land titles august 2

8/12/2019 Land Titles August 2

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vii. Issuance of Decree

1. When judgment becomes final

G.R. No. 77770. December 15, 1988.

ATTY. JOSE S. GOMEZ, DELFINA GOMEZ ESTRADA, ENRIQUITA GOMEZ OXCIANO,BENITA GOMEZ GARLITOS, REYNALDO GOMEZ ESPEJO, ARMANDO GOMEZ,ERLINDA GOMEZ GUICO, EUGENIA GOMEZ CALICDAN, AZUCENA GOMEZ

ORENCIA, TEODORO S. GOMEZ, JR., and ALEJO S. GOMEZ (now deceased)represented by his wife, LETICIA Y. GOMEZ, and children, namely, MARGIEGOMEZ GOB, JACINTO Y. GOMEZ, ALEJO Y. GOMEZ, JR., and MARY ANN Y.GOMEZ,petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. PEDRO G. ADUCAYEN,Judge Regional Trial Court, San Carlos City (Pangasinan) Branch LVI, HON.CHIEF, LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION, Quezon City, Metro Manila, andSILVERIO G. PEREZ, Chief, Division of Original Registration, Land RegistrationCommission, Quezon City Metro Manila

D E C I S I O N

PADILLA, J p:

The present case originated with the filing by petitioners on 30 August 1968 in the Court of First Instance(now Regional Trial Court) of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, of an application for registration of several lotssituated in Bayambang, Pangasinan. Cdpr

The lots applied for were Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,10, 11 and 12 of Plan Psu-54792 Amd.-2. Thelots were among those involved in the case of Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abran,1whereinthis Court declared Consolacion M. Gomez owner of certain lots in Sitio Poponto, Bayambang,Pangasinan. Petitioners are the heirs of Teodoro Y. Gomez (father of Consolacion) who, together withConsolacion's son, Luis Lopez, inherited from her parcels of l and when Consolacion Gomez died intestate.Petitioners alleged that after the death of Teodoro Y. Gomez, they became the absolute owners of thesubject lots by virtue of a Quitclaim executed in their favor by Luis Lopez. The lots (formerly portions ofLots 15, 16, 34 and 41 covered by Plan Ipd-92) were subdivided into twelve lotsLots Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4,5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12. The subdivision plan was duly approved by the Bureau of Lands on 30

November 1963. Petitioners agreed to allocate the lots among themselves.

After notice and publication, and there being no opposition to the application, the trial court issued anorder of general default. On 5 August 1981, the court rendered its decision adjudicating the subject lotsin petitioners' favor. 2

On 6 October 1981, the trial court issued an order 3expressly stating that the decision of 5 August 1981had become final and directed the Chief of the General Land Registration Office to issue thecorresponding decrees of registration over the lots adjudicated in the decision of 5 August 1981.

On 11 July 1984, respondent Silverio G. Perez, Chief of the Division of Original Registration, LandRegistration Commission (now known as the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration),submitted a report to the court a quostating that Lots 15, 16, 34 and 41 of Ipd-92 were already coveredby homestead patents issued in 1928 and 1929 and registered under the Land Registration Act. Herecommended that the decision of 5 August 1981, and the order of 6 October 1981 be set aside.Petitioners opposed the report, pointing out that no opposition was raised by the Bureau of Lands during

the registration proceedings and that the decision of 5 August 1981 should be implemented because it

had long become final and executory.

After hearing, the lower court rendered a second decision on 25 March 1985 setting aside the decisiondated 5 August 1981 and the order dated 6 October 1981 for the issuance of decrees. 4Petitionersmoved for reconsideration but the motion was denied by respondent judge on 6 August 1985 for lack ofmerit. 5

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with this Court which in turn referred the petitionto the Court of Appeals. 6

On 17 September 1986, the appellate court rendered judgment, 7dismissing the petition and stating,among others, thus

"In resum, prior to the issuance of the decree of registration, the 138respondent Judge has still the power and control over the decision herendered. The finality of an adjudication of land in a registration orcadastral case takes place only after the expiration of the one-year periodafter entry of the final decree of registration (Afalla vs. Rosauro, 60 Phil.622; Valmonte vs. Nable, 85 Phil. 256; Capio vs. Capio, 94 Phil. 113).When the respondent Judge amended his decision after the report of therespondent officials of the Land Registration office had shown thathomestead patents had already been issued on some of the lots,respondents cannot be faulted because land already granted byhomestead patent can no longer be the subject of another registration(Manalo vs. Lukban, et al., 48 Phil. 973).

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, We resolve to DISMISS thepetition for lack of merit.

"SO ORDERED."

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the appellate court in its Resolution dated 10 March1987. 8Hence, this recourse.

Several issues are raised by petitioners in this petition. The more important issues before the Court are:(a) whether or not respondent Judge had jurisdiction to issue the decision of 26 March 1985 which setaside the lower court's earlier decision of 5 August 1981 and the order of 6 October 1981; (b) whether ornot the respondents Acting Land Registration Commissioner and Engr. Silverio Perez, Chief, Division ofOriginal Registration, Land Registration Commission, have no alternative but to issue the decrees ofregistration pursuant to the decision of 5 August 1981 and the order for issuance of decrees, dated 6October 1981, their duty to do so being purely ministerial; (c) whether or not "the law of the case" is t hedecision in Government of the Philippine Islands v. Abran,supra, which held that the lands adjudicated to

Consolacion Gomez were not public lands, and therefore they could not have been acquired by holders ofhomestead titles as against petitioners herein.

It is not disputed that the decision dated 5 August 1981 had become final and executory. Petitionersvigorously maintain that said decision having become final, it may no longer be reopened, reviewed,much less set aside. They anchor this claim on section 30 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property RegistrationDecree) which provides that, after judgment has become final and executory, the court shall forthwithissue an order to the Commissioner of Land Registration for the issuance of the decree of registrationand certificate of title. Petitioners contend that section 30 should be read in relation to section 32 of P. D.1529 in that, once the judgment becomes final and executory under section 30, the decree of registrationmust issue as a matter of course. This being the law, petitioners assert, when respondent Judge set asidein his decision, dated 25 March 1985, the decision of 5 August 1981 and the order of 6 October 1981 heclearly acted without jurisdiction.

Petitioners' contention is not correct. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral


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or land registration proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after theexpiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final decree of registration. 9This Court, in severaldecisions, has held that as long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land RegistrationCommission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from date of entry of suchdecree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration proceeding continues to beunder the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it. 10

Petitioners contend that the report of respondent Silverio Perez should have been submitted to the courta quobefore its decision became final. But were we to sustain this argument, we would be pressuringrespondent land registration officials to submit a report or study even if haphazardly prepared just to

beat the reglementary deadline for the finality of the court decision. As said by this Court in De los Reyesvs. de Villa: 11

"Examining section 40, we find that the decrees of registration must bestated in convenient form for transcription upon the certificate of title andmust contain an accurate technical description of the land. This requirestechnical men. Moreover, it frequently occurs that only portions of a parcelof land included in an application are ordered registered and that the limitsof such portions can only be roughly indicated in the decision of the court.In such cases amendments of the plans and sometimes additional surveysbecome necessary before the final decree can be entered. That can hardlybe done by the court itself; the law very wisely charges the Chief Surveyorof the General Land Registration Office with such duties (AdministrativeCode, section 177)."

Thus, the duty of respondent land registration officials to render reports is not limited to the

period before the court's decision becomes final, but may extend even after its finality but notbeyond the lapse of one (1) year from the entry of the decree. LLpr

Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registration officials to issue the decree is purelyministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of the court and the decree mustbe in conformity with the decision of the court and with the data found in the record, and they have nodiscretion in the matter. However, if they are in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation andissuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in this respect, asofficials of the court and not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court. 12They arespecifically called upon to "extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registrationproceedings." 13

The foregoing observations resolve the first two (2) issues raised by petitioners.

Petitioners next contend that "the law of the case" is found in Government of the Philippine Islands vs.Abran, et al., supra,where it was decided by this Court that the lands of Consolacion M. Gomez, fromwhom petitioners derive their ownership over the lots in question, were not public lands. A reading of thepertinent and dispositive portions of the aforesaid decision will show, however, that the lots earliercovered by homestead patents were not included among the lands adjudicated to Consolacion M. Gomez.The decision states:

"With respect to the portions of land covered by homestead certificates oftitle, we are of opinion that such certificates are sufficient to prevent thetitle to such portion from going to appellants aforesaid, for they carry withthem preponderating evidence that the respective homesteaders heldadverse possession of such portions, dating back to 1919 or 1920,accordingly to the evidence, and the said appellants failed to object to thatpossession in time." (Emphasis supplied)

"Wherefore, modifying the judgment appealed from, it is hereby orderedthat the lots respectively claimed by Agustin V. Gomez, Consolacion M.Gomez, and Julian Macaraeg, be registered in their name, with theexclusion of the portions covered by the homestead certificates . . ."(Emphasis supplied.) 14

The report of respondent land registration officials states that the holders of the homesteadpatents registered the lots in question in the years 1928 and 1929. The decision in Government ofthe Philippine Islands vs. Abranwas promulgated on 31 December 1931. Hence, the subject lotsare specifically excluded from those adjudicated by the aforesaid decision to Consolacion M.Gomez. prLL

It is a settled rule that a homestead patent, once registered under the Land Registration Act, becomesindefeasible and incontrovertible as a Torrens title, and may no longer be the subject of an investigationfor determination or judgment in cadastral proceeding. 15

The aforecited case of Government vs. Abran, therefore, is not "the law of the case", for the lots in

question were not private lands of Consolacion M. Gomez when homestead patents were issued overthem in 1928-1929. There is sufficient proof to show that Lots 15, 16, 34 and 41 of Ipd-92 were alreadytitled lands way back in 1928 and 1929 as shown by Annexes "A, "B", "C" and "D" of respondents'Memorandum. 16

Lastly, petitioners claim that if the decision of 5 August 1981 of the lower court is sustained, thehomestead title holders may still vindicate their rights by filing a separate civil action for cancellation oftitles and for reconveyance in a court of ordinary civil jurisdiction. Conversely, the same recourse may beresorted to by petitioners. "(T)he true owner may bring an action to have the ownership or title to landjudicially settled, and if the allegations of the plaintiff that he is the true owner of the parcel of landgranted as free patent and described in the Torrens title and that the defendant and his predecessor-in-interest were never in possession of the parcel of land and knew that the plaintiff and his predecessor-in-interest have been in possession thereof be established, then the court in the exercise of its equityjurisdiction, without ordering the cancellation of the Torrens title issued upon the patent, may direct thedefendant, the registered owner, to reconvey the parcel of land to the plaintiff who has been found to bethe true owner thereof." 17

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costsagainst the petitioners-appellants.

SO ORDERED.


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G.R. No. 159595. January 23, 2007.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. LOURDES ABIERA NILLAS,respondent.

D E C I S I O N

TINGA,J p:

The central question raised in this Petition for Review is whether prescription or laches may bar a petitionto revive a judgment in a land registration case. It is a hardly novel issue, yet petitioner Republic of thePhilippines (Republic) pleads that the Court rule in a manner that would unsettle precedent. We denycertiorariand instead affirm the assailed rulings of the courts below.

The facts bear little elaboration. On 10 April 1997, respondent Lourdes Abiera Nillas (Nillas) filed aPetition for Revival of Judgment with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City. It was allegedtherein that on 17 July 1941, the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros Oriental rendered aDecision Adicionalin Expediente Cadastral No. 14, captioned as El Director De Terrenos contra EstebanAbingayan y Otros. 1 In the decision, the CFI, acting as a cadastral court, adjudicated several lots,together with the improvements thereon, in favor of named oppositors who had established their title totheir respective lots and their continuous possession thereof since time immemorial and ordered the Chiefof the General Land Registration Office, upon the finality of the decision, to issue the correspondingdecree of registration. 2 Among these lots was Lot No. 771 of the Sibulan Cadastre, which wasadjudicated to Eugenia Calingacion (married to Fausto Estoras) and Engracia Calingacion, both residentsof Sibulan, Negros Oriental. 3

Nillas further alleged that her parents, Serapion and Josefina A. Abierra, eventually acquired Lot No. 771in its entirety. By way of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 7 November 1977, Engracia Calingacion sold herundivided one-half (1/2) share over Lot No. 771 to the Spouses Abierra, the parents of Nillas. On theother hand, the one-half (1/2) share adjudicated to Eugenia Calingacion was also acquired by theSpouses Abierra through various purchases they effected from the heirs of Eugenia between the years1975 to 1982. These purchases were evidenced by three separate Deeds of Absolute Sale all in favor ofthe Spouses Abierra. 4

In turn, Nillas acquired Lot No. 771 from her parents through a Deed of Quitclaim dated 30 June 1994.Despite these multiple transfers, and the fact that the Abierra spouses have been in open and continuouspossession of the subject property since the 1977 sale, no decree of registration has ever been issuedover Lot No. 771 despite the rendition of the 1941 CFI Decision. Thus, Nillas sought the revival of the1941 Decision and the issuance of the corresponding decree of registration for Lot No. 771. The recordsdo not precisely reveal why the decree was not issued by the Director of Lands, though it does notescape attention that the 1941 Decision was rendered a few months before the commencement of the

Japanese invasion of the Philippines in December of 1941. ESCacI

No responsive pleading was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), although it entered itsappearance on 13 May 1997 and simultaneously deputized the City Prosecutor of Dumaguete City toappear whenever the case was set for hearing and in all subsequent proceedings. 5

Trial on the merits ensued. The RTC heard the testimony of Nillas and received her documentaryevidence. No evidence was apparently presented by the OSG. On 26 April 2000, the RTC rendered aDecision 6 finding merit in the petition for revival of judgment, and ordering the revival of the 1941Decision, as well as directing the Commissioner of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue thecorresponding decree of confirmation and registration based on the 1941 Decision.

The OSG appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals, arguing in main that the right of action torevive judgment had already prescribed. The OSG further argued that at the very least, Nillas shouldhave established that a request for issuance of a decree of registration before the Administrator of theLRA had been duly made. The appeal was denied by the appellate court in its Decision 7dated 24 July2003. In its Decision, the Court of Appeals reiterated that the provisions of Section 6, Rule 39 of theRules of Court, which impose a prescriptive period for enforcement of judgments by motion, refer toordinary civil actions and not to "special" proceedings such as land registration cases. The Court ofAppeals also noted that it would have been especially onerous to require Nillas to first request the LRA tocomply with the 1941 decision considering that it had been established that the original records in the1941 case had already been destroyed and could no longer be reconstructed.

In the present petition, the OSG strongly argues that contrary to the opinion of the Court of Appeals, theprinciples of prescription and laches do apply to land registration cases. The OSG notes that Article 1144of the Civil Code establishes that an action upon judgment must be brought within ten years from thetime the right of action accrues. 8 Further, Section 6 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedureestablishes that a final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years

from the date of its entry, after which time it may be enforced by action before it is barred by statute oflimitations. 9 It bears noting that the Republic does not challenge the authenticity of the 1941 Decision,or Nillas's acquisition of the rights of the original awardees. Neither does it seek to establish that theproperty is inalienable or otherwise still belonged to the State.

The OSG also extensively relies on two cases, Shipside Inc. v. Court of Appeals10and Heirs of Lopez v.De Castro. 11 Shipsidewas cited since in that case, the Court dismissed the action instituted by theGovernment seeking the revival of judgment that declared a title null and void because the judgmentsought to be revived had become final more than 25 years before the action for revival was filed. InShipside, the Court relied on Article 1144 of the Civil Code and Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules ofCivil Procedure in declaring that extinctive prescription did lie. On the other hand, Heirs of Lopezinvolvedthe double registration of the same parcel of land, and the subsequent action by one set of applicants forthe issuance of the decree of registration in their favor seven (7) years after the judgment had becomefinal. The Court dismissed the subsequent action, holding that laches had set in, it in view of thepetitioners' omission to assert a right for nearly seven (7) years. cEDIAa

Despite the invocation by the OSG of these two cases, there exists a more general but definitejurisprudential rule that favors Nillas and bolsters the rulings of the lower courts. The rule is that "neitherlaches nor the statute of limitations applies to a decision in a land registration case." 12

The most extensive explanation of this rule may be found in Sta. Ana v. Menla, 13 decided in 1961,wherein the Court refuted an argument that a decision rendered in a land registration case wherein thedecree of registration remained unissued after 26 years was already "final and enforceable." The Court,through Justice Labrador, explained:

We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of theassignment [of error], except insofar as it supports his theory that after adecision in a land registration case has become final, it may not beenforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except by anotherproceeding to enforce the judgment or decision. Authority for this theory isthe provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment may beenforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but within 10

years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39). This provision of the Rulesrefers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings,


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such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in acivil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is securedas against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce thesame within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makesthe decision unenforceable against the losing party. In specialproceedings[,] the purpose is to establish a status, condition orfact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a personof a parcel of land is sought to be established. After theownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration,no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary,except when the adverse or losing party had been in possessionof the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.

Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar toSec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action,except the proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of awrit of possession. The decision in a land registration case, unless theadverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final without any furtheraction, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal. . . .

. . . There is nothing in the law that limits the period within whichthe court may order or issue a decree. The reason is . . . that thejudgment is merely declaratory in character and does not need tobe asserted or enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore,the issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judgeand of the Land Registration Commission; failure of the court or

of the clerk to issue the decree for the reason that no motiontherefor has been filed can not prejudice the owner, or the personin whom the land is ordered to be registered. 14

The doctrine that neither prescription nor laches may render inefficacious a decision in a land registrationcase was reiterated five (5) years after Sta. Ana, in Heirs of Cristobal Marcos, etc., et al. v. De Banuvar,et al. 15 In that case, it was similarly argued that a prayer for the issuance of a decree of registrationfiled in 1962 pursuant to a 1938 decision was, among others, barred by prescription and laches. Inrejecting the argument, the Court was content in restating with approval the above-cited excerpts fromSta. Ana. A similar tack was again adopted by the Court some years later inRodil v. Benedicto. 16Thesecases further emphasized, citing Demoran v. Ibanez, etc., and Poras17andManlapas and Tolentino v.Llorente, 18 respectively, that the right of the applicant or a subsequent purchaser to ask for theissuance of a writ of possession of the land never prescribes. 19

Within the last 20 years, the Sta. Anadoctrine on the inapplicability of the rules on prescription andlaches to land registration cases has been repeatedly affirmed. Apart from the three (3) cases mentionedearlier, the Sta. Anadoctrine was reiterated in another three (3) more cases later, namely: Vda. deBarroga v. Albano, 20Cacho v. Court of Appeals, 21and Paderes v. Court of Appeals. 22The doctrineof stare decisis compels respect for settled jurisprudence, especially absent any compelling argument todo otherwise. Indeed, the apparent strategy employed by the Republic in its present petition is to feignthat the doctrine and the cases that spawned and educed it never existed at all. Instead, it is insistedthat the Rules of Court, which provides for the five (5)-year prescriptive period for execution ofjudgments, is applicable to land registration cases either by analogy or in a suppletory character andwhenever practicable and convenient. 23 The Republic further observes that Presidential Decree (PD)No. 1529 has no provision on execution of final judgments; hence, the provisions of Rule 39 of the 1997Rules of Civil Procedure should apply to land registration proceedings.

We affirm Sta. Ananot out of simple reflex, but because we recognize that the principle enunciatedtherein offers a convincing refutation of the current arguments of the Republic.

Rule 39, as invoked by the Republic, applies only to ordinary civil actions, not to other or extraordinaryproceedings not expressly governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure but by some other specific law or

legal modality such as land registration cases. Unlike in ordinary civil actions governed by the Rules ofCivil Procedure, the intent of land registration proceedings is to establish ownership by a person of aparcel of land, consistent with the purpose of such extraordinary proceedings to declare by judicial fiat astatus, condition or fact. Hence, upon the finality of a decision adjudicating such ownership, no furtherstep is required to effectuate the decision and a ministerial duty exists alike on the part of the landregistration court to order the issuance of, and the LRA to issue, the decree of registration.

The Republic observes that the Property Registration Decree (PD No. 1529) does not contain anyprovision on execution of final judgments; hence, the application of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of CivilProcedure in suppletory fashion. Quite the contrary, it is precisely because PD No. 1529 does notspecifically provide for execution of judgments in the sense ordinarily understood and applied in civilcases, the reason being there is no need for the prevailing party to apply for a writ of execution in orderto obtain the title, that Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is not applicable to land registrationcases in the first place. Section 39 of PD No. 1529 reads:

SEC. 39.Preparation of Decree and Certificate of Title. After thejudgment directing the registration of title to land has become final, thecourt shall, within fifteen days from entry of judgment, issue an orderdirecting the Commissioner to issue the corresponding decree ofregistration and certificate of title. The clerk of court shall send, withinfifteen days from entry of judgment, certified copies of the judgment andof the order of the court directing the Commissioner to issue thecorresponding decree of registration and certificate of title, and acertificate stating that the decision has not been amended, reconsidered,nor appealed, and has become final. Thereupon, the Commissioner shallcause to be prepared the decree of registration as well as the original and

duplicate of the corresponding original certificate of title. The originalcertificate of title shall be a true copy of the decree of registration. Thedecree of registration shall be signed by the Commissioner, entered andfiled in the Land Registration Commission. The original of the originalcertificate of title shall also be signed by the Commissioner and shall besent, together with the owner's duplicate certificate, to the Register ofDeeds of the city or province where the property is situated for entry in hisregistration book. EHTADa

The provision lays down the procedure that interposes between the rendition of the judgment and theissuance of the certificate of title. No obligation whatsoever is imposed by Section 39 on the prevailingapplicant or oppositor even as a precondition to the issuance of the title. The obligations provided in theSection are levied on the land court (that is to issue an order directing the Land RegistrationCommissioner to issue in turn the corresponding decree of registration), its clerk of court (that is totransmit copies of the judgment and the order to the Commissioner), and the Land RegistrationCommissioner (that is to cause the preparation of the decree of registration and the transmittal thereof to

the Register of Deeds). All these obligations are ministerial on the officers charged with theirperformance and thus generally beyond discretion of amendment or review.

The failure on the part of the administrative authorities to do their part in the issuance of the decree ofregistration cannot oust the prevailing party from ownership of the land. Neither the failure of suchapplicant to follow up with said authorities can. The ultimate goal of our land registration system isgeared towards the final and definitive determination of real property ownership in the country, and theimposition of an additional burden on the owner after the judgment in the land registration case hadattained finality would simply frustrate such goal.

Clearly, the peculiar procedureprovided in the Property Registration Law from the time decisions inland registration cases become final is complete in itself and does not need to be filled in. Fromanother perspective, the judgment does not have to be executed by motion or enforced by action withinthe purview of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Following these premises, it can even be posited that in theory, there would have been no need for

Nillas, or others under similar circumstances, to file a petition for revival of judgment, since revival ofjudgments is a procedure derived from civil procedure and proceeds from the assumption that the


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judgment is susceptible to prescription. The primary recourse need not be with the courts, but with theLRA, with whom the duty to issue the decree of registration remains. If it is sufficiently established beforethat body that there is an authentic standing judgment or order from a land registration court thatremains unimplemented, then there should be no impediment to the issuance of the decree ofregistration. However, the Court sees the practical value of necessitating judicial recourse if a significantnumber of years has passed since the promulgation of the land court's unimplemented decision or order,as in this case. Even though prescription should not be a cause to bar the issuance of the decree ofregistration, a judicial evaluation would allow for a thorough examination of the veracity of the judgmentor order sought to be effected, or a determination of causes other than prescription or laches that mightpreclude the issuance of the decree of registration. IcESaA

What about the two cases cited by the Republic, Shipsideand Heirs of Lopez? Even though the Courtapplied the doctrines of prescription and laches in those cases, it should be observed that neither casewas intended to overturn the Sta. Anadoctrine, nor did they make any express declaration to such effect.Moreover, both cases were governed by their unique set of facts, quite distinct from the general situationthat marked both Sta. Anaand the present case.

The judgment sought belatedly for enforcement in Shipsidedid not arise from an original action for landregistration, but from a successful motion by the Republic seeking the cancellation of title previouslyadjudicated to a private landowner. While one might argue that such motion still arose in a landregistration case, we note that the pronouncement therein that prescription barred the revival of theorder of cancellation was made in the course of dispensing with an argument which was ultimatelyperipheral to that case. Indeed, the portion of Shipsidedealing with the issue of prescription merelyrestated the provisions in the Civil Code and the Rules of Civil Procedure relating to prescription, followedby an observation that the judgment sought to be revived attained finality 25 years earlier. However, theSta. Anadoctrine was not addressed, and perhaps with good reason, as the significantly more extensive

rationale provided by the Court in barring the revival of judgment was the fact that the State no longerheld interest in the subject property, having divested the same to the Bases Conversion DevelopmentAuthority prior to the filing of the action for revival. Shipsideexpounds on this point, and not on theapplicability of the rules of prescription.

Notably, Shipsidehas attained some measure of prominence as precedent on still another point, relatingto its pronouncements relating to the proper execution of the certification of non-forum shopping by acorporation. In contrast, Shipside has not since been utilized by the Court to employ the rules onprescription and laches on final decisions in land registration cases. It is worth mentioning that sinceShipsidewas promulgated in 2001, the Court has not hesitated in reaffirming the rule in Sta. Ana asrecently as in the middle of 2005 in the Paderescase.

We now turn to Heirs of Lopez, wherein the controlling factual milieu proved even more unconventionalthan that in Shipside. The property involved therein was the subject of two separate applications forregistration, one filed by petitioners therein in 1959, the other by a different party in 1967. It was thelatter who was first able to obtain a decree of registration, this accomplished as early as 1968. 24On the

other hand, the petitioners were able to obtain a final judgment in their favor only in 1979, by which timethe property had already been registered in the name of the other claimant, thus obstructing theissuance of certificate of title to the petitioners. The issues of prescription and laches arose because thepetitioners filed their action to enforce the 1979 final judgment and the cancellation of the competing titleonly in 1987, two (2) years beyond the five (5)-year prescriptive period provided in the Rules of CivilProcedure. The Court did characterize the petitioners as guilty of laches for the delay in filing the actionfor the execution of the judgment in their favor, and thus denied the petition on that score. IHSTDE

Heirs of Lopeznoted the settled rule that "when two certificates of title are issued to different personscovering the same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail . . . ," and indeed even if thepetitioners therein were somehow able to obtain a certificate of title pursuant to the 1979 judgment intheir favor, such title could not have stood in the face of the earlier title. The Court then correlated thelaches of the petitioners with their pattern of behavior in failing to exercise due diligence to protect theirinterests over the property, marked by their inability to oppose the other application for registration or to

seek enforcement of their own judgment within the five (5)-year reglementary period.

Still, a close examination of Heirs of Lopezreveals an unusual dilemma that negates its application asprecedent to the case at bar, or to detract from Sta. Anaas a general rule for that matter. The executionof the judgment sought for belated enforcement in Heirs of Lopezwould have entailed the disturbance ofa different final judgment which had already been executed and which was shielded by the legalprotection afforded by a Torrens title. In light of those circumstances, there could not have been a"ministerial duty" on the part of the registration authorities to effectuate the judgment in favor of thepetitioners in Heirs of Lopez. Neither could it be said that their right of ownership as confirmed by thejudgment in their favor was indubitable, considering the earlier decree of registration over the sameproperty accorded to a different party. The Sta. Anadoctrine rests upon the general presumption that thefinal judgment, with which the corresponding decree of registration is homologous by legal design, hasnot been disturbed by another ruling by a co-extensive or superior court. That presumption obtains inthis case as well. Unless that presumption is overcome, there is no impediment to the continuedapplication of Sta. Anaas precedent. 25

We are not inclined to make any pronouncements on the doctrinal viability of Shipsideor Heirs of Lopezconcerning the applicability of the rules of prescription or laches in land registration cases. Suffice it tosay, those cases do not operate to detract from the continued good standing of Sta. Anaas a generalprecedent that neither prescription nor laches bars the enforcement of a final judgment in a landregistration case, especially when the said judgment has not been reversed or modified, whetherdeliberately or inadvertently, by another final court ruling. This qualifier stands not so much as a newly-carved exception to the general rule as it does as an exercise in stating the obvious.

Finally, the Republic faults the Court of Appeals for pronouncing that the 1941 Decision constituted resjudicatathat barred subsequent attacks to the adjudicates' title over the subject property. The Republicsubmits that said decision would operate as res judicataonly after the decree of registration was issued,which did not happen in this case. We doubt that a final decision's status as res judicatais the impelling

ground for its very own execution; and indeed res judicatais more often invoked as a defense or as afactor in relation to a different case altogether. Still, this faulty terminology aside, the Republic'sarguments on this point do not dissuade from our central holding that the 1941 Decision is stillsusceptible to effectuation by the standard decree of registration notwithstanding the delay incurred byNillas or her predecessors-in-interest in seeking its effectuation and the reasons for such delay, followingthe prostracted failure of the then Land Registration Commissioner to issue the decree of registration. Inthis case, all that Nillas needed to prove was that she had duly acquired the rights of the originaladjudicatesher predecessors-in-interest-in order to entitle her to the decree of registration albeit stillin the names of the original prevailing parties who are her predecessors-in interest. Both the trial courtand the Court of Appeals were satisfied that such fact was proven, and the Republic does not offer anycompelling argument to dispute such proof. cCESaH

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.


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4. Writ of Possession and Writ of Demolition

G.R. No. L-25660. February 23, 1990.LEOPOLDO VENCILAO, MAURO RENOBLAS, TELESFORO BALONDIA, FELIX ABANDULA,FAUSTO GABAISEN, ISIDORO ELIVERA, RAYMUNDO BONGATO, MARTIN ROLLON,EUSTAQUIO MEDANA, DOROTEO ELIVERA, FRANCISCO PAGAURA, MACARIO GEPALAGO,GREGORIO ITAOC, ALEJANDRO RENOBLAS, SIMEON BARBARONA, GREGORIO RENOBLAS,FRANCISCO ASOY, TEOFILA GUJELING, FABIAN VILLAME, VICENTE OMUSORA, PEDROBALORIA, GREGORIO ITAOC, TERESITA ITAOC, FAUSTINO ITAOC, FORTUNATO ITAOC,FLORENTINA GEMENTIZA, RESTITUTA OMUSORA, ZOILA OMUSORA, FELISA OMUSORA,ROBERTO HAGANAS, FELISA HAGANAS, FERMIN HAGANAS, VICTORIANO HAGANAS,JULIA SEVILLA, ROMAN MATELA, MARCELA MATELA, DELFIN MATELA, PELAGIO MATELA,ROBERTA MATELA, PROCOPIO CABANAS and SERAFINA CABANAS,plaintiff-appellants, vs.TEODORO VANO, JOSE REYES, ROSARIO REYES, SALUD OGILVE BELTRAN, AMALIA R.OGILVE, FLORA VDA. DE COROMINAS, JESUSA REYES, LOURDES COROMINAS MUNOZ,JUAN COROMINAS, LOURDES C. SAMSON CEBALLOS, SOLEDAD C. SAMSON RAMA,DOLORES V. GARCES FALCON, JAIME GARCES, JOAQUIN REYES, and PEDRO RE. R.

LUSPO, defendants-appellees.

G.R. No. L-32065. February 23, 1990.

LEOPOLDO VENCILAO, SOFRONIO ROLLON, AURELIO ELIVERA, FRANCISCO PAGAORA,MARTIN ROLLON, GRACIANO MAHINAY, GERARDO ELIVERA, GREGORIO ITAOC, ISIDROELIVERA, DEMOCRITO ELIVERA, FAUSTO GABAISIN, ALBINO RENOBLAS, EUSTAQUIOMENDANIA, SIMEON BARBARONA, TELESFORO BALONDA, FELIX ABANDOLA, SATURNINAGEPILAGO, TEOFILA GOHILING, TOMAS REAMBONANSA, MARCOS HAGANAS, PASTORASNA and MAURO RENOBLAS,petitioners,vs. HONORABLE PAULINO S. MARQUEZ, Judge,Court of First Instance of Bohol, Branch 1, and MARIANO OGILVE, et. al.,respondents.

G.R. No. L-33677. February 23, 1990.

LEOPOLDO VENCILAO, SOFRONIO ROLLON, AURELIO ELIVERA, FRANCISCO PAGAORA,MARTIN ROLLON, GRACIANO MAHINAY, GERARDO ELIVERA, GREGORIO ITAOC, ISIDROELIVERA, DEMOCRITO ELIVERA, FAUSTO GABAISIN, ALBINO RENOBLAS, EUSTAQUIOMENDANIA, SIMEON BARBARONA, TELESFORO BALONDA, FELIX ABANDOLA, SATURNINAGEPILAGO, TEOFILA GOHILING, TOMAS REAMBONANSA, MARCOS HAGANAS, PASTORASNA and MAURO RENOBLAS,petitioners,vs. HONORABLE PAULINO S. MARQUEZ, Judge,Court of First Instance of Bohol, Branch 1, The Provincial Sheriff, Province of Bohol, andMARIANO OGILVE, et. al., respondents.

D E C I S I O N

MEDIALDEA, J p:

On February 7, 1974, We resolved to allow the consolidation of these three cases, considering that theyinvolve the same parties and parcels of land: (1) G.R. No. L-25660this is an appeal from the order ofthe Court of First Instance of Bohol (now Regional Trial Court) 1dated May 12, 1964 dismissing thecases of some of the plaintiffs-appellants and its order dated August 25, 1965 denying the motion forreconsideration and the motion to declare the defendants-appellees in default; (2) G.R. No. L32065 this is a petition for certiorari of the order of the Court of First Instance of Bohol 2dated May 14, 1970directing the execution of its prior order dated May 6, 1969 finding petitioners guilty of contempt; (3)G.R. No. L-33677 this is a petition for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition of the order of the

Court of First Instance of Bohol dated June 2, 1971 directing the demolition of the houses of thepetitioners.

On February 15, 1988, We resolved to require the parties to manifest whether or not they are stillinterested in prosecuting these cases, or supervening events have transpired which render these casesmoot and academic or otherwise substantially affect the same. On March 25, 1988, the petitioners filedan ex partemanifestation that they are still very much interested in the just prosecution of these cases.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

G.R. No. 25660

On April 1, 1950, the heirs of the late Juan Reyes filed an application for registration of the parcels ofland allegedly inherited by them from Juan Reyes, in Land Registration Case No. 76, L.R.C. Record No. N-4251. On July 26, 1951, administratrix Bernardina Vda. de Luspo filed an amended application forregistration. After hearing, the land was registered under Original Certificate of Title No. 400 (pp. 84-85,

Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo).

On October 9, 1962, a complaint for reconveyance of real properties with damages and preliminaryinjunction, Civil Case No. 1533, (pp. 2-19, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo) was filed by plaintiffs-appellantsbefore the Court of First Instance of Bohol. It was alleged that they are the lawful owners of theirrespective parcels of land including the improvements thereon either by purchase or inheritance and havebeen in possession publicly, continuously, peacefully and adversely under the concept of owners for morethan thirty (30) years tacked with the possession of their predecessors-in-interest. However, thoseparcels of land were included in the parcels of land applied for registration by the heirs of Juan Reyes,either by mistake or fraud and with the intention of depriving them of their rights of ownership andpossession without their knowledge, not until the last part of 1960 when the defendants-appellees,through their agents, attempted to enter those parcels of land claiming that they now belong to the heirsof Juan Reyes. To the complaint, the defendants-appellees moved to dismiss on two grounds (pp. 19-22,Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo), namely: (1) for lack of cause of action and (2) the cause of action is

barred by prior judgment. LibLex

On July 20, 1963, the court a quoissued an order denying defendants-appellees' motion to dismiss (pp.29-30, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo). However, acting on the motion to set aside such order (pp. 31-32,Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo), on May 12, 1964, the same court issued another order reversing itselfpartially (p. 56, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo), the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, the cases herein of the plaintiffs Alejandro Renoblas, FaustoCabaisan, Fabian Villame, Gregorio Ita-oc, Faustino Ita-oc, Fortunato Ita-oc, Roberto Haganas, Felisa Haganas, Fermin Haganas, VictorianoHaganas, Julia Sevilla, Ramon Matela, Roberto Matela, Procopio Cabaasand Vicente Amosora are hereby dismissed on the ground of res adjudicatawith these plaintiffs paying proportionately eighteenth-forty one (18/41) ofthe costs, but the petition to dismiss the case of the rest of the plaintiffs ishereby denied.

"SO ORDERED."


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On May 28, 1964, the plaintiffs-appellants whose cases were dismissed filed a motion for reconsideration(pp. 57-58, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo). On July 24, 1964, the plaintiffs-appellants whose cases werenot dismissed filed a motion to declare the defendants-appellees in default for failure to file their answerwith the time prescribed by law (pp. 68-75, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo). On the other hand,defendants-appellees filed their opposition to the motion for reconsideration praying that the complaintas regards the rest of the plaintiffs-appellants be likewise dismissed (pp. 75-80, Record on Appeal; p. 7Rollo).

On August 25, 1965, the court a quo issued an order in connection therewith (pp. 82-98, Record onAppeal; p. 7, Rollo) denying all motions.

The case is now before Us with the following as assignments of errors (p. 3, Brief for the Plaintiffs-Appellants; p. 9, Rollo), to wit:

"I

"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASES OF THEPLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS WHOSE NAMES ARE ALREADY MENTIONEDABOVE ON THE ALLEGED GROUND THAT THEIR CASES ARE BARRED BY APRIOR JUDGMENT OF RES ADJUDICATA.

"II

"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION OF THEPLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS WHOSE CASES ARE NOT DISMISSED TODECLARE THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES IN DEFAULT FOR HAVINGFAILED TO FILE THEIR ANSWER WITHIN THE TIME PRESCRIBED BY

LAW."

On August 12, 1966, a resolution was issued by this Court dismissing the appeal as regards the secondissue because the order appealed from was merely interlocutory, hence, not appealable (pp. 35-38,Rollo).

On August 17, 1988, petitioners Alex Abandula, Mauro Renoblas, Simeon Barbarona, Fabian Villame,Macario Gepalago, Eustaquio Medana, Julia Sevilla, Gregorio Itaoc, Francisco Asoy and Martin Rollon f ileda motion to withdraw their appeal on the ground that they are now the absolute owners and possessorsof their respective parcels of land subject of Civil Case No. 1533.

The appeal is not impressed with merit.

The plaintiffs-appellants claim that no evidence was presented by the defendants-appellees that they(plaintiffs-appellants) were notified of the date of the trial on the merits of the application for registrationnor were they given copies of the decision of the trial court. Likewise, they contend that res judicatais

not applicable in an action for reconveyance. cdrep

The allegations that no evidence was presented by the defendants-appellees that plaintiffs-appellantswere notified of the date of the trial on the merits of the application for registration nor were they givencopies of the decision of the trial court are new issues. It is a well-settled rule that, except questions onjurisdiction, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the court below and itis within the issues made by the parties in their pleadings (Cordero vs. Cabral, G.R. No. 36789, July 25,1983, 123 SCRA 532). The other contention that res judicata is not applicable in an action forreconveyance is not plausible. The principle of res judicataapplies to all cases and proceedings, includingland registration and cadastral proceedings (Republic vs. Estenzo, G.R. No. L-35376, September 11,1980, 99 SCRA 65; Paz vs. Inandan, 75 Phil. 608; Penaloza vs. Tuazon, 22 Phil. 303).

It is a settled rule that a final judgment or order on the merits, rendered by a court having jurisdiction ofthe subject matter and of the parties, is conclusive in a subsequent case between the same parties andtheir successors in interest litigating upon the same thing and issue, regardless of how erroneous it maybe. In order, therefore, that there may be res judicata,the following requisites must be present: (a) The

former judgment must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the

subject matter and of the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be,between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of cause of action(San Diego vs. Cardona, 70 Phil. 281; Ramos vs. Pablo, G.R. No. 53692, Nov. 26, 1986, 146 SCRA 24).

The underlying philosophy of the doctrine of res judicatais that parties should not be permitted to litigatethe same issue more than once and when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by acourt of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the partiesand those in privity with them in law or estate ( Sy Kao vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 61752, Sept. 28,1984, 132 SCRA 302). The doctrine of res judicata is an old axiom of law, dictated by wisdom andsanctified by age, and is founded on the broad principle that it is to the interest of the public that thereshould be an end to litigation by the same parties and their privies over a subject once fully and fairlyadjudicated. Interest republicae ut sit finis litium(Carandang vs. Venturanza, G.R. No. L-41940, Nov. 21,1984, 133 SCRA 344). To ignore the principle of res judicatawould be to open the door to endlesslitigations by continuous determination of issues without end (Catholic Vicar Apostolic of the MountainProvince vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 80294-95, Sept. 21, 1988, 165 SCRA 515).

Thus, when a person is a party to a registration proceeding or when notified he does not want toparticipate and only after the property has been adjudicated to another and the corresponding title hasbeen issued files an action for reconveyance, to give due course to the action is to nullify registrationproceedings and defeat the purpose of the law.

In dismissing the cases of some of the petitioners, the court a quometiculously discussed the presenceof all the elements of res judicata(pp. 36-38; pp. 42-54, Record on Appeal; p. 7; Rollo):

"There is no question that in that Registration Proceedings, LRC RecordNo. N-4251, Land Registration Case No. N-76, the Court of First Instance

of the province of Bohol had jurisdiction of the subject matter, that saidcourt had rendered a judgment on the merit that was terminated in theCourt of Appeals since December, 1958, and that decision is now final witha decree of registration over the parcels of land described in theapplication issued to the applicants.

"The subject matter (the parcels of land) now claimed by the plaintiffs inthis case at bar are the same, or at least part of the parcels alreadyadjudicated registration in that registration case to the persons, some ofthem are made defendants in this case before us. The cause of actionbetween the two cases are the same, ownership of these parcels of land,though the forms of action are different, one is an ordinary LandRegistration and the other is reconveyance.

'It is settled that notwithstanding thedifference in the form of two actions, the doctrine of

res adjudicata will apply where it appears that theparties in effect were litigating for the same thing. Aparty can not, by varying the form of action, escapethe effects of res adjudicata (Aguirre vs. Atienza, L-10665, Aug. 30, 1958; Geronimo vs. Nava., No. L-12111, Jan. 31, 1959; Labarro vs. Labateria, et al., 28O.G. 4479).

'Well settled is the rule that a party cannot by varying the form of action, or adopting adifferent method of presenting his case, escape theoperation of the principle that one and the samecause of action shall not be twice litigated betweenthe same parties or their privies.' (Francisco vs. Blas,et al., No. L-5078; Cayco, et al., vs. Cruz, et al., No.L-12663, Aug. 21, 1959).

'Accordingly, a final judgment in an


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ordinary civil action, determining the ownership ofcertain lands is res adjudicata in a registrationproceeding where the parties and property are thesame as in the former case (Paz vs. Inandan, 75 Phil.608; Pealoza vs. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303).'

"xxx xxx xxx

"But are there identities of parties in this case before us and the former

registration proceedings? Identity of parties means that the parties in thesecond case must be the same parties in the first case, or at least, must besuccessors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of theformer action or proceeding, or when the parties in the subsequent caseare heirs (Chua Tan vs. Del Rosario, 57 Phil. 411; Martinez vs. Franco, 51Phil. 487; Romero vs. Franco, 54 Phil. 744; Valdez, et al. vs. Penida, No. L-3467, July 30, 1951).

"xxx xxx xxx

"Returning our attention to the case at bar, andwith in mind the principles of res adjudicata above-quoted, wenoticed that many of the plaintiffs were not oppositors in theformer registration case, but many are children of the formeroppositors. In such a case we have to determine the case ofevery plaintiff, if the former decision in the land registration

case is conclusive and binding upon him."xxx xxx xxx

"The defendants had proven that the adjoining owners and claimants ofthe parcels of land object of registration proceeding had been notifiedwhen the land was surveyed. These persons notified according to thesurveyor's certificate, Exhibit "B" were as follows: Cipriano Samoya, FaustoBaguisin, Silveria Pahado, Enojario Laroda, Alejandro Renoblas, Heirs ofGregorio Lofraco, Julian Villame, Pedro Itaoc, Adriano Toloy, BartolomeOmosura, Marcelina Asilon, Gregorio Baguinang, et al., Nicolas Omosura,Simon Lagrimas, et al., Martin Quinalayo, Gorgonio Baquinang, DemetrioAsolan, Catalino Orellena, Heirs of Catalina Palves, Manuel Mondano, AngelMondano, Victoriano Balolo, Eugenio del Rosario, Verinici Bayson, FelominoRuiz, Apolonio Horbeda, and Mun. of Calape.

"The following persons were notified by the Chief of the Land RegistrationOffice of the initial hearing (Exhibit "J") of the registration proceedingsenjoining them to appear on June 16, 1952, at 8:30 a.m., before the Courtof First Instance of Bohol to show cause why the prayer of said applicationshould not be granted: the Solicitor General, the Director of Lands, theDirector of Public Works and the Director of Forestry, Manila; the ProvincialGovernor, the Provincial Fiscal and the District Engineer, Tagbilaran, Bohol;the Municipal Mayor, Gorgonio Baguinang, Demetrio Azocan, CatalinoOrellena, Manuel Mondano, Angel Mondano, Victoriano Bolalo, Eugenio delRosario, Verinici Bayson, Filomeno Ruiz, Apolonio Horboda, the Heirs ofGregorio Lofranco, Julian Villame, Pedro Itaoc, Adriano Toloy, BartolomeOmosora, Marcelina Asilom, Gregorio Baguinang, Nicolas Omosora, SimonLagrimas and Martin Quinalayo, Calape, Bohol; the heirs of CatalinoPolvos, Fausto Baguisin, Cipriano Samoya, Silveria Pohado, EnojarioLaroda, Alejandro Renoblas and Leoncio Barbarona, Antequera, Bohol.

"And after the application had been filed and published in accordance withlaw the following persons represented by Atty. Conrado D. Marapao filed

opposition to that registration proceeding: Felipe Cubillo, Simon Lagrimas,Simeon Villame, Felix Lacorte, Victor Omosura, Germana Gahil, AnastacioOrillosa, Enerio Omosura, Valeriano Tuloy, Cipriano Sanoya, PabloDumagdag, Andres Reimbuncia, Roman Reimbuncia, Cledonio Cabanas,Moises Cabanas, Calixto Gohiting, Gervasio Sevilla, Pedro Omosura, DanielItaoc, Luis Omosura, Bartolome Omosura, Nicasio Omosora, Calixto Sevilla,Teodora Omosora, Jose Sabari, Silverio Lacorte, Silverio Tuloy, GertrudesSevilla, Teodora Sevilla, Magno Orill osa, Gervacia Sevilla, Marcos Hagonos,Eleuterio Pandas, Pablo Omosora, Fabian Villame, Teodoro Omosora,Magdalina Asilom, Mauricio Matela, Marciano Ordada, Eusebio Omosora,and Gregorio Repelle (Exhibit "E"), Atty. Juna V. Balmaseda inrepresentation of the Bureau of Lands, and Asst. Fiscal Norberto M.Gallardo in representation of the Municipality of Calape.

"Plaintiffs Mauro Renoblas and Gregorio Renoblas are children of plaintiffAlejandro Renoblas. Plaintiff Telesforo Balanda is son-in-law of Alejandro,being the husband of Juliana Renoblas, daughter of Alejandro. PlaintiffAlejandro Renoblas was not one of the oppositors in the registrationproceedings, but he was notified of the initial hearing of that registrationcase and by the surveyor that surveyed the land object of registration(Exhibit J-Movant). Therefore, the decision of the land registrationproceeding is binding upon him and his case is dismissed on the ground ofres adjudicatawith costs.

"xxx xxx xxx

"Plaintiff Fausto Cabaisan was notified by the surveyor and that notice ofthe initial hearing. And though he was not an oppositor, the former landregistration proceeding is binding on him. Therefore, this case is dismissedin so far as Fausto Cabaisan is concerned with costs.

"xxx xxx xxx

"Plaintiffs Gregorio Ita-oc, Teresita Ita-oc, Faustino Ita-oc and FortunatoIta-oc are children of Daniel Ita-oc, one of the oppositors in theregistration proceedings. They claim parcel No. 10 described in paragraph2 of the complaint. Gregorio Ita-oc testified that his land was inherited bysaid plaintiffs' mother from her father, Pio Sevilla. The evidence on record(Exhibits J-3, J-4, J-5). However (sic), shows that the land is declared inthe name of Daniel Ita-oc, a former oppositor in the registration case.Hence, these plaintiffs are successors-in-interest of Daniel Ita-oc, and,therefore, are bound by the decision in that registration case. Their case,

therefore, is dismissed, with costs."Plaintiffs Roberto Haganas, Felisa Haganas, Fermin Haganas andVictoriano Haganas are children of Marcos Haganas, a former oppositor inthe registration case. Marcos testified that his claim before was only twohectares, while the claim of his children is seven hectares, which comefrom his wife, not from him. These plaintiffs claim two parcels, one underTax Declaration No. R-4452, and Tax Declaration No. R-8456. It appearsthat Tax Declaration No. R-4452 (Exhibit M) is in the name of MarcosHaganas and the land described under Tax Declaration No. R-8456 wasbought by the spouses Marcos Haganas and Tomasa Sevilla from GertrudisSevilla in 1956 (Exhibit M-3), who was an oppositor in the registrationproceeding. Therefore, plaintiffs Roberto Haganas, Felisa Haganas, FerminHaganas, and Victoriano Haganas are successors-in-interest to propertiesin which the decision in the registration case is conclusive and binding totheir predecessors-in-interest. Hence, their case here is dismissed with

costs.


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"Plaintiff Julia Sevilla is the wife of Marcelo Matela, who was the oppositorin the registration proceedings. Plaintiffs Roman Matela, Marcela Matela,Delfin Matela, and Roberta Matela are their children. She has no son bythe name of Pelagio. Julia testified that the land now claimed by herchildren came from her father Pio Sevilla. The land that was claimed byMauricio Matela as oppositor was in his name under Tax Declaration No.5099. This is the same land now claimed by plaintiffs Julia Sevilla, RamonMatela, Marcela Matela, Delfin Matela, and Roberta Matela (Exhibit 0-4).These plaintiffs are successors-in-interest of Mauricio Matela, who is boundby the decision in that land proceeding wherein he was the oppositor.Therefore, the case of these plaintiffs are dismissed with costs.

"Plaintiff Procopia Cabaas was the wife of Andres Reambonancia,oppositor in the land registration proceedings. She claims parcel No. 20described in paragraph 2 of the complaint bearing Tax Declaration No. R-8121. It appears that this land is declared in the name of AndresReambonancia (Exhibit N-3) who, as oppositor in the land registrationcase, is bound by the decision of that case. Therefore, the case of plaintiffProcopia Cabaas, as successor-in-interest to Andres Reambonancia, ishereby dismissed, with costs.

"Plaintiff Vicente Amosora is the son of Enerio Amosora and FlorenciaGahil, both oppositors in the former registration case. The land claimed byplaintiff Vicente Amosora is described as parcel No. 24 of paragraph 2 ofthe complaint under Tax Declaration No. R-6107, under the name of hisfather Enerio Amosora. Since Enerio Amosora was an oppositor in theformer land registration of which this land was a part, the decision of thatland registration case is conclusive and binding not only to EnerioAmosora, but also to his successor-in-interest, pl aintiff Vicente Amosora,whose case therefore, is dismissed with costs."

G.R. No. L-32065

Upon the death of administratrix Bernardina Vda. de Luspo, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3561 wasissued in the name of Pedro R. Luspo and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3562 was issued in the nameof several persons (p. 36, Rollo).

A writ of possession dated November 6, 1959, a first alias writ of possession dated January 6, 1961, anda second alias writ of possession dated July 2, 1966 were issued by the trial court against the petitioners.A sample of the guerilla-like, hide and seek tactics employed by the petitioners was proved by the officialreport of the deputy sheriff dated January 21, 1960. Another evidence of petitioners' refusal to sign andto vacate was a certification dated July 22, 1966 and the Sheriff's return dated October 25, 1966.

On March 29, 1967, a petition for contempt was filed by Mariano Ogilve, who is one of the registeredowners of the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3562, against the petitioners forrefusing to vacate the land occupied by them and for refusing to sign the Sheriff's return.

On May 6, 1969, the court a quoissued a resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads (p. 47, Rollo):

"FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, make it of record thatProcopia Reambonansa voluntarily left the land and dropped out from thecase; the charge of contempt against Alejandro Renoblas (who died) isdismissed and each of the remaining 22 respondents are hereby foundguilty of contempt under Sec. 3-b of Rule 71 and are hereby sentencedeach to pay a fine of One Hundred Pesos, authorizing the ConstabularyDetachment at or near Candungao, Calape, Bohol to collect the same andto transmit the money to the Clerk of this Court, with subsidiaryimprisonment in case of insolvency at the rate of one day for every P2.50or fraction of a day, the said Constabulary Detachment to effect thecommitment if any of them is unable to pay the fine. The fingerprints of

each of these 22 respondents shall also be taken by the constabulary andfiled with the record of this case.

"It is so ordered."

On June 4, 1969, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforestated resolution whereasOgilve filed an opposition thereto.

On February 14, 1970, the motion for reconsideration was denied. On March 18, 1970, another motionfor reconsideration was filed by petitioners on the ground of pendency of the action for reconveyance inCivil Case No. 1533 and their appeal i n G.R. No. L-25660. On May 14, 1970, the court a quoordered theproper officers to actually execute the resolution dated May 6, 1969. cdphil

Hence, the present petition.

Petitioners raise the following issues:

I

THAT THE SAID RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN ISSUING A WRIT OFPOSSESSION WITHOUT ANY COMPLAINT FILED IN COURT FOR FORCIBLEENTRY AND DETAINER, NOR FOR RECOVERY OF OWNERSHIP ANDPOSSESSION OF THE PARCELS OF LAND IN QUESTION AGAINST THEHEREIN PETITIONERS.

II

THAT THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN ISSUING A WRITOF POSSESSION AGAINST THE PETITIONERS HEREIN, WHO WERE NOTPARTIES TO THE REGISTRATION PROCEEDING AND WHO WERE NOTDEFEATED OPPOSITORS OF THE SAID APPLICATION FORREGISTRATION.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Petitioners contend that they were not claimants-oppositors nor defeated oppositors in the said landregistration case, as their names do not appear in the amended application for registration; that theyhave occupied the subject parcels of land for more than thirty (30) years which began long before thefiling of the application for registration; and that after the hearing of the registration case, they continuedin possession of the said land.

In a registration case, the judgment confirming the title of the applicant and ordering its registration inhis name necessarily carried with it the delivery of possession which is an inherent element of the right ofownership. The issuance of the writ of possession is, therefore, sanctioned by existing laws in thisjurisdiction and by the generally accepted principle upon which the administration of justice rests(Romasanta, et. al. vs. Platon, 34 O.G. No. 76; Abulocion, et. al. vs. CFI of Iloilo, et al., 100 Phil. 554[1956]). A writ of possession may be issued not only against the person who has been defeated in aregistration case but also against anyone unlawfully and adversely occupying the land or any portionthereof during the land registration proceedings up to the issuance of the final decree (Demorar vs.Ibaez, et al., 97 Phil 2 [1955]). LLpr

The petitioners' contention that they have been in possession of the said land for more than thirty (30)years which began long before the filing of the application for registration and continued in possessionafter the hearing of the registration case, worked against them. It was a virtual admission of their lack ofdefense. Thus, the writs of possession were properly issued against them.

However, We do not subscribe to the ruling of the court a quothat petitioners are guilty of contempt.

Under Section 3 (d) of Rule 19, Rules of Court, if the judgment be for the delivery of the possession of


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real property, the writ of execution must require the sheriff or other officer to whom it must be directedto deliver the possession of the property, describing it, to the party entitled thereto. This means that thesheriff must dispossess or eject the losing party from the premises and deliver the possession thereof tothe winning party. If subsequent to such dispossession or ejectment the losing party enters or attemptsto enter into or upon the real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, orin any manner disturbs the possession of the person adjudged to be entitled thereto, then and only thenmay the loser be charged with and punished for contempt (Quizon vs. Philippine National Bank, et al. , 85Phil. 459). According to this section, it is exclusively incumbent upon the sheriff to execute, to carry outthe mandates of the judgment in question, and in fact, it was he himself, and he alone, who was orderedby the trial judge who rendered that judgment, to place the respondents in possession of the land. Thepetitioners in this case had nothing to do with that delivery of possession, and consequently, their refusalto effectuate the writ of possession, is entirely officious and impertinent and therefore could not hinder,and much less prevent, the delivery being made, had the sheriff known how to comply with his duty. Itwas solely due to the latter's fault, and not to the disobedience of the petitioners, that the judgment wasnot duly executed. For that purpose, the sheriff could even have availed himself of the public force, had itbeen necessary to resort thereto (see United States v. Ramayrat, 22 Phil. 183). prcd

G.R. No. L-33677

On March 22, 1971, Mariano Ogilve filed a Motion for a Writ of Demolition which was granted by the trialcourt on April 5, 1971 (pp. 42-43, Rollo) against those who were adjudged guilty of contempt. On April29, 1971, the petitioners filed an urgent motion for reconsideration of said order. On June 2, 1971, thetrial court issued another order, the dispositive portion of which reads (p. 48, Rollo):

"WHEREFORE, in the absence of writ of preliminary injunction DeputyProvincial Sheriff Pedro Aparece must not only take P.C. soldiers with himbut also carpenters to effect the demolition, the carpenters being at the

expense of the Luspo.

"IT IS SO ORDERED."

Hence, the present petition.

The issue here is whether or not the respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction, orwith grave abuse of discretion and thus excluded the herein petitioners from the use and enjoyment oftheir right to which they are entitled when he (respondent judge) issued the order of demolition on April5, 1971 and again on June 2, 1971 (p. 107, Rollo).

On July 14, 1971, this Court issued a temporary restraining order (p. 51, Rollo). LexLib

The petition is not impressed with merit.

The petitioners allege that the respondent judge cannot issue a writ of demolition pending the resolutionof G.R. No. L-32065.

We rule that the petition in G.R. No. L-32065 was not a bar to the issuance of the writ of demolition. It issignificant to note that the subject matter of the petition in G.R. No. L-32065 is the order dated May 14,1970 directing the execution of the prior order dated May 6, 1969 finding petitioners guilty of contemptand not the writs of possession themselves. Thus, the respondent Judge correctly issued the writs ofdemolition. In Meralco vs. Mencias, 107 Phil 1071, We held:

"[I]f the writ of possession issued in a land registration proceeding impliesthe delivery of possession of the land to the successful litigant therein(Demorar vs. Ibaez, 97 Phil. 72; Pasay Estate Company vs. Del Rosario,et al., 11 Phil. 391; Manlapas vs. Llorente, 48 Phil. 298), a writ ofdemolition must, likewise, issue, especially considering that the latter writis but a complement of the former which, without said writ of demolition,would be ineffective.

xxx xxx xxx

"[The issuance of the writ of demolition] is reasonably necessary to dojustice to petitioner who is being deprived of the possession of the lots inquestion, by reason of the continued refusal of respondent . . . to removehis house thereon and restore possession of the premises to petitioner.

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1)In G.R. No. L-25660, the appeal is DENIED and the orders of the Court of First Instance dated May 12,1964 and August 25, 1965 are AFFIRMED; the motion to withdraw the appeal of some of the plaintiffs-appellants is GRANTED;

2)In G.R. No. L-32065, the petition is GRANTED and the resolution of the Court of First Instance datedMay 14, 1970 is SET ASIDE; and

3)In G.R. No. L-33677, the petition is DISMISSED and the order of the Court of First Instance dated June2, 1971 is AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.


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5. Possession of third persons after issuance of final decree, Remedy

6. Consequence of Refusal to Vacate

vii. When OCT takes effect

G.R. No. 123346. March 31, 2009.

MANOTOK REALTY, INC. and MANOTOK ESTATE CORPORATION,petitioners

,vs

.CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,respondent.

G.R. No. 134385. March 31, 2009.

ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURE, INC. ,petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF JOSE B.DIMSON, REPRESENTED BY HIS COMPULSORY HEIRS: HIS SURVIVING SPOUSE,ROQUETA R. DIMSON AND THEIR CHILDREN, NORMA AND CELSA TIRADO,ALSON AND VIRGINIA DIMSON, LINDA AND CARLOS LAGMAN, LERMA ANDRENE POLICAR, AND ESPERANZA R. DIMSON; AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OFMALABON,respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

TINGA,J p:

In the Court's Resolution dated 14 December 2007, 1 the Court constituted a Special Division of theCourt of Appeals to hear the instant case on remand. The Special Division was composed of threeAssociate Justices of the Court of Appeals, with Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga as Chairperson; JusticeLucas Bersamin as Senior Member; and Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao as Junior Member. Weinstructed the Special Division to proceed as follows:

The Special Division is tasked to hear and receive evidence, conclude theproceedings and submit to this Court a report on its findings and

recommended conclusions within three (3) months from finality of thisResolution.

In ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of title should prevail, theSpecial Division is directed to make the following determinations based onthe evidence already on record and such other evidence as may bepresented at the proceedings before it, to wit: ICASEH

i.Which of the contending parties are able to trace back theirclaims of title to OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917?

ii.Whether the imputed flaws in the titles of the Manotoksand Araneta, as recounted in the 2005 Decision, are borne bythe evidence? Assuming they are, are such flaws sufficient todefeat the claims of title of the Manotoks and Araneta?

iii.Whether the factual and legal bases of 1966 Order of

Judge Muoz-Palma and the 1970 Order of Judge Sayo aretrue and valid. Assuming they are, do these orders establisha superior right to the subject properties in favor of theDimsons and CLT as opposed to the claims of Araneta andthe Manotoks?

iv.Whether any of the subject properties had been thesubject of expropriation proceedings at any point since theissuance of OCT No. 994 on 3 May 1917, and if so what arethose proceedings, what are the titles acquired by theGovernment and whether any of the parties is able to traceits title to the title acquired by the Government throughexpropriation.

v.Such other matters necessary and proper in ascertainingwhich of the conflicting claims of title should prevail.

WHEREFORE, the instant cases are hereby REMANDED to the SpecialDivision of the Court of Appeals for further proceedings in accordance withParts VI, VII and VIII of this Resolution.

SO ORDERED. 2

The Special Division proceeded to conduct hearings in accordance with the Resolution. The parties tothese cases, namely CLT Realty Development Corporation (CLT), Manotok Realty Inc. and ManotokEstate Corporation (the Manotoks), the Heirs of Jose B. Dimson (Heirs of Dimson), and Araneta Instituteof Agriculture, Inc. (Araneta), were directed by the Special Division to present their respective evidenceto the Court of Appeals. Thereafter, the Special Division rendered a 70-page Report 3(Report) on 26November 2008. The Special Division submitted the sealed Report to this Court. EHaCID

Before taking action on the Report itself, we dispose of a preliminary matter. On February 17, 2009, theManotoks filed a motion beseeching that copies of the report be furnished the parties "so that they maysubmit their comments and objections thereon in accord with the principle contained in Sec. 10, Rule 32of the Rules of Court". We deny the motion.

It is incorrect to presume that the earlier referral of these cases to the Court of Appeals for reception ofevidence was strictly in accordance with Rule 32. Notably, Section 1 of said Rule authorizes the referral ofthe case to a commissioner "by written consent of both parties", whereas in the cases at bar, the Courtdid not endeavor to secure the consent of the parties before effectuating the remand to the Court ofAppeals. Nonetheless, our earlier advertence to Rule 32 remains proper even if the adopted proceduredoes not hew strictly to that Rule, owing to our power under Section 6, Rule 135 to adopt any suitableprocess or mode of proceeding which appears conformable to the spirit of the Rules to carry into effect

all auxiliary processes and other means necessary to carry our jurisdiction into effect. HEaCcDMoreover, furnishing the parties with copies of the Sealed Report would not serve any useful purpose. Itwould only delay the promulgation of the Court's action on the Sealed Report and the adjudication ofthese cases. In any event, the present Resolution quotes extensively from the sealed Report anddiscusses its other substantive segments which are not quoted.

The Report is a commendably exhaustive and pellucid analysis of the issues referred to the SpecialDivision. It is a more than adequate basis for this Court to make the following final dispositions in thesecases.

I.

We adopt the succeeding recital of operative antecedents made by the Special Division in its Report:

THE PROCEDURAL ANTECEDENTS

DIMSON v. ARANETA


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CA-G.R. CV. NO. 41883 & CA-G.R. SP No. 34819

[SC-G.R. No. 134385]

On 18 December 1979, DIMSON filed with the then Court of First Instance["CFI"] of Rizal a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damagesagainst ARANETA. On 7 May 1980, DIMSON amended his complaint andincluded Virgilio L. Enriquez ["ENRIQUEZ"] as his co-plaintiff.

In said Amended Complaint, DIMSON claimed that he is the absoluteowner of a 50-hectare land located in Bo. Potrero, Malabon, Metro Manilacovered by TCT No. R-15169, [Lot 25-A-2] of the Caloocan Registry ofDeeds. Allegedly, DIMSON had transferred the subject property toENRIQUEZ by way of an absolute and irrevocable sale on 14 November1979. Unfortunately though, DIMSON and ENRIQUEZ discovered that thesubject property was being occupied by ARANETA wherein an "agriculturalschool house" is erected and that despite repeated demands, the latterrefused to vacate the parcel of land and remove the improvementsthereon. IECcaA

ARANETA, for its part, refuted said allegations and countered that it is theabsolute owner of the land being claimed by DIMSON and that the realproperties in the Araneta Compound are "properly documented and validlytitled". It maintained that it had been in possession of the subject parcel ofland since 1974. For this reason, the claims of DIMSON and ENRIQUEZwere allegedly barred by prescription.

During the trial, counsel for ARANETA marked in evidence, among others,certifications from the Land Registration Commission attesting that TCTsNos. 13574 and 26538, covering the disputed property, are in the namesof ARANETA and Jose Rato, respectively. ARANETA also offered TCT No.7784 in evidence to prove that it is the registered owner of the landdescribed therein.

On 28 May 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision upholding the title ofDIMSON over the disputed property . . .

Undaunted, ARANETA interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals,docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 41883, which was later consolidated with CA-G.R. SP No. 34819 in view of the inter-related issues of the two cases.

In its 30 May 1997 Decision, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No.

41883, sustained the RTC Decision in favor of DIMSON finding that thetitle of ARANETA to the disputed land is a nullity. In CA-G.R. SP No. 34819,the Court of Appeals likewise invalidated the titles of ARANETA, relying onthe Supreme Court ruling in Metropolitan Waterworks and SewerageSystem v. Court of Appeals, which declared null and void the certificates oftitle derived from OCT No. 994 registered on 3 may 1917. It was also heldthat ARANETA failed to sufficiently show that the Order sought to benullified was obtained through extrinsic fraud that would warrant theannulment thereof. SIHCDA

Dissatisfied still, ARANETA filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or NewTrial espousing therein as basis for its entreaty the various letters fromdifferent government agencies and Department Order No. 137 of theDepartment of Justice, among others.

On 16 July 1998, the various Motions of ARANETA were denied by the

Court of Appeals. Nonetheless, the Court ordered DIMSON to maintain

status quountil the finality of the aforesaid judgment.

Consequently, ARANETA filed a petition before the Supreme Court.Refuting the factual finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals,ARANETA contended that there is only one OCT 994 covering the MaysiloEstate issued on 3 May 1917 pursuant to the Decree No. 36455 issued bythe Court of Land Registration on 19 April 1917 and added that there weresubsequent certifications issued by the government officials, notably fromthe LRS, the DOJ Committee Report and the Senate Committees' JointReport which attested that there is only one OCT 994, that which had beenissued on 3 May 1917. AHDTIE

CLT v. MANOTOK

CA-G.R. CV. No. 45255

[SC-G.R. No. 123346]

On 10 August 1992, CLT filed with the Regional Trial Court ["RTC"] ACOMPLAINT FOR Annulment of Transfer Certificates of Title, Recovery ofPossession and Damages against the MANOTOKS and the Registry ofDeeds of Metro Manila District II (Calookan City, Metro Manila)["CALOOCAN RD"].

In its Complaint, CLT alleged that it is the registered owner of Lot 26 ofthe Maysilo Estate located in Caloocan City and covered by Transfer

Certificate of Title No. T-177013, a derivative title of OCT No. 994. As abasis of its proprietary claim, CLT averred that on 10 December 1988, ithad acquired Lot 26 from its former registered owner, Estelita I. Hipolito["HIPOLITO"], by virtue of a Deed of Sale with Real Estate Mortgage.HIPOLITO's title was, in turn, a direct transfer from DIMSON, theregistered owner of TCT No. 15166, the latter having acquired the sameby virtue of a Court Order dated 13 June 1966 issued by the Court of FirstInstance of Rizal in Civil Case No. 4557. CAaDSI

On the other hand, the MANOTOKS maintained the validity of their titles,which were all derivatives of OCT No. 994 covering over twenty (20)parcels of land located over a portion of Lot 26 in the Maysilo Estate. Insubstance, it was contented that the title of CLT was an offspring of anineffective grant of an alleged undisputed portion of Lot 26 by way of

attorney's fees to its predecessor-in-interest, Jose B. Dimson. TheMANOTOKS, in this connection, further contended that the portion of Lot26, subject of the present controversy, had long been disposed of in favorof Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano Leuterio and hence, there was nothing morein said portion of Lot 26 that could have been validly conveyed to Dimson.

Tracing the legitimacy of their certificates of titles, the MANOTOKS allegedthat TCT No. 4210, which cancelled OCT No. 994, had been issued in thenames of Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano Leuterio on September 1918 byvirtue of an Escritura De Venta executed by Don Tomas Arguelles and DonEnrique Lopes on 21 August 1918. TCT No. 4210 allegedly covered anapproximate area of 19,565.43 square meters of Lot 26. On even date,TCT No. 4211 was transferred to Francisco Gonzales on the strength of anEscritura de Venta dated 3 March 1920 for which TCT No. T-5261,covering an area of 871,982 square meters was issued in the name of oneFrancisco Gonzales, married to Rufina Narciso.


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Thereafter, TCT No. T-35485, canceling TCT No. T-5261, was issued toRufina Narcisa Vda. de Gonzales which was later replaced with the namesof Gonzales six (6) children. The property was then subdivided and as aresult of which, seven (7) certificates of titles were issued, six (6), underthe names of each of the children while the remaining title was held by allof them as co-owners.

Eventually, the properties covered by said seven certificates of title wereexpropriated by the Republic of the Philippines. These properties werethen later subdivided by the National Housing Authority ["NHA"], intoseventy-seven (77) lots and thereafter sold to qualified vendees. As itturned out, a number of said vendees sold nineteen (19) of these lots toManotok Realty, Inc. while one (1) lot was purchased by the ManotokEstate Corporation.

During the pre-trial conference, the trial court, upon agreement of theparties, approved the creation of a commission composed of threecommissioners tasked to resolve the conflict in their respective titles.Accordingly, the created Commission convened on the matter in dispute.

On 8 October 1993, Ernesto Erive and Avelino San Buenaventurasubmitted an exhaustive Joint Final Report ["THE MAJORITY REPORT"]finding that there were inherent technical infirmities or defects on the faceof TCT No. 4211, from which the MANOTOKS derived their titles (also onTCT No. 4210), TCT No. 5261 and TCT No. 35486. Teodoro Victorianosubmitted his Individual Final Report ["THE MINORITY REPORT"] dated 23October 1993.

After the conduct of a hearing on these reports, the parties filed theirrespective comments/objections thereto. Upon order of the trial court, theparties filed their respective memoranda. caHCSD

Adopting the findings contained in the Majority Report, the RTC, on 10May 1994, rendered a Decision, in favor of CLT and ordered, amongothers, the cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the name of theMANOTOKS.

The MANOTOKS elevated the adverse RTC Decision on appeal before theCourt of Appeals. In its Decision dated 28 September 1995, the Court ofAppeals affirmed the RTC Decision, except as to the award of damageswhich was deleted. The MANOTOKS then moved for reconsideration, butsaid motion was denied by said appellate court in its Resolution dated 8January 1996. After the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration, theMANOTOKS filed a Petition for Review before the Supreme Court.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT

Before the Supreme Court, the Petitioners for Review, * separately filed bythe MANOTOKS, ARANETA and Sto. Nio Kapitbahayan Association, Inc.,["STO. NIO"], were consolidated.

Also submitted for consideration of the Supreme Court were the report ofthe Fact Finding Committee dated 28 August 1997 and the SenateCommittee Report No. 1031 dated 25 May 1998 which concluded thatthere was only one OCT No. 994 issued, transcribed and registered on 3May 1917.

THE SUPREME COURT DECISION

In its Decision dated 29 November 2005 ["THE SUPREME COURT 2005DECISION"], the Supreme Court, through its Third Division, affirmed theRTC Decision and Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, which declared thetitles of CLT and DIMSON as valid.

In invalidating the respective titles of the MANOTOKS and ARANETA, theSupreme Court, in turn, relied on the factual and legal findings of the trialcourts, which had heavily hinged on the imputed flaws in said titles.Considering that these trial court findings had been affirmed by the Courtof Appeals, the Supreme Court highlighted the fact that the same wereaccorded the highest degree of respect and, generally, should not bedisturbed on appeal.

Emphasis was also made on the settled rule that because the SupremeCourt was not a trier of facts, it was not within its function to reviewfactual issues and examine, evaluate or weigh the probative value of theevidence presented by the parties.

THE SUPREME COURT RESOLUTION

Expectedly, the MANOTOKS and ARANETA filed their respective Motionsfor Reconsideration of the Supreme Court 2005 Decision.

Resolving said motions for reconsideration, with the Office of the SolicitorGeneral ["OSG"] intervening on behalf of the Republic, the Supreme Court,in its Resolution of 14 December 2007 ["THE SUPREME COURT 2007RESOLUTION"] reversed and nullified its 2005 Decision and categoricallyinvalidated OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, which was the basis of thepropriety claims of CLT and DIMSON. However, the Supreme Courtresolved to remand the cases to this Special Division of the Court ofAppeals for reception of evidence. EHCDSI

To guide the proceedings before this Special Divisio

land titles august 2

Documents