The Ones We Love to HateBy

Melissa Beretta

9.22.2014Game Theory and Democracy

Introduction: Congress, Friend or Foe?

If you’ve ever stood in line at the DMV, been audited by the IRS, despised the opposing

political party, or had jury duty, you’re likely to know the feeling of disapproval of your

bureaucratic and political system. However, all of these government-related issues, when voted

on, receive higher approval ratings than the United States Congress (“Congress Losing Out”).

That’s not all. Congress suffered traumatizing losses to household favorites, such as

zombies, public radio fundraising, and mothers-in-laws, and couldn’t seem to scrape out a win

over classics like toenail fungus, dog poop, and hemorrhoids (“Congress Losing Out”).

It’s not all bad news for the 535 men and women in charge of creating the policy for our

entire nation. Congress triumphed over serial killers (a 56/18 margin), Honey Boo Boo (42/33),

and the Ebola virus (47/28). While these victories may be small, they give hope to our leaders

that maybe one day, they’ll close that gap between them and cockroaches (44-42) (“Congress

Losing Out”).

In 2014, approval ratings for Congress are at a startling low. In a poll conducted by

Gallup this past August, only 19% of United States voters said that most members of Congress

deserve to be reelected. This is close to the lowest number reported since 1992 when Gallup first

collected data on this subject. The lowest reelect percentage recorded was from earlier in 2014,

when only 17% thought most members of Congress should gain reelection (Newport).

This extremely low approval rating for Congress is not unusual, especially in recent

years. When asked whether they approve or disapprove of Congress as a whole, only 13% of US

registered voters in August said they approved, while 83% disapproved. This is not far from the

all-time-low, which was a shocking 9% in last November’s report. Other than a brief spike in

2001, Congress’s job approval rating hovers between 20 and 40% on average, a clear sentiment

of disapproval amongst the majority (Jones, “Congressional Job Approval”). However, in recent

years, this number has dropped even lower, with problems of gridlock and hyper partisanship

resulting in mass dissent for the Congress’s actions and lack thereof.

An interesting change is seen, however, when voters are asked about their district

representative apart from Congress as a whole. When asked if the US representative in their

district deserves reelection, 50% of voters in August of 2014 said they did. This is not an

unfamiliar trend in the data. In past years, especially in the late ‘90s and early 2000s, approval

for congressional representatives on an individual basis has been around 60% or above

(Newport).

A Closer Look: Examining the Voters’ Rational

There are many reasons for the disparity in these two data points. Voters see the House of

Representatives and the Senate as two large bodies that usually cannot put policy together in a

timely manner, even when certain pieces of legislation seem obvious or are widely favored.

When it comes to gun control, “members of Congress can't even agree on universal background

checks which just about every living and breathing American favors. (91 percent according to

ABC News/Washington Post.)” (Bannon). Regarding the economy, disagreements on budgets

and how to handle the deficit fill Congress’s time, while items like job creation, a problem that

concerns all Americans and is extremely tangible for many, are pushed aside (Bannon). To the

average American, Congress appears unable to make progress or create effective legislation.

This overall disapproval of Congress becomes an issue when in the face of major threats

to the nation. One former congressional aide asked the important question: “What happens when

we are faced with another national crisis -- a declaration of war, a need to investigate presidential

wrongdoing on the scale of Watergate, or something the likes of which we haven't faced before

--- and the institution we depend on doesn't have the respect of one-tenth of the population?”

(Cannon). When Congress polls lower than twerking and car salespeople (Fuller), it is hard to

envision a situation where their actions in the event of a serious catastrophe will garner support

from the American population. This puts us in danger if a decision had to be made about

something as serious and lethal as war or international relations.

Individual representatives, however, have many manners in which they connect and aid

their districts. This, throughout history, has led to their relative popularity as compared to

Congress as a whole. People tend to trust and like their representatives. They gain popularity

through name-recognition at local events, casework, and support of district-specific projects. In

addition, more elevated and strategic manners of holding the majority, such as gerrymandering,

allow incumbents more opportunities for reelection and possession of “safe-seats.” They have

franking privilege, or “the ability to send postage-free informational letters or announcements to

their constituents on a regular basis” (“Why Are”), and money, as PACs, Super PACs, and

interest groups favor incumbents that are their allies in policy-making efforts. In many ways,

incumbents are thrust into the public’s eyes, and their constituents look favorably on them as

individuals separate from Congress.

Still, the approval ratings for representatives independent of Congress consistently hover

just above 50%. This means, according to Gallup, that only half of the public thinks their

representative should be reelected. Even less, says Gallup, think that most members of Congress

deserve another term. In 2012, for example, 36% of voters said that most members deserved

reelection, and 59% of voters said their own representative deserved reelection. The result?

Ninety percent of U.S. Congress that sought reelection in 2012 won in their district (Jones,

“Ahead of Midterms”).

This data seems contrary to public desire. If 64% of people disapproved of Congress as a

whole and believed most members did not deserve reelection, it appears to be against the general

will of the people to have 90% of the legislative body renew their 2 or 6 year terms. This result is

not atypical. Ninety percent reelection rate for incumbents is actually low when compared to past

years. In 2006 and 2008, the number was 94%. In 1998 and 2000, it reached an unbelievable

98% (Jones, “Ahead of Midterms”). As we are currently operating, the U.S. has an extremely

low turnover rate in our policy-making positions.

The Incumbency Advantage

In order to determine the positive and negative effects that this trend has on the United

States value of democracy, one can examine the different strategies that incumbents use to

procure their spots year after year. Some seem to come inherently from the job description. For

example, name and face recognition stem from the constant exposure that constituents have to

their congressional representatives. Researchers also claim that while only a select portion of the

voting population could name their representative off-hand, they continue to choose the

incumbent over the challenger (Mann). In 1978, a research study was conducted to evaluate why

incumbents, especially in the House of Representatives, were reelected in such large margins.

Overall, the data showed that “Incumbents are both better known and better liked than

challengers, largely because they have the resources enabling them to communicate with their

constituents frequently and directly” (Mann). More specifically, analysts discovered that name

recognition when measured was really measuring “name recall”. They explain, “many voters

unable to recall the names of their representatives or challengers can nevertheless recognize the

names when presented with them, which is the situation they face in the voting booth” (Mann).

When the appropriate measures for testing recognition are used, voters are not only more likely

to know their representatives’ names, but when they do not, there’s still only a one in seven

chance of voting for the challenger. From this, it’s clear that name recognition is not the only

thing that contributes to incumbency advantage.

Congressional representatives, both in the Senate and in the House of Representatives,

have the franking privilege, meaning they are able to send mailings, free of charge, to members

in their district. While elected officials cannot campaign through government-sanctioned mail,

they can send out “letters, questionnaires, newsletters, books, government pamphlets,

Congressional Record reprints, or speeches” that improve their visibility amongst the voting

population (Cover). Without spending any campaign money, incumbents are able to indirectly

campaign by demonstrating to their constituents their platforms and past triumphs.

Representatives can highlight programs that provide aid to the district, creating a sense amongst

the people that the incumbent is at their service (Cover). Challengers, on the other hand, must

spend their limited campaign finances to achieve these same goals—and they lack the direct

proof that their policies and proposed programs will help their voters. Nonetheless, the franking

privilege alone is does make not a successful incumbent. Research conducted in 1982 noted that

after the first piece of mail from a congressman, which produced a high percentage of name

recognition amongst voters, subsequent pieces of mail did not have much affect on the

constituents at large (Cover). The difference between 3 and 6 pieces of mail from a

representative was not large, and often made no difference at all. Thankfully for challengers,

their money could be spent in different places, without much harm done.

Some argue that one of the greatest incumbency advantages stems from a process known

as gerrymandering. Where redistricting based on partisan lines fails, and the two parties need to

compromise, they often settle on incumbent protection as a primary goal in drawing electoral

zones. This process “is sometimes called a ‘sweetheart gerrymander’ – where the two major

parties make sweetheart deals intended to create safe districts for both Democratic and

Republican incumbents. Safe districts ensure incumbents reelection by packing their party

supporters into those areas” (Amy). Through incumbent gerrymandering, Republicans and

Democrats can compromise without one of the parties guaranteeing many new districts for

themselves.

Gerrymandering can help incumbents achieve reelection, yet in a study called “The

Rising Incumbent Reelection Rate: What’s Gerrymandering Got to Do With It?” conducted at

Harvard University by John Friedman and Richard Holden, evidence arose that proved contrary.

In fact, the study presented data showing that redistricting has, over time, reduced incumbents’

probability of reelection. In a summary of their results, the researchers share:

If changes in the incumbent bias of gerrymandering were responsible for the

entire increase in reelection rates, then the decadal jumps would be positive…

We find just the opposite; the time trend is positive and statistically significant,

while the jumps are on average, negative. Three decades show statistically

significant shifts against incumbent reelection, while none favor it (Friedman).

It has been said, as a compromise between the two ideas, that gerrymandering, and partisan

redistricting in general, can make seats “safer” for incumbents. The research discussed above

shows an alternate side of the argument, based on decades of data, and prompts the idea that

incumbent gerrymandering may not be in the long term best interest for political parties

(Friedman).

One trend worthy of discussion is the use of incumbency as a voting cue. When people

identify with a certain political party and are uneducated on the platforms of specific local

candidates, they tend to take party as a “voting cue”. This leads to straight ticket voting, where

voters will vote for all candidates in either the Republican or Democratic Party, solely based on

their party affiliation. Currently, there is a major trend toward dealignment. In January of 2014, a

record-high of 42% of Americans identified their political affiliation as “independent” (Jones,

“Record High”). This statistic indicates that more Americans identify with no political party than

with Democrats or with Republicans. Gallup, the organization conducting this poll, discusses the

implications of the steady rise in independence amongst the American public. They say, “The

rise in political independence is likely an outgrowth of Americans' record or near-record negative

views of the two major U.S. parties, of Congress, and their low level of trust in government more

generally” (Jones, “Record High”). This is where the problem arises. According to Gallup,

Americans were less likely to vote on party lines because of a distrust of Congress and

government as a whole. However, the 1978 national election research study makes the claims

that when party ties weaken, voters begin to use incumbency as a “voting cue” (Mann). Data

shows that when Americans, especially independents, are uneducated about a certain political

race, they assume that a candidates experience as a representative makes them more fit for the

job. Ironically, this decreases the turnover rate in Congress and decreases the likelihood for

change in the government body that Americans were dissatisfied with in the first place.

The major way in which incumbents guarantee reelection is their overwhelming

monetary lead over challengers. Data from the 2004 congressional elections shows that on

average, challengers for seats in the House were outspent, on average, by $700,000; challengers

in the Senate by an average of $4 million (“Why Are”). These numbers express the need for

challengers to spend grossly large amounts of money to be competitive with incumbents. The

Center for Responsive Politics published an extremely fascinating set of data based off campaign

spending for congressional elections since 1998 (“Dollars and Cents”). The first graph, shown

below, shows the “Cost of Beating an Incumbent, Over Time”:

As indicated above, the amount of money that it takes per campaign to triumph over an

incumbent is rising steadily. The dip in 2010 can be accounted for by the overall scorn for

Congress and extreme sentiment of disapproval that overwhelmed the American public during

the midterm elections. Disapproval for Congress in 2010 was similar to where it is now, with

only 51% of the population thinking that their representative deserved reelection (compared to

50% today) (Jones, “Ahead of Midterms”). This might indicate that in the graph above, the

amount it takes to beat an incumbent in 2014 compared to 2012 will be lower.

A second figure from the Center for Responsive Politics shows how much a challenger

would have to spend in a given year to increase their odds of beating an incumbent (Dollars and

Cents). The data for 2008-2012 is shown below:

The issue with this emphasis on lofty campaign spending is in the challenges that non-

incumbents face when attempting to procure funds. Interest groups, PACs, and Super PACs

donate a large percentage of their funds raised to incumbents, due to the higher likelihood that

these candidates will achieve success come Election Day (“PAC Dollars”). In addition, past

policy efforts and cooperation with lobbyists, or seats on important committees, can be attractive

attributes that incumbents have over less experienced challengers. In an opinion written in 2003,

Justice Stevens explains, “Incumbents have pre-existing relationships with corporations and

unions, and groups that wish to procure legislative benefits may tend to support the candidate

who, as a sitting officeholder, is already in a position to dispense benefits and is statistically

likely to retain office” (Pastine). Interest groups and PACs know what an incumbent will do

while in office and whether they have the clout to do it—challengers do not carry with them the

same sense of certainty. In 2012, PACs gave over 80% of their donations to incumbents when it

came to groups representing Agribusiness, Communications/Electronics, Construction, Defense,

Energy/Natural Resources, Finance/Insurance/Real Estate, Health, Law and Lobbyists,

Transportation, and Miscellaneous Business. Only in Labor and Single-Issue/Ideological groups

did the percentage drop to 64% and 52%, respectively (“PAC Dollars”). With the majority of

PACs funneling money to incumbents, challengers are often left to less effective, low-level

fundraising efforts. Campaign finance reform, which will be discussed later in this paper, is often

raised as a solution to this challenger disadvantage.

The Aftermath: How Incumbency Advantage Affects Democracy

The research, polling, and reelection results do not lie. Incumbents have an

overwhelming advantage in the races for the House of Representatives and the Senate.

Nevertheless, this data is incomplete without discussing the implications of this striking dismay

for Congress and it’s link to incredibly high rates of reelection on democracy as a whole. First,

it’s important to establish what American’s believe is the true purpose of democracy. We define

democracy, in its simplest form, as “a government in which the supreme power is vested in the

people and exercised by them directly or indirectly through a system of representation”

(“Democracy”). Originally, and most would argue currently, the purpose behind this type of

government was to forbid any one person or group from having full authority or strikingly more

power than another. However, when exploring incumbency advantage, many believe that the low

turnover in Congress leads to a “permanent political class” (Balko). Approval ratings are dismal

and “Americans' confidence and trust in the institution, and ratings of its members as honest and

ethical, are also among the lowest Gallup has measured” (Jones, “Congressional Job Approval”),

yet the likelihood is high that reelection rates for incumbents stay above 80%. This seems

contrary to the desires of the majority.

Opponents of incumbency advantage believe that the high likelihood for their reelection

leads to fewer competent challengers and an air of overconfidence amongst incumbents. In an

article published in the Journal of Public Economics, Ivan and Tuvana Pastine propose,

“Incumbency advantage may have deleterious effects on social welfare. The office-holder may

be less responsive to his constituents, since he would have little reason to fear defeat” (Pastine).

In addition to a lack of respect for the needs of constituents, the researchers prompt that

incumbency advantage provides less incentive for competent or qualified challengers in districts

where incumbents are favored for simply their duration in office. They claim, “Even if the

challenger is of higher quality, he may have a smaller probability of victory than the incumbent.

High-quality candidates with high opportunity cost may be deterred from running for office

because of weak electoral prospects” (Pastine). Many cases have arisen in the past where

incumbents strongly favored for reelection will run unopposed, which takes all choice away from

voters. For the 2014-midterm elections, as of June, there were five Massachusetts Congressmen

running relatively unopposed. The Associated Press declared Congressmen James McGovern,

Richard Neal, Michael Capuano, Joseph Kennedy, and Stephen Lynch “virtually guaranteed

reelection” (“5 Massachusetts”). The Pastines and their supporters would argue that these

incumbents, faced with nonexistent opposition, have the ability to disregard the wishes of their

constituents and still get away with electoral success.

Despite the evidence for problems spawned by incumbency advantage, there are positive

aspects generated by this trend that cannot be overlooked. Many choose to acknowledge the

importance of each individual representative to their district as greater than how they function as

a whole. If usually, the majority of voters say that their congressperson should be reelected, it

makes sense that the majority of congressional representatives would gain another term. Many

voters value the more personal affects that their representatives have on their districts. Bridge

and road construction, casework, area-specific job creation—these direct effects on constituents

gain incumbents popularity despite the inefficiency of Congress as a whole. In each specific

district, while people might disapprove of the House or Senate, statistically they are more likely

to love their specific representative.

One extremely eccentric congressman, Dan Flood, was especially great at maximizing his

popularity amongst constituents while completely disregarding the needs of the rest of the

American public. He understood the value behind supporting district specific projects and

funding that would directly affect his voters. In an article written in 1975, George Crile of

Harpers Magazine described him as “an aging, pugnacious, Red-baiting eccentric whose vision

of the national interest never seems to extend beyond the borders of his constituency” (Crile).

While his disregard for national priorities made him the embodiment of congressional atrocities

in the eyes of many reformers, Dan Flood was the undeniable hero of Wilkes-Barre,

Pennsylvania, the base of his constituency. In the face of a flood that threatened the lives of his

district, Flood used his connections with the Secretary of Defense and position on the

appropriations committee to fly in and personally see to it that extra helicopters and emergency

relief procedures were sent and in effect (Crile). Earlier in his time as congressman, the coal-

mining district faced economic turmoil as Army and Budget officials realized that conversion of

furnaces from coal to oil could save the United States over $20 million per year. Flood, as vice-

chairman of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee made sure that the proposals failed. In an

interview he explained, “I use all of these opportunities, advantages, seniority, and all of this

stuff for the purpose of helping whatever is left of the goddamn anthracite coal industry” (Crile).

To the American public, Dan Flood seemed to neglect all respect for national desires and

projects, focusing only on where he could allocate money to his district and on making

connections that would further his ability to send funds to and base projects in Wilkes-Barre. To

his constituents, he was irreplaceable, and he spent sixteen total terms in the House of

Representatives, thirteen of those consecutive. One observer summed up Flood quite accurately

saying, “There sits a buffoon with the mold of Zeus, the strength of Atlas, and, forgive me, but

he is godlike” (Crile).

While few commit to their constituents and disrespect the American public with Flood’s

zeal and fervor, many representatives and Senators spend copious amounts of their time, money,

and effort appealing directly to their voters in efforts to regain reelection. This decline in federal

legislative efficacy and efficiency has led to extreme gridlock, and most recently, government

shutdown.

Possible Solutions and Reforms

So, which do we want? Are we better off with congressional representatives that focus

their efforts on district and state specific projects but are relatively unproductive as a national

legislative body, or would we benefit from a reconstruction of the system?

Suggestions for how to revamp Congress’s structure are always plentiful. A popular and

frequently prompted idea is the imposition of term limits. In February of 2014, Republican Mick

Mulvaney of the House of Representatives proposed a bill to amend the Constitution to list a

maximum number of years that members of Congress could serve (Shabad). While members of

the House and Senate are reelected every two or six years, respectively, there is nothing listed in

the Constitution that restricts how many times a person can be reelected in any given position.

This bill set the limit at 24 years, with 12 years maximum in the House and 12 years in the

Senate (Shabad). While support amongst Congress itself might be limited, as representatives are

most ineffective at legislating themselves, it seems like a push for more turnover could lessen the

incumbency advantage and lead to some forced change and innovation within the group.

Nevertheless, the standing precedent in the Supreme Court leads us to believe that pushing for

term limits on Congressmen is not in the foreseeable future. In 1995, the court ruled that states

couldn’t place term limits on national level representatives (Shabad). However, this case, U.S.

Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, specifically references the states’ ability to regulate Congress, not

Congress’s ability to regulate itself. Therefore, there might be some room to discuss an

amendment.

Another area through which people are attempting to curb incumbency advantage is

campaign finance reform. However, limiting the amount that incumbents are allowed to raise, we

often forget, limits the amount that challengers can raise as well. Experts point out, “Making it

more difficult for challengers to raise money only makes it more difficult for them to overcome

the non-monied advantages of incumbency” (Balko). Studies show that while limiting campaign

spending to a more moderate level can even the playing field for challengers, limiting spending

to an extreme low can put challengers at just as much of a disadvantage as having no ceiling at

all (Pastine). The problem boils down to three properties of campaign spending that are

imbalanced between incumbents and their challengers. The Pastine researchers describe these as

“initial voter disposition advantage, efficiency in fundraising and effectiveness in campaign

spending” (Pastine). They argue that restricting both candidates to equal levels of electioneering

(no matter the level of restriction) will lead to an advantage for the incumbent. In terms of

efficiency in fundraising, as discussed earlier in the paper, high-level donors and PACs favor

incumbents due to their stability and relative predictability compared to lesser-known

challengers (Pastine). Lastly, incumbents tend save money by skipping the process of name

recognition. Challengers can be more effective in spending when they have enough money to not

only build up name recognition but also to match the incumbent in introducing platform and

negative ad campaigns. The study shows, “The challenger must spend more than the incumbent

to overcome the incumbent's head-start advantage. Since the maximum the challenger can spend

is given by the limit, the incumbent never needs to spend as much as the limit. This implies that

the challenger is effectively constrained by the limit while the incumbent is not” (Pastine).

Overall, the suggestion of campaign finance reform as a method of overcoming incumbency

advantage may not be as clear-cut as it seems.

However, there remains the belief that incumbents are favored for a reason. More often

than not, the majority of US registered voters think that their representative deserves reelection.

Voters say their Congressmen or Senators deserve another term for a variety of reasons, most

prominently because they are “Doing a Good Job (29%)”, he or she “Works for/Stands up

for/Supports district,state (18%)”, or he or she “Shares my views, values (6%) (Newport). Most

Congressmen and Senators, while they may make no tangible progress as a legislative body, care

deeply for the needs of their constituents, or at least make it appear that way.

In addition, some argue that turn-over happens naturally decade by decade as politicians

retire, either due to illness, scandal, or just a general desire to move on from office. Each year,

roughly 10-20% of incumbents seeking reelection do not receive it. In any one election, “the

number may seem small, but some elections produce relatively large numbers of new members.

Over the course of three or four elections a large portion of the Congress may turn-over in spite

of high incumbent success rates in particular election years” (“Why Are”). The 113th Congress

took in 14 freshmen senators and 83 freshmen House representatives (“Freshmen Members”).

Each year, the number of freshmen in Congress lingers at around 90-100 newbies, which builds

each election cycle to create this turnover that the voters so desire. While it may not be

immediate, many would claim that this gradual renewal is the proper manner of mixing

innovation and youth with certainty and experience.

Concluding Remarks

In today’s polls, approval for Congress is at a startlingly low rate. Americans favor our

435 congressmen and 100 senators less than lice, hipsters, and witches (“Congress Losing Out”,

Cannon), a fact that diminishes hope amongst many for any future confidence in the legislative

body. Real Clear Politics reports, “The 113th Congress will go down as the least-popular in

history” (Cannon). The American public is “frustrated,” and representatives acknowledge the

contempt for the era of divided government that has fallen upon the nation (Cannon).

The country needs to evaluate whether this property of the legislative branch is

something that needs to be altered. Does incumbency advantage feed into the hyper partisanship,

the ineffectiveness, and the disregard for national priorities? Will we, within decade’s time, get

the natural turnover to revive Congress? What are the appropriate and effective steps to take

when considering reform? All of these questions should and, hopefully, will be answered within

the upcoming years. America is getting tired of having an inefficient and divided Congress.

The 2014-midterm elections are predicted to yield a large freshmen class and a possible

Republican sweep of the House and Senate. With the probability for fewer incumbents and two

houses in political alignment, Americans may be faced with a less frustrating Congress—one that

has the opportunity to make actual progress through agreement instead of constant gridlock. This

will all depend on whether Americans vote with their disdain or favor incumbency over change.

Only time will tell.

Summary

The subject of this paper is incumbency advantage, its effects on democracy, and possible solutions and reform to fix, what some would say is, the issue causing a constant disdain for Congress. While there is no consensus, and we make no determinations, as to whether incumbency advantage is the most vital matter leading to low congressional approval ratings, it nonetheless is a crucial point of discussion as we languish in an era of gridlock and divided government. We begin by discussing congressional approval ratings, both of the two legislative bodies in their totality, and then of individual representatives as viewed by their districts. It’s captured through data collected by Gallup and other polling websites that while only a small minority of the population approves of Congress and thinks the majority of representatives should be reelected, usually, the majority of the population believes that their particular representative deserves to be reelected. This leads to the high reelection rate for incumbents. The voters’ rational in this lopsided trend is examined.

Next, the subject moves to how incumbents receive their various advantages. Topics discussed include incumbent versus challenger name recognition, the franking privilege, incumbent-centered gerrymandering, incumbency as a voting cue, and campaign finance. Most specifically, the paper examines the ways in which each of these advantages is established and whether they are truly strengths for the incumbent. In the case of gerrymandering, we find that some researchers do not believe this to be a true advantage for all incumbents over long periods of time, and we look at this further in the paper. Later on, the effects on democracy are confronted. This interesting trend lead political scientists and pollsters to believe that the population of voters is not choosing candidates fully based on their own desires and self interest. However, some experts choose to focus on the positive ways that incumbents influence their districts instead of the negatives that may arise from a low turnover in Congress. With the example of Congressman Dan Flood, we see that some of the representatives loved most by their districts harvest support in a manner that is often counter to national priorities. Reelection follows these incumbents, and most incumbents, because of the voters’ self interest overpowering a need for congressional unity.

Lastly, we assess the possibilities for reforming our electoral and campaign systems in order to curb incumbency advantage. With the establishment of congressional term limits and possible solutions to the large gaps in campaign spending seen between incumbents and their challengers, politicians and interest groups feel they might have found a fix for the overwhelming incumbent reelection rate. However, researchers find that these methods may not be as effective as previously believed. Setting term limits is a lofty goal, especially when confronted with past Supreme Court decisions and Congress’s general inability to self-legislate. Campaign finance reform often hurts challengers more than incumbents, as capping spending leaves newcomers with little means for establishing name recognition along with platform and policy ideas. It’s deduced, therefore, that these attempts at limiting incumbency advantage are not fully developed.

This intriguing debate is one with many facets and lots of room for exploration. This paper attempts to investigate the many ways that incumbents have won the hearts of voters in their district while, as a group, garnering hate and disapproval.

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