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TRANSCRIPT
In the
Supreme Court of Ohio
STATE OF OHIO,
Plaintiff-Appellee.
v.
RYAN TURNER,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Case No. 2019-1674
On Appeal from the
Clermont County
Court of Appeals,
Twelfth Appellate District
Court of Appeals
Case No. CA2018-11-082
______________________________________________________________________________
MERIT BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL
DAVE YOST IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEE STATE OF OHIO
______________________________________________________________________________
D. VINCENT FARIS (0001163)
Prosecuting Attorney
NICK HORTON (0091191)
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
Clermont County Prosecutor’s Office
76 South Riverside Drive, 2nd Floor
Batavia, Ohio 45103
(t) 513-732-8175
(f) 513-732-7592
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellee
State of Ohio
ZACHARY F. FARIS (0088118)
40 South 3rd Street
Batavia, Ohio 45103
(t) 513-732-1141
(f) 513-732-8824
Counsel for Defendant-Appellant
Ryan Turner
DAVE YOST (0056290)
Attorney General of Ohio
BENJAMIN M. FLOWERS* (0095284)
Solicitor General
*Counsel of Record
STEPHEN P. CARNEY (0063460)
Deputy Solicitor General
30 East Broad Street, 17th Floor
Columbus, Ohio 43215
(t) 614-466-8980
(f) 614-466-5087
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost
Supreme Court of Ohio Clerk of Court - Filed May 19, 2020 - Case No. 2019-1674
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................................... ii
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................ 1
STATEMENT OF AMICUS INTEREST .................................................................................... 3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS ............................................................................. 4
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................................. 6
Amicus Curiae Ohio Attorney General’s Proposition of Law: ................................................ 6
An officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop a motor vehicle for a marked-
lane violation under R.C. 4511.33(A)(1) when the officer observes the tires of the vehicle
driving on, but not across, a marked-lane line. ........................................................................ 6
A. A driver who drives on a marked-lane line violates R.C. 4511.33(A)(1), so
an officer who observes that violation may lawfully conduct a traffic stop.
................................................................................................................................. 6
1. The statutory text and this Court’s precedents confirm that a driver
who drives on a marked line violates the Marked-Lane Statute. ............ 6
2. None of Turner’s contrary arguments have merit. ................................. 10
B. Even if driving on the line did not violate the Marked-Lane Statute, the
trooper’s belief that it did was a reasonable mistake of law, justifying the
stop. ...................................................................................................................... 11
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................... 16
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .................................................................................................... 17
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Page(s)
City of Bowling Green v. Godwin,
110 Ohio St. 3d 58, 2006-Ohio-3563 ....................................................................3, 13, 14, 15
Heien v. North Carolina,
574 U.S. 54 (2014) ........................................................................................................... passim
Pryor v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs.,
148 Ohio St. 3d 1, 2016-Ohio-2907 ........................................................................................6
Riley v. California,
573 U.S. 373 (2014) .................................................................................................................13
State v. Brown,
143 Ohio St. 3d 444, 2015-Ohio-2438 ..................................................................................14
State v. Franklin,
2012-Ohio-3089 (5th Dist.) .....................................................................................................7
State v. Kneier,
2015-Ohio-3419 (11th Dist.) ...................................................................................................7
State v. Marcum,
2013-Ohio-2652 (5th Dist.) .....................................................................................................7
State v. Mays,
119 Ohio St. 3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539 .......................................................................... passim
State v. Smith,
2017-Ohio-5845 (3d Dist.) .......................................................................................................7
United States v. Cortez,
449 U.S. 411 (1981) .................................................................................................................12
Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis,
100 Ohio St. 3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849 ..................................................................................15
Statutes and Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Const. amend. IV......................................................................................................... passim
iii
Ohio Const. art I, section 14 .......................................................................................3, 12, 14, 15
R.C. 109.02 ......................................................................................................................................3
R.C. 4511.33 .......................................................................................................................... passim
Other Authorities
Ohio Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices §3A.05.02 .................................................7
Ohio Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices §3A.06.01 .................................................8
Traffic Crash Facts, Ohio Department of Public Safety (April 2018) .......................................3
INTRODUCTION
This Court often speaks of bright lines in the figurative sense. This case involves
a bright line in the literal sense. Ryan Turner drove his car on, but not over, the “fog
line” that separates the right lane of traffic from the shoulder of the road. A trooper
observed this and stopped Turner for a suspected violation of R.C. 4511.33(A)(1), which
requires drivers to remain “entirely within a single lane.” During the stop, the trooper
discovered that Turner was drunk and arrested him for operating a vehicle while
intoxicated. Turner now claims the trooper had no lawful basis to stop him in the first
place, as he had no basis for suspecting a violation of R.C. 4511.33(A)(1)—according to
Turner, that statute prohibits driving over the marked line, not on it. Turner thus argues
that his subsequent arrest was unlawful, and on that basis seeks to suppress the
evidence from the stop.
Turner is wrong, for two reasons, either of which is independently sufficient to
rule against him.
First, the trooper lawfully stopped Turner because Turner’s driving on the
marked lane actually violated R.C. 4511.33(A)(1). In other words, the trooper lawfully
stopped Turner because he observed Turner breaking the law. The statute’s plain text,
and this Court’s precedent, support holding that touching a line—whether an outer fog
line, a center line separating opposing traffic, or a line separating multiple lanes of
same-direction traffic—violates the law against leaving the lane (except when allowed
2
for turning, safe lane changes, and so on). Ohio’s “Marked-Lane Statute,” as this brief
calls R.C. 4511.33(A)(1), requires that motorists drive, “as nearly as is practicable,
entirely within a single lane or line of traffic” and prohibits them from moving “from
such lane or line until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made
with safety.” Id. A marked line cannot be “within” two lanes simultaneously. It
follows that a marked line is between adjoining lanes, not part of either lane. And so a
vehicle operated on the marked line is not being operated “entirely within” a single
lane; the vehicle, in other words, is being operated in violation the Marked-Lane
Statute.
This Court has held that the Marked-Lane Statute’s meaning is informed by
“common sense” and safety concerns, and here, those further support finding a
violation. State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St. 3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539 ¶19. “Common sense
dictates that the statute is designed to keep travelers, both in vehicles and pedestrians,
safe.” Id. It follows that the line itself is not part of the lane. If it were, the statute
would compel the unsafe and illogical conclusion that two cars in parallel lanes, or
opposing lanes, have a simultaneous right to be on the line. Moreover, as the appeals
court noted in upholding the stop here, police officers typically look to a car’s tires to see
most easily when a line is touched. But when the tires are already on the line, parts of
the car off the ground, such as fenders or a side mirror, are already over the line. State v.
Turner, 2019-Ohio-3950 ¶20 n.3 (12th Dist.) (“App. Op.”).
3
Second, the stop was lawful even if the trooper misunderstood the Marked-Lane
Statute. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Section 14 of the
Ohio Bill of Rights, both prohibit “unreasonable searches and seizures.” When an officer
makes a search or seizure based on a reasonable mistake of law, the search or seizure
complies with this restriction. Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60–61 (2014); City of
Bowling Green v. Godwin, 110 Ohio St. 3d 58, 2006-Ohio-3563 ¶¶15–16. Here, a
reasonable officer in the trooper’s position could have interpreted the Marked-Lane
Statute in the manner the State suggests. Any seizure predicated on that interpretation,
therefore, was lawful.
STATEMENT OF AMICUS INTEREST
The Attorney General is Ohio’s chief law enforcement officer and “shall appear
for the state in the trial and argument of all civil and criminal causes in the supreme
court in which the state is directly or indirectly interested.” R.C. 109.02. The State is
directly interested here. Each year, over one thousand people die in traffic accidents in
Ohio, and over a hundred thousand are injured. See Traffic Crash Facts, Ohio
Department of Public Safety, at 2 (April 2018), https://bit.ly/35d3Uey. In addition to the
Attorney General’s interest in giving clear guidance to all police officers, local or State,
he has a special interest in advising the State Highway Patrol how and when to enforce
traffic laws such as the Marked-Lane Statute. Thus, the Attorney General has many
interests in ensuring that the State’s traffic laws are appropriately enforced.
4
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
1. At almost midnight on August 5, 2019, Trooper Jordan Haggerty, an on-duty
Ohio State Highway Patrol Officer, stopped at a red light in Clermont County. There,
he observed Appellant Ryan Turner’s vehicle almost turn into a curb and then
overcorrect back into its lane. Suppression Decision Transcript, Case No. 2018-TRC-
11581 (Nov. 13, 2018) (“Decision Tr.”) 2–3; Suppression Hearing Transcript (Oct. 31,
2018) (“Hearing Tr.”) 9. The officer found this turn “odd” because most people would
“just turn and go straight” instead of driving so close to the curb then quickly correcting
back into the lane. Hearing Tr. 9. Trooper Haggerty followed the suspicious car and
watched as the driver drifted to the right and allowed his right tires to touch, but not
cross, the white fog line on the edge of the roadway. Decision Tr. 3, Hearing Tr. 10.
The trooper believed that he had just witnessed a marked-lane violation under
R.C. 4511.33(A)(1), so he initiated a traffic stop for that infraction. Hearing Tr. 10, 19–20.
That stop led to the discovery that the driver, Ryan Turner, was drunk; a later breath-
alcohol test showed that his blood-alcohol content was 0.158. App. Op. ¶2. Turner was
charged with operating a vehicle while intoxicated and one marked-lane violation.
App. Op. ¶2.
2. Turner pleaded not guilty and moved to suppress the breath-alcohol test
results. App. Op. ¶3. He claimed that driving on the line does not violate the Marked-
Lane Statute, and that the trooper therefore had no authority to perform the stop that
5
resulted in Turner’s arrest. The Clermont County Municipal Court found that, as a
matter of law, a vehicle that touches, but does not cross, a marked-lane line does not
violate R.C. 4511.33(A)(1). Decision Tr. 5–7. Because the court found that no marked-
lane violation occurred, it held that Trooper Haggerty did not have probable cause to
stop Turner’s vehicle. Id. Accordingly, the court granted Turner’s motion to suppress.
Id.
3. The Twelfth District reversed, holding that a driver does violate the Marked-
Lane Statute by driving on a traffic line. App. Op. ¶19. The appeals court explained
that the statutory language required drivers to remain “entirely within” their lane, and
that driving on a lane-marking line is not fully inside a single lane of traffic. Id. The
court noted this Court’s reasoning in State v. Mays, which held the Marked-Lane Statute
prohibits a driver from crossing a lane-marking line. Id. The appeals court reasoned
that, because Mays required drivers to strictly observe lane lines, it also required drivers
to avoid driving on lane lines. Id. ¶¶19–20. Because Trooper Haggerty saw Turner
drive on the white fog line, the Twelfth District concluded, Haggerty had probable
cause to conduct a traffic stop. App. Op. ¶22.
On Turner’s motion, the Twelfth District certified a conflict to this Court.
Conflict Order (Nov. 22, 2019) 2. This Court determined that a conflict existed on the
question whether an officer has reasonable and articulable suspicion to conduct a traffic
stop of a motor vehicle for a marked-lane violation under R.C. 4511.33(A)(1) when the
6
officer observes the tires of a vehicle driving on, but not across, a marked line.
01/22/2020 Case Announcements, 2020-Ohio-94 (Jan. 22, 2020).
ARGUMENT
Amicus Curiae Ohio Attorney General’s Proposition of Law:
An officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop a motor vehicle for a marked-
lane violation under R.C. 4511.33(A)(1) when the officer observes the tires of the vehicle
driving on, but not across, a marked-lane line.
A. A driver who drives on a marked-lane line violates R.C. 4511.33(A)(1), so
an officer who observes that violation may lawfully conduct a traffic
stop.
When Turner drove on the fog line, did he violate the Marked-Lane Statute, R.C.
4511.33(A)(1), which requires drivers to stay “entirely within” their lanes (except when
passing or where it is impractical to do so)? The answer is “yes”; driving on the
marked-lane line violates the statute.
1. The statutory text and this Court’s precedents confirm that a
driver who drives on a marked line violates the Marked-Lane
Statute.
Text. The question whether the Marked-Lane Statute prohibits driving on a
marked line turns, first and foremost, on the statutory text. Pryor v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of
Job & Family Servs., 148 Ohio St. 3d 1, 2016-Ohio-2907 ¶14. The Marked-Lane Statute
provides that motorists shall drive “entirely within a single lane or line of traffic.” R.C.
4511.33(A)(1). A lane, in both legal and lay usage, is a strip of roadway for a single line
of cars. In other words, each lane is the territory of one stream of traffic, and that traffic
alone. Therefore, lanes must be physically and legally distinct from one another, and
7
every piece of the lane must belong to a single line of traffic. From this, it follows that
marked lines are not part of any “lane.” Marked-lane lines must serve as boundaries
between lanes, and cannot be part of an adjoining lane—otherwise, adjoining lanes would
share the common line between them. The line itself would be “within” two different
lanes at once. Therefore, a driver is not “entirely within” his lane when he drives on the
line between two lanes, or between the lane and the road shoulder.
It does not matter whether the line in question divides two lanes of traffic or
whether, as here, the line divides one lane from the shoulder. The statute refers simply
to “lanes”—it does not distinguish between types of lanes or types of marked lines. As
such, there is no basis for treating some lines differently from others, as recognized by
cases applying the statute to drivers who cross a marked line. See State v. Smith, 2017-
Ohio-5845 ¶5 (3d Dist.) (line separating road from parking lane); State v. Franklin, 2012-
Ohio-3089 ¶4 (5th Dist.) (double yellow center pavement lines); State v. Kneier, 2015-
Ohio-3419 ¶2 (11th Dist.) (white fog line); State v. Marcum, 2013-Ohio-2652 ¶4 (5th Dist.)
(applying R.C. 4511.33(A)(1) to a driver who drove both on the yellow center lines and
the white fog line).
For what it is worth, the Ohio Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices shares
this understanding of the statute’s meaning. It states that the purpose of marked-lane
lines is to “delineate … [t]he separation of traffic.” §3A.05.02. The lines are meant to
give drivers a clear boundary to follow: “a solid line discourages or prohibits crossing
8
(depending on the specific application).” §3A.06.01(B). Each of these statements
suggests an understanding of “lane” that includes no overlap.
This reading of “lane” and “line” is further confirmed by the Marked-Lane
Statute’s mandate that drivers stay “entirely within” a lane. The Court has applied this
particular term before. See State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St. 3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539. In Mays,
the driver argued that even driving across the white edge line did not violate the statute
because, he said, the statute does not require “absolute observance of the lane
markings.” Mays, 119 Ohio St. 3d 406 ¶15. This Court expressly rejected that
permissive reading of the statute, instead holding that the “entirely within a single
lane” language strictly prohibited a driver from leaving the lane even once. Id. ¶16.
Even if a marked lane could be considered space shared by two lanes, a driver who
passes onto it is not “entirely within” one marked lane—he would be mostly in one lane
and slightly in another. Indeed, when a car drives on the marked line, that tire and the
portion of the car above it are not “completely” in the “interior” or “inside” of the lane:
the mirror, the fender, and any other protrusions will be outside the principal lane.
App. Op. ¶20 n.3.
The fact that the statute allows drivers to cross marked lines when it is
“impracticable” to stay in the lane, R.C. 4511.33(A)(1), makes no difference. The
impracticability exception permits drivers to deliberately cross lines when there is no safe
way to avoid doing so—for example, when a dead deer or a John Deere is blocking part
9
of a lane. As this Court explained, “[t]he legislature did not intend for a motorist to be
punished when road debris or a parked vehicle makes it necessary to travel outside the
lane. Nor, we are quite certain, did the legislature intend this statute to punish
motorists for traveling outside their lane to avoid striking a child or animal.” Mays, 119
Ohio St. 3d 406 ¶19 (quoting State v. Hodge, 147 Ohio App. 3d 550, 2002-Ohio-3053 ¶43
(7th Dist.)). The Court reasoned that the mandate to stay in the lane whenever
“practicable” allowed drivers to exit the lane to avoid road hazards or hitting
something or someone. But it is not “impractical” to drive without drifting into another
lane under normal circumstances. And so the statute cannot be read to permit some
degree of line crossing because of “mere inattentiveness or carelessness.” Mays, 119
Ohio St. 3d 406 ¶19. “The phrase ‘as nearly as is practicable’,” said the Court, “does not
give a driver the option to remain within the lane markings.” Id. Only “special
circumstances” relieve a driver of the otherwise strict duty to stay within a lane.
Precedent. Mays based its interpretation of the Marked-Lane Statute in part on
considerations of common sense and safety. These considerations support the plain-
text interpretation advanced above.
“Common sense dictates that the statute is designed to keep travelers, both in
vehicles and pedestrians, safe.” Mays, 119 Ohio St. 3d 406 ¶19. That common-sense
concern demands a strict reading of the requirement to stay within the lane: “the
legislature intended only special circumstances to be valid reasons to leave a lane, not
10
mere inattentiveness or carelessness.” Id. While Mays applied common sense and
safety concerns to crossing the line, the same concerns apply to driving on the line. As
noted above, if the line itself is included as part of the adjoining lane or lanes, then two
cars would each have the right to that shared space. That, of course, is dangerous—
when two cars attempt to occupy the same space, it is a “crash.” It is true enough that
drivers will typically try not to collide. See Turner Br. 27. Still, “common sense”
dictates interpreting the statute so as to foreclose incompatible rights of way.
2. None of Turner’s contrary arguments have merit.
Turner raises several counterarguments, none of them persuasive.
First, Turner relies heavily upon the fact that every court of appeals other than
the Twelfth District has interpreted the Marked-Lane Statute to permit driving on a road
line. Turner Br. 6–16. The answer to this argument is simple: those decisions are
wrong for the reasons outlined above, and this Court is not bound by lower court
decisions.
Second, Turner mistakenly dismisses the point about two lanes sharing a line
simply by saying that no real safety concerns exist because drivers will not actually
drive into a space already occupied by another driver. Turner Br. 24–25. This argument
is irrelevant. Turner is surely right that most drivers try to avoid accidents. But the
question here is whether the ordinary meaning of “lane,” and “common sense,” see
11
Mays, 119 Ohio St. 3d 406 ¶19, allow interpreting Ohio law to make some portion of road
equally open to two drivers—including two drivers traveling in opposite directions.
Third, Turner also mistakenly asserts that the State’s view grants “complete
discretion” to an officer to decide when a violation exists. And worse yet, he says, an
officer could claim that the car touched the line “any time the motorist merely comes
close,” “[e]ven if the motorist did not touch the line.” Turner Br. 34. These concerns are
unfounded. The State’s rule creates a bright-line rule based on an actual bright line: the
driver violates the law if and only if he touches or crosses the marked line. No officer
who sees a driver coming close to the line without touching it would have any basis for
making a stop.
B. Even if driving on the line did not violate the Marked-Lane Statute, the
trooper’s belief that it did was a reasonable mistake of law, justifying
the stop.
Even if Turner were right about what the statute meant, he would be wrong that
Trooper Haggerty made an illegal stop. Both the constitutional text and settled
precedent establish that officers conduct a legal seizure when they make a stop
predicated on a reasonable misunderstanding of law. As shown above, the question
whether the Marked-Lane Statute prohibits driving on a marked line is at least fairly
debatable, which means Trooper Haggerty’s interpretation was (at worst) a reasonable
misunderstanding and the stop itself lawful.
12
1. To see why the federal and Ohio constitutions permit seizures predicated on
reasonable misunderstandings of law, start with the constitutional text. The Fourth
Amendment to the federal constitution, and Section 14 of Ohio’s Bill of Rights, both
prohibit “unreasonable searches and seizures.” This language makes no distinctions
between seizures predicated on factual errors and those predicated on legal errors—
either type of error may be “reasonable” or “unreasonable,” and so either type of error
may or may not make a stop illegal. It is no surprise, then, that “cases dating back two
centuries support treating legal and factual errors alike.” Heien v. North Carolina, 574
U.S. 54, 62 (2014). Chief Justice Marshall himself upheld the reasonableness (and thus
legality) of a search that rested on a reasonable mistake of law—a misinterpretation of a
statute under which “‘the construction of the law was liable to some question.” Id.
(citing United States v. Riddle, 5 Cranch 311, 313 (1809)). “‘A doubt as to the true
construction of the law is as reasonable a cause for seizure as a doubt respecting the
fact.’” Id. (quoting Riddle, 5 Cranch at 313) (emphasis omitted).
Binding precedent from this Court and the Supreme Court of the United States
confirms the legality of seizures predicated on reasonable misunderstandings of law.
The U.S. Supreme Court definitely established the legality of such stops in Heien. Id. at
60. And Heien further explained the wisdom behind this rule. Officers are human.
They do not have perfect knowledge, and they must often deal in probabilities rather
than hard certainties. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981). Between the
13
complexities of law and the multitude of factual situations that arise, the reality of
modern-day law enforcement is that officers in the field may “suddenly confront” a
situation where the application of a statute is unclear. Heien, 574 U.S. at 66. The Fourth
Amendment does not require officers in these difficult situations to accurately predict
the proper legal interpretation of a statute before they can act. Instead, the Fourth
Amendment requires officers to refrain from conducting unreasonable searches and
seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 381 (2014) (“The
ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness”). Therefore, officers
need only be reasonable, not perfect, in deciding whether a statute authorizes a search
or seizure. Heien, 574 U.S. at 60.
This Court can take great pride in having beat Heien to the punch. Years earlier,
this Court held that a traffic stop is justified when an officer has a reasonable, but
mistaken, belief that a legal violation has occurred. Godwin, 110 Ohio St. 3d 58, 2006-
Ohio-3563. In Godwin, a driver disregarded posted signs and turned where a sign said
not to. Id. ¶¶3–5. An officer witnessed the turn, pulled over the car, and discovered a
drunk driver. Id. ¶3. The problem that later arose was that the signs were not legally
authorized. Id. ¶6. The signs, as “traffic control devices,” complied with the statewide
manual. Id. But a local ordinance required the city council to approve all such signs,
and the council had not approved the sign the driver ignored. Because the signs were
not valid, disregarding the sign was no legal violation at all. The driver said that
14
undercut the basis for the stop. This Court disagreed, explaining that the officer’s
reasonable belief that a violation occurred was enough to justify a stop. “[T]he fact that
[the driver] could not be convicted of failure to obey a traffic-control device is not
determinative of whether the officer acted reasonably in stopping and citing him for
that offense,” explained the Court. Id. ¶15. An officer need not “correctly predict that a
conviction will result.” The Court quoted approvingly a federal court’s observation
that a “mistaken belief” about what “the law permitted” was allowed, as “the officer
‘was not taking the bar exam,’” but was trying to be reasonable in enforcing the law. Id.
(citing United States v. Wallace, 213 F.3d 1216, 1220 (9th Cir. 2000)). “[T]he issue is not
how well the officer understood the” law, but “whether an objectively reasonable police
officer would believe that [the driver’s] conduct . . . constituted a traffic violation, based
on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the stop.” Id. ¶16.
2. Against all this, the amicus brief from the Ohio Academy of Criminal Defense
Lawyers urges the Court to “reject the rule from Heien … under the Ohio Constitution.”
Academy Br. 15. The Academy cites cases in which the Court has noted that Ohio’s
search-and-seizure provision, Article I, Section 14, may provide greater protection than
the federal Fourth Amendment, and says the Court should adopt that approach as to
the reasonable-mistake rule. Academy Br. 4–15 (citing State v. Brown, 99 Ohio St. 3d 323,
2003-Ohio-3931 ¶21 (Brown I); State v. Brown, 143 Ohio St. 3d 444, 2015-Ohio-2438 ¶23
15
(Brown II)). And it urges the Court to expand Section 14 beyond the Fourth
Amendment here.
These cases are irrelevant. As an initial matter, this Court already adopted the
Heien view in Godwin—a case the Academy fails to cite. Moreover, while the Court may
interpret the provisions in Ohio’s constitution more broadly than analogous provisions
in the federal constitution, there is no good reason to do so here. The fact that
analogous federal and state constitutional provisions can mean different things does not
mean that they always do, or that state courts should invent distinctions that do not
exist. And, as discussed above, neither text, history, practicalities, nor precedent justify
interpreting a provision that bars “unreasonable” seizures to bar seizures based on
reasonable misinterpretations of law. Certainly, no party or amicus in this case has tried
to make the weighty showing needed to overrule a settled precedent. See Westfield Ins.
Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St. 3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849 ¶¶43–48.
3. Because Heien controls as to the Fourth Amendment and Godwin controls as to
Article I, Section 14, the main question here is whether the trooper had a reasonable
belief that Turner violated the law in driving on the line. The answer is yes. Even if
Trooper Haggerty were wrong about what the law meant, his interpretation was
reasonable for all the reasons explained above. Indeed, the fact that the Twelfth District
agreed with Trooper Haggerty’s interpretation all but establishes the reasonableness of
his mistake. See Heien, 574 U.S. at 69–70 (Kagan, J., concurring) (finding an officer’s
16
view reasonable as to complicated legal question “on which different judges hold
opposite opinions”) (internal citations omitted).
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court should answer the certified question “yes” and
affirm the Twelfth District.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVE YOST
Attorney General of Ohio
/s Benjamin M. Flowers
BENJAMIN M. FLOWERS * (0095284)
Solicitor General
*Counsel of Record
STEPHEN P. CARNEY (0063460)
Deputy Solicitor General
30 East Broad Street, 17th Floor
Columbus, Ohio 43215
(t) 614-466-8980
(f) 614-466-5087
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Merit Brief of Amicus Curiae Ohio
Attorney General Dave Yost in Support of Appellant State of Ohio was served this 19th
day of May by e-mail on the following:
D. Vincent Faris
Nick Horton
Clermont County Prosecutor’s Office
76 South Riverside Drive, 2nd Floor
Batavia, Ohio 45103
Zachary F. Faris
40 South 3rd Street
Batavia, Ohio 45103
/s Benjamin M. Flowers
Benjamin M. Flowers
Solicitor General