eric voegelin on nazi political extremism

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Eric Voegelin on Nazi Political ExtremismAuthor(s): Clifford F. PorterSource: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 63, No. 1 (Jan., 2002), pp. 151-171Published by: University of Pennsylvania PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3654262

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2/22

r i c

Voegel in

o

N a z i

olitical

xtremism

Clifford

E

Porter

EricVoegelin (1901-1985) is notas well knownamonghistoriansas he is

among

political

theorists,

yet

he has

had

a

continuing

influence

on both Ger-

man

Social

Democratand

ChristianDemocrat

political

leaders.

His

early

life

is

very

much

a

reflection

of

both

the

intellectual

developments

and

the chaos

of

Germany

and

Austria

between the

wars.

Voegelin's

analysis

of

Nazism

is worth

revisiting

by

historians

because

it

delineated

the

Nazi

rationale

or

the Holo-

caust in the

early

1930s,

even

if

the Nazis themselves

had

yet

to

move

towards

mass

murder

arly

in

the

regime.

Voegelin

was

not

prescient

enough

to

predict

the

extent

of the

Holocaust,

but

he

understood

hat

the

ideological

rationale

of

Nazi violence was unlimited.Furthermore, is descriptionof politicalextrem-

ism

as

Gnosticism

in

1952

is

valid

for

explaining

why

an

individual

might

support

he Nazis

and then

voluntarily

commit

extraordinarily

icious

acts to

try

to

realize the

dream-worldof the

ThirdReich.

The

political,

economic,

and

social chaos

in

Austria

after

World

War

I was

the

catalyst

for

the

young

Eric

Voegelin's

studies

of

the

essence

of

ideologies

and

the

ideologists

who

promoted

hem

from

both the

left

and

right

wing.

As

National Socialism

grew,

so

did his

experiences

with

and

understanding

of

extremist

political

ideologies.

Contemporary

ntellectual

debates

between

neo-

Kantianandexistentialistmethodology,however,didnothelppenetrate o the

essential

causes

of

political

extremism.

His

experiences

n America

n the mid-

1920s

were essential for

his

development

away

from what

he characterized

s

narrow

methodological

provincialism

to

an

empiricism

open

to

philosophic

questions,

including spiritual

questions.

By

1938

he had

theorized

hat

ideolo-

gies

were

political

secular

religions

that substituted

he

state for

divine

reality.

Because

of

this

interpretation,

Voegelin's

approach

o totalitarianism

as

been

characterized

as an

outdated

ersatz

religion

model,

better suited

for the

Cold

War.'The ersatz

religion

model

worked

reasonably

well to describe

simi-

See,

for

example,

Dominick

LaCapra,

Representing

the

Holocaust:

History

Theory,

and

Trauma

(Ithaca,

N.Y.,

1994).

151

Copyright

2002

by

Journal

f the

History

of

Ideas,

Inc.


http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/22

152

Clifford

F Porter

larities

the

National Socialist

movement had

with

religions,

but

Voegelin

rec-

ognized

that t

did

not

penetrate

o the essence

of

ideologies.

His

understanding

of

ideologies

matured

after

World War

II

into his

theory

that

ideologies

were

Gnostic

quests

for absolute

certainty

hat

caused

alienation

from

reality.

Voegelin thoughtthatthe searchfor certaintyultimatelyrequiredexclud-

ing any

evidence

to the

contrary

of the

ideology;

therefore,

deologies

limited

the

individual's view

of

human

reality

to the

immediate

world.

Furthermore,

although

ideologies

are

founded on

a

kernel

of

truth-e.g.,

proletarians

are

sometimes

oppressed-ideologists

become

quickly

alienated

from

reality

as

a

consequence

of

their own

quest

for

certainty

about

meaning

in

existence.

The

consequences

of

alienationare that

ideologists

pursue

he

perceived

immanent

good

and

try

to

eliminate the

perceived

immanent

evil,

thereby

rationalizing

criminality

nd

even murder.Violence

s inherent o

extremist

olitical

deologies.

Background

and

Influences:

Weber,

Kraus,

University,

and

America

Eric

Voegelin

was born

in

1901

and

grew

up

in

Vienna.

After

the war

Austria was convulsed

by

political

and social

crises

ranging

from

attempted

reactionary

and

Communist

coups

to

constant

ood

shortages.

In

the first

post-

war election

Voegelin's

political

and

social

inclinations

ed

him to

vote for

the

Social

Democratic

Party SDP),

but he was

aggravated

by

the

uncompromising

Marxist

rhetoricof the

SDP

leadership.

n

this

atmosphere

Voegelin

began

his

long journey

toward

understandingdeologies,

butfirst he hadto workthrough

many

different

political

and

philosophic

problems

before

he

arrived

at an ad-

equate understanding.

The

intellectuals

that influenced

him

during

this

long

process

were

diverse,

but

they

shared

a

hostility

to

ideologies.

The

first

mportant

cademic

nfluence on

Voegelin

was

Max

Weber.2

We-

ber

encouraged

ntellektuelle

Rechtschaffenheit

intellectual

honesty)

with oth-

ers and

especially

with

oneself.

Weber

insisted on

following

an

ethic

of re-

sponsibility

or

one's

actions

(Verantwortungsethik),

ather

han

makingapolo-

gies

for

following

an

ethic of

good

intentions

(Gesinnungsethik).

The

latter,

Weber

feared,

was often used to

justify

bad

consequences

of well-intended

actions.3

These

simple principles helped

guide

the

young

Eric

Voegelin

away

from violent

ideological

movements.

Weber

also

was intenton

"scientifically"

understanding

ociety.

"Science"

(wissenschaft)

did

nothave

quite

the same

positivistic

implications

n German

as it did in eitherFrench or

English,

although

there

was

the

positivistic

ten-

dency

to

eliminate

any perceived

values

in scientific

work.4

The

impact

on

Voegelin

rather

straightforwardlympressed

on him

the need

to

be as honest

2

AutobiographicalReflections,

11-13.

3

Ibid.,

11.

4

Jiirgen

Gebhardt

nd

Barry

Cooper,

"Introduction,"

he

Collected

Works

f

Eric

Voegelin,

I,

On

the Form

of

the American

Mind,

tr.

Ruth

Hein

(Baton Rouge,

1995),

xii-xv.




4/22

Voegelin's

nterpretations

f

Nazi

Extremism

153

with

himselfand n

his

studies s he

could

be. The

first

xample

of

this

was

his

quick

abandonment

f

Marxism

when

he

decided

it was

economically

untenable.5

Voegelin

followed

Weber's

methodology

of

comparative

knowledge

for

scientific

inquiry;

otherwise,

without

comparison

with

other

societies'

experi-

ences, abasis foranyresearchwas limitedto one's own realmof social experi-

ence. The

premise

of

Voegelin's comparative

research

was that

there

was

a

common

ground

of

human

experience

across

time and

space.

When

Voegelin

studied

ancient or

non-Western

societies,

he

saw essential

similarities

in hu-

man

experience,

rather han

differences.

A

problematic

spect

ofWeber's

work,

however,

was

how

to

define

"value."

Weber's

emphasis

on

value-free science

meant

that

many

social

issues could

not

adequately

be

studied because

they

involved

values.

Voegelin began

to

understand hat

ethical

judgement

in

society required

a

foundation

of

values.

This issue would resurface n the late 1920s in Voegelin's study of political

science as a

subset of

constitutional

aw. The

problem

of

how

to

judge

value

was

not

philosophically

difficult for

Voegelin

because

the

underlying

premise

of

his

work was that

humanity

has

a

spiritual

as

well as

a

temporal

oundation.

The

Weberian

eliminationof values

severely

hindered

studying

political

phi-

losophy

or

ideologies,

and

it

took

Voegelin

several

years

to work

through

he

problem.

As he

put

it

50

years

later:

But of

course

so

far

as

science

is concerned

that

is a

very

precarious

position,

becausestudentsafter all wantto knowthereasons

why

they

should

conduct

themselves

in a

certain

manner;

and

when

the reasons

-that

is,

the

rational

order

of existence-are

excluded

from

consider-

ation,

emotions are liable

to

carryyou

away

into all

sorts

of

ideological

and

idealistic

adventures n which ends

become

more

fascinating

han

the means.6

Without

a

clear

science of

values or

ethics,

a

basis

for human

conduct

was

missing.

Furthermore,

ithoutsuch a science

of

values,

a

critique

of

the behav-

ior of

ideologists

is difficult. Weber was a

very

ethical

person,

so this was not

an

issue.

The

generation

after World

War

I,

however,

was

deeply

troubled,

lacking

social

or

political

stability

in

any

form,

paradigm,

zeitgeist,

or even a

Platonic noble

myth.

A

related and fundamental

question

remained,

which

Voegelin

witnessed

around him

academically,

socially,

and

politically:

why

did

intellectuals,

political

groups,

or factions

cling

to

philosophies

thatwere

demonstrably

alse-for

example,

Zionist

Jewish

conspiracies

or

the inevita-

bility

of the

proletarian

evolution?

5

Autobiographical

Reflections,

11.

6

Ibid.,

12.




5/22

154

Clifford

F

Porter

The

Viennese

iconoclast,

drama

ritic,

and social

commentator,

Karl

Kraus,

reinforced

Voegelin's

emphasis

on the

pursuit

of truth

and intellectual

honesty.

Kraus's

scathing

commentary

on

contemporary

ntellectuals

and

ournalists

n

his

journal

Die

Fackel

was

essential for

Voegelin's

developing

understanding

of ideologies. Krausruthlesslyexposedthe artificialityandpretentiousnessof

much of

Viennese

literati

hrough

vicious

satire.7

He was

a

master

of

language

and

firmly

held that

how

a

person

used

language

represented

his or

her true

character.

The Viennese literati

had

corrupted

heir

professional

ethics

by

fail-

ing

to

report

the

complete

truth,

especially

during

the

war where

journalism

decayed

into

insulting

propaganda.

The literati

also

failed

as

leaders

of

culture,

which

was

perhaps

he

focus of Kraus's bitterest

attack,

because

without

cul-

tural

eadership

he

civilizationwould

decay.

If

honesty

n

language

were

used,

honesty

of

discourse

must

follow.

However

the

reverse

held true:

dishonest

use

of

language represented

dishonest intentionsand

contempt

for the audience,

thereby

preventing

ruth.8

Voegelin

concluded from

reading

Kraus

hat

ideologists

could

not

be

suc-

cessful without

destroying language

and truth.The

consequence

of

the

abuse

of

language

in

political

and

social

life

is that

the standards

of

thought

are so

lowered that

the

society

becomes

susceptible

to the

vulgar

propaganda

f the

National

Socialists.9

Wittgenstein

was also

profoundly

influenced

by

Kraus:

with

ethical

precision

in

language

it would

be

possible

to

truly

study philoso-

phy

and

prevent

deology.

0

Fifty

years

later

Voegelin

still

thought

a

thorough

analysis

of the success of theNazis was not

possible

without

studying

Kraus's

diagnosis

of Austrian

society

beginning

in the 1890s."

As

admirableas

Kraus was

a

critic of

society,

his

tactic

of

satirizing

his

enemies was

ineffective

against

the Nazis.

The

Nazis

twisted

language

and

appealed

to

people's

worst

instincts,

raising

terror

and

violence

to

an

alleged

spiritual

evel.

In

this

case,

the sword

was

mightier

than

the

pen.12

However,

once actual

events

usurped

atire,

hen

society

had

decayed

too

farto be

saved.'"

Kraus's words were

inadequate

o

influence

society,

and

the

effort to

change

behavior

by

demanding

honest

language

failed.

The

failure

of

language

was

a

manifestation

of a

deeper problem.

7

Carl E.

Schorske,

Fin-de-Siecle

Vienna:

Politics

and Culture

New

York,

1985),

363.

8

Kari

Grimstad,

Masks

of

the

Prophet:

The

Theatrical

World

f

Karl Kraus

Toronto,

1982).

9

Wilma Abeles

Iggers,

Karl

Kraus:

A Viennese

ritic

of

the

twentieth

century

(The

Hague,

1967),

32.

10

Allan Janik

and

Stephen

Toulmin,

Wittgenstein

Vienna

New

York,

1973),

93.

"

Autobiographical

Reflections,

18.

12

Kari

Grimstad,

Masks

of

the

Prophet:

The

Theatrical

World

f

Karl

Kraus,

228.

13

Krausdied

in

1936,

two

years

before

the

Anschluss.




6/22

Voegelin's

nterpretations

f

Nazi

Extremism

155

Voegelin

adopted

Kraus's

analysis

that

the Nazis'

linguistic

vulgarity

and

use

of

pagan

symbols

indicated

heir rue

essence

as

criminal

barbarians.'4

Much

of

the

symbolism

in

the

propaganda

f the

Nazis was

designed

to

garner

mme-

diate

support

and

did

not

reflect the truenature

of

their

ideology.

But

what

was

or was not Nazi ideology was not entirelyclear at the time to many people,

including

Krausand

Voegelin.

It was still true that

many

Germans

responded

positively

to

the

propaganda.5

The academic

debatesof

the

1920s at the

University

of

Vienna,

were

domi-

nated

by

methodological

arguments

about

epistemology

and did

not

help

Voegelin

understand

he

ideologies.

All

academic

discussions,

or so it

appeared

to

Voegelin,

were

subsetsof

the

competing

arguments

between

the

neo-Kantian

Kultur-wissenschaft

ndthe

universalist

Geisteswissenschaften.'

Reducing

he

debate to its

base

level,

the

question

was whether

knowledge

was

a

priori

or

if

existence preceded essence. Hans Kelsen, one of Voegelin's professors in

Vienna,

used

a

priori

categories

for

the

logic

of

a

legal

system.

In

the semantics

used

at

the

time

Staatslehre

Political

Studies)

was

a

part

of

Rechtslehre

Legal

Studies).

Consequently,

anythingbeyond

Rechtslehre

could

notbe

considered

political

science and

"values"

as defined

by

Weber

and

in common

use,

and

were

not

considered

mportant

or

studying

political

or

legal

systems.

The

ques-

tion

in

terms

of

the

Pure

Theory

of Law

was whether

he activities

of

Commu-

nists

and,

later,

the

National Socialists were

legal.

Such a

question,

however,

hardly explains

why

ideologists

behaved

as

violently

as

they

did,

especially

against

innocent

people

when the Nazis madeit

technically

legal

after 1933.

Ideologists

claimed to

be

scientific,

and the

methodologies

of

neo-

Kantianism

and

existentialismdid not

easily

allow

a

challenge

of

the

values

of

the

ideologists.

So within

the

academic

community

in

which

Voegelin

was

working

there was

not an

adequate

foundation o

challenge

the

ideologies

as

unethical,

immoral,

or

simply

bad "values."

In fact

all

methodologies

within

the

intellectual

climate

tendedto

forbidvalue-based

or

metaphysical

question-

ing.

Neo-Kantianism

rejected

any

study

not

within

a

priori

categories,

such

as

Rechtslehre.

Heidegger rejected

value

judgments

because

a

priori

conscious-

ness

was

fallacious. Marxism

simply rejected

metaphysics

as

bourgeois

ab-

stractions.

These

intellectual aboos frustrated

Voegelin

throughout

his

life."

During

Voegelin's

studies

in

America

he

learned

how

to break

out

of

this

limited

debate

and

how to

find a betterbasis

for

analyzing politics

and

ideolo-

gies.

He studied

the

British and American common-sense

philosophic

tradi-

14

Voegelin

describedNazism's

appeal

in

part

as

pre-Christian

aganism

in

1940,

"Some

Problems

of

German

Hegemony,"

TheJournal

of

Politics,

3

(1941),

164.

15

E.g.,

see

the analysis of Nazi propagandan

Ian

Kershaw,The "HitlerMyth

":

Image

and

Reality

in

the

ThirdReich

(New

York,

1987).

16

JiirgenGebhardt nd

Barry

Cooper,

"Introduction."Onthe Form

of

the

AmericanMind,

xii-xv.

'7Eric

Voegelin,

New

Science

of

Politics

(Chicago,

1952),

21.




7/22

156

Clifford

F

Porter

tion,

attending

he

seminars

of John

Dewey

and Alfred

North

Whitehead

and

reading

commentaries

n

America

by

writers

such

as

George

Santayana,

Alexis

de

Tocqueville,

and

William

James.

He also

experienced

his

open-ended

com-

mon-sense

philosophy

as

practicedby

his host

in

Wisconsin,

the labor

econo-

mist, JohnR. Commons.He also spenttimestudyingFrenchphilosophy,from

Bodinto

Bergson,

and

earned

o

appreciate

he Lucretian

oetry

of Paul

Valery.'8

These

experiences

caused

a

profoundchange

in his outlook.

The

methodologi-

cal

debates

of

Central

Europe

were no

longer

meaningful.

British

and

American

philosophers

were

asking metaphysicalquestions,

rather

han

seeking

method-

ological

answers abouthow

to determine

ruth

positivistically

in

a

precise

sys-

tem of

thought.19

oegelin,

therefore,

became

convinced

of the

basic

provincial-

ism of

German

academic

questions,

then

rejected

neo-Kantianism

and existen-

tialism for a

return

o

metaphysics

and

empiricism.

He

read

Heidegger's

Sein

undZeit in 1927,which was

creating

a sensationat thetime in AustriaandGer-

many,

and later

simply

stated

hatwhen he read

t,

"It

ust

ranoff."20

Heidegger

had

essentially

presented

a

closed

philosophy

by

offering

a

complete

answerto

the

fundamental

questions

of

human

consciousness-existence

precedes

es-

sence. To

Voegelin,

Heidegger

had

denied

the

open-ended

nature

of

existence.

As

Voegelin

furtheredhis own

studies

into

medieval

Christian

and

classi-

cal

philosophy,

he

came to

believe

that

consciousness

relied

on more

han

merely

external

objects;

t

was

consciousness

of

experiences

of

both

immanent

reality

and

of

spiritual

reality.2'

Although

he never

formally

became

a member of

a

Christian

denomination,

Voegelin

developed

an

understanding

f the Christian

and

classical ideas as

symbols

of

Divine

reality,

such

as

consciousness

orfaith.22

The

hostility

to

metaphysics

n

the academic

community,

he

believed,

prevented

philosophy

from

asking

transcendental r

spiritual

questions

about

human

ex-

istence

and

discarded

religious

and

metaphysical

symbolism

as

mere

supersti-

tion.23

He found

current

methodologies

limiting,

whereas

the

experiences

of

the

classical and Christian

philosophers

revealed

a

greater

breadth

of

human

experience.

Voegelin

concluded that

modern

philosophy

had

closed

itself

to

the

possibility

of

transcendent

eality

and

consequently

provided

little

guid-

ance for

recognizing

the Nationalist Socialists forwhat

they

were-immature

barbarians.

By

the

late

1920s

Voegelin

had

the foundation

o formulate

a

theory

of

ideologies.

His own work

was

disciplined

by

Weber's

and

Kraus's

influ-

ences,

and he

bypassed contemporary

methodologicalproblems

by

returning

to a

classical and Christian

understanding

f

metaphysics

and

empiricism.

'"


28-33.

'~

On

the Form

of

the American

Mind,

4-5.

20

Autobiographical

Reflections,

33.

21Ibid.,

70-74,

and Ellis

Sandoz,

The

Voegelinian

Revolution

Baton

Rouge,

1981),

51-53.

22

Autobiographical Reflections, 63.

23

E.g.,

Eric

Voegelin,

From

Enlightenment

o

Revolution,

d.

by

John

H.

Hallowell

(Durham,

N.C.,

1975),

25-27.




8/22

Voegelin's

nterpretations

f

Nazi

Extremism

157

Voegelin's

personal

experiences

at this time are

very

revealing

about

the

nature

of

ideologies-that

is,

he

experienced

the

consequences

of

ideological

thinking.Voegelin

very

much

enjoyed

discussing political

events

with his stu-

dents,

while

at the

same time

trying

often

in vain to

keep

their

minds

open

to

philosophic questions and to prevent them from falling into the closed

mindednessof an

ideological

system.

He

was

rattled

afterone

lively

discussion

at

the

Volkshochschule,24

when

one

of

his better

students

old

him

that

it

would

be

a

true

shamethat

when

they-the

SDP--came

to

power,

they

would

have

to

kill

Voegelin.

The

ideological

logic

was

very straightforward;

he

SDP

politics

were

correct,

and

even

though

Professor

Voegelin

was a wonderful

and honest

intellect,

he

would be

dangerous

o

the

struggle.

The

logic

disturbed

Voegelin

greatly:

he

political

objectives

of the

ideologist

were more

mportant

han

honest

philosophic inquiry.

Thestudent

learly

understood

Voegelin's

critiques

of theSDP oranyother

narrow

deology.

But the

ideology

was

so

vitally important

o

society,

civiliza-

tion,

or the

proletariat

hat

any

undermining

riticism

had to

be eliminatedfor

the

ultimate

goal.

Implicitly,

if

not

explicitly,

the

student

understood

hat

the

intellectual

honesty

Voegelin

had learned

from

Weber

was

of

secondary

im-

portance,

or

even

dangerous,

o

ideological

goals.

Voegelin

concluded

that

ideologies

were

systems

of

thought

that

denied

intellectual

honesty,

rejected

metaphysics,

and

accepted

political

violence. Over

the

next

twenty years

Voegelin

first

challenged

the

ideologies'

claims

to

be

scientific,then he tried to

explain ideologies

as secular

political

religions.

Ide-

ologists

could

not

be

partners

n scientific

inquiry;

they

were

objects

of

in-

quiry.

Towards Political

Religions

Voegelin's

first

attempts

o

penetrate

o

the essence

of

National

Socialism

were two

books

published

in

1933

analyzing

race

theories-Rasse

und

Staat

and

Die

Rassenidee

in der

Geistesgeschichte.

He showed

that

National Social-

ist racismdeniedthe fundamental

umanity

of Jewsand other

races,

and,

based

on

his own

studies with

biology,

that National

Socialist

race

theory

was

not

science.

Voegelin

labeled this

abuse

of science

for

ideological

purposes

rather

than

to understand

eality

as

"scientism."25

The Nazi race idea had in fact little to do

with

biology

and

ethnography.

Rather,

Voegelin

believed

that

racism

was the

symbolic

expression

of the or-

dering principle

of

Germannationalism.

The elaborate

use

of scientific lan-

guage gave

comfort to

the

ideologists

that

they

were

actually engaged

in

sci-

24

This

was

the SDP

sponsored

college

for

urban

workers,

where

Voegelin

taught

rom1927

to

1938.

The

Austrian

SDP

was dominated

by

Marxism

at

the time.

25

From

Enlightenment

o

Revolution,

20-21.




9/22

158

Clifford

E Porter

ence

seeking positive

truth.

Nonetheless,

no matter

how

elaborate

he

use

of

language

was,

it

still

denoted little or

nothing.26

In

the

introduction o

Die

Rassenidee

in der

Geistesgeschichte,

Voegelin

outlined the

dangerous

mplications

of modem

race

theories.

Although

he

did

not mentionNationalSocialismby name,it is obviously theobjectof his con-

tempt:

The fact

that

human

beings

are

physiologically

descended

from

each other

does

not

yet

make

a

human

history....

...

the

dangerous

hought

arises

that

the

historical

substance

could

be

arbitrarily enerated

by

diligent

clubs

for the

breeding

of

racially

pure

bodies....

It is

a

nightmare

o think hatwe should

recognize

the

people

whom

we follow and whom we allow to come nearus notby their ooks, their

words,

and their

gestures,

but

by

their

cranial

index

and

the

propor-

tional

measurements

of

their extremities.27

With

the

humanity

of Jews

and other

races

undermined

by

race

theory,

the

nightmare

ame true

ess

than 10

years

later.

Few

could

have

imagined

n

1933

that the

worst

possible

implications

of

National

Socialism

from

a

dream

could

become real.

Quite

clearly,

the

words

used

by

the

Nazis

had

real

consequences.

Voegelin

had

foreseen that the Nazis would establish

Aryan

breeding

farms

andcranialmeasurementsas SS enlistmentcriteria.

As

the discrimination

nd aws directed

against

he

Jews

increased,

Voegelin

publicly

predicted

n

the

Vienna Neue

Freie

Presse

(30

Nov.

1937)

that

should

anotherwar between

the

greatpowers

develop,

"total

war would

probably

be a

war of annihilation"

Vernichtungskrieg).28

udging

by

the

international

itua-

tion

in

late 1937-wars

in

Spain

and

China-there

were

no limits

to

warfare

between

peoples.

Wars

between states

were

previously

imited,

but

it

was

clear

by

1937 that all

citizens

would become

participants.

According

to

Voegelin,

the

next war would

be

a war

between

racially

defined

peoples

with no

logical

limits until

one

people

or

another

was

annihilated.

Having

demonstratedNational

Socialism's

false

claim

to

science

and

its

implicit logic

toward

violence,

Voegelin

had

yet

to

resolve

satisfactorilywhy

ideologies

were

believable to

so

many people

of

varying

ntelligence

and

socio-

economic class.

In his

next

attempt,

Der

Autoritaire

taat

(1936),

Voegelin

discussed

the

danger

of

ideologies

in the context

of

whether

or

notthe

Austrian

26

BarryCooper,

Eric

Voegelin

and

the Foundations

of

Modern

Political

Science

(Colum-

bia, Mo.,

1999),

41.

27

Eric

Voegelin,

The

History

of

the Race

Idea:

From

Ray

to

Carus,

tr.

Ruth

Hein

anded.

Klaus

Vondung

(Baton

Rouge,

1998),

23-25.

28

"Der

neue

Stil

des

Krieges,"

Neue Freie

Presse,

30

November

1937.




10/22

Voegelin's

nterpretations

f

Nazi

Extremism

159

authoritarian

onstitution f 1934

was

an

adequate

defense

for

democracy gainst

either

Nazi or

Communist

deologies.

An

authoritarian

tate

was

certainly

bet-

ter than

the

totalitarian

egime

to

the north n

Germany.

Voegelin

also

demon-

strated

hat

Kelsen's

Pure

Theory

of

Law failed: its

absence

of values allowed

for the legal seizureof powerby groupsopenlyhostile to democracy.

Aside

from

ruining

his

personal

relationship

with

Kelsen,

Voegelin

theo-

rized that the

totalitarian

conception

of

the

state,

as

developed

by

the Nazi

Staatslehre

heorist

Carl

Schmitt,

broke

down

the

distinction

between

the

com-

munity

or

society

(Gesellschaft)

and the state.

The totalitarian

tate tried

to

controlor

lead the

community

directly

n

all

aspects

of

human

ife

based on

the

ideological

conception

of

human

reality.

That

such

control

of

all

of

society

proved

difficult for the

Nazis

is

not

the essential

observation,

but rather

hat he

totalitarian

deology

tried to

subordinate

he individual

to

the

party

and

the

state.29

The

Authoritarian

tate

on

the

other hand had

no

such

objective.

Its

goal

was

to

defend

the

state from

ideological

assault.

If the

authoritarian

tate

could

defend

itself

successfully,

then there existed

the

very

real

possibility

that

a

maturedemocratic radition

could

develop

to

resist

ideologies

on

its

own.3"

The

appeal

of

ideologies

was not addressed

n

DerAutoritiire

Staat and

the

question

remained

why

the Nazis hated he Jews

so

much.

Voegelin

concluded

thatthe

Nazis

made the

Jews the Satanic

figure

that

any

millenarian

movement

needs. The

Nazis

inherited

his

tradition

rom

the

lingering

anti-Semitic

sub-

cultureof Central-East

Europe,

buttheir

ideology

changed

it intothe

symbol-

ism of

good

versus

evil

manifested

as

Aryan

versus

Semite.

It is

logical

that

with sucha

religious

mindset

he

destruction

f

evil could

become

a

political

goal.31

Voegelin's

last

effort

to

understand

he

appeal

of

ideologies

before

the

war

was Die

Politischen

Religionen

(1938).

He furthered

his

understanding

hat

totalitarian

deologists

were

in

the

same tradition

as

the

many

millenarian

per-

versions

of

Christianity

nd

political

religions

of

ancient

Egypt.32

ie

Politischen

Religionen

is

an

emotional and

polemical

work. All

of

Voegelin's

principles

are

evident

from the

first few

pages.

First

and

foremost,

ideologies

were

at

their basis

nothing

more than

temporal,

secular

attempts

o

createa

religious

community

to

answer

humanity's

fundamentally piritual

needs.

Second,

po-

litical

religions

denied

divine

reality,perverted

emporal

reality,

and

attempted

to

enforce their

visions

of

reality

on the

rest

of

the

society.

Consequently,

29

Der

Autoritaire taat,

10-11.

30

Ibid.,

281-83.

'

Cooper,

"Introduction,"

olitical

Religions,

xxi; and,

Gregor

Sebba,

"Prelude

and varia-

tions

on

the Theme of Eric

Voegelin,"

Eric

Voegelin

s

Thought:

A Critical

Appraisal,

ed. Ellis

Sandoz

(Durham,

N.C.,

1982),

12.

32

Eric

Voegelin,

Political

Religions,

Introduced

y BarryCooper,

trans.

T.J.

DiNapoli

and

E.S.

Easterly

III,

Toronto

Studies

in

Theology,

23

(1986), orig.

Die Politischen

Religionen

(Stockholm,

1939).

The first effort

to

distribute

n Vienna

in

1938

was

obstructed

by

the

Nazi

Anschluss.




11/22

160

Clifford

F

Porter

Voegelin

unreservedly

argues

that the

basis

for

a renewal

of

philosophy

and

political

society requires

a

spiritual

religious

foundation,

whether

it

is

within

the

traditional

churches

or

not. His

reasons

for this

are

simply

that

humanity

must be

in

balance with

its

spiritual

and

physical

existence

and

that the

denial

of the spiritualaspecthas causedmanyerrors n modem philosophy.33

Voegelin

used

empirical

evidence

on two levels

to

make

his

argument.

The

first is

simply

thatthe

consequences

of

ideologies

are obvious

in the terror

he

Nazis

caused.

Secondly,

and far more

profoundly,

Voegelin

argued

that

the

basis of

human

spirituality

s within

the

soul and

is

accessible

to

everyone

by

looking

within

one's

self.34

Man

experiences

his

existence

as a creature

and therefore

as doubtful.

Somewhere

in

the

depths,

at

the umbilicus

of

the

soul,

there

where

it

touchesthe cosmos, it strains.This is the

place

of those stimuliwhich

are

inadequately

eferred o as

"feelings"

and

which

are

therefore

eas-

ily

confused

with

similarly

named,

superficial

movements

of

the

soul.35

Religious

experiences

are

real and

they

are evident

throughout

history

in

the

various

symbols

every

culturehas used to describe

them.

Furthermore,

ithout

recognizing

the

foundation

of these

experiences

as evidence

of

divine

reality,

the

individual

cannot

recognize

the

breadth

of

reality

and

will

attempt

o

create

false

images

to account

for the

missing

spirituality

producing

alienation

or

a

deformationof

reality.

Othersare

granted

only

scant

glimpses

of

reality,

perhaps

only

one:

of

nature,

a

great person,

his

Volk,

humanity.

What is seen

becomes

for

him

the

Realissimum,

he

metareality;

t

takes

the

place

of

God and

therefore

conceals from him

all

else,

even-and

above

all-God.36

Not

only

does this

passage

demonstrate

Voegelin's

spiritual

philosophy,

t

also introduces

ew

terms

o

convey

his

meaning

more

accurately.

Realissimum

and

metareality

areused to

signify

a

concept

of

reality

hat s

changed

fromand

fails to

incorporate

all

human

experiences.)

With

spiritual

reality

denied or

obscured,

something

must take

its

place

to

respond

to

the

human

need

to

ex-

press

the

feeling

of

being

created.37

Voegelin

argues

that

modem

philosophy

had

gradually

attributed o

the state the

redemptive

power

that

belongs

to God.

33

Ibid.,

3.

34

This

is

clearly

the

influence

of his classical

and

Christian

studies,

but

Voegelin

never

specifically

indicated

what

influenced

him

towards

hese

conclusions

or

when

he

accepted

hem.

35

bid.,

10.

36

bid.,

12-13.

37

Ibid.,

11.




12/22

Voegelin's

nterpretations

f

Nazi

Extremism

161

"It

was

Hegel

who

proposed

the

theory

that

the

Volk

as the State

was the

spirit

in

its

immediate

reality

and

therefore

he absolute

power

on

earth.""38

he

indi-

vidual

becomes

subsumed

by

this

apparatus

nd

gains

his own

meaning

only

by

being

a

part

of

the State.

Unlike a secularthinkerwho mightattributehe desire for salvationeither

to

culture or to

human

psychology

in the

face

of

death,

Voegelin

takes

the

experience

as real

evidence of the

existence

of the soul

in

essentially

the

same

way

Socrates did 2300

years

earlier

in the Phaedo.

The real

experiences

of

divine

reality

are

expressed

in

complex

and

confusing

sets of

symbolic

lan-

guage

and

concepts

formed

by

historical

and cultural

circumstances.

The com-

plexity

of

symbols

creates

confusion,

but there

are still

only

two

kinds of

reli-

gion:

The spiritual

religions,

which find the Realissimum n the Weltgrund,

shouldbe

termed

or

us "world-transcendent

eligions;"

ll

others,

which

locate the

divine

in

partial

hings

of

the

world,

should

be

called

"world-

immanent

religions."39

The

latterare the

political

religions

which

have served

as the

foundations

or

totalitarian

deology.

National

Socialism

was not

the

first

political

religion,

however.

Voegelin

makes the bold claim

that the first

political

religion

in

human

history

was

the

Egyptian

cult created

by

the PharaohAkhenatonin

approximately

1376

Bc.

Using

the

comparative

approach

earned

from

Weber,

Voegelin

argues

that

Akhenaton

changed

the ancient

religious

structure

o

makehimself the

direct

conduit

of

meaning

from the

gods

to the

people

of

Egypt.

After

Akhenaton's

death

the

Egyptians

returned

airly

quickly

to

their

old

gods

in no

small

part

because

the

people

had

to

rely

on the

Pharaoh-i.e.,

a

man-to

participate

n

a

meaningful

religiousexperience.40

Having

used

the

comparative

approach

o demonstrate

hat

political

reli-

gions

were

not

new

in

human

history,Voegelin

outlined

the essential

elements

of a

religious

structureandthe

parallel

within

contemporary

political

move-

ments.

Just

as

every religion

has its

own

hierarchy

and

ecclesiastical

officials,

faith

and the

apocalypse

also have

their

essential

role.

The

political

religion,

for

example,

offers itself as

the

good,

and there

is

an

evil,

or

anti-good.

In

the

case of

Germany

he Jews were the

embodiment

of evil.

The

relationship

between

the

ideologist

and the

ideology

is also

very

reli-

gious.

Belonging

to the Christian

eligious

community,

ecclesia,

is

symbolized

as a

mystic

union with the

body

of

Christ,

unio

mystica.

On

the

other

hand,

a

38 bid.,

8.

39

bid.,

14.

40

Ibid.,

17-28.




13/22

162

Clifford

E

Porter

political

religion

also

offers

purpose

and

salvation,

but

only

withinthe

tempo-

ral

community.

The

ideologist

enjoys

a

mystical

connection

with

the

ideologi-

cal

community,

giving

a

purpose

to

existence.

The

ideological

community

n-

carnates

he source

of

meaning,

offering

salvation,

replacing

God

as the con-

duitfor salvation.Thus,the ideologists' positionentailsthatthe state controls

everything ust

as a

church determines

religious practices;

n

a

political

reli-

gion

public

policy

replaces

theology.

Consequently,

he

ideological

commu-

nity

becomes

clearly

totalitarian fter it controls

the

state.

The

historical

development

of the idea

that the

community

has

purported

divine

qualities

s

traced

by

Voegelin

to Joachim

of

Flora

n the

thirteenth

en-

tury.41

Yet it takes

centuriesfor the

cultural

development

of

the

symbolism

of

the

temporal

community

to

replace

God

completely

as

the

spiritual

basis of

human

existence.

By

the

seventeenth

century

Hobbes's

Leviathan

became

the

mediatorbetweenGod andman,as Akhenatonwas forEgypt.Again, the indi-

vidual

finds

meaning

and salvation not

in

an

individual

relationship

or under-

standing

of

existence but

strictly

in

terms

of

how the

individual

fits into

the

state.

The

historical

development

required

or

the

religious/political

symbols

of

the

temporal

community

or

state to

replace

God

is

long

and

complex.

As

Voegelin

recounts this

process,

beginning

with Joachim

and

the

millenarian

traditionsof the

Reformation

mixed

with the scientific

revolution,

it

leads

to

the

creationof

the

symbols

of

scientism,

where

"scientific

philosophies"

offer

the

knowledge

of how to achievesalvationwithoutRevelation.42Sciencethus

gains

the status

of Revelation.

Challenging

science is difficult because

science

contains

powerful

sym-

bols

that offer

definitive answers about

human

existence.

But

the

scientism of

the

political

religion

has dubiousclaims

to

truth,

which

Voegelin

demonstrated

in

Rasse und Staat and Die

Rassenidee

in

der

Geistesgeschichte.

The

most

bothersome

aspect

of

scientism is that

it obscures

truth

n the

name

of

science.

The

question

remains:

why

did otherwise

ntelligent

people

accept

the

dubious

claims

of

scientism

and

ignore

the

weaknesses

in

their

ideological

theories?

Voegelin

continues,

Since the

myth

[ideology]

is not

justified

by

supernatural

evelation

and

scientific criticism cannot stand

its

ground,

there

develops

in

the

second

phase

a new

conception

of

truth-Rosenberg's

concept

of

so-

called

organic

truth.The

theory

is then further

developed

into the

in-

terpretation,

hat that which

promotes

the

existence

of

the

organically

closed

temporalcommunity

of a

people

is

true.43

41

Ibid.,

44-45.

42

Ibid.,

59.

43

Ibid.,

63.

Rosenberg

was

the

chief

philosopher

of

National

Socialism.




14/22

Voegelin's

nterpretations

f

Nazi

Extremism

163

Truth

becomes

malleableand

dependent

on the

political

goals

that

the

ideology

has

established,

which

Kraushad satirized

earlier.

The

purveyor

of

truth s

the

party

or the

state with

its

ultimate

arbiter

being

the

leader;

in the case of

the

ThirdReich, the leaderis the Fiihrerplaying the identicalrole of Akhenaton

and

acting

as the

conduit of

meaning

to the

Volk.

Voegelin

concludes

the main

body

of

discussion

with the

evidence

of

the

poetry

of Gerhard

Schumann's

Lieder

vom

Reich

(1935),

which illuminates

all of

the

religious

symbolism

of

the

ideology:

Lost

myself

and found the

Volk,

he

Reich.

The

Fiihrer

Slaves

that we

are,

make

us free

Millions

bowed

down before

him

in

silence

Redeemed. The

Heavens flamed

pale

as

morning.

The

sun

grew.

And with it

grew

the

Reich.

The

deed was

good,

if

you

reddened

t with

blood.'

The

symbolism

is

painfully

obvious,

disturbing,

and

came

from

an

otherwise

well-educatedman.

Religious

symbolism

includes an "anti-idea"or Satanicfoe that

opposes

the

good

offered

by

the

ideology.

In the

case of

the

Third

Reich,

the Jews are

the

anti-idea.

Voegelin

states

very early

in

the

book

that the

danger

to

other

people

is

very

real:

The

mechanicalmeans of

killing

were

therefore

nvented

not

by

acci-

dent,

but

rather

by

the

spirit

hathas become

the

State,

n order o

trans-

form

the

personal

orm of

courage

nto the

impersonal.

This

homicidal

urge

is

directed

against

an

abstract

oe,

not

against

a

person.45

The

danger

o

the Jews as

an

abstract

oe

was

imminent.

By

1938

Voegelin

had

outlined

he

logic

of

ideological

violence,

and

there

was

no

reason

why

the

National

Socialists would

stop.

Theory

was translated

nto

practice,

and

physi-

cal

attackson

Jews accelerated

as

Hitler

grew

moresecure

in

power.

(That

the

Nazis

required

several

years

before

they

actually

formulated

he idea of

the

Holocaust and

that

they

triedto

keep

it a secret

testify

to the

resistance

of

tradi-

tional cultural

morality

to

murder.

That the resistance

was

eventually

over-

come

demonstrates

he

power

of the

ideology.)

44 bid.,

71-74.

45

bid.,

8.




15/22

164

Clifford

E

Porter

Gnosticism

Political

Religions

worked

well

to

describe

Nazi

symbolism,

because

the

Nazis

used

a

variety

of

Christianand

Pagan symbols

for

propaganda

nd for

a

vaguemetaphysicalappealto the massesandto themselves.46 utwith therise

of

Communist

otalitarianism

nd East

European

oups

by

Stalin's

regime,

de-

scribing

Marxist

deology

as

a

political religion

or

manifestation

of

pre-Chris-

tian

pagan symbolism

did not

hold.

Throughout

he

1940s

Voegelin

struggled

to

better

understand

deologies,

but

first

he

had to

escape

the

Third Reich to

find

refuge

in Britain

or the

United States.

In

1938

the

Anschluss

forced

Voegelin

to flee

Europe.

The

Anschluss

was

not

opposed by

the

West-Italy,

Britain,

and

France--despite

Mussolini's

ef-

forts at

oint

action

and

to

Voegelin's

intensedissatisfaction.

Voegelin

believed

the West would

stop

the Anschluss in order to

prevent

a Germanrevanchist

threat

directed

against

Czechoslovakia.

He was so

angry

at the

West's

geopo-

litical

miscalculation hat

he

contemplated

oining

the

Nazis

as

German

roops

entered Vienna. He

described himself

as

taking

several

hours

to

calm

down

before

deciding

his

best

option

was to

flee.47

It

is

very peculiar

hat

Voegelin

would even

contemplate oining

the

Nazis

even in a

state

of

"fury,"

as he

described

t.

He wrote

many

anti-Nazi

books

and

articles,

and

clearly

expressed

his

opposition

to

narrow

deologies,

especially

vulgar

ones

that

used

brutality

as

others

might

play

sports.48

Even

in

fury

there

mustbe some rationalefor action.

Voegelin's

fatherwas a Nazi

sympathizer

and an

admirer

of

Hitler

and

would

perhaps

prevent

his

arrest

or

a

short

time.

All

that

can be

discerned s

that

by

becoming

a

Nazi,

Voegelin

would

survive

in

the

short term and avoid the

fate of

many

other

victims.

However,

it was a

state of

mind that

evaporated

within

a few hours

and

he

planned

his

escape.

When the Nazis

occupied

Austria

Voegelin,

along

with

many

others,

was

immediately

fired from

the

University

of

Vienna and

the

Volkshochschule

e-

cause of his

open

anti-Nazism. The Austrian

government

offices

were

not

taken

over

immediatelyby

Nazis,

so

Voegelin prepared

or a

legal

exit visa

to

Switzerlandwiththe

help

of

well-placed

relatives,

andfrom therehe would

go

to

Harvard or

a

term to

tutor in

political

science.

Before

leaving, Voegelin

went

to

see

his

father,

smashed

a

portrait

of Hitler

on

the

floor,

then

left;

he

never

saw his father

again.

By

the

time his

papers

were

in

order

and

he

boarded

a train

for

Switzerland,

he

Gestapo

was

literally

on

the

way

to arrest

him.49

46

Eric

Voegelin,

"SomeProblems

of

German

Hegemony,"

TheJournal

of

Politics,

3

(1941 ,

164.

47

Autobiographical

Reflections,

42-43.

48

Voegelinhadpublishedmanyarticles n both VienneseandGermannewspaperscriticiz-

ing

the

intellectual

pretensions

of

National Socialism.

49

Cooper,

Eric

Voegelin,

16-18.




16/22

Voegelin's

nterpretations

f

Nazi

Extremism

165

Once

Voegelin

arrived n

Switzerland,

his

trip

was held

up

by

the Ameri-

can

vice-consul.

The

official

theorized

hat

if

Voegelin

was

not

Jewish,

Catho-

lic,

or

a

Socialist,

his

only

reason for

fleeing

the Nazis

was because

he was

a

criminal.50

Arrivingin America,Voegelin discoveredmany otherEuropean migres

from

Hitler's

Europe

centered

n

New

England.

These

emigres

were

often

bit-

ter

about

heir

light

anddid

not like their

new

American

urroundings.

oegelin

always

liked

America but

found

the

cosmopolitan

academic

circles

of

New

England

to

be

provincial.

So he

moved to

the

University

of

Alabama

in

Bir-

mingham,

then to

Louisiana

State

University

at Baton

Rouge,

where

he

re-

mained until

1958.51

Once

in

the

United

States

Voegelin

wrote

several

articles

and

papers

re-

stating

his

fundamental

understanding

f

events.

In 1940

he

tried to describe

NationalSocialism's success as in

part

dueto the medievalsubstratum f pre-

Christian

paganism

that ran

throughout

Germany.52

He

furthered

his

work

on

the

history

of

ideas

fromthe

"supposed

onstitutionalism

f Plato

and

Aristotle,

through

the

dubious

constitutionalism

of the Middle

Ages,

into

the

splendid

constitutionalism

of the

modem

period.""53

ut

this

model

was

not

entirely

sat-

isfying.

Furthermore,

oegelin

realized

hat

Political

Religions

only adequately

described

Nazism,

but it

failed

o

penetrate

o

the essence

of

ideologies

n

general.

Voegelin

observed

that the Nazis

were

emotionally

tribal

because

"[t]ribalism

s the

answer to

immaturity

because

it

permits

man

to remain

m-

maturewith the sanctionof his

group."54

ut therewere

consequences

for im-

maturity:

good

Germans who

got

emotionally

drunk

on

the

harangues

of

the

savior...andwho

shrank

back

in horror

when the

program

..

was

trans-

lated into

political

action.55

Abandoning

his

earlier

conjecture

about

the nature

of

"pre-Christian

agan-

ism,"

Voegelin

refined

his

views,

describing

Nazi

symbolism

as a

mix of im-

manent

pagan

tribalismwithin the

symbols

of

Christianity.56

Voegelin's

analysis

evolved

in the late

1940s,

when

he

realizedthat

this

explanation

did not

adequately

lluminate

he

ideological

motivations

of Com-

munism

or

Positivism.

According

o

Voegelin,

the latter

also

exhibited

an

ideo-

logical

limiting

of

philosophy

and science

to

temporal

reality-in

this

case

quantifiable

aws

describinghumanity.

50


44.

5

Ibid.,

57-58; and,

Cooper,

Eric

Voegelin,

21.

52

"Some

Problemsof German

Hegemony,"

164

53

Autobiographical

Reflections,

63.

54

Voegelin,

From

Enlightenment

o

Revolution,

97.

55

bid.,

145.

56

bid.,

97.




17/22

166

Clifford

E

Porter

...

The

climax of this

is the

magic

dream

of

creating

he

Superman,

he

man-made

Being

that

will

succeed

the

sorry

creature

of

God's

making.

This is

the

great

dream

that

first

appeared

maginatively

n the

works

of

Condorcet,

Comte,

Marx,

Nietzsche

and later

pragmatically

n the

CommunistandNationalSocialist

movements.57

He

also

realized

that his

own

quest

to discover the

meaning

of

history

through

a

study

of

ideas

presumed

o

limit

human

experience

strictly

to

the movement

of

ideas.

But,

history

is,

in

part,

unknowable

or

many

reasons,

not the least

of

which

is that

much

of

human

experience

ies

before

us.

Also,

ideas

are

symbols

of

experience;

they

are not

independent

objects.

As

symbols,

ideas

represent

experiences

people

have

had

throughouthistory."8

Voegelin

discovered how

to tie

together

his

observations

and

analysis

of

National Socialism while

studying

Gnosticism n ancient,medieval,and mod-

em

forms. As

the search for

certainty,

Gnosticism

became

for

Voegelin

the

model for

diagnosing

modem,

mass,

ideological

movements.

Ideologies

are

modem

Gnostic

speculations

of the

meaning

of existence.

All

ideologists

claim

to

provide

definitive

and absolute

understanding

nd

knowledge-i.e.,

gnosis-

of the

meaning

of

existence. Gnostic

speculations

are

not new.

Throughout

human

history

people

have

attempted

o break

rom

the fundamental

ncertain-

ties

of

existence

to

find salvation from

that

uncertainty.

Furthermore

modern

Gnostic

ideologists

seek this salvation

through

he

state

as a

substitute

or di-

vine

reality;

the statecomes to

represent

all of human

reality

and

through

ts

perfection

he

Gnostic

ideologists

achieve

salvation-in

other

words,

the foun-

dations

for

totalitarianism re laid. The drive

for

certainty,

however,

requires

a

limited

understanding

f human

experience

and

leads

to

an alienation

rom

the

fullness

of both

Divine and

temporalreality.

This

alienation

requires

more

ex-

planation.

It

was

obvious

to

Voegelin

that

many

ideologies

paralleled

eligious

move-

ments. A

religious

quest

for

answers,

however,

is

inadequate

to

explain

all

ideological

movements;

or

example,

Marx

viewed

any

religious

or

metaphysical

speculation

or

feelings

as

mere

bourgeois

abstractions.59

n TheNew Science

of

Politics

(1952)

and

later

Voegelin

no

longer

described

deologies

as

religious

quests;

rather,

he

argues

that

ideologists

sought

certainty

o

escape

the uncer-

tainty

of humanexistence.

According

to

Voegelin,

the

Christian

response

to

uncertainty

was

the

symbol

of

faith

elaborated

by

St.

Paul

in Heb. 11:1: "Now

faith is the substance of

things hoped

for,

the evidence

of

things

not

seen."60

57 bid.,

301-3

58 Voegelinian

Revolution,

109.

5

See, e.g., KarlMarx,"EconomicandPhilosophicManuscripts f 1844,"EngelsReader,

ed.

RobertC. Tucker

New

York,

1978'),

92.

60

Eric

Voegelin,

The

New

Science

of

Politics

(Chicago,

1952),

122.




18/22

Voegelin's

nterpretations

f

Nazi

Extremism

167

Faith,

however,

does

not

definitively

solve or

end

uncertainty.

According

to

Voegelin,

Marx

rejected

aith

and instead

found

certainty

hrough

his

scien-

tific

discovery

of the

process

of

history;

the

Nazis,

by

contrast,

ound

it

in

the

scientific

explanation

of

Race.

Voegelin

thus concludes

that

Gnosticism as

a

counterexistentialdream

world can

perhaps

be

made

intelligible

as the

extreme

expression

of an

experience

which

is

uni-

versally

human,

that

is,

of

a

horrorof

existence

and

a desire

to

escape

from it.61

Voegelin

further

oncluded hatthe

attempt

o

break

away

from

the

fundamen-

tal

fact

of

uncertainty

equires

a

limiting

of

the

sphere

of

human

experience

to

merely temporal

experience.

In

short,

God

does not offer

a

salvation

from

un-

certainty,most

painfully

manifested

by

death. Onthe otherhand,Gnostic ide-

ologists

limit

the

horizonof all

reality-particularly

of

human

consciousness-

so

that

certainty

can be discovered.

Developing

a

position

he elaborateddecades

earlier,

Voegelin

argued

hat

limiting

human

experience

to

temporalreality

leads

to

a limited

understanding

of

human

consciousness and

prevents

the

recognition

of

reality.

Ideological

explanations

of

reality

are therefore deformations

of

reality

when

they

seek

certainty

xclusively

within

the

temporal phere

of

existence.

Thus

Heidegger's

and

Marx's assertion that

existence

precedes

essence

may

give

a

definitive

explanation

of the

development

of consciousness, but it was at the price of

ignoring

the

spiritual

and

unknown

part

of

reality.

Such

a deformation

of

real-

ity

has

serious

consequences.

Thus,

Socrates

was

right

o

proclaim

hathe knew

thathe knew

nothing

and

therebypreserved

openness

to

philosophic

questions.

The

Gnostic

urge

is a

consistent

occurrence

throughout

human

history.

Voegelin

had read about

many

movements

in ancient

and

medieval

eras

that

were

describedas Gnostic

by

current

cholars,

and he

realized

the

connection

with

modem

Gnosticism while

reading

Hans Urs

von

Balthasar's

Prometheus

(1937).

Another

influence

was,

Ferdinand

Christian

Baur's

1835

work,

Die

christliche

Gnosis;

oder die christliche

Religionsphilosophie

nihrer

geschicht-

lichen

Entwicklung.

t

described

common forms

of

Gnosticism

in

history,

in-

cluding

strandsof Gnosticism

in

Hegel

and

Schelling.62

Still,

a

theory

of

the

movementof ideas fails

to

explain

any

connection

or

influence

from

one

Gnos-

tic

movement

to

another

over the

span

of

millennia.

For

example,

it did not

make sense that Marx and Hitler

were

directly

influenced

by

reading

about

ancient Gnosticism. He

came to believe

that the

answer

to

understanding

he

appeal

of Gnosticism ies

in humanconsciousness.

Thus,

Voegelin

was able to

61

Ibid., 167.

62

Autobiographical

Reflections,

66. Gilles

Quispel

considered

t "obvious"

hat

Jung

was

a

gnostic.




19/22

168

Clifford

F

Porter

understand

why

ideologies only

sometimes

appear

imilar

o

religions

and

why

Gnosticism is a

consistent

phenomenon hroughout

history.

Gnosticism

has

often

penetrated

nto Christian

ymbolism

because

Chris-

tianity

expanded

both

spiritually

and

politically,

and

many

Christians

were not

satisfied with thetenuousbondof Faith. AncientGnosticism s commonlyun-

derstood to be an

early

form of Christian

heresy

of

the second

century

eric voegelin on nazi political extremism

Documents