CASE DIGESTS 1ST BATCH

ATTY. TIAMSON LTD

#1 Johnson v. M'Intosh 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823)By : Ana Liza B. Arciaga

Brief Fact Summary. Action for ejectment for lands in the State of Illinois, in which plaintiff claims superior title under purchase and conveyance from the certain Indian nations over defendant under a later grant from the United States.

FACTS: Thomas Johnson, one of the first Supreme Court justices, bought land from Piankeshaw Native American tribes in 1773 and 1775. The plaintiffs were lessees of Thomas Johnson's descendants, who had inherited the land. The defendant, William M'Intosh (pronounced "McIntosh"), subsequently obtained a land patent from the United States. The plaintiffs brought an action for ejectment against M'Intosh in the United States District for the District of Illinois, contending that their chain of title was superior by virtue of Johnson's purchases. District Court held for M'Intosh, Johnson appealed.

ISSUE: Issue. Whether a title conveyed by the Native Americans can be recognized by the Federal Courts?

Held. No. Judgment affirmed.Title to lands is and must be admitted to depend entirely on the law of the nation in which they lie.Discovery of America by Great Britain gave them the exclusive right to settle, possess, and govern the new land, and the absolute title to the soil, subject to certain rights of occupancy of the Native Indians.By treaty between Great Britain and the United States, the powers of government, and the right to the soil, passed to the United States, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy, and the exclusive power to extinguish that right was vested in that government which might constitutionally exercise it.Conquest gives a title that the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny, respecting the original justice of the claim that has been successfully asserted.

#2 MATEO CARIÑO vs. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT (G.R. No. 2869, March 25, 1907)Alegre, Cristie B.

Facts:Mateo Cariño filed a petition in the Court of Land Registration praying that there be granted to

him title to a parcel of land consisting of 40 hectares, 1 are, and 13 centares, together with a house erected thereon in Baguio, Province of Benguet. The Insular Government opposed the granting of said petition alleging that the whole parcel of land is public property of the Government and the same was never acquired in any manner or through any title of egression from the State.

The Court of Land Registration rendered its judgment in favor of the Insular Government and declared the property in question as public land.Issue: Whether or not Mateo Cariño owns the land in question.Held: No. The law provides that a parcel of land, being of common origin, presumptively belong to the State during its sovereignty, and, in order to perfect the legitimate acquisition of such land by private persons, it was necessary that the possession of the same pass from the State. And there is no evidence

or proof of title of egression of this land from the domain of the Spanish government nor is there any possessory information equivalent to title of composicion or under agreement.The land in question is not covered within any one of the three (3) conditions required by Art. 19 of the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894: 1) That the land has been in an uninterrupted state of cultivation during a period of six (6) years last past; 2) That the same has been possessed without interruption during a period of 12 years and has been in a state of cultivation up to the date of the information and during the three (3) years immediately preceding such information; 3) That such land had been possessed openly without interruption during a period of 30 or more years, notwithstanding the land had not been cultivated. Moreover, since the verification of the possessory information authorized by the; royal decree was limited in time to one year and after the expiration of this period, the right of the cultivators and persons in possession to obtain gratuitous title thereto lapses and the land together with full possession reverts to the state, or as the case may be to the community, and the said possessors and cultivators of their assigns would simply have rights under universal or general title of average in the event that the land is sold within a period of five (5) years immediately following the cancellation. Hence, in the case at bar, the rights that remained to Cariño, if he was the true possessor, was the right of average in case the State could have sold the same within the period of 5 years.

#3 Cariño Vs. Insular Gov’t of the PhilsBertumen, Yzabel Eden M.

MATEO CARIÑO VS. INSULAR GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES212 U.S. 449 (1909)

FACTS:An Igorot applied for the registration of a certain land. He and his ancestors had held the land as owners for more than 50 years, which he inherited under Igorot customs. There was no document of title issued for the land when he applied for registration. The government contends that the land in question belonged to the State. Under the Spanish Law, all lands belonged to the Spanish Crown except those with permit private titles. Moreover, there is no prescription against the Crown.

ISSUE:Whether or not the land in question belonged to the Spanish Crown under the Regalian

Doctrine.

HELD:No. Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted title to his land. The United States Supreme Court, through Justice Holmes declared: “It might perhaps, be

proper and sufficient to say that when, as far as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.”

There is an existence of native title to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown, as an exception to the theory of jura regalia.

#4 Cruz vs. DENR SecretaryEspino, Rosanna E.

Facts: Former Justice Isagani Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights Act (IPRA Law) on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural resources.In addition, Cruz et al contend that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of “ancestral domains” and “ancestral lands” which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law also violate the rights of private landowners.

Issue: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.

Held: The Supreme Court promulgated a resolution dated 6 December 2000 where it declared that of the fourteen (14) judges who participated in deliberating the petition, seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition and seven (7) other members voted to grant the petition. As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was re-deliberated upon. However, after re-deliberation, the voting remained the same and thus, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition was dismissed and IPRA was declared constitutional.

#5 DOJ Opinion no. 23 Series of 1995 (March 17, 1995)Ma. Rizza De la Paz

FACTS: Assistant secretary Romulo san Juan of DENR requested for reconsideration on the DOJ Opinion no. 169 which affirmed the query raised on whether the prohibition in Section 4 (a) of RA. 6657 against the reclassification of forest lands applies to unclassified PUBLIC FOREST. To quote:

               Section 4 scope- The comprehensive Agrarian reform law of 1989 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands, as provided in proclamation no. 131 and executive order no. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.                  More specifically the following lands are covered by the CARP:

           (a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of forest  or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this act until congress taking into considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of public domain.

This department's aforesaid opinion is based on the premise that since the CARL made reference to "forest lands" without any qualification and considering that "forest lands" under the revised forestry code include public forest, forest reserves and permanent forest, the prohibition against the reclassification of "forest lands"under the CARL should apply to unclassified public forest.

Assistant Secretary contends  that the term public forest refers to a mass of public domain which has not been the subject of the present system classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest purposes.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reclassification of forest lands applies to unclassified public forest.

HELD: No, it will not apply to unclassified public forest. the key word in said law is "reclassification" where there has been no previous classification, there can be no "reclassification of forest lands to speak of within the meaning of Section 4(a). the prohibition in said provision does not, and cannot apply to those lands of the public domain.

#6 Jones vs Insular GovernmentMisa, Anjelo E.

Facts: On January 16, 1904, F. Stewart Jones filed a petition with the Court of Land Registration, praying that he be inscribed as the owner of a certain tract of land in the Province of Benguet within the reservation defined under Act No. 636. He claims that, he bought the land in question from an Igorot named Sioco Carino on May 01, 1901, and he was able to record the deed with the Registrar of Property on the 12th day of May of the same year. The Solicitor General intervened with the said petition on the ground that the property was a public land. At the trial, the Solicitor General contended that the said court had no jurisdiction to register the land in the said reservation. Thus, the court decided in favor of the petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not Section 2 of Act No. 648 is void for it empowers the Civil General to make reservation over a specific public land and give title or dispose it to those who have claims over it.

Ruling: No, Section 2 of Act No. 648 is not void. In the given case, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Land Registration in upholding the right of the petitioner to inscribe the said land under his name. The case was decided citing Section 12 of Bill of 1902 (The Philippine Organic Act) wherein, the President of the US placed all the property ceded by the Spain (by virtue of Treaty of Paris) under the control of the Philippine Government, to be administered for the benefit of its inhabitants. Thus, the intent as well as the substance of Act No. 646, empowering the Civil Governor to make reservation for a specific public land for public use, either for the Insular Government or its political subdivision, coheres with and does not contradict with the provisions of the Bill of 1902.

#7 Mapa vs insular governmentPagente, Jigg Lynnard B.

Facts: Mapa registered his 16 hectare land which he had possessed for a period of 20 or more years with the Court of Land Registration. That court rendered favorable judgment to mapa. The decision is based on section 54, paragraph 4 of Act 926 which states: "All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the open, continuous exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by said act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the Government, for a period of ten years next preceding the taking effect of this act, except when prevented by war, or force majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the provisions of this chapter."

The government appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the land in controversy is agricultural land within the meaning of the section above quoted.

Ruling: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of land registration.

The Supreme Court held that there is to be found in the act of Congress a definition of the phrase “agricultural public lands,” and after a careful consideration of the question we are satisfied that the only definition which exists in said act is the definition adopted by the court below. Section 13 says that the Government shall “Make rules and regulations for the lease, sale, or other disposition of the public lands other than timber or mineral lands.” To our minds, that is the only definition that can be said to be given to acricultural lands. In other words, that the phrase “agricultural land” as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands.

#8 CAMPOMANES, ALYSTER P. Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abella (49 Phil. 49)

Facts:This is a petition for the registration of a certain parcel or tract of land located in the municipality of San Jose, Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippine Islands. It appears from the record that on the 21st day of September, 1915, the appellant Maria del Rosario presented a petition in the Court of First Instance for the registration under the Torrens system, of the very land now in question by virtue of her appeal. In that case, after issue joined and after hearing the evidence, the Honorable Vicente Nepomuceno, judge, denied the registration of all of the northern portion of the land included in her petition represented, which was the plan presented in that action, upon the ground that said portion was more valuable for timber purposes than for agricultural purposes.

Issue:Whether or not the land in dispute is an agricultural land and hence, must be registered in the name of the plaintiff.

Held:Whether particular land is more valuable for forestry purposes than for agricultural purposes, or vice-versa, is a question of fact and must be established during the trial of the cause. Whether the particular land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral is a question to be settled in each particular cause, unless the Bureau of Forestry has, under the authority conferred upon it, prior to the intervention of private interest, set aside for forestry or mineral purposes the particular land in question. During the trial of the present cause, the appellant made no effort to show that the land which she claimed, outside of that which had been decreed in her favor, was more valuable for agricultural than forestry purposes. The judgment appealed from was affirmed.

#9 John Frederick Y. Castro

RAMOS VS. DIRECTOR OF LANDS

FACTS:

Restituo Romero gained possession of a tract of land located in Nueva Ecija. He took advantage of the Royal Decree to obtain a possessory information title to the land and was registered to his name. The said track of land was then sold to Cornelio Ramos Herein the petitioner. Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered.Director of Lands opposed on the ground that Ramos had not acquired a good title from the Spanish government.Director of Forestry also opposed on the ground that the first parcel of land is forest land.It has been

seen however that the predecessor in interest to the petitioner at least held this tract of land under color of title.

ISSUE:Whether or not the actual occupancy of a part of the land described in the instrument giving color of title sufficient to give title to the entire tract of land?

HELD:The general rule is that possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract of land under the claim of ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of another.The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith and he has open, peaceable, and notorious possession of a portion of the property, sufficient to apprise the community and the world that the land was for his enjoyment in accordance with Subsection 6 of section 54, of Act No. 926, entitled The Public Land Law, as amended by Act No. 1908

Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession. Ramos and his predecessor in interest fulfilled the requirements of the law on supposition that the premises consisted of agricultural public land.

On the issue of forest land, Forest reserves of public land can be established as provided by law. When the claim of the citizen and the claim of the government as to a particular piece of property collide, if the Government desires to demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry should submit to the court convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes.

In this case, the mere formal opposition on the part of the Director of Forestry, unsupported by satisfactory evidence will not stop the courts from giving title to the claimant. Petitioner and appellant have proved a title to the entire tract of land for which he asked for registration. Registration in the name of the petitioner is hereby granted.

#10 JH. AKRON vs THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

Beler, Vertine Paul F.

FACTS OF THE CASE

This case was commenced for the purpose of registering a land under the Torrens system, which bounded, particularly situated in the plan description attached to the complaint and made part thereof. The respondent, Oppositor, The Government of the Philippine islands alleged that the said land was the property of the Government of the United States of America and under the control of the Government of the Philippines. No proof was presented by the oppositor regarding its allegations. The Judge render its decision favouring Akron, and ordered that the said land be registered to the latter, however that the right of the government to open a road in a manner that the opening should fifteen meters meters wide and should follow approximately the line of the road. Hence the Director of the lands appealed to this court. That all of said land, with the exception of a small part at the north, the exact description and extension of which does not appear, has been cultivated and planted for more than forty-four years

prior to the date of this decision; 3. That said land was formerly occupied, cultivated and planted by Moros, Mansacas and others, under a claim of ownership, and that they lived thereon and had their houses thereon, and that portion of the land which was not planted or cultivated was used as pasture land whereon they pastured their carabaos, cattle, and horses; 4. That all of said Moros and Mansacas sold, transferred and conveyed all their right, title and interest in said land to the applicant, J. H. Ankron, some eleven years past, at which time all of the said former owners moved o n to adjoining lands where they now reside; 5. That the possession under claim of ownership of the applicant and his predecessors in interest was shown to have been open, notorious, actual, public and continuous for more than forty-four years past, and that their claim was exclusive of any other right adverse to all other claims; 6. That the applicant now has some one hundred fifty (150) hills of hemp, some eight thousand (8,000) cocoanut trees, a dwelling house, various laborers' quarters, store-building, large camarin (storehouse of wood, a galvanized iron and other buildings and improvements on said land.

Issue: Whether or not the said land is owned by the government of the Philippines.

Ruling: Yes, The court held that the applicant proved and validly supplied the requisites for the registration of the said land into an agricultural land as per stated by paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926. The important prerequisites for registration of land imposed by said section 54, paragraph 6, are (a) that the land shall be agricultural public land as defined by the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902; (b) that the petitioner, by himself or his predecessors in interest, shall have been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership for a period of ten years next preceding the taking effect of said Act. The government failed to disrupt the said facts presented by the applicant.

Hence, the court rendered its judgement in favor of the applicant

#11 Director of Forestry vs. Villareal Bolisay ,Sherry Ann D.

Facts:On January 25, 1949, Ruperto Villareal applied the land for registration consisting of 178,113sqm of mangrove swamps located of Sapian, Capiz. The petitioner, Director of Forestry was one of the several persons who opposed the application for registration of a parcel of land .

He alleged that he and his predecessors-in-interests had been in possession of the said parcel of land for more than forty years (40).

Both parties agreed in one point that the disputed land was a mangrove swamp. The respondent argued that mangrove swamp are agricultural land but the petitioner contended that it is a forestall land therefore not disposable.

The Court of the First Instance of Capiz however grants the application of the respondent. The decision of the lower court was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence the Director of Forestry elevated the case to the Supreme Court for review on certiorari.

Issue:Whether or not, mangrove swamps or manglares are agricultural land or forest land.

Held:The Survey plan of the mangrove swamps approved by the Director of Lands, to prove that the land is registered, cannot be invoked. The mere existence of such plan would not have effect of converting the mangrove swamps, as forest land, into agricultural land. Such approval is ineffectual because it is clearly in officious. The Director of Lands was not authorized to act premises. Under the law it is the Director of Forestry who has the authority to determine whether forest land is more agricultural rather forestry.

                 The Supreme Court held that mangrove swamps as forest lands is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.

                        Furthermore the legislative definition embodied in section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 which declares that mangrove swamps or manglares form part of the public forests of the Philippines hence they are not alienable.

                        The evidence presented by the respondent in its claim were not sufficient to prove its possession and ownership of the land, he only presented tax declaration.

                        Wherefore the decision of the Court of Appeals was set aside and the application for registration of title by the respondent is dismissed by the Supreme Court.

#12 DENR vs. YAP, G.R. No. 167707, October 8, 2008Ramarama, Joseph Nico P.

FACTS:

G.R. No. 167707:On November 10m 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801. In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and Pta Circular No. 3-38 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. The declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them. Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles. RTC and CA ruled in favor of the herein Respondent-claimant.

G.R. No. 173775:On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island into 400 hectares of reserved forest land and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land. On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants filed before the Supreme Court the nullification of the said proclamation because it infringed on their vested rights over portions of Boracay. Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying Boracay

into agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act. Thus, their possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.

The SC ordered the consolidation of the two petitions as they principally involve the same issues on the land classification of Boracay Island.

ISSUE:Whether or Not Proclamation No. 1801 and Proclamation No. 1064 classified Boracay Island as agricultural land.

HELD:The 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national parks. Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated. Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been "officially delimited and classified."

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.

Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of lands from the facts of each case, except those that have already became private lands. Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the Executive Department, through the President, the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest. Since then, courts no longer had the authority, whether express or implied, to determine the classification of lands of the public domain.

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705. The DENR and the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified land of the public domain.

Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of Boracay into an agricultural land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular which made Boracay Island an agricultural land. The reference in Circular No. 3-82 to "private lands"117 and "areas declared as alienable and disposable"118 does not by itself classify the entire island as agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82

makes reference not only to private lands and areas but also to public forested lands.

It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay as alienable and opened the same to private ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141120 provide that it is only the President, upon the recommendation of the proper department head, who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands.

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised the authority granted to her to classify lands of the public domain, presumably subject to existing vested rights. Classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office of the President. Courts have no authority to do so.122 Absent such classification, the land remains unclassified until released and rendered open to disposition.123

#13 ALDECOA, vs.THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT

Mendoza, Joselito Angelo B.

Facts

The petitioner on March 8, 1904, in accordance with the new Land Registration Act, applied for the registration of his title to a parcel of land, 3,375 sqm. in the town of Surigao, a plan and technical description of said parcel was attached to his application. The Attorney-General on March 21, 1905 objected to the registration applied for, alleging that the land in question was the property of the Government of the United States, and belongs to the Insular Government. The title of ownership issued by the politico-militar governor of Surigao, Mindanao, issued on the June 19, 1889, to Telesforo Ibañez de Aldecoa, antecessor of the petitioner, was entirely null and void, for the reason that said grant had not been made in accordance with the laws because the said governor had no authority to make such a grant. The petitioner on April 8, 1905 amended his former petition, and relying upon the provisions of paragraph 5 and 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, alleged that at the time he requested the registration of the land in question the aforesaid Act No. 926 was not yet in force. The land in question is classified as agricultural land but in actual it is converted into a building lot. On February 2, 1907, the judge of the Court of Land Registration entered his decision in favour of the respondent. The petitioner moved for a new trial. The petitioner asked whether or not the land is susceptible of being cultivated, and, ceasing to be agricultural land, was converted into a building lot, is subject to the legal provisions in force regarding Government public lands which may be alienated in favor of private individuals or corporations.

Issue

Whether or not the land in question is classified as agricultural land?

Held

The court ruled that the land in question is classified as agricultural land. The court said any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, and may be converted into a field, and planted with all kind of vegetation; for this reason, where land is not mining or forestall in its nature, it must necessarily be included within the classification of agricultural land, not because it is actually used for the purposes of agriculture, but because it was originally agricultural and may again become so under other circumstances; besides, the Act of Congress contains only three classifications, and makes no special provision with respect to building lots or urban lands that have ceased to be agricultural land. The court also said that in the case at bar we have to deal with laws that were enacted after almost all the towns of this Archipelago were established, and it must be assumed that the lawmakers have started from the supposition that titles to the building lots within the confines of such towns had been duly acquired; therefore, in special cases like the present one, wherein is sought the registration of a lot situated within a town created and acknowledged administratively, it is proper to apply thereto the laws in force and classify it as agricultural land, inasmuch as it was agricultural prior to its conversion into a building lot, and is subject at any time to further rotation and cultivation; moreover, it does not appear that it was ever mining or forest land.

#14 Alexander A. KrivenkovsThe Register of Deeds, City of ManilaGR No. L-630Rufino Samuel R. Mantos III 2012-0596

Facts: The petitioner in this case is an alien who brought a residential lot and wish to register the same under the Register of Deeds in Manila in December of 1941. The registration was duly interrupted by the was. The petitioner sought for the accomplishment of the said registration in May of 1945. How-ever, the petitioner’s application for registration was subsequently denied by the Register of Deeds of Manila on the ground that the former is an alien and as such he is prohibited to acquire land within this jurisdiction. As a result, petitioner brought his action the Court of First Instance of Manila wherein he was again denied of his prayer and the same court sustained the refusal of the Register of Deeds to deny him the registration of his land to which the petitioner appealed from, hence this present case.

Issue: Wether or not aliens may acquire lands classified as “residential lands”?

Held: No. Under the Constitution, aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands, including residential lands.

The court made reference to Section 1 of Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution wherein it states that:“Sec. 1 All agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coals, petro-leum, and other mineral oils, all sources of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philip-pines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilisation shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations, associations at least sixty percent of the capital of which is owned by such citizens…” the same section further provides that: “…Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development or utilisation of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years…”Furthermore, the court further stressed in ruling this case is that the general tenor of the term “agricul-tural land” does not really pertain to the literal use for agricultural purposes but as to its susceptibilty to cultivation for agricultural purposes. A technical term whose usage is known and understood by the

lawmakers and by the Constitutional Commission during that period, it basically referred to lands not falling under the classification either as timber or mineral lands, and thus includes residential lands.

#15 MINERAL LANDS IN RELATION TO LAND TITLES

Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Dumyung 

GR No. L-31666-68, April 30, 1979 

FERNANDEZ, J.:

FACTS:

The Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company (LEPANTO), petitioner herein, filed motions for intervention in three civil cases between the Republic of the Philippines and Manuel Dumyung, Fortunate Dumyung and Dumyung Bonayan (DUMYUNGs). The civil cases are for the annulment of Free Patents on the ground of misrepresentation and false data and informations furnished by the private respondents herein. The complaints in intervention alleged that a portion of the titled lands in question is within the intervenor's ordinary timber license and another portion of said lands is embraced in its mineral claims.

The trial court ruled that upon the issuance of said Free Patents it were duly registered with the office of the Register of Deeds of Baguio and Benguet, and consequently, these properties became the private properties of the DUMYUNGs and that these titles enjoy the same privileges and safeguards as Torrens titles. It is therefore clear that the lands belonging to the defendants are now indefeasible and this Court has no power to disturb such indefeasibility of said titles, let alone cancel the same. LEPANTO filed a motion for reconsideration but the trial court denied it. Thereupon LEPANTO filed this petition for review.

ISSUE: Does the issuance of free patents over a public domain such as mineral land valid?

HELD:  It is well settled that a certificate of title is void when it covers property of public domain classified as forest or timber and mineral lands. Any title issued on non-disposable lots even in the hands of alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled. It was premature for the trial court to rule on whether or not the titles based on the patents awarded to the private respondents have become indefeasible and that DUMYUNGs are entitled to the benefits granted to the members of cultural minorities. The principal factual issue raised by LEPANTO is that the lands covered by the patents and certificates of title are timber lands and mineral lands and, therefore, not alienable. Without receiving evidence, the trial court dismissed the cases. Therefore the order dismissing Civil Cases of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City is set aside and the said cases are remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

#16 Republic of the Philippines, Benguet and Atok vs. Court of Appeals and Dela Rosa, G.R. No. L- 43938, April 15, 1988

Ralph Jireh A. Bartolome

FACTS: These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on February 11, 1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three children, Victoria, Benjamin and Eduardo. The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided into 9 lots and covered by plan Psu-225009. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in 1964.The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big Wedge

Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9.

Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim in September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the date of its purchase, Benguet had been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner, as evidenced by its construction of adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its geological mappings, geological samplings and trench side cuts, and its payment of taxes on the land.

For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma and Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded on January 2, 1931, in the office of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were purchased from these locators on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said lots as evidenced by its annual assessment work on the claims, such as the boring of tunnels, and its payment of annual taxes thereon.

The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land sought to be registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.

The applicants appealed to the respondent court, which reversed the trial court and recognized the claims of the applicant, but subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining claims. In other words, the Court of Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims. Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking their superior right of ownership.

ISSUE: WON the decision of the CA, the land being reserved for both parties particularly the surface rights of the land for Dela Rosa while the sub-surface rights for Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claim, is correct?

HELD:No. Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption.

The owner of a piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height. The rights over the land are indivisible and the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or completely agricultural.

Once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the time, such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to mineral land and may not be used by any private party, including the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the mining operations to be undertaken therein, For the loss sustained by such owner, he is of course entitled to just compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings.

#17 Mateo Carino VS The Insular Government Lopez, Christina

FACTS: In 1903, Mateo Cariño filed a petition for him to be granted a certificate of title over a 40 hectare land in Baguio, Benguet. He claimed that he and his predecessors in interest had been in possession over said parcel of land since time immemorial; that the Igorot community where the said land was located had always considered Mateo Cariño and his predecssors/ancestors as the owner of said land; that said parcel of land had been transferred to his predecessors and unto him in accordance with the Igorot custom.

The land registration court granted his petition but the government through the Solicitor General opposed said grant on the ground that Mateo Cariño and ancestors failed to register said land during the Spanish Era. It was argued that in 1880, the Spanish government decreed that all privately held land must be registered or else they will be reverted back to the public domain (pursuant to the regalian doctrine).

The case reached the Philippine Supreme Court. The latter ruled against Mateo Cariño hence Cariño further appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his possession of it for  some time.

HELD: Yes, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision held by the Philippine Supreme Court. Mateo Cariño cannot be deprived of his land simply because he failed to comply with the formalities required by the Spanish law (or by a Philippine law). Cariño’s title, which he acquired from his ancestors predates, by more than 50 years, the establishment of the American government in the Philippines (in fact, even before the establishment of the Spanish government in the Philippines).

The US Supreme Court also noted that even the Solicitor General admitted that the Igorots were hardly ruled by the Spanish government. That being, it is unlikely that the Spanish government would grant land titles to the Igorots even if they will register their land under the old Spanish Law. The US Supreme Court also ruled that to follow the stand of the Solicitor General is to deprive the land titles of the natives (not only Igorots but all native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands). Under the Constitution: “no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws.” The term “any person” includes the natives (in this case, the Igorots). All lands held under private ownership during the Spanish era shall therefore be presumed to be such. Failure to register under Spanish Law did not revert said lands to the public domain.

#18 - Cruz vs. DENR Secretary (G.R. No. 135385. December 6, 2000)Jore, Vijoseph Anthony P.

Facts: Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).

Issue: Did the IPRA violate the Regalian Theory?

Held: No Final Decision. Petition dismissed due to lack of votes; Law remained valid and constitutional (7to grant ‐7 to dismiss)

Justice Puno’s Separate Opinion:

Republic Act No. 8371 is entitled "An Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote the Rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples, Creating a National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Establishing Implementing Mechanisms, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It is simply known as "The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997" or the IPRA.

The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in Philippine society. It grants these people the ownership and possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these lands and domains. The ownership given is the indigenous concept of ownership under customary law which traces its origin to native title.

Ancestral domains comprise lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein and includes ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable or not, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources.

Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same conditions as ancestral domains except that these are limited to lands and that these lands are not merely occupied and possessed but are also utilized by the ICCs/IPs under claims of individual or traditional group ownership. These lands include but are not limited to residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots.

The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be acquired in two modes: (1) bynative title over both ancestral lands and domains; or (2) by torrens title under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act with respect to ancestral lands only.(2) The Concept of Native Title

Native title is defined as:"Sec. 3 [l]. Native Title- refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far back as memory reaches, have been held under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands and are thusindisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest.

Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest rights to lands and domains held under a claim of private ownership as far back as memory reaches. These lands are deemed never to have been public lands and are indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest. The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestraldomains (which also include ancestral lands) by virtue of native title shall be recognized and respected. Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned, shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which shall recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated.

Like a torrens title, a CADT is evidence of private ownership of land by native title. Native title, however, is a right of private ownership peculiarly granted to ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands and domains. The IPRA categorically declares ancestral lands and domains held by native title as  never to have been public land. Domains and lands held under native title are, therefore, indisputably presumed to have never been public lands and are private.

The Rights of ICCs/IPs Over Their Ancestral Domains and Lands

Section 7 (a) defines the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over their ancestral domains which covers (a) lands, (b) bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by the ICCs/IPs, (c) sacred places, (d) traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and (e) all improvements made by them at any time within the domains. The right of ownership includes the following rights: (1) the right to develop lands and natural resources; (b) the right to stay in the territories; (c) the right to resettlement in case of displacement; (d) the right to regulate the entry of migrants; (e) the right to safe and clean air and water; (f) the right to claim parts of the ancestral domains as reservations; and (g) the right to resolve conflict in accordance with customary laws.

Section 8 governs their rights to ancestral lands. Unlike ownership over the ancestral domains, Section 8 gives the ICCs/IPs also the right to transfer the land or property rights to members of the same ICCs/IPs or non-members thereof. This is in keeping with the option given to ICCs/IPs to secure a torrens title over the ancestral lands, but not to domains.

The Right of ICCs/IPs to Develop Lands and Natural Resources Within the Ancestral Domains Does Not Deprive the State of Ownership Over the Natural Resources and Control and Supervision in their Development and Exploitation .

The Regalian doctrine on the ownership, management and utilization of natural resources is declared in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, viz:

"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State.

As owner of the natural resources, the State is accorded primary power and responsibility in the exploration, development and utilization of these natural resources

Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domains. The right of ICCs/IPs in their ancestral domains includesownership, but this "ownership" is expressly defined and limited in Section 7 (a).

indeed, the right of ownership under Section 7 (a) does not cover "waters, minerals, coal,petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,flora and fauna and all other natural resources" enumerated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution as belonging to the State.

Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the ICCs/IPs are merely granted the right to "manage and conserve" them for future generations, "benefit and share" the profits from their allocation and utilization, and "negotiate the terms and conditions for their exploration" for the purpose of "ensuring ecological and environmental protection and conservation measures." 

#19. Anwar, AL-Raffy N.

Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company vs. Dumyung

FACTS:The Republic of the Philippines filed separate civil actions for annulment of the free patent and the corresponding certificates of title issued pursuant thereto to herein private respondents on the ground of misrepresentation and false data and information furnished by said respondents. The Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company intervened alleging that a portion of the titled lands in question was within its ordinary timber license, and other portion, embraced in its mineral claims. The proceedings on these cases were suspended until after the three criminal cases for falsification of public documents filed by the Republic of the Philippines against private respondents for allegedly making untrue statements in their application for free patents over the subject lands were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Thereafter, upon motion of private respondents and without having received any evidence in the civil cases, the trial judge dismissed said cases, and ruled that respondents' original certificates of title had become indefeasible, that they were entitled to the benefits of Republic Act 3872 as members of the cultural minorities, and their acquittal in the criminal cases for falsification was a bar to these civil cases. Hence, this petition. ISSUE/S: Whether or not the titles based on the patents awarded to the private respondents have become indefeasible.RULING:The Supreme Court held that the trial judge erred in ruling on the factual issues in these civil cases without having received evidence thereon, and ruled that the acquittal of private respondents from the criminal cases for falsification could not be a bar to these civil cases, for, the only issue in the criminal cases was whether or not there was evidence beyond reasonable doubt that the private respondent had committed the acts of falsification and the factual issues of whether or not the lands in question were timber and mineral and whether or not private respondents belonged to the cultural minorities and are qualified under RA 3872 to be issued free patents on said lands were not in issue in said criminal cases. It was also premature for the trial court to rule whether the titles based on the patents awarded to the private respondents have become indefeasible. It is well settled that a certificate of title is void when it covers property of public domain classified as forest or timber and mineral lands. Any title issued on non-disposable lots even in the hands of alleged innocent purchaser for value shall be cancelled.The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

#21. STA. MONICA INDUSTRIAL AND DEVELOPMENT CO. vs CALLAMAS, LEO ERNESTO H.

Facts: In 1912, Court of Land Registration of Zambales, confirmed a title of two (2) parcels of land in Zambales.

In 1985, respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed with the Court of Appeals a complaint for the annulment of the decree alleged that it was null and void for lack of jurisdiction because the land was inside the U.S. naval reservation and that it was still within the forest zone in 1912, having been released therefrom only in 1961, and hence cannot be the subject of disposition or alienation as private property.

The Republic offered its evidence, consisting of a land classification map prepared by the Director of Forestry in 1961 to prove that the land became alienable and disposable only in 1961

Petitioner argued had been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession thereof for at least 10 years, before confirmation, and his possession of the said parcels of land was in the concept of owner

On the other hand, Public respondent then reiterated that "[a]t the time title was issued on December 9, 1912, the parcel of land covered by the title was still within the forest zone and it was not until January 31, 1961 that said land was released by the Bureau of Forest Development as alienable and disposable”

Issue: won title is void

Ruling: Act No. 926, known as the Public Land Act, which was enacted into law on October 7, 1903 but which took effect on July 26, 1904, was the law applicable to petition for confirmation of title to the two (2) parcels of land. It provided:SEC. 54. The following-described persons or their legal successors in right, occupying public lands in the Philippine Islands, or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles to such lands have not been perfected, may apply to the Court of Land Registration of the Philippine Islands for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefore

a person who had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious session and occupation of public agricultural land for a period of at least ten (10) years prior to July 24, 1904 could petition for the confirmation of his title over the land he had so possessed and occupied. The land registration court confirmed title to the two (2) parcels of land after due notice and hearing.

# 23 Republic of the Philippines vs. T.A.N. Properties, IncGR No. 154953, June 26 2008Verano, MarbienCARPIO, J.

Facts:

T.A.N. Properties, Inc. filed an Application for Original Registration of Title covering Lot 10705-B of the subdivision plan Csd-04-019741 which is a portion of the consolidated Lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre. The land, with an area of 564,007 square meters, or 56.4007 hectares, is located at San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas. The trial court set the case for initial hearing. The Notice of Initial Hearing was published in the Official Gazette and also posted in a conspicuous place on the bulletin board of the Municipal Building of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, as well as in a conspicuous place on the land. All adjoining owners and all government agencies and offices concerned were notified of the initial

hearing. When the trial court called the case for initial hearing, there was no oppositor other than the Opposition of the Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands (petitioner). The trial court issued an Order of General Default against the whole world except as against petitioner. During the hearing, Ceferino Carandang (Carandang) appeared as oppositor. The trial court gave Carandang ample time until within which to file his written opposition. Carandang failed to file his written opposition and to appear in the succeeding hearings, the trial court reinstated the Order of General Default. During the hearings conducted, respondent presented three witnesses. The testimonies of respondent's witnesses showed that Prospero Dimayuga (Kabesang Puroy) had peaceful, adverse, open, and continuous possession of the land in the concept of an owner since 1942. Upon his death, Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by his son Antonio Dimayuga (Antonio). Antonio executed a Deed of Donation covering the land in favor of one of his children, Fortunato Dimayuga (Fortunato). Later, however, Antonio gave Fortunato another piece of land. Hence, Antonio executed a Partial Revocation of Donation, and the land was adjudicated to one of Antonio's children, Prospero Dimayuga (Porting). Porting sold the land to respondent. The trial court adjudicated the land in favor of respondent. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court's Decision. Hence, petitioner filed an appeal to the Supreme Court questioning the said decision.

Issues:

The issues may be summarized as follows:1. Whether the land is alienable and disposable;2. Whether respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land in the concept of an owner since June 1945 or earlier; and3. Whether respondent is qualified to apply for registration of the land under the Public Land Act.

Rulings:

The Court ruled that the petition has merit and that respondent failed to prove that the land is alienable and disposable; that there was no open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation in the concept of an owner; and that respondent, a private corporation, cannot apply for registration of the land of the public domain.

(1) The court opined that the certifications issued by Community Environment and Natural Resources Offices (CENTRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and Regional Technical Director, Forest Management Services of the DENR (FMS-DENR) are not sufficient. In that under DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 20, series of 1988, the CENRO issues certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares. The Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) issues certificate of land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares. DAO No. 38, dated 19 April 1990, amended DAO No. 20, series of 1988. DAO No. 38, series of 1990 retained the authority of the CENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares, as well as the authority of the PENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares. However, in this case, respondent applied for registration of Lot 10705-B. The area covered by Lot 10705-B is over 50 hectares (564,007 square meters). The CENRO certificate covered the entire Lot 10705 with an area of 596,116 square meters which, as per DAO No. 38, series of 1990, is beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable and disposable. In the same manner, Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR has no authority under

DAO Nos. 20 and 38 to issue certificates of land classification. Hence, the certification issued by the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, in the form of a memorandum to the trial court, has no probative value.

Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable. The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove that Lot 10705-B falls within the alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR Secretary. Petitioner also points out the discrepancy as to when the land allegedly became alienable and disposable. The DENR Secretary certified that based on Land Classification Map No. 582, the land became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1925. However, the certificate on the blue print plan states that it became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1985. The court said that while the certifications submitted by respondent show that under the Land Classification Map No. 582, the land became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1925, the blue print plan states that it became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1985. Respondent alleged that "the blue print plan merely serves to prove the precise location and the metes and bounds of the land described therein and does not in any way certify the nature and classification of the land involved. However, respondent should have at least presented proof that would explain the discrepancy in the dates of classification. Marquez, LRA Records Officer II, testified that the documents submitted to the court consisting of the tracing cloth plan, the technical description of Lot 10705-B, the approved subdivision plan, and the Geodetic Engineer's certification were faithful reproductions of the original documents in the LRA office. He did not explain the discrepancy in the dates. Neither was the Geodetic Engineer presented to explain why the date of classification on the blue print plan was different from the other certifications submitted by respondent.

(2) The court opined that the trial court's reliance on the testimonies of respondents’ witnesses (Evangelista and Torres) was misplaced. That Evangelista's statement that the possession of respondent's predecessors-in-interest was open, public, continuous, peaceful, and adverse to the whole world was a general conclusion of law rather than factual evidence of possession of title. Further, the court agreed that respondent failed to establish that its predecessors-in-interest had held the land openly, continuously, and exclusively for at least 30 years after it was declared alienable and disposable.

The court disagreed to the testimony of Evangelista that he knew that Kabesang Puroy had been in possession of the land before 1945 and thereafter succeeded by Fortunato; and that their family owned a lot near Kabisang Puroy’s Land, since Evangelista only worked on the land for three years, and that he did not know the exact relationship between Kabesang Puroy and Fortunato, which is rather unusual for neighbors in a small community. He did not also know the relationship between Fortunato and Porting. In fact, Evangelista's testimony is contrary to the factual finding of the trial court that Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by his son Antonio, not by Fortunato who was one of Antonio's children. Antonio was not even mentioned in Evangelista's testimony. And that the tax declarations presented were only for the years starting 1955. While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of claim of ownership. Respondent did not present any credible

explanation why the realty taxes were only paid starting 1955 considering the claim that the Dimayugas were allegedly in possession of the land before 1945. The payment of the realty taxes starting 1955 gives rise to the presumption that the Dimayugas claimed ownership or possession of the land only in that year.

(3) The court opined that respondent, a private corporation, cannot apply for registration of the land of the public domain. The 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Although, the 1935 Constitution, there was no prohibition against private corporations from acquiring agricultural land. The 1973 Constitution limited the alienation of lands of the public domain to individuals who were citizens of the Philippines. Under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations, even if wholly owned by Filipino citizens, were no longer allowed to acquire alienable lands of the public domain. The present 1987 Constitution continues the prohibition against private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. In the present case, respondent has failed to prove that any portion of the land was already private land when respondent acquired it from Porting in 1997.

#25 Republic v. T.A.N. Properties Inc. (555 SCRA 477) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. T.A.N. PROPERTIES, INC., respondent. G.R. No. 154953; June 26, 2008Facts: In 1999, T.A.N. Properties filed in the RTC of Batangas an application for the registration of a land, located at Sto. Tomas, Batangas and with an area of 56.4007 hectares. In this case, respondent submitted two certifications issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The first is the Certification by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Offices (CENRO). The second certification in the form of a memorandum to the trial court, which was issued by the Regional Technical Director, Forest Management Services of the DENR (FMS-DENR), stated “that the subject area falls within an alienable and disposable land.

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, opposed the application on the ground that T.A.N. Properties did not prove that the land was alienable and disposable.Issue: Whether or not the applicant proved that, the land is alienable and disposable?Ruling: NO. The certifications are not sufficient. The Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) issues certificate of land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares. However, CENRO issues certificate of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares. The CENRO certificate covered the entire Lot 10705 with an area of 596,116 square meters is beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable and disposable.Hence, the certification issued by the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, in the form of a memorandum to the trial court, has no probative value.

Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and

disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.

The government officials who issued the certifications were not presented before the trial court to testify on their contents. The trial court should not have accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that the land is alienable and disposable.

#26 Victoria vs. Republic Agnir, Wenceslao IV B.

Facts Petitioner Natividad Sta. Ana Victoria applied for registration under the property registration

decree of a 1,729 sq.m. lot before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Taguig city. She testified and offered documentary evidence to show that subject lot under the taguig cadastral mapping is a portion of a parcel of land with an area of 17,507 sq.m. originally owned by Victoria’s father and previously declared in his name for tax purposes which was inherited by Victoria and her siblings via a deed of partition. The evidence showed that said land is inside the alienable and disposable area under project 27-b certified by the Bureau and where the republic failed of Forest Development to which she and her predecessors in interest have been in possession continuously, uninterruptedly, openly, publicly, adversely since the early 1940s and have been declared as owners for taxation purposes for the last 30 years. The republic failed to present evidence to support their opposition.

The MeTC rendered a decision in favor of Victoria, granting the application for registration and finding that said petitioner had sufficiently established her claim and right under the land registration law. Republic appealed to CA stating that petitioner failed to establish the kind of possession for registration and failed to present evidence that subject land is alienable and disposable.

CA reversed the decision of the MeTC stating that Victoria failed to prove that subject land is alienable and disposable land of the public domain. CA found it unnecessary to pass upon the evidence of Victoria’s possession and occupation of the subject property. Victoria’s motion for reconsideration was denied.Issue:

Whether or Not Victoria amply proved that the subject lot is alienable and disposable land of the public domain

Held: To prove that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable, an applicant must

establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of lands investigators; and a legislative act or statute.

The applicant may secure a certification from the government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable, but the certification must show that the DENR secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO and CENRO. The applicant must also present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable and disposable, as declared by the DENR secretary or as proclaimed by the president.

In this case, court ordered the OSG to verify that the DENR certification submitted by petitioner Victoria as valid to which OSG found to be with merit since the one who signed DENR certification is authorized to issue certifications regarding status of public lands as alienable and disposable. Also,

records show that the subject property was covered by a cadastral survey of Taguig conducted by the government at its expense to which such surveys are carried out precisely to encourage landowners and help them get titles to the lands covered by such title. It does not make sense to raise an objection after such a survey that the lands covered by it are alienable land of public domain like a public forest.

Wherefore, the court grants the petition, reverses and sets aside the resolution of the court of appeals and reinstates the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, branch 74 of the city of taguig.

# 28 Republic vs JavierAndres, Jimbo B.

FACTS:

Neptuna Javier filed a verified application for Original Registration of Title for a parcel of land measuring 12,903.50 square meters located in Sitio Tabing Ilog, Sta. Ana, Taytay Rizal. Prior to initial hearing, Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, through the office of the Solicitor General, filed a Notice of Appearance and Opposition to Javier’s application claiming that neither Javier nor her predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land since June 12,1945, they also claimed that the said property was a portion of public domain, hence it was not subject to private appropriation.

Javier on her part submitted several documents for her to establish that she complied with the jurisdictional requirement. On trial, she testified that she acquired that said property through Deed of Donation executed by her paternal aunt Catalina. It was also noted on trial that they are in open, continuous, public, peaceful and notorious possession and occupation of the said property together with Catalina for more than 30 years. It was also averred that Catalina declared the property in her name and had been paying real property tax.

On October 16,2000, MTC rendered decision favouring Javier and granting the prayer for her application for the registration of the property. The same was affirmed by Court of Appeals on its September 27, 2007 decision, thus this appeal.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the MTC decision of granting Javier’s application for the registration of the said property.

HELD:

NO, the Supreme Court ruled for the affirmation of the decision of the Court of Appeals, citing Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree. The requirements are as follows: 1. That the property in question is alienable and disposable land of public domain; 2. That applicants themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation and 3. That such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. It was ruled that Javier was able to comply with all the requisites and likewise Javier was able to prove that the subject land is alienable as at stated in the CENRO report.

#29 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES versus IMPERIAL CREDIT CORPORATION , June

25, 2008, Mabansag, Liezl JoyREPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES versus IMPERIAL CREDIT CORPORATION

Imperial Credit Corporation was granted an application for Original registration of Title holding as a basis thereof paragraphs (2) and (4) of section 14 of PD 1529 (“THE PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE”). On March 7, 1996Imperial Credit Corp. bought from Juan Tajon a parcel of land situated in Barrio Caloique , Antipolo City for the amount of 17986.00 pesos as evidenced by the deed of sale of mortgage. Upon payment of the balance, the ownership of the property was consolidated in the name of the respondent and the mortgage constituted was released in Dec. of 1997. The property was thereafter privately surveyed under PSU-178075 and approved on 25 January 2000. On 14 February 2000, respondent filed before the RTC of Antipolo City an application for registration of a parcel of land, as shown on Plan PSU-178075 containing an area of 8,993 square meters. The application was docketed as LRC Case No. 00-2493 and raffled off to Branch 74 of said RTC. The application alleged, among others, that respondent “subrogated former owner Jose Tajon, who has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the parcel of land, being a part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945, by virtue of Deed of Sale with Mortgage executed on 07 March 1966. At the hearing, Ricardo Santos, respondent’s legal researcher and duly authorized attorney-in-fact, testified on the fact of respondent’s actual possession through its caretaker, Teodisia Palapus, who had been overseeing said property since its acquisition from Jose Tajon. Palapus also corroborated Santos’ testimony and added that except for some trespassers, no one else had laid possessory claim on the property. Aside from the transfer documents, the other documentary evidence submitted consisted of a 1993 tax declaration, the tracing cloth plan, survey description, a certification from the Land Management Sector in lieu of the geodetic engineer’s certificate and the report by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office that the property falls within the alienable and disposable zone. On 21 November 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting respondent’s application for registration. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), seasonably appealed from the RTC’s Decision to the Court of Appeals, contending that respondent failed to present incontrovertible evidence that respondent and its predecessor-in-interest have been in open continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier.  The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision on 02 June 2006, dismissing the appeal by the OSG. Hence the appeal to the Supreme Court. The Government argued that contrary to the Court of Appeals’ ruling that respondent was able to prove its claim under paragraphs (2) and (4) of Section 14, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, respondent’s application for registration was actually based on paragraph (1) of Section 14, P.D. No. 1529, the conditions under which were not sufficiently established by respondent’s evidence.

Issue: Whether or not the appeal to reverse the decision of the CA affirming the RTC’s ruling of granting the OCT should be reversed.

RulingThe Supreme Court Found the petition of the Republic of the Philippines meritorious. CA decision was reversed.Although the government concedes that respondent was able to show that the land applied for has been declassified from the forest or timber zone and is an alienable public agricultural land, respondent’s evidence failed to satisfy the requirement under paragraph (1) of Section 14, P.D. No. 1529, that is, respondent’s possession and occupation of the property for the length of time and in the manner required by law. The Supreme Court Found the petition of the republic of the Philippines meritorious. Under the Regalian doctrine, the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. This is

premised on the basic doctrine that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Any applicant for confirmation of imperfect title bears the burden of proving that he is qualified to have the land titled in his name.1[4]The reckoning date under the Public Land Act for the acquisition of ownership of public lands is June 12, 1945 or earlier, and that evidence of possession from that date or earlier is essential for a grant of an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. While a tax declaration by itself is not sufficient to prove ownership, it may serve as sufficient basis for inferring possession.

#30 TORRES, ANDERSON (2012-0684)REPUBLIC vs HUBILLAFACTS: On March 5, 1999, respondents filed an application for registration of title for Lot No. 6218-B in Subdivision Plan Csd-04-004665-D situated in Alaminos, Laguna (the Property). Respondents alleged that they have been in open, continuous, public, peaceful and notorious possession and occupation of the Property, by themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, prior to June 12, 1945. Among others, the respondents presented the following documents to support their application: 1) a blue print copy of the subdivision plan Csd-04-004665-D approved by the Director of Lands through Assistant Regional Director Ernesto Viquiera; 2) a technical description approved by the Land Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR); 3) a certification from the DENR Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) which states that the Property is entirely within the alienable and disposable zone as of December 31, 1925 and has not been previously titled; 4) a report of the Land Management Bureau stating that the Property is not covered by any previous land registration case; and 5) tax declarations dating from 1999 back to 1945 in the names of Mateo Abrigo and Rodrigo Abrigo after the former’s death.The petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred when it deemed the submission of a blueprint copy of the survey plan as sufficient compliance with the requirements under the Property Registration Decree. In this regard, petitioner avers that submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands, is a mandatory requirement in cases of application for original registration of land.ISSUE: Whether or not submission of a blueprint copy of the survey plan is a sufficient compliance with the requirements under the Property Registration Decree.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that blueprint copies of the original tracing cloth plan from the Bureau of Lands and other evidence could also provide sufficient identification to identify a piece of land for registration purposes. The Court concluded that the subject property was sufficiently identified by: 1) the blueprint copy of the plan and technical description which were both approved by the Land Management Services of the DENR; and 2) the report of the Land Management Sector stating that the subject property is not a portion of, nor identical to any previously approved isolated survey. The applicants in that case also submitted a certified true copy of the original tracing cloth plan to the Court of Appeals as well as a certification from the Land Registration Authority attesting that the original plan in diazo polyester film was on file.

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