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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

 

G.R. No. L-26127 June 28, 1974

(Civil Case No. 3621)

VICTOR BENIN, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs.

MARIANO SEVERO TUASON y DE LA PAZ, ET AL., defendants. J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. L-26128 June 28, 1974

(Civil Case No. 3622)

JUAN ALCANTARA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs.MARIANO SEVERO TUASON y DE LA PAZ, ET AL., defendants. J.M. TUASON & CO., INC., defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. L-26129 June 28, 1974

(Civil Case No. 3623)

DIEGO PILI, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs.MARIANO SEVERO TUASON y DE LA PAZ, ET AL., defendants. J.M. TUASON & CO., INC., defendant-appellant.

Jose Palarca Law Offices for plaintiffs-appellees.

Manuel O. Chan & Rodolfo M. Caluag for defendant-appellant.

 

ZALDIVAR, J.:p

Appeal from the decision, dated January 18, 1965, of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the Hon. Judge Eulogio Mencias, presiding in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622, and 3623.  1

On May 19, 1955 three sets of plaintiffs filed three separate complaints containing substantially the same allegations. 2

In Civil Case No. 3621, the plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of the three parcels of agricultural lands, described in paragraph V of the complaint, located in the barrio of La Loma (now barrio of San Jose) in the municipality (now city) of Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an aggregate area of approximately 278,928 square meters; that they inherited said parcels of land from their ancestor Sixto Benin, who in turn inherited the same from his father, Eugenio Benin; that they and their predecessors in interest had possessed these three parcels of land openly, adversely, and peacefully, cultivated the same and exclusively enjoyed the fruits harvested therefrom; that Eugenio Benin, plaintiff's grandfather, had said parcels of land surveyed on March 4 and 6, 1894, that during the cadastral survey by the Bureau of Lands of the lands in Barrio San Jose in 1933 Sixto Benin and herein plaintiffs claim the ownership over said parcels of land; that they declared said lands for taxation purposes in 1940 under Tax Declaration No. 2429; that after the outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other places, after having secured the permission of the plaintiffs, constructed their houses thereon and paid monthly rentals to plaintiffs.

In Civil Case No. 3622 the plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of two parcels of agricultural land, described in paragraph V of the complaint, located in the Barrio of La Loma (now Barrio San Jose) in the municipality of Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an aggregate area of approximately 148,118 square meters; that these parcels of land were inherited by them from their deceased father Bonoso Alcantara, who in turn inherited the same from his father, Juan Alcantara; that plaintiffs Juan Alcantara and Jose Alcantara were the children of Bonoso Alcantara; that these two brothers inherited the land from their father, and they and their predecessors in interest had been in open, adverse and continuous possession of the same, planting therein palay and other agricultural products and exclusively enjoying said products; that on March 28, 1894 plaintiffs' grandfather, Juan Alcantara, had said lands surveyed; that during the cadastral survey by the Bureau of Lands of the lands in Barrio San Jose in 1933 Bonoso Alcantara and the plaintiffs filed and registered their claims of ownership over said lands; that plaintiffs had said lands declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 2390, of Quezon City; that after the outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other places, after having secured permission from plaintiffs, settled and constructed their houses on said lands and plaintiffs collected monthly rentals from them.

In Civil Case No. 3623, plaintiffs alleged that they are the owners and possessors of a parcel of agricultural land located in the Barrio of La Loma (now San Jose), municipality of Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an area of approximately 62,481 square meters; that this parcel of land was inherited by plaintiffs from their ancestor Candido Pili who in turn inherited the same from his parents; that Candido Pili and his predecessors in interest owned, possessed, occupied and cultivated the said parcel of land from time immemorial; that upon the death of Candido Pili his children Luisa Pili, Pascual Pili, Diego Pili and Manuel Pili succeeded to the ownership and possession and cultivation of said land; that plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest, as owners and possessors of said land, had openly, adversely and continuously cultivated the land, planting thereon palay and other agricultural products and enjoying exclusively the products harvested therefrom; that during his lifetime, Candido Pili ordered the survey of said land sometime on March 11, 1894, and when the cadastral survey of said land was conducted by the Bureau of Lands in 1933 Candido Pili and plaintiffs filed and registered their claim of ownership over the said parcel of land; that plaintiffs had the land declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 2597, Quezon City, Philippines; that after the outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other places, after securing permission from plaintiffs, settled and constructed their houses in said land and plaintiffs collected monthly rentals from their lessees or tenants.

The plaintiffs in these three civil cases uniformly alleged, in their respective complaint, that sometime in the year 1951 while they were enjoying the peaceful possession of their lands, the defendants, particularly the defendant J.M. Tuason and Co. Inc., through their agents and representatives, with the aid of armed men, by force and intimidation, using bulldozers and other demolishing equipment, illegally entered and started defacing, demolishing and destroying the dwellings and constructions of plaintiffs' lessees, as well as the improvements consisting of rice paddies (pilapiles), bamboos and fruit trees, and permanent improvements such as old roads, old bridges and other permanent landmarks within and outside the lands in question, disregarding the objections of plaintiffs, and as a result plaintiffs were deprived of the rentals received from their lessees; that plaintiffs made inquiries regarding the probable claim of defendants, and in 1953 they discovered for the first time that their lands, as described in their respective complaint, had either been fraudulently or erroneously included, by direct or constructive fraud, in what appears as Parcel No. 1 (known as Santa Mesa Estate) in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Land Records of the province of Rizal in the names of the original applicants for registration, now defendants, Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz.

The plaintiffs in each of the three complaints also alleged that the registered owners mentioned in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 had applied for the registration of two parcels of land (known as the Santa Mesa Estate and the Diliman Estate), located in the municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del Monte, province of Rizal, of which parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) contained an area of 8,798,617 square meters; that the registration proceedings were docketed as LRC No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration; that the application for registration in LRC No. 7681, containing the boundaries, technical descriptions and areas of parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) and parcel No. 2 (Diliman Estate) was published in the Official Gazette; that before the decision was handed down in LRC No. 7681, the area, boundaries and technical descriptions of parcel No. 1 were altered and amended; that the amendments and alterations, which were made after the publication of the original application, were never published; that on March 7, 1914 a decision was rendered in LRC No. 7681 based on the amended plan; that pursuant to the decision of March 7, 1914 a decree of registration was issued on July 6, 1914, known as Decree No. 17431, decreeing the registration in the names of the applicants of the two parcels of land (Santa Mesa Estate and Diliman Estate); that the decision dated March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is null and void because the Land Registration Court had no jurisdiction to render the decision for lack of publication; that Decree No. 17431 issued pursuant to the decision of March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is likewise null and void from the beginning, because it was issued pursuant to a void decision and because the boundaries, technical descriptions and areas appearing in the decree are different and not identical with the boundaries, technical descriptions and areas in the application for registration as published in the Official Gazette; that the area of parcel No. 1 as mentioned in Decree No. 17431 is bigger than the area of parcel No. 1 appearing in the application for registration as published in the Official Gazette; that Original Certificate of Title No. 735, referring to parcel 1 (Santa Mesa Estate), is also null and void from the beginning because it was issued pursuant to a void decree of registration; that the area, boundaries and technical description of Parcel No. 1 appearing in Decree of Registration No. 17431 and in the Original Certificate of Title No. 735 are different from the area, boundaries and technical description appearing in the application for registration as published in the Official Gazette; that the plaintiffs had not been notified of the proceedings in LRC No. 7681 although the applicants knew, or could have known, by the exercise of necessary diligence, the names and addresses of the plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest who were then, and up to the time the complaints were filed, in possession and were cultivating the lands described in paragraph V of their respective complaint; and that during, before, and even after the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 the defendants had tacitly recognized the ownership of the plaintiffs over their respective lands because said defendants had never disturbed the possession and cultivation of the lands by the plaintiffs until the year 1951; and that all transfer certificates of title issued subsequently, based on Original Certificate of Title No. 735, are also null and void. 3

The plaintiffs in each of the three cases prayed the court: (1) to declare them owners and entitled to the possession of the parcel, or parcels, of land described in their respective complaint, as the case may be; (2) to revoke the decision of the Court of Land Registration, dated March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681, and to declare Decree No. 17431, dated July 6, 1914 null and void from the beginning with respect to Parcel No. 1(Santa Mesa Estate) in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 which include the lands of the plaintiffs; (3) to declare Original Certificate of Title No. 735, particularly as it refers to Parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) also null and void; (4) to declare null and void all transfer certificates of titles issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal and of Quezon City subsequent to, and based on, Original Certificate of Title No. 735; (5) to order the defendants, in the event Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is declared valid, to reconvey and transfer title over the land described in their respective complaint in favor of the plaintiffs in each case, as the case may be; (6) to order the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the market value of the lands in question in case of defendants' inability to reconvey the same; (7) to order the defendants to pay damages to the plaintiffs; (8) to issue a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendants, their lawyers, their agents and representatives from disturbing the ownership and possession of the plaintiffs during the pendency of these cases.

The plaintiffs, in the three cases, were allowed by the trial court to litigate as paupers.

Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was actually served with summons. The other defendants were ordered summoned by publication in accordance with Sections 16 and 17 of the Rules of Court. Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. appeared. The other defendants were all declared in default.

On June 23, 1955 defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss in each of the three cases. This motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court on July 20, 1955.

On July 18, 1955 the trial court issued an order granting the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the plaintiffs in their complaints. The preliminary injunction, however, was lifted by order of the trial court on October 3, 1955, upon the posting by defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. of bonds in the total amount of P14,000.00 pursuant to the order of the court of September 26, 1955.

On August 11, 1955 defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed in the three cases a motion for reconsideration of the order of July 20, 1955 denying the motion to dismiss. This motion for reconsideration was denied by order of the court of September 26, 1955.

On November 29, 1955 defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed an answer in each of the three cases. In its answer, this defendant, among others, specifically denied plaintiffs' claim of ownership of the lands involved in each case. The answer contains special and affirmative defenses, to wit: (1) that the plaintiffs' cause of action is barred by prior judgment and res judicata in view of the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in its Civil Case No. Q-156 which was subsequently elevated to the Supreme Court as G.R. No. L-4998, in which latter case the Supreme Court affirmed in toto the order of the lower court dismissing the case; (2) that the complaints failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants; (3) that the plaintiffs' action, assuming that their complaints state sufficient cause of action, had prescribed either under Act No. 496 or under statutes governing prescription of action; (4) that defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. is a buyer in good faith and for valuable consideration of the parcels of land involved in the three cases; (5) that the registration proceedings had in LRC No. 7681 instituted by the defendant's predecessors in interest was in accordance with law, and the requirements for a valid registration of title were complied with. By way of counterclaim the defendant prayed that the plaintiffs be ordered to pay damages as therein specified.

The plaintiffs, amended their complaints in the three cases, by including additional parties as plaintiffs, and the amended complaints were admitted by the trial court. The defendant, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., filed a manifestation that it was reproducing and realleging its answers to the original complaints as its answers to the amended complaints in view of the fact that the amendments to the complaints consist merely in the inclusion of additional indispensable as well as necessary parties-plaintiffs. 4

On June 7, 1962, after the plaintiffs had presented their evidence, defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. presented a motion to dismiss the cases upon grounds that (1) the actions were barred by the statute of limitations; (2) that the actions barred by a prior judgment; and (3) that plaintiffs had not presented any evidence to prove their claim of ownership. The defendant later filed a motion to withdraw the third ground of its motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss, as well as to the motion of defendant to withdraw its third ground to dismiss. The trial court, in an order dated December 3, 1962, granted defendant's motion to withdraw the third ground of its motion to dismiss but denied the motion to dismiss. 5

After trial, on January 18, 1965, the lower court rendered a decision for the three cases, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the Plaintiffs and against the Defendants as follows:

A — Declaring that the decision, the decree and the title issued in LRC No. 7681, are null and void,ab initio, and of no effect whatsoever;

B — Declaring that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 found on page 136 Vol. A-7 of the Registration Book of Rizal is null and void from the very beginning (and) of no effect whatsoever;

C — Declaring that all Transfer Certificates of Title emanating or allegedly derived from Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Province of Rizal are likewise null and void;

D — Declaring that the plaintiff in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 are the owners and entitled to the possession of the parcels of land claimed and described in paragraph V of their respective complaints;

E — Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming under them to vacate and restore to the plaintiffs the possesion of the parcels of land described in paragraph V of the complaint in Civil Case No. 3621 and indicated as Parcel A, Parcel B and Parcel C, in SWO-40187 (Exh. "UU" and Exh. "VV");

F — Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming under them to vacate and restore to the plaintiffs the possession of the parcels of land described in paragraph V of the complaint in Civil Case No. 3623 and indicated as Parcel D and Parcel F, in SWO-40187 (Exh. "UU" and Exh. 'VV");

G — Ordering the Defendants and all persons claiming under them to vacate and restore to the plaintiffs the possession of the parcels of land described in paragraph V of the complaint in Civil Case No. 3623 and indicated in Parcel E, in SWO-491187 (Exh. "UU and Exh. "VV");

H — Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3621 the sum of P600.00 a month as actual damages for uncollected rentals from 1951 until such possession is restored to them;

I — Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623 the sum of P600.00 a month, as actual damages for uncollected rentals from 1951 until such possession is restored to them;.

J — Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623 the sum of P150.00 a month as actual damages for uncollected rentals from 1951 until such possession is restored to them; .

K — Ordering the defendants to pay the costs; .

L — The defendants' counterclaim is hereby declared dismissed for lack of merit."  6

A motion for new trial was filed by defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. on January 30, 1965. However, before the motion for new trial was resolved by the court, said defendant, on February 11, 1965, filed a notice of appeal to this Court and an appeal bond, and on February 12, 1965 he filed the record on appeal. 7 The record on appeal, after it had been corrected and amended, as ordered and/or authorized by the trial court, was approved on September 29, 1965. 8

Appellant J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc., in this appeal, contends that the trial court committed the following errors:

I. The lower court erred in holding that the Land Registration Court in GLRO No. 7681 lacked or was without jurisdiction to issue decree No. 17431 for the alleged reason that:

(1) The amendment to the original plan was not published;

(2) The description of Parcel 1 in the decree is not identical with the description of Parcel 1 as applied for and as published in the Official Gazette;

(3) Parcel 1 as decreed is bigger in area than Parcel 1 as applied for;

(4) A. Bonifacio Road is the only boundary on the West of Parcel 1.

II. The trial court erred in finding that the transcription of the decree No. 17431 was not in accordance with the law and that, therefore, said OCT 735 was a complete nullity and the land remains unregistered.

III. The trial court erred in taking cognizance of these cases despite its lack of jurisdiction to hear and decide the same.

IV. The trial court erred in not dismissing these cases on the grounds of prescription and laches, and in denying the motions to dismiss filed on said grounds.

V. The trial court erred in not dismissing these cases on the ground of res judicata and in denying the motion to dismiss filed on said ground.

VI. The trial court erred in declaring null and void all certificates of title emanating from OCT 735.

VII. The trial court erred in holding that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. is not a purchaser in good faith and for value.

VIII. The trial court erred in awarding ownership of the lands claimed by, and in awarding damages to, the appellees.

IX. The trial court erred in denying and in dismissing appellant's counterclaim and in sentencing appellant to pay the costs of these suits.

As stated by the trial court in its decision, "These cases involve the validity of the decision and the decree issued in LRC No. 7681 resulting in the issuance of Title No. 735, and the ownership and possession of several parcels of land, claimed by the plaintiffs in their respective complaints...."

The lower court, summarizing its findings, among others, concluded that: (1) the decision and the decree in LRC No. 7681 are null and void ab initio, having been rendered without jurisdiction; (2) Original Certificate of Title No. 735 issued pursuant to the decree in LRC No. 7681 is null and void, having been issued pursuant to a void degree; (3) Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is null and void because the No. 17431 in LRC No. 7681, assuming the degree to be valid, had not been inscribed in accordance with the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496; (4) all Transfer Certificates of Title allegedly emanating and derived from the void Original Certificate of Title No. 735 are likewise null and void; and (5) the plaintiffs in these three civil are the owners and entitled to the possession of the parcels of land described in their respective complaints.

We have carefully examined and studied the voluminous records, and the numerous documentary evidence, of these three cases, and We find that the conclusions of the trial court are not supported by the evidence and the applicable decisions of this Court.

The Original Certificate of Title No. 735 that had been declared null and void ab initio by the trial court covers two big parcels of land, mentioned in said title as Parcel 1, having an area of 8,778,644.10 square meters more or less, known as the Santa Mesa Estate; and Parcel 2, having an area of 15,961,246 square meters more or less, known as the Diliman Estate. The three parcels of land involved in Civil Case No. 3621, having an aggregate area of 278,853 square meters, more or less; the two parcels of land involved in Civil Case No. 3622 having an aggregate area of 154,119.7 square meters, more or less; and the one parcel of land involved in Civil Case No. 3623, having an area of 62,481 square meters, more or less, are all included in the area of Parcel 1.  9 The trial court, in its decision, states that the identity of the parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs is not disputed and that both the plaintiffs and the defendant admit that the parcels of land litigated are found within the boundaries of the present Sta. Mesa Heights Subdivision (Parcel 1) covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. 10 It is shown in the survey plans, presented by both the plaintiffs and the defendant, that the six parcels of lands involved in these three cases are located at the northwestern portion of Parcel 1. (Exhs. UU, VV; and Exh. 29).

The records show, and it is established by the evidence, that sometime in 1911 Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz, filed with the Court of Land Registration an application for the registration of their title over two parcels of land, designated in the survey plans accompanying the application as Parcel 1 with an area of 8,798,617 square meters, and Parcel 2 with an area of 16,254,037 square meters. The application was docketed as LRC No. 7681. There was another application covering three other parcels of land, docketed as LRC No. 7680. The application in LRC No. 7681 was set for hearing on November 20, 1911 (Exh. X). The application and the notice of hearing, containing the technical descriptions of the two parcels of land applied for, were published in the issue of the Official Gazette of October 25, 1911 (Exh. YY). On November 20, 1911 the Court of Land Registration issued an order of general default against the whole world except the Insular Government, the Director of Lands and the municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del Monte (Exh. 28). On December 23, 1911 the court issued an order authorizing the amendment of the plan in LRC No. 7681 (Exh. 23). November 11, 1913 the applicants and the Government entered into an agreement whereby the Government agreed to withdraw its opposition to the application for registration of title over the portion known as Hacienda Diliman (Parcel 2) on condition that the roads existing on said tract of land be allowed to remain, and it was further agreed "that the issuance, of the title to applicants shall be made subject to all the exceptions established by Section 39 of Act 496 as amended by Section 1 of Act 2011" (Exh. 21). On December 29, 1913 the Court of Land Registration rendered a decision (Exh. 24) in both LRC No. 7680 and LRC No. 7681 which, among others, stated that during the registration proceedings the plans accompanying the two applications were amended in order to exclude certain areas that were the subject of opposition, that the order of general default was confirmed, that the Chief of the Surveyor's Division of the Court of Land Registration was ordered to submit a report as to whether or

not the new (amended) plans had included lands which were not by the original plans, and whether or not the new plans had excluded the lands that had already been covered by the decree in LRC No. 3563. The decision further stated that in the event that the new plans did not include new parcels of land and that the lands that were the subject of the proceedings in LRC No. 3563 had been excluded, an additional decision would be made decreeing the adjudication and registration of the lands that were the subject of the registration proceedings in favor of the applicants, as follows: To Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, two sixths (2/6) undivided portion to Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6) undivided portion; to Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6) undivided portion; to Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6)undivided portion; and to Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6) undivided portion.

In compliance with the order contained in the decision of December 29, 1913, the Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration, on January 24, 1914, submitted a report (Exh. 22) to the court which, among others, stated that the new plan of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681 did not include any land that had not been previously included in the original plan.

On March 7, 1914 the Court of Land Registration rendered a supplemental decision declaring that, on the basis of the decision of December 29, 1913 and of the report of the Surveyor of Court of Land Registration, the applicants Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz and others were the owners of the land applied for, as described in the amended plan, in the proportion mentioned in the decision, and ordering that the land applied for be registered in the names of the applicants and that a decree of registration be issued in accordance with the decision and the amended plan. On March 27, 1914 the Chief of the Survey Division addressed a communication to the registration court, in connection with LRC No. 7681, suggesting that the decision of the court of March 7, 1914 be modified such that the decree of registration be based upon the original plan as published and not upon the amended plan (Exh. Z-3). The Court of Land Registration did not follow the recommendation of the Chief of the Survey Division. On July 6, 1914 Decree of Registration No. 17431 was issued by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office pursuant to the decision of the Court of Land Registration of March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681. The decree contains the technical description of the two parcels of land in accordance with the plan as amended. It appears in the decree that Parcel 1 has an area of 8,798,644.10 square meters, more or less, or an increase of 27.10 square meters over the area of 8,798,617 square meters that was stated in the application for registration and in the notice of hearing which were published in the Official Gazette of October 25, 1911; and that Parcel 2 has an area of 15,961,246 square meters, more or less, or a decrease of 292,791 square meters from the area of 16,254,037 square meters that was stated in the application and in the notice of hearing that were published in the Official Gazette (Exhs. 25 and YY). All in all, there is a decrease of 292,763.90 square meters in the aggregate area of the two parcels of land sought to be registered.

Subsequently, on July 8, 1914, the Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal issued Original Certificate of Title No. 735 in the names of the applicants, Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz (Exh. 30).

1. We shall now deal with the first error assigned by the appellant.

The lower court declared Original Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void ab initio because, according to said court, that title was based on Decree of Registration No. 17431 in LRC No. 7681 that was null and void, said decree having been issued pursuant to a decision of the Court of Land Registration in LRC No. 7681 which had no jurisdiction to render said decision.

As We have adverted to, Original Certificate of Title No. 735 covers two big parcels of land: Parcel 1, known as the Santa Mesa Estate, and Parcel 2, known as the Diliman Estate. The records show that

these two parcels of land had been subdivided into numerous lots, and most of those lots had sold to numerous parties — Parcel 1 having been converted into a subdivision known as the Santa Mesa Heights Subdivision, and the lots had been sold to private individual and entities, such that in that subdivision now are located the National Orthopedic Hospital, the station of Pangasinan Transportation Co. (Pantranco), Sto. Domingo Church, Lourdes Church and others. Necessarily, as a result of the sales of the lots into which Parcel 1 was subdivided, transfer certificates of title were issued to the purchasers of the lots, and these transfer certificates of title were based upon transfer certificates of title that emanated from Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The trial court declared null and void all transfer certificates of title emanating, or derived, from Original Certificate of No. 735.

The decision of the trial court declaring null and void ab initio Original Certificate of Title No. 735 would invalidate the title over the entire area included in Parcel 1 — which admittedly includes the six parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs-and also the title over the entire area included in Parcel 2. Let it be noted that Parcel 1 has an area of 8,798,644.10 square meters, more or less, and Parcel 2 has an area of 15,961,246 square meters, more or less; while the six parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs have an aggregate area of only 495,453.7 square meters, more or less. In other words, the area of the six parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs is only a little over two per cent (2%) of the aggregate area of Parcel 1 and Parcel 2. But the decision of the trial court nullified Original Certificate of Title No. 785, without any qualification.

The trial court held that the Court of Land Registration had no jurisdiction to render the decision in LRC No. 7681 because during the registration proceedings, after the original application and notice of hearing had been duly published, the plan of Parcel 1 was amended and no publication regarding the amended plan was made. The trial court pointed out that the area and the description of Parcel 1 in Decree of Registration No. 17431 are not identical with the area and description of Parcel 1 applied for and published in the Official Gazette. The trial court stressed on the point that publication is one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide an application for registration and to order the issuance of a decree of registration, as provided in Act 496 (Land Registration Act).

We believe that the lower court erred when it held that the Land Registration Court was without jurisdiction to render the decision in LRC No. 7681. Under Section 23 of Act 496, the registration court may allow, or order, an amendment of the application for registration when it appears to the court that the amendment is necessary and proper. Under Section 24 of the same act the court may at any time order an application to be amended by striking out one or more parcels or by severance of the application. The amendment may be made in the application or in the survey plan, or in both, since the application and the survey plan go together. If the amendment consists in the inclusion in the application for registration of an area or parcel of land not previously included in the original application, as published, a new publication of the amended application must be made. The purpose of the new publication is to give notice to all persons concerned regarding the amended application. Without a new publication the registration court can not acquire jurisdiction over the area or parcel of land that is added to the area covered by the original application, and the decision of the registration court would be a nullity insofar as the decision concerns the newly included land. 11 The reason is because without a new publication, the law is infringed with respect to the publicity that is required in registration proceedings, and third parties who have not had the opportunity to present their claim might be prejudiced in their rights because of failure of notice. 12 But if the amendment consists in the exclusion of a portion of the area covered by the original application and the original plan as previously published, a new publication is not necessary. 13 In the latter case, the jurisdiction of the court over the remaining area is not affected by the failure of a new publication. 14

In the case at bar We find that the original plan covering Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 that accompanied the application for registration in LRC No. 7681 was amended in order to exclude certain areas that

were the subject of opposition, or which were the subject of another registration case; and the Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration was ordered to determine whether the amended plan included lands or areas not included in the original plan. In compliance with the order of the registration court said Chief of the Survey Division informed the court that no new parcels were included in the new (or amended) plan. Thus, in the decision of the Court of Land Registration in LRC Nos. 7680 and 7681, dated December 29, 1913 (Exh. 24), We read the following:

Despues de las notificaciones y avisos de las dos solicitudes en ambos expedientes, se enmendaronlos planos unidos a  los mismos para excluir ciertas porciones que habian sido objeto de oposicion.

xxx xxx xxx

POR TANTO, ratificando como por la presente se ratifica la declaracion de rebeldia general, se ordena:

"1.o Que el Jefe de la Division de Agrimensores de este Tribunal terreno que no haya sido comprendido en los planos originales ...." 15

On January 24, 1914, the Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration made a report to the court (Exh. 22), from which the report We read the following:.

Cumpliendo lo mandado por el Tribunal en el No. 1 de la parte dispositiva de su Decision de fecha 29 de Diciembre proximo pasado, el que suscribe, despues de un detenido estudio de los planos unidos a los Expedientes arriba citados, tiene el honor de informar:

1.o Que los nuevos planos presentados por los solicitantes corresponden a las parcelas 1.a 2.a, y 3.a, del Expedients No. 7680 y a la 1.a parcela del No. 7681, que son las mismas a que se refiere el plano Exhibito A del No. 7680.

xxx xxx xxx

4. Que los nuevos planos presentados de las parcelas 1.a, 2.a y 3.a del Expediente 7680, y de la 1.a del 7681 no incluyen terreno alguno que no haya sido comprendido en los planos originales. 16

And so, in the supplemental decision of the Court of Land Registration in LRC No. 7681, dated March 7, 1914 (Exh. 24-A), the report of the Chief of the Survey Division was taken into consideration and the court ordered the registration of the lands applied for by the applicants as described in the amended plan ("como esta descrito en el plano enmendado"). It is thus shown that the amended plan in LRC No. 7681 did not cover parcels, or areas, that were not previously included in the original plan which accompanied the application that had been published in the Official Gazette. There was, therefore, no necessity for a new publication of the amended plan in order to vest the Court of Land Registration with jurisdiction to hear and decide the application for registration in LRC No. 7681 and to order the issuance of Decree of Registration No. 17431 upon which Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was based.

Way back in 1933, this Court had occasion to rule on the validity of the very same Original Certificate of Title No. 735 which the trial court had declared null and void in the three cases now before this Court. In the case of the Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Acuña (59 Phil. 183) the

validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was assailed by the appellants (Pascual Acuña and others) precisely upon the ground that during the registration proceedings, which brought about the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, the original plan of the applicants was ordered amended, and no new publication was made of the amended plan and so it was urged that the registration court did not have jurisdiction to order the issuance of the decree of registration in favor of the applicants. The action in this case was instituted by the Bank of the Philippine Islands as receiver of the Tuason Entail for the purpose, among others, of recovering from Pascual Acuña and others certain lands included in the Santa Mesa and Diliman hacienda located in the barrios of Bagobantay and Diliman, in the municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del Monte Province of Rizal. Upon hearing, the Court of First Instance of Rizal declared that none of the defendants owned any part of the land in controversy. On appeal, this Court observed that the character in which the plaintiff sued was not open to question, and the material facts were as follows: The heirs of the Tuason estate, referred to as the Tuason Entail, held a Torrens title to a tract of land with an area of about 1,600 hectares located in the province of Rizal. This property was then covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3792 issued in lieu of older certificates dating from July 8, 1914. This Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3792 emanated from Or Certificate of Title No. 735. 17 The appellants precisely sought to nullify the title of the heirs of the Tuason estate, which emanated from Original Certificate of Title No. 735, upon the ground, as now urged by the appellees in the three cases at bar, that during the registration proceedings the original plan of the lands known as the Sta. Mesa and Diliman was amended, and no publication was made of the amended plan. Regarding the question of the non-publication of the amended plan, this Court said:

Among the arguments made by the appellants of the Bagobantay group, it is alleged that the Torrens title relied by the plaintiff is void, and in support of this contention it stated that, during the course of the registration proceedings, an order was made by the court for the amendment of the applicants and that this order was not followed by new publication, wherefore, it is supposed the court was without jurisdiction to decree the title to the applicants. In this connection reliance is placed upon the doctrine stated in the Philippine Manufacturing Co. vs. Imperial (49 Phil. 122). But the brief for the appellants fails to call attention to the fact that the rule stated in the case cited has reference to an amendment of the plan by which additional land, different from that included in the original survey is intended to be brought within the process of registration. In the case before us, the order referred to was for the exclusion of certain portions of the land covered by the original survey, and the doctrine of the case cited cannot apply. Apart from this it does not appear that the portion intended to be excluded comprehended any part of the land which had been usurped. 18

The appellees, however, asserts that the case of the Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Acuña, supra, is not applicable to the three cases now before this Court because what was involved in said case was Parcel 2 of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, and not Parcel 1 which is the land involved in these cases. This assertion of the appellees is not correct. The decision in that case states that the action was instituted by the Bank of the Philippine Islands, as receiver of the Tuason Entail, for the purpose, among others, of recovering from Pascual Acuña and others "certain lands contained in the Sta. Mesa and Diliman Hacienda located in the barrios of Bagobantay and Diliman in the municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del Monte." 19 But what matters is the doctrine that was laid down by this Court in that case that is: that when the original survey plan is amended, after the publication of the application in order to include land not previously included in the original survey, a new publication of the amended plan is necessary in order to confer jurisdiction upon the registration court to order the registration of the land that is added to what was included in the original survey plan. The ruling of this Court in the Bank of the Philippine Islands case has a decisive application in the three cases now before this Court.

The trial court laid stress on the point that publication of the amended plan of Parcel 1 should have been made because it appears in the Decree of Registration No. 17431, and as reproduced in Original Certificate of Title No. 735, that the area of said parcel is "bigger" than the area stated in the application as published in the Official Gazette; and, also, that the boundaries of Parcel 1 stated in the decree are not identical with the boundaries stated in the application as published in the Official Gazette. We paid particular attention on this point of the lower court's decision, and our impression is that the trial court had exploited certain minor discrepancies between the description of Parcel 1 in the decree of registration and its description in the original application, in order to bolster its ruling that "to render a decision on the amended plan, boundary descriptions, and additional lands comprised within Parcel 1 in Decree No. 17431, a republication of such amended plan, boundary description, technical description and additional areas is necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the Court." 20

Oddly enough, when the lower court said that the area of Parcel 1 in the decree of registration is bigger than the area of Parcel 1 in the application as published, it did not mention the fact that the difference in area is only 27.10 square meters. We believe that this difference of 27.10 square meters is too minimal to be of decisive consequence in the determination of the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735. It was error on the part of the lower court to lay stress on this circumstance and made it a basis for ruling that because in the amended plan there is this increase in area as compared to the area appearing in the application as published, the Land Registration Court did not have jurisdiction to render the decision decreeing the registration of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681. The Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration, in his report to the court of January 24, 1914 (Exh. 22), stated that the new plan of Parcel 1 did not include any land that was not included in the original plan. That report was made precisely in compliance with the order of the registration court, in the decision of December 29, 1913 in LRC No. 7681, to inform the court "si los nuevos planos incluyen o no terreno que no haya sido comprendido en los planos originales". That report was submitted by the Chief Surveyor "despues de un detenido estudio de los planos unidos a los expedientes". Under the foregoing circumstances, our inference is that the area of 27.10 square meters was already included in the original plan, and that the computation of the area in the original survey must have been inaccurate; and the error was corrected in the recomputation of the area when the amended plan was prepared. We made a careful study and comparison of the technical description of Parcel 1 appearing in the application as published, and the technical description appearing in Decree of Registration No. 17431 (Exhs. 19, 19-A and Z-6), and We accept the explanation of counsel for the appellant that this seeming increase of 27.10 square meters had been brought about "by the fact that when the amendment of the plan was made, the distances and bearings in a few points along the southwestern boundary (Please see Exh. 19) were brought to the nearest millimeter and to the nearest second respectively; whereas, the computation of the survey in the original plan was to the nearest decimeter and to the nearest minute only". 21 We believe that this very slight increase of 27.10 square meters would not justify the conclusion of the lower court that "the amended plan ... included additional lands which were not originally included in Parcel 1 as published in the Official Gazette." It being undisputed that Parcel 1 has an area of more than 8,798,600 square meters (or 879.86 hectares), We believe that this difference of 27.10 square meters, between the computation of the area when the original plan was made and the computation of the area when the amended plan was prepared, can not be considered substantial as would affect the identity of Parcel 1.

Moreover, no evidence was presented to identify this area of 27.10 square meters, nor to show its location, in relation to the entire area of Parcel 1. The appellees did not even attempt to show that this excess area of 27.10 square meters is included within the parcels that they are claiming. We cannot, therefore; consider this area of 27.10 square meters as an area that was separate and distinct from, and was added to, the land that was covered by the original survey plan, such that the publication of the amended plan would be necessary in order that the registration court could acquire jurisdiction over that area. As We have pointed out, this increase of 27.10 square meters was simply

the result of the recomputation of the area when the original plan was amended. There is no showing that the recomputation is incorrect. Neither is there a showing that this small area of 27.10 square meters belongs to any person and that person had been deprived of his property, or had failed to claim that particular area because of the non-publication of the amended plan. On the other hand, there is the report of the Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration (Exh. 22) stating that the amended plan of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681 did not include any land which was not included in the original plan.

It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that only in cases where the original survey plan is amended during the registration proceedings by the addition of lands not previously included in the original plan should publication be made in order to confer jurisdiction on the court to order the registration of the area that was added after the publication of the original plan. 22

The settled rule, further, is that once the registration court had acquired jurisdiction over a certain parcel, or parcels, of land in the registration proceedings in virtue of the publication of the application, that jurisdiction attaches to the land or lands mentioned and described in the application. If it is later shown that the decree of registration had included land or lands not included in the original application as published, then the registration proceedings and the decree of registration must be declared null and void in so far — but only in so far — as the land not included in the publication is concerned. This is so, because the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the land not included in the publication-the publication being the basis: of the jurisdiction of the court. But the proceedings and the decree of registration, relating to the lands that were included in the publication, are valid. Thus, if it is shown that a certificate of title had been issued covering lands where the registration court had no jurisdiction, the certificate of title is null and void insofar as it concerns the land or lands over which the registration court had not acquired jurisdiction. 23

And so in the three cases now before this Court, even granting that the registration court had no jurisdiction over the increased area of 27.10 square meters (as alleged by appellees), the most that the lower court could have done was to nullify the decree and the certificate of title insofar as that area of 27.10 square meters is concerned, if that area can be identified. But, certainly, the lower court could not declare, and should not have declared, null and void the whole proceedings in LRC No. 7681; and, certainly, the lower court erred in declaring null and voidab initio Original Certificate of Title 735 which covers not only the supposed excess area of 27.10 square meters but also the remaining area of 8,798,617 square meters of Parcel 1 and the entire area of 15,961,246 square meters of Parcel 2. The trial court, in its decision, declared Original Certificate of Title No. 735 "null and void from the very beginning and of no effect whatsoever", without any qualification. This declaration by the lower court, if sanctioned by this Court and given effect, would nullify the title that covers two big parcels of land (Parcels 1 and 2) that have a total area of 24,759,890.10 square meters, or almost 2,476 hectares. And not only that. The trial court declared null and void all transfer certificates of title that are derived, or that emanated, from Original Certificate of Title No. 735, regardless of whether those transfer certificates of title are the results of transactions done in good faith and for value by the holder of those transfer certificates of title.

It must be noted that the appellees in the present cases claim six parcels that have an area of some 495,453.7 square meters (about 49.5 hectares), whereas the combined area of Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 is 24,759,890.10 square meters (about 2,476 hectares). It must also be noted that both Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 have been subdivided into numerous lots (Exhs. 14 and 14-B) which have already been acquired by numerous persons and/or entities that are now holding certificates of title which can be traced back to Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The decision of the lower court, however, would render useless Original Certificate of Title No. 735 and all transfer certificates of title emanating, or derived, therefrom. The decision of the lower court would certainly prejudice the rights of the persons, both natural and juridical, who had acquired portions of Parcel 1 and Parcel 2, relying

on the doctrine of the indefeasibility of Torrens title. The decision of the lower court would, indeed, prejudice the rights of persons who are not parties in the present cases. And this is so, because the trial court, in its decision, did not adhere to the applicable decisions of this Court in resolving the pertinent issues in these cases.

Another reason mentioned by the lower court to support its ruling that Decree of Registration No. 17431 is null and void is that the description of Parcel 1 in the decree of registration is different from the description of the same parcel in the notice of hearing of the original application for registration as published in the Official Gazette. The different description that appears in the decree of registration, according to the lower court, is an amendment to the Original survey plan that accompanied the application and the amended survey plan should have been republished; and because there was no such republication the registration court was without jurisdiction to issue the decree of registration. The lower court also committed an error in making this ruling. We find that the lower court incorrectly laid stress on differences in the names of the owners, and on differences in the designations, of the lands that adjoin Parcel 1 along its southwestern boundary. We find, however, that these differences are well explained in the record.

In the notice of hearing in LRC No. 7681 (Exhibits YY and YY-2) the boundaries of Parcel 1 are stated as follows:

Bounded on the N. by property of Rosario Negrao and others (Maysilo Estate); E. by the San Juan River; SW. by Parcel 3, properties of Benito Legarda, Hospital de San Juan de Dios, by Parcel 2, Santa Clara Monastery, by Parcel 1; and W. by a road, Cementerio del Norte and the Roman Catholic Church.

As described in Decree of Registration No. 17431 (Exh. 25), the boundaries of Parcel 1 are as follows:

PARCEL 1. Bounded on the N. by property of Rosario Negrao y Escobar, et al., (Maysilo Estate): On the E. by San Juan River; on the SW. by properties of Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., Benito Legarda, Hospital de San Juan de Dios and C.W. Rosenstock & Co.; and on the W. by a road, Cementerio del Norte and property of the Roman Catholic Church ...

It will thus be noted that the boundaries of Parcel 1 on the northern, eastern, and western sides, as they appear in the notice of hearing that was published and in Decree of Registration No. 17431, are the same. It is in the southwestern boundary where there appear some differences in the names of the owners, or in the designations, of the adjoining lands. Thus, in the published notice of hearing, it appears that the names of the owners, or the designations, of the lands that bound Parcel 1 (of LRC No. 7681) on the Southwest are parcel 3, properties of Benito Legarda, Hospital de San Juan de Dios, parcel 2, Monasterio de Santa Clara and parcel 1; while in the decree of registration it appears that the lands that bound Parcel 1 (of LRC No. 7681) on the Southwest are the properties of Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., Benito Legarda, Hospital de San Juan de Dios and C.W. Rosenstock & Co. Upon a careful examination of the records, We find that the lands that adjoin Parcel 1 at its southwestern boundary, as indicated in the notice of hearing that was published in the Official Gazette, are the same lands that are indicated in the decree of registration as the lands that adjoin Parcel 1 at its southwestern boundary. There is simply a change in the names of the owners or in the designations, of the lands. We find that parcels 3, 2 and 1, appearing as the boundary lands on the southwestern side of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681, as published, are in fact parcels of land that are owned, and had been applied for registration, by Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al. in LRC No. 7680. This LRC No. 7680 was heard and decided jointly with LRC No. 7681 by the Land Registration Court (Exh. 24). These parcels 3, 2 and 1 of LRC No. 7680, being lands owned by

Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., it may as well be stated in the decree of registration that those lands on the southwestern side of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681 are the properties of Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., instead of designating them as parcel 3, parcel 2, and parcel 1 (of LRC 1680). And so, what appears in Decree of Registration No. 17431 as the properties of Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., at the southwestern side of Parcel 1 are no other than those very parcels 3, 2 and 1 that appear in the notice of hearing as the lands that bound Parcel 1 on the southwest.

In the description of Parcel 1 as published, it appears that one of the boundaries on the southwestern side is Santa Clara Monastery, while in the decree of registration the words "Santa Clara Monastery" do not appear but, instead, are replaced by the words "C. W. Rosenstock & Co." It will be remembered that during the registration proceedings the plan of Parcel 1 was ordered amended, and the surveyor, who prepared the amended plan must have found that what used to be the property of the Santa Clara Monastery at the time of the original Survey was already the property of C. W. Rosenstock & Co. when the amended plan was prepared. This can simply mean that there was a change of ownership from Santa Clara Monastery to C.W. Rosenstock & Co. It must be considered that the original survey took place from December, 1910 to June, 1911 (Exhibits 18 and 19), while the registration case was decided on March 7, 1914.

Under Section 40 of Act 496, the decree of registration "shall contain a description of the land as finally determined by the court." Evidently, the Court of Land Registration acted in consonance with this provision of the law when, in its decision in LRC 7681, it took into consideration the actual description of Parcel 1 as shown in the amended survey plan, and when it disregarded the recommendation of the Chief of the Survey Division, dated March 27, 1914, that the decision of the court of March 7, 1914 "be based upon the original plans, as published, and not upon the amended plan." It may well be said that Decree of Registration N. 17431 simply contains the correct area of Parcel 1 and the correct names of the owners of the lands that bound Parcel 1 in LRC No. 1681 as of the time when the decision of the land registration court was rendered.

In this connection, the following pronouncement of this Court in the case of Domingo vs. Ongsiako, 55 Phil. 361, 373-4, is pertinent:

We may further observe that underlying the contention of the plaintiffs is the idea that errors in the plans nullify the decrees of registration. This is erroneous. It is the land and not the plan which is registered. Prior to the enactment of Act No. 1875, practically all plans for land registration were defective especially in regard to errors of closures and areas, but so far no such errors have been permitted to affect the validity of the decrees. If the boundaries of the land registered can be determined, the technical description in the certificate of title may be corrected without cancelling the decree. Such corrections have been made in this case by approved surveys which embrace all of the land here in question. To nullify and cancel final decrees merely by reason of faulty technical descriptions would lead to chaos.

We have taken note of the fact that the six parcels of land that are claimed by the plaintiffs in the three cases now before this Court are on the northwestern portion of Parcel 1 (parcels labelled A, B, C, D, E and F, in Exh. UU; and Exhs. 17, 29 and 29-B). They are far from the southwestern boundary. The circumstance, therefore, regarding the dissimilarity in the names of the owners, or the designations, of the lands that adjoin the southwestern side of Parcel 1 is of no moment insofar as the lots claimed by appellees are concerned. What matters is that the lots claimed by the appellees are included in Parcel 1 of LRC No. 1681 and are located at the northwestern portion of said Parcel 1. Indeed, it was error on the part of the lower court to make as one of the bases in declaring Decree of Registration No. 17431 and Original Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void and of no effect

whatsoever the aforestated dissimilarities in the names of the owners, or in the designations, of the lands on the southwestern side of Parcel 1, because those dissimilarities are well explained in the records of these cases.

The lower court committed still another error when it made the finding that the only boundary of Parcel 1 on the western side is "A. Bonifacio road" and then declared that the lands situated west of the A. Bonifacio road were never the subject of the registration proceedings in LRC No. 7681. The lower court declared the lands west of A. Bonifacio road as unregistered lands and awarded the ownership of those lands to the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621 and 3622 (appellees in G.R. Nos. L-26127 and L-26128). This finding of the lower court is contrary to the evidence presented by the parties in these cases. Both the appellees and the appellant submitted as their evidence the notice of hearing of the application as published in the Official Gazette (Exhibit X, YY and YY-2; and Exhibit 26) and the decree of registration No. 17431 (Exhibit Y, and Exh. 25) wherein are clearly stated that the boundaries of Parcel 1 on the West are: (1) a road, (2) Cementerio del Norte and (3) Roman Catholic Church (Exhs. Z-6, UU, and Exhs. 6, 18, 19 and 20). But the lower court considered the A. Bonifacio road as the only boundary on the West, and ignored the two other boundaries on the West that are mentioned both in the notice of hearing as published and in the decree of registration. The sketches and the survey plans, forming part of the evidence on record, show that the road, labelled as "A. Bonifacio", goes alongside the western boundary of Parcel 1 (separating Parcel 1 and the Cementerio del Norte), until it reaches a point where it traverses the northwestern portion of Parcel 1, such that from the point where it enters the area of Parcel 1 what is left as the boundaries on the western side are the Cementerio del Norte and the Roman Catholic Church (Exhibits UU, VV, 17, 19 and 29). Ignoring the existence of the Cementerio del Norte and the Roman Catholic Church as the other boundaries of Parcel 1 on the West, the lower court declared that the lands west of the A. Bonifacio road, which form part of the lands that are claimed by the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621 and 3622, are outside the boundary of Parcel 1 on the west and that those particular areas had remained as unregistered lands and are not covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. This finding of the lower court is contrary to the very admission of the appellees in these three cases that all the lands (six parcels in all) that they claim are included in the area of Parcel 1 mentioned in Original Certificate of Title No. 735. In paragraph XIV of the original, as well as in the amended complaint, in each of these three cases, the plaintiffs alleged that the lands that they claim "had either been fraudulently or erroneously included ... in Parcel 1 (known as Santa Mesa Estate) of the Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Land Records of the Province of Rizal."  24 In their appeal brief, the appellees categorically stated that "Both the appellees and the appellant admit that these parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs in these three (3) civil cases are located within Parcel 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735". 25 In the pre-trial order of the lower court of December 18, 1957, it was stated that the parcels of land litigated in these are portions of the lands covered by OCT No. 735. 26 The lower court itself, at the earlier part of its decision, stated that "both the plaintiffs and the defendants admit that the parcels of land litigated in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 are found within the boundaries of the present Santa Mesa Heights Subdivision covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735" 27 The appellees in these two cases had never asserted that part of the lands that they claim are outside the boundaries of Parcel 1, nor did they assert that part of the lands that they claim have remained unregistered and not covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The lower court had made a finding not only contrary to the evidence of the appellees but even more than what the appellees asked when it said in its decision that the western boundary of Parcel 1 is only the A. Bonifacio road and that the lands claimed by the appellees west of this road had never been registered. This Court certainly can not give its approval to the findings and rulings of the lower court that are patently erroneous.

2. The lower court also erred when it declared Original Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void upon the ground that the decree of registration was not transcribed in the Registration Book in accordance with the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496. In its decision, the lower court said:

During the trial, the Book of Original Certificate of Title was brought to the Court. The Court had occasion to see and examine the `ENTRY' made in the Registration Book. The Court found that the Face of the Title which, under ordinary circumstances, should be Page 1 is found as Page 2. The sheet containing the technical description which should be page 2 is Page 1. The FACE of the Title, which should have been Page 1, contained the last portion of the description of the land described in the decree. The sheet containing the bulk of the description of the lands decreed should have been Page 2. The so-called Original Certificate of Title No. 735 found on Page 138, Book A-7 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal is, therefore, null and void because the provisions of Section 41 of the Land Registration Law have not been complied with. Said Section requires that the entry in the Registration Book must be a transcription of the Decree and the paging should consist of a leaf or leaves in consecutive order .... 28

The pertinent provisions of Section 41 of Act 496 reads, as follows:

SEC. 41. Immediately after final decision by the court directing the registration of any property, the clerk shall send a certified copy of such decision to the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, who shall prepare the decree in accordance with section forty of Act numbered four hundred and ninety-six, and he shall forward a certified copy of said decree to the register of deeds of the province or city in which the property is situated. The register of deeds shall transcribe the decree in a book to be called the "Registration Book" in which a leaf, or leaves in consecutive order, shall be devoted exclusively to each title. The entry made by the register of deeds in this book in each case shall be the original certificate of title, and shall be signed by him and sealed with the seal of his office....

The pertinent provisions of Section 40 of Act 496 reads, as follows:

SEC. 40. Every decree of registration shall bear the day of the year, hour, and minute of its entry, and shall be signed by the clerk. It shall state whether the owner is married or unmarried, and if married, the name of the husband or wife. If the owner is under disability, it shall state the nature of the disability, and if a minor, shall state his age. It shall contain a description of the land as finally determined by the court , . . The decree shall be stated in a convenient form for transcription upon the certificates of title hereinafter mentioned.

Section 29 of Act 496 provides that as soon as the decree of title has been registered in the office of the register of deeds, as provided in Section forty-one, the property included in said decree shall become registered land under the Act. Section 42 of Act 496 provides that the certificate shall take effect upon the date of the transcription of the decree.

This Court has held that as defined in Section 41 of Act 496, the certificate of title is the transcript of the decree of registration made by the register of deeds in the registry. 29

The appellant presented as evidence a photostat of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, as found in the Registration Book in the office of the register of deeds of Rizal (Exhibit 50).  30 We have examined this document very carefully, and We find that it is a copy of the original that satisfies all the requirements of a valid Torrens title as provided for in Sections 40 and 41 of Act 496.

On the face, or on the first page, of this title, there is the certification of the Chief of the Land Registration Office that the decree of registration was registered in Manila on July 6, 1914 at 7:41

a.m.; and the certification of the Register of Deeds of Rizal that the decree was received for transcription in his office on July 8, 1914 at 3:30 P.M. It is also stated on the face of this title that it was entered pursuant to Decree No. 17431 of the Court of Land Registration, dated at Manila on the 7th day of March 1914, in Case No. 7681 of said court. The names of the declared owners, their civil status, their spouses if married, and their respective interest or share in the lands covered by the title are stated on the face of this title. We have noted that the technical descriptions of the lands (Parcels 1 and 2) covered by the title are copied on the sheets constituting the title. We have compared the technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 as they appear on this photostat of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 (Exhibit 50) with the technical descriptions of these lands as they appear in the decree of registration (Exhibit Y for the plaintiffs, and Exhibit 25 for the defendant), and We find that the technical descriptions appearing on the title are the complete and faithful reproduction, or transcription, of the technical descriptions appearing in the decree of registration.

We have noted what the lower court found, that the technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 do not begin on the face, or on the first page, of this title, as a technical description is ordinarily copied on the certificate of title. What appears on the face of this title is the last part of the technical description of Parcel 2. The technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 begin on the second page and end on the first page. This circumstance, that is, that the technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 do not begin on the face, or on the first page, of the title, is the basis of the lower court in ruling that the decree of registration was not transcribed in the registration book in accordance with Section 41 of Act 496, and so Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is null and void. We have noted, however, that in its decision the lower court made no mention that in the transcription of the decree in the registration book any of the data that is required in Section 40 of Act 496 to be included had been omitted. We have also noted — and this fact is undenied — that the technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 as they appear in Decree of Registration No. 17431 are fully and faithfully transcribed on the photostat of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 (Exhibit 50). There is no showing that the manner of transcribing the decree, as it appears on that photostat, was done for a fraudulent purpose, or was done in order to mislead. Considering that the decree of registration is fully transcribed in the Registration Book, and also as copied in Original Certificate of Title No. 735, the circumstance that the beginning of the technical descriptions is not found on the face, or on the first page, of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is not a ground to nullify the said certificate of title. We agree with the lower court that the transcription of the technical descriptions should begin, or should have been started, on the face, or on the first page, of the title. We hold, however, that the fact that this was not so done in the case of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 should not be taken as a factor in determining the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735. This defect in the manner of transcribing the technical descriptions should be considered as a formal, and not a substantial, defect. What matters is that the original certificate of title contains the full transcription of the decree of registration, and that the required data provided for in Section 40 of Act 496 are stated in the original certificate of title. The lower court made a literal construction of the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496 and strictly applied its construction in the determination of the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735. We believe that the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496 should be interpreted liberally, in keeping with Section 123 of said Act which provides that "This Act shall be construed liberally so far as may be necessary for the purpose of effecting its general intent." If We adopt a literal construction of the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496, as was done by the lower court, such that the defect in the manner or form of transcribing the decree in the registration book would render null and void the original certificate of title, then it can happen that the validity or the invalidity of a certificate of title would depend on the register of deeds, or on the personnel in the office of the register of deeds. The register of deeds, or an employee in his office, can wittingly or unwittingly render useless a decree of registration regularly issued pursuant to a decision of a registration court and thus nullify by the error that he commits in the transcription of the decree in the Registration Book an original certificate of title that has been existing for years. This strict interpretation or construction of Section 41 of Act 496 would certainly not promote the purpose of the Land Registration Law (Act 496), which generally are to ascertain once and for all the absolute title

over a given landed property 31; to make, so far as it is possible, a certificate of title issued by the court to the owner of the land absolute proof of such title 32; to quiet title to land and to put a stop forever to any question of legality of title 33; and to decree that land title shall be final, irrevocable and indisputable. 34

We, therefore, hold that the formal defect in the transcription of Decree of Registration No. 17431 in the Registration Book did not render null and void Original Certificate of Title No. 735. Consequently, We declare that the two parcels of land (Parcel 1 which includes the lands claimed by the appellees, and Parcel 2) covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 are properly registered under the Torrens System of registration.

3. The principal issue that has to be resolved in the present appeal is whether or not the lower court had correctly declared that "Original Certificate of Title No. 735 ... is null and void from the very beginning and of no effect whatsoever. 35

In the preceding discussions, We have held that the lower court erred when it declared null and void Original Certificate of Title No. 735. We have found that the registration proceedings that brought about the decree of registration upon which was based the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 were in accordance with the provisions of Act 496, as amended. We have held that the Land Registration Court that ordered the issuance of the decree of registration had jurisdiction to hear and decide the application for registration filed by Mariano Severo, Teresa Eriberta, Juan Jose, Demetrio Asuncion, and Augusto Huberto, all surnamed Tuason y de la Paz. The records show that the notice of hearing of the application, which embodied the technical descriptions of the two parcels of land (Parcel 1, known as the Sta. Mesa Estate, and Parcel 2, known as the Diliman Estate), was duly published as required by law. The records show that the hearing on the application was regularly held, and that the registration court had seen to it that no land which was not included in the original survey plan and not covered by the original application was made the subject of the registration proceedings. We have found that the decree of registration was properly issued by the Land Registration Office pursuant to the decision of the Land Registration Court, and that said decree of registration was fully transcribed in the Registration Book in the office of the Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal. We have found also that the six parcels of land that are claimed by the appellees. in the three cases now before Us are all included in Parcel 1 that is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735.

In view of Our findings and conclusion that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued in accordance with the provisions of Act 496, and that the six parcels of land that are claimed by the appellees in the present cases are covered by said certificate of title, what is left for this Court to decide is whether or not the appellees still have any legal right over the six parcels of land that they claim.

Let it be noted that, as maintained by counsel for the appellees, the action of the appellees is principally to recover the ownership and possession of the six parcels of land mentioned and described in their complaints. The appellees would accomplish their objective through alternative ways: (1) secure the nullification of the decision of the Land Registration Court in LRC No. 6781, the nullification of the Decree of Registration No. 17431 and the nullification of Original Certificate of Title No. 735; (2) if they fail in their efforts to secure the desired nullifications, with Original Certificate of Title No. 735 being considered valid and effective, they seek the reconveyance to them by the defendants named in their complaints, including herein appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., of the six parcels of land that they claim; and (3) if they cannot secure a reconveyance, they seek to secure payment to them by the defendants named in their complaints of the actual value of the six parcels of land that they claim.

It appears to Us that the appellees are not sure of their stand, or have not adopted a definite stand, in asserting the rights that they claim.

It is the settled rule that a party seeking the reconveyance to him of his land that he claims had been wrongly registered in the name of another person must recognize the validity of the certificate of title of the latter. It is also the rule that a reconveyance may only take place if the land that is claimed to be wrongly registered is still registered in the name of the person who procured the wrongful registration. No action for reconveyance can take place as against a third party who had acquired title over the registered property in good faith and for value. And if no reconveyance can be made, the value of the property registered may be demanded only from the person (or persons) who procured the wrongful registration in his name. 36

The lower court accepted, and sustained, the assertion of the appellees that the proceedings in LRC No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration were null and void and that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is null and void ab initio and of no effect. The trial court even went to the extent of declaring that some of the parcels of land claimed by the appellees in Civil Cases Nos. 3621 and 3622 (now G.R. Nos. L-26127 and L-26128 before this Court) were not covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The lower court forthwith declared the appellees the owners of the parcels of land claimed by them, as described in their complaints. Strangely enough, the lower court, upon declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void, did not make any statement, or observation, regarding the status or situation of the remaining lands (Parcels 1 and 2) covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 after adjudicating to the appellees the six parcels of land claimed by them in their complaints.

In the present appeal counsel for the appellees had maintained, and has endeavored to show, that the lower court was correct in annulling Original Certificate of Title No. 735 and in adjudicating in favor of the appellees the ownership and possession of the six parcels of land claimed by them in their complaints.

But, as hereinbefore held by Us, the lower court erred in declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 735 void and of no effect. We have held that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued as a result of the registration proceedings in LRC No, 7681 which was regular and that said certificate of title is valid and effective. The proceedings in LRC 7681 being in rem, the decree of registration issued pursuant to the decision rendered in said registration case bound the lands covered by the decree and quieted title thereto, and is conclusive upon and against all persons, including the government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice or citation, or included in the general inscription "To whom it may concern", and such decree will not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceedings in any court for reversing judgment or decree. Such decree may only be reopened if any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud would file in the competent court of first instance a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value had acquired an interest on the land, and upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree, or the certificate of title issued pursuant to the decree, is incontrovertible (See. 38, Act 496). In the case now before Us, the Decree of Registration No. 17431 in LRC 7681 was entered on July 8, 1914. It is undisputed that no person had filed any petition for review of the decree of registration in LRC 7681 within the period of one year from July 8, 1914. That decree of registration, and Original Certificate of Title No. 735 issued pursuant thereto, therefore, had been incontrovertible since July 9, 1915.

Moreover, innocent purchases for value had acquired interest in the lands covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. 37

The Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued on July 8, 1914 in the names of the original an applicants for registration, namely, Mariano Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz and Augusta Huberto Tuason y de la Paz. Herein appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. is not one of those who were registered as the original owners mentioned in Original Certificate of Title No. 735. When the original complaints were filed in these three cases in the Court of First Instance of Rizal the parties named defendants in each of the three cases were Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, Augusta Huberto Tuason y de la Paz, the heirs of each one of these defendants (without naming them), and J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. Of all the defendants named in the three complaints only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. appeared and filed its answer to the complaints. All the other defendants did not appear, and so they were all declared in default. 38 It had to happen that way because as of the time when the three complaints were filed on May 19, 1955 the ownership of Parcel 1 that was originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 had already passed to defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. In fact this defendant had caused Parcel 1 to be subdivided and had sold the subdivision lots.

The records show that Parcel 1 in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was part of the properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason (Tuason Entail) which became involved in a litigation in the Court of First Instance of Manila. 39 During the pendency of the case the properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason were administered by the Bank of the Philippine Islands as the judicial receiver. In the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dated May 5, 1938, in Civil Case No. 24803, the Bank of the Philippine Islands, as receiver, was authorized, directed and ordered to execute, upon payment to it of the sum of P763,925.75, a deed of transfer and assignment in favor of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. of the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31997, which was originally Parcel 1 included in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 (Exh. 13-B). On June 13, 1938 the receiver Bank of the Philippine Islands executed the deed of transfer and assignment (Exh. 13-A). Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34853 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal was forthwith issued in the name of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. (Exhs. 12-b and 36). The deed of transfer and assignment was approved by the court in an order dated June 17, 1938. This conveyance to the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. took place at a time when the Supreme Court had already decided the case of Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Acuña (59 Phil. 183) wherein this Court upheld the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 and also the validity of the transfer certificate of title emanating therefrom. 40

The circumstances attending the acquisition by the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. of the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31997 — which was formerly Parcel 1 covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 — clearly indicate that said corporation acquired its title in a regular transaction as purchaser in good faith and for value. On June 15, 1938 the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. in turn sold the same property to J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 35073 was issued in the name of the latter (Exhs. 12-c and 37).

The lower court declared that herein appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was a purchaser in bad faith. We do not find any evidence in the record that would sustain such a finding of the lower court. One reason given by the lower court in declaring appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. a purchaser in bad faith is the fact that the incorporators of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. and the incorporators of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. were practically the same persons belonging to the same Tuason family. We do not see anything wrong if some incorporators of the Heirs of D. Tuason Inc. are also incorporators of the J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. During these days when businesses are promoted, operated, and managed, through corporate entities, it is not surprising to see two or more corporations organized by the same persons or group of persons with different purposes, for different lines of business and with distinct or separate assets and interests. Besides, as has been shown, the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. acquired the land (Parcel 1 in Original Certificate of Title No. 735) from the Bank of the Philippine Islands, the receiver of the properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason, in a sale that was

authorized, and subsequently approved, by the court. The Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. paid the sum of P763,950.80 for the property. Certainly if the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. had acquired the land originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 in a transaction that was authorized by the court, for a valuable consideration, thereby acquiring a good title over the property as a purchaser in good faith and for value, the title that it transferred to J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. when it sold same property to the latter was also a good title, and J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was also a purchaser in good faith and for value — even if it appears that the incorporators of the two corporations belong to the same Tuason family. The records of these cases are bereft of any evidence which would indicate that the sale of Parcel 1 in question by the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. to J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was fraudulent.

Another reason given by the lower court in declaring appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. a buyer in bad faith is that when said appellant bought Parcel 1 originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 it was aware of the fact that the appellees or their predecessors in interest were in possession of, and were cultivating, the six parcels of land that they now claim in these cases. The conclusion of the lower court is too strained. It should be remembered that the registered property bought by J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had an area of some 879 hectares. It could happen that certain relatives or ancestors of appellees had been squatting on some portions of the land and claimed certain areas as their own, to the extent of having the areas claimed by them declared for taxation purposes in their names. Thus the appellees presented in evidence tax declarations that appear to have taken effect as of 1941. We have noted, however, that at the back of those tax declarations are written the words "This parcel is a duplicate of the land under Tax No. 764-J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc." (Exhs. E-Alcantara, F-Alcantara, FF-1-Benin, GG-Benin, HH-Benin, BBB-Pili, and BBB-1-Pili). 41 These annotations simply reveal that when the predecessors of the appellees had those tax declarations made to cover the lands that they claim, those lands were already included in the tax declaration of appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. Appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had been exercising, and asserting, its proprietary rights over the lands in question after it bought the same from the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. 42This is borne by the statement in the order, dated September 26, 1955, issued by Judge Juan P. Enriquez who at the time was presiding the branch of the Court of First Instance of Rizal where these three were pending, as follows:

3. It having been shown that J. M. Tuason & Co. had title covering the land in question which they are subdividing into small lots for sale and in view of the observation under paragraph 2 hereof the Court finds that there is no justifiable reason to maintain the writ of preliminary injunction that has been issued. This is particularly true in Civil Case No. 2622, defendants having secured a final judgment against plaintiffs Juan Alcantara and Jose Alcantara for ejectment before the Municipal court of Quezon City; and such injunction would annul the order of the execution issued by the Quezon City courts. It should be noted that the herein plaintiffs at the beginning pleaded to the Court that the area on which their respective houses stand be not touched and their possession thereof be respected by defendant J. M. & Co. In other words, each plaintiff is merely asking for about 250 square meters each which represents the land on which the house stands and their immediate yard, and not the whole land covered by these three or 68 hectares. On the other hand, the Court requires J. M. Tuason & Co. to put up a bond of P2,000 in favor of each of the defendant (sic) to answer for whatever damages he may suffer by reason of the continuance during the action of the acts complained of. 43

Besides, the possession by the appellees, either by themselves or through their predecessors in interest, if there was such possession at all, would be unavailing against title holder of a Torrens certificate of title covering the parcels Of lands now in question. From July 8, 1914 when Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued, no possession by any person of any portion of the lands covered by

said original certificate of title, or covered by a subsequent transfer certificate of title derived from said original certificate of title, could defeat the title of the registered owner of the lands covered by the certificate of title. In this connection, let it be noted that appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. became the registered owner of Parcel 1, which was originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735, only on June 15, 1938, or almost 24 years after Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued.

It can well be said that J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had relied on the title of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. when it bought the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.34853, and the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. likewise had relied on the title of the Mayorasgo Tuason (Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al.) when it bought the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31997 from the judicial receiver, duly authorized and approved by the court. We, therefore, can not agree with the lower court when it declared appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. a purchaser on bad faith.

The evidence shows that appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had converted the land originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735, including the six parcels claimed by appellees into a subdivision, and numerous persons and entities had purchased the subdivision lots, and the purchasers in turn were issued transfer certificates of title covering the lots that they bought, based on the transfer certificate of title in the name of J. M Tuason & Co., Inc. The buyers of the lots relied upon the certificate of title in the name of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and because they paid for the lots they certainly are purchasers in good faith and for value. The purchasers of these lots have built thereon residential houses, office buildings, shops, hospital, even churches. But the lower court, disregarding these circumstances, declared null and void all transfer certificates of title that emanated, or that were derived, from Original Certificate of Title No. 735. This is a grave error committed by the lower court. And the error is compounded when the lower court ordered appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and all those claiming under said appellant, to vacate and restore to the appellees the possession of the parcels of lands that are claimed by them in the present cases. The possessors of the lots comprised within the six parcels of land in question, and who hold certificates of title covering the lots that they bought, are not parties in the present cases, and yet the decision of the lower court would annul their titles and compel them to give up the possession of their properties. To give effect to the decision of the lower court is to deprive persons of their property without due process of law. 44 The decision of the lower court would set at naught the settled doctrine that the holder of a certificate of title who acquired the property covered by the title in good faith and for value can rest assured that his title is perfect and incontrovertible.  45

In view of the foregoing discussions, it is obvious that the action of the appellees in the three cases now before this Court must fail..

It has been shown that appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had acquired a valid title over the land which includes the six parcels that are claimed by the appellees. The fact, that the predecessors in interest of the appellees — or any person, for that matter — had not filed a petition for the review of the decree of registration in LRC No. 7681 within a period of one year from July 8, 1914 when the decree of registration was issued, is a circumstance that had forever foreclosed any proceeding for the review of said decree. As We have adverted to, that decree of registration had become incontrovertible. An action, similar to one brought by the appellees in each of the present cases, which attack collaterally the said decree of registration cannot be entertained.  46 Neither may the action of the appellees for reconveyance of the lands in question be entertained because such action had already prescribed, barred by laches, considering that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 had been issued way back in 1914 and the complaint in the present cases were filed only on May 19, 1955, or after a lapse of some 41 years. Moreover, as of the time when these complaints were filed the six parcels of land claimed by the appellees are no longer covered by the certificate of title in the names of the persons who procured the original registration of those lands. The title to Parcel 1, which includes the six parcels of land claimed by the appellees, had passed to the hands parties who were innocent purchase for value.

This Parcel 1 which was one of the two parcels originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735, was subsequently covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31997. As has been shown, this Parcel 1 was part of the properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason and it was conveyed by order of the court in Civil Case No. 24803 of the Court of First Instance of Manila to the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc., and the latter in turn conveyed the same to J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34853 in the name of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. was cancelled and transfer Certificate of Title No. 35073 was issued in the name of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. It has also been shown that J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had converted Parcel 1 to a subdivision. Numerous persons and entities bought those subdivision lots, and to those buyers were issued transfer certificates of title covering the lots that they acquired. It is very clear, therefore, that an action for reconveyance cannot prosper against appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., much less against the registered owners of the lots that form parts of the six parcels of land that are claimed by the appellees. 47

Neither may the appellees have a cause of Action for damages against appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., considering that said appellant is not one of the original registered owners that procured the registration of the land. There is no evidence that J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had anything to do with the registration proceedings which brought about the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 — even supposing that the registration was procured fraudulently.

4. Numerous cases have been decided by this Court, dealing on questions regarding the validity and ineffectiveness of Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The rulings of this Court in those cases are necessarily relevant to, and of decisive bearing in, the resolution of the issues involved in the three cases now at bar.

(a) We have earlier cited the case of the Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Acuña (59 Phil., 183), where the jurisdiction of the Court of Land Registration that issued the decree which was the basis of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was questioned, and this Court upheld the jurisdiction of the registration court and categorically pronounced the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735.

(b) There is the case of Jose Alcantara, et al., versus Mariano Tuason y de la Paz, et al. (G.R. No. L-4998, Mar. 13, 1953, 92 Phil. 796), where this Court declared that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is incontrovertible and is conclusive against all persons claiming, either by themselves or by their predecessors in interest, rights over the lands covered by said certificate of title.

We find that the Alcantara case is intimately related to the three cases at bar, and the rulings of this Court in that former case are of decisive application to these three cases.

On August 29, 1950 a complaint was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch) by Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin, Pascual Pili, Alejandro de Dios, Tomas Bagagonio, Quintina Sandoval, and Tomasa Lazaro against Mariano Tuason y de la Paz, Heirs of Mariano Tuason, J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and Gregorio Araneta, Inc. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-156. It will be noted that three of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-156, namely, Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin, and Pascual Pili, are among the original plaintiffs in the three cases now before this Court; Elias Benin, in Civil Case No. 3621; Jose Alcantara, in Civil Case No. 3622; and Pascual Pili, in Civil Case No. 3623. Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili, as plaintiffs in that Civil Case No. Q-156 claimed that they were the lawful owners of six (of the ten) parcels of land described in paragraph 2 of their complaint — Jose Alcantara claiming two parcels, Elias Benin claiming three parcels, and Pascual Pili claiming one parcel. Substantially, it is alleged in the complaint 48 that each plaintiff, by himself and by his predecessors in interest, as lawful owner, had been in the actual, open and continuous possession of his own respective parcel, or parcels, of land from time immemorial until January 1950 when the defendants by force and by the use of armed men started to convert their lands into a subdivision; that on July 8, 1914 the defendants had obtained Original Certificate of Title No. 735 over a parcel of land which included the lands possessed by them (plaintiffs) and which they and their ancestors

had been enjoying as owners, for more than thirty years before the issuance of the title; that the silence and inaction of the defendants since the date of their original certificate of title showed that said certificate of title did not express the status of the their claim to the said parcels, that plaintiffs were not given formal notice by the defendants of the registration of the lands, such that defendants' certificate of title No. 735 was not in accordance with law, and that defendants did not have proper title for registration to the parcels of land owned by the plaintiffs, as described in the complaint; and that because the certificate of title issued by the register of deeds was still in the names of the defendants, successors in interest of the Tuasons y de la Paz, and has not passed to innocent parties for valuable consideration, the conveyance of the same to the plaintiffs was in order. The plaintiffs prayed that therein defendants be ordered to execute deeds of conveyance of the parcels of land described in their complaint in favor of the plaintiffs, that the defendants' certificate of title be cancelled and the corresponding certificate be ordered issued in the names of the plaintiffs. We quote from the decision:

The material allegations of the complaint are: that plaintiffs are owners of the parcels of land set forth in their complaint, which parcels are situated along Bonifacio street, barrio of San Jose, Quezon City, and that they have been in actual, open, and continuous possession and enjoyment thereof without molestation from defendants from time immemorial to the present; that on July 8, 1914, defendants obtained a certificate of title (No. 735) over a parcel of land, which included the lands by plaintiffs, and which they and their ancestors had been enjoying as owners more than 30 years before the issuance of said title; that on June 23, 1950, defendants caused the removal of two houses of plaintiffs on the land; and that defendants did not file any action against plaintiffs before the inclusion of the lands in their title, in violation of the "due process of law" clause of the Constitution. There are other allegations which really are arguments of legal discussion, thus: that defendants could not acquire title by the registration proceedings against the lawful holder, especially without formal notice, because registration is to confirm title, not to acquire it; that the silence of the defendants since the issuance of their title shows that this does not express the lawful status of their claim, etc. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it states no of action and that, if it does, the same is barred by the statute of limitations. The court sustained this motion on the second ground. Subsequently, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint with the same substantial allegations, but with new ones, i.e., that it was in January, 1950, that they learned that their lands were included in the registration proceedings which culminated in the issuance of defendants' title; that defendants never claimed ownership to the lands, but directly or indirectly allowed plaintiffs to continue exercising their rights of ownership over the same. This amended complaint was denied admission, and the motion for the reconsideration of the order of dismiss was also denied. Hence the appeal.

In affirming the order of the lower court dismissing the complaint, this Court held:

Without considering whether the trial court's refusal to admit the amended complaint is erroneous or not we are constrained to hold that the dismissal of the action, even with the amended complaint is a basis thereof, is correct. From the allegations of both the original and amended complaints, it appears that the defendants are holders of a certificate of title issued on July 8, 1914 as a consequence of registration proceedings. There is no allegation in both original and amended complaints that the plaintiffs were not notified, or were not aware, of the registration proceedings. It is presumed, therefore, that as occupants proper notices thereof were served on them and that they were aware of said proceedings. If this is so, then the plaintiffs, who were, or whose predecessors in interest were, on the land during the registration proceedings, were bound by said proceedings. The latter are in rem and bind the whole world, whether served with notice personally or not. (Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil., 49). And the decree of registration, in pursuance of which defendants' title

was issued, binds the land and quiets title thereto, and is conclusive against the plaintiffs. (Section 38, Land Registration Act). The supposed right of plaintiffs by reason of their alleged continued possession for thirty years was, therefore, destroyed fully and completely by the registration proceedings, and their supposed ignorance of the inclusion of the lands can not exclude them from the effects of the registration proceedings, and the supposed conduct of defendants in allowing plaintiffs to continue on the land after registration can not serve as basis of any title or right thereto, because acts of a possessory character by tolerance of an owner does not constitute possession (Article 1942, Spanish Civil Code), and because no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession (Section 46, Land Registration Act).

Thus, in the Alcantara case, as in the Bank of the Philippine Island vs. Acuña case, supra, this Court upheld the validity of the registration proceedings which culminated in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735. This Court declared that "the decree of registration, in pursuance of which defendants' title was issued, binds the land and quiets title thereto and is conclusive against the plaintiffs." In other words, in virtue of that decision, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-156, among them Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili, and their successors-in-interest, could no longer question the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, nor claim any right of ownership over any portion of the land that is covered by said certificate of title.

But Elias Benin, Jose Alcantara, and Pascual Pili again came to court to claim ownership over portions of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. On May 19, 1955 Elias Benin, joined by his brother Victor Benin and his sister Marta Benin, filed Civil Case No. 3621; Jose Alcantara joined by his brother Juan Alcantara, filed Civil Case No. 3622; and Pascual Pili, joined by his sister Luisa Pili, filed Civil Case No. 3623. These are the three cases which originated in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch) which are now before this Court on appeal.

In the earlier part of this decision, We have pointed out that the complaints in these three cases had been amended so as to include as parties plaintiffs all the heirs of the persons who were alleged to be the owners of the parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs in each case. Thus, the complaint in Civil Case No. 3621 was amended to include all the heirs of Sixto Benin, the alleged owner of the three parcels of land described in the complaint and the common predecessor in interest of all the plaintiffs in the case. The complaint in Civil Case No. 3622 was amended to include all the heirs of Bonoso Alcantara, the alleged owner of the two parcels of land described in the complaint and the common predecessor in interest of all the plaintiffs in the case. The complaint in Civil Case No. 3623 was amended to include all the heirs of Candido Pili, the alleged owner of the one parcel of land described in the complaint and the common predecessor in interest of all the plaintiffs in the case.

In those three cases, in the court below, herein appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. (defendant therein) filed a motion to dismiss upon the principal ground "that the cause of action (assuming there is one) is barred by prior judgment, or by the statute of limitation". In its motion to dismiss J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. contended that the decision of the Supreme Court in the Alcantara case is a bar to the action of the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 of the Court of the First Instance of Rizal. The lower court, however, denied the motion to dismiss. In its answer to the complaint in each of these three cases, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. set up as affirmative defenses the very grounds of its motion to dismiss. After the plaintiffs had closed their direct evidence, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed another motion to dismiss upon the ground that the action was barred by the statute of limitations and by a prior judgment, and that the plaintiffs had not presented evidence to prove their claim of ownership. This second motion to dismiss was also denied by the lower court.  49

In its decision, which is now on appeal before this Court, the lower court held that the decision in the Alcantaracase was not a bar to the action in these three cases, ruling that there is no identity, of

the parties, of the subject matter, and of the cause of action, between Civil Case No. Q-156, on the one hand, and Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622, and 3623, on the other.

It is now contended by appellant J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc., in the present appeal, that "the trial court erred in not dismissing these cases on the ground of res judicata and in denying the motion to dismiss filed on said ground." 50

Does the judgment in the aforementioned Alcantara case operate as a bar to the action of the appellees in the three cases at bar?

In order that the rule of res judicata may apply, the following requisites must be present: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be, between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, of subject-matter, and of cause of action (San Diego vs. Cardona, 70 Phil. 281-283).

We find that the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998) is a final judgment on the merits that was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties. The only requisite for res judicata which we have to determine is whether between Civil Case Q-156 (G.R. No. 4998), on the one hand, and Civil Cases Nos. 8621, 3622 and 3623 (G.R. Nos. L-26127, 26128 and 26129), on the other, there is identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action.

In our examination of the records and the evidence, We find that there is identity of subject matter. In the lower court's pretrial order dated December 18, 1957, which was based on the agreement of the parties, it is stated

That the parcels of land in litigation in Case No. Q-156 are substantially identical to the same parcels of land litigated in them cases Nos. 3621, 8622 and 3623. 51

We also find that there is identity of cause of action. It is apparent, upon reading the original complaint (Exhibit 1) in Civil Case Q-156 and the decision in the Alcantara case (G.R. No. L-4998), that the cause of action in Civil Case Q-156 was based on the alleged fact that the defendants had dispossessed and deprived the plaintiff therein of the parcels of land described in the complaint, which were claimed by the plaintiffs as their own and of which they had been in actual, open and continuous possession from time immemorial, and that said lands were wrongly included in Certificate of Title No. 735 that was obtained by the defendants. In the three cases at bar, plaintiffs (now appellees) also complain of having been dispossessed and deprived by the defendants of the parcels of land of which they were absolute owners and possessors, by themselves and through their predecessors in interest, since time immemorial and that their said lands wrongly included in Parcel 1 of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 that was obtained by the defendants. In Civil Case No. Q-156, on the one hand, and in the three cases now at bar, on the other, the plaintiffs therein seek the nullification of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, and the reconveyance to them of the parcels of land that they claim as theirs. 52 It appears clear to Us that in Civil Case No. Q-156 and in the three cases at bar, the object or purpose of the plaintiffs is to recover the ownership and possession of the same parcels of land.

As far as the parties are concerned, We find that there is no exact identity of parties between Civil Case No. Q-156, on the one hand, and Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, on the other. It appears that of the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 only Elias Benin, Jose Alcantara and Pascual Pili were plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-156. In Civil Case No. Q-156, the defendants were Mariano Tuason y de la Paz, Heirs of Mariano Tuason, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.

and Gregorio Araneta, Inc., while in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 the defendants were Mariano Severo, Teresa Eriberta, Juan Jose, Demetrio Asuncion, Augusta Huberto, all surnamed Tuason y de la Paz (the persons appearing as registered owners in Original Certificate of Title No. 735), their heirs, and J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. We find that the natural persons surnamed Tuason, and the heirs, refer to the persons who belong to the Tuason family that secured the registration of Parcel 1 in Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The defendant Gregorio Araneta Inc. in Civil Case No. Q-156 is the administrator of the Tuason properties. So, the parties defendants in all these cases are practically the same. We find, however, that in Civil Case No. Q-156 as well as in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, it was the defendant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. that actually controverted the claims of the plaintiffs.

After a careful study, We are of the considered view that the judgment in the Alcantara case is a bar to the action of the plaintiffs who are the heirs of Elias Benin in Civil Case No. 3621 (G.R. No. 26127), of plaintiff Jose Alcantara in Civil Case No. 3622 (G.R. No. 26128), and of plaintiff Pascual Pili in Civil Case No. 3623 (G. R. No. 26129) under the doctrine of res adjudicata. We are likewise of the considered view that the decision in the Alcantaracase would serve to rule out the action of the other plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 under the doctrine of stare decisis.

In Civil Case No. 3621 the original plaintiffs were Victor Benin, Marta Benin, and Elias Benin--two brothers and a sister. In the amended complaint it was alleged that these three original plaintiffs had another brother, and another sister, namely Esteban Benin and Felipa Benin. But because all the five Benin brothers and sisters died, they were all substituted by their heirs, such that as of the time when Civil Case No. 3621 was decided the plaintiffs were: (1) the heirs of Victor Benin; (2) the heirs of Marta Benin; (3) the heirs of Elias Benin; (4) the heirs of Esteban Benin, and (5) the heirs of Felipa Benin.

In Civil Case No. 3622 the original plaintiffs were Juan Alcantara and Jose Alcantara. Juan Alcantara died, and he was substituted by his heirs, such that as of the time Civil Case No. 3622 was decided the plaintiffs were: (1) the heirs of Juan Alcantara, and (2) Jose A. Alcantara.

In Civil Case No. 3623 the original plaintiffs were Pascual Pili and Luisa Pili. In the amended complaint, it was alleged that Luisa Pili and Pascual Pili had two brothers who were already dead, namely, Diego Pili and Manuel Pili, so they were substituted by their heirs. Luisa Pili died, and she was substituted by her heirs, such that as of the time Civil Case No. 3623 was decided, the plaintiffs were: (1) the heirs of Diego Pili; (2) the heirs of Manuel Pili; (3) the heirs of Luisa Pili, and (4) Pascual Pili.

It would thus appear that of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3621 Elias Benin is the only one who was a plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-156; of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3622 Jose E. Alcantara, who is still living, is the only one who was a plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-156; of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623 Pascual Pili, who is still living, is the only one who was a plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-156.

It being Our finding that the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998-the Alcantara case) is a final judgment on the merits that was rendered by a court that had jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties, and that there is identity of subject matter and cause of action between Civil Case No. Q-156, on the one hand, and Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622, and 3623, on the other; and it appearing that Elias Benin is a party-plaintiff both in Civil Case Q-156 and Civil Case No. 3621; that Jose Alcantara is a party-plaintiff in both Civil Case No. Q-156 and Civil Case No. 3622; that Pascual Pili is a party-plaintiff in both Civil Case No. Q-156 and Civil Case No. 3623; and that the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-156 and in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 are practically the same persons and/or entities, We hold that the doctrine of bar by a previous judgment or res adjudicata squarely applies to Elias Benin, or to his heirs and successors in interest in Civil Case No.

3621; to Jose Alcantara and his heirs or successors in interest in Civil Case No. 3622; and to Pascual Pili and his heirs or successors in interest in Civil Case No. 3623.  53

We now consider the case of the other plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623.

It will be noted that in Civil Case No. 3621 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership of the three parcels of land described in the complaint on their being heirs or successors in interest of Sixto Benin who died in 1936. In Civil Case No. 3622 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership over the two parcels of land described in their complaint on their being the heirs and successors in interest of Bonoso Alcantara who died in 1934. In Civil Case No. 3623 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership of the one parcel of land described in their complaint on their being the heirs and successors in interest of Candido Pili who died in 1931.

When Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili, alleged in their complaint in Civil Case No. Q-156 (which was filed in 1950) that they were the owners of the parcels of land specified in their complaint, having inherited the same from their ancestors and had been in possession of the same from time immemorial, each was claiming a right as an heir of Bonoso Alcantara, Sixto Benin, and Candido Pili, respectively. Similarly, in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, the source of the rights claimed by the plaintiffs Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili and all the other plaintiffs were their respective ancestor, or predecessor in interest, namely Bonoso Alcantara, Sixto Benin and Candido Pili, as the case may be.

Inasmuch as Sixto Benin died in 1936, Bonoso Alcantara died in 1934, and Candido Pili died in 1931, it is obvious that during all the time when the registration proceedings in LRC No. 7681 were taking place before the Court of Land Registration, which culminated in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 on July 8, 1914, Sixto Benin, Bonoso Alcantara and Candido Pili were living. The records show that no one of these three persons, or their representative, had filed any opposition to the application for registration in said LRC 7681, nor did any one of them, or their representative, file any petition for review of the decree of registration No. 17431 that was issued in said LRC No. 7681.

It is Our view, therefore, that the decision of this Court, in G.R. No. L-4998, which affirmed the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing the complaint of Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili (along with four other plaintiffs) in Civil Case No. Q-156 should apply not only against the heirs, of Elias Benin, against Jose Alcantara, and against Pascual Pili, as plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, respectively, but also against all the other plaintiffs in those cases. We find that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3621 do not claim a right which is different from that claimed by Elias Benin in Civil Case No. Q-156. Likewise, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3622 do not claim a right different from that claimed by Jose Alcantara in Civil Case No Q-156. And, also, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623 do not claim a right different from that claimed by Pascual Pili in Civil Case No. Q-156. They all claim the same right, based on the alleged ownership of their respective common predecessor in interest — in Civil Case No. 3621 the common predecessor in interest being Sixto Benin; in Civil Case No. 3622 the common predecessor in interest being Bonoso Alcantara; and in Civil Case No. 3623 the common predecessor in interest being Candido Pili. In Civil Case No. Q-156 Elias Benin based his claim of ownership upon the ownership of his predecessor in interest who necessarily must be Sixto Benin; Jose Alcantara, upon the ownership of his predecessor in interest who necessarily must be Bonoso Alcantara; and Pascual Pili, upon the ownership of his predecessor in interest who necessarily must be Candido Pili. It follows, therefore, that the decision of this Court in G.R. No. L-4998 (Civil Case No. Q-156), which held untenable the cause of action of the successors in interest, of Sixto Benin, of Bonoso Alcantara and of Candido Pili, to recover the ownership and possession of any land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735, would also foreclose a similar cause of action of all other persons who claim to be successors in interest of

Sixto Benin, of Bonoso Alcantara and of Candido Pili over any land covered by said certificate of title. As We have adverted to, Sixto Benin died in 1936, Bonoso Alcantara died in 1934, and Candido Pili died in 1931. These three predecessors in interest of the appellees died long after the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, which took place on July 8, 1914.

And so, even if there are plaintiffs (now appellees) in these three cases who are not privies to plaintiffs Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin, and Pascual Pili in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998 — the Alcantara case) and were not parties in that case, still the ruling of this Court in that former case, to the effect that therein plaintiffs or their predecessors in interest were bound by the proceedings in the registration court which culminated in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, holds and applies to those plaintiffs in these three cases, because the claim of ownership of these plaintiffs is based on the same predecessors in interest of plaintiffs Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili in said Civil Case No. Q-156. 54 It may well be said that the interests of the appellees in G.R. No. L-26127 (Civil Case No. 3621) who claim rights as heirs or successors in interest of Sixto Benin were represented by Elias Benin in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998); the appellees in G.R. No. 26128 (Civil Case No. 3622) who claim rights as heirs or successors in interest of Bonoso Alcantara were represented by Jose Alcantara in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998); the appellees in G.R. No. 26129 (Civil Case No. 3623) who claim rights as heirs or successors in interest of Candido Pili were represented by Pascual Pili in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998).

(c) In the case of Albina Santiago, et al. vs. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. (G.R. No. L-14223, November 23, 1960) 55, where Original Certificate of Title No. 735, was also in question, this Court ruled on issues akin to the issues involved in the three cases now at bar. Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-2918, against J. M. Tuason & Co. Inc. alleging, substantially, that their ancestor, Inocencio Santiago, was the owner of a parcel of land, evidenced by a document (attached to their complaint as Annex A) issued by the Spanish government on May 12, 1848 56; that Inocencio Santiago had since then been in possession of the aforesaid land as owner, publicly, continuously and adversely until his death, when his two children, Isaias and Albina, succeeded and continued to own and possess said land pro indiviso in the same character as that of their predecessor that upon the death of Isaias Santiago his one-half share of the land was inherited by his eleven children who, together with their aunt Albina, continued to own and possess the land in the same character as that of their predecessors; that Albina and her co-plaintiffs came to know that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had previously filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City Civil Case No. Q-27 for "quieting of title and recovery of possession" against five of the children of Isaias Santiago involving the parcel of land of which they were co-owners; that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had claimed that parcel to be part of the land covered by its Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119; that the judgment in Civil. Case No. Q-27, in which they (Albina Santiago, et al.) were never impleaded as parties, had already become final 57; that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had executed the judgment against them, excluding and rusting them from the enjoyment and possession of the land. Albina and her co-plaintiffs also alleged that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 (37679) of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., as well as Original Certificate of Title No. 735 from which the former was derived, did not include the parcel claimed by them; that even granting that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 included the parcel claimed by them the inclusion of that parcel in the certificate of title of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was done through fraud because they, nor their predecessors, were not actually notified of the registration proceedings. As ground for cancellation of the certificate of title of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs further alleged that the technical description in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 had been falsified to include areas never brought within the jurisdiction of the Land Registration Court, since they were areas not included in the application and publication in the registration proceedings; that long before the predecessors of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. applied for, and secured, registration of the land which included their parcel of land they had already acquired ownership thereof not only by the document, Annex A of their complaint, but also by acquisitive prescription. Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs prayed, that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. be ordered to desist from enforcing Civil Case No. Q-27 against them; that a resurvey be ordered to determine whether or not Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 (37679) included the land described in their complaint; that a reconveyance to them be ordered of whatever portion of the land claimed by them may

be found included in transfer Certificate of Title No. 119; that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 and Original Certificate of Title No. 735 be ordered cancelled and substituted with a new certificate of title embracing only those lands included in the application, publication and/or decree in LRC No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration.

Upon motion of defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dismissed the complaint of Albina Santiago, et al., upon the grounds that there was no cause of action, that the case was barred by a prior judgment in Civil Case No. Q-27 which was affirmed by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-5079, and that the action of the plaintiffs, if they had any, had prescribed.

This Court affirmed the order of the lower court dismissing the complaint of Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs.58 Regarding the contention of Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs that the judgment in the previous case (Civil Case No. Q-27, affirmed in G.R. No. L-5079) would not operate as res judicata against them because they were not parties in that suit, and that they did not derive their title from the defendants in the previous suit, this Court held:

We agree with appellants that the decision in the preceding suit to quiet title, prosecuted by the appellee Tuason & Co. against other heirs of Ynocencio Santiago (99 Phil., 615; 50 Off. Gaz. 11, 5727), can not constitute res judicata against these appellants who were not parties to that suit and do not derive their title from the defendants in the previous litigation (Rule 39, sec. 44 (b). There is authority for the proposition that a judgment may be made binding in a subsequent litigation upon one who, although not a formal party to a previous suit, has actually conducted or controlled the action or defense therein (65 ALR 1134), or who was adequately represented in such previous litigation; but no clear proof of the existence of such exceptional circumstance is before us in the present case. On the other hand, the rule is that co-owners are not privies inter se in relation to the property owned in common.

xxx xxx xxx

But granting that the plaintiffs-appellants herein are not privies of the defendants Santiago in the former litigation over this same property (S.C.G.R. No. L-5079), still the pronouncement of this Court, made in the former case, to the effect that the Spanish document (Annex A) issued in favor of Ynocencio Santiago (ancestor of appellants herein) was neither a titulo de informacion posesoria nor a title by composicion con el estado, and, therefore, vested no ownership over the land therein described in favor of Ynocencio Santiago, holds and applies to herein appellants, since the quality or the legal effect of the document does not depend upon the person who invoke it.

If the late Ynocencio Santiago did not become the owner of the disputed property by virtue of the document Annex A, then appellants herein, as heirs of Ynocencio have not acquired such ownership either. It follows that the first and second causes of action of their complaint, predicated as they are on the assumption that such ownership and its consequential rights resulted from Annex A, must necessarily fail. Not being owners, they can complain of no invasion of dominical rights.

It will thus be noted that in the aforementioned decision in the Santiago case, even if Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs were not considered privies to the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-27, and even if they were not parties in that previous case, this Court nevertheless applied to them the judgment

(G. R. No. L-5079) in that previous case where it was pronounced that the document, Annex A of the complaint of Albina Santiago, et al., was neither atitulo de informacion posesoria nor a title by composision con el estado, and it did not establish the right of ownership of their predecessor in interest, Inocencio Santiago, Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs had based their claim of ownership on that document (Annex A). 59 This Court held in that previous case that the document was unavailing against Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and against Original Certificate of Title No. 735.

And so, following the logic of this Court in its decision in the Santiago case, in the three cases at bar We hold that even if the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3621, except the heirs of Elias Benin, are not privies to Elias Benin and were not parties in Civil Case No. Q-156; even if the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3622, except Jose Alcantara, are not privies to Jose Alcantara and were not parties in Civil Case No. Q-156; and even if the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623, except Pascual Pili, are not privies to Pascual Pili and were not parties in Civil Case No. Q156, still the pronouncement of this Court in the judgment in that previous case (G.R. No. L-4998), to the effect that the plaintiffs in that case and their predecessors in interest were bound by the registration proceedings which culminated in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, holds and applies to all the plaintiffs (now appellees) in these three cases. In that judgment this Court ruled out, or did not sustain, the rights claimed by the predecessors in interest of herein appellees over the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. These appellees, therefore, have not succeeded to any right that can derrogate the validity and conclusiveness of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, and of the certificates of title that are derived from said original certificate of title.

Coming back to the Santiago case, as regards the contention of Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs that the registration proceedings which resulted in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 were irregular and fraudulent, this Court held:

(T)he mere fact that appellants herein were not personally notified of the registration proceedings that resulted in a decree of registration of title in favor of the Tuasons in 1914 does not constitute in itself a case of fraud that would invalidate the decree. The registration proceedings, as proceedingsin rem, operate as against the whole world and the decree issued therein is conclusive adjudication of the ownership of the lands registered, not only against those parties who appeared in such proceedings but also against parties who were summoned by publication but did not appear. The registration by the appellee's predecessors-in-interest freed the lands from claims and liens of whatever character that existed against the lands prior to the issuance of the certificates of title, except those noted in the certificate and legal encumbrances saved by law (Yumol vs. Rivera and Dizon, 64 Phil. 13, 17 and cases cited therein). In addition, there being no allegation that the registered owners procured the non-appearance of appellants at the registration proceedings, and very much more than one year having elapsed from the issuance of the decree of registration in 1914, neither revocation of such decree nor a decree of reconveyance are obtainable any more.

Regarding the claim of Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs that they had acquired title by prescription over the parcel of land claimed by them, this Court held:

It follows also that the allegation of prescriptive title in favor of plaintiffs does not suffice to establish a cause of action. If such prescription was completed before the registration of the land in favor of the Tuasons, the resulting prescriptive title was cut off and extinguished by the decree of registration. If, on the contrary, the prescription was either begun or completed after the decree of registration, it conferred no title

because, by express provision of law, prescription cannot operate against the registered owner (Act 496, section 46).

Thus, in this Santiago case, as in the Alcantara case, this Court declared conclusive and indefeasible Original Certificate of Title No. 735 which was issued as a result of the registration proceedings in L.R.C. No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration. There are many other cases where this Court has made a similar pronouncement regarding Original Certificate of Title No. 735.  60

In view of the findings, and the rulings, that We have hereinbefore made, it follows that, as contended by the appellant, the lower court also erred when it declared the appellees the owners of the lands claimed by them and in awarding damages to them, in these three cases. 61

We consider it unnecessary to rule on the counterclaim of appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., for damages and attorneys fees against the appellees 62, considering, as the records show, that the appellees are persons who are not in a position to pay damages in any form. 63 We believe that the appellees had filed their complaints in the honest, but mistaken, belief that they have a good cause of action against the appellant corporation and not because they meant to embarrass or humiliate the persons who are identified or connected with the appellant.

WHEREFORE, the joint decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch) in Civil Cages Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, appealed from, is reversed and set aside. The bond filed by appellant in the three cases in the court below for the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction is ordered cancelled. No pronouncement as to costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., took no part.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 118436.  March 21, 1997]

HEIRS OF MANUEL A. ROXAS and TRINIDAD DE LEON VDA. DE ROXAS (in substitution of original petitioner), petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MAGUESUN MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

D E C I S I O NROMERO, J.:

Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas, substituted by her heirs,[1] instituted this petition for review of the Court of Appeals decision dated December 8, 1994 in "Trinidad de Leon Vda.de Roxas v. Maguesun Management and Development: Corporation," (CA G.R. CV No. 38328), alleging reversible error committed by respondent appellate court when it affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite. The issue presented before us is whether or not private respondent Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud in obtaining a decree of registration over two unregistered parcels of land in Tagaytay City, actual fraud being the only ground to reopen or review a decree of registration.

The facts of the case are narrated below:

On July 2, 1990, herein private respondent Maguesun Management and Development Corporation (Maguesun Corporation) filed an Application for Registration of two parcels of unregistered land located in Barangay Sungay, Tagaytay City (Lot Nos. 7231 and 7239, Cad-355, Tagaytay Cadastre) with an area of 3,641 and 10,674 square meters respectively. The original registration case was docketed as Case No. TG-373 before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18, presided over by Judge Julieto Tabiolo. In support of its application for registration, Maguesun Corporation presented a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 10, 1990, executed by Zenaida Melliza as vendor and indicating the purchase price to be P170,000.00. Zenaida Melliza in turn, bought the property from the original petitioner herein, Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas for P200,000.00 two and a half months earlier, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated March 26, 1990 and an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication dated March 24, 1990.

Notices of the initial hearing were sent by the Land Registration Authority (the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Authority or NALTDRA) to Hilario Luna, Jose Gil and Leon Luna on the basis of Maguesun Corporation's application for registration. Since Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas was not named as an adjoining owner, occupant or adverse claimant, she was not sent a notice of the proceedings. Publication was made in the Official Gazette and the Record Newsweekly. [2] After an Order of general default was issued, the trial court proceeded to hear the land registration case. On October 4, 1990, the Land Registration Authority reported, among other things, that the subject parcels of land had previously been applied for registration in Land Registration Case No. 500, GLRO Record No. 55072 at the Court of First Instance of Cavite by Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon but no decision has been rendered thereon.[3] Eventually, on February 13, 1991 the Regional Trial Court granted Maguesun Corporation's application for registration (Land Registration Case No. TG-373) in a three-page decision with the following dispositive portion: [4]

"WHEREFORE, this Court gives imprimatur to the application for registration of said lands described in plan As-04-000108? Lot Nos. 7231 and 7239, one with an area of 3,641 and the other with an area of 10,674 square meters, as supported and shown by

the corresponding technical descriptions now forming part of the records, in the name of Maguesun Management and Development Corporation, with office address at 521 Edsa, Quezon City, free from all liens and encumbrances and from any other adverse claims of any kind and nature.

Upon finality of this Decision, the same ipso facto becomes executory, upon which eventuality the corresponding decree of registration may thus be issued.

SO ORDERED."

Consequently, the Regional Trial Court issued the Order for Issuance of the Decree on March 14, 1991, after the afore-mentioned Decision in LRC No. TG-373 became final[5] but not before it ordered, on February 14, 1991, Land Registration Case No. 500 (GLRO Record No. 55072) applied for by Manuel A Roxas and Trinidad de Leon, dismissed.

It was only when the caretaker of the property was being asked to vacate the land that petitioner Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas learned of its sale and the registration of the lots in Maguesun Corporation's name.

Hence, on April 21, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for review before the Regional Trial Court, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-1183 to set aside the decree of registration on the ground that Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud. She alleged that the lots were among the properties she inherited from her husband, former President Manuel A. Roxas, who died on April 15, 1946 and that her family had been in open, continuous, adverse and uninterrupted possession of the subject property in the concept of owner for more than thirty years before they applied for its registration under the Torrens System of land titling. Petitioner further denied that she sold the lots to Zenaida Melliza whom she had never met before and that her signature was forged in both the Deed of Sale and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. In support of her claims, she also listed a number of irregularities in the documents to prove actual fraud. In addition, and perhaps more significantly, she claimed that Maguesun Corporation intentionally omitted her name as an adverse claimant, occupant or adjoining owner in the application for registration submitted to the Land Registration Authority such that the latter could not send her a Notice of Initial Hearing. As result, an order of general default was issued and Maguesun Corporation's application for registration was granted. She charged Maguesun Corporation with knowledge or authorship of the fraud owing to the fact that Maguesun Corporation's president, Manolita Guevarra Suntay after whom the corporation was named, was her niece. Manolita Suntay is the daughter of Lourdes Guevarra Suntay, a deceased cousin of petitioner Vda. de Roxas who used to help with the latter's business affairs. Manolita Suntay used to take care of the registration and insurance of the latter's cars.[6]

The sole issue of the case, as laid down by the trial court after the pre-trial, was whether or not Vda. de Roxas' signatures on the Deed of Absolute Sale and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication in favor of Zenaida Melliza were forged. [7] Petitioner, who was then already 92 years of age, testified in open court on February 11, 1992 that she

has never met Zenaida Melliza, that she did not sell the subject lots and that her signatures on the Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Self-Adjudication were forged. [8] A document examiner from the Philippine National Police (PNP) concluded that there was no forgery.[9] Upon petitioner's motion, the signatures were re-examined by another expert from the National Bureau of Investigation The latter testified that the signatures on the questioned and sample documents were not written by the same person.[10] Despite the foregoing testimonies and pronouncements, the trial court dismissed the petition for review of decree of registration on April 15, 1992. [11] Placing greater weight on the findings and testimony of the PNP document examiner, it concluded that the questioned documents were not forged and if they were, it was Zenaida Melliza, and not Maguesun Corporation, who was responsible. Accordingly, Maguesun Corporation did not commit actual fraud. The court further noted that petitioner Mrs. Trinidad Roxas had not been paying taxes for several years, which fact "exhibited what appeared to be unmistakeable signs of not actually owning (the lots) any more," and that her application for registration was "previously dismissed and abandoned," thus indicating that "petitioner herself is aware that she had already lost . x x interest, if not actually her rights, over the property in question." [12]

In a decision dated December 8, 1994, [13] respondent court denied the petition for review and affirmed the findings of the trial court. The Court of Appeals held that petitioner failed to demonstrate that there was actual or extrinsic fraud, not merely constructive or intrinsic fraud, a prerequisite for purposes of annuling a judgment or reviewing a decree of registration. Additionally, respondent court stated that the discrepancies or irregularities in the Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Self-Adjudication pointed out by petitioner are not patent or obvious, involve matters that are too trivial, requiring knowledge of the intricacies of the law and are "not necessarily and exclusively indicia of extrinsic fraud and/or bad faith — especially when considered in the light of circumstances hereinafter discussed." The records also show, according to the appellate court, that Maguesun Corporation had not concealed from the court either the existence of petitioner or any interest she may have had in the registration proceedings. Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that publication of the initial hearing in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. [14]

Hence, the instant petition for review where it is alleged that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Maguesun Corporation did not commit actual fraud warranting the setting aside of the registration decree and in resolving the appeal on the basis of Maguesun Corporation's good faith. Petitioners pray that the registration of the subject lots in the name of Maguesun Corporation be cancelled, that said property be adjudicated in favor of petitioners and that respondent corporation pay moral damages not less than P100,000.00, exemplary damages not less than P36,000.00 and attorney's fees of P60,000.00.

We find the petition for review impressed with merit.

1.  Registration of untitled land under the Torrens System is done pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1529, the Property Registration Decree which amended and codified laws relative to registration of property. [15] Adjudication of land in a registration (or cadastral) case does not become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one

year after the entry of the final decree. Before such time, the decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering the decree, which court after hearing, may set aside the decision or decree and adjudicate the land to another party.[16] Absence, minority or other disability of any person affected, or any proceeding in court for reversing judgments, are not considered grounds to reopen or revise said decree. However, the right of a person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud is recognized by law (Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529) as a valid and legal basis for reopening and revising a decree of registration. [17] It is further required that a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration be filed within one year from the date of entry of said decree, that the petitioner has a real and dominical right and the property has not yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser. [18]

Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive. Actual or positive fraud proceeds from an intentional deception practiced by means of the misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact.[19] Constructive fraud is construed as a fraud because of its detrimental effect upon public interests and public or private confidence, even though the act is not done or committed with an actual design to commit positive fraud or injury upon other persons.[20]

Fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud is regarded as intrinsic where the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action, or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated therein, and is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured, so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy.[21] Extrinsic fraud is also actual fraud, but collateral to the transaction sued upon.[22]

The distinctions are significant because only actual fraud or extrinsic fraud has been accepted as grounds for a judgment to be annulled or, as in this case, a decree of registration reopened and reviewed. [23] In the oft-cited Macabingkil v. People's Homesite and Housing Corporation case, the Court drew from American jurisprudence stating that "relief has been granted on the ground that, by some fraud practiced directly upon the party seeking relief against the judgment or decree, (and) that party has been prevented from presenting all of his case to the court." [24] The "fraud" contemplated by the law in this case (Section 32, P.D. No. 1529) is actual and extrinsic, which includes, an intentional omission of fact required by law. [25] For fraud to justify a review of a decree, it must be extrinsic or collateral, and the facts upon which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered.[26] Persons who were fraudulently deprived of their opportunity to be heard in the original registration case are entitled to a review of a decree of registration.

In Ramirez v. CA,[27] this Court adopted the Court of Appeals' ruling that the suppression of the fact that the applicant spouses possessed the subject ricefield merely as antichretic creditors and the fraudulent concealment and misrepresentation in the application that no other persons had any claim or interest in the said land, constitute specific allegations of extrinsic fraud supported by competent proof. Failure

and intentional omission of the applicants to disclose the fact of actual physical possession by another person constitutes an allegation of actual fraud. [28] Likewise, it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a third person.[29]

The Court here finds that respondent Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud in obtaining the decree of registration sought to be reviewed by petitioner.

Petitioner Vda. de Roxas contended that Maguesun Corporation intentionally omitted their name, or that of the Roxas family, as having a claim to or as an occupant of the subject property. In the corporation's application for registration filed with the trial court in LRC No. TG-373, the following declaration appears:

"6.     That the names in full and addresses, as far as known to the undersigned, of the owners of all adjoining properties; of the persons mentioned in paragraphs 3 and 5 (mortgagors, encumbrancers, and occupants) and of the person shown on the plan as claimants are as follows:

Hilario Luna, Jose Gil. Leon Luna.   Provincial Road   all at Tagaytay City (no house No.)"[30]

The highlighted words are typed in with a different typewriter, with the first five letters of the word "provincial" typed over correction fluid. Magesun Corporation, however, annexed a differently-worded application for the petition to review case (Civil Case No. TG-1183, "Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas v. Maguesun Management and Development Corporation, et al."). In the copy submitted to the trial court, the answer to the same number is as follows:

Hilario Luna, Jose Gil, Leon Luna, Roxas.[31]

The discrepancy which is unexplained appears intentional. If the word "Roxas" were indeed erased and replaced with "Provincial Road all at Tagaytay City (no house No.)" in the original application submitted in LRC No. TG-373 but the copy with the word "Roxas" was submitted to the trial court in Civil Case No. TG-1183, it is reasonable to assume that the reason is to mislead the court into thinking that "Roxas" was placed in the original application as an adjoining owner, encumbrancer, occupant or claimant, the same application which formed the basis for the Land Registration Authority in sending out notices of initial hearing. Section 15 of Presidential Decree No 1529 also requires the applicant for registration to state the full names and addresses of all occupants of the land and those of adjoining owners, if known and if not known, the extent of the search made to find them. Respondent corporation likewise failed to comply with this requirement of law.

The truth is that the Roxas family had been in possession of the property uninterruptedly through their caretaker, Jose Ramirez. [32] Respondent Maguesun Corporation also declared in number 5 of the same application that the subject land was unoccupied when in truth and in fact, the Roxas family caretaker resided in the subject

property. Respondent corporation is likewise charged with the knowledge of such possession and occupancy, for its President, who signed the Deed of Sale over the property, knew fully well that her grandaunt Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas owned the property. It is reasonable to expect her as a buyer to have inspected the property prior to the sale such that the ascertainment of the current possessors or occupants could have been made facilely. Respondent corporation's intentional concealment and representation of petitioner's interest in the subject lots as possessor, occupant and claimant constitutes actual fraud justifying the reopening and review of the decree of registration. Through such misfeasance, the Roxas family was kept ignorant of the registration proceedings involving their property, thus effectively depriving them of their day in court.

2.  Respondent Court of Appeals held that Maguesun Corporation had not concealed from the court either the existence of Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas or any interest she may have in the registration proceedings for the records are replete with references by Maguesun Corporation itself to petitioner. [33] Mention of the late President's name as well as that of petitioner was made principally in the Formal Offer of Exhibits for respondent corporation, in a Copy of Plan of Lots 7231 and 7239, tax declarations and as predecessor-in-interest. However, this is not sufficient compliance with what the law requires to be stated in the application for registration. Disclosure of petitioner's adverse interest, occupation and possession should be made at the appropriate time, i.e., at the time of the application for registration, otherwise, the persons concerned will not be sent notices of the initial hearing and will, therefore, miss the opportunity to present their opposition or claims.

3.  Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing was made in the Official Gazette and in the Record Newsweekly, admittedly not a newspaper of general circulation. The Court of Appeals held that pursuant to Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Said provision of law expressly states that "the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette   and   once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. x x x"

While publication of the notice in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court, publication in a newspaper of general circulation remains an indispensable procedural requirement. Couched in mandatory terms, it is a component of procedural due process and aimed at giving "as wide publicity as possible" so that all persons having an adverse-interest in the land subject of the registration proceedings may be notified thereof.[34] Although jurisdiction of the court is not affected, the fact that publication was not made in a newspaper of general circulation is material and relevant in assessing the applicant's right or title to the land.

4.  The allegations of forgery and the discrepancies in the documentary, as well as in the testimonial evidence regarding this issue which are all crucial to this case, compelled the Court to undertake a careful review of the facts of the case. [35] A close scrutiny of the evidence on record leads the Court to the irresistible conclusion that forgery was indeed attendant in the case at bar. Although there is no proof of

respondent Maguesun Corporation's direct participation in the execution and preparation of the forged instruments, there are sufficient indicia which proves that Maguesun Corporation is not the "innocent purchaser for value" who merits the protection of the law.

In response to the questions fielded by the trial counsel and by counsel for petitioner, PNP Document Examiner Zacarias Semacio sought to explain all the differences pointed out in the questioned signatures and in the sample signatures as having been caused merely by "natural variation." [36] He concluded that the questioned signatures were not forged. In contrast, Chief of the Questioned Documents Division of the National Bureau of Investigation, Arcadio Ramos testified with more specificity as befits an expert that the questioned and sample signatures were not written by one and the same person because of "(t)he manner of execution of strokes the personalized proportional characteristics of letters; the linking/connecting between letters the structural pattern of letters and other minute details x x x." [37] Moreover, petitioner Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas categorically declared that she has never met Zenaida Melliza and did not sell the subject property. [38] Petitioner, then over ninety years old, has no motive to attest to a falsehood. Petitioner and her family also own several other pieces of property, some of which are leased out as restaurants, e.g. Leo's Restaurant and Ma Mon Luk Restaurant. [39] This is an indication that petitioner is not unaware of the value of her properties. Hence, it is unlikely that she would sell over thirteen thousand square meters of prime property in Tagaytay City to a stranger for a measlyP200,000.00. Finally, even to a layman's eye, the documents, as well as the enlarged photographic exhibit of the signatures, reveal forgery. The questioned signatures taken from the Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Self-Adjudication are starkly different from the sample signatures in several documents executed by petitioner. The questioned signatures are smooth and rounded, and have none of the jagged and shaky character of petitioner's signatures, characteristic of the penmanship of elderly persons.

There are also added considerations reflective of the dubious character of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication purportedly executed by petitioner. [40] In it she declares that she is a resident of 22 8th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, when she actually lives in 2 Park Road, North Forbes Park, Makati. She also states that she is the "sole heir of the late Manuel De Roxas who died sometime on the year 1944 at Manila." Petitioner's husband is President Manuel A. Roxas and she refers to herself as Trinidad de Leon vda. de   Roxas . President Roxas was survived by petitioner and their two children, Ma. Rosario Roxas and Gerardo Roxas (who predeceased petitioner). The fact that petitioner was not the sole heir was known to the general public, as well as the demise of the late President on April 15, 1946 while delivering a speech at Clark Field, Pampanga. The aforementioned irregularities are too glaring to have been ignored. If petitioner did in fact execute said Affidavit, there is no reason why she should state facts other than the unadulterated truth concerning herself and her family.

Additionally, Zenaida Melliza's non-appearance raises doubt as to her existence. Her given address was Matina, Davao City. How was she related to petitioner and what led her to purchase the subject property? Respondent corporation could very well have presented her to prove the legitimacy of their transaction. If petitioner were selling said

property, would she not have offered them first to interested relatives such as Manolita G. Suntay? Would an ordinary person sell more than thirteen thousand square meters of prime property forP170,000.00 when it was earlier purchased for P200,000.00? These questions highlight several implausibilities in the alleged sale of the subject property by herein petitioner. As Maguesun Corporation's President who is related to petitioner, Manolita G. Suntay should have verified the sale of the subject property by Zenaida Melliza. Manolita G. Suntay's closeness to petitioner Vda. de Roxas, as one who even registered the latter's car, suggests acquaintance with the late petitioner's properties as well as the possibility that she took advantage of such knowledge.

From the foregoing, it is quite clear that respondent corporation cannot tack its possession to that of petitioner as predecessor-in-interest. Zenaida Melliza conveyed no title over the subject parcels of land to Maguesun Corporation as she was not the owner thereof.[41] Maguesun Corporation is thus not entitled to the registration decree which the trial court granted in its decision. Palpably, petitioner has not been interrupted in her more than thirty years of open, uninterrupted, exclusive and notorious possession in the concept of an owner over the subject lots by the irregular transaction to Zenaida Melliza. She therefore retains title proper and sufficient for original registration over the two parcels of land in question pursuant to Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. [42]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 38328 ("Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas v. Maguesun Management & Development Corporation, et al.") promulgated on December 8, 1994 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Accordingly, registration of title over the subject parcels of land, described in Plan AS-04-000108, Lot Nos. 7231 and 7239, with an area of 3,461 and 10,674 square meters, respectively, as shown and supported by the corresponding technical descriptions now forming part of the Records of LRC No. TG-373, is awarded to herein petitioner Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas and her heirs, herein substituted as petitioners. Upon finality of this Decision, the Land Registration Authority is hereby directed to ISSUE with reasonable dispatch the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title pursuant to Section 39 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.

SO ORDERED.Regalado, (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 168155             February 15, 2007

HEIRS OF MARINA C. REGALADO AND HEIRS OF ARNULFO C. REGALADO, REPRESENTED BY AMADEO C. REGALADO, Petitioners, vs.EPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Marina Regalado (Marina) filed on July 14, 1987 an application for registration of a parcel of land situated in Sitio Balubad, Barrio Nangka, Marikina, Metro Manila which was surveyed and recorded as Psu-3907 (the property).1

The application, docketed as LRC Case No. 10916 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, was published on November 14, 1988 in the Official Gazette and on November 28, 1988 in Nueva Era, a newspaper of general circulation.2

Marina subsequently filed on January 18, 1991 a motion to withdraw the application without prejudice to the refiling of the same, citing as grounds 1awphi1.net

. . . the discrepancies on the question of the survey and accession number corresponding to the survey plan of the property, the question thereof not being indubitable and to allow the Bureau of Lands time to examine its records; and for another compelling reason was the inevitable absence of applicant from the country to arrange and assist in the intestate estate of her late widowed sister whose children [were] all minors in London.3

The motion to withdraw the application was granted on February 28, 1991.

On March 17, 1992, Marina filed a petition to reinstate the earlier application which was withdrawn. The court denied the petition on a technical ground.4

On May 6, 1992, Marina filed another application for land registration before the Pasig RTC.

Marina later filed on May 28, 1992 an "Amended Application for Registration"5 alleging, inter alia, that she had "by herself or through her predecessor-in-interest . . . been in open, continuous and notorious possession and occupation of said land which is alienable and disposable of [sic] the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since 1945 or earlier";6 and that she acquired the land "by virtue of a Deed of Assignment dated January 3, 1977 executed by the registered claimant Tomas Antero as Assignor"7 in her favor.

The application was docketed as LRC Case No. R-4633, but was re-numbered as LRC No. N-11237.8

To the Amended Application, the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed an opposition on March 15, 1994, it claiming to be the owner of the property which it referred to as the "Balubad Nangka Project" and which had been declared as an Area for Priority Development under Proclamation No. 1967 dated May 14, 1980.9

Acting on the Amended Application, a "Notice of Initial Hearing"10 scheduled on June 26, 1995 was published in the May 22, 1995 issue of the Official Gazette11 and in the June 22, 1995 issue

of Taliba.12 Copies of the "Notice of Initial Hearing" were sent to all adjoining owners, the persons named therein with known addresses, and government agencies and offices concerned.13

During the pendency of her application or on November 29, 1995, Marina died, hence, her counsel filed on February 21, 1996 a "Motion to Substitute Applicant," alleging that her surviving heirs designated Arnulfo Regalado, her eldest son, as the applicant to pursue and litigate the land registration case in their behalf.14Branch 155 of the Pasig RTC granted the motion on April 30, 1996.15

On August 20, 1996, Arnulfo Regalado executed a Waiver of the "area covered by the National Housing Authority [sic] without prejudice to the other land subject of the . . . petition."16 In the same Waiver, he ceded, transferred, and waived 30,239 square meters of the property to the NHA.17

Finding that "the possession of the substitute-applicant is open, continuous, adverse, against the whole world, in the concept of owner, and under a bona fide claim of ownership"18 and that "[t]he property is not part of any forest zone nor of any aerial, military or naval reservations of the government and is classified to be alienable and disposable,"19 Branch 155 of the Pasig RTC, by Decision of August 12, 1997, ordered the registration of the property, except the portion which was waived in favor of the NHA, pro indiviso in the name of the heirs of Marina (Bernardita R. Carino, Amadeo C. Regalado, Ernesto C. Regalado, Elizabeth R. Cabading, Alberto C. Regalado, Milagros R. Escalante, and Arnulfo C. Regalado).20

The Republic of the Philippines (the Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Notice of Appeal of the RTC decision.21

By Decision22 of February 10, 2004, the Court of Appeals found for the Republic in this wise:

We sustain the first argument raised by the Republic as to the discrepancy in the lot size and technical descriptionbetween the original as published vis-à-vis that stated in the petition even after the waiver of 30,239 square meters in favor of the NHA. It is notable too that there are differences among the original technical descriptionsmade for Tomas Antero [who allegedly assigned the property to Marina] (Exh. "Z"), that duly approved by the Bureau of Lands (Exh. "AA"), and also that published in the Taliba (Exh. "F"), from the final technical description of the subject land in the assailed Decision. This is a serious defect for the technical description sets the extent and boundaries of the land to be registered, and so should be precise for purposes of identification, delineation, and distinction, and notice to the public.23 (Underscoring supplied)

The appellate court thus dismissed the application for registration.

Their Motion for Reconsideration24 having been denied,25 Marina’s heirs filed the instant Petition26 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, faulting the Court of Appeals to have erred

I. . . . IN ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL OF THE REPUBLIC DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT WAS NOT PARTY IN THE CASE AS IT HAD NOT FILED ANY OPPOSITION OR ANSWER AGAINST THE APPLICATION   FOR REGISTRATION BEFORE THE COURT A QUO;

II. . . . IN FINDING THAT THE COURT A QUO DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE APPLICATION   FOR DECREE OF REGISTRATION OVER THE INSTANT CASE

III. . . . IN FINDING THAT PETITIONERS FAILED TO SUBSTANTIATE THEIR REGISTERABLE RIGHTS OVER THE SUBJECT LAND   IN THE CASE AT BAR.27 (Underscoring supplied)

In the meantime, the heirs of Marina designated Amadeo Regalado as their attorney-in-fact to pursue the application.28

The petition is devoid of merit.

The failure of the Republic to file any opposition or answer to the application for registration, despite receipt of notice thereof,29 did not deprive its right to appeal the RTC decision.30

Relative to the allegation that the Director of Lands or that the government did not oppose the application of herein respondent, as in fact on December 26, 1969 an order of general default was issued by the court against the whole world, suffice it to say that as stated by this Court in Luciano v. Esterella, 34 SCRA 769, "it is a well known and settled rule in our jurisdiction that the Republic, or its government, is usually not estopped by mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents." And, in an earlier case, Republic vs. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.,32 SCRA 211, "there was an enunciation of such a principle in this wise: ‘Thus did the lower court, as pointed out by the then Solicitor General, conclude that the government was bound by the mistaken interpretation arrived at by the national treasurer and the auditor general. It would consider estoppel as applicable. That is not the law. Estoppel does not lie."31 (Underscoring supplied)

Respecting the finding of the appellate court on the "discrepancy" in the lot size   and technical descriptionsmentioned in the earlier-quoted portion of its decision, the heirs contend that "[w]hat appears, after a careful comparison of the approved survey plan (Exh. ‘Z’), and that republished [sic] with Taliba (Exh. ‘F’) and the Official Gazette (Exhibit ‘CC’), were simple clerical errors and minor discrepancies which do not substantially alter the technical description of the subject property as published by the Land Registration Authorityin the Official Gazette (Exh. ‘CC’) and that by petitioner with the Taliba (Exh. ‘F’)."32

Petitioners conclude that any such discrepancy "was unsubstantial and did not in any way affect the jurisdiction of the Land Registration Court."

Petitioners’ contention fail in light of the following clear pronouncement of this Court in Fewkes v. Vasquez,33 viz:

Under Section 21 of the Land Registration Act, an application for registration of land is required to contain, among others, a description of the land subject of the proceeding, the name, status and address of the applicant, as well as the names and addresses of all occupants of the land and of all adjoining owners, if known, or if unknown, of the steps taken to locate them. When the application is set by the court for initial hearing, it is then that notice (of the hearing), addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the lot being registered and the adjoining owners, and indicating the location, boundaries and technical description of the land being registered, shall be published in the Official Gazette for two consecutive times. It is this publication of the notice of hearing that is considered one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the court   in land registration cases, for the proceedings being in rem, it is only when there is constructive seizure of the land, effected by the publication and notice, that jurisdiction over the res is vested on the court. Furthermore, it is such notice and publication of the hearing that would enable all persons concerned, who may have any rights or interests in the property, to come forward   and show to the court why the application for registration thereof is not to be granted.

It must be remembered that the application in this case filed in the court below was for registration, not of the big parcel of land (Lot No. 1383, Pls-764-D or Lot no. 21), but of certain portions thereof designated by applicant-appellant as Lots Nos. 21-A and 21-B.   It is the technical description of these 2 smaller lots, therefore, that must be published   in order that the persons who may be

affected by their registration may be notified thereof. For, considering that the adjoining owners of Lot No. 21 would not be the same as the owners of the properties adjoining Lots Nos. 21-A and 21-B, the notification of the adjoining owners of the big lot would not be the notice to the adjoining owners or occupants of the smaller lots required by law. In short, it is the publication of the specific boundaries of Lots Nos. 21-A and 21-B that would actually put the interested parties on notice of the registration proceeding, and would   confer authority on the land registration court to pass upon the issue of the registerability   of said lots in favor of the applicant .34 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Marina’s heirs invoke Benin v. Tuason,35 synthesizing its ruling as follows, quoted verbatim:

"An slight increase in area   registered over the area contained in the application is not fatal to the decree of registration." "Registration Court has no jurisdiction only in so far as areas not covered by original application are added." Also, "Amendment to application for registration need not be published anew if merely excludes portions covered by the original application.36 (Underscoring supplied)

It is not the lot or property size alone, however, in which the appellate court found a discrepancy. More importantly, it found discrepancy in the technical descriptions of the property appearing in the different documents material to the resolution of the Amended Application for registration.

IN ANY EVENT, Marina’s heirs as applicants in this land registration case "bear the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain."37 This they failed to discharge.

In another vein, while the heirs claim that Tomas Antero assigned the property to Marina by a Deed of Assignment, no proof was presented that Tomas Antero had possessed the same in the concept of an owner. That the property was surveyed for Tomas Antero38 does not prove his ownership.39 Marina’s heirs themselves admit, in their petition filed before this Court, the doubtful nature of Tomas Antero’s title to the property, thus:

It is worth pointing out that the very reason why the previous owner Tomas Antero of the subject lot failed to secure the corresponding Tax Declaration was because of the apparent hesitation of then Municipality of Marikina, Metro Manila to issue the same, contending that it considered the same as part of the public domain. That attitude of the Municipality of Marikina, Metro Manila could be readily gleaned from the very Tax Declaration No. B-0069187 issued to petitioner Marina C. Regalado, the specific portion thereof is quoted, to wit:

NOTE:

It is believed that the land covered by this declaration form [ sic ] part of the public domain and was assessed upon the insistence of the declarant   and upon compliance with Article 5-E of the Assessment Regulation No. 3-75.40(Underscoring in the original; emphasis supplied)

Other than Marina’s uncorroborated testimony given in a previous attempt to have the property registered, there is no proof to sustain the trial court’s finding that Marina, her uncle, aunt, and other relatives have been residing in the property for more than 30 years and that she herself had been residing there for 15 years when Tomas Antero executed the deed of assignment in her favor.41

Marina’s admission that she does not know the name of the public road traversing the property42 belies her claim that she resided therein for 15 years. At most, the evidence indicates that

Marina possessed and occupied a small portion of the property, while some 600 other parties possessed and occupied the rest.43

As for the tax declaration in the name of Marina,44 it is not conclusive proof of ownership. While it is a good indication of possession in the concept of owner,45 delayed declaration of property for tax purposes negates

a claim of continuous, exclusive, and interrupted possession in the concept of an owner.46

In the case at bar, Marina claimed that the property was assigned to her as early as 1977, yet she only declared it for tax purposes in 1988,47 following her first attempt to have the land registered on July 14, 1987.48

And, there is no proof that Marina religiously paid taxes on the property. In fact, in her testimony, she twice stated that she intended to pay taxes only if and when ordered to do so by the court.49 The photocopies of Tax Receipt Nos. 7436713 and 7436714 annexed to the motion for reconsideration filed by Marina’s heirs before the Court of Appeals cannot be appreciated in their favor. On top of being mere photocopies, they were not offered in evidence before the trial court. To consider them at the appeal stage would deny the other parties the right to rebut them.50

In fine, the trial court’s finding that Marina had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession in the concept of owner and under a bona fide claim of ownership51 fails. The reversal by the appellate court of the trial court’s decision must thus be upheld.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 182913               November 20, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.ANTONIO, FELIZA, NEMESIO, ALBERTO, FELICIDAD, RICARDO, MILAGROS AND CIPRIANO, ALL SURNAMED BACAS; EMILIANA CHABON, SATURNINO ABDON, ESTELA, CHABON, LACSASA DEMON, PDERITA CHABON, FORTUNATA EMBALSADO, MINDA J. CASTILLO, PABLO CASTILLO, ARTURO P. LEGASPI, and JESSIE I. LEGASPI, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to review, reverse and set aside the November 12, 2007 Decision1 and the May 15, 2008 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 64142, upholding the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Cagayan de Oro City (RTC) , which dismissed the consolidated cases of Civil Case No. 3494, entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Antonio, et al. and Civil Case No. 5918, entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Emiliana Chabon , et al. Said civil cases were filed by the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) for the cancellation and annulment of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-358 and OCT No. O-669, covering certain parcels of land occupied and utilized as part of the Camp Evangelista Military Reservation, Misamis Oriental, presently the home of the 4th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army.

The Antecedents:

In 1938, Commonwealth President Manuel Luis Quezon (Pres. Quezon) issued Presidential Proclamation No. 265, which took effect on March 31, 1938, reserving for the use of the Philippine Army three (3) parcels of the public domain situated in the barrios of Bulua and Carmen, then Municipality of Cagayan, Misamis Oriental. The parcels of land were withdrawn from sale or settlement and reserved for military purposes, "subject to private rights, if any there be."

Land Registration Case No. N-275

[Antonio, Feliza, Nemesio, Roberto, and Felicidad, all surnamed Bacas, and the Heirs of Jesus Bacas, Applicants (The Bacases)]

The Bacases filed their Application for Registration3 on November 12, 1964 covering a parcel of land, together with all the improvements found thereon, located in Patag, Cagayan de Oro City, more particularly described and bounded as follows:

A parcel of land, Lot No. 4354 of the Cadastral Survey of Cagayan, L.R.C. Record No. 1612, situated at Barrio Carmen, Municipality of Cagayan, Province of Misamis Oriental. Bounded on the SE., along lines 1-2-3-4, by Lot 4357; and alongline 4-5, by Lot 3862; on the S., along line 5-6, by Lot 3892; on the W. and NW., along lines 6-7-8, by Lot 4318; on the NE., along line 8-9, by Lot 4319, along line 9-10, by Lot 4353 and long line 10-11, by Lot 4359; and on the SE., along line 11-1, by Lot 4356, all of Cagayan Cadastre; containing an area of THREE HUNDRED FIFTY FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY SEVEN (354,377) square meters, more or less, under Tax Declaration No. 35436 and assessed at P3,540.00.4

They alleged ownership in fee simple of the property and indicated in their application the names and addresses of the adjoining owners, as well as a statement that the Philippine Army (Fourth Military Area) recently occupied a portion of the land by their mere tolerance.5

The Director of the Bureau of Lands, thru its Special Counsel, Benito S. Urcia (Urcia) , registered its written Opposition6 against the application. Later, Urcia, assisted by the District Land Officer of Cagayan de Oro City, thru the Third Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Misamis Oriental, Pedro R. Luspo (Luspo) , filed an Amended Opposition.7

On April 10, 1968, based on the evidence presented by the Bacases, the Land Registration Court (LRC) rendered a decision8 holding that the applicants had conclusively established their ownership in fee simple over the subject land and that their possession, including that of their predecessor-in-interest, had been open, adverse, peaceful, uninterrupted, and in concept of owners for more than forty (40) years.

No appeal was interposed by the Republic from the decision of the LRC. Thus, the decision became final and executory, resulting in the issuance of a decree and the corresponding certificate of title over the subject property.

Land Registration Case No. N-521 [Emiliana Chabon, Estela Chabon and Pedrita Chabon, Applicants (The Chabons)]

The Chabons filed their Application for Registration9 on May 8, 1974 covering a parcel of land located in Carmen-District, Cagayan de Oro City, known as Lot 4357, Cagayan Cadastre, bounded and described as:

A parcel of land (Lot 4357, Cagayan Cadastre, plan Ap-12445), situated in the District of Carmen, City of Cagayan de Oro. Bounded on the NE. by property of Potenciano Abrogan vs. Republic of the Philippines (Public Land); on the SE. by properties of Geronimo Wabe and Teofilo Batifona or Batipura; on the SW. by property of Teofilo Batifona or Batipura; and on the NW. by property of Felipe Bacao or Bacas vs. Republic of the Philippines (Public Land). Point "1" is N. 10 deg. 39’W., 379.88 M. from B.L.L.M. 14, Cagayan Cadastre. Area SIXTY NINE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED THIRTY TWO (69,632) SQUARE METERS, more or less.10

They alleged ownership in fee simple over the property and indicated therein the names and addresses of the adjoining owners, but no mention was made with respect to the occupation, if any, by the Philippine Army. The Chabons likewise alleged that, to the best of their knowledge, no mortgage or encumbrance of any kind affecting said land with the exception of 18,957 square meters sold to Minda J. Castillo and 1,000 square meters sold and conveyed to Atty. Arturo R. Legaspi.11

On February 18, 1976, there being no opposition made, even from the government, hearing on the application ensued. The LRC then rendered a decision12 holding that Chabons’ evidence established their ownership in fee simple over the subject property and that their possession, including that of their predecessor-in-interest, had been actual, open, public, peaceful, adverse, continuous, and in concept of owners for more than thirty (30) years.

The decision then became final and executory. Thus, an order13 for the issuance of a decree and the corresponding certificate of title was issued.

The present cases

As a consequence of the LRC decisions in both applications for registration, the Republic filed a complaint for annulment of titles against the Bacases and the Chabons before the RTC. More specifically, on September 7, 1970 or one (1) year and ten (10) months from the issuance of OCT No. 0-358, a civil case for annulment, cancellation of original certificate of title, reconveyance of lot or damages was filed by the Republic against the Bacases, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 3494. On the other hand, on April 21, 1978 or two (2) years and seven (7) months after issuance of OCT No. 0-669, the Republic filed a civil case for annulment of title and reversion against the Chabons, docketed as Civil Case No. 5918.

Civil Case No. 3494 against the Bacases

The Republic claimed in its petition for annulment before the RTC14 that the certificate of title issued in favor of the Bacases was null and void because they fraudulently omitted to name the military camp as the actual occupant in their application for registration. Specifically, the Republic, through

the Fourth Military Area, was the actual occupant of Lot No. 4354 and also the owner and possessor of the adjoining Lots Nos. 431815 and 4357. Further, the Bacases failed to likewise state that Lot No. 4354 was part of Camp Evangelista. These omissions constituted fraud which vitiated the decree and certificate of title issued.

Also, the Republic averred that the subject land had long been reserved in 1938 for military purposes at the time it was applied for and, so, it was no longer disposable and subject to registration.16

Civil Case No. 5918 against the Chabons

In this case, the Republic claimed that it was the absolute owner and possessor of Lot No. 4357. The said lot, together with Lots 431817 and 4354, formed part of the military reservation known as Camp Evangelista in Cagayan de Oro City, which was set aside and reserved under Presidential Proclamation No. 265 issued by President Quezon on March 31, 1938.18

In its petition for annulment before the RTC,19 the Republic alleged that OCT No. 0-669 issued in favor of the Chabons and all transfer certificates of titles, if any, proceeding therefrom, were null and void for having been vitiated by fraud and/or lack of jurisdiction.20 The Chabons concealed that the fact that Lot 4357 was part of Camp Evangelista and that the Republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was its actual occupant and possessor.21 Further, Lot 4357 was a military reservation, established as such as early as March 31, 1938 and, thus, could not be the subject of registration or private appropriation.22 As a military reservation, it was beyond the commerce of man and the registration court did not have any jurisdiction to adjudicate the same as private property.23

Decision of the Regional Trial Court

As the facts and issues in both cases were substantially the same and identical, and the pieces of evidence adduced were applicable to both, the cases were consolidated and jointly tried. Thereafter, a joint decision dismissing the two complaints of the Republic was rendered.

In dismissing the complaints, the RTC explained that the stated fact of occupancy by Camp Evangelista over certain portions of the subject lands in the applications for registration by the respondents was a substantial compliance with the requirements of the law.24 It would have been absurd to state Camp Evangelista as an adjoining owner when it was alleged that it was an occupant of the land.25 Thus, the RTC ruled that the respondents did not commit fraud in filing their applications for registration.

Moreover, the RTC was of the view that the Republic was then given all the opportunity to be heard as it filed its opposition to the applications, appeared and participated in the proceedings. It was, thus, estopped from contesting the proceedings.

The RTC further reasoned out that assuming arguendo that respondents were guilty of fraud, the Republic lost its right to a relief for its failure to file a petition for review on the ground of fraud within one (1) year after the date of entry of the decree of registration.26 Consequently, it would now be barred by prior judgment to contest the findings of the LRC.27

Finally, the RTC agreed with the respondents that the subject parcels of land were exempted from the operation and effect of the Presidential Proclamation No. 265 pursuant to a proviso therein that the same would not apply to lands with existing "private rights." The presidential proclamation did not, and should not, apply to the respondents because they did not apply to acquire the parcels of

land in question from the government, but simply for confirmation and affirmation of their rights to the properties so that the titles over them could be issued in their favor.28 What the proclamation prohibited was the sale or disposal of the parcels of land involved to private persons as a means of acquiring ownership of the same, through the modes provided by law for the acquisition of disposable public lands.29

The Republic filed its Notice of Appeal before the RTC on July 5, 1991. On the other hand, the Bacases and the Chabons filed an Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of the Writ of Execution and Possession on July 16, 1991. An amended motion was filed on July 31, 1991. The RTC then issued the Order,30 dated February 24, 1992, disapproving the Republic’s appeal for failure to perfect it as it failed to notify the Bacases and granting the writ of execution.

Action of the Court of Appeals and the Court regarding the Republic’s Appeal

The Republic filed a Notice of Appeal on April 1, 1992 from the February 24, 1992 of the RTC. The same was denied in the RTC Order,31 dated April 23, 1992. The Republic moved for its reconsideration but the RTC was still denied it on July 8, 1992.32

Not satisfied, the Republic filed a petition before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 28647, entitled Republic vs. Hon. Cesar M. Ybañez,33 questioning the February 24, 1992 Order of the RTC denying its appeal in Civil Case No. 3494. The CA sustained the government and, accordingly, annulled the said RTC order.

The respondents appealed to the Court, which later found no commission of a reversible error on the part of the CA. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal as well as the subsequent motions for reconsideration. An entry of judgment was then issued on February 16, 1995.34

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The appeal allowed, the CA docketed the case as CA G.R. CV No. 64142.

On November 12, 2007, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. It explained that once a decree of registration was issued under the Torrens system and the reglementary period had passed within which the decree may be questioned, the title was perfected and could not be collaterally questioned later on.35 Even assuming that an action for the nullification of the original certificate of title may still be instituted, the review of a decree of registration under Section 38 of Act No. 496 [Section 32 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529] would only prosper upon proof that the registration was procured through actual fraud,36 which proceeded from an intentional deception perpetrated through the misrepresentation or the concealment of a material fact.37 The CA stressed that "[t]he fraud must be actual and extrinsic, not merely constructive or intrinsic; the evidence thereof must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant, because the proceedings which are assailed as having been fraudulent are judicial proceedings which by law, are presumed to have been fair and regular."38

Citing the rule that "[t]he fraud is extrinsic if it is employed to deprive parties of their day in court and, thus, prevent them from asserting their right to the property registered in the name of the applicant,"39 the CA found that there was none. The CA agreed with the RTC that there was substantial compliance with the requirement of the law. The allegation of the respondent that Camp Evangelista occupied portions of their property negated the complaint that they committed misrepresentation or concealment amounting to fraud.40

As regards the issue of exemption from the proclamation, the CA deemed that a discussion was unnecessary because the LRC already resolved it. The CA stressed that the proceeding was one in rem, thereby binding everyone to the legal effects of the same and that a decree of registration that had become final should be deemed conclusive not only on the questions actually contested and determined, but also upon all matters that might be litigated or decided in the land registration proceeding.41

Not in conformity, the Republic filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied on May 15, 2008 for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition.

GROUNDS RELIED UPONWARRANTING REVIEW OF THEPETITION

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE LAND REGISTRATION COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION FILED BY RESPONDENTS DESPITE THE LATTER’S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE MANDATORY REQUIREMENT OF INDICATING ALL THE ADJOINING OWNERS OF THE PARCELS OF LAND SUBJECT OF THE APPLICATION.

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE A REGISTRABLE RIGHT OVER THE SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND WHICH ARE WITHIN THE CAMP EVANGELISTA MILITARY RESERVATION.

3. IN G.R. NO. 157306 ENTITLED "REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANATALIA ACTUB TIU ESTONILO, ET AL.," WHICH INVOLVES PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS CLAIMING RIGHTS OVER PORTIONS OF THE CAMP EVANGELISTA MILITARY RESERVATION, THIS HONORABLE COURT HELD THAT THESE INDIVIDUALS COULD NOT HAVE VALIDLY OCCUPIED THEIR CLAIMED LOTS BECAUSE THE SAME WERE CONSIDERED INALIENABLE FROM THE TIME OF THEIR RESERVATION IN 1938. HERE, THE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE BEING SUSTAINED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS WERE ISSUED PURSUANT TO THE DECISIONS OF THE LAND REGISTRATION COURT IN APPLICATIONS FOR REGISTRATION FILED IN 1964 AND 1974. VERILY, THE COURT OF APPEALS, IN ISSUING THE HEREIN ASSAILED DECISION DATED NOVEMBER 15, 2007 AND RESOLUTION DATED MAY 15, 2008, HAS DECIDED THAT INSTANT CONTROVERSY IN A MANNER THAT IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.42

Position of the Republic

In advocacy of its position, the Republic principally argues that (1) the CA erred in holding that the LRC acquired jurisdiction over the applications for registration of the reserved public lands filed by the respondents; and (2) the respondents do not have a registrable right over the subject parcels of land which are within the Camp Evangelista Military Reservation.

With respect to the first argument, the Republic cites Section 15 of P.D. No. 1529, which requires that applicants for land registration must disclose the names of the occupants of the land and the names and addresses of the owners of the adjoining properties. The respondents did not comply with that requirement which was mandatory and jurisdictional. Citing Pinza v. Aldovino,43 it asserts that the LRC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case. Moreover, such omission constituted fraud or willful misrepresentation. The respondents cannot invoke the indefeasibility of the titles

issued since a "grant tainted with fraud and secured through misrepresentation is null and void and of no effect whatsoever."44

On the second argument, the Republic points out that Presidential Proclamation No. 265 reserved for the use of the Philippine Army certain parcels of land which included Lot No. 4354 and Lot No. 4357. Both lots were, however, allowed to be registered. Lot No. 4354 was registered as OCT No. 0-0358 and Lot No. 4357 as OCT No. O-669.

The Republic asserts that being part of the military reservation, these lots are inalienable and cannot be the subject of private ownership. Being so, the respondents do not have registrable rights over them. Their possession of the land, however long, could not ripen into ownership, and they have not shown proof that they were entitled to the land before the proclamation or that the said lots were segregated and withdrawn as part thereof.

Position of the Respondents

The Bacases

The Bacases anchor their opposition to the postures of the Republic on three principal arguments:

First, there was no extrinsic fraud committed by the Bacases in their failure to indicate Camp Evangelista as an adjoining lot owner as their application for registration substantially complied with the legal requirements. More importantly, the Republic was not prejudiced and deprived of its day in court.

Second, the LRC had jurisdiction to adjudicate whether the Bacases had "private rights" over Lot No. 4354 in accordance with, and therefore exempt from the coverage of, Presidential Proclamation No. 265, as well as to determine whether such private rights constituted registrable title under the land registration law.

Third, the issue of the registrability of the title of the Bacases over Lot No. 4354 is res judicata and cannot now be subject to a re-litigation or reopening in the annulment proceedings.45

Regarding the first ground, the Bacases stress that there was no extrinsic fraud because their application substantially complied with the requirements when they indicated that Camp Evangelista was an occupant by mere tolerance of Lot No. 4354. Also, the Republic filed its opposition to the respondents’ application and actively participated in the land registration proceedings by presenting evidence, through the Director of Lands, who was represented by the Solicitor General. The Republic, therefore, was not deprived of its day in court or prevented from presenting its case. Its insistence that the non-compliance with the requirements of Section 15 of P.D. No. 1529 is an argument that is at once both empty and dangerous.46

On jurisdiction, the Bacases assert that even in the case of Republic v. Estonilo,47 it was recognized in Presidential Proclamation No. 265 that the reservation was subject to private rights. In other words, the LRC had authority to hear and adjudicate their application for registration of title over Lot No. 4354 if they would be able to prove that their private rights under the presidential proclamation constituted registrable title over the said lot. They claim that there is completely no basis for the Republic to argue that the LRC had no jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate their application for registration of their title to Lot No. 4354 just because the proclamation withdrew the subject land from sale and settlement and reserved the same for military purposes. They cited the RTC statement that "the parcels of land they applied for in those registration proceedings and for which

certificates of title were issued in their favor are precisely exempted from the operation and effect of said presidential proclamation when the very same proclamation in itself made a proviso that the same will not apply to lands with existing ‘private rights’ therein."48

The Bacases claim that the issue of registrability is no longer an issue as what is only to be resolved is the question on whether there was extrinsic or collateral fraud during the land registration proceedings. There would be no end to litigation on the registrability of their title if questions of facts or law, such as, whether or not Lot No. 4354 was alienable and disposable land of the public domain prior to its withdrawal from sale and settlement and reservation for military purposes under Presidential Proclamation No. 265; whether or not their predecessors-in-interest had prior possession of the lot long before the issuance of the proclamation or the establishment of Camp Evangelista in the late 1930’s; whether or not such possession was held in the concept of an owner to constitute recognizable "private rights" under the presidential proclamation; and whether or not such private rights constitute registrable title to the lot in accordance with the land registration law, which had all been settled and duly adjudicated by the LRC in favor of the Bacases, would be re-examined under this annulment case.49

The issue of registrability of the Bacases’ title had long been settled by the LRC and is

res judicata between the Republic and the respondents. The findings of the LRC became final when the Republic did not appeal its decision within the period to appeal or file a petition to reopen or review the decree of registration within one year from entry thereof.50

To question the findings of the court regarding the registrability of then title over the land would be an attempt to reopen issues already barred by res judicata. As correctly held by the RTC, it is estopped and barred by prior judgment to contest the findings of the LRC.51

The Chabons

In traversing the position of the Republic, the Chabons insist that the CA was correct when it stated that there was substantial compliance52 with the requirements of the P.D. No. 1529 because they expressly stated in their application that Camp Evangelista was occupying a portion of it. It is contrary to reason or common sense to state that Camp Evangelista is an adjoining owner when it is occupying a portion thereof.

And as to the decision, it was a consequence of a proceeding in rem and, therefore, the decree of registration is binding and conclusive against all persons including the Republic who did not appeal the same. It is now barred forever to question the validity of the title issued. Besides, res judicata has set in because there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action.53

The Chabons also assailed the proclamation because when it was issued, they were already the private owners of the subject parcels of land and entitled to protection under the Constitution. The taking of their property in the guise of a presidential proclamation is not only oppressive and arbitrary but downright confiscatory.54

The Issues

The ultimate issues to be resolved are: 1) whether or not the decisions of the LRC over the subject lands can still be questioned; and 2) whether or not the applications for registration of the subject parcels of land should be allowed.

The Court’s Ruling

The Republic can question even final and executory judgment when there was fraud.

The governing rule in the application for registration of lands at that time was Section 21 of Act 49655 which provided for the form and content of an application for registration, and it reads:

Section 21. The application shall be in writing, signed and sworn to by applicant, or by some person duly authorized in his behalf. x x x It shall also state the name in full and the address of the applicant, and also the names and addresses of all adjoining owners and occupants, if known; and, if not known, it shall state what search has been made to find them. x x x

The reason behind the law was explained in the case of Fewkes vs. Vasquez,56 where it was written:

Under Section 21 of the Land Registration Act an application for registration of land is required to contain, among others, a description of the land subject of the proceeding, the name, status and address of the applicant, as well as the names and addresses of all occupants of the land and of all adjoining owners, if known, or if unknown, of the steps taken to locate them. When the application is set by the court for initial hearing, it is then that notice (of the hearing), addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the lot being registered and the adjoining owners, and indicating the location, boundaries and technical description of the land being registered, shall be published in the Official Gazette for two consecutive times. It is this publication of the notice of hearing that is considered one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the court in land registration cases, for the proceedings being in rem, it is only when there is constructive seizure of the land, effected by the publication and notice, that jurisdiction over the res is vested on the court. Furthermore, it is such notice and publication of the hearing that would enable all persons concerned, who may have any rights or interests in the property, to come forward and show to the court why the application for registration thereof is not to be granted.

Here, the Chabons did not make any mention of the ownership or occupancy by the Philippine Army. They also did not indicate any efforts or searches they had exerted in determining other occupants of the land. Such omission constituted fraud and deprived the Republic of its day in court. Not being notified, the Republic was not able to file its opposition to the application and, naturally, it was not able to file an appeal either.

The Republic can also question a final and executory judgment when the LRC had no jurisdiction over the land in question

With respect to the Bacases, although the lower courts might have been correct in ruling that there was substantial compliance with the requirements of law when they alleged that Camp Evangelista was an occupant, the Republic is not precluded and estopped from questioning the validity of the title.

The success of the annulment of title does not solely depend on the existence of actual and extrinsic fraud, but also on the fact that a judgment decreeing registration is null and void. In Collado v. Court of Appeals and the Republic,57 the Court declared that any title to an inalienable public land is void ab initio. Any procedural infirmities attending the filing of the petition for annulment of judgment are immaterial since the LRC never acquired jurisdiction over the property. All proceedings of the LRC involving the property are null and void and, hence, did not create any legal effect. A judgment by a court without jurisdiction can never attain finality.58 In Collado, the Court made the following citation:

The Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-registrable properties, such as public navigable rivers which are parts of the public domain, and cannot validly adjudge the registration of title in favor of private applicant. Hence, the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga as regards the Lot No. 2 of certificate of Title No. 15856 in the name of petitioners may be attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally, by the State which is not bound by any prescriptive period provided for by the Statute of Limitations.59

Prescription or estoppel cannot lie against the government

In denying the petition of the Republic, the CA reasoned out that 1) once a decree of registration is issued under the Torrens system and the reglementary period has passed within which the decree may be questioned, the title is perfected and cannot be collaterally questioned later on;60 2) there was no commission of extrinsic fraud because the Bacases’ allegation of Camp Evangelista’s occupancy of their property negated the argument that they committed misrepresentation or concealment amounting to fraud;61 and 3) the Republic did not appeal the decision and because the proceeding was one in rem, it was bound to the legal effects of the decision.

Granting that the persons representing the government was negligent, the doctrine of estoppel cannot be taken against the Republic. It is a well-settled rule that the Republic or its government is not estopped by mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,62 it was written:

In any case, even granting that the said official was negligent, the doctrine of estoppel cannot operate against the State . "It is a well-settled rule in our jurisdiction that the Republic or its government is usually not estopped by mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents (Manila Lodge No. 761 vs. CA, 73 SCRA 166, 186; Republic vs. Marcos, 52 SCRA 238, 244; Luciano vs. Estrella, 34 SCRA 769).

Consequently, the State may still seek the cancellation of the title issued to Perpetuo Alpuerto and his successors-interest pursuant to Section 101 of the Public Land Act. Such title has not become indefeasible, for prescription cannot be invoked against the State (Republic vs. Animas, supra).

The subject lands, being part of a military reservation, are inalienable and cannot be the subjects of land registration proceedings

The application of the Bacases and the Chabons were filed on November 12, 1964 and May 8, 1974, respectively. Accordingly, the law governing the applications was Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141,63 as amended by RA 1942,64 particularly Sec. 48(b) which provided that:

Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

As can be gleaned therefrom, the necessary requirements for the grant of an application for land registration are the following:

1. The applicant must, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, have been in possession and occupation of the subject land;

2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive and notorious;

3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application; and

4. The subject land must be an agricultural land of the public domain. As earlier stated, in 1938, President Quezon issued Presidential Proclamation No. 265, which took effect on March 31, 1938, reserving for the use of the Philippine Army parcels of the public domain situated in the barrios of Bulua and Carmen, then Municipality of Cagayan, Misamis Oriental. The subject parcels of land were withdrawn from sale or settlement or reserved for military purposes, "subject to private rights, if any there be."65

Such power of the President to segregate lands was provided for in Section 64(e) of the old Revised Administrative Code and C.A. No. 141 or the Public Land Act. Later, the power of the President was restated in Section 14, Chapter 4, Book III of the 1987 Administrative Code. When a property is officially declared a military reservation, it becomes inalienable and outside the commerce of man.66 It may not be the subject of a contract or of a compromise agreement.67 A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership, until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such.68 In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and De Jesus,69 it was even stated that

Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be acquired.1âwphi1 The claims 0f persons who have settled on, occupied, and improved a parcel of public land which is later included in a reservation are considered worthy of protection and are usually respected, but where the President, as authorized by law, issues a proclamation reserving certain lands and warning all persons to depart therefrom, this terminates any rights previously acquired in such lands by a person who was settled thereon in order to obtain a preferential right of purchase. And patents for lands which have been previously granted, reserved from sale, or appropriate, are void.

Regarding the subject lots, there was a reservation respecting "private rights." In Republic v. Estonilo,70 where the Court earlier declared that Lot No. 4318 was part of the Camp Evangelista Military Reservation and, therefore, not registrable, it noted the proviso in Presidential Proclamation No. 265 requiring the reservation to be subject to private rights as meaning that persons claiming rights over the reserved land were not precluded from proving their claims. Stated differently, the said proviso did not preclude the LRC from determining whether or not the respondents indeed had registrable rights over the property.

As there has been no showing that the subject parcels of land had been segregated from the military reservation, the respondents had to prove that the subject properties were alienable and disposable land of the public domain prior to its withdrawal from sale and settlement and reservation for military purposes under Presidential Proclamation No. 265. The question is of primordial importance because it is determinative if the land can in fact be subject to acquisitive prescription and, thus, registrable under the Torrens system. Without first determining the nature and character of the land, all the other requirements such as the length and nature of possession and occupation over such land do not come into play. The required length of possession does not operate when the land is part of the public domain.

In this case, however, the respondents miserably failed to prove that, before the proclamation, the subject lands were already private lands. They merely relied on such "recognition" of possible private rights. In their application, they alleged that at the time of their application,71 they had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject parcels of land for at least

thirty (30) years and became its owners by prescription. There was, however, no allegation or showing that the government had earlier declared it open for sale or settlement, or that it was already pronounced as inalienable and disposable.

It is well-settled that land of the public domain is not ipso facto converted into a patrimonial or private property by the mere possession and occupation by an individual over a long period of time. In the case of Diaz v. Republic,72it was written:

But even assuming that the land in question was alienable land before it was established as a military reservation, there was nevertheless still a dearth of evidence with respect to its occupation by petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest for more than 30 years. x x x.

x x x.

A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant, and the raising thereon of cattle, do not constitute possession under claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State. While grazing livestock over land is of course to be considered with other acts of dominion to show possession, the mere occupancy of land by grazing livestock upon it, without substantial enclosures, or other permanent improvements, is not sufficient to support a claim of title thru acquisitive prescription. The possession of public land, however long the period may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State. [Emphases supplied]

In the recent case of Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines,73 the Court emphasized that fundamental is the rule that lands of the public domain, unless declared otherwise by virtue of a statute or law, are inalienable and can never be acquired by prescription. No amount of time of possession or occupation can ripen into ownership over lands of the public domain. All lands of the public domain presumably belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed.74

Another recent case, Diaz v. Republic,75 also held that possession even for more than 30 years cannot ripen into ownership.76 Possession is of no moment if applicants fail to sufficiently and satisfactorily show that the subject lands over which an application was applied for was indeed an alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain. It would not matter even if they declared it for tax purposes. In Republic v. Heirs of Juan Fabio,77 the rule was reiterated. Thus:

Well-entrenched is the rule that unless a land is reclassified and declared alienable and disposable, occupation in the concept of an owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. Consequently, respondents could not have occupied the Lot in the concept of an owner in 1947 and subsequent years when respondents declared the Lot for taxation purposes, or even earlier when respondents' predecessors-in-interest possessed the Lot, because the Lot was considered inalienable from the time of its declaration as a military reservation in 1904. Therefore, respondents failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Lot is alienable and disposable.

Public lands not shown to have been classified as alienable and disposable land remain part of the inalienable public domain. In view of the lack of sufficient evidence showing that the Lot was already classified as alienable and disposable, the Lot applied for by respondents is inalienable land of the public domain, not subject to registration under Section 14(1) of PD 1529 and Section 48(b) of CA

141, as amended by PD 1073. Hence, there is no need to discuss the other requisites dealing with respondents' occupation and possession of the Lot in the concept of an owner.

While it is an acknowledged policy of the State to promote the distribution of alienable public lands to spur economic growth and in line with the ideal of social justice, the law imposes stringent safeguards upon the grant of such resources lest they fall into the wrong hands to the prejudice of the national patrimony. We must not, therefore, relax the stringent safeguards relative to the registration of imperfect titles. [Emphases Supplied]

In Estonilo,78 where the Court ruled that persons claiming the protection of "private rights" in order to exclude their lands from military reservations must show by clear and convincing evidence that the properties in question had been acquired by a legal method of acquiring public lands, the respondents therein failed to clearly prove that the lands over which they lay a claim were alienable and disposable so that the same belonged and continued to belong to the State and could not be subject to the commerce of man or registration. Specifically, the Court wrote:

Land that has not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belongs to the State as part of the public domain. For this reason, imperfect titles to agricultural lands are subjected to rigorous scrutiny before judicial confirmation is granted. In the same manner, persons claiming the protection of "private rights" in order to exclude their lands from military reservations must show by clear and convincing evidence that the pieces of property in question have been acquired by a legal method of acquiring public lands.

In granting respondents judicial confirmation of their imperfect title, the trial and the appellate courts gave much weight to the tax declarations presented by the former. However, while the tax declarations were issued under the names of respondents’ predecessors-in-interest, the earliest one presented was issued only in 1954.19 The Director, Lands Management Bureau v. CA20 held thus:

"x x x. Tax receipts and tax declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership. 1âwphi1 They are mere indicia of [a] claim of ownership. In Director of Lands vs. Santiago:

‘x x x [I]f it is true that the original owner and possessor, Generosa Santiago, had been in possession since 1925, why were the subject lands declared for taxation purposes for the first time only in 1968, and in the names of Garcia and Obdin? For although tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof that the holder had a claim of title over the property.’"

In addition, the lower courts credited the alleged prior possession by Calixto and Rosendo Bacas, from whom respondents’ predecessors had purportedly bought the property. This alleged prior possession, though, was totally devoid of any supporting evidence on record. Respondents’ evidence hardly supported the conclusion that their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since "time immemorial."

Moreover, as correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the evidence on record merely established the transfer of the property from Calixto Bacas to Nazaria Bombeo . The evidence did not show the nature and the period of the alleged possession by Calixto and Rosendo Bacas. It is important that applicants for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles must present specific acts of ownership to substantiate their claims; they cannot simply offer general statements that are mere conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of possession.

It must be stressed that respondents, as applicants, have the burden of proving that they have an imperfect title to Lot 4318. Even the absence of opposition from the government does not relieve

them of this burden. Thus, it was erroneous for the trial and the appellate courts to hold that the failure of the government to dislodge respondents, judicially or extrajudicially, from the subject land since 1954 already amounted to a title. [Emphases supplied]

The ruling reiterated the long standing rule in the case of Director Lands Management Bureau v. Court of Appeals,79

x x x. The petitioner is not necessarily entitled to have the land registered under the Torrens system simply because no one appears to oppose his title and to oppose the registration of his land. He must show, even though there is no opposition to the satisfaction of the court, that he is the absolute owner, in fee simple. Courts are not justified in registering property under the Torrens system, simply because there is no opposition offered. Courts may, even in the absence of any opposition, deny the registration of the land under the Torrens system, upon the ground that the facts presented did not show that the petitioner is the owner, in fee simple, of the land which he is attempting to have registered.

The Court is not unmindful of the principle of immutability of judgments that nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable.80 Such principle, however, must yield to the basic rule that a decision which is null and void for want of jurisdiction of the trial court is not a decision m contemplation of law and can never become final and executory.81

Had the LRC given primary importance on the status of the land and not merely relied on the testimonial evidence of the respondents without other proof of the alienability of the land, the litigation would have already been ended and finally settled in accordance with law and jurisprudence a long time ago.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The November 12, 2007 Decision and the May 15, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 64142 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Judgment is rendered declaring the proceedings in the Land Registration Court as NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, Original Certificate of Title Nos. 0-358 and 0-669 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City are CANCELLED. Lot No. 4354 and Lot No. 4357 are ordered reverted to the public domain.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-16761            October 31, 1964

JOHN M. MILLER and EMILIO ESPINOSA, JR., applicants-appellees, vs.THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, ET AL., oppositors, ANSELMO IRENEA, ARTURO DE LA CRUZ, DOMINADOR MANGCAO, LUCAS FRANCISCO,

CIPRIANO SEQUILLO, PEDRO TAGALOG, PONCIANO GARCIA, RODOLFO DE DIOS, ET AL., private oppositors-appellants.

A. P. Mayor & C. P. Mayor for private oppositors-appellants.E. Espinosa & J. Ma. Francisco for applicants-appellees.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

A parcel of land in Tigbao, Milagros, Masbate, which, after survey, appeared to contain 411 hectares as per plan PSU-143798 was applied for registration in the Court of First Instance of Masbate on June 18, 1956 by John M. Miller and Emilio Espinosa, Jr.

After notice and publication, initial hearing was held on June 20, 1957. The Director of Lands and Bureau of Public Highways filed written oppositions. Thirty-five individuals appeared and expressed verbal oppositions. All persons, ,except the abovementioned oppositors, were declared in default on July 8, 1957.

On July 24, 1958 applicants started presenting evidence and the private oppositors were given five days to file written opposition (Tsn., p. 5). Of the oppositors 28 filed written but unverified opposition on July 29, 1958. On August 20, 1958 applicants finished adducing evidence and rested their case.

On August 27, 1958 the private oppositors presented their first witness. After his cross-examination, counsel for applicants called the Court's attention to the lack of verification in the opposition filed by the private oppositors and moved to dismiss the same.

The private oppositors offered to verify their opposition. After parties had filed memoranda, the court issued an order on January 13, 1959 dismissing the unverified opposition, without pronouncement as to costs (Rec. on Appeal, p. 26). Motion for reconsideration was denied by order dated November 18, 1959. The private oppositors have appealed from both orders.

The requirement of verifying oppositors in land registration proceedings is based on Sec. 34 of Act 496 —

Any person claiming an interest, whether named in the notice or not, may appear and file an answer on or before the return day, or within such further time as may be allowed by the court. The answer shall state all the objections to the application, and shall set forth the interest claimed by the party filing the same and apply for the remedy desired, and shall be signed and sworn to by him or by some person in his behalf.

Applicants failed to invoke this provision seasonably. Without objecting to the unverified opposition, they proceeded with the trial, presented evidence and rested their case. Only after the first witness of the private oppositors had testified and applicants' counsel had cross-examined him, was the defect of lack of verification brought up. By that time, applicants had waived the defect —

An objection to a want of verification must be reasonably made. ... The objection must be taken before trial ... . The question cannot properly be raised by an objection to the introduction of evidence.

xxx           xxx           xxx

Lack of, or defect in the verification of a pleading may be waived by the adverse party's failure to make a proper and timely objection thereto ... . Where a party proceeds with the case as though his adversary's pleading were verified, he waives the lack of verification of such pleading.

xxx           xxx           xxx

The act of ... proceeding to trial on the merits without objection, is generally a waiver of all uncertainties, ambiguities, irregularities, formal defects, of fault or defects of any kind in the pleading of the adverse party.

xxx           xxx           xxx

By ... going to trial without objection, ... a party may waive the right to urge that his adversary's pleading is not subscribed or verified ... . (46 C. J. S. 1120, 1129, 1133, 1137.)

Applicant's contend that the defect could not be waived because it resulted in the private oppositors' lack of standing in the case from the start.

This court has already held unverified oppositions sufficient to confer standing in court on oppositors. In Malagum vs. Pablo, 46 Phil. 19, a written opposition not made under oath was dismissed by the lower court. When oppositors sought from this Court mandamus to have their opposition reinstated, this Court denied the same for the reason that petitioners "had appeared in the case, had therefore a standing in court, and the order excluding their answer was in effect a final determination of their rights" so that appeal and not mandamus was their proper remedy.

In Nicolas vs. Director of Lands and Camungao, L-191478, December 28, 1963, the lower court dismissed a petition for review of its judgment adjudicating the land to an applicant, filed by an oppositor who was not notified of the hearing, for the reason that —

In the first place, the opposition filed by him was not a valid opposition because it was not sworn to as required by the Land Registration Act. It was simply a written appearance. In other words, he failed to file the answer in due form.

On appeal this Court held —

The written appearance with opposition presented by petitioner herein, on November 7, 1951 (R.A.) was a valid one, and sufficient to give him legal standing in court and would entitle him to notice, as a matter of right. The lower court erred in choosing to ignore the written appearance with opposition, which was a substantial compliance with the law, that requires a formal answer.

For purposes of record, the private oppositors should be allowed, as they had requested, to verify their opposition because, in any event, the supposed defect is deemed waived.

WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from are set aside and the case is remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings, without costs. So ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.