pages from 134481113 14597569 weapons equipment of the napoleonic wars

8/22/2019 Pages From 134481113 14597569 Weapons Equipment of the Napoleonic Wars

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CAVALRYWEAPONS &TACTICS

HE CAVALRYa bewildering variety of names, all

valry was divided into three basic cateries: heavy, medium and light. The formeras specifically designed to execute thearge, a potentially-decisive blow, hence theme: heavy horses and large men to impartimpetus. Heavy cavalry included'Garde du Corps' (German andBritish Household Cavalry,

guards and dragoons; Grenadiers aGendarmerie d'Elite and CarabiniersPrussian dragoons; and during the

Wars regiments simply titledDragoons were medium cavalry (one

lighter than the 'heavies ') , despiteeir original function as mounted infantryo rode into action and dismounted toThough France employed dismounted

their function during the greaterof the Napoleonic Wars was as bona fide

Mounted on faster horses and lighterlightcavalrywas used for reconnaisprotection of an army, and pursuit at

e end of a battle, though naturally wasadept at all other forms of mountedThe consequent prestige of the armas usually reflected in glamorous uniforms,

bravado and hard-drinking,tomized in hussar corps, light cavalryfrom Hungarian irregulars, whoseme was perpetuated by the universal fur

and pelisse. The archetype hussar, theench Comte de Lasalle, epitomized the35

whole light cavalry spirit by declaring: 'AHussar who isn't dead at thirty is a blackguard' (he survived to 34). Less prestigiouswas the ord inary l ight horse: Chasseurs aCheval (French), Chevau-Legers and German Chevaulegers, Mounted lagers (Germanand Russian) and Light Dragoons (British).Those armed with lances, often wearinguniform styled on t radi tional Polish lines,were named either Lanciers (French) orUhlans (German). Other terms includedChevau-Leger-Lanciers and Eclaireurs aCheval (scout-lancers), both French.

Organization was based upon the cavalryregiment, comprising several squadrons,each sub-divided into t roops or companies;one company might be designated 'elite'(authorized in France in 1801, as the 1stCompany of the 1st Squadron), differingfrom the remainder Oilly in matters of dressand sometimes morale. Within the regimentsome men might be armed with accuratefirearms and designated ' flankers ' (skirmishers), or the front rank might be armedwith lances (both adopted by the Russianhussars, for example).

In 1791 the establishment of a Frenchregiment included a headquarters consistingof the colonel, two It-colonels, a quartermaster-paymaster, surgeon-major, chaplain,two 'adjutants' (R.S.M.s), trumpet-majorand five 'craftsmen' (saddler, armourer,tailor, cobbler and breeches-maker). Lightand carabinier regiments comprised foursquadrons (others three), each of two com-


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panies, a company consIstIng of a captain,lieutenant, two sub-lieutenants, a 'marechaldes-Iogis-chef' (sergeant-major), two 'marechaux-des-Iogis' (sergeants), a 'brigadierfourrier' (quartermaster-corporal), four'brigadiers' (corporals), a trumpeter, andfifty mounted and four dismounted troopers.Organization fluctuated, though companystrength rarely exceeded a hundred; similarly,changes of terminology occurred in commiss ioned ranks , 'chef de brigade' and 'chefd'escadron' replacing colonel and It-colonel in1793, 'colonel' and a new second-incommand rank, 'major', being res tored byNapoleon. Briefly the term 'demi-brigade'replaced ' regiment ' during the RevolutionaryWars, each demi-brigade divided into foursquadrons of two companies each, each of I 16men; but in practice a whole demi-brigaderarely averaged above 200 or 300 men.Shortages of horses led to the reduction

of the French heavy arm by 1803 to fourteenregiments, and in 1805 twenty-four dragoonregiments were given a mixed establishmentof three mounted and two dismounted squadrons each, the latter formed into six-companybattalions, two ofwhich formed a dismountedregiment, and three regiments a division. Thesystem was naturally unpopular and saw onlylimited service.By 1806,when French cuirassier regimentsreceived a fourth squadron, regimental staffconsisted of colonel, major, two 'chefsd'escadron', two 'adjutants-major', paymaster-quartermaster, surgeon-major, 'aidemajor', two 'sous-aides-major', two'adjutants', a corporal- trumpeter and sixcraftsmen (as above, plus spur-maker); andeach company comprised a captain, lieutenant,2nd-lieutenant, sergeant-major, four sergeants, 'fourrier', eight corporals, eighty-twotroopers and a trumpeter.

French hussar regiments remained virtuallyunchanged in character, but the lancer was aninnovation; first adopted by the PolishChevau-Legers of the Imperial Guard, thelance was used more extensively as two otherGuard regiments and ultimately nine lineunits (the two lancer regiments of theVistula Legion, six dragoon regiments and the30th Chasseurs a Cheval) were equipped inthis role, the line unit s (conver ted in 181 I)

being termed 'Chevau-Leger-Lanciers'.Other nations had similar cavalry estab

lishments. For example, a British dragoonregiment of 1815 comprised three squadrons,each of two troops, each troop containing acaptain, two lieutenants , troop-sergeantmajor, three sergeants, four corporals,trumpeter, farrier, and from sixty to sixtyfive privates. Regimental s trength in actionwas around 400, but often less. Furthertactical sub-divisions included half-squadron(i.e. troop), division (half-troop), and subdivision (quarter-troop).

Austrian regiments each comprised eightsquadrons of varying complement, giving in1805 a nominal total of over 1,400 forcuirassiers and dragoons and over 1,700 forchevaulegers, hussars and lancers. In 1803,like France, Russia ' lightened' her cavalry byreducing the cuirassiers to six regiments andincreasing dragoons to twenty-two. Bothtypes had five-squadron regiments, two companies per squadron and over 1,000 men perregiment; hussar regiments comprised tensquadrons each, about 1,900 men per regiment. By 1812, there were five Lifeguardregiments, eight of cuirassiers, thirty-sixdragoon and eleven hussar regiments, pluscossacks. After the Treaty of Paris, Prussiancavalry regiments comprised four squadrons,each of two companies of two platoons(Ziigen), each squadron numbering 125 men.On campaign it was common to field onlytwo or three squadrons, with two or moreregiments combining to form provisionalunits like the 'Combined Hussars ' of theGrande Armee in 1812. Independent('Normal') squadrons formed from selectedpersonnel ult imate ly became the GuardDragoon, Uhlan and Hussar regiments;volunteer uni ts of 'National cavalry' andLandwehr had varied establishments, aregiment usually comprising five squadrons.

For proficient manoeuvre, training wasparamount. For a simple movement like 'TheLine will retire and form Two Columns' noless than eighteen verbal commands werelisted in the British manual of 1808. 43Manoeuvre varied with nationality, from

three-file column to single- or double-rankline, the charge executed at a gallop wheneverpracticable, slowly built up from a walk.


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tacticians considered a third rank ofligible value, restricting the attack to twoks as Mack instructed the Austrian cavalry.Austrian manual of 1805 notes:'The regiment attacks in two waves. Theond wave follows the first at the distance

f twelve paces. Each wave has two rows,ich are separated from one another by theof a horse's pace. The horses r ide onehind the other for cover. The leaders of theuadrons ride half a length in front of the

the leaders of the platoons andride in the ranks. '44

The front rank comprised experiencedthe space between riders was such

their knees were not quite touching.are accounts of cavalry being pressedgether so closely that the horses could notand conversely of the files of opposingopening to allow the protagonists to passone another, the men hacking at theemy as they rode past.)Czar Paul's 'Code ofField Cavalry Service'

decreed the two-rank formation, 'forrience shows that the third rank is uselessit impedes nearly all movements, and whenfalls it proves dangerous to rider and'45 These regulations were replaced inby the 'Preliminary Decree Concerninge Order of the Cavalry Service ' whichuded attacks by column of platoons, 'thest formation for any kind of movement,'46

which detachments of sixteen menout in open order to protect the flanks.cavalry regulations of 1812 revolved

und the basic three-man group, the 'Rotte'.t tacks were made in column or echelon,adron column' being the regiment's four

behind each other, or 'halfquadron column' in which each squadrond two 'Ziigen' in line, the regiment havingdouble-Ziigen frontage and eight-Ziigen

Mounted skirmishers always engagede enemy with carbines or pistols about 150200 yards in front of the main body.Whilst swordsmanship was important, the

of larger formations was the decisiveactor in cavalry tactics. Napoleon conthat although two mamelukes couldthree Frenchmen, 300 French could

an equal number of mamelukes, andFrench overthrow 1 ,500 mamelukes;

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similarly, Wellington wrote:'I considered our cavalry so inferior to theFrench for want of order, that although Iconsidered one of our squadrons a match fortwo French, yet I did not care to see fourBritish opposed to four French, and still moreso as the numbers increased, and order (ofcourse) became more necessary. They couldgallop, but could not preserve their order.'47In other words, the larger the formation, themore discipline (as opposed to swordsmanship) counted.The British lack of control often resulted

in a charge getting out of hand, careeringonward usually to disaster. At Campo Mayor,for example, an audacious charge captured theFrench siege-train, thundered on for severalmiles, met fresh French troops, were chasedback and lost the captured guns. Few Britishgenerals (excepting Paget) had any idea ofhow a charge should be executed. At Maguilla( I I June 1812) Slade's successful chargedashed on and was routed, about whichWellington wrote:'I t is occasioned entirely by the trick ourofficers of cavalry have acquired of gallopingat every thing, and their galloping back as fastas they gallop on the enemy. They neverconsider their situation, and never think onmanoeuvring before an enemy - so little thatone would think they cannot manoeuvre,excepting on Wimbledon Common; and whenthey use their arm as it ought to be used,viz., offensively, they never keep nor providefor a reserve.

'All cavalry should charge in two lines, ofwhich one should be in reserve; if obliged tocharge in one line, part of the line, at le.astone-third, should be ordered beforehand topull up, and form in second line, as soon asthe charge should be given, and the enemyhas been broken and has retired. '48

After Waterloo he endeavoured to int roduce controlled manoeuvre by his 'Instructions to Officers Commanding Brigades ofCavalry in the Army of Occupation, ' whichlisted the following pointers towards asuccessful operation:' I . A strong reserve should be kept to exploitsuccess or cover withdrawal.2. A cavalry force should be deployed in

three lines, the first two deployed and the


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A

B

C

D

[Q]Adjutant[j]Adjutant Major (RSM) Brigadier (Corporal)~ Brigadier-fourrier (Q.M. Corporal)1ZJ Marechal-des-logis (Sergt)

~ Marechal-des-logis chef (Sgt-Mjr)

Captain~ Lieutenant~ Marechal-des-Iogis with standard~ Sous-lieutenant (2nd Lieut.)mrumpeter


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E

F

OfficerSergeantCorporal

~ QuartermasterII] Squadron Officer Commanding OfficerD Represents line of troops

21. Cavalry Formations. A. A squadron of French light cavalry in line of battle; B. Aof French Light cavalry in 'Colonne serree'; C. A squadron of French Light cavalry

'Colonne par divisions' of company frontage; D. A squadron of French heavy cavalry inonne serree', preceded by the regimental trumpeters; E. A squadron of French heavy cavalrycolumn of fours; F. A British cavalry regiment in line in close order.

reserve in column but formed so as to beeasily moved into line.When act ing against cavalry the spacebetween lines should be between 400 and500 yards, sufficient for effective supportbut allowing the front line to retire withou t disturbing the cohesion of theremainder.Against infantry the second line shouldbe 200 yards behind the first, allowingthe second line to charge the infan trybefore they had t ime to recover from thecharge of the first line.When the first line charged, the supportsshould follow at a walk to evade involvement in the melee; 'For order in thesupports must be rigidly kept - they areuseless if they have got into confusion. '4 9

Napoleon's cavalry tactics relied upon thesmashing blow of a 'heavy' charge, executedwith audacity and discipline. ' . . . it is impossible to fight anything but a defensive war',he wrote, 'unless one has practically achievedparity with the enemy cavalry.'so 'Cavalryneeds audacity and practice; above all it mustnot be dominated by the spirit ofconservatismor avarice.'sl To this end, heavy and mediumcavalry were used in large bodies for shockaction (his 'reserve' corps of heavy cavalryformed a central striking-force), supportedwhenever possible by horse artil le ry andinfantry. The actual charge (similar in mostarmies) was executed as follows: the cavalrywould trot for one-third of the distance to theenemy; then canter; then gallop when 150yards from the target, and only in the last

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Ft"g.22. French cut"rasst"ers t"n actt"on t"n Russt"a, 1812. Prt"nt afterAlbrechtAdam.

fifty yards break into the charge 'a l'outrance'when the horses were given their heads;disciplinewas enforced throughout so that thehorses would not become exhausted beforethe moment of impact and so that an immediate rally could be made to resist counterattack. Massive mounted attacks reliedheavily upon adequate support (the failure ofthe charges at Waterloo was a result ofinsufficient co-ordination of support), but thesuccesses of Napoleon's cavalry - Eylauthe supreme example - proved the validity ofhis comment: 'Without cavalry, batt les arewithout result.'52

Light cavalry were often distributed tomake full use of their specialist role (in 1812,for example, each of Napoleon's heavy divisions had a light regiment, usually ChevauLeger-Lanciers, attached), and were ofteninstructed not to seek combat: 'less disgrace

attaches to an hussar officer who retreats, thanto one who gets embroiled with the enemy inunfavourable circumstances',53 as a Russianorder read. 'Outpost duty' demanded greatvigilance, as disaster could overtake theunwary (such as Ney's surprise at Fozd'Arounce, 181 I , and Gerard's at Arroyo dosMolinos). Despite lack of official training('any idea . . . of outpost duty was consideredabsurd'),54 many British units became moreadept than the French at reconnaissance; forexample, the 1st Hussars of the King'sGerman Legion kept a forty-mile line againstfour times their number of French fromMarch to May 181 I , without letting a Frenchpatrol through, without losing a vedette , ortransmitting a single piece of incorrectinformation.

Light cavalry was paramount at the endof a battle, covering a retreat or pursuing the4


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Fig. 23. Cavalry in combat at t%:terloo: Private Samuel Godley ofthe British 2nd Life Guards -known as 'the Marquis ofGranby' because ofhis bald head - defends himself successfully against aFrench cuirassier. Print published by Thomas K e l l y ~ 1816.Spectacular results could follow theof a disordered foe; Napoleon wrote:Jena, the light cavalry capitalized thectory all on its own',55 not only driving thearmy to the Baltic but capturingrtresses as well, Lasalle (with typical hussarwith 500 men receiving the surren

r of the 6 ,000 garrison of Stettin!Long-range raids were rare, though thessacks were expert a t this type of 'hi t-andwarfare; in fact their loose organizationunsuitable for conventional combat, forDenis Davidov described an attack of

and cossacks on formed troops:'Colonels, officers, subalterns and many

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simple cossacks rode at the enemy, but all invain. The columns rode on, one behind theother, drove us off with shots from theirmuskets and laughed at our art of cavalryfighting . . . [they] ploughed straight throughour cossacks, like a battleship among fishingboats . . . ' . 56But the cossacks eventually harried theGrande Armee out of existence.Casualties resulting from a cavalry charge

against infantry could fluctuate surprisingly;though Colborne 's br igade was all butannihilated at Albuera, the French 4th Line,similarly r idden-over at Austerlitz, escapedwith only eighteen dead.


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CAVALRY SWORDSCavalry sabres were classified in two distincttypes, depending upon the manner in whichthey were employed. Those designed for thecut - the swinging slash with the edge of theblade - were usually curved with a sharpenededge, or straight and wide-bladed with bluntpoint. Those designed for the thrust - inwhich the sabre stabbed forwards with thestraight arm, like an extended f inger - werenarrow-bladed with sharpened point andoften blunt edge. Some sabres combined thecharacteristics of both types.The best employment of a sabre remaineda vexed question throughout the period.

Marshal Saxe believed the sabre '. . . shouldbe three square . . . and carefully blunted onthe edges, that the soldier may be effectuallyprevented cutting with it in action, whichmethod of using the sword never doesexecution',57 but the cut remained the preferred stroke of many, the t hrust not beingregarded as feasible against a mounted opponent in the British Rules and Regulations forthe Sword Exercise of Cavalry (1796):'The thrust has only one mode of execution. . . a greater degree of caution is required inits application against cavalry . . . for if thepoint is parr ied, the adversary's blade getswithin your guard, which is not to be recovered in time . . . for which reason thepoint should seldom or never be given in theattack, but principally confined to the pursuit ,when i t can be applied with effect and withoutrisk. The case is different in acting againstinfantry, as the persons against whom youdirect the point are so much below your ownlevel, that the weight of your sword is not sofelt; consequently it is managed with greaterfacility than with an. extended arm carriedabove the level of the shoulder . . . againstinfantry, the point may be used with as mucheffect as the edge and with the same degreeof security.' 58

French heavy and medium cavalry usedsabres suitable only for the thrust (at which

they were supremely proficient), even thelight cavalry's curved sabres being capable ofthrusting. The British chopper-like sabrescompared badly, as 'An Officer of Dragoons'wrote about the Peninsular War in the UnitedService Journal (1831):'The sword of the British heavy dragoonis a lumbering, clumsy, ill-contrivedmachine.

It is too heavy, too short, too broad, too muchlike the sort of weapon which we have seenGrimaldi cut of f the heads of a line ofurchins on the stage. The . . . light dragoonsabre . . . we can answer for its utility inmaking billets for the fire . . . There can beno doubt that thrusting is the proper use tomake of the sword; it is a brutaloperation . . . ' 59Training was .. essential to produce a goodcavalryman. Not only was a good seat vital,but the sword had to become an extension ofthe arm for the cavalryman had virtually tolearn to fence on horseback, to protect hisbreast, back, bridle-arm and thigh, to executea blow against cavalry on his right or left,infantry standing, kneeling or even lyingdown, and often with a cumbersome, illbalanced sabre. Even the simple cut variedwith circumstance, the British 1796 manualemphasizing that against cavalry, all movement should come from the wrist andshoulder, a bent elbow exposing the forearmto the enemy's blade; whereas against infantrya bent elbowwas necessary to obtain sufficientsweep for the blow. In the charge it wasusual to 'point' the sabre, often with the-guarduppermost for maximum protection, thismovement with a curved blade resulting inthe tip pointing downwards and the cuttingedge uppermost.The weight of metal and its distributionwas important in sabre-design, a cutting

weapon needing more weight on the bladeto assist the downward slash, and the thrusting sabre requiring a heavy hilt to facilitatethe raising of the point. The channels

Fig. 24. Above: The Cut with the curved cavalry sabre. A British Light Dragoon from TheSword Exercise of the Cavalry, 1796. Below: The Thrust with the straight cavalry sword. AFrench Dragoon 'Giving Point'.42


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43


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Fig. 25. Left: A French Carabinier) showing the cuirass. Engraving by M. Haider after Gericault. Right:French cuirassier officer. Print by Martinet.

running down a blade (erroneously called'blood channels') were a method of reducingweightwithout reducing strength, the deepestchannels being found on weapons designedsolely for the thrust. Guards varied from thesingle knuckle-bow or quillon type, providinglittle protect ion, to the basket-hilt version,sometimes almost enclosing the ent ire hand,and counter-balancing too greatly the weightof the blade. But in the hands of a proficienttrooper, the sabre, whether blunt or sharp,could inflict horrific injuries, amputationsand decapitations being very common. 'I t isa brutal operation . . . '.

Britain began the Revolutionary Wars withthe 1788 sabre, the light version not curvedenough to execute a decent cut and the

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heavy version an ill-balanced monstrosity,both of very inferior steel. When comparedto the sabres and proficiency of theirAustrian allies in Flanders in 1793, they werea disgrace. John Gaspard Le Marchantattempted to remedy the situation by copying everything possible from the Austriancavalry, renowned as swordsmen and forhigh-quality weapons. His reforms beganwith the issue of the 1796 Rules and Regula-tions and continued with sabre-design, LeMarchant finding the existing patterns so ill-balanced thatmany wounds to British soldiersand their horses were inflicted by the ir ownweapons!Ensuring an improved quality by enforcingstricter controls, Le Marchan t copied the


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26. Cavalry combat between British dragoons and French cuirassiers atwaterloo. Print by R. Havell after-M.Wright.

an 1775-pattern heavy cavalry sabre fore British 1796 pattern, with a broad,aight blade and pierced 'disc' hilt. Thoughimprovement, it was still a cumbersomeapon, having a blunt point (some wereregimentally) and prompting Capt.of the 3rd Dragoons to note inr il 1812 the results of an engagement at'. .. scarcely one Frenchman died of his

although dreadfully chopped, where12 English Dragoons were killed on the

and others dangerously wounded byIf our men had used their swords so,times the number of French would havekilled. '6 0The 1796 light cavalry sabre was better,ving a wide, curved blade but a single-barwhich gave scant protection; but it wasgood for slashing that Prussia copied itactly for their 181 I-pattern sabre.

French sabres, despite a number of minoralterations in pattern, retained the same basicdesign: thrusting-swords with long, narrowblades and mult i-barred hilts, and lightcavalry sabres designed for the cut but with asharpened point capable of thrusting, initiallywith single-bar guard but later adopting thebetter protection ofmulti-bar. Some, particularly those of carabiniers, had shell-guardsbearing plaques embossed with regimentaldevices, in this case the bursting grenade. Aswith French firearms, sabre-patterns werenamed after the year in the Revolutionarycalendar in which they were authorized, notthe year of actual issue; for example, the'An IX' (1800-01) heavy cavalry sabre wasno t issued until 183-05, apparently; whilstthe 'An IX' and 'An XI' light cavalry patternswere not issued until about 1807, old patternscontinuing in use even after a newer patternhad been distributed to some units. Two

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)

Fig. 27. British swords. Top to Bottom: Heavy cavalry troopers' broadsword and scabbard,1796 pattern; detail of hilt; light cavalry sabre, 1796 pattern.

further patterns - the 'An XIII ' fordragoons and light cavalry - were issuedeven later.

The 'Pallasche' was a German design ofsabre with a straight, broad and heavycutting-blade, the term usually associated alsowith the huge guard, half-enclosing the hand,often encountered in German and Russianservice, sometimes bearing elaboratelyembossed designs or cut-out segments. Thelarge guard was rarely seen outside Germanicarmies, though British Household Cavalryofficers latterly carried such a sabre, and theFrench 'An IV' carabinier pattern was notdissimilar. The single-bar guard was commonin Germany for all types of light cavalrysabre, though a refinement found on someAustrian weapons was a second bar fittingover the first, hinged to swing out and lockinto position to provide extra protection.Both all-metal and half-metal, half-leatherscabbards were used by all nations, t he non-

metal scabbard (leather, or leather coveringa wooden core) in theory keeping the 'edge'on the blade longer than a metal scabbard.In practice it was a n eg li gib le point, British'cutting' sabr es all having meta l scabbardswith apparently little ill-effect on their alreadydubious efficacy, whilst French thrustingsabres, also with metal scabbards, had bluntedblades to begin with. Leather scabbards,however, were light and more manageable,with no danger of the sword becoming rustedin the scabbard as it could in a metal one. Thetwo common methods of suspension were by astud on the scabbard fitting into a 'frog' onthe waist- or shoulder-belt, or the morecommon scabbard-rings attached to twoslings suspended from the belt.

The campaigns in Egypt prompted theadoption of the oriental or 'mameluke' sabre,a sharply-curved weapon with guardless hilt.Highly-fashionable, particularly amongstlight cavalry officers, the pattern was carried


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, \ " - - - ~ '---------------------------) ..

28 . Top to Bot tom: Austrian heavy cavalry broadsword, 1803,0 Austrian light cavalrybre with folding hilt,0 detail ofhilt,0 Baden dragoon officers' sabre, 1800,0 Saxon cuirassier officers'1800 .

becoming so popular tha t Eurocopies of oriental weapons were prothey were also favoured by musicians

d particularly by drum-majors. Otherweapons included the Caucasianused by Russia's Asiatic irregular

the 'k indjal ' being a double-edged,and guardless short sword;

versions were used though thecossack 'shashqa' was not issued1834. The mamelukes of the FrenchGuard carried not only Turkishbut even a Turkish dagger in brass

Many nations copied the sabre-designs ofers, examples being cited above. In some

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cases this process was aided by the adoptionof large numbers of captured weapons, inparticular large quantities of French weaponsin use by both Prussian and Russian forcesin 1812-14. Russia copied the French cuirassier sabre in 1806 (for dragoons) and 1809 (forcuirassiers), replacing the previous Germanstyle weapons; curved sabres introduced in1809 also followed French lines, except thepommel which curved sharply at the top inan opposi te d irect ion to the blade; and somany 'An XI' light cavalry. sabres werecaptured by .Russia in 1812 that the patternwas copied for the 1826 sabre.


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Fig. 29. French cavalry swords. Left to Right : Carabinier troopers' sabre; cavalry s w o r d - b e l t ~sabretache, slings and sabre of An XI Pattern; Hussar officers' sabre; Mameluke scimitar.

--8


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HE CARBINEhe carbine was a short-barrelled cavalry

not to be confused with the longerelled cavalry musket or the 'musketoon',e latter an imprecise term used by different

to imply different weapons, usuallya longer-barrelled carbine witheater range. A characteristic of the carbineas a belt-fitting, allowing the gun to beon a spring-clip from a shoulder

Despite its short range, the carbine enabledto fight as skirmishers, both on foot

nd from horseback, and was thus principallyl ight cavalry weapon (some heavy unitsreceived carbines). A well-disciplinedgiment could even fire a volley from horse

Parquin records the French 20tha Cheval at Eylau, meeting acharge with a volley of carbine-firesix paces range, knocking over the Russianrst line before charging the remainder with

e sabre.The most common British carbine was theaget', General Henry Paget being creditedits design. It was characterized by itsrate, small 16-inch barrel, a lock incorawaterproof raised pan and bolt-lock'safety-catch', apparently produced asarly as 1806), and a ramrod mounted upon

'stirrup' or swivel, attaching it permanentlythe stock to prevent accidental loss when

on horseback. A further modification,by the 16th Light Dragoons at least,as a folding butt, making it even more

Other patterns, also named afterwere the Elliott and Harcourt car

the former approved in 1773 butthroughout the Napoleonic Wars;28-inch barrel had a ramrod with bulging

nd which was secured by fitting into a notchthe stock. The Harcourt apparently was

only to the 16th Light Dragoons, 500supplied by Henry Nock in 1794; itsis uncertain but Nock's 'screwlessck' was fitted to some ordinary carbines

from 1797. The Brown-Bess style caval rymusket was reported in March 1796 to be'very inconvenient, useless and cumbersome',the report recommending its replacement bya 26-inch barrel carbine until which time 'thepresent Dragoon Firelock should be cu t downto . . . 26 ins so as to be reduced to aCarbine; a Swivel Bar added to it . . . will givean additional convenience in the carriage andto be carried But [sic] downwards.'61 Afurther recommendation, carried into effectfor a few years, was a standardization ofbores which, as the French realized, greatlysimplified ammunition-supply. Though allnew wea'pons were produced in musket-borefor a time, the old system returned, meaningthat the cavalryman had to carry two lots ofammunition, for pistol and carbine. Thecomplexity of different bores is exemplifiedby the following table from James' Regimental Companion: 62

Drams of No . o fpowder per balls percartridge lb weightMusket 6 14-!Carbine,musket bore 5-! 14-!Carbine pistol,musket bore 3-! 14-!Carbine 4 20Carbine pistol 3 20Common pistol 3 34

Other weapons styled 'carbines' were actuallyshort muskets used by artillery and infantryN.C.O.s.French light cavalry, t ra in and gendarmeswere issued with carbines, but not until 1812

did the heavy cavalry receive them, thoughsome captured Austrian weapons wereordered to be distributed in 1805. The 'issue'pattern was the 1786 musketoon (musketbore), and after 1801 the 'A n IX' pattern,including a bayonet worn from a frog on the

]0 . Left: Top to Bottom: British Paget cavalry c a r b i n e ~ ' British Elliott pattern carbine;ench Dragoon m u s k e t ~ A n I X - X I I I Pattern; French cavalry carbine A n I X - X I I I P a t t e r n ~owing reverse side.49


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Fig. 31. Top to Bottom: French 1777 Pattern cavalry pistolJ British Light Dragoon pistolJFrench An XIII Pattern cavalry pistolJ British New Land Pattern pistol.

waist-belt. Other nations issued carbines, butnot all as liberally as the French and British;in the Russian hussars , for example, onlysixteen men per squadron, the 'flankers', wereso equipped after the withdrawal of thegeneral issue in 1812 .

50

Due to the infrequency of its use, contemporary comparisons of carbines are few,though the super iori ty of the French type(and the manner in which it was handled)was obvious. For example, 'An Officer ofDragoons' writing in 1831 respecting the


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War reported that ' . . . our lightcarbine is so decidedly bad in allthat we have only patience to say,

e sooner it is got rid of the better. '63writing in the same publication,

the dut ies of light troops in skirshing in the Peninsula:' . . . a man with common observation couldot shut his eyes to the glaring fact, that the

of the French chasseur, and hisof acting on foot in cases of emerency, gave him vast advantages over ourght dragoons at the out-posts. '64

In fact, Stapleton Cotton in 18 I 3 reportedhe had ordered the British Householdvalry to cease to carry carbines (except sixr troop), 'as these troops can never be calledto skirmish, and the horses have alreadysufficient load to carry. '65HE PISTOL

the manufacture of vast quantities ofstols (23,137 pairs by French makers until814, for example), so that almost everyhad one or two, they were hardlyer used. 'An Officer of Dragoons' recorded

e opinion of Marshal Saxe: 'Pistols . . . arely a superfluous addition of weight and[sic] and added his own'We never saw a pistol made use

f except to shoot a glandered horse. '66 Thestol's range was so limited that its dischargeas pointless 'till you feel your antagonist'swith the muzzle,'67 at which range it wasto use the sword.Nevertheless, Britain issued a bewilderingof pistols in pistol- and carbine-bore,varying from the 12-inch

eavy Dragoon Pistol' to the 9-inch 'Lightas well as a continuous supply frome East India Company. The 1796-patternvalry pistol had a ramrod carried in the

but this development was not populard the 'o ld pattern' was being ordered again1801. Variations included the 1796-pattern

with Nock's 'screwless lock', bolt-locksthe Paget carbine, and the ' ra ised pan'

had channels on either side to divertThe common 'Land Pattern'

had a swivel ramrod like the Pagetrbine to its 9-inch barrel; another patternthe 9-inch barrelled carbine-bore 'Dump-

51

l ing' pistol with (after 1812) swivel ramrodand raised pan, and in 1814 a 'Squirrel'pistol, perhaps another name for the 'Dumpling'. Unofficial attempts were made to adaptcarbine-ammunition to the pistol, so that onlyone type of ammunition need be carried, byshaking half the powder out of a carbinecartridge to use it for the pistol; if a soldierin the heat of battle forgot to reduce thecharge of powder the recoil would blow thepistol out of his hand.

French pistols had the standard bore (17. Imm.). The 1777 pistol, characterized by asmall amount ofwoodwork and a steel ramrodset to one side of the barrel , was used unt ilthe issue of the 'An IX', which had ?stock extending almost to the muzzle; thelater 'An XIII ' again reverted to the foreshortened stock.Cavalry pistols were commonly carried inholsters attached to the saddle, but whencarried by artillery or engineers (as they werein a number of armies) were suspended inhols ters from the waist- or shoulder-belt.They were carried in this manner by mostinfantry officers. For cavalry regiments notarmed with carbines, or with carbines carriedin a saddle-boot, the pistol could be hung onthe spring-clip of the carbine-belt; a number,usually 'Sea Service' pistols, had a belt-clipattached, a rectangular bar which slipped overthe waist-belt, obviating the need for aholster . Small pistols could even be carr iedin the pockets of a greatcoat.

Huge numbers of privately-purchasedpistols were used by officers, ranging from deluxe versions of regulation patterns to ornateduellers; some were producedwith detachableshoulder-s tocks to turn them into shortcarbines. Even such finely-made weapons,however, had l it tle effect on the battlefieldexcept at the closest range.THE LANCETraditionally a Polish weapon, the lance wasemployed by most armies during the Napoleonic Wars, Britain being a notable exception. The lance, however, was is sued onlysparsely; even France only formed appreciablenumbers of lancer units a f t e ~ 181 I - 12.The reason for this lay in the characteristicsof the weapon, for whatever its advantages the


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lancer was at a distinct disadvantage in a meleeonce the initial 'shock ' had passed; the factthat a lancer was almost defenceless once thepoint had been turned was a major factorinfluencing Britain against its adoption. Inaddition, specialist training was required toproduce a proficient lancer; when the French3rd Hussars were issued experimentally withlances but without t raining in 1800-01 theywere recorded as not being armed but simplycarrying a pole! For skirmishing, scouting andpursuit, however, the lance was lethal, andeven in a defensive role, with a regimentformed in close order with lances levelled, animpenetrable 'hedge' could be formed at leastuntil the opposition had hacked off sufficientlance-heads to force a way through.A lance can be 'aimed' at a target withgreater accuracy than a sword, so not onlycould a lancer strike an enemy horsemanbefore coming within sabre- range , againstunformed infantry he was an executioner.Colborne's Brigade at Albuera was caught inthe flank by Polish lancers; one battalion, the2/31st, was farthest from the point of impactand was able to form square. The otherssuffered percentage losses of 85.3 per cent .(1/3rd), 75.9 per cent. (2/48th) and 61.6 percent. (2/66th). A further use of the lance wasdemonstrated at Katzbach (1813), when mudprevented the French cavalry from exceedinga walk and heavy rain made the Prussianinfantry unable to fire; a square was thusable to hold off the French with a hedge ofbayonets until some lancers arr ived, theirsuperior 'reach' breaking the square immediately. Prime exponents of the lance were thecossacks, ofwhom General Wilson wrote thatthe lance

,. . . is the constant exercise of his youth andboyhood, so that he wields it, although from14 to 18 feet in length, with the sameaddress and freedom that the best swordsmanin Europe would use his weapon. '68

Fig. 32. Left: Front and side views ofFrenchcavalry lanceJ 1812 Pattern (Not to scale.)


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Fig. .13. Austrian cuirassiers with campaign equipment,c. 1813. Print afterJA . Klein.

An Elucidation . .. for the Formations and Movements of 54Cavalry, p. 76. 55Quoted in Wagner, p. 62. 56.Quoted in Duf fy , Austerlitz, p. 34.Quoted in Duf fy , Borodino, p. 44. 57Wellington to Lord John Russell, 21 July 1826, quoted 58.Oman, Wellington's Army, p. 104.

8. Wellington to Lt-Gen. Hill, 18 June 1812; 'Despatches' 59IX , p. 240. 60.Quoted Oman, Wellington's Army, pp . I 11-12. 61.Chandler, p. 35 I , quoting Napoleon, Correspondence(Paris, 1858-70), Vol. XXXI, p. 426. 62.Ibid., p. 35 I , quoting Napoleon, Correspondence, XXXI, 63p 428. 64Ibid., p. 355, quoting Napoleon, Correspondence, XXXI, 65P427 66.Quoted in Duf fy , Austerlitz, p. 35. 68.

Tomkinson, quoted in Oman, {%/ellington's Army, p. 110.Quoted in Chandler, p. 355.Wagner, p. 62, quoting Tarle, E. , Napoleonovo tazenina Rus f 8 I 2 , p. 313.Quoted in United Service Journal, 1831, II , p. 6r .Quoted in Rogers, Mounted Troops of the British Army,p. 1531831, II, p. 6r .Bragge, p. 49.Quoted in Blackmore, British Military Firearms, pp .107-08.James, II , p. 183.United Service Journal, 1831, II , p. 61.Ibid., p. 206.Quoted i n Glover, Wellington's Army, p. 50.and 67. United Service Journal, 1831, II , p. 6r.Wilson, 'Br ie f Remarks '; see also Royal Mil itaryChronicle, 1812, p. 207.

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Fig. 34. Three illustrations showingBritish artillery c. 1802J on the march and beingmanhandledby infantrymenJ

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