Directorate for Manpower, Personnel and Administration (ECJ1)

Directorate for Manpower, Personnel and Administration (ECJ1)

The overall classification of this briefing is UNCLASSIFIED

Steve EwellEUCOM Exec Director J-6

1 December 09

Coalition Information Sharing… Stronger Together

Topics

• EUCOM Strategic Vision for C4ISR Interoperability/Info sharing

• MNIS concerns

• EUCOM Interaction with NATO

NATO and Coalition Forces MUST interoperate

The alternative is UNACCEPTABLE

The Challenge

British soldier was killed in Afghanistan by 'friendly fire'

Corporal Danny Nield was 31 years old.

A British soldier killed in Afghanistan last week was hit by a rocket- propelled grenade in a “friendly-fire” incident.

Corporal Danny Nield, 31, died after an explosion during an attack on the Taleban in Helmand province. He was serving as a forward air controller, the role filled by Prince Harry when he was in Afghanistan.

An investigation has begun but the Ministry of Defence said yesterday that the cause appeared to be a rocket-propelled grenade fired by a soldier of the Afghan National Army. “At this time it is not known whether this was caused by a weapon misfire or a malfunction of the ammunition,” an MoD spokesman said.

Fratricide

U.S. Forces Kill 6 Afghan Police Officers by Mistake

KABUL, Afghanistan — United States forces killed six Afghan police officers and one civilian on Wednesday during an assault on the hide-out of a suspected Taliban commander, the authorities said, in what an American military spokesman called a “tragic case of mistaken identity.” Thirteen Afghan officers were also wounded in the episode. A statement issued jointly by the American and the Afghan military commands said a contingent of police officers fired on United States forces after the Americans had successfully overrun the hide-out, killing the suspected Taliban commander and detaining another man.

The statement said the Americans had already entered the hide-out, a building in Qalat, the capital of the southern province of Zabul, when they came under attack by small-arms fire and rocket-propelled grenades from “a compound nearby.”

“Multiple attempts to deter the engagement were unsuccessful,” the statement said.

Fratricide

TWO DANISH SOLDIERS KILLED LAST WEEK IN AFGHANISTAN

Two Danish soldiers killed last week in Afghanistan may have been shot by friendly fire from another international squadron. The two Danish soldiers killed in Afghanistan last week during a long battle with Taliban forces may have been hit by fire from another battalion of the International Security Assistance Force, according to the British military.

A huge offensive in the country’s Helmand province that began on 19 September resulted in two Danish casualties, Mikkel Keil Sørensen and Thorbjørn Ole Reese, and three other soldiers wounded.

Original reports indicated that the two soldiers were killed when Taliban forces conducted an evening attack against Danish forces camped in the ‘Green Zone’ along the Helmand river.

The British military and Danish military police are investigating the circumstances of the battle and the soldiers’ deaths.

Fratricide

Sharing in Afghanistan… “how not to do it”… or better put… “learning how to do it”

Future coalitions will be little different…

ISAF coalition made up of 40 nations, 14 non-NATO• Reported 2500 NGOs working in Afghanistan• Major command structures… bring diversity (chaos?)

– NATO, U.S., and National networks– Predominant Networks

• NATO Secret, ISAF Secret, NATO Unclassified, USA SIPRNET, USA NIPRNET, CENTRIXS

Diverse information sharing categories in ISAF • NATO/ISAF Military and Civilian Personnel• Coalition Forces Personnel• NATO/ISAF contractors• Local Contractors• NON-ISAF Military and CIV personnel (ANSL, PAKMIL)• International Community (NGO, UN, Red Cross)• Others

Lessons and disconnects• Nations will bring divergent and non-compatible contributions• Nations will guard their information and sources

Power of networked environment built on ability to share, and relies on that attribute to improve information/knowledge by collective processes and cross-fertilization

We Must be WILLING and MOTIVATED to share,

even if by carrier pigeon…

Policy and CONOPS must be addressed simultaneously with new technology…

Key Closing Thought… up front

Traditional Battlefield Interoperability… Equipment, Concepts, and Policy will always be with us…

ASM – Air-to-Surface Missile

AWACS – Airborne Warning and Control System

CSAR – Combat Search and Rescue

DCA – Defensive Counter Air

GBAD – Ground Based Air Defense

JSTARS – Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System

MLRS – Multiple Launcher Rocket System

Multi-NAT – Multiple Nations

OCA – Offensive Counter Air

SEAD – Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

SOF – Special Operations Forces

UAV – Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

Joint Fires

Non-Traditional Interoperability… New Thought… New Requirements…

Stability vs. Warfighting

Interoperability focused on partners… not DoD• Not achieved by issuing common equipment• Gained by continuously working to tie cultural, procedural, technical and policy aspects of

militaries and governments together• Not a single shot effort… nor can results be gained quickly• Interoperability first about policy… then technology

Information and technology sharing as tools to influence foreign policy • USG policy is “unity of effort” … our actions are protectionist• Convince policy makers sharing creates U.S. strategic advantage• As FMF dollars dwindle… leverage value of technology as policy tool• Enhance data usability (USG fails to embrace international data standards)

Focus is not warfighting . . . it’s on creating securityFocus is not warfighting . . . it’s on creating security

Command and Control Interop Boards• Bi-Lateral forum to advocate C4 and

weapon system interoperability• 60% policy … 40% in military standards,

equip, and procedures• Bring agencies and acquisition

communities together with international counterparts

EUCOM Strategic Initiatives… Promoting Interoperability … Building Capacity

International Interoperability: COCOMs can provide insight to policy and acquisition communities

Link 16 NetworkLink 16 Network

Coalition Warrior Interoperability Demonstration• JCS/J6 sponsored, JFCOM executed

• Coalition Task Force new technology demo• UK informed capability development • NATO National system to system testing• NORTHCOM HS/HD

Venue to test technology “maturity” prior to Milestone B decision

Influencing national C4 architectures of partner nations• EUCOM generates national C4 joint concept of operations• Guide FMS and Direct Commercial Purchases of partners

Combined Endeavor

• Enabling nations to deploy interoperable C4 capabilities in support of multinational crisis response ops

At the end of the day . . .

Traditional Interoperability & Info Sharing

• Advocate for international standards/coalition interoperability• Observation… existing DoD forums avoid international interop issues

• Reduce “resistance” to incorporate international tech into U.S. systems• Weapon and IT technology…many DoD governing groups, no “senior among peers”• Competing organizational policies prevent interoperability

Interoperability & Info Sharing in new Security & Stability Environment

• Differences exists between “warfighting” and “stability” information sharing requirements• Iraq and Afghanistan models driving Multi-National warfighting requirements• Day to day global information exchange guided by connect and collaborate model

• Monolithic systems create internal and international policy restrictions • Intersection between governments, militaries, NGOs and interagencies is the Internet

Leverage COCOM’s “International” Initiatives & Expertise

• Sounding board to address international technology shortfalls and transition opportunities• COCOM-sponsored venues to engage partner nations on policy & interop issues• Advocate to promote policy and procedural changes required in Stability and Security ops

New international C2 model… focus not on Command and Control but on

“Connect and Collaborate”New international C2 model… focus not on Command and Control but on

“Connect and Collaborate”

A New NATO… 21st Century Roles will drive new info sharing requirements

Home Missions• Deterrence & Defense• Transatlantic Resilience• Europe Whole and Free at Peace

Away Missions• Crisis Prevention and Response• Stability Operations• Working effectively with Partners

These mission share common requirements• Improved capabilities that are deployable• Better synergy between NATO & partners, including NGOs• Cooperation between Civil and Military authorities• Requires allies match means to agreed upon missions

(1) Alliance Reborn: An Atlantic Compact for the 21st Century

Information Sharing for Security and Stability… New Challenges “C2” vs Traditional C2 Connect and Collaborate

• How to integrate organizations we do not command and control for planning and execution?

• Lack of standardized, integrated information

• How to integrate knowledge and expertise from Interagency, NGOs, Academia, and other non-traditional centers of excellence?

• Utilize INTERNET based… open source, equipment and applications

• Balance RISK of sharing against the GAINS of sharing … educate DoD policy makers

Leveraging the Internet, its supply networks, architectures and standards enables DoD and other government agencies to build global capacity for international information sharing… on international terms… not U.S. terms

Information Sharing Space

Multinational partners (SECRET-Rel Networks)• Mission-specific (ISAF, MCFI)

• Standing alliance (NATO)

• Bilateral

• Ad Hoc (Georgia)

OGA/NGO/IGO (non-classified, UNCLASS and FOUO)

Cross-domain requirements

Historical Focus on Systems instead of Sharing

Proliferation of Networks

44 CENTRIXS/multinational US networks• Including bi-lats

• Growing: ISAF, Thailand, Mexico, etc.

NATO classified networks (US BICES)

Multiple UNCLAS sharing capabilities (HarmonieWeb, APAN, Intelink, etc.)

Instead of facilitating Information Sharing we have created multiple Information Silos

“Eating the Elephant”

MNIS… an immense amount of complexity… all have been working on “our piece of the elephant”

What’s missing… ? Clear guidance…

• A CONOPS for Information Sharing:

• To guide faster deployment and uniform employment

– ADHOC coalition networks in days not months

– Off the shelf GOTS and COTS solutions

• To drive industry to respond to requirements

• To specify how we will implement Suite “B”

• To provide long-term vision

We must enable an Enterprise Cross-Domain Provider

CENTRIXS Model

Presently U.S focused, but . . . we need to change…

• Information Sharing CONOPS “musts”:– Define information exchange requirements first

– Adopt interoperability standards in partnership

– Be more responsive and much faster

• CENTRIXS-ISAF - model for the future?– Peer network relationship with NATO

– Some common applications and data

– Evolving to fully integrated systems

Summary

• Current policies = too hard to share required information

• Bridge multiple information silos via Cross-Domain Solutions

• Adopt policies to embrace and empower our partners’ capabilities• Adopt standards for reciprocal trust

• Establish a single DoD entity to oversee all multinational/multi-agency Information Sharing capabilities

USNMR

Established Communication Flow with NATO

OSD JCS

US Del to Mil Com

USMILREP

ACO

CoCOM

USNLR

Liaison Info Flow

Direct Info Flow

ACT

SHAPE, Mons, BE SACT, Norfolk, VA, US

MC

Increase Interactivity with NATO

Problem Areas

• No EUCOM Staff Synchronization Dealing w/ NATO

• Lack Of Unified Coord Between EUCOM & SHAPE Staff

• Lack Of Formal USNMR /USNLR Relationship w/EUCOM

• Lack Of IT Access Both Directions

• Lack Of NATO General Knowledge Among Staff

Increase Interactivity with NATO

Solution• Add EUCOM LNO at USNMR (SHAPE)

• Add EUCOM LNO at USMILREP (Brussels)

• Designate O-6 NATO Issue Coordinator in J5

• Hold Quarterly AO Lvl Issue Meetings

• Continue Annual GO/FO Staff Exchange

• Staff EUCOM/NATO Training

• Increase Use & Availability of NATO Secure Systems At EUCOM

Desired Effects•Increase Relations w/NATO

•Formalize Relationships

•Synchronize Staff Efforts (Enhance SC & BPC Effect)

•General Knowledge of NATO as a Staff Core Competency

•Open IT Lines Of Communication

Future Interaction

USMILREP

US NMR

SHAPEJ-STAFF

OPEN LOC AS REQUIREDIT SolutionsNATO Core Competency Tng

Builds NATO Knowledge Core CompetencyFormalizes ContactsSynchronizes Staff Allows For Continued AO Interaction

CONTINUE

USEUCOMJ-STAFF

GO/FO Annual Staff Exchange

EUCOM NATO Issue Coordinator Stuttgart (ECJ5)

ADD

Quarterly Issue Coord Meeting

ADD

I.D. NATO Issue Team (WG) Reps

O-6 Same LOCs Work For ACT

ADDEUCOM LNO to USNMRat SHAPEO-5

ADDEUCOM LNO to USMILREPat Brussels, BEO-5

We Must be WILLING and MOTIVATED to share

Policy and CONOPS must be addressed simultaneously with new technology…

Key Closing Thought