joint fires coordination - defense technical information … · umbrella under which joint fires...

■

70 JFQ / Spring 1999

By R O B E R T J. D’ A M I C O

The boundaries between close and deepbattlespace will vary among combatantcommands in typical theaters of opera-tions. The point at which deep and

close battlespace meet rates attention from plan-ners because it challenges joint force comman-ders (JFCs) who must conduct tactical and opera-tional fires and maneuvers as well as joint firesupport. One cause for this consideration is theumbrella under which joint fires are placed,

where cross-boundary coordination is critical forsynchronized actions that create economy offorce, unity of effort, and integrated joint opera-tions. Joint doctrine does not sufficiently addressintra-theater, cross-boundary joint fires coordina-tion. The answer lies in modifying doctrine. Thisproposal can be examined in joint publications,joint universal lessons learned (JULL) archives,combined forces command, and combatant com-mand boundary relationships and sources. Theproblem transcends service interests. More impor-tantly, lives depend on adequate joint fires coor-dination. A review of the differences betweenterms of art and service perspectives on battle-space reveals the implications of this issue forcommanders and suggests some solutions.

Lieutenant Colonel Robert J. D’Amico, USAF, is currently assigned to the Air Staff; he completed this article while attending the Naval War College.

Joint FiresCoordination:

Service Competenciesand Boundary Challenges

55th

Sig

nal C

ompa

ny (R

usse

ll J.

Goo

d)

1421 D'Amico Pages 8/26/99 8:02 AM Page 70

Report Documentation Page Form ApprovedOMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering andmaintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information,including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, ArlingtonVA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if itdoes not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE 1999 2. REPORT TYPE

3. DATES COVERED 00-00-1999 to 00-00-1999

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Joint Fires Coordination: Service Competencies and Boundary Challenges

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

5b. GRANT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5e. TASK NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) National Defense University,Institute for National Strategic Studies,260Fifth Avenue SW Bg 64 Fort Lesley J. McNair,Washington,DC,20319

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATIONREPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Same as

Report (SAR)

18. NUMBEROF PAGES

8

19a. NAME OFRESPONSIBLE PERSON

a. REPORT unclassified

b. ABSTRACT unclassified

c. THIS PAGE unclassified

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18

close air support

deep battlespace

close battlespace

strategic attack

joint force landcomponent commander’s

forward boundary

fire supportcoordination line

forward lineof troops

direct fire direct support

offensive counter airinterdiction

D’ A m i c o

Spring 1999 / JFQ 71

Toward a Common UnderstandingThe services use different terminology to dis-

cuss joint fires and close and deep battlespace. InJoint Pub 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, jointfires are “fires produced during the employmentof forces from two or more components in coor-dinated action toward a common objective.” TheArmy distinguishes between operational and tac-tical fires. In short, operational fires are lethal andnon-lethal weapon effects that influence enemyoperational forces, critical functions, and key fa-cilities to accomplish operational objectives insupport of either an operation or a campaign. Forinstance, advanced tactical missile system (ATACMS) fire against an enemy surface-to-sur-

face launcher can be oper-ational. On the otherhand, tactical fires arelethal or non-lethalweapon effects thatachieve tactical objectivesin direct support of a

major operation. ATACMS or multiple launchrocket systems, for example, when fired at anenemy heavy artillery position provide direct sup-port and realize tactical objectives.

Close and Deep Operations. The Air Force con-siders operational fires as deep operations, or oper-ational fires beyond the fire support coordinationline (FSCL) which include air interdiction, strate-gic attack, suppression of enemy air defenses, andoffensive counter-air missions. The goal of thesefires is to achieve a desired effect on a given targetset or system of targets. Tactical fires also includeclose air support for ground forces in the closebattlespace before FSCL.

Again joint fires can be operational or tacti-cal. The difference between them is their purpose:the former have operational objectives and thelatter have tactical objectives. They can also be at-tacks on close or deep targets with direct fire, di-rect support, or deep supporting fire. Unfortu-nately, there is no consensus on the purpose ofoperational and tactical fires. For example, somesources state that the key distinction betweenthem lies in the result, with operational fires hav-ing a decisive impact on the outcome of a majoroperation or campaign. As shown in figure 1,joint fires beyond FSCL occur in deep battlespaceand before it in close battlespace.

This notion of a generic joint operations area(JOA) vividly depicts boundaries and typical mis-sions. But what are deep and close operations?Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force doctrine doesnot directly consider them. Only the Army con-ceptualizes these operations. In Field Manual 100-5, Operations, close operations involve imme-diate contact and include corps/division currentbattles. The battlespace lies beyond the forwardline of troops. By contrast, deep operations maydefeat an enemy outright and include activitiesagainst opposing forces and functions beyondclose battle. Deep battlespace, moreover, is thearea beyond FSCL.

In sum the inconsistency in service descrip-tions of joint fires and battlespaces makes debateover joint fires coordination difficult. Cross-boundary actions involving operational fires indepth and tactical fires in the close fight are im-portant for planners. Joint fire support with syn-chronized actions can provide greater economyof force and unity of effort. Unfortunately, termi-nology is not the sole disparity. New weaponswhich can rapidly attack deep targets permeatethe battlefield. Moreover, methodologies for es-tablishing intra-theater boundaries are missingfrom joint doctrine.

Service SpecializationEvery service has weapon systems that tra-

verse intra-theater boundaries. They can attackclose and deep targets; thus command, control,and coordination become critical operational de-sign requirements. For example, the Army hasATACMS and Apache helicopters; the MarineCorps has F/A–18s, AV–8s, and LAMB aircraft;Special Operations Forces have direct action andspecial reconnaissance teams; and both the Navyand Air Force have strike aircraft, cruise missiles,and unmanned aerial vehicles. Service weaponsystems can conduct close air support, strategicattack, and interdiction missions as well as othersthat affect deep battlespace.

close operations involve immediate contact and includecorps/division current battles

Figure 1. Generic Joint Operations Area: Missions And Battlespaces

55t

Sig

nal C

ompa

ny (R

usse

ll J.

Goo

d)1421 D'Amico Pages 8/26/99 8:02 AM Page 71

■ J O I N T F I R E S


Because of increasing service capabilities toattack deep targets, there is a growing need forjoint fire support and greater coordination forjoint fires between close and deep battles. Oneperspective advocates that the joint force landcomponent commander (JFLCC) control all assetswhich influence the close battlespace, such asA–10s, and that the joint force air componentcommander (JFACC) control all assets which in-fluence the deep battlespace, such as ATACMS.Unfortunately, this approach to forming air andland commander boundaries may not solve theinevitable requirement for synchronized cross-boundary actions during wartime.

Boundaries that separate deep and close bat-tlespaces are nominally well established withintheaters of operations but are not clearly based onjoint doctrine. Joint fires crossing intra-theaterboundaries must be deconflicted to prevent fratri-cide and duplication while supporting opera-tional momentum, maintaining the initiative,and conducting maneuvers.

The method of segmenting JOA variesamong joint force commanders (JFCs). Variousjoint publications provide guidance. For example,Joint Pub 2, Intelligence Support to Joint Operations,discusses supported commander responsibilities

and Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations,discusses establishing supported and supportingrelationships between components. In a majortheater war (MTW) like Korea, the commander inchief of Combined Forces Command (CFC) setsboundaries, areas of operations (AOs), and com-mand relationships among subordinate comman-ders (see figure 2).

Close battlespace describes the area betweenthe forward line of troops (FLOT) and FSCL. Asshown in figure 1, joint fires in this area consistof close air support, counter air, direct supportmissions, and more. JFLCC is the supported com-mander whose forward boundary extends well be-yond FSCL. In Korea this is called the deep battlesynchronization line (DBSL). It is important sincethe airspace beyond it is controlled tightly by se-quencing and prioritizing air assets to conduct si-multaneous missions in the air component com-mander’s deep battlespace. But from an Armyperspective this boundary clashes with the inde-pendence of JFLCC and need to shape opera-tional depth. JFACC is the supported commanderfor deep operations beyond the land componentcommander’s forward boundary. In this AO, jointfires consist of air and surface interdiction mis-sions that affect operational maneuvers of JFLCC,as well as support for special operations, strategicattack, counter air, and direct support missions.

55th

Sig

nal

Com

pany

(A

lfred

o B

arra

za)

AH–64 helicopter,Joint Forge in Bosnia.

31st

Mar

ine

Exp

editi

onar

y U

nit (

Kris

ten

A. L

asic

a)

AV–8B providingclose-air support,Cobra Gold ’98.


supported commander

supported commander

rear area

deep battle synchronization line (boundary)

deep battle synchronization line (boundary)

fire support coordination line

forward line of troops

joint force aircomponent commander

joint force landcomponent commander

deep battle

close battle

D’ A m i c o


Supported CommandersThe cross-boundary joint fires coordination

problem is intense between FSCL and the landcomponent commander’s forward boundary be-cause both supported commanders in the closeand deep battles have time-sensitive missionsthere. Overlapping actions must be synchro-nized since they are interdependent, but jointdoctrine offers little guidance on how to achieveit. In addition, the situation is exacerbated inrapidly mobile battles when FSCL and the JFLCCforward boundary move quickly. As a battle be-comes more mobile, the distance between FLOTand FSCL grows, which increases the demandfor close air support (CAS) missions. Moreover,controlling CAS in a rapidly moving battle is dif-

ficult (figure 3).Furthermore, interdiction be-

yond FSCL but before the JFLCCforward boundary must be pre-planned to complement opera-tional maneuvers, disrupt themovement of troops and equip-

ment toward the close battle, and control the air-space. JFACC is normally the supported comman-der for interdiction; however, such missions arecritical just beyond FSCL where JFLCC is nor-mally the supported commander. This battlespace

area is not within the JFACC boundary.Unfortunately, joint doctrine offers littledirection on ensuring economy of forceand unity of effort in this criticalwarfighting zone.

Joint Pub 3-0 briefly discusses controland coordinating measures. It states thatFSCLs are permissive fire support coordi-nating measures established and adjustedby JFLCC. Additionally, Joint Pub 3-09 as-serts that commanders conducting jointfires beyond FSCL must inform all affectedcommanders to avoid fratricide. Doctrinespecifically addressing joint fire supportdeclares that coordinating is critical to“avoid conflicting or redundant attackoperations.”

Because an FSCL is a permissive firesupport coordinating measure, joint firesbeyond this point allow for rapid attacksof targets of opportunity which are withinthe air tasking order (ATO) planningcycle. Major operations and command re-lationships must be flexible enough tocapitalize on the growing capability ofsupported commanders to attack timesensitive targets beyond FSCL. Moreover,FSCL is not a boundary. The synchroniza-

tion of actions on both sides of it is normally theresponsibility of JFLCC out to the forward bound-ary. Furthermore, joint publications state that inexceptional situations commanders unable to co-ordinate activities may attack targets beyondFSCL. But failing to coordinate “may increase therisk of fratricide or waste limited resources.” Ifground forces can attack targets without coordi-nating with JFACC, then synchronizing actions,coordinating targeting, and achieving objectivesare jeopardized.

Joint doctrine offers little advice on thecross-boundary problem and in some cases af-fords special status to a service. For example, JointPub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), pro-tects a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF)from supported commanders who desire to use itsair assets. During an amphibious operation, theintegrated use of Marine air and ground forces ismandated because an amphibious objective area(AOA) is vulnerable. But once an operation iscomplete and AOA disestablished, synchronizedjoint fires in the deep battle become problematic.For instance, Joint Pub 0-2 indicates that excessMAGTF sorties go to JFC. However sorties forcounter-air, long-range interdiction, and recon-naissance do not qualify as excess since they fur-nish “a distinct contribution to the overall jointforce effort.”

fire support coordinationlines are established andadjusted by JFLCC

Figure 2. Boundaries and Areas of Operations: Combined Forces Command

31st

Mar

ine

Exp

editi

onar

y U

nit (

Kris

ten

A. L

asic

a)1421 D'Amico Pages 8/26/99 8:03 AM Page 73

Figure 3. Static and Mobile Battlefields



I II

static mobile


joint force land componentcommander’s forward boundary

joint force land componentcommander’s forward boundary

fire supportcoordination line

fire support coordination line


close air supportclose airsupport

SynchronizationWhen AOA is disestablished and MAGTF

uses organic air to shape its deep operational ma-neuvers, joint fires among the services becomenearly impossible to synchronize. Deconflictingoffensive counter-air, strategic attack, and inter-diction missions is a priority to prevent fratricide.The problem is that concerns for joint service de-confliction override those for synchronized ac-tions when there is clearly an opportunity forjoint fires coordination which provides greatereconomy of force and unity of effort. A simple so-lution to deconflict forces has been to provideMAGTF with its own boundary (AO), which pro-trudes well beyond FSCL and the JFLCC forward

boundary. This allows freedom of maneuver, butwith a loss of joint fires coordination and sup-port, economy of force, and unity of effort. Thisseparate organization fragments JFC commandand control because integrated MAGTF opera-tions, even as part of an MTW, are protected.

The complexity of this difficulty can be seenin the controversy associated with Joint Pub 3-09,which was in coordination between 1994 and1998. It was published last year, but the lengthycoordination is indicative of the joint fires contro-versy and illustrates the complexity of the problemof joint fires and the conflict among the services.

Another indicator of the importance of thisissue is revealed in the JULLs database. Cross-boundary joint fire was identified by U.S. Pacific,U.S. Central, and U.S. Atlantic Commands as wellas CFC in exercises and real operations. For exam-ple, a Marine unit in Unified Endeavor ’95 high-lighted the need to integrate joint fire support effi-ciently and effectively to support joint forces. Theboundary between a MAGTF air wing and JFACCassets in Cobra Gold ’94, and the unified use ofjoint service assets to reach JFC objectives, causedmajor problems for planners. Difficulty duringUlchi Focus Lens ’94 in coordinating joint fires be-yond FSCL resulted in ATO production problemsfor JFACC and an increased likelihood of fratri-cide. Finally, the 82d Airborne Division identifiedFSCL placement problems during Gallant Eagle

55th

Sig

nal C

ompa

ny (G

lenn

W. S

uggs

)

Self-propelled howitzersand ammunition carrier,Bosnia.


D’ A m i c o


’88. In short, maneuvering airspace for organicArmy aviation assets was too small to provide ade-quate close air support for ground units because ofthe confined space between FLOT and FSCL andbecause FSCL changes were not coordinated with

other component com-manders.

The Combined ForcesCommand solution . InKorea, CFC addressedthis problem by ap-pointing JFACC as the

“coordinating authority” for operational firesbetween FSCL and DBSL. Moreover, he said thatin combat JFLCC can still attack time-sensitivetargets between FSCL and the forward boundarywithout informing JFACC. However, “such at-tacks should be the exception rather than therule,” according to the Deep Operations Primer-Korea.

In the Korean theater CFC efforts to resolvethe problem have not been totally successful. Forexample, synchronization problems identifiedduring joint and combined command and con-trol exercises (Ulchi Focus) involved direct sup-port missions beyond FSCL. However, incorporat-ing direct fire beyond FSCL was relatively easy tocoordinate between supported commanders be-cause of short flight times of direct fire assets.

Desert Storm. Some critics may argue that ex-ercises and simulations are not suitable test casesto claim that a cross-boundary problem is signifi-cant—possibly arguing that exercises are not ro-bust enough or that operational leaders will re-solve this real war challenge. One need only look

at JULLs from Desert Storm to realize that this isuntrue. During that real-war operation, the Armyand Marine Corps applied different rules for cross-boundary fires. The former service thought that itcould provide both direct and indirect fires indeep battlespace while the latter treated FSCL asthe boundary. The Joint Staff recommendationwas to redefine the term. The new definitionfound in the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associ-ated Terms describes a boundary as a line delineat-ing areas to allow coordination and deconflictionbetween units, formations, or areas. Unfortunately,it does not solve the problem of joint fires coordi-nation across intra-theater boundaries.

Implications of the ChallengeThis topic is controversial because it tran-

scends the joint services and involves issues atthe core of service functional specialties. Withever-increasing weapon capabilities to simultane-ously and precisely attack targets throughoutclose and deep battlespaces, coupled with a trendtoward near-real time information, the cross-boundary problem is now acute. In the near fu-ture, it may become overwhelming for opera-tional commanders unless joint doctrine iscrafted to address it adequately. Additionally, theissue will affect many JFCs executing their warplans. However, the problem is beyond the sightof many commanders in less developed theaters.In small-scale contingencies, establishing appro-priate missions and tasks, tailoring forces, and or-ganizing command structures may be overridinggoals during planning phases. This operationalchallenge has immediate and future importanceto joint operations.

Despite a lack of attention in joint pubs, thearea between the JFLCC forward boundary andFSCL is critical when synchronizing actionsamong joint forces, achieving economy of force,and establishing an optimal time-space-force re-lationship. Synchronization of actions beyondFSCL is key for operational momentum and inte-grated operational maneuvers focused on JFC ob-jectives. Interdiction missions, for example,should aim at enemy forces that affect opera-tional maneuvers; those not closely connectedwith operational maneuvers are irrelevant toground commanders (and possibly have adverseeffects on offensive operations and operationalmomentum). When JFLCC must attack a highpriority target beyond FSCL with direct fire ordeep supporting fire, joint fire support can re-duce the vulnerability of some assets. JFACC canreprioritize or divert counter air or other deepbattle missions to provide joint fire support. In

with ever increasing weaponcapabilities, the cross-boundaryproblem is now acute

55th

Sig

nal C

ompa

ny (R

usse

ll J.

Goo

d)

High mobility artilleryrocket system.55

tS

igna

l Com

pany

(Gle

nn W

. Sug

gs)

1421 D'Amico Pages 8/26/99 8:04 AM 5



Korea, the synchronization of actions in the areabetween FSCL and the forward boundary is han-dled by two working groups, the JFLCC deep op-erations coordination cell and the JFACC syn-chronization cell. Both ensure operationalmaneuvers are complemented with deep battle-space missions.

In addition, synchronizing JFACC andMAGTF actions can enhance the economy offorce as interdiction, counter-air, and close airsupport missions among services become comple-mentary (rather than deconflicted) and supportJFC campaign objectives with a unified effort.The isolation of a MAGTF in its AO after disestab-lishing an AOA allows it unity of command andindependent operations; however, joint fire sup-port and coordination problems are intensifiedwhile unity of effort may be degraded.

Finally, the optimal relationship amongspace, time, and forces fits neatly with opera-tional designs that emphasize the synchroniza-tion of joint actions around FSCL. For example, asshown in figure 3, FSCL placement becomes far-ther removed from FLOT during rapidly movingbattles. This increased space requires more forces

for close air support in front of FSCL and interdic-tion beyond it. In sum, rapidly moving battles at-tempt to minimize time and capture objectivesquickly at the cost of requiring greater space andmore forces. The synchronization of joint fires iscritical for greater unity of effort, economy offorce, and achievement of objectives.

Joint fires coordination among supportedcommanders is a complex issue with significantimplications. Individual service specialties, in-cluding doctrine and weapon systems, as well asthe cross-boundary challenge to realize economyof force and unity of effort, must be addressedwhen campaigns are being planned. The solutionrests in the heart of operational synchronizationwhich, according to Joint Pub 3-0, is the essenceof campaign planning and execution. Problemsaffecting both supporting and supported com-manders exist. Currently the solution often lies inflexible and innovative operational leadership.But joint doctrine must be expanded to cope withthis challenge because senior leaders depend onthe Armed Forces to effectively provide the meansto achieve the desired political ends with thegreatest success at the least cost. Smaller budgetsand realigned roles and missions will make thecross-boundary problem more important to solve.

1stC

omba

t Cam

era

Squ

adro

n (J

im V

arhe

gyi)

Multiple launch rocketsystem, Korea.


D’ A m i c o


In this post-Cold War period, we need to continu-ously improve campaign planning and workthrough valid command and control issues.

Intra-theater, cross-boundary coordination iscritical for JFCs in achieving objectives with thegreatest unity of effort and economy of force.Synchronized joint fires in the deep battlespacecontribute to a soundly executed campaign plan.Thus joint doctrine should be modified to resolvethis challenge. Solutions range from organiza-tional structural changes to increased commandand control to include:

■ providing JFLCCs enough maneuvering area be-yond FSCL to independently shape the deep battle-space—allowing for unity of command and centralizedcontrol

■ synchronizing air interdiction missions withground operational maneuvers

■ creating liaison elements within both JFLCCand JFACC staffs to focus on close and deep battlespacemaneuvers; communication between supported com-manders is key

■ appointing JFACC as the coordination authorityfor operational fires beyond FSCL to ensure unity of ef-fort and avoid duplication and fratricide

■ minimizing uncoordinated cross-boundary jointfires and limiting them to time-sensitive and emergingcritical targets

■ valuing cost-effective joint fires; cross-boundaryjoint fires should not occur as a matter of convenience

■ keeping egos out of the solution—lives are atstake.

Most importantly, commanders, staffs, andcombatant units must focus on objectives and findthe best options to achieve them. Solutions basedon service biases or special agenda only complicatea joint force commander’s mission. JFQ

55th

Sig

nal C

ompa

ny (J

oel C

. Mille

r)

M–109 firing live roundduring Joint Guard.

1stC

omba

t Cam

era

Squ

adro

n (J

im V

areg

yi)


joint fires coordination - defense technical information … · umbrella under which joint fires...

Documents