illuminate an area operator wants to observe. If

the place is on or near a path the operator has already traveled through,then getting to the position where the light source can be placed is less



of a problem. However, the location where the light source needs to beplaced may be where an operator would have to risk exposure to unexamined

area in order to reach. If the time of exposure to place a light source atthe location is short enough to use momentary exposure technique, usually

when distance to the location is short, then momentary exposure techniquecan be used. Use of directional light device that projects light in limited

range of direction, like most flashlights, would be preferable becauseomni-directional light device has higher probability of also illuminating

the operator using that method if the operator is not so far from the lightsource. If an operator would be exposed to unexamined area to reach the

location where the light source needs to be placed too long, if theoperator travels to the location, the operator needs to consider different

method or ways to deliver the light source to the location withouttraveling to the location. If there is a way to deliver a light source to

the desired location without traveling to the location without raising

other risks, it would be preferable in all previously mentioned cases ofdetached light source use, for reasons that will be explained in the

following.

Once the light source is placed, the operator who placed it there usually

should immediately move away from the illumination device in the samemanner of Negated Concealment procedure described in "Contact Management"

section. One reason is that the illumination device would be immediatelyactivated upon placement, since it is highly unlikely devices such as most

flashlights used for the method would be designed to be remotely operatedfor this kind of application, and the area near the activated light may

receive incoming fire shortly after the activation of the light. This maynot be much of a problem if the operator has placed the light in the

location under protection of an object that would shield the operator fromgun fire. Another reason is that an operator may be reaching into an area

that is in very close proximity to unexamined area in order to reach thelocation of the illumination device placement, and there may be an opponent

hidden in that close unexamined area. Operator may have to approach theillumination device's location again, if the location or area near it is

the only area available for the operator to observe the illuminated areathe operator needs to observe. However, an opponent would not be able to

know when an operator would be near the light source.---------------------------------------------------------------------------

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Relative light advantage:

For the purpose of minimizing visual detection and recognition of anoperator by opponents, operators would:



-Minimize light emission

-Maneuver and position in areas relatively low light level compared to

possible location of opponents.

-Maneuver and position in areas where view of of the operator's locationfrom possible opponent's location point of view would have least contrast

between an operator and operator's background either in color or level oflight.

There are also situations where operators cannot avoid being exposed to

light. There can also be an area where an operator would be exposed to thatis relatively darker than the operator's location, and the operator may

also have difficulty seeing whether if that dark area contains a threat.

There is an option of lighting up those darker areas that operators areexposed to, if exposure to those areas is not avoidable and risk of leaving

the area dark is greater than possible exposure by emitting light by use foflashlight, etc.



Destroying lighting devices not working in operators' favor is another

option to consider.---------------------------------------------------------------------------

---------------------------------------------------------------------------Muzzle blast:

When a firearm is discharged, there may be emission of visual signatures in

form of flash and smoke. Muzzle blast impact on objects near muzzle canalso generate things, such as dust smoke caused by muzzle blast impact on

dusty surface near the muzzle, that exposes the shooter.

While operators should be aware of a possibility of exposure by muzzleblast and take necessary cautions, this should not be relied on as a

detection method. Modern ammunition burns propellant with higher efficiencythan that of the past, and depending on the gun and ammunition combination

encountered, visual signature from muzzle blast may be very hard to detect.



There can be very little flash which is hard to detect even at night time.Having a prior thought regarding how to react when such flash is observed

may help, but it should not be a standard method to rely on its detection.Even if a flash is observed, it may not indicate the identity of the party

that fired the gun the flash was emitted from and what the target was.

Also, for protection, efficient flash suppressor can be of great benefitwhen addition of the device does require significant weight or size

increase that causes problems with effective operation. That would be thecase with most rifles, but installation of such devices can be a problem

with most pistols.

Suppressors are designed primarily for the purpose of reduction of gun shotnoise, however it can aid significantly in reducing muzzle flash.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------



1.1.5.2. Audio signature.

Audio signature also needs to be minimized. But, it is not practical toexpect any operator can be perfectly silent. Even a completely silent

object can alert a person because the object being introduced into a spacewould alter the way ambient noise is propagated in the space, which is one

way a person feels another person's presence even when the person did nothear anything that signifies a human approaching.

Ambient noise should be utilized to conceal sounds made by operators as

much as possible. Means to generate ambient noise can also aid inconcealment. However, such noise can also hinder operators' ability to hear

sounds generated by opponents.

Equipments should be configured in a way that it would not emit sound when

user does not expect it to. Alarm or feature that makes beeping sound everyhour on watches should be disabled. Operators need to be cautious for noisegenerated from radio, if radios are in use. Equipments that need frequent

adjustment that generates noise should be avoided. If an equipment has aspeaker, standard plan for operating such equipment should be to have its

volume as low as possible or speaker kept off except for moments when asound from the speaker is needed. Operating such equipments with plan of

normally keeping volume loud and turning the volume down when needed has ahigh likely hood of operators forgetting to lower the volume or getting in

situations where there is no opportunity to adjust the volume. Useequipments such as of ear piece or headphones that focus sound near user's

ears that makes sound audible without high volume helps minimize soundsignature if there is a need to monitor audio signals or communications

through electronic equipments. This where ear muffs with headphones thatprovides sounds from surroundings and audio signal or communication from

radio to the user is also useful.



1.1.5.3. IR signature.

IR imaging devices are getting more and more affordable. Thermal camera,although not as affordable as IR devices, are being offered on the market

for general public in certain areas. I anticipate complex surveillance andelectronic warfare devices that are now made man portable to be

increasingly involved in individual level small arms combat. In themilitary sector, man portable radio transmission detection device is now a

reality.

The basic principle to counter to minimize signatures in regards to IR orthermal devices are not so different from that of minimizing visual

signatures. The main difference is that those mechanical devices see thingsin different range of frequency. Most of them do not give the user the

ability to distinguish color. Which limits the ability to recognize object

by color contrast on the screen only. Most principles in dealing withvisual signature apply the same. Since most light source that emits visible

light also emits IR, shaded area is also harder to see with IR devices,although a lot easier than naked eye.

It works by detecting ambient IR reflected from objects, so there must be asource in the environment, such as moon or star light, emitting IR that

creates ambient IR or an artificial IR emitter device. That means inabsence of IR emitter device, it will not work where there is nothing to

provide ambient IR, such as most cases of being inside of a structure withno lights on and no opening for IR from outside to come in.

A beam of light directed to IR sensor can be effective in jamming IR

observation devices. It can create glare. Also, it can also trigger aprotection mechanism of certain IR devices to reduce input so that the

light too bright for the devices would not damage it, which would result inreduced detection capability.

Thermal devices works by detecting IR light generated by heat of the object

itself. Because of that, it does not require any ambient IR light for it tooperate. It is relatively more difficult to protect operators being

detected by it, because simply having an object block a direct line ofsight would be insufficient. If body heat warms up the operator's

surrounding object, it will be detectable, even if the object blocks direct

line of sight from the device. And, the type of IR light is also capable ofgoing through things that would block visible or IR range light used by

regular IR devices, giving the user to see through certain type and degreeof smoke or some type of fabrics. However, using objects to block detection

will work, if the object is dense enough and operator affecting the

temperature of the object, like warming the object with body heat, can beprevented. In such cases, the object used for shielding itself should not

be something that draws attention in view of thermal devices. Thermalsignature of such object should blend in with that of objects in



surrounding environment.

It can detect very minimal heat generated by interaction between objects.For example, very minimal heat on a road caused by vehicle being driven

over it may leave a heat trail on the road visible to thermal devices forcertain duration even after the vehicle has moved away. It can tell if a

car engine is warm or not, and detect heat transferred from an operator 'shand on objects when the operator touched the object. This means leaving

any heat signature behind is also a concern.

However, the device do require the background heat picture to be somewhatmonotonous to work better. For example, detecting a person walking in a

desert at night would yield better result than trying to spot someone in abusy street of a heavily urbanized area. So, camouflage principles to work,

although it would be a pattern of heat combined with outline contrast of

surrounding objects at work.

Thermal devices can require higher work load compared to IR devices. Sinceit requires users to recognize objects by contrast created in a differentmanner from how regular or IR light create contrast, there are more options

to display the image to aid in recognition. One example of most often usedoption being switching between "White Hot"(Objects displayed brighter

represents hotter object) and "Black Hot"(Objects displayed darkerrepresents hotter object) mode. Also, although it has great detection

capability regarding heat signature, the way it generates image makes itless efficient for user to recognize details of the features of objects.

Also, because it works on picking up a different frequency of signal, it

objects that are normally transparent to visual and regular IR devices maynot be transparent to a thermal device.

Another restriction is that with head worn types, such devices limit the

user's peripheral vision, and may cause loss of situational awareness ifthe user moves through a series of different light condition quickly, such

as running into a dark room to a brightly lit room.

Even with all the problems, IR devices may bring a great advantage insituations where users are fighting against opponents without such

equipments in environment where objects of tactical significance cannot be

observed with just human eyes. Rural area at night time where no artificiallightings are installed can be a good example. However, light conditions

often change, especially in urban environment. When lighting conditionchange, it will also change whether if using IR observation device is an

advantage or disadvantage. And, the change can be very quick and frequent.

Even at night time, there are often a lot of light sources in areas thathave artificial structures creating direct and ambient light in dynamic

manner. That means operators with IR devices may not be the only ones thatcan see objects of tactical significance. And, considering the problems



associated with use of IR devices, whether if use of it is an advantage canbe very uncertain. Even in low light, not limiting peripheral vision and

motion range with IR observation devices may be of advantage as long asthere is enough amount of light to observe what is needed to be seen.

If opponents suddenly turns on a visible light and illuminates operators,

the IR device advantage is taken away, and operators using IR devices areonly left with the limitations it imposes which hinders operators' ability

to respond even if the opponents expose themselves with the visible lightin the process. So, operators using those devices should be aware of the

risk and be prepared to respond to opponents' attack when their areasuddenly being lit up by visible light.

Interference caused by IR observation devices:

Most head harness or helmet mounted IR devices have limited adjustmentrange for the angle the device can be set, usually only up or down. Theview direction is fixed with the direction the user's head is facing. This

becomes a problem when user's face is not facing the direction an objectthe user is trying to see. When aiming a rifle, a shooter may tilt one's

head to one side from upright position while eyes are facing toward theintended target. Shooter's head is usually tilted downwards in many

circumstances, and especially so while in prone position, with eyes rotatedupwards to look toward the front. When all parties are on a horizontal

plane, that results in the eye facing the target with the IR device mountedon shooter's head pointing downwards. Mechanical arms that hold IR devices

on head harness or helmet can be adjusted to alleviate that problem; but asmentioned before, the adjustment range is limited.

This also greatly hinders a shooter's ability to execute effective gunnery

or even observe a target when head mounted IR devices are used. The shooterwill likely have great reduction in the ability to effectively use any iron

or scope sights on guns. Even if the user is able to get a gun's sight inthe device's view, when a person attempts to view a target aimed with a gun

sight through video camera, that person may have problems with making thecamera display both the sight and the target which are at different

distances with enough clarity, mostly due to optical focus limitations.

Some electro-optical devices do not properly recognize objects at veryclose distance. And, use of regular IR or thermal optics can present the

same problems.There may also be a problem with forming a shooting platform that is

effective.

Aiming devices such as laser sight that does not require the user to see

the aiming device in line of sight to the target is often utilized inconjunction with IR observation device to alleviate this problem. However,



it does not completely eliminate the problem. Such problem will make aperson relying on head mounted IR observation devices to favor postures

with the upper body or head in somewhat upright. Use of laser presents aproblem that operator would be emitting a detectable signature. Use of

laser in IR light sepctrum would make it indetectable to naked eyes, butnot to IR observation devices, depending on what IR light frequency range

the laser is on. Laser aiming devices add additional weight, requireselectrical power, and additional effort to zero the device often set offset

to the bore axis in both horizontal and vertical plane.

If IR observation device is mounted on a gun, the user has less problempointing the device toward where the user's eyes' orientation. But, if that

is the only device available, then it has a problem with the user alwayshaving to keep the gun in aiming position and scan every area the user

wants to observe with the gun when the device has to be relied on.

Weapon mounted observation aids:

Operators should try to have observation aids that is separate from ones

mounted on weapon for aiming. For example, operators should have hand heldflashlight that is separate from weapon mounted flashlight, so that weapon

mounted light does not have to be used as a primary illumination device.The reason is that devices such as flashlight needs direct line of sight to

any object it is aiding in being observed. That results in the flashlightor similar devices being exposed first to unexamined area along with

operator's eyes. Also, such device may have to be positioned in variousposition to aid in observation that might make operator get a weapon in

position that would hinder operators from effectively using it in shortesttime possible if the device is attached to the weapon. That makes it harder

to guard the weapon from being grabbed by opponents in unexamined area anduse the weapon effectively when situation requiring its immediate use

arises.



1.1.5.4. Other signatures

-Radio signal:

Control emission from communication equipments if radio emission wouldexpose operators.

1.1.5.5. Remote exposure devices

These are devices that are set up in a location to expose opponent by

creating signatures detectable to operators away from the location upon anyinteraction with a possible opponent. There are wide range of such devices,

many of which can be improvised. Example of such a device can be something

simple as objects that makes noise when stepped on. More elaborate formwould be a trip wire that causes a flare to be launched when a person moves

the wire. Such devices were used in war to help soldiers detect enemies whowere unaware of the device tripping the wire.

In addition to purpose built remote detection sensor devices fororganizations like military, there are many battery operated compact motion

detection devices available for general public now. A motion sensoractivated light small enough to be carried in a pocket can be placed at

locations to expose or surprise an opponent.

At the same time, operators should also be aware of such devices workingagainst them. Many areas, especially urban areas, have large amount of

motion detection activated devices that can alert an opponent. Althoughthose devices can be set up by opponents, it is mostly set up by people who

are not a hostile party for utility purposes. Some utility lightingfixtures are motion sensor activated. There are many automated doors that

are activated by proximity detector or pressure pad. There also can bealarm sensors installed in a building for burglary deterrence. Any of those

can accidentally expose an operator's presence.



1.1.5.6. Jamming.

Visual:

-Light source:

Strong light source that can overpower light signature from operator placedin front of operator from observer's point of view can provide concealment

for the operator.

Strong burst of light can saturate the light input a human can handle,temporarily hindering ability for the person exposed to the light to see.

However, the light has to be very intense. Such light can be generated fromdedicated noise flash devices.

However, how much effect it has is affected by amount of ambient light theperson the light is used against is adjusted to. If the ambient light

opponent's eyes are adjusted to is very bright, such as area illuminated bysun light at day time, the effect may be too low to have any significance.But, if opponents vision is adjusted to darkness, even beam from hand held

flashlight directed on opponents eyes can be effective.

Directing a beam of a flashlight that on an opponent's eyes may create ajamming effect in certain situations. An opponent seeing a flashlight with

its beam directed on the opponents eyes would create a glare at the pointwhere the flashlight is at in the opponent's point of view. It would also

create an area around the glare where human eye cannot effectively observedue to the overwhelming signal input from the glare The glare and the

reduced observability area around it would create a certain degree ofconcealment.

The width of the area around the glare human eyes cannot effectively

observe and the level of glare would change according to ambient lightlevel. Also, even if an object is behind a flashlight jamming opponent's

observation, and seen inside the area of the opponent's view that isaffected by the jamming, it can still be visible if the object is

illuminated with enough intensity to overpower the flashlight's light.



-Smoke: Smoke generated from fire or chemical devices, etc., can be used as

visual screen.

Audio:

-Loud noise can distract or disorient people. Noises from explosives or gun



fire, or from dedicated noise flash devices are used for that purpose,but it's effect should not be relied on. The effect varies greatly

depending on how much sound pressure actually reaches the persontargeted. Also, since disorientation is linked to mental state, the

targeted person's mental state also affects the outcome. Disorientationeffect is reduced when opponent is alert, and it is reduced even more when

the opponent anticipates such measures.

Radio:

-Noise signal jamming:

Although purpose built radio signal jamming devices are not commonly

available to operators out side of government capacity at the time of thiswriting, if purpose designed communication jamming devices are available

operators should consider its use. Military radios with encryption andfeatures such as frequency hop are relatively resistant to jamming.However, even for operators in government capacity, access to such radios

are very limited out side of military.

For radio communications with known frequency without dedicated jammingresistant features can be vulnerable to jamming. Keep in mind that the

jamming device does not have to be a purpose built device, it may notrequire a sophisticated method for jamming to be successful. Even a radio

can be used to make communication difficult on frequency it is capable oftransmitting.

-Deception:There is also an issue of authenticating someone who is giving information

through radio communication. False information by unauthorized party is apossibility.

-Area selection:Making opponent's get into areas where there are barriers that radio

signals are hard to propagate through can be of help. Being inside certain

type of structures can make radio communication difficult for bothoperators and their opponents.



1.1.6. Maneuver and positioning.

*****More details in Maneuver and positioning.



1.2. Utilizing, prioritizing of major factors.

The problem with increasing operator security regarding tactical factors isthat actions taken in order to increase positive effects in regards to

certain factor conflicts with what is beneficial in regards to some otherfactors. An action that may have a positive influence on certain factors

and negative influence on other factors at the same time.

Primary method to determine the benefit of certain action when suchconflict exists is through prioritizing. Each factor has different level of

influence in different situations. Evaluation of soundness of certainaction should be assessed based on its influence on overall security, not

just one tactical factor. Recognizing what tactical factor has moresignificance is a given situation allows operators to choose action that

would benefit the operators in regards to those factors that have more

significance, allowing them to assign priority.

Affect on probability of achieving security by certain action =(Probability increase by positively affected factors)x(significance ofpositively affected factors) -(Probability decrease by negatively affected

factors)x(significance of negatively affected factors)

For example: A gunnery process will expose the operator. If the operatorincapacitates the opponent, the security will increase greatly. So, if the

operator has high probability of success with the gunnery process, theprobability of gaining security may increase. However, if the operator has

a low probability of success, the consideration to avoid the negativeeffect of exposure to an opponent’s observation and attack will prevail.

But, if the operator is already exposed to attack, withholding attack toavoid exposure will no longer be a consideration. In that case, the

operator may initiate a gunnery process, or maneuver to an area that isshielded, or do both. Gunnery process in many cases means at least some

part of the operator's body being exposed to an opponent. And in somesituations, to utilize a certain shielding object may hinder effective use

of the operator's weapon.

An operator's evasive maneuver to make it difficult for opponents to aimthe operator would lower the probability of operator being hit by opponents

gun fire, but it also decreases the operator's gunnery effectiveness. If

the operator can incapacitate the opponent before the opponent can haveeffective hits on operator, and the operator moving affecting operator's

gunnery effectiveness would make it fail, then operator's gunnery process

combat operations with firearms volume 2 chapter 1 tactics release 2013-02-14

Documents