compiled rule 62 digests

RULE 62: INTERPLEADER

1. Ocampo v. Tirona

Facts: Ocampo bought the subject parcel of land from Rosauro Breton, heir of the registered owner Alipio Breton Cruz. Tirona, tenant of Breton, was informed of this arrangement and started paying Ocampo rent. Some months thereafter, Ocampo received a letter from Callejo Law Office stating that Tirona will stop paying rent because the area has been declared under area for priority development. Ocampo then wrote a demand letter for payment of rental. Despite receipt of said letter, Tirona failed and refused and still fails and refuses to heed Ocampo’s demands.Ocampo then filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against Tirona before the MTC. Tirona answered by asserting that Dona Yaneza was the owner, not Ocampo. Tirona subsequently filed a motion for leave to amend her answer because a lawyer did not assist her in her initial answer. In her amended answer, Tirona maintained that Ocampo is not the owner of the subject land. Tirona also alleged that she has a right of first refusal in case of sale of the land. MTC ruled in favor of Ocampo because of non-payment of rent and because of the termination of Tirona’s right to possess and occupy the subject land. Tirona changed theory in the RTC and raised that it was Rosauro’s sister Ma. Lourdes who could validly sell the land to Ocampo. The court did not believe her and still ruled in favor of Ocampo. CA considered partition of the estate of Alipio as a prerequisite to Ocampo’s action so it reversed the decision of the MTC and RTC. Issue: Who has the right of possession of the subject land? What should have been filed by Tirona to show good faith of Tirona in not paying rent?Decision: Ocampo has a better right. All the elements of unlawful detainer are present. Tirona obviously is in bad faith. The good faith of Tirona is put in question in her preference for Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola when Ocampo informed her earlier that the land has already been sold to him. As a stakeholder, Tirona should have used reasonable diligence in hailing the contending claimants to court. Tirona need not have awaited actual institution of a suit by Ocampo against her before filing a bill of interpleader. An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does

not know the person to whom to pay rentals due to conflicting claims on the propertyNote: The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has property whether personal or real, in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right in both, or claims an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the conflicting claimants, comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among themselves, in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or the other thing. The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double liability but to protect him against a double vexation in respect of one liability. When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, there arises in reality a new action and the former are styled interpleaders, and in such a case the pleading which initiates the action is called a complaint of interpleader and not a cross-complaint

2. Praxedes Alverez v. Commonwealth

Facts: Plaintiffs alleged that they are bringing an action in behalf of themselves and 5 thousand other persons in that they are in possession for many years of lots on which they now have their houses and agricultural land. These lands are found within Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan. They do not claim to be owners of the said lands but rather only of the improvements thereon. They allege that they are entitled to occupy the same because it is where they have lived as well as their predecessors in interest and that they recognize in favor of someone their obligation to pay reasonable rent over their occupation and that the true owner is the government by virtue of escheat. This was acquired by the government through the death of Rodriguez de Figueroa without leaving any heir and his 2 minor daughters not leaving any heirs also. Colegio de San Jose and Carlos Young are claiming the estate. However, defense alleged that Colegio de San Jose, through the Jesuits, had practiced “Substitucion Pupilar” and had administered and managed the estate until they succeeded to appropriate the same, considering it as part of the temporal property of the church. But after the Jesuits were expelled, it was confiscated by the Spanish

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS (Atty. Melo, 1st Sem, 2010-2011)

government and after the Philippine government passed laws, the ownership of such lands passed on to the current government and that the municipality of San Pedro has a right to a hacienda for the exclusive benefit of its inhabitants; and that the Colegio de San Jose should render an accounting of the rentals which it has been collecting from the hacienda, which should not be less than P60,000.

Issue #1 alleged that an interpleader is a petition, hence cannot be subject to demurrer.

The action of interpleader, under section 120, is a remedy whereby a person who has personal property in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right in both, comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said personal property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among themselves, in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or the other thing. The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double liability but to protect him against a double vexation in respect of one liability. When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, there arises in reality a new action and the former are styled interpleaders, and in such a case the pleading which initiates the action is called a complaint of interpleader and not a cross-complaint. Hence, demurrer is proper.

Issue #2 alleged is that the interpleader is effective against the government despite it not giving its consent.

Philippine Commonwealth Government cannot be compelled to litigate without its consent, which also holds true in an action for interpleader. There is no substantial difference between making it defend itself against it will in a case where it is a defendant and compelling it, without its consent, to interplead in an action commenced by another person. In one and the other case it is compelled, without its consent, to maintain a suit or litigation, and this is what the legal principal prohibits.

Issue #3 alleged that Colegio de San Jose, Municipality of San Pedro and the Government are contending over the right of collecting the rents over the hacienda, hence interpleader proper.

An action of interpleader is indefensible from any standpoint for lack of the basis of reason relied upon by the plaintiffs in their complaint, namely, that there are two entities, the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the Colegio de San Jose, contending over the hacienda and claiming to be entitled to collect the rent or canon coming therefrom . Carlos Young is not included because according to his own admission, he is a mere lessee of the Colegio de San Jose, Inc., and does not claim any right of ownership adverse to the latter. It also appears from the allegations said complaint of interpleader that the municipality of San Pedro also admits that the Commonwealth of the Philippine is the owner of the hacienda by transfer and right of escheat.

Issue #4 has to do with the holding of the court that the complaint of interpleader of the municipality of San Pedro is premature inasmuch as there has been no order yet that the defendant litigate among themselves.

In the opinion of the court it is necessary that there be a declaration to this effect before the defendant may litigate among themselves and file a complaint of interpleader. Section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure in truth requires such and good practice demands that the defendants be not permitted to file claims or complaint of interpleader until after the court has ordered that they should litigate among themselves. This procedure will do way with groundless suits, and will save the parties time, inconvenience, and unnecessary expenses.

3. Wack Wack Golf v. Won

FACTS: Wack Wack Golf & Country Club (“Corporation”), a non-stock, civic and athletic corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines, filed a complaint of interpleader. It alleged, for its first cause of action, that defendants Lee Won and Bienvenido Tan were both claiming ownership over the Corporation’s membership fee certificate (“MFC”) 201: Won, by virtue of the decision of the CFI of Manila in civil case 26044 and by MFC


201-serial no. 1478 issued on Oct. 17, 1963 by the deputy clerk of court for and in behalf of the president and secretary of the corporation and of the People’s Bank & Trust Company; Tan, on the other hand, by virtue of MFC 201-serial no. 1199 issued on July 24, 1950 pursuant to an assignment in his favor by Swan, Culbertson and Fritz, the original owner of MFC 201. For its second cause of action, the Corporation alleged that MFC 201-serial no. 1478 issued by the deputy clerk of court in behalf of the Corporation is null and void because it was issued in violation of the Corporation’s by-laws, which require the surrender and cancellation of the outstanding MFC 201 before issuance may be made to the transferee of a new certificate duly signed by its president and secretary, aside from the fact that the decision of the CFI of Manila in civil case 26044 is not binding upon defendant Tan.

The Corporation prayed for the issuance of an order requiring Lee and Tan to interplead and litigate their conflicting claims, declaring who the lawful owner of MFC 201 is, and ordering the surrender and cancellation of MFC 201-serial no. 1478 issued in the name of Lee.

The trial court dismissed the complaint upon motion of the defendants on the grounds of res judicata, failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, and bar by prescription.

ISSUE: Whether or not the action of interpleader was proper and timely filed.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.The action of interpleader, under §120 of the Code of Civil

Procedure, is a remedy whereby a person who has personal property in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right to either, comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said personal property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among themselves in order to determine finally who is entitled to tone or the one thing. The remedy is afforded to protect a person not against double liability but against double vexation in respect of one liability.

A stakeholder should use reasonable diligence to hale the contending claimants to court. He need not await actual institution of independent suits against him before filing a bill of interpleader. He should

file an action of interpleader within a reasonable time after a dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by either of the contending claimants. Otherwise, he may be barred by laches or undue delay. But where he acts with reasonable diligence in view of the environmental circumstances, the remedy is not barred.

If a stakeholder defends a suit filed by one of the adverse claimants and allows said suit to proceed to final judgment against him, he cannot later on have that part of the litigation repeated in an interpleader suit. In the case at hand, the Corporation allowed civil case 26044 to proceed to final judgment. And it offered no satisfactory explanation for its failure to implead Tan in the same litigation. In this factual situation, it is clear that this interpleader suit cannot prosper because it was filed much too late.

A successful litigant cannot later be impleaded by his defeated adversary in an interpleader suit and compelled to prove his claim anew against other adverse claimants, as that would in effect be a collateral attack upon the judgment.

In fine, the interpleader suit cannot prosper because the Corporation had already been made independently liable in civil case 26044 and, therefore, its application for interpleader would in effect be a collateral attack upon the final judgment in the said civil case; Lee had already established his rights to MFC 201 in the civil case and, therefore, this interpleader suit would compel him to establish his rights anew, and thereby increase instead of diminish litigations, which is one of the purposes of an interpleader suit, with the possibility that the benefits of the final judgment in the said civil case might eventually be taken away from him; and because the Corporation allowed itself to be sued to final judgment in the said case, its action of interpleader was filed inexcusably late, for which reason it is barred by laches or unreasonable delay.

4. Ramos v. Ramos

Facts: Petitioners are children of the late Paulino V. Chanliongco, Jr., who was the co-owner of a parcel of land in Tondo. The other co-owners were his siblings: Narcisa, Mario and Antonio. By virtue of a SPA executed by the co-owners in favor of Narcisa, her daughter Adoracion had sold the lot to respondents. Because of the conflict among the heirs of the co-owners as


to the validity of the sale, respondents filed with the RTC a Complaint for Interpleader to resolve the various ownership claims.

The RTC upheld the sale insofar as the share of Narcisa was concerned. It ruled that Adoracion had no authority to sell the shares of the other co-owners, because the SPA had been executed in favor only of her mother Narcisa. The CA held that the sale was valid. This 1995 decision was not appealed; it became final. In 1999, petitioners filed with the CA a Motion to Set Aside the Decision, contending that they had not been served a copy of either the Complaint or the summons, nor been impleaded as parties to the case. CA denied their motion.

Issue: W/N the CA erred in denying petitioners’ motion and allowing its decision to take its course, inspite of its knowledge that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioners and passing petitioners’ property in favor or respondents, hence without due process of law.Held: The Complaint filed by respondents with the RTC called for an interpleader to determine the ownership of the real property in question. Specifically, it forced persons claiming an interest in the land to settle the dispute among themselves as to which of them owned the property. Essentially, it sought to resolve the ownership of the land and was not directed against the personal liability of any particular person. It was therefore a real action, because it affected title to or possession of real property. As such, the Complaint was brought against the deceased registered co-owners, as represented by their respective estates.

Clearly, petitioners were not the registered owners of the land, but represented merely an inchoate interest thereto as heirs of Paulino. They had no standing in court with respect to actions over a property of the estate, because the latter was represented by an executor or administrator. Thus, there was no need to implead them as defendants in the case, inasmuch as the estates of the deceased co-owners had already been made parties.

Under the former rules (when the complaint was filed), an executor or administrator is allowed to either sue or be sued alone in that capacity. In the present case, it was the estate of petitioners’ father Paulino, as represented by Sebrio Tan Quiming and Associates, that was included as

defendant and served summons. As it was, there was no need to include petitioners as defendants. Not being parties, they were not entitled to be served summons.

5. Beltran v. People’s Homesite

Facts: An interpleader suit was filed on August 21, 1962, by plaintiffs Jose Beltran, et al. in their own behalf and in behalf of all residents of Project 4 in Quezon City, praying that the People's Homesite & Housing Corporation (PHHC) and GSIS be compelled to litigate and interplead between themselves their alleged conflicting claims involving said Project 4.

PHHC leased out housing units to plaintiffs in 1953. The lessees, paying monthly rentals therefor, were assured by competent authority that after 5 years of continuous occupancy, they would be entitled to purchase these units. In 1961, the PHHC announced that the management, administration and ownership of Project 4 would be transferred to GSIS in payment of PHHS debts to GSIS. PHHC also asked the tenants to signify their conformity to buy the housing units at the selling price indicated on the back thereof, agreeing to credit the tenants, as down payment on the selling price, 30% of what had been paid by them as rentals. The tenants accepted the PHHC offer, and on March 27, 1961, the PHHC announced in another circular that all payments made by the tenants after March 31, 1961 would be considered as amortizations or installment payments.

By the end of 1960, administration and ownership of Project 4 was turned over to GSIS. PHHC, however, through its new Chairman-General Manager, Esmeraldo Eco, refused to recognize all agreements previously entered into with GSIS, while GSIS insisted on its legal rights to enforce the said agreements and was upheld in its contention by both the Government Corporate Counsel and the Secretary of Justice.

Plaintiffs thus claimed that these conflicting claims between PHHC and GSIS caused them great inconvenience and incalculable moral and material damage, as they did not know to whom they should pay the monthly amortizations or payments.


TC: Designated the People's First Savings Bank, QC "to receive in trust the payments from the plaintiffs on their monthly amortizations on PHHC lots and to be released only upon proper authority of the Court."

PHHC and GSIS filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint of Beltran, et al. for failure to state a cause of action as well as to lift the Court's order designating the People's First Savings Bank as trustee to receive the tenants' payments on the PHHC lots.

TC granted the Motion, ruling that the counsel for GSIS ratified the allegations in his motion and made of record that GSIS has no objection that payments on the monthly amortizations be made directly to PHHC. There was thus no dispute as to whom the residents pay and therefore no cause of action for interpleading. Counsel for defendants went further to say that whatever dispute, if any, may exist between the two corporations over the lots and buildings in Project 4, payments made to the PHHC will not and cannot in any way affect or prejudice the rights of the residents thereof as they will be credited by either of the two defendants.

On appeal, plaintiffs claim that the trial Court erred in dismissing their suit, contending the allegations in their complaint "raise questions of fact that can be established only by answer and trial on the merits and not by a motion to dismiss heard by mere oral manifestations in open court," and that they "do not know who, as between the GSIS and the PHHC, is the right and lawful party to receive their monthly amortizations as would eventually entitle them to a clear title to their dwelling units."

Issue: Whether the dismissal of the complaint for interpleader was proper? YES.

Ruling: Plaintiffs entirely missed the vital element of an action of interpleader. Rule 62, section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court requires as an indispensable element that "conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made" against the plaintiff-in-interpleader "who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in

whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants." While PHHC and GSIS may have conflicting claims between themselves with regard to the management, administration and ownership of Project 4, such conflicting claims are not against the plaintiffs nor do they involve or affect the plaintiffs. No allegation is made in their complaint that any corporation other than the PHHC which was the only entity privy to their lease-purchase agreement, ever made on them any claim or demand for payment of the rentals or amortization payments. The questions of fact raised in their complaint concerning the enforceability, and recognition or non-enforceability and non-recognition of the turnover agreement of December 27, 1961 between the two defendant corporations are irrelevant to their action of interpleader, for these conflicting claims, loosely so-called, are between the two corporations and not against plaintiffs. Both defendant corporations were in conformity and had no dispute, as pointed out by the trial court that the monthly payments and amortizations should be made directly to the PHHC alone.

6. Sy-Quia v. Sheriff of Ilocos Sur

Facts: This is a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the Sheriff of Ilocos Sur to proceed with a chattel mortgage foreclosure sale. On 3 Feb 1915, Cheng-Laco and Cheng-Kiangco executed a chattel mortgage in favor of the petitioner, Sy-Quia on their mercantile establishment, including the merchandise therein, as security for a 6k debt. The mortgage was recorded on the date of its execution and fell due on 3 Feb 1917. An agreement was made that the mortgagors were allowed to sell the merchandise replenishing their stock and that the new stock brought in should also be subject to the mortgage. On 5 May 1924, Cheng-Laco executed another chattel mortgage on the same establishment and all its contents in favor of the respondent De Leon (De Leon) as security for the sum of P4,900, which mortgage was recorded on 4 May 1924. The petitioner, in writing, requested the sheriff to take possession of the mortgaged property and to sell it at public auction under Sec. 14 of the Chattel Mortgage Law (Act No. 1508). The sheriff seized the establishment


and fixed the date of the sale on 2 June 1924. Afterwards, De Leon presented an adverse claim to the property by virtue of his chattel mortgage, alleging that all the goods on which the chattel mortgage of Sy-Quia was given had been sold long before the chattel mortgage in favor of De Leon was executed and that the earlier chattel mortgage was of no effect. The sheriff, in doubt as to the conflicting claims, suspended the foreclosure proceedings and brought an action under section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure requiring the two claimants to interplead.

Issue: W/N the sheriff was correct in suspending the sale and bringing an action requiring the 2 claimants to interplead

Held: YES. Court held that it would’ve been better practice for the sheriff to sell the property and hold the proceeds of the sale subject to the outcome of the action of interpleader, the court would still not justify interference by mandamus. The sheriff might lay himself open to an action for damages if he sold the goods without the consent of the holder of the last mortgage, and it does not appear that the petitioner offered to give bond to hold him harmless in such an event. His action in suspending the sale pending the determination of the action of interpleader seems justified. In cases like this, the petition for mandamus should be addressed to the Courts of First Instance rather than to this court. The petition is denied with the costs against the petitioner.

7. De Jesus v. Sociedad Arendenteria

Facts: A partnership composed of Aragon, Cuneta and de la Cruz, owned a cockpit which it rented to the Defendant company. Both Cuneta and Aragon sold each their 2/5th interest in the partnership to the de Jesus. Cuneta sold his interest subject to the right to repurchase. Having failed to exercise his right to repurchase, the sale became absolute in favor de Jesus who now owned 4/5th the interest in the partnership.

De Jesus in this action seeks to recover of the Defendant company the amount of the monthly rental which he claims be due him as the owner of Cuneta’s interest

The trial judge recognized the right of de Jesus to the monthly

rental from the Defendant company from the date of the judgment entered by him but declined to give judgment for the monthly rental from the date of purchase of Cuneta’s interest to the date of the judgment. The trial judge reasoned that since there had been no formal adjudication of de Jesus’ ownership of Cuneta’s interest prior to the date of the judgment, the Defendant company was not obligated to pay de Jesus the monthly rental corresponding to that interest pending the adjudication of this question, since to have done so might have exposed it to the risk of having the contract terminated by Cuneta for failure to pay to him the stipulated rental, in the event that it should later be judicially determined that Cuneta and not de Jesus was the true owner.Issue: Was the ruling of the trial judge correct?Ruling:The trial judge erred. The Defendant company had due and sufficient notice of the sale. Demand was formally and promptly made upon it for the payment of the rent to which de Jesus was thereafter entitled. Under its contract it was the Defendant company’s duty to pay the stipulated rent to the owner of the interest. If with due notice of the purchase of this interest by de Jesus, it paid any other person than the true owner, such payment in no wise relieved it of its obligations under the contract to pay the true owner. It must fulfill and comply with the terms of its contract, and de Jesus is entitled to recover the stipulated rent from day of the perfection of his purchase of Cuneta’s interest. Judgment for the rent in question from the date of purchase to the date of the judgment should have been rendered in favor of de Jesus.

Just bec the right of ownership was in dispute, doesn’t mean the Defendant company could lawfully refuse to pay the rent because it might risk paying the wrong person and suffer the consequences.If the Defendant company had any sufficient ground to be in doubt as to which of the claimants was entitled to the rent, it could have protected itself from the danger of making payment to the wrong person by requiring the contesting claimants to interplead, thus leaving the determination of the doubt to the courts. The Defendant company not having exercised this right, it voluntarily assumed the risk of payment to the wrong person, and of course payment to the wrong person under such circumstances (even if it were actually made, which does not affirmatively appear from the record in the case), would not relieve it of liability to the person lawfully entitled to receive


payment under the rental contract.8. Mesina v. IAC

FACTS: Jose Go (Go) purchased from Associated Bank (AB) Cashier's Check

No. 011302 for P800,000.00. Unfortunately, Go left said check on the top of the desk of the bank manager when he left the bank.

The bank manager entrusted the check for safekeeping to a bank official, a certain Albert Uy (Uy), who had then a visitor in the person of Alexander Lim (Lim).

Uy had to answer a phone call on a nearby telephone after which he proceeded to the men's room. When he returned to his desk, his visitor Lim was already gone, along with the check.

Uy advised Go to go to the bank to accomplish a "STOP PAYMENT" order. Uy also made a police report, pointing to the person of Alexander Lim as the one who could shed light on it.

Police records that AB received the lost check for clearing on December 31, 1983, coming from Prudential Bank (PB) Escolta Branch. The check was immediately dishonored by AB and sent it back to PB, with "Payment Stopped" stamped on it.

4 days thereafter, the same was again returned to AB. Yet again, AB dishonored it.

Several days later, AB received a letter from Atty. Lorenzo Navarro (Atty. Navarro) demanding payment on the cashier's check being held by his client, whose name he refused to reveal. Atty. Navarro threatened to sue if payment is not made

AB in its letter replied saying the check belonged to Go who lost it in the bank and is laying claim to it.

The police sent a letter to the Manager of the PB requesting assistance in identifying the person who tried to encash the check, but it refused. PB said it had to protect its client's interest and the identity could only be revealed with the client's conformity.

Unsure of what to do on the matter AB filed an action for Interpleader naming as Go and “John Doe”, Atty. Navarro's unnamed client.

AB received summons and copy of the complaint for damages of Marcelo A. Mesina (Mesina) from the RTC of Caloocan City.

AB moved to amend its complaint, having been notified for the first time of the name of Atty. Navarro's client and substituted Mesina for John Doe. Simultaneously, AB thru representative Uy, informed Cpl. Gimao of the Western Police District that the lost check of Go is in the possession of Mesina.

Cpl. Gimao went to Mesina to inquire on how he had possession of the check. Mesina answered that it was paid to him by Lim in a "certain transaction" but refused to elucidate further.

An information for theft and warrant of arrest was issued to Lim. (said warrant up to the date of the filing of this petition remains unserved since Lim couldn’t be found).

Meanwhile, Go filed his answer in the Interpleader Case and moved to participate as intervenor in the complaint for damages. Uy also filed a motion of intervention and answer in the complaint for Interpleader.

During pre-trial conference in the interpleader case, it was disclosed that the "John Doe" is actually Mesina.

Mesina, instead of filing his answer to the complaint in the interpleader, filed on an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss Ex Abudante Cautela alleging lack of jurisdiction in view of the absence of an order to litigate, failure to state a cause of action and lack of personality to sue.

o denied by TC and ruled that AB’s complaint sufficiently pleaded a cause of action for interpleader

o MR of Mesina deniedo Judge Gonong declared Mesina in default

Mesina filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction with IAC o dismissed by IACo MR of Mesina also denied

TC DECISION ON INTERPLEADER: ordered AB to replace Cashier's Check in favor of Go or its cash equivalent with legal rate of interest from date of complaint.


ISSUE: W/N interpleader suit is proper?

HELD: YES. Decision affirmed in toto.

RATIO: Mesina insists that there is no showing of conflicting claims; thus, interpleader is out of the question. However, AB merely took the necessary precaution not to make a mistake as to whom to pay and therefore interpleader was its proper remedy. It has been shown that the interpleader suit was filed by AB because Mesina and Go were both laying their claims on the check. Mesina was even asking payment thereon and Go as the purchaser or owner.

AB filed the interpleader suit not because petitioner sued it but because Mesina is laying claim to the same check that Go is claiming. On the very day AB instituted the case in interpleader, it was not aware of any suit for damages filed by Mesina against it as supported by the fact that the interpleader case was first entitled Associated Bank vs. Jose Go and John Doe.THUS, records of the case show that AB had to resort to details in support of its action for Interpleader. Before even resorting to Interpleader, AB took precautionary and necessary measures to bring out the truth.

9. Vda. De Camilo v. Arcamo

Facts: Petitioner Petra had been in peaceful, open and adverse possession of a parcel of public foreshore land situated in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur. A commercial building was erected on said property and respondent Ong Peng Kee was a lessee of one of the apartments of said commercial building. Bannister filed an unlawful detainer case against both De Camilo and Kee but for his failure to appear at the trial, he was declared in default. Petitioners Franciscos had also been in possession, peaceful, open and adverse of a parcel of public foreshore land, adjoining that land occupied by De Camilo. On this parcel, a commercial building was erected by the Franciscos. The two commercial buildings were burned down. Two weeks thereafter, respondents Kee and Ong, constructed a building of their own

which was so built that portions of the lands previously occupied by petitioners were encroached upon.De Camilo filed a case for Forcible Entry against the respondents with respect to portion belonging to her wherein the building of Kee was erected. The Franciscos filed a similar case. The respondents claimed that the land where they constructed their building was leased to them by the Municipality of Malangas. Pending trial of the two cases, the respondents filed a complaint for Interpleader against De Camilo, Estrada, the Franciscos, Bannister, the Mayor and Treasurer of Malangas, alleging that the filing of the cases of forcible entry, indicated that the defendants in the Interpleader had conflicting interests, since they all claimed to be entitled to the possession of the lot in question and they (Kee and Ong) could not determine without hazard to themselves who of defendants was entitled to the possession. Interpleader plaintiffs further alleged that they had no interest in the property other than as mere lessees.Herein petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for Interpleader but the same was denied and they were ordered to interplead. Petitioners instituted the present proceedings for certiorari and mandamus, against Justice of peace Arcamo and herein respondents. They allege that Arcamo gravely abused his discretion in giving due course to the complaint for interpleader, and that he unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which was specifically enjoined by law, and for which there was no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The CFI ruled that Arcamo had no jurisdiction to try the case of interpleader.

Issue: Was the filing of the interpleader proper? Does the Justice of the Peace Court have jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Interpleader case?

Held: No to both. Section 1, Rule 14 provides that an Interpleader is proper whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against a person, who claims no interest whatever in the subject-matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, such person may bring an action against the conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves.


The petitioners did not have conflicting claims against the respondents. Their respective claim was separate and distinct from the other. De Camilo only wanted the respondents to vacate that portion of her property which was encroached upon by them when they erected their building. The same is true with Estrada and the Franciscos. They claimed possession of two different parcels of land of different areas, adjoining each other. Furthermore, it is not true that respondents did not have any interest in the subject matter. Their interest was the prolongation of their occupancy or possession of the portions encroached upon by them. It is, therefore, evident that the requirements for a complaint of Interpleader do not exist. The complaint asking the petitioners to interplead, practically took the case out of the jurisdiction of the JP court, because the action would then necessarily "involve the title to or possession of real property or any interest therein" over which the CFI has original jurisdiction. Then also, the subject matter of the interpleader would come under the original jurisdiction of the CFI, because it would not be capable of pecuniary estimation, there having been no showing that rentals were asked by the petitioners from respondents.

10. Makati Development Corp v. Tanjuatco

Facts: Plaintiff Makati Dev’t Corp and defendant Tanjuatco entered into a contract whereby the latter bound himself to construct a reinforced concrete covered water reservoir, office and pump house and water main at Forbes Park, furnishing the materials necessary therefor. Before making the final payment of the consideration agreed upon, plaintiff inquired from the suppliers of materials, who had called its attention to unpaid bills of Tanjuatco, whether the latter had settled his accounts with them. In response to this inquiry, Concrete Aggregates, Inc. (supplier) made a claim in the sum of P5,198.75, representing the cost of transit-mixed concrete allegedly delivered to Tanjuatco. With his consent, plaintiff withheld said amount from the final payment made to him and, in view of his subsequent failure to settle the issue thereon with the Supplier, plaintiff instituted the present action against Tanjuatco and the Supplier, to compel them "to interplead their conflicting claims."

Tanjuatco moved to dismiss the case, upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the litigation, the amount involved therein being less than P10,000.00. The lower court granted the same and dismissed the case. Hence, this appeal. Plaintiff contends that the CFI has jurisdiction because the subject-matter of this litigation is not the aforementioned sum of P5,198.75, but the right to compel the defendants "to litigate among themselves".

Issue: Does the CFI have jurisdiction over the case?

Held: No. Plaintiff may compel the defendants to interplead among themselves concerning the aforementioned sum of P5,198.75. The issue of who among the defendants is entitled to collect the same is the object of the action and is not within the jurisdiction of the CFI. The plaintiff in asserting the jurisdiction of the CFI relies upon Rule 63 of the present Rules of Court, prescribing the procedure in cases of interpleading, and section 19 of Rule 5, which omits the Rules on Interpleading among those made applicable to inferior courts. However, the jurisdiction of our courts over the subject-matter of justiciable controversies is governed by Rep. Act No. 296, as amended, pursuant to which municipal courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil cases "in which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in controversy", amounts to not more than PHP10,000. Secondly, "the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts" belongs to Congress and is beyond the rule-making power of the Supreme Court, which is limited to matters concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Thirdly, the failure of said section 19 of Rule 5 of the present Rules of Court to make its Rule 63, on interpleading, applicable to inferior courts, merely implies that the same are not bound to follow Rule 63 in dealing with cases of interpleading, but may apply thereto the general rules on procedure applicable to ordinary civil action in said courts.

11. RCBC v. Metro Container Corp.


FACTS: Sept. 1990, Ley Construction Corporation (LEYCON) contracted a loan from RCBC in the amount of P30 million which was secured by a real estate mortgage over a Valenzuela property. LEYCON failed to settle its obligations prompting RCBC to institute extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against it and in Dec. 1992, RCBC was the highest bidder.

LEYCON as a response, filed an action for Nullificatoin of Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale and Damages against RCBC but eventually RCBC was able to consolidate its ownership over the property due to LEYCON’s failure to redeem. Metro Container Corporation (METROCAN) which was leasing the property from LEYCON was demanded by RCBC to make rental payments. LEYCON filed an action for Unlawful Detainer against METROCAN.

METROCAN, meanwhile, filed a complaint for Interpleader against LEYCON and RCBC to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves and to determine which among them shall rightfully receive the payment of monthly rentals. In the Interpleader case, an amicable settlement was made between METROCAN and LEYCON with respect to back rentals. However, in the Unlawful Detainer case, METROCAN was order to pay LEYCON whatever rentals were due. METRPCAN claims interpleader case is moot and academic because of amicable settlement. RCBC alleges, however, that the decision of the lower court in the ejectment case cannot render the Interpleader action moot and academic.

ISSUE: W/N the Party who initiates the interpleader action may be compelled to litigate if he is no longer interested to pursue such cause of action?

RULING: It is undisputed that METROCAN filed the interpleader action because LEYCON was claiming payment of the rentals as lessor and RCBC was making a demand by virtue of the consolidation of the title of the property in its name. The Supreme Court said that the unlawful detainer case involves issue of material possession and not of ownership, therefore, the reason for the interpleader ceased when the lower court rendered judgment ordering METROCAN to pay LEYCON. It should be remembered

that an action for interpleader is afforded to protect a person not against double liability but against double vexation in respect of one liability.


compiled rule 62 digests

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