final buku - scholarlypublications.universiteitleiden.nl

Cover Page

The handle https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3176604 holds various files of this Leiden University dissertation. Author: Fauzi, M.L. Title: Aligning religious law and state law: street-level bureaucrats and Muslim marriage practices in Pasuruan, Indonesia Issue Date: 2021-05-18

https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/1

https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3176604

https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/1�

Reforming the Bureaucracy of Muslim Marriage

109

PartTwo

PRACTICE

Chapter 2

110

Pasuruan: Islam and Other Contexts

111

CHAPTER3

Pasuruan:IslamandOtherContexts

1. Introduction

Thisthesisdealswiththereformofthebureaucracyconcernedwithmarriage and how it has affected the everyday legal practice ofmarriageinaruralsociety.ItincludesananalysisofthelocalpracticesandlivedexperiencesofmarriageinaMuslimcommunityinaregencyinthenortheasternpartoftheprovinceofEastJava:Pasuruan.Thischapteroffersanintroductionwhichwillassistinunderstandingthesocio-economic history, the religious and cultural life and thedevelopmentofIslaminPasuruan.Itconsistsofthreesections.ItfirstsetsthescenebydelineatingthehistoricaldevelopmentofPasuruan,including the history of Madurese migration and the historicaldevelopmentofIslam.Secondly,itaddressescurrentcultural,religiousandpolitical life.ThelastsectioncentresonspecificelementsofthecommunityinwhichIdidmyfieldwork.

2. HistoricalContext

According to the Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indië, the namePasuruanderives fromthe Javanesewordsuróhwhichmeansbetel.TheEncyclopaediementionsthekromo(high)Javaneseequivalentofthename,whichispasedahan,fromtherootsedahwhichalsomeans

Chapter 3

112

betel.1 However, this name has gone out of use and the fact thatPasuruan was once a place where the betel (areca) palm grew inabundance has long since faded from people’s memories. ThealternativenameofPasuruan,Gembong(thenameofariverdividingthe town),whichwasusedbymany Javanese in thepast is alsonolongerused.

ThedistrictofPasuruanis locatedaround65kilometressouth-eastofSurabaya, thecapital cityof theprovince.TodayPasuruan ishome to 1,501,798 Muslim people or 98 percent of the wholepopulation.AgroupofHindus,around15,612(1%),mostofwhomliveinthesouthernhighlandsaroundthevolcanoMountBromo,constitutethe second largest population.2 Historically, it was not until theMataram kingdom occupied the southern part of Surabaya in the1600sthatPasuruanbecameanimportanttown.AftertheadventofMataram,PasuruanwasruledbyregentswhoweresubordinatesoftheMataramsultanateinCentralJava.TheareasurroundingPasuruanwas a frontier area of Mataram, especially in view of its closerelationship with the “stubborn remnants of Hinduism in theeasternmostcorneroftheisland”.Elsonsaysit“servedbothasafieldofcombatandaredoubtforrebels”.3

1 P.A. van der Lith and Joh. F. Snelleman, Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indië, vol. 3 edition (Amsterdam: KIT Royal Tropical Institute, 2010), p. 233. 2 BPS Kab. Pasuruan, Kabupaten Pasuruan dalam Angka 2016 (Pasuruan: BPS Kab. Pasuruan, 2017). 3 R.E. Elson, ‘Sugar and Peasants: The Social Impact of the Western Sugar Industry on the Peasantry of the Pasuruan Area, East Java, from the Cultivation System to the Great Depression’ (Monash University, 1979).


113

Figure3.1.MapofPasuruan

This section elucidates the history of Pasuruan, including thearrival of Madurese migrants, the socio-economic situation in thecolonialperiodandthedevelopmentof Islam,roundingoffwiththechangeswhichoccurredaftertheProclamationofIndependenceandundertheNewOrderera.

2.1. MadureseOut-MigrationtoPasuruan

Pasuruan, and this is generally true of other areas located in theEasternSalientof Java (tapalkuda), ishome topeopleofMaduresedescent.ThehistoricaltiesbetweenMaduraandPasuruangobackalongwaytothethirteenthcentury,whenRadenWijaya,thefounderofthe Majapahit kingdom, agreed to grant Wiraraja, the Regent ofMadura,theEasternSalientofJavaingratitudeforhissupportofthekingdom.Nevertheless,earlierliteraturesuggeststhatbothJavaneseand Madurese were already conscious of belonging to the samecultural community. Husson categorizesMadurese out-migration toEastJavaintosixchronologicalorders.HeclaimsthatMadureseserfsfirstwent toEast Java in the thirteenthand fourteenthcenturies, tocolonize agricultural land and support theMajapahit kingdom.This

Chapter 3

114

migrationwaspartlytheresultofgeographicalfactorssuchasscarcityofgoodsoil,deforestationanderosionintheirownisland.4Thismarksthefirstout-migrationwaveofMaduresetoJava.

Thesecondwaveofmigrationtookplacebetweenthesixteenthand the nineteenth century. At the time, Madura was a source ofsoldiers for the powers fighting for supremacy in East Java. Themilitary missions stimulated population movements. To take oneexample,athousandMaduresewererecruitedbytheVOCforthewaragainst Blambangan in 1741. Madurese soldiers who had beeninvolvedindifferentbattlesinEastJavaremainedthereafterwards.Ifthey did return toMadura, they brought back such glowing storiesabout the prospects in East Java theymotivated otherMadurese tomovethere.5ThethirdmigrationwasanexodusofMaduresepeasantsbetween1820and1850.Duringthisperiod,Madurahadthestatusofafreeprovinceunderthetermsofthe1745agreementbetweentheRegent ofWest Madura and the VOCwhich stated that the Regentwould be allowed to govern independently in return for an annualcontributionofmoneyandtroops.ThissituationcontinueduntiltheliquidationoftheVOCin1799whenMaduralostitsspecialself-rulestatus,whichhadhadasevereconsequenceforthelocals.Theyhadtopay crippling taxes and retributions and therefore many left theirisland to begin a new life in East Java with their families.6 TheemigrationdisadvantagedthelocalagricultureinMaduraintermsofthedecrease inmanpowerduring theplantingandharvestseasons.TheislandwasspunintoaneconomicdownturnanditsdependenceonJavabecamemoremarkedduringthisperiod.7

AsIhavementionedbefore,thescarcityofgoodsoil inMadurahasbeenanenduringproblemandalways formed to thebarrier toagricultural development. Agricultural harvests in the nineteenthcentury were far from enough to satisfy local needs. There are

4 Laurence Husson, ‘Eight Centuries of Madurese Migration to East Java’, Asia and Pacific Migration Journal, vol. 6, no. 1 (1997), p. 79. 5 Ibid., pp. 81–3. 6 Ibid., pp. 84–5. 7 Ibid., p. 85.


115

referenceswhichindicatethewidespreaduseofcooliesandseasonaland permanent workers from Madura in East Java, particularly inPasuruan, Besuki, Jember, Probolinggo, Bondowoso and Lumajang.Theseareasweretheimportantcash-cropcentresoftheprovince.Areportshowsthatin1892,40,000MaduresemigratedtoEastJava.ThebigdemandforworkersinEastJavareallybeganwhentheDutchEastIndiesgovernmentopenedawholeseriesofplantationstherebetweenthe 1830s and the 1870s. In addition to the very large-scalegovernment project, enterprising individuals also set up their ownprivate plantations. The establishment of these private plantationsproduced a rapid spurt in Madurese migration. Madura quicklybecame a reservoir of the manpower which was so vital to thisdevelopment. For instance, Probolinggo experienced a 5.19 percentpopulationincreasein1854,attributabletothearrivalofMadurese.The expansion ofthe government plantation project and privateenterprisesmeantthatthecane-sugarindustryofJavawasthesecondlargestintheworldafterCuba.8Thisseasonalmigrationmarkedthefourthwave ofmigrationwhich took place in the latter part of thenineteenthcentury.AccordingtoHusson,9withreferencetoWeddik,kinshiptiesmeantthatmigrantsfromSampangandBangkalanchoseto reside in Pasuruan. Quoting Van Nes, Elson reveals that, in the1830s,demographically,Madureseconstitutedaround35percentofPasuruan residents, approximately 170,049 Javanese and 92,463Madurese.10

The fifth round of migration occurred during the Japaneseoccupation (1942-1945). During this period, Madurese peasantssufferedfamineandpovertybecauseofthecontinualworseningoftheisland’seconomy,theresultoffailedharvestsandcripplingtaxation.Avery large group ofMaduresemade theirway to East Java on foot,travellingatnighttoavoidthesun,intheirbattletosurviveseekingtofind food and work in Java.11 The last wave of migration occurred

8 Ulbe Bosma, ‘The Cultivation System (1830-1870) and Its Private Entrepreneurs on Colonial Java’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 38, no. 2 (2007), pp. 275–91. 9 Husson, ‘Eight centuries of Madurese migration to East Java’, p. 86. 10 Ibid., p. 85. 11 Ibid., pp. 88–9.

Chapter 3

116

betweenthe1950sandthe1960sandstillcontinuestoday.Bigcitiesin East Java have experienced a rapid rate of urbanization as aconsequenceofnaturalpopulationincreaseandmigrationfromruralareas.AndithasbeentheMaduresewhohavesuppliedtheworkforce,labourersandcooliesfortheplantationaroundthesecities.Theyhavealso worked as shopkeepers, run food-stalls (warung), becomerickshaw-drivers(tukangbecak)and fruit-sellers. Internalsolidarityamong Madurese seems to play an important role in the group’seconomicsituation.12 Interestingly, themigratory influxhas led toamore fluid social structure in Pasuruan. The Madurese who havesettledtherewerenotreallyinclinedtosubmittothepretensionsofJavanesearistocrats.13

2.2. ColonialOccupation

AsImentionedearlier,ahugewaveofMaduresemigrantsarrivedinPasuruanduringthecourseofthenineteenthcentury,whentheDutchEastIndiesgovernmentsetupaprojectencouragingtheestablishmentofplantationsandsugar-factories.ThePasuruanareafirstfiguredasan important area on the stage of Java’s history when, in 1830,Governor-General Van den Bosch decreed that it was part of theCultivation System. This was a policy introduced by the DutchgovernmentwhichimposedontheJavanesepopulationtheobligationto grow andmake compulsory deliveries of coffee, sugar-cane andotherexportproductsinexchangeforcroppayments.14Theexpansionof agricultural commodities required thousands of labourers andcoolies.Although theDutch introducedmanycommercial crops, thetwomostsuccessfulduringthelifeoftheSystemprovedtobecoffeeandsugar.

12 Ibid., pp. 90–2. 13 Robert W. Hefner, The Political Economy of Mountain Java: An Interpretive History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p. 195. 14 Fasseur Cornelis, ‘The Cultivation System and its Impact on the Dutch Colonial Economy and the Indigenous Society in Nineteenth-Century Java’, in Two Colonial Empires. Comparative Studies in Overseas History, ed. by Bayly C.A. and Kolff D.H.A. (Dordrecht: Springer, 1986), pp. 137–54; Melissa Christina van Bijsterveld, ‘Continuation and Change on Dutch Plantations in Indonesia’ (Leiden University, 2018).


117

AttheheightoftheCultivationSystem,thelabourforcemobilizedfor government enterprises was coerced and their sheer numbersmassive.15 Meanwhile, the number of coffee trees planted grewsignificantlyuntileventually70percentofallJavanesefamilieswereinvolvedincompulsorycultivationandmorethanhalfofthemworkedwith coffee. However, the payment for these products was notcommensuratewiththemarketvalueorwiththeeffortsrequiredbytheplanters.Thevalueoftheexportproductamountedto11.3millionguilders in 1830 and rose to 66.1million in 1840.16 Although, as aconsequence of its astonishing profitability, coffee remained agovernment monopoly longer than any other crop,17 the northernlittoral stretching fromPasuruan to Surabayabecame Java's largestsugar-growing region, andwould remain so for the duration of theCultivationSystem.Hence, itgoeswithoutsaying, thissystemhadaconsiderable impactontheeconomicandsocial lifeofthePasuruanpeople.Nevertheless,incontrasttoareasinCentralJava,PasuruandidnotsufferundertheCultivationSystem.18Certainlythecultivationofsugar-caneandthesugarindustryofferedthenativeelitesoftheareaprosperitybutdidnothaveanyconsiderableimpactontheordinarypeople.19

In terms of the administrative development of the area, thePasuruanregencywasofficially inaugurated in1901.Besidessugar,theregencyhadcentresof forestryandcopper-mining.ThetownofPasuruanservedasthecapitaloftheregencyanditwasalsomadethecapital of the present-day regencies of Probolinggo, Malang andLumajang. As time passed, the economic position of the Pasuruanregency declined as the result of various factors. One of the mostimportant was that the Gembong River, which divided the town,graduallysiltedup.20Atthepreciselysametime,theearlytwentieth

15 Hefner, The Political Economy of Mountain Java: An Interpretive History, p. 45. 16 Cornelis, ‘The Cultivation System and its Impact on the Dutch Colonial Economy and the Indigenous Society in Nineteenth-Century Java’. 17 Hefner, The Political Economy of Mountain Java: An Interpretive History, p. 43. 18 Ibid. 19 Dédé Oetomo, ‘The Chinese of Pasuruan: Their Language and Identity’ (Australian National University, 1987). 20 Ibid., p. 16.

Chapter 3

118

century, SurabayaHarbourwasexpandedand theSurabaya-Malangrailwaywasopened.TheopeningofthisrailwayratherundercuttheimportanceofPasuruananditslippedintoanindustrialdecline.MuchofitstradewasdivertedtoProbolinggo.ThecapitalofresidencywastransferredtoMalangin1930.21

2.3. Pre-Independence

ThehistoricalbackgroundoforthodoxunderstandingofIslaminthepre-independenceeraexplainstherapidgrowthofSarekatIslam(SI,IslamicUnion)inPasuruan22andlateroftheNU.SIwasapartywhichgrew out of an association of Muslim merchants who wanted toimprovetheireconomicintereststoputthemmoreonaparwiththoseofChinesemerchantsinJava.Itbecameapoliticalpartyinthe1920s.Trying to trace the history of SI in Pasuruan is a difficult exercisebecauseofthelackofsources.WhatisknownisthatarepresentativeofSIwasquiteactiveinhisvisitstothosevillagesinPasuruanwithwhichhehadpersonalandfinancialtiesandinthemhewouldsetupavillagereligiousleaderasasortofalocalorganizer.Becauseofitsconfiguration, SI attracted peasants and quickly became anorganizationembracedbythepeasantsintheirstrugglesagainsttheinfidelrulersandthepriyayi,asocialclasscomprisingtheelitesandgovernment officials. This idea of struggling against the rulers andsocial elites struck a profound chord among traditionalistMuslims.AnotherreasonSIexpandeditsinfluencewasthatitslottedneatlyintothewaveofIslamicrevivalismwhichsweptJavaaroundthe1910sandsharedtheSIidealsofcommunalsolidarityandbelonging.23

ThedevelopmentofSIwasinterruptedbytheonsetofasevereeconomic crisis, popularly known as the Great Depression, inIndonesia during the 1930s. Although this Great Depression had adetrimental effect on the Pasuruan economy, it did not change the

21 Ibid. 22 Harry J. Benda, ‘The Pattern of Administrative Reforms in the Closing Years of Dutch Rule in Indonesia’, The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 25, no. 4 (1966), p. 592. 23 Elson, ‘Sugar and Peasants: The Social Impact of the Western Sugar Industry on the Peasantry of the Pasuruan Area, East Java, from the Cultivation System to the Great Depression’.


119

politicalfaceofPasuruanverymuch.Underthiscalmsurface,theNUquietlybegantoexpanditsinfluence.24ItpursuedaslightlydifferentstrategytothatofSI.Itadoptedanonconfrontationalstrategytowardsthe rulers and, on the ground in the villages, it encouraged ruralreligious teachers to promote its own style of religious platform.Studentsinpesantren(santri)weresentintoareasofthecountrysideto organize pengajian (classes in Qur’an), thereby laying thegroundwork for the establishment of a new chapter of theorganization. In short, its strategies were apolitical.25 Its prioritiescould be said to have been: do not provoke immediate anticolonialresistance but concentrate on disseminating traditional Islam. Bydeployingthiscautiousapproach,theNUwontheheartsandmindsofthat section of the population which was a still less ‘Islamic’,succeedinginspreadingitsbasetothesouthernhighlands,despitethefact that the contest between Islam and Javanism (kejawen) in thehighlandswasstillongoing.26

TheDutchcolonialrulewaspowerfulenoughtocurbattemptstoestablish Indonesian sovereignty but was not strong enough toeliminatetheNationalistspirit.Atthatpoint,theIndonesiansstilldidnothavethepowertocompetewiththecolonialrulerandthereforeneededoutsidehelp.BeginninginMarch1942,theJapaneseprovidedjustthishelpbytakingoverDutchpowerinIndonesia.Sadly,itwasafalsedawnandIndonesianswouldsoonhavetofacetherealityofthehardshipofJapaneserule:ascarcityoffood,clothingandmedicinesaswellasforcedlabouronalargescale.PasuruanpeoplerememberedtheJapaneseoccupation(1942to1945)asadifficultandfrighteningperiod.27 The policy the Japanese employed towards Islam wasvirtually the reverse of that of the Dutch and exploited the oldantipathytowardsChristianrulers.TheJapaneseauthoritiescourtedreligious teachers in the villages and rewarded them by increasingtheirlocalpower.Inanutshell,theeffectoftheJapanesepolicywasto

24 Hefner, The Political Economy of Mountain Java: An Interpretive History, p. 197. 25 Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation,1942-1945 (Dordrecht: Foris Publications, 1983). 26 Hefner, The Political Economy of Mountain Java: An Interpretive History, p. 197. 27 Oetomo, ‘The Chinese of Pasuruan: Their Language and Identity’, p. 14.

Chapter 3

120

expandthegrowthoftheIslamicmovement.Inreturn,theJapanesewere eager to obtain the aid of these religious leaders in the fightagainstthereturnoftheformerrulers.28Moreover,JapanesesupportwasalsocrucialtotheestablishmentoftheMasyumi,afederationofallIndonesianMuslimorganizations, inwhich theNUexecutiveplayedimportant roles. The NU then became part of the governmentbureaucracy through its involvement in theShumubu, the Japanese-createdOfficeofReligiousAffairs.29InthefinalmonthsoftheJapaneseoccupation, Hizbullah, a military arm of theMasyumi, launched anintensive campaign to win mass membership in Pasuruan. Theresultant success guaranteed Muslim supremacy in lowlandPasuruan.30HizbullahwaspotentiallychallengedbytheestablishmentofNationalistyouthcorpsin1944,Peta(PembelaTanahAir,DefendersoftheHomeland).However,PetafailedtoobtainasignificantinfluenceontheMuslimcommunities inPasuruan,whichremainedafirmNUbastion.

2.4. Post-IndependenceandtheNewOrderEra

WiththeProclamationofIndependenceinAugust1945,thenewstateof theRepublic of Indonesia came into being in the territory of theformer Dutch East Indies. However, the dream of an independentIndonesianstatewasopposedbytheformercolonialpower.Attheendof the Second World War, the Dutch asserted their intention ofregainingthecolonywiththesupportoftheirEuropeanallies.Thewarofattrition,popularlyknownbyIndonesiansastheRevolution,lastedformorethanfouryears.31TheDutchorganizedamilitaryexpeditionin 1946 but it failed to raise resistance in urban Pasuruan.32Nevertheless,insomewaysitdidencouragearepublicanmovementinthesouthernparttoresisttheinfiltrationofNUinfluencefromthe

28 Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation,1942-1945. 29 Ibid. 30 Hefner, The Political Economy of Mountain Java: An Interpretive History, p. 198. 31 Kevin W. Fogg, ‘Islam in Indonesia’s Foreign Policy, 1945-1949’, Al-Jami’ah, vol. 53, no. 2 (2015), p. 308. 32 Hefner, The Political Economy of Mountain Java: An Interpretive History, p. 198.


121

north. This movement caught the Islam-based organizations inPasuruanatadisadvantageandledtotheestablishmentofNationalistdominanceintheregionfollowingthewar.However,greatlyassistedby the vast development of pesantren, traditionalist Muslims didmanagetopreservetheirentrenchedsocio-structuralpower.

Ayearearlier,in1945,IndonesiahaddeclareditsIndependence.SoonafterIndependence,thegovernmentsoughttoholdalegislativeelection.But,giventheprevailingpoliticalinstability,theelectionwasnot possible. In 1953, the government was able to pass a bill onelectionswhichwasenshrinedas a law. It gave the right tovote toeverybodyovertheageofeighteenorwhowasorhadbeenmarried.TheelectioncampaignfollowedhardontheheelsofthepassingofthelawandthefirstelectionwasheldinSeptember1955.Inthisgeneralelection,devoutMuslimsweredrawntotheMasyumiandNU,whereasNationalistJavanesechosetopursuetheirstrugglethrougheitherPNI(Partai Nasional Indonesia, the Indonesian National Party) or PKI(PartaiKomunisIndonesia,theCommunistPartyofIndonesia).33Thisdivision shaped the development of the Islamization in Pasuruan,whichwasverymuchboundupinthealiran(stream)patternofpartymobilization.Politicalpartiesinfiltratedruralareascanvassingvotes.TheNUenjoyedamajorsuccessandwonasignificantnumberofseats(18.4%)intheParliament.34TheMasyumiscoredanevenbiggerwin,as the runner-up, with 20.9 percent of the votes. Religion featuredprominentlyinthepoliticalcampaign.

Compared to other areas, the polarization in Pasuruan wasrelativelysimple:splitbetweentheNU-dominatednorthernlowlandsandtheNationalistsouthernhighlands,althoughtheinfluenceoftheMasyumi inPasuruanwasinescapable.TheNUwashighlycriticaloftheMasyumi, disagreeingwith itsmodernist ideology.Nevertheless,theNUandMasyumi leadersmeton commonground in their ideasabout Communism. They identified communists with atheists.

33 Justus M. van der Kroef, ‘Indonesia’s First National Election: A Sociological Analysis’, The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, vol. 16, no. 3 (1957), p. 238. 34 Robert W. Hefner, ‘Islamizing Java? Religion and Politics in Rural East Java’, The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 46, no. 3 (1987), p. 550.

Chapter 3

122

Although certain figures in the NU condemned the PKI as an anti-Islamicorganization,someNUleaderswerelessconcernedaboutthecommuniststhanabouttheirmodernistMuslimrivals.

In Pasuruan where religious issues have always loomed large,Islamhaswieldedasignificantinfluence.MasyumileadersandradicalkyaifromtheNUdemandedthatthetraditionalritualpracticesinthehighlandsouthbeoutlawed.Theiroppositioncametoahadpriortothe 1955 electionwhen tensions escalated after a group ofMuslimactivists (linked to radical factions in the NU) occupied a famousupland dhanyang (a sacred place). Although overall the Islamicpoliticalpartiesweredisappointedwiththeresultofthefirstelectionof1955on thenational level, inPasuruan itself the election resultsconfirmedthedominanceoftheNU,whichenjoyedasignificantwin,61percentofthevotes,inthatelection.OnlyMaduraproducedamorestunningresultthanPasuruan.35ThisNUelectoralvictoryinPasuruanput the Pasuruan's Javanist highlanders in a tricky situation. Theelection results meant that the major success of the Islam-basedpoliticalpartiesposedaseriousthreattotheirreligioustraditions.

AnotherdevelopmentinthewakeoftheelectionwasthegrowinginfluenceofthePKI.TheeconomicdeclineinIndonesiawhichdoggedthelate1950sandearly1960shadasevereimpactoninflation.ThePKI took the opportunity presented by the deteriorating economicsituationtoexpanditsruralconstituency.Attheendof1963,thePKIintroduced a campaign to make the land reform enacted in 1960Agrarian Law a reality. The PKI mobilized farmers into ‘unilateralactions’(aksisepihak)toseizethelandoflargelandownersandholddemonstrations in support of sharecropping. Unsurprisingly, thisinitiativeprovokedstrongreactionsfromtheMuslimlandlords.36EastJavawasthesceneofsomeofthemostviolentconfrontationsbetweenMuslimsandcommunists.Tellingly,inlowlandPasuruanthePKIfailedtogainthesupportoftheruralpeopleasthepowerexertedbythekyai

35 Hefner, The Political Economy of Mountain Java: An Interpretive History, p. 200. 36 Ibid., p. 201.


123

provedtoostrong.Realizingitwasfloggingadeadhorse,thePKI inPasuruansoonfocuseditsattentionontheuplands.37

Intheyears1965to1966,Indonesiaexperiencedadarkchapterinitsnationalhistoryaslarge-scalekillingsandcivilunrestrockedthecountry.Thekillings generally targetedmembersof thePKI and itscomrade organizations. The trouble began on the evening of 30September 1965 when a group of militants who proclaimedthemselves Soekarno's protectors executed six of Indonesia's topmilitary generals allegedly to pre-empt a possible coup. However,Soekarnorefusedtoassociatehimselfwiththismovement.Nowthecracks in the façade of his poor leadership begin to show. Major-GeneralSoeharto,whoatthetimewastheleaderofKostrad(KomandoStrategisAngkatanDarat, ArmyStrategic Command), capitalizedonthe situation to claim control over the country.Hedeployed troopswhile propagating the idea that the movement’s actions posed adanger to the nation. Masterminded by Soeharto and his militaryforces,propagandaassociatingthecoupattemptwiththePKIbegantobe disseminated.38 The campaign was successful, convincing bothIndonesianandinternationalaudiencesthatthemurderswereaPKIattempt to undermine the government under President Soekarno.Nevertheless,thewritingwasonthewallandpublicopinionbegantoshiftagainstSoekarno,disturbedbyhisundisguisedsympathyfortheeventsof30Septemberandhistoleranceofcommunistelements.

Soehartopresentedthecampaignasanationwideconspiracytocommit the mass murder of large segments of the populationassociated with the PKI. The army removed those top civilian andmilitary leaders it thought sympathetic to the PKI. By the end ofOctober,thepropagationofthisconspiracytheoryhadeasilywonthesupport of the Muslim leaders. These leaders, many of whomcontrolledlargeswathesofagrarianland,feltthreatenedofthePKI’sefforts to speed up land reform. Furthermore, groups of devoutMuslimsjoinedinthepurgesagainstcommunists,arguingthatitwas

37 Ibid., p. 202. 38 Jerome R. Bass, ‘The PKI and the Attempted Coup’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 1, no. 1 (1970), pp. 96–105.

Chapter 3

124

theirboundendutytocleanseIndonesiaofatheism.InMarch1967,theParliament strippedSoekarnoofhis remainingpowerandSoehartowasappointedasActing-President.In1968,Soehartowasappointedtothefirstofhisfive-yeartermsasPresident.ThetermNewOrderwasusedtodistinguishSoeharto’sregimefromSoekarno’sOldOrder.

DuringtheNewOrderera,underthebannerofPancasila,theNewOrder attempted to control Islamic forces. Islamic political partieswereweakenedandmergedintoasingleonein1973and,later,thisnew body was obliged to replace its Islamic foundation withPancasila.39Thephilosophical foundationofthenation, ideologicallyPancasilaisnotsecular.Instead,itcomprisesfiveprinciples,thefirstofwhichisbeliefinOneGod.Toreinforcethisstateideology,anumberoflocalgovernmentsinitiatedtheideaofcreatingso-calledPancasilavillages.Behindtheconceptliesthedesireforpeopletohavepeacefulandprosperouslivesandtostriveforequalitybeforethelaw.Itwasalsomeant to encourage citizens tomake strong a commitment topractisingtheirreligiousdoctrine,particularlyIslam.Consequently,itisnot too farfetched to say that this ideawasmeant tobe theNewOrder’sstrategyorchestratedtogainMuslimsupport.ThePasuruangovernmentwasalsoencouraged toestablish thesevillages.40 In itscampaign the central government stressed that commitment to thereligiousprincipleinPancasilawasthedeterminantintheapplicationof the other principles. Therefore, the development of traditionalIslamic schools (pesantren), which produced Islamic leaders, wasconsideredconsistentwiththespiritofPancasila.

Despitethesuccessofthistactic,theNewOrderfeltitnecessaryto establish another channel of communication with the Muslimcommunity. In1975,TheMUI,wasestablishedasavehicle throughwhichtomobilizesupportforitsdevelopmentpoliciesfromMuslims.Inthe1990s,theNewOrderseemedtoreachaturningpointwhenit

39 Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Islamic state or state Islam? Fifty years of state-Islam relations in Indonesia Hamburg: Abera-Verlag’, in Indonesien am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts, ed. by Ingrid Wessel (Hamburg: Abera-Verlag, 1996), pp. 19–34. 40 Pemda Kab Pasuruan, The Present Day of Kab Pasuruan (Pasaruan: Pemda Kab Pasuruan, 1974).


125

establishedtheAssociationofIndonesianMuslimIntellectuals(IkatanCendekiawanMuslimSe-Indonesia,ICMI).SomearguedthattheICMIreflected thegrowing influenceof Islam in thebureaucracyand theriseof aMuslimurban 'middle class'.41However, someothershaveclaimed that itwas an expression of the continuing Islamization ofdailylifewhichhadoccurredinthe1970sand1980s.42InPasuruanthetrendtowardsthegrowinginfluenceofIslamamongtheMuslimmiddle classdidnot seem tohappen.Pesantrenwerenotdislodgedfromtheirpositionas thekeysocial institutionwhichsustained thedevelopmentofIslaminthearea.

3. Cultural,ReligiousandPoliticalLife

Islam,whichcamefromthenorthernpartofCentralJava,penetratedintothisareainthefirstpartofthesixteenthcentury.43AsIslamizationtookholdinthisregionitledtothedevelopmentofwhatisknownascoastal Islam(Islampesisir)andslowlybutsurely itemergedasthecentre of so-called traditionalist Islam.44 The most fundamentalfeatureofthistypeofMuslimcommunityisitsdeepcommitmenttoupholding religious traditions such as collectively reciting dhikr(remembranceofAllah,aseriesofdevotionalacts)dedicatedto thedeadandrecitingprayersfortheProphet(solawatan)aswellasdeep-seatedobediencetoreligiousleaders.

The influence of Islam was reinforced by the expansion oftraditional religious schools (pesantren) in the northern lowlandsduringthelasthalfofthenineteenthcentury.TheseschoolsbecamecentresofthepropagationoftraditionalIslam.Onawiderscale,theywerealsocrucialtolowlandpoliticsandsocialstructure.Maritalties

41 Robert W. Hefner, ‘Islam, State, and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for the Indonesian Middle Class’, Indonesia, vol. 56, no. October (1993), p. 32. 42 Bruinessen, ‘Islamic state or state Islam? Fifty years of state-Islam relations in Indonesia Hamburg: Abera-Verlag’. 43 M.C. Ricklefs, A history of modern Indonesia (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), p. 34. 44 M.C. Ricklefs, Polarising Javanese society: Islamic and other visions, c. 1830-1930 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007); Koentjaraningrat, Javanese Culture (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 318.

Chapter 3

126

connectedwealthy families topesantrenteachers.Ordinaryvillagerswere also expected to make gifts of money and land to religiousteacherstosupporttherunningofthepesantren.45

Nevertheless,Hefner remarks thatPasuruan isoneof themostheterogeneous regencies in Java46 As I have already mentioned,kejawen holds sway in the south while Islamic traditionalismpredominatedinthenorth.ThisIslamicorientationisnotthepreserveofcertainsocialclasses,butspansthemall.Inthissection,Iwishtoexplain particular traits of the Pasuruan people who live in thenorthernlowlands,includingtheirculture,religion,patron-clienttiesandpolitics.

3.1. CulturalLife

MypersonalacquaintancewiththisareabeganwhenIstudiedinanIslamicsecondaryschool(madrasahaliyah)inthetownofJemberinthelate1990s.Ipassedthroughthisareaonmywaybackandforthtomy hometown, Sidoarjo. The character of the people living in thevicinityofmyschoolwasnotsomuchdifferentfromthepeoplelivinginJember.Themostdistinctivefeatureofacommunityisitslanguage.ByandlargethepeoplespeakinMadureseor,whentheydospeakinJavanese or Indonesian, they do so with a Madurese accent. Asdiscussedearlier,thestronginfluenceofMaduresecultureinthisarea,and other eastern East Java parts in general, has a long historicaltrajectory.TheemigrationfromMaduraconstitutedanewdiasporainJava.47Afteran intensesocio-cultural interactionwiththenativesoftheeasternpartofJava,anew-hybridizedculturewasformedcalledpedalungan or orang campuran (mixed people).48 This new culturedisplaysspecialcharacteristics,namely:theuseoflocallanguage,thepattern of economic activities and political participation.49 Another

45 Hefner, The Political Economy of Mountain Java: An Interpretive History, p. 195. 46 Hefner, ‘Islamizing Java? Religion and Politics in Rural East Java’, pp. 533–554. 47 Husson, ‘Eight Centuries of Madurese Migration to East Java’. 48 Konstantinos Retsikas, ‘The Power Of The Senses: Ethnicity, History and Embodiment in East Java, Indonesia’, Indonesia and the Malay World, vol. 35, no. 102 (2007), p. 970. 49 Retsikas, ‘The Power Of The Senses: Ethnicity, History and Embodiment in East Java, Indonesia’; Konstantinos Retsikas, Becoming – An Anthropological Approach to Understandings of the Person in Java (London: Anthem Press, 2012).


127

reference calls thempendhalungan. The term comes from theword“dhalung”inJavanesewhichmeansabigpotinwhichriceiscooked.This area has become a melting pot of Javanese and Madureseculture.50Thesocietyisidentifiedwithanagrarianculture,hardwork,strongfeelingsofsolidarityandgreatrespectforIslamicleaders.

Theothermajorsub-culturesofEastJavaareknownasarekorarek’anandmatraman.IspentmychildhoodinSidoarjoinwhichbothlanguage and culture are characterized as arek’an. Geographically,arek’an culture is located in thecentralpartofEast Java, stretchingfrom Surabaya to south coast ofMalang regency. The termarek’anitself comes from the Javanesewordarekwhichmeans children oryoungpeople.Arek’an isassociatedwithbeing ‘modern’ in termsofopen-minded,rational,well-educatedandabletoadapteasilytonewsituations.Fromthereligiouspointofview,ifpendhalunganaresaidto be very fervently attached to a traditional type of Islam and areidentifiedby their great respect for Islamic leaders,arek’an tend topractiseIslamictraditionalismratherlessassiduously.Thethirdsub-culture,matraman, issituatedinthewesternpartofEastJava, fromthenorthtothesouthcoast,borderingtheprovinceofCentral Java.They still preserve a culture which has been inspired by in theMataram sultanate in Central Java. They are identifiedwith amoresubtleuseoflanguage,theirrespectforkingshipandtheirembracingofthemostrefinedvaluesofJavaneseculturesuchastheirfacilityintheuseofapolitelanguageindailyconversations.Localnormsaresetonthebasisofpatriarchyandhierarchy.51

Besides the language marker, another indication of thependhalungan community is the way people dress. Although theyfollowasimilartraditionalmodelofunderstandingIslamasinotherplacesinEastJava,thewomeninthisareashowdistinctpeculiaritiesindressing.EmbracingtheMadureseculture,thewomen,bothyoung

50 Christanto P. Raharjo, Pendhalungan: Sebuah ‘Periuk Besar’ Masyarakat Multikultural (presented in Jelajah Budaya 13 August, 2006), p. 3. 51 Mufidah Ch, ‘Complexities in Dealing With Gender Inequality: Muslim Women and Mosque-Based Social Services in East Java Indonesia’, Journal of Indonesian Islam, vol. 11, no. 2 (2017), pp. 459–88.

Chapter 3

128

andold,wearkebaya(traditionalIndonesianblouse),traditionalhijab(kerudung)andsarongsorwrap-aroundskirts inbright,contrastingcolours. The idea behind the selection of such colours is that theyreflectcourage,opennessandacertainstraightforwardness.Themenwearalooseblackblousewithredandwhitestripes.Thesharpstripesare meant to encourage the building of a firm character andfearlessnessinfacingchallenges.Thelooseclothesindicatefreedomandopenness.Thisoutfitiscalledpesa’an,andiswornonbothformaloccasionsand indaily life.Thewomen like towearaccessoriesandreallyconspicuousjewellery.Itcanbefashionedfromeithergoldorsilver and sometimes includesuniquemotives. Jewellery isworn todisplaysocialandeconomicstatus.52

3.2. ReligiousGroups

The regency of Pasuruan has long been one of themost importantcentresofIslamictraditionalisminJava.AsachanneloftraditionalistMuslimclerics,afteritsfoundation,theNUquicklyattaineddominancein lowland political life. In the Indonesian religious landscape, a‘traditionalist’issomeonewhoembracesoneofthefourSunnischoolsof jurisprudence.53 Islamic traditionalism is themain featurewhichdistinguishes the NU from Muslim ‘modernist’ or ‘reformist’organizations.54 InadditiontoitsadherencetotraditionalIslam,theNU has been forthright and quite active in promoting the role of areligiouscivilsocietybycriticizingthestatepowerandbybecomingavehicleforsocialcohesionamongcitizensinthe1980sand1990s.TheNU became a political party in the 1950s butwasmerged into thePartaiPersatuanPembangunan(PPP,theUnitedDevelopmentParty)in1973.Finally,attheNUSitubondoNationalCongress(Muktamar)in1984,agroupofitsintellectualsandactivistsurgedforareturntotheKhittah (Guidelines) of 1926. This would have meant that the NUabandon politics and revert to being purely religious and social

52 Etty Herawati, Kain dan Pakaian Tradisional Madura (Jakarta: Dinas Museum dan Sejarah, Pemerintah DKI Jakarta, 1979). 53 Rumadi, Islamic Post-Traditionalism in Indonesia (Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2015), p. 23. 54 Faisal Ismail, ‘The Nahdlatul Ulama: Its Early History and Contribution to the Establishment of Indonesian State’, Journal of Indonesian Islam, vol. 5, no. 2 (2011), pp. 247–82.


129

organization.55However,sincethecollapseoftheNewOrder,manyNUleadershavedominatedstrategicpositionsinthecentralgovernmentbureaucracy,letaloneinPasuruan.

WithinNU itself adiversityof religious tendencies is apparent.SomeNUleadersinPasuruanadherestrictlytoclassicalfiqhdoctrineswhen it comes to the relationship between religions, religiousminoritiesandsomeparticularissueswithinIslam,suchaspolygyny.Theyarequitecriticalof thecentralorganizersof theNUwhohavepromotedmodernideasoftoleranceandpluralism.ThiscriticalgroupisanecdotallyknownasNUGarisLurus(StraightPathNU).Kyaiwhohavelimitededucationandliveinkampung(village)arelikelytobeproponentsofthisgroup.

Despitethisdivide,themajorityofNUleadersinPasuruanpreferto cultivate an understanding of the middle path of Islam. Theypromote an idea called Islam Nusantara (Archipelago Islam)whichrepresents the close interaction between Islam and local cultures.IslamNusantaraemphasizestheunderstandingthat tobeaMuslim,onedoesnothavetoignorenationalandlocalidentities.Instead,bothnationalandlocalidentitiescanco-existwithanIslamicidentity.Thecombinationof the twocanassistone tobeadevoutMuslimandaNationalistatthesametime.This‘progressive’lineofNUbegantogainpopularity amongNUmemberswhenAbdurrahmanWahid chairedthisorganizationfrom1984to1999).WahidsuccessfullyledNUinitsadoptionofvaluessuchasdemocracyandreligioustolerance.56

TheNUisnottheonlyIslamicgroupactiveinPasuruan.AlthoughtheMuhammadiyahandPersis(PersatuanIslam,IslamicUnion)alsohave a presence, they are less popular. Both organizations wereinspired by the reformist movement inaugurated by MuhammadAbduhinthemagazineTafsirAl-Manar.TheMuhammadiyahchosetofollowapathwhichemphasizesbothreligiousandseculareducationand a tolerance of other faiths. In contrast to the NU, the

55 Robin Bush, Nahdlatul Ulama and the Struggle for Power within Islam and Politics in Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), p. 28. 56 Alexander R. Arifianto, Islam Nusantara & Its Critics: The Rise of NU’s Young Clerics, no. 18-23 January 2017 (Singapore, 2017).

Chapter 3

130

Muhammadiyah encourages its followers to use their own legalreasoning (ijtihad) rather than adhering to tradition. Adherence tolegal decisionsmadebyprevious jurists (taklid) shouldbe avoided.This religious idea is designated pemurnian akidah (purifying thefaith).57AsdidtheMuhammadiyah,Persishasevolvedinthedirectionof reforming traditional Islamicpractices. It opposes thepracticeofkissingthehandofanotherpersonasasignofrespect,apracticewhichremainspartofNUtradition.58

Furthermore, Bangil, the capital of Pasuruan, is home to theheadquarters of Shi’a Islam in Indonesia. The rapiddevelopment ofthis Islamicstreamledtoananti-Shi’aprotest in2007.Theprotest,mainlychampionedbyolderNUmembers,tookplaceinfrontoftheYAPI (Yayasan Pesantren Islam) in Bangil. The YAPI is a pesantrenwhichbelongstoShi’aMuslims.ItwasfoundedbyHuseinal-Habsy,anIndonesian of Arab descent, in 1976 and has expanded into anestablished educational institution covering primary to high schoolwhichwelcomesstudentsnotonlyfromShi’abutalsoSunnifamilies.Thesameprotestrecurred in2011.TheattackersthrewstonesatafemalepesantrenoftheShi’acommunity.

ThisactionangeredtheyouthwingoftheNU,Ansor,whichurgedpolicetoinvestigatetheattack.ThisyouthwingoftheNUisgenuinelyconcernedwiththerighttoexistofreligiousminoritiesandisnotinfavourofthefar-rightwingofIslam.OtheryouthforumsalsoshowedtheirconcernandorganizedarallyinfrontoftheYAPI,claimingthatthe protection of diversity is enshrined in the national motto ofBhinneka Tunggal Ika.59 This stand on a point of principaldemonstratesthatthereisatendencyamongtheyoungergenerationof theNUtoembraceamoremoderateunderstandingof Islam,onewhichencouragestheprotectionofreligiousminorities.

57 James Lowe Peacock, Purifying the Faith: the Muhammadijah Movement in Indonesian Islam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978). 58 Jeremy Menchik, Islam and democracy in Indonesia: tolerance without liberalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 59 Samsu Rizal Panggabean, ‘Policing Sectarian Conflict in Indonesia: The Case of Shi’ism’, in Religion, Law and Intolerance in Indonesia, ed. by Tim Lindsey and Helen Pausacker (London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 280–1.


131

Another recent development is that the right-wing IslamicorganizationestablishedinAugust1998,theIslamicDefenderFront(FPI,FrontPembelaIslam),whichismoststronglyrepresentedintheurban areas, has begun to gain influence in rural areas. From atheologicalpointofview,itisnotdifferenttotheNUandanumberoflocalkyaihaveevenshownaninterestinit.TheFPIpromotestheideaof amar makruf nahi munkar (commanding what is good andforbidding what is evil) and even allows the use of violence in itsimplementation. Its principal attraction to this idea is that theorganization perceives it to be part of real dakwah(propagation/proselytization).TheFPIhasbecomerathernotoriousfor its paramilitary division which carries out intensive raids onmassageparlours,bars,karaokevenues,gamblingcentresandother‘evilplaces’,especiallyduringRamadhan.60

TherelationshipbetweentheFPIandtheNUisnotalwaysgood.Duringthelastfewyears,thelocalbranchesoftheFPIandthelocalNUyouthorganizationshaveoftenbeenatloggerheadsandin2017thetensionintensified,resultinginanattackcommittedbyagroupofFPImembersonahousewhichbelongedtoamemberofAnsor.Theattackwas triggered by amisunderstanding about a Facebook postwhichwasbelievedtohavehumiliatedthetopFPIleader.61Inmid-2017,thelocalFPIinviteditstopleader,RizieqSyihab,todeliveraspeechinthetablig akbar (great congregation). This sermon elicited a harshreactionfromtheaudiencesinceheseverelycriticizedthegovernmentandtheleadersoftheNUfornotsupportingtheideaofassigningtheShariaaformalplaceinthefabricofthenation.

ThetraditionalunderstandingofIslamaspractisedbytheNUhasinfluenced localpeople’ssocial life innorthernPasuruan. Importantphases of life, such as birth, marriage, birthdays and death, arecelebrated and commemorated in a localized formof Islamic ritual.

60 Helen Pausacker, ‘Pink or Blue Swing? Art, Pornography, Islamist and the Law in Reformasi Indonesia’, in Religion, Law and Intolerance in Indonesia, ed. by Tim Lindsey and Helen Pausacker (London: Routledge, 2016), p. 290. 61 Muhajir Arifin, ‘Gara-gara Postingan di Medsos, Ansor dan FPI Pasuruan Bersitegang’, Detik.com, https://news.detik.com/berita-jawa-timur/d-3495695/gara-gara-postingan-di-medsos-ansor-dan-fpi-pasuruan-bersitegang, accessed 14 Oct 2018.

Chapter 3

132

Beatty remarks that all rituals reflect the interests of orthodoxy increating social harmony in the neighbourhood by recommendingadjustingone’sbehaviourtounorthodoxothers.62

Figure3.2.TraditionalwayofcelebratingabirthdaywhichiscalculatedonthebasisofIslamiclunarcalendar.TheceremonyinvolvesrecitationofQuranicchapters,ledbyareligiousleader.

3.3. Patron-ClientRelations

ThegrowthoftraditionalistIslamisaffectingtherelationshipbetweenthe state, religious leaders and the Muslim people. The robustcommitmenttoIslamictraditionsandthestrictobediencetoreligiousleaders(kyai)itrequireshaveledtoacomplicatingoftherelationshipbetweenreligionand thestate.Community-levelpoliticsoperateonthe basis of the patron-client tieswhich characterize society in theeasternmostpartofEastJavanese.63Thebulkofthesearemanifestedin informal institutions, for instance, kyai and santri (people ofpesantren). These Islamic institutions and religious leaders are two

62 Andrew Beatty, Varieties of Javanese religion: an anthropological account (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 155–157. 63 Phillip Drake, Indonesia and the Politics of Disaster: Power and Representation in Indonesia’s mud Volcano (New York: Routledge, 2016), p. 5.


133

fundamental entities which maintain such power relations.64PesantrenserveascentresinwhichknowledgeofIslamistransferredtopupils (santri) andkyai are reproduced.65Pesantren arenotonlyconsideredtobetheguardiansoftraditionalistIslamasawhole,butbecomepartofbothreligiousandsocio-culturalinstitutionsinwhichkyai are themain actors.66 Theypreserve the chainof traditionalistIslamwithinthestructureofintellectualandsocialnetworks,towhichmarriage and kinship make a considerable contribution. Bothpesantrenandkyai co-maintain theentityknownassantri culture,67whichentailsamixtureof Javaneseand Islamiccultures.68Toput itsimply,thereligiousorientationoftraditionalistIslamisimbuedwiththepeople’sdevotiontoastrictobservanceofIslamicprinciplesandtheir intensiveperformanceof religious rituals69 and is inextricablyidentified with the core position of pesantren and kyai or ulama(religiousleaders).Thesereligiousleadersarethemainactorsinthesocialrelations70whichupholdnotonlyreligiousauthoritiesthroughIslamicscholarshipbutalsostronglydefinesocialandpoliticalroles.The relationship between them and local people is embodied in apatron-clienttie.

Aftermore thanhalf a century, the timehas come to re-assessClifford Geertz’s important 1960 work on Javanese kyaiwhich has

64 Dhofier, The Pesantren Tradition: The Role of the Kyai in the Maintenance of Traditional Islam in Java; Robert W. Hefner, ‘Reimagined Community: A Social History of Muslim Education in Pasuruan, East Java’, in Asian visions of authority: religion and the modern states of East and Southeast Asi, ed. by Charles F. Keyes, Laurel Kendall, and Helen Hardacre (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), pp. 75–95. 65 Azyumardi Azra, Dina Afrianty, and Robert W. Hefner, ‘Pesantren and Madrasa: Muslim Schools and National Ideals in Indonesia’, in Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education, ed. by Robert W. Hefner and Muhammad Qasim Zaman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), p. 174. 66 Ronald Alan Lukens-Bull, ‘A Peaceful Jihad: Javanese Islamic Education and Religious Identity Construction’ (Arizona State University, 1997), p. 5; Hiroko Horikoshi, Kiai dan Perubahan Sosial (Jakarta: P3M, 1987), p. 114. 67 Yanwar Pribadi, ‘Religious Networks in Madura: Pesantren, Nahdlatul Ulama, and Kiai as the Core of Santri Culture’, Al-Jami’ah: Journal of Islamic Studies, vol. 51, no. 1 (2013), pp. 1–32. 68 Zamakhsyari Dhofier, ‘Kinship and Marriage among the Javanese Kyai’, Indonesia, vol. 29 (1980), pp. 47–58. 69 Ibid., p. 50. 70 Lukens-Bull, ‘A Peaceful Jihad: Javanese Islamic Education and Religious Identity Construction’, p. 5; Horikoshi, Kiai dan Perubahan Sosial, p. 114.

Chapter 3

134

beenabasis for furtherstudiesabout theirchangingposition in thecomplexityofsocialtransformationsinIndonesia.Heargues,insteadof being alienated from the pressures of Nationalism and Islamicmodernism, thekyai transformed themselves intoakindof culturalbroker for a different sort of interest.Kyai have not only played asignificant role in transmitting Islam to the ordinary people andoccupiedafocalpositionwithinthetraditionalsocialstructure,theyhavealsomanagedtocarvethemselvesoutandplayanewsocialrolewhichhasofferedthemthepossibilitytoenhancetheirsocialpowerandprestige.71Thepoliticalroleofkyaihasbeenmostconspicuousintheir function as a mediator of the political issues concerningNationalismforthevillagerssurroundingthem.Mansurnoorremarkskyai are, and always will be, embedded in the socio-political andreligious lives of Muslims. He emphasizes the roles they play inmaintainingthebalancebetweentheirattachmenttoreligioustenetsandthelocalsettinginwhichtheyoperate.72Thecriticalroleplayedbykyai can take a variety of forms as eitherkyai pesantren orkyaitarekat(inSufiorders).AssuggestedbyTurmudi,asagroup,kyaihavestriven either to make the existing social order compatible withreligious ideals or tomould these religious ideals to be compatiblewiththeexistingorder.73

Patronage is also a part of formal institutions, especiallywhenreligious leaders enter politics and the state bureaucracy. ThistendencyisincontrovertiblewhenwelookattherealityinPasuruanin the last decade. Furthermore, kyai are commonly wealthylandowners,andthereforepartofthesocialelite.74Theupshotisthatthe localpeople inPasuruanareheavilydependentonkyai sociallyand, even more importantly, in all matters related to religiousnormativity. For instance, they come tokyai to ask forblessingand

71 Clifford Geertz, ‘The Javanese Kijaji: The Changing Role of a Cultural Broker’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 2, no. 2 (1960), p. 230. 72 Iik Arifin Mansurnoor, Islam in an Indonesian world: Ulama of Madura (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1990). 73 Endang Turmudi, Struggling for the Umma: Changing Leadership Roles of Kiai in Jombang, East Java (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2006). 74 Dhofier, ‘Kinship and Marriage among the Javanese Kyai’.


135

prayersorseekadviceonanappropriatenamefortheiroffspringorthe date of a marriage ceremony. It is only the kyai who has theauthoritytointerprettheSharia.Inanyinterpretationofmarriageandfamilialmatters,ratherthanstateregulations,itisSharia,asembodiedinfiqh,whichistakenastheauthoritativenorminthemanagementoftheir daily lives, with a helping hand from the influence of localtraditions.

Howthestatedealswithreligious issuesremainsan importanttopicofpublicdebate inpresent-day Indonesia.The followingshortsketchilluminateshowtraditionalistIslaminteractswith,oratleastcontests, the state in thePasuruan context. Itwas at the endof theIslamic holy month of Ramadhan in mid September 2008 when aterribletragedyhitthetownofPasuruan.Thousandsofpeople,manyofwhomweremothersbetweentheagesoffortyandsixty,wenttotheprivate home of the famous and wealthy Saychon family. Theydescendedonthehouseuponhearingnewsaboutanalmsdistributionwhichhadspreadlikewildfireafewdaysbefore.Intheearlymorning,theygatheredinfrontofthegatesinthehopeofcollectingthesumofRp.40,0000($3.07)inacashdonation.Thisdistributionissupposedtobeanannualtraditionobservedbythatfamily.Unfortunately,thecash delivery turned into a deadly stampede. The women in frontfoughttoscreamastheywerepushedfrombehindinthecrowd.Morethan twenty people were crushed to death. Called to account, aSaychonson,Faruq,wasnamedbythepoliceasasuspectashewastheco-ordinatorofthisdistribution.Thelocalcriminalcourtdecidedto sentenceFaruq to three years’ imprisonment, indictinghimwithnegligencecausingdeath.75

Unhappily that year, the Saychon family had not chosen acharitable institution to distribute the alms as had been its customsincethe1980s.Amongthemanyreasonsforthischangeofheartwasthatthefamilydidnotwanttodelegateitslong-establishedidentityasa philanthropist to other agencies. The Saychon family thought it

75 Tempo.co, ‘Trauma “Zakat Maut”, Haji Syaichon Salurkan Zakat ke Badan Amil’, TEMPO Interaktif (2009), https://m.tempo.co/read/news/2009/09/07/151196632/trauma-zakat-maut-haji-syaichon-salurkan-zakat-ke-badan-amil, accessed 15 Jun 2017.

Chapter 3

136

importanttomaintainitssocialstandingasadonorshowingsolidaritywith the poor. Another version has it that, by holding such a self-managed-distribution,familymembersweremoreconfidentthatthefundswouldreachtheintendedrecipients,asitwasdubiousaboutthetrustworthiness of existing private and state-run charitableinstitutions.

Notunnaturally,thetragicincidentgaverisetoreligiousdebatesaboutthelegalstatusofthedirectdistributionofalmsgiving.Theheadof the National Almsgiving Body (Badan Amil Zakat Nasional,BAZNAS),DidinHafiduddin,washarshinhiscriticism.Hestatedthatdirect distribution is not an Islamic tradition, but owes farmore tofeudal tradition. Nevertheless, he did not deny that there was aproblem about social trust in government almsgiving agencies. 76Takingadifferent tack,HasyimMuzadi, thegeneralheadof theNU,was reluctant to accept the impermissibility of such privatedistributions.Inhisview,thepathchosenbytheSyaichonfamilywasagenuinelygoodonebutthenegligenceshownduringthedistributionwasoflegalmattersubjecttopoliceinvestigation.77Thiscaserevealsseveralinterestingsocialaspects.Undeniablyindividualswithahighersocio-economicstatushavetheright/dutytoemploytheirresourcesto provide protection and benefits to persons of lower status whoreciprocate this gesture by owing obedience to their patron.78However,ifitssocialstatusistobepreserved,thisinitiativeshouldbeundertakenprivately,eschewingtheinvolvementofthestateagencies.Therationaleisthat,wheneverthestateseesanopportunity,itwilltrytousurpthemechanismssustainingthesepatron-clientrelations.

76 Tempo.co, ‘Tebar Zakat ala Haji Syaikhon Tak Sesuai Quran’, TEMPO Interaktif (2008), https://nasional.tempo.co/read/news/2008/09/16/058135727/tebar-zakat-ala-haji-syaikhon-tak-sesuai-quran, accessed 15 Jun 2017. 77 Tempo.co, ‘Pembagian Zakat Haji Syaikhon Fikri Tidak Haram’, TEMPO Interaktif (2008), https://m.tempo.co/read/news/2008/09/16/058135791/pembagian-zakat-haji-syaikhon-fikri-tidak-haram, accessed 15 Jun 2017. 78 James C. Scott, ‘Patron-Clients Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia’, The American Political Science Review, vol. 66, no. 1 (1972), p. 92.


137

Figure3.3.Eachfamilyadoptsitsownrespectedkyaiwhosephotosarecommonlyhungonthewallinthefrontroom.

3.4. PoliticalSphere

Scholarlydiscussionhas linkedpolitics inEast Java topolitik aliran(streampolitics).FirstproposedbyCliffordGeertz,this isapoliticalforce which was built on deeply rooted streams present in socio-religiouscommunities.Scholarshavearguedthatthefirstdemocraticelectionin1999reflectedtheoldpatternofaliranpolitics.Certainlythis rings true when applied to East Javanese society. Despite thecomplex multi-party system available in Indonesia, electoralcompetitioninEastJavahasunquestionablybeendominatedbytwomajoraliran-oriented parties: the Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB,TheNational Awakening Party), theNU-based political partywhichbroadly represents the traditionalist santri community, and thePDIPerjuanganwhich tends to attract the ballot-papers of theabanganvoters.Astimeshavechanged,somescholarsarguethattheintensecompetitionbetweenindividualcandidates,publiclyknownasperangfigure (war of personalities) has challenged the old aliran politics.Thesepoliticalcandidateshavenotonlymanagedtowinvotesfromtheir traditional communities, but are now increasingly lookingbeyondtheoldaliranidentities.Aliranremainscentraltothepoliticallife.Yet,currentsocialchangeshavemeantthatpolitikaliranhaslost

Chapter 3

138

alotofitssignificance.79Thelatestdevelopmenthasledtotheriseof‘new clientelism’ in which patron-client relations within aliran areweakening (dealiranisasi) and are being replaced by more openarrangements.80

DuringthefourgeneralelectionsheldinPasuruansince1999,thePKBhaswonthemostvotesontheregencylevel.Inthe2009election,fifteen out of the fifty seats or 30 percent of the localmembers ofParliamentwerefromthePKB.Inthe2014election,thePKBsuffereda dramatic decline, gaining only twelve parliamentary seats or 24percent.Secondintheracewerethenationalistparties,namely:PDIPerjuanganandPartaiGerindra, eachwith seven seats.Despite thisdecline, the PKB has succeeded in having one of its representativeappointed president of the Parliament. Not only this, the currentRegent,IrsyadYusuf,whowasaPKBmemberoftheParliamentinthepreviousterm,isanoverarchingiconofthetriumphofboththePKBandNU.Inthe2018electionforanewRegent,noneofpoliticalpartiesproposedcandidatestostandagainsthim.He,supportedbyGusMujibImron,theleaderoftherenownedPesantrenAl-Yasini,puthimselfupastheonlysinglecandidate(calontunggal).

4. SocialLifeinSumbersari

Thissectionexploressomeparticularaspectsof thearea inwhich Ihavebeenconductingmyfieldwork.Sumbersariisapseudonymofasub-district.Itiscomposedofseventeenvillagesinwhichthemajorityof thepeople,especially in thesouthernpart, speakMadurese.Onlythoselivinginthenorth,borderingthetownofBangil,speakJavanese.Now,inspiteofspeakinginMadurese,allthelocalresidentsidentifythemselvesasJavanese.

79 Andreas Ufen, ‘From Aliran to Dealignment: Political Parties in Post-Suharto Indonesia’, South East Asia Research, vol. 16, no. 1 (2008), pp. 5–41. 80 Rubaidi, ‘East Java: New Clientalism and the Fading of Aliran Politics’, in Electoral dynamics in Indonesia: money politics, patronage and clientelism at the grassroots, ed. by Edward Aspinall and Mada Sukmajati (Singapore: NUS Press, 2016), p. 277.


139

AccordingtoRetsikas,theareaischaracterizedbyaninterestingidea of the endless transformation from one culture, Madurese, toanother culture, Javanese, which he calls “becoming”. Local peopletendtodescribethemajorcharactertraitoftheJavaneseasthequalityofhalus(refinement),whiletheMaduresesideisperceivedaskasar(rough-and-ready).81AnthropologistshavesaidthatamongJavanesepeopleto‘behaveasaJavanese’means‘toconducthim/herselfwithurbanity.Ineverydaylife,apersonissaidtobe“Javanese”ifhisorherdaily behaviour mirrors the ideal of sejatining becik, which meansaspiring to a character based on pituduh (acting advisedly) in theJavanesetradition.Conversely,somebodyissaidtobe“notJavanese”ifhisorherdailywayoflifefailstoreflectthegoodvaluesembodiedin Javanese culture.82 Under these circumstances, Madurese try tobecome‘Javanese’.Despitetheirbestintentions,thisdoesnotalterthenegative stereotypeofMadurese in circulation among the Javanese.Some Javanese still think that Madurese migrants are reluctant tointegrateintoJavanesesociety.HussonarguesthatMadureseare“thevictimsofadeep-seatedprejudicewhichpicturesthemascoarseandbrutal”.83Thesituationisnotimprovedbythefacttheytendtoresistexogamyandfavourself-segregatedresidence.84

Sumbersari, as is common in Maduro-Javanese areas, has tocontendwithanarrayofsocialproblems,chiefamongthempoverty85andatendencynottoparticipateinformaleducation.Thisavoidanceof the established formal educational system hasmadepesantren acentral institution. Pesantren offer an alternative educationalinstitutionwhichisperceivedtobeadequatetofulfiltheirneedsasitinculcatesinstudentsnotonlytheknowledgetheyrequiretofunction

81 Retsikas, Becoming – An Anthropological Approach to Understandings of the Person in Java, p. xiv. 82 Ayu Sutarto, ‘Becoming a True Javanese: A Javanese View of Attempts at Javanisation’, Indonesia and the Malay World, vol. 34, no. 98 (2006), p. 41. 83 Husson, ‘Eight Centuries of Madurese Migration to East Java’, p. 91. 84 Ibid., p. 92. 85 Gerben Nooteboom, Forgotten People: Poverty, Risk and Social Security in Indonesia, the Case of the Madurese (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2015).

Chapter 3

140

insocietybutalso instilsreligionandcharacter-building inthem. Inthefollowing,IseektoexploretwomajorelementsinSumbersari.

4.1. EconomyandEducation

Based on the 2015 official record, Sumbersari has around 63,635residents,withbirthrateof1.49percentperyear.Themajorityofthepeople of Sumbersari work as farmers and labourers (kerjaserabutan).Seventypercentoftheeconomicresourcesofthevillagersisgeneratedbytheagriculturalsector.Therateofunemploymentisfairly high. Although the land, 50 percent of which is rice-fields, isgenerally fertile, the crops cultivated do not make any significantamountofmoney.Thesmallerareaof the land isgivenover todrycultivation(tegal)onwhichthepeopledoplantricehereduringtherainy season.However, as this is impossible in thedry season, theychange to plantingmaize,mango trees and tuberose flowers.Whenadverse weather conditions mean that the going gets tough, thefarmersraisecattleandgoats.Themajorityofthewomendonotearnmoney outside the household. They sometimes do work at homeembroidering the costumeworn by women during Islamic prayers(mukena)butthisgeneratesonlyaverylowincome.

Participationinformaleducationofpeopletenyearsandolderisgenerally low. Twenty-eight percent of them (or about 17,799persons)haveonlycompletedprimaryschoolandnotcontinuedontoahigher level.Thispercentagedecreasessignificantlyon juniorandseniorhighschoollevels.Only6,171people(9.7percent)haveafirst-level secondary school certificate,while amere 4,146 (6.5 percent)have finished senior secondary school. Nevertheless, it should benotedthatthesefiguresrelatetoseculareducation.Thisisasocietywhichpaysgreat attention to their children’s religiouseducation invarious Islamic education institutions, ranging from small-scalepesantren to very large ones. Hence, their participation in informalpesantren education appears to be the best explanation ofwhy thenumbergoingontothelasttwolevelsofformaleducationissolow.Itmustalsobesaidthat,thoughyoungstersareincreasinglygoingonto


141

higher education (university), their number is still very small, 0.6percent.86

OnthelevelofthePasuruanregency,itcanbesimplysaidthatthenumberofformalIslamicschoolsislowerthanthatofformalpublicschools.However,comingdowntotheSumbersarisub-district,Islamicschoolsappeartobeatleastasimportantastheirpubliccounterparts.Even on the level of middle school, Islamic schools are dominant.leaving that aside,what is obvious on both district and sub-districtlevelsisthatinformalschools,pesantrenandmadrasahdiniyah,arethemostcommoneducationalinstitutionsinthearea.Amadrasahdiniyahis anout-of-school institution teaching subjects related to Islam. Itscurriculum spans primary to high school level. As just mentionedabove,thehighnumberofmadrasahdiniyahonprimary(ūlā)levelisan indicationof theconcernamongthe localsaboutequippingtheirchildrenwithadequateknowledgeofandskillsrelatedtotheirreligionfromanearlyage.

Quiteawareof the situation, the localgovernmenthas recentlydrawnupapolicydesigned tosupport the importanceofmadrasahdiniyah. In 2016 the local regent (Bupati) issued Regulation No.21/2016whichobligesMuslimpupilsintheprimaryandjuniorhighschools to attend madrasah diniyah for at least two hours in theafternoon.87 Article 4 of the Regulation states that, as an informalschool, thepurposeof themadrasahdiniyah is to expandchildren’scapacitysoastoformthemintopiousandwell-behavedpersons.Theregulation also urges people to support the operation ofmadrasahdiniyahfinancially.

4.2. PesantrenAtmosphere

Sumbersariisnowadayshometonearlythirtypesantrenorabout10percentofallthepesantreninPasuruan.Basedonstatisticalrecords,in2014therewere320pesantreninPasuruanalone.Allthepesantren

86 BPS Kab. Pasuruan, Kecamatan Rembang dalam Angka 2015 (Pasuruan: BPS Kab. Pasuruan, 2015), pp. 46–8. 87 Peraturan Bupati Pasuruan (Regent’s Regulation of Pasuruan) No. 21 of 2016 On the Obligation to Study in a Madrasah Diniyah.

Chapter 3

142

runmadrasah diniyah, while some also run formal Islamic schools.However,notallmadrasahdiniyahbelongtopesantren.Consequentlythe number of madrasah diniyah far exceeds the number ofpesantren.88PesantrenrepresentadiscourseofwhatitistobeadevoutJavanese Muslim.89 For people living in the lowlands, a pesantreneducation is considered to be an important factor in shaping theirchildren’slives.Commensuratewiththismindset,theidealpatternisthat, after completing primary school, female teen-agers study inpesantren. Middle-class religious families want their daughters tostudy in major pesantren which are renowned for their long-establishedtraditionofthetrainingofIslamicsubjects.

Parentssendtheirdaughterstopesantren toequipthemwithagoodunderstandingofIslamtoassistthemintheirfuture.Theyarefirmlyconvincedthatpesantrenwillgiveaguaranteeoftheinculcationand protection of female morality. To ensure the system worksproperly, a pesantren education generally adopts the concept ofeducationalsegregation,keepingmaleandfemalepupilsseparated.90Althoughtheyarehappyfortheirdaughterstoparticipateinthis,forwomen in particular general education is still perceived as lessimportant than religious education. This is because women aresupposedtoworkinthehomeandraisechildren.Thegenerallineofthinkingisthatwomendonotneedagoodeducationalfoundationtocarry out these tasks. Local people seem to ignore the fact that amotherhasmoreinfluenceoneducatingchildrenthanafather.Theyrefer these jobs to dapur (kitchen), sumur (well) and kasur (bed).Confirmingthisassertion,thegeneralpatternshowsthatthenumberoffemalestudentsininformalpesantrenissignificantlyhigherthanthemalestudents.Togiveanexample,PesantrenMiftahulUluminKrajanvillagehasaround600femalestudentsandjust30malestudentswhoboard(mukim)initsdormitories(pondok).

88 BPS Kab. Pasuruan, Kecamatan Rembang dalam Angka 2015, p. 54. 89 Muhammad Latif Fauzi, ‘Traditional Islam in Javanese Society: The Roles of Kyai and Pesantren in Preserving Islamic Tradition and Negotiating Modernity’, Journal of Indonesian Islam, vol. 6, no. 1 (2012), pp. 125–44. 90 Eka Srimulyani, Women from Traditional Islamic Educational Institutions in Indonesia: Negotiating Public Spaces (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012), p. 118.


143

HereisareviewofhowcentralinformalIslamiceducationisthattaughtinpesantren.Inmid-March2017,ImetAlfifromSumbersari,afemalestudentatalocalIslamicuniversity.Iwaseventuallyinvitedtovisit her house andwas introduced to Gus Raibin, her forty-seven-year-old father, who serves as an imam, leader of a small mosque(langgar),andhermother.InspiteofitsstrongcommitmenttoIslamicnormativity,thisfamilyappearstopresentanotableexception.Theirdaughteristheonlyonefromamongotherreligiousfamilymembersand others in their surroundings who has managed to reach auniversity education.Nearly all thewomenofAlfi’s age are alreadymarriedandbusywiththeirchildren.Iwascuriousabouthowlocalpeople generally view the relationship between religion andeducation.Theyexplainedme:

“Sumbersari is different. Religion is the prime instrument inpreservingmorality. Girls are encouraged not to obtain a fullyroundededucation(sekolahtinggi).Thisisnothingtodowiththelack of financial resources. People do not comprehend thecontributionmade to life by (secular) education.Whenwomenareassumedtobecomehousewives,whyspendmuchmoneyforschooling?Furthermore,theybelievethatvocationalhighschoolonly provides students with the skills required to work in afactory.Thereisastereotypeitismorallyimproperforadevoutwomantodomenialwork.”

However,thewindsofchangearecomingandinthelastdecade,parentshavebeenincreasinglyinsistentthattheirchildrenacquirenotonly a good understanding of Islam, but also acquire generalknowledge and practical skills. Consequently, pesantren have beenexpandingtheircurriculatorespondtothesenewaspirations.Inmyfieldwork I have found that, over the last few years a number ofpesantren in Sumbersari have been attempting to reduce the gapbetweenreligiousandseculareducation.This iscoincidentwiththedevelopment on the national level which has shown a growingtendency for Islamic schools to be more open to change. In 2009,Pesantren Al-Ikhlas set up a vocational school (sekolah menengahkejuruan). Likewise, some year ago, in addition to the informalmadrasah diniyah, PesantrenRoudlotunnajah expanded its range offormal schools. It opened an Islamic junior high school (madrasah

Chapter 3

144

tsanawiyah) which educates students in both Islamic and secularsubjects. Since the opening of this school, this pesantren has beenenjoyingaconsiderableincreaseinthenumberofstudents,althoughnotallof themareboarders.Thisall suggests thatparentsarenowawarethathavingadiplomainformaleducationisthetouchstonetoamuchbetterlifefuturefortheirchildren.91

Sumbersari itself does not have many major pesantren. Thenumber of studentswho board inmany of them generally numberbetweentwentyandonehundred.Onlyafewofthemhavemorethan200students.Themajorityofthestudentsarelocal,butafewcomefromneighbouringareasandfromplacesinMadura.Themajorityofthepesantren inSumbersarihavebeenestablishedbykyaiwhoarelinkedbytiesofdescent,marriageandeducation,forminganIslamiclinkagewhichextendsacrosseasternJavaandMadura.92ManyofthemaregraduatesoftherespectablePesantrenSidogiriinPasuruan.Forthis reason, numerousmadrasah diniyah in Sumbersari are officialbranches (ranting) of the Pesantren Sidogiri’s Madrasah MiftahulUlum(MMU)whichhasbeengoingsince the1930s.TheMMUrunsmadrasahdiniyahonfourlevels:isti‘dadiyah(preparatory),ibtida’iyah(basic), tsanawiyah (middle) and aliyah (high). These rantingmadrasah teachthesamecurriculum,subjectsandreferenceswhicharetaughtintheMMUheadquarters.

AmongEast JavaneseMuslim traditionalists, PesantrenSidogirienjoysthereputationofbeingthemostdistinguishedandimportantcentre for studying the classical books (kitab) on fiqh used by theShafi‘ıschool.AmongthereferencestaughtarethekitabwrittenbytheAbū Shujāʿ family, including Matn al-ghāya wa al-taqrīb by theBaṣrajuristAbūShujāʿal-Iṣfahānī(d.1197)anditscommentaryFatḥal-qarībal-mujībbyMuhammadIbnal-Qasimal-Ghazzı(d.1512)andthoseproducedbytheMalībarīfamilysuchasFatḥal-Mu‘īnbisharḥ

91 This is based on my interviews with the leader of this pesantren. 92 Hefner, ‘Reimagined Community: A Social History of Muslim Education in Pasuruan, East Java’.


145

Qurrat al-‘ayn by Zayn al-Dīn al-Malībarī (d. 1579).93 Pupils on thealiyah level are taught using fiqh sources from a comparativeperspective.Itsalumninetworkiswellmaintained,joinedtogetherinan association called Ikatan Alumni Santri Sidogiri (IASS, theAssociation of the Sidogiri Alumni). This network, encompassingdistrictrepresentativesthroughoutEastJava,regularlyholdsabahsulmasa’il forum in response to theneed to find solutions toeverydayreligiousproblems.

5. Conclusion

Thischapterhasofferedabriefdescriptionof thehistoricalcontextandthecurrentdevelopmentsinIslamandotherfieldsinPasuruan.PasuruanisaregencyintheprovinceofEastJavawhichisinhabitedbyamajorityofMuslimcommunitieswhichgenerallyshowatendencytowardspractisingthetraditionalIslam94encouragedbytheNU.ThisreligiousorientationdrawsstrengthfromthefactthatmanyPasuruanresidents have historical roots in the island of Madura. For manycenturies,Pasuruanhasbeen thedestinationofMaduresemigrants.Their migration certainly gathered strength because of the jobopportunitiesofferedbythesugar-plantationprojectinthenineteenthcentury.ThemigrantshaveacculturatedwiththeJavanese,aminglingwhichledtoadistinctsub-culturecalledpedalunganorpendhalungan.This community has been established on the basis of patron-clientrelationships in which kyai or the leaders of pesantren act as thepatron.

TheinfluenceofIslaminPasuruanwasstronglyreinforcedbytheexpansionoftraditionalreligiousschools(pesantren)inthenorthernlowlandsduringthelasthalfofthenineteenthcenturyandtheearly

93 Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Kitab Kuning: Books in Arabic Script Used in the Pesantren Milieu, Comments on a New Collection in the KITLV Library’, Bijdragen Tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, vol. 146, no. 2 (1990), pp. 244–6; Scott C. Lucas, ‘Justifying Gender Inequality in the Shāfiʿī Law School: Two Case Studies of Muslim Legal Reasoning’, Journal of the American Oriental Society, vol. 129, no. 2 (2009), p. 242. 94 Dhofier, The Pesantren Tradition: The Role of the Kyai in the Maintenance of Traditional Islam in Java, p. xix.

Chapter 3

146

partofthetwentiethcentury.TheseschoolsservedascentresforthepropagationoftraditionalIslam.AlthoughtheinfluenceoftheNUispredominant, Pasuruan is home to different Muslim groups. Theseinclude modernist organizations such as the Muhammadiyah andPersis,albeittheirinfluenceislessstrong.InadditiontoSunniIslam,followersofShi’iIslamcanalsobefoundinPasuruan.Althoughtheyhaveacentrefortheirreligiouseducation,theirexistencesometimesprovokesharshoppositionfromthelocalpeople.

Thedevelopmentof traditionalist Islam inPasuruan constantlyaffects the relationship between the state, religious leaders and theMuslimcommunity.ThecommitmenttopractisingIslamictraditionsandthestronglyinculcatedobediencetoreligiousleaders(kyai)haveled to a complicated relationship between religion and the state.Community-levelpoliticsoperateonthebasisofthepatron-clienttieswhichcharacterizetheeasternpartofEastJavanesesocietyingeneral.This social configuration appears to have infiltrated and influencedpoliticallife.Since1999inPasuruan,PKB,anNU-basedpoliticalparty,hasbeenthewinningpartyontheregencylevelinthelastfourgeneralelections.Furthermore,IrsyadYusuf,thecurrentRegentwhoisanex-member of the PKB faction in Parliament can be considered anoverarchingiconofthetriumphoftheNU.

ThepoliticalandsocialsituationinPasuruanisnotsignificantlydifferent fromthat inotherareas ineasternpartofEast Java.AreassuchasProbolinggo,LumajangandJemberalsohaveabignumberofMadurese migrants who have evolved into a pendhalungancommunity.Nevertheless,Pasuruandoeshaveitsownidiosyncrasieswhich set it apart. Firstly, Pasuruan is geographically close to thecapital city of Surabaya. The most obvious consequence of thisproximityisthepresenceofahugeindustrialcomplexinPasuruan.Onthebrightside,theindustrialdevelopmentinthisareahasprovidedanamplerangeofjobopportunitiesforthelocalyouth.Afterfinishinghigh school, there is a tendency for young people towant tomakemoneyas factoryworkersratherthangoingtouniversity.Secondly,Pasuruanbordersareaswithanarek’ansub-culture.AsImentionedearlier,thearek’ansub-cultureisconsidered‘modern’.Thereisalocal


147

anecdotewhichsays thatpendhalunganpeoplearedeemedmodernafter they have adopted the Javanese arek’an sub-culture, speakJavaneseorgotostateschools.Thirdly,initssouthernpartPasuruanishometoMountBromo,thecentreofanon-Islamicmovement,whichmakesPasuruanoneofthemostheterogeneousregenciesinJava.

Sumbersari,theareainwhichIhavebeendoingmyfieldwork,canbeidentifiedasanagrariansociety.Agriculturecontributes70percentofeconomicresourcesofthevillagers.Sumbersarihastocontendwithanarrayofsocialproblems,chiefamongthempovertyandatendencynot to participate in formal education. This avoidance of theestablishedformaleducationalsystemhasmadeeitherpesantrenormadrasahdiniyahacentralinstitution.Pesantrenofferanalternativeeducationalinstitutionwhichisperceivedtobeadequatetofulfiltheirneedsasitinculcatesinstudentsnotonlytheknowledgetheyrequiretofunctioninsocietybutalsoinstilsreligionandcharacter-buildinginthem.However,thewindsofchangearecomingandinthelastdecade.Pesantren havebeenexpanding their curricula to respond to anewaspiration,i.e.providinggeneralknowledgeandpracticalskills.Thisiscoincident with the development on the national level which hasshown a growing tendency for Islamic schools to bemore open tochange.

The next chapter focuses onmarriage practices in a village inPasuruan.Ittriestounderstandtheentanglementoflocalnormsandtherolesoflocalactors,namelykyai(religiousclerics)andpengarep(voluntary traditional matchmakers) in the everyday practice ofmarriage. It specifically questions in what ways does the socialstructureoftraditionalistIslaminfluencethepracticeofmarriageinthe community of Sumbersari in Pasuruan. Significantly, it alsoincludes an analysis of the roles of the individual agencies of thecouplesinshapingamarriage.

Chapter 3

148

final buku - scholarlypublications.universiteitleiden.nl

Documents