International Security and Peace

WWI

Prof. Jaechun Kim

WORLD WAR I Ask two critical questions!

What were the political objectives? What were the causes?

Why do we have to care about WWI?

The first global war: 65 million men mobilized, 11-12 million lost lives more than

21 million wounded; civilians suffered great casualties…

The whole society was mobilized… the civilian population worked as never be-

fore…

Repercussions in Int’l Relations: Beginning of drop Europe as center of power;

Emergence of US as a great power

End of Imperialism… and colonialism…

Revulsion followed enthusiasm after the war: optimism about the liberal capitalism… belief in progress and mankind… rise of com-munism and fascism…

Extraordinary scholarly attention with regard to cause of WWI “theory of inadvertent war”

War is not a deliberate choice of leaders War breaks out because of intl systemic pressure that cause war that no one re-

ally wants…

Backgrounds - Int’l Environment

Bismarck formed the Three Emperor’s League between G, Italy,

and Austria-Hungary Triple Alliance in 1882

B then signs secret treaties with Russians Reinsurance Treaties

Isolation of France

William II clashed with B in Prussian policy toward Rus-sia… B resigns in 1890

William II didn’t renew Reinsurance Treaty with Russians “Russo-Franco Alliance”

Dual Entente in 1895 between France and R France would support R if R was attacked by G R would support F if F was attacked by G If any member of the Triple Alliance mobilizes, both France and

Russians would mobilize…

Britain abandons policy of “splendid isolation.” Why?

Britain now begins to look for allies. Anglo-Japanese Al-liance(1902). Entente Cordiale (1904) with France. Then treaty with Russia

Triple Entente was formed against Triple Alliance

                                                                                                                   

The war to end all wars?

The first crisis between Germany and France (over Morocco in 1905)

Kaiser giving speech supporting the independence of Morocco

Second crisis: Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1908) Serbia backed by Russia vs. Austria backed by Ger-many

Russia was not ready for war…

Third Crisis (over Morocco again): Agadir Crisis (1911) Germans sending gunboats to Agadir…

Fourth Crisis: Two Balkan Wars, 1914 & 1913 Serbia emerging the most powerful on the Balkan… Great tension between Serbia and Austria…

The assassination on July 28ty 1914 was the event which sparked off a whole series of events and crises; these crises culminated in the outbreak of WWI…

Backgrounds-Social Structures and Moods

Oligarchic state structure and fears of upheaval But because of industrial revolution, the new middle class was growing… new proletariat

class… and they wanted reform

“Even if everything now goes smash, it will be all worth it!” War was a relief from internal tensions… (German minister for war)

Oligarchs were not interested in reforms… wanted wars abroad… War came as relief from internal tensions…

Systemic militarism Period of huge military build-up… Germany - universal conscription; large re-

serves; detailed war planning… armies and navies were expanding… Huge influence of military… civilians weren’t involved in military plans.. War is glorious and even fun!!

(Blind) Nationalism Particularly on Balkans… Panslavism and Pangermanism…

Social Darwinism Doctrine of racial superiority

Imperialism… Social Darwinism justified the imperialism…

Causes (Interpretations) of WWI

Inadvertent War Thesis – Fischer Thesis (Third Level) (First Level)

Inadvertent War Thesis claim that the third level fac-

tors such as the Cult of Offensive, Interlocking Mobi-

lization System (i.e., rigid war plans), and Alliance Sys-

tem under the multi-polar system that existed in Eu-

rope in the early 19th century led to WWI !!

Multi-polar system that existed in Europe led to WWI….

Tight alliance system, rigid war plans based on cult of offensive, and system of interlocking mobilization is to blame…

P Bracken, P Kennedy, S Van Evera, T Schelling, M Howard, R Ned Lebow

P Bracken: “The war systems of the day stimulated each other into a frenzy. Political leaders lost control of the tremendous momentum built up when their armies went on alert.”

Schelling: “a great starting of engines, a clutching and gear-ing and releasing of brakes and gathering momentum until the machines were on collision course.”

Howard: “armies were juggernauts which even their own generals could hardly control.”

How did the “system” dictate the logic?

(1) Rigid War Plans!

War plans were worked out in advance down to the last detail

Very rigid… Could not be adjusted to changing situations

War plans had a momentum of their own! Statesmen could not mod-

ify them…

In the war planning process itself, political considerations were

never really taken into account! The plans were elaborated on the

basis of military considerations… (at odds with Clausewitz…)

Ned Lebow: “The German Army’s almost total autonomy enabled it to plan for war in a political vacuum. When the July crisis came, G’s political leaders were confronted with a military plan that had been formulated solely with reference to narrow organizational criteria and requirements.”

Schilieffen Plan Alfred von Schiliefen In case of war, attack France first, then attack Rus-

sia… can’t fight both F and R at the same time… Decisive victory over France British neutrality…; It

was believed that Russians would take about 6 weeks to mobilize..

Conversation between German Ambassador in Britain and the Kaiser

Britain – Belgian security treaty…

The rigidity of Russian military plan

Russian plans called for immediate attack against both A-H and Germany

P Kennedy of History Dept at Yale: “The Russians possibly possessed the most inflexible plan of all, and their inability to mobilize separately against A-H proved to be one of the most fateful errors of the July crisis.”

Political leaders were ignorant of the military plans

Political leaders in Germany didn’t understand that if they attack

Belgium and France, they would invite Brits into the war. Russian

leaders didn’t know their war plan required mobilization against

both AH and G…

They didn’t understand the consequences of their order to mobi-

lize…

Schilieffen Plan

(2) Cult of Offensive (Stephen Van Evera) and theory of offense - defense balance…

Offense had the advantage over Defense

Van Evera: Germany’s expansionist policy was rooted in a (baseless) belief that the offense had the advantage.

Firepower enhancing technology – favors defense!

Clausewitz: Defense is always easier in land warfare because of the advan-tages of cover and the capability to choose and prepare terrain and fortify posi-tions

Van Evera: If the military realities had been understood, if the actual power of the defense had been understood, the whole system would have been much more stable.

Leaders didn’t understand the meaning of technological change… that introduced firepower enhancing technology…

War could and should be won by quick and decisive offense… Win-dows of opportunities are closing… because of the construction of Russian railroads..

S plan was a highly offensive-oriented war plan..

(3) Interlocking mobilization system

S plan – by mobilizing rapidly and then attacking in the west G would be able to defeat F before facing R…

The Germans could not allow a Russian general mobilization to run its course w/o ordering their own mobilization and in fact attacking France…

By mobilizing rapidly and then attacking in the west G would be able to defeat F before having to face Russians…

Russian Mobilization would lead to German mobilization, and under the German war plan mobilization meant war against France! Be-cause it mandated surprise attack of France… interlocked!!!

Lloyd George (Prime Minister of Britain): “The governments of Europe simply stumbled and staggered into war.”

(4) Tight alliance system under multipolar

international system… Chain-ganging…

Validity of Inadvertent War Theory

In order for the inadvertent war theory to hold

lack of understanding (on the part of the political lead-ers)

Russian leaders did not understand that their mobi-lization would lead to German mobilization…

German leaders did not understand the implica-tions of S plan…

   political leaders were not free “agents”

“Moltke had superseded the Chancellor in all but names.” “The military logic took over…”

Sazonov in Russia lost control over the situations No room for political leaders to maneuver…

Fischer Thesis (Fritz Fischer)

Minimalist Germany-blaming view : G might have risked a continental war, but G pre-

ferred the prewar status quo to a continental war. G knowingly risked a continental war.

Intermediate G-blaming view : G preferred a continental war to the prewar status

quo, but she preferred the prewar status quo to a great war. Fischer school moderates.

Maximalist G-blaming view : G preferred a great war (including GB) to the prewar

status quo; decision to fight against France and Russia was already made

Which is more convincing, Fischer thesis or sys-temic theory?

Clausewitz and WWI War plans (S plan of Germany and Russian war plan)

were based on military considerations w/o political considerations separation between military and polit-ical…

War plans did not adjust to changing situations…

War plans were not based on the fact that political considerations should precede military means…

What were the political aims that Germany was pursuing? Did means match to

pursue these goals?

Expansion of territories… annexation of Belgium and Eastern France (maybe

Poland and Lithuania, too…)

Germany: By the and of 1914 it was obvious that their previous war plans

would not work…

Peace could have been available earlier… The Allied terms were still not that

harsh

Withdrawal to her prewar frontiers in the west

The abandonment of Alsace-Lorraine

Indemnity for Belgium

Creation of independent Poland

German leadership was fighting for objectives that could be obtained only by total victory…

Erich von Ludendorff’s bent on total victory (or absolute war)…  

Absolute war involves total subordination of politics to war efforts.

Civil-Military Relations in Germany before and during the WWI

Gen. Erich von Ludendorff and his bent on absolute war

Classic example of militaristic society Military assuming large role in public life Military supported by powerful interest groups… Political leaders were onlookers.. Public had confidence in military leadership…

Ludendorff’s war aim included expansion of territo-ries – annexation of Belgium and Eastern France… basically unatainable… Ludendorff vs. Bethmann Firing of Foreign Minister…

Unrestricted submarine warfare (1918) Toward 1916 G could not attain a decisive vic-

tory as planned… But Ludendorff ordering indiscriminate subma-

rine warfare… Rejecting Woodrow Wilson’s peace terms… Dissolving Reichstag…

*Georges Clemenceau (French Prime Minister): “War is too serious a business to be left ex-clusively in the hands of generals.”   

Some of the Characteristics of Battlefields

 Influence of Clausewitz on battlefields “buffalo” tactics – violent frontal assaults

Deadlock of trench warfare War of Attrition

Blind emphasis on moral forces Élan in France (600,000 casualties during first six months of the war)

Skeptical of strategic maneuver;

Accumulation of maximum force at the decisive point in or-der to defeat the enemy main force in battle;

The conduct of operations so as to inflict the great-est possible number of losses on the enemy;

One more push or more will power would earn vic-tory;

Desperate attempts by soldiers field to redefine old concepts of courage and valor;

Dogged refusal to be put off by heavy casualties;

WORLD WAR II WWII in context

* About 60 million people were dead * Truly world wide war

National Policies and Ideas Germany

practiced creative history! V treaty were too harsh Lebensraum Rise of Hitler

Japan Militarism appears in Japan.. Dominate foreign poli-

cies and national ideas.. A sugar-coated self image

Italy

Britain and France• weakened by WWI

Russia• Bolshevik Revolution & Aftermath

How the Storm Gathered Non-aggression pact at Locarno in 1925 Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact in 1928 World-wide economic depression – 1929 Hitler comes into power in 1933

Hitler’s recoveries & conquests The Rhineland (industrial heartland of G) 1936 Austria 1938 – assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss Czech 1938-39 - demanded Sudentenland Munich conference *Emil Hacha.. Poland next – 1939 (Sept. 1)

Far East Japan invaded Taiwan (1895), Korea(1905), Manchuria, and China… The US wanted neutrality until late 1930s Pearl Harbor (Dec. 7th 1941)

Origins (Causes) of WWII

Hitler blaming view Cf. AJP Taylor, Origins of the Second World War

3rd level explanation to the outbreak of WWII K. Waltz and BOP theory

Problems in multi-polar system Chain-ganging Buck-passing

Why is bipolar system stable compared to multi-polar system? Neither chain ganging nor buck passing

Chain ganging and buck passing and advantage of offense and defense

Cult of defensive and WWII

Military-fueled cult of offensive vs. civilian-based cult of defensive – WWI spiral process in which alliance dynamics magnified the consequences of local disputes, turning them into global issues. WWII deterrence failure in which buck-passing diplomacy by the status quo powers encouraged expansionist powers to risk aggression!

German Strategy Strategy of Piecemeal Expansion

Strategy of limited liability and buck-passing Soviet Union : Stalin-Soviet Union would not pull others’ chestnuts out of the fire; Stlalin to Khruschev - Couldn’t they put up any resistance at all? France : pass the cost to Brits (buck-passing) Britain : strategy of limited liability

Churchill: “There was never a war in all history easier to prevent by timely action than the one which has just desolated such great areas of the globe.”

Why did the W Democracies adopted a strat-egy of appeasement?

2nd level explanation-Democratic Peace?