AU/ACSC/2017

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

READY OR NOT, ADS-B IS COMING

By

Bryan A. Culipher, Major, USAF

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

Instructor: Dr. Fred Stone

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

June 2017

DISTRIBUTION A. Approved for public release: distribution unlimited.

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Disclaimer

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not

reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. government or the Department of Defense. In

accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the

United States government.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

DISCLAIMER ................................................................................................................... 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................... 2

FIGURES ........................................................................................................................... 3

ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... 4

SECTION I: INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 5

DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM ............................................................................... 5

RESEARCH QUESTION ............................................................................................. 7

SECTION II: LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................ 7

SECTION III: CASE STUDY OF AIR TRAFFIC MODERNIZATION ......................... 9

BACKGROUND: AIR TRAFFIC REFORM & MODERNIZATION ................................... 9

THE AIR DEFENSE PROBLEM: BEFORE & AFTER 9/11 ............................................. 12

PRIMARY RADAR ........................................................................................ 14

SECONDARY SURVEILLANCE RADAR .......................................................... 15

ADS-B: A CONCEPT FOR CONGESTED AIRSPACE .................................................... 17

ADS-B: THE GOOD ..................................................................................... 18

ADS-B: THE BAD ....................................................................................... 21

SECTION IV: DISCUSSION OF THE CASE STUDY RESULTS ................................. 24

THE AIR FORCE’S ADS-B COMPLIANCE APPROACH .............................................. 24

THE CALCULUS OF COMPLIANCE ........................................................................... 27

THE COST OF COMPLIANCE .................................................................................... 29

SECTION V: RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................ 33

SECTION VI: CONCLUSION .......................................................................................... 34

ENDNOTES… ................................................................................................................... 37

BIBLIOGRAPHY .............................................................................................................. 45

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FIGURES

FIGURE I: ........................................................................................................................ 10

FIGURE II: ....................................................................................................................... 16

FIGURE III: ..................................................................................................................... 19

FIGURE IV: ..................................................................................................................... 26

FIGURE V: ....................................................................................................................... 28

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ABSTRACT

After two decades of reform efforts, in 2012 Congress authorized the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA) to modernize their Air Traffic Management system, transforming how

they control aircraft throughout the National Airspace System (NAS). Because of the FAA’s

exclusive control over American airspace, its air traffic modernization mandates immediately

impact Air Force aircraft and the military’s freedom of movement in domestic skies.

As part of FAA’s “NextGen 2020” initiatives, almost all of the Air Force’s aircraft

inventory will require avionics upgrades, including Automatic Dependent Surveillance-

Broadcast (ADS-B) technology retrofits. Last year, Air Force leadership testified before

Congress about its compliance status, and its ADS-B roll-out strategy. Casting this articulated,

implementation plan against the Air Force’s total inventory of airframes, I explore whether the

Air Force is ready for the FAA’s January 2020 ADS-B compliance deadline. Because there are

still three years until the mandates effective-date, ADS-B procurement time and pricing lead my

case-study of the Air Force’s compliance priority-schedule. Air Force leadership has placed

ADS-B compliance-priority on those aircraft that regularly fly outside of American airspace.

Federal acquisition protocols add to the cost and roll-out of ADS-B transponder purchase and

installation, and contribute to the likelihood that not all of the Air Force inventory will have

ADS-B installed by 2020.

Absent an ADS-B waiver, non-compliant aircraft may be given flight restrictions by the FAA,

such as flying low, sub-optimal navigation, or denied-entry, which cost the Air Force time, fuel,

and readiness. Consequently, with its NextGen 2020 mandate, the FAA stands to effectively

impair Air Superiority, which is the exclusive mission of the United States Air Force.

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SECTION I: INTRODUCTION

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has been managing aircraft in America’s

skies since the 1950s, and not much has changed technologically since that time. Land-based

radar, which has been air control’s infrastructure-paradigm for the past 65 years, has seen little

modernization, still utilizing primary and secondary radar to identify and track aircraft traveling

through the National Airspace System (NAS). With the advent of Global Positioning Satellite

(GPS) technology in the 1990s, the FAA saw their chance to modernize Air Traffic Management

(ATM) through aircraft-installed tracking, reducing the reliance on aging radar. The FAA’s

reform effort was stalled by the attacks of September 11, 2001, when America witnessed the

greatest attack on the United States, by means of aviation. Eleven years later, on Valentine’s

Day 2012, President Obama signed into law H.R. 658, known as the FAA Modernization and

Reform Act, which provided $11 billion for FAA’s Next Generation Air Traffic Management

system.1

As part of the aviation reform, FAA is mandating that all aircraft, including military

aircraft, install Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) transponders, which will

shift communication from detection of aircraft movements by land-based radar, to a continuous

stream of data, emitted from the aircraft itself. On January 1, 2020, any aircraft without ADS-B

will be prohibited from operating above 10,000 feet and from entering controlled airspace. In

addition to offering Air Traffic Controllers (ATC) more precise positioning and identifying data,

ADS-B transponders have the added benefit of eliminating FAA’s need for expensive and aging,

land-based radar detection systems.2

DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM

While ADS-B will relieve the FAA’s need to support aging and expensive land-based

radar systems, its implementation will have budgetary, logistical and security consequences to all

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aircraft owners, but particularly the military. With only three years until the mandate’s effective

date, Air Force leadership has set a prioritization strategy for ADS-B transponder installation in

the Air Force’s 5,500 aircraft. Complicating timely-compliance, is the fact that the Air Force

must observe federal acquisition procedures for the purchase of, and installation of, the required

ADS-B transponders. Adding to the timeline, many military airframes have complicated

avionics already built-in, and there has to be adequate testing of the eventual ADS-B retrofits,

before the planes can operate safely. While many of the Air Force’s inventory will be compliant

by January 2020, many will not meet the ADS-B deadline; this poses a threat to airspace access,

restricted by the mandate. Absent an exemption or waiver for military aircraft, planes may be

grounded until ADS-B transponders are installed.

In addition to the Total Force’s (Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve aircraft) compliance

deadline challenges, the Air Force has operational security (OPSEC) and communication

security (COMSEC) concerns with ADS-B because of its lack of encryption capability. ADS-B

technology is premised on open-source transmitting, so it is susceptible to hacking, whereby an

aircraft’s GPS data is manipulated to misidentify, or “spoof,” where the plane is actually

located.3 Furthermore, because of the continuous broadcast of ADS-B technology, secret

missions flown in domestic airspace, as well as existing military avionics inside the plane, may

be compromised unless discretionary transmission is an alternative to full, unrestricted broadcast.

Despite the military’s logistical and security concerns with ADS-B, the FAA is not

entertaining waivers or exemptions for military compliance with NextGen 2020.4 With only

three years left, the Air Force’s compliance strategy includes concurrently prioritizing roll-out,

testing already-installed retrofits, exploring encryption options for ADS-B transponders, and

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weighing remedial measures for secondary radar maintenance, in order to both comply with

FAA’s modernization mandates and to preserve mission-readiness.

RESEARCH QUESTION

The FAA’s ADS-B compliance deadline is non-discretionary and non-discriminatory; it

is a Congressional mandate set for January 1, 2020 that applies to military aircraft, as well as

private, which will inhibit freedom of movement for any non-compliant aircraft. Consequently,

the ADS-B transition has immediate, strategic implications for Air Force readiness. In order to

answer, “Is the Air Force Ready for NexGen 2020’s Looming ADS-B Compliance Deadline?”

this research paper will use an Exploratory Case Study framework for an examination of the Air

Force’s ADS-B roll-out plan, where implementation-priority is influenced by time, cost and

security concerns.

SECTION II: LITERATURE REVIEW

In studying the Air Force’s readiness for the 2020 ADS-B mandate, primary resource

interviews will measure which airframes are on-track for timely compliance, and will be cast

against Congressional budget documents and hearings that explain the Air Force’s priority

rationale. Federal acquisition documents will also speak to the time and cost factors impacting

the Air Force’s compliance with the January 2020 mandate. Interviews with FAA Subject

Matter Experts provide the primary resource material for understanding how ADS-B stands to

modernize the current Air Traffic Management paradigm. FAA-published documents will serve

as secondary resources, providing the technical context for the ATM reform movement, which

emphasizes ADS-Bs benefits to the larger National Airspace System. Congressional testimony

by Air Force leadership will provide the avionics-conversion costs influencing its roll-out

strategy, as well as explain the collateral operational and budgetary impact of ADS-B, such as

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the cost-shift of radar sustainment expenses, demonstrating the negative implications of ADS-B

on the Air Defense mission. Tertiary resources, such as aviation articles and legal journals, will

explain the larger aeronautics industry’s reaction to security and cost concerns.

Much of the industry-specific literature relevant to researching NextGen 2020’s ADS-B

mandate and the Air Force’s readiness, is primary resource material for this case study. First,

federal legislation establishing FAA’s mission and authority over domestic air space sets the

predicate for why FAA’s ADS-B compliance deadline governs the Air Force. Congress provides

additional, primary resource material with its public hearings on NextGen 2020, where Air Force

Acquisition Officers testify to the House Armed Services Committee. When called to testify,

Generals Timothy Fay, Jon Thomas, Michael Fortney, and David Nahom, all published their

written remarks and reports, as well as appearing before the Committee for questioning. The

resulting dialogue between the Congressional panel and the Generals at the September 14, 2016

hearing, provides detail of the Air Force’s ADS-B roll-out strategy and its associated costs.

Federal acquisition documents, to the extent they are not redacted to protect the vendor’s

proprietary information, reveal some of the specific cost and time data, influencing timely ADS-

B compliance by the Air Force.

FAA ADS-B publications and illustrations, in-person interviews with FAA Subject

Matter Experts, and Air Force personnel, will explain how ADS-B compares to the existing land-

based radar infrastructure, and will identify the strengths and weaknesses of ADS-B as an

evolution in Air Traffic Management and Air Defense. These primary resources, together with

some secondary resource articles, will illustrate the positives and negatives of America’s current,

radar Air Traffic Management system, as well as the promise and compromise that ADS-B

technology presents to the military. Secondary resources, such as scholarly articles on the costs

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associated with FAA primary and secondary radar operations, describe the avionics reform

efforts of the 1990s. Finally, tertiary resources like military-news reports on avionics reform,

and air traffic industry periodicals that detail the industry’s preparation for ADS-B

implementation, as well as periodicals that describe the federal aviation compliance

environment, will highlight the impediments to NextGen’s full implementation by 2020.

SECTION III: A STUDY OF AIR TRAFFIC MODERNIZATION’S ROLL-OUT

BACKGROUND: AIR TRAFFIC REFORM & MODERNIZATION

The Federal Aviation Act of 19585 created the Federal Aviation Administration and

charged it with active control, regulation and safety management of America’s skies.6 As

America’s population grew, its airspace became more congested, resulting in increased workload

and stress-level of the air traffic controllers who ensure safe, reliable, and efficient air travel.

Even with this increase in aircraft operations, congested airspace, and busy controllers, aviation

has remained a safe mode of travel.7

Even with FAA’s safety track record with existing radar infrastructure, Air Traffic

Management’s platforms have not kept pace with technological advances made in general

aviation, particularly since the 1990s explosion in, and ubiquity of, GPS. NextGen 2020 is the

reform movement’s legislative victory, that aims to bring controlled airspace into the 21st

century, simultaneously reducing stress on air controllers by shifting the active communication

workload from the tower, to the on-board transponder, and “going-green” through improved

aircraft routing, which reduces fuel-burn inefficiencies.8 Air traffic modernization is not

confined to domestic skies; the International Civilian Aviation Organization (the global version

of FAA) is also mandating ADS-B compliance, as part of a uniform, international

standardization and modernization.9

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In its implementation of NextGen 2020, the FAA requires commercial, general aviation,

and even military aircraft to upgrade their avionics to include ADS-B.10 An ADS-B transponder

is an unencrypted, open-source broadcast device that can be either retrofitted to traditional

transponders already installed on aircraft, or can be a standalone device installed in new-aircraft

avionics.11 As Figure I below, entitled, “How ADS-B Works” depicts, the main source of data to

the ATC, is now the aircraft itself, and controllers no longer rely on land-based, line-of sight

radars.

FFiigguurree II:: HHooww AADDSS--BB WWoorrkkss (Adapted from Rick Durden, “ADS-B: Time to Stop

Procrastinating?” www.avweb.com, May 4, 2014, https://www.avweb.com/news/features/ADS-

B-Time-to-Stop-Procrastinating-221955-1.html)

There are two separate operations associated with ADS-B’s continuous data-stream: 1)

ADS-B Out and 2) ADS-B In. ADS-B Out, the equipage required for the mandate, continually

broadcasts position reports (one ping, per second), providing ATCs with real-time, aircraft

locations, enhancing situational awareness for both the pilot and the tower.12 ADS-B In allows

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the onboard system to receive data from other aircraft, such as a nearby plane’s

horizontal/vertical position, surface indicators/alerts, airborne conflict detection, and de-

confliction guidance.13

For general aviation and commercial aircraft, both retrofit and new-installation of ADS-B

comes with a considerable price tag and prices can vary depending on the airframe involved. For

air transport aircraft, described by FAA as Part 25, which regularly fly over 18,000 feet, ADS-B

Out is averaging $200,000 for retrofitted aircraft and $25,000 for newly-built aircraft.14 By

contrast, for the private aircraft, the costs ranges from $2,000 to $8,000, depending on aircraft

type and where it will be installed.15 This one-time purchase and install cost is paid by the

aircraft owner, who then must pay an additional monthly subscription fee for system-use, much

like a cellphone service.16

In addition to precision-locating improving situational awareness for controllers, ADS-B

offers the consequential benefit of reducing FAA’s need for land-based radar systems that are

currently in-use for tracking aircraft in domestic airspace. As early as 1993, FAA had planned to

phase-out primary radar in the United States.17 Seven years later, on April 5, 2000, President

Clinton signed into law the Wendell Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act.18 With this act

in place, the National Airspace System was poised to revolutionize air traffic control by

streamlining, and ultimately decommission, land-based radar, in favor of GPS-based tracking.19

At a cost of approximately $1 billion a year, the FAA currently operates and maintains about

60% of all radars across America at various, decentralized airports; the military and the

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) cost-share the remaining 40%.20 After January 1,

2020, the FAA will likely appeal to have this cost-sharing percentage revised, saving the FAA

substantial operational costs.21

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Unlike the FAA, the United States Air Force is charged with America’s Air Defense.22

From the Air Readiness and Air Defense aspect, ADS-B compliance will immediately impact the

Air Force both logistically (for ADS-B installation into the 5,500 aircraft it the Air Force’s

inventory), but also by inevitably shifting primary and secondary radar maintenance costs from

FAA, to the military and DHS. While the 9/11 terrorists, and on-going terrorist threats to

domestic airspace, stalled the air traffic reform movement, the primary and secondary radar upon

which current Air Traffic Management relies, will still be critical to the mission of Air Defense,

even after the FAA’s NextGen ADS-B modernization is complete.

THE AIR DEFENSE PROBLEM: BEFORE & AFTER 9/11

Prior to 9/11, National Guardsmen charged with defending America from airborne

threats, focused their attention outward, toward the oceans and Gulf of Mexico.23 Guardsmen

used a combination of FAA radars and military radars, stationed along the American coastline, to

identify airborne Tracks-Of-Interest (TOI) entering the Air Defense Identification Zone

(ADIZ).24 The ADIZ is a buffer zone that surrounds North America, where all aircraft must be

positively identified prior to entering America’s sovereign airspace. A pilot sets the transponder

to a discrete code, established by the FAA, at the beginning of their flight, allowing for two-way

communication with ATC. As the plane travels along its flight path, the relevant ATCs can

confirm that the pilot is on-course with the pilot’s original, requested flight plan. Pre- 9/11, an

airplane that was not in communication with ATC was technically “non-operational radio”

(NORDO) and triggered very few Air Defense protocols. At times, the culprit was a simple

failure to “handoff” from one Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC), to the next sector.25

Sometimes, the aircraft’s radio was the problem, needing to be fixed once the pilot arrived at the

airplane’s eventual destination.

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In the post 9/11-environment, however, NORDO aircraft cannot be presumed to have

simply missed the handoff; rather, even though they do occur periodically, a NORDO now

triggers specific, Air Defense measures. Since the War on Terror began, every NORDO,

suspicious activity or disturbance on-board a flight over domestic airspace, is subject to a

thorough identification and analysis process, demanding careful interrogation, communication,

review and possible tactical action, if needed.

Given the vulnerabilities exploited by the 9/11 hijackers, the United States now

examines both aircraft coming into domestic airspace from abroad, and internal, domestic flights

which could also prove a threat to the civilian population.26 Prior to 9/11, there was only one

case of a hijacked airplane to be used as a weapon in America. An off-duty FedEx pilot tried to

take over the plane from the flight crew with intent to crash it into FedEx Headquarters in

Memphis, TN.27 The crew was able to regain control of the aircraft, saving the lives of many

FedEx employees working that day. Hijacked aircraft were rare occasions then, and still are

today.

Once fully implemented, NextGen 2020 will shift traditional identification from

secondary radar interrogation of a transponder, to aircraft-installed ADS-B, which affirmatively

broadcasts the plane’s identity to ATCs.28 With a mandatory-compliance date of 2020, FAA will

enjoy the cost-savings championed by its air modernization and reform movement of the 1990s,

which was delayed by the civilian air and air defense industries’ recalibrations post- 9/11.

ADS-B technology will result in the redundancy of air traffic control’s two main types of

radar: primary radar and secondary radar, each of which are defined and identified by the FAA

and Air Defense industry.29 Nonetheless, the resulting decommission of primary and secondary

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radar in America will remove a substantial data-source, which the Air Defense industry relies on

for identifying TOIs inside domestic airspace.

PRIMARY RADAR

For the purpose of this research paper, an overview of radar operations and its role in Air

Traffic Management generally, and for Air Defense specifically, is necessary. Primary radars

were first used in the Battle of Britain, during World War II, as an early warning system, which

detected incoming enemy planes.30 Primary radars generate a frequency-pulse, which impacts

objects in the sky, then offers a return-echo to the radar providing a “slant range.”31 Primary

radar’s advantage is its unilateral data-source, where nothing is required from the target aircraft;

no transponder communication is required from the aircraft, for its detection.32 More than mere

detection, most modern, primary radars have a “sweep” (the actual 360 degree rotation of the

radar emitter,) which is measured in revolutions per minute.33 The distance an object travels

during this sweep can be used to measure the plane’s speed and heading. These metrics are

referred to by the ATM industry as raw radar data.34 This raw data provides no amplifying

information, but provides a basic indication that there is an object moving through domestic,

protected airspace.35

There are several disadvantages associated with primary radar data. Because of

atmospheric refraction, an airplane’s altitude is unreliable. Additionally, as an aircraft

approaches the radar limits, its return signal weakens; this will cause the track to “fade” from air

traffic view.36 Also, primary radar, because of its simplicity, does not discriminate its detections;

airplanes, birds, and even severe weather, will cause a false-positive radar hit. Finally, primary

radar is not smart-data; the data requires some form of supplemental identification process

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(visual identification, verbal communication with the tower or electronic identification).37 For

the supply of spare, unsophisticated, raw-feed data, primary radar works well.

SECONDARY SURVEILLANCE RADAR

Conversely, Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR), which is generally mounted on top of

primary radar, interrogates a transponder inside the aircraft, providing FAA and military air

defenders with amplifying information about the track, which primary radar does not provide.38

Transponders, such as those used today as SSR, were first used by the military as a way of

identifying friendly aircraft. When interrogated by military operators, the transponders transmit

a coded message that signal if it was an ally. This became known as “Identification Friend or

Foe” (IFF).39 Both military and civilian aircraft share a few, unclassified codes, which make

shared airspace easier to manage for both the FAA’s civilian mission and for the military’s Air

Defense mission.

SSR interrogates the various, discrete codes emitted by transponders. For example,

Figure II, pictured-below, entitled “Transponder Modes,” describes the different modes used in

both military and civilian aircraft. Military modes include 1, 2, 3A & 3C, 4, 5, and S.40 Of this

portfolio of modes, Modes 1, 2, 4, and 5 are explicitly classified, which provide military aircraft

information such as mission data, unit codes, and IFF replies. By contrast, civilian aircraft use

Modes 3A & 3C, S.41 Civilian codes are unclassified, providing ATC with a radar location

through a discrete Mode 3A, which creates an “ident” (identification) feature that allows the

radar symbology to broadcast prominently on the ATC’s scope, back at the tower. With high-

density air traffic in some sectors, the pilot’s “ident” becomes easy-to-see on an otherwise

cluttered radar display.42

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Another example of public transponder data that SSR can glean is Mode 3C, from which

the ATC can get a precise reading of the plane’s altitude (height in the airspace), from the

plane’s pressure-altitude data, which is calculated by the atmospheric pressure on the aircraft, as

it is flying. In congested airspace, Air Traffic Managers get enhanced altitude data accuracy

from Mode 3C, which increases the situational awareness for both the pilot, ATC and air

defenders.43

FFiigguurree IIII:: TTrraannssppoonnddeerr IInntteerrrrooggaattiioonn MMooddeess (Adapted from “The Evolution of Air Craft

Tracking” by Doug Gould, FAA ATO, Special Operations, January, 2015)

The sea-change in ATM reform that ADS-B presents to the controlling community, is

that interrogation of the aircraft will not be the major data-supplier. Rather, the on-plane ADS-B

will be affirmatively broadcasting, unfiltered data to the ATC, and the larger air traffic public,

more transparently.44 Accordingly, a major problem with ADS-B, as applied to military aircraft,

is that the military operates their transponders with classified modes, like Modes 1, 2, and 4,

which cannot be emitted to the general public in a blanket broadcast. If not encrypted, military

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operations can be tracked by anyone through public websites, thereby exposing potentially

classified locations and tactics.45 This is an obvious OPSEC concern for both the U.S. military

and law enforcement. Furthermore, in an ADS-B-environment, classified modes will only be

readable by the old, land-based radars that retain the ability to query classified codes.

Consequently, abandoning primary radar and SSR, while an appealing budgetary option from the

FAA’s civilian-mission perspective, jeopardizes the military’s Air Defense mission. As ADS-B

becomes standard in aircraft in the next three years, land-based radar will become redundant

sources of air traffic data for civilian control towers, but those radar are still a valuable asset to

the Air Defense mission of the United States Air Force.

ADS-B: A CONCEPT FOR CONGESTED AIRSPACE

ADS-B is a critical part of the larger air traffic industry’s modernization reform

movement, envisioned to benefit ATM through greater aircraft position accuracy, increased en-

route efficiency, better management of congested airspace around busy airports, and enhanced

surface-features, allowing for safer aircraft taxiing, regardless of conditions. These benefits aim

to reform the National Airspace System, not just improve the conditions for the controlling

community, by improving the efficiency landscape for the commercial airline industry, as well.

With the trend toward more congested airspace, ADS-B offers many benefits to safe and

efficient air travel.

At any given time, there are approximately 7,000 active flights in the skies over the U.S.,

with annual, en-route flights totaling a little over 40 million.46 En-route flights are expected

increase by 1.4% per year, bringing that total to approximately 55 million by 2036.47

Additionally, with the proliferation of commercially sold drone aircraft for recreational use and

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with businesses such as FedEx and UPS48 in the testing phases of unmanned, aerial package

delivery, airspace is becoming increasingly congested.49

ADS-B: THE GOOD

As a global modernization movement, NextGen is an industry-wide reform effort

following the International Council Aviation Organization (ICAO) guidance.50 ADS-B

communication with ATCs is just one element of NextGen’s larger Concept of Operations,

designed to improve the National Airspace System.51 The U.S. economy depends on a healthy

aviation industry, which itself represents approximately 5.1% of America’s GDP.52 Through

cost savings and improved ATM of commercial air travel, the FAA projects that NextGen will

generate $133 billion in value to the U S, through 2030.53

Figure III below illustrates these cost-savings and new revenue as a result of more

efficient routing of commercial passenger and cargo airliners, improved runway efficiency,

improved landing-approach control, and better ATC over low-visibility operations and aircraft-

spacing, known as “separation” management.54 ADS-B is designed to improve coverage over

low-level and mountainous regions, and to offer ATCs more accurate aircraft position-reports

and neighboring planes more thorough aircraft data-sharing.

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FFiigguurree IIIIII:: AAnnnnuuaall CCoosstt && BBeenneeffiitt ooff NNeexxttGGeenn MMiidd--TTeerrmm CCaappaabbiilliittiieess (reprinted from,

“NextGen: The Business Case for the Next Generation Air Transportation System,” FAA.gov,

[FY 2014], 8.)

Another limitation with radar, is that it employs “line-of-sight” technology. In areas with

fewer radars, in mountainous regions of Alaska, over the Gulf of Mexico, and Oceanic flights,

aircraft can drop from radar when the pulse is blocked by mountains or the aircraft is out of

range. As depicted in Figure I earlier in this paper, entitled, “ADS-B: How It Works,” the ADS-

B transponder’s data-push is coming directly from the aircraft to a ground receiver, which then

sends the transmission immediately to ATCs. In remote areas, the transmission is aided by

global navigation satellite system (GNSS) systems, greatly improving the accuracy of a plane’s

position location. Furthermore, because the data-flow is based on satellite-based GPS, localized

altitude and weather patterns do not interfere with ATC’s tracking.55

ADS-B works as perpetual stream of broadcasted data, routed through on-plane GPS,

thereby providing a far more accurate picture of the track to the ATC, as compared with the

scanning updates of traditional, land-based radar. While radars update every 4-12 seconds,

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providing the ATC a sweep-derived location, the data flow lags behind the actual location.56 For

instance, with an aircraft traveling at 500 knots, the plane can cover 1.7 miles in the time it takes

for the radar to sweep again.57 With ADS-B broadcasting position-reports every second, ATCs

are given precise data, which radar cannot offer; accordingly, ATC has a greater confidence in

the aircraft’s location, giving FAA the ability to shorten the separation between commercial jets,

and greater confidence in real-time location, in congested airspace.58 By 2030, FAA is

projecting approximately 60,000 flights in controlled airspace, per day.59 Beyond the

commercial airspace regulation mission, Air Defenders will also benefit from a real-time locator

of any suspicious Tracks of Interest (TOI), as they develop.60

ADS-B not only provides better coverage, it also presents far more comprehensive

aircraft data to be broadcast in real-time. This increase in flight transparency is seen by FAA, in

its capacity as the commercial air traffic managers of our Nation, as a major strength.61 ADS-B

technology, when registered with FAA, will provide ATCs with such identifying data as, aircraft

type, owner, fuel capacity, load capacity, age, and even the airplane’s serial number.62 Because

ADS-B offers constant broadcasting of this dossier of data, pilots in the air, controllers in the

tower, and Air Defenders will have enhanced situational awareness of every compliant flight;

and so will the public at large.63 The constant stream of data being broadcast, allows any

member of the public to observe the ADS-B, which provides an unprecedented level of aircraft

transparency. For example, the global panic of “missing” Malaysia flight MH370 would never

have happened with ADS-B continuously broadcasting its location.64

ADS-B In- equipped aircraft will also get Flight Information System-Broadcast (FIS-B,)

Traffic Information Services-Broadcast (TIS-B,) and Automatic Dependent Surveillance-

Rebroadcast (ADS-R) capabilities.65 Similar to the military’s “Link 16” datalink, ADS-B In will

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offer a bird’s-eye view of cooperative aircraft, providing even General Aviation aircraft with

military-grade awareness. This level of enhanced situational-awareness will benefit the General

Aviation pilot, alerting the pilot of other aircraft in the vicinity. Older military aircraft, like

aging helicopters, small trainers, and even UAVs, can improve situational awareness from the

additional avionics ADS-B offers.

Tasked with managing domestic air traffic safely, the FAA sees the ubiquity of GPS-

enabled ADS-B technology as an opportunity for governmental efficiency and resource-

optimization.66 By shifting the cost of transponder-purchase and installation/retrofit in the

aircraft to the aircraft owners, the FAA will be in a position to decommission primary and

secondary radar currently used to detect and interrogate aircraft in domestic airspace.67 As

described earlier in this paper, FAA currently operates and maintains 60% of all land-based radar

in the United States and the military and DHS maintain the remaining 40%.68 Whether the

FAA’s cost-shift of primary radar maintenance to the military, operates as a cost-savings to the

American taxpayer, is an open question for the air traffic reform movement.

ADS-B: THE BAD

For all of NextGen’s promises to revolutionize Air Traffic Management in America,

ADS-B also has its detractors. The military has a concern with Operational Security (OPSEC)

for covert missions and Continuity of Operations (COOP)-planning, as well as legitimate

concern over hackers corrupting ADS-B data, causing confusion in the commercial air traffic.

The FAA’s cost-shift of aircraft location communication systems from the federal regulatory

agency, to the aviation industry itself, will place the cost of transponder installation and

maintenance onto the aircraft’s owner.

22

While the commercial ATM community sees ADS-B’s open source premise as a benefit,

for military flights, more transparency can mean compromised operational security. Air Force

Instruction 10-701 defines OPSEC as a “process of identifying, analyzing and controlling critical

information indicating friendly actions associated with military operations and other activities.”69

OPSEC also means identifying what information can be observed by the adversary, determining

what critical information could be collected and useful to adversaries, then executing measures to

reduce those vulnerabilities to an acceptable level.70

As described earlier in this paper, in a radar-detection and interrogation environment, the

military uses specific transponder modes to fly covert missions, with ATC being able to see

certain flights in the control tower, with public access to these specialized flights blocked. All

Air Force personnel take ancillary OPSEC training which emphasizes how, in a digital world,

classified information can be obtained, not always through direct information gathering, but

through piecing together small bits of unclassified information, filling the gaps with ADS-B’s

open-source data-sharing. Grouping mission details through large-force maneuvers associated

with departure times and locations are all unclassified when standing alone, but can become

classified, when amalgamated.71

ADS-B’s constant broadcasting of mission-critical flight details, including patterns,

groupings and movements, present a key vulnerability to the Air Force. While some flight

details are not, at face value, compromised by ADS-B, collated data on air bases, aircraft types,

and response times from those bases, can be available to anyone with a computer able to digest

ADS-B. Additionally, important COOP and Continuation of Government (COG) exercises,

which may include flight data, are properly understood as Top Secret, Sensitive Compartmented

Information (TS/SCI) classifications.72

23

Another major negative of ADS-B technology is that, being open-source in nature, its

data-stream is susceptible to hackers.73 Brad Haines, Information Systems Security Professional

and hacker himself, explains that disrupting ADS-B would not be difficult for groups wanting to

cause confusion, and potentially dangerous, conditions within America’s ATM system.74 While

federal law makes intentionally hacking air navigation management systems a crime punishable

by five years in federal prison, hackers located outside North America, and thus outside the reach

of our legal system, can do grave damage, remotely.75 In 2011, Iran successfully hacked into an

RQ-170 “Sentinel” drone, taking over the controls, and crashing it in Kashmar.76 U.S. military

and intelligence officials, embarrassed by the incident, began exploring encryption options,

experimenting with coupling commercial-grade encryption with National Security Agency

(NSA) approved encryption devices.77 Organizations like ISIS are actively recruiting cyber-

warriors for their “Cyber Caliphate,” to exploit first-world military reliance on high-tech

avionics.78 General Darren McDew points out that it is hard to hack into the DOD mainframe,

directly, but adversaries find it much easier to attack unsecure sources, then “tunnel their way in

through the backdoor.”79 To the extent ADS-B utilizes unencrypted technology, NextGen

2020’s aviation modernization effort creates further vulnerabilities for military UAVs, as well as

piloted aircraft. Mr. Haines concludes that, without much expense, sophistication, or effort,

hackers may be capable of manipulating the ADS-B broadcast timing, thereby reducing the

accuracy and confidence pilots and controllers would have in actual aircraft location and

altitude.80

Yet another exposure of ADS-B is the possibility of “spoofing” the GPS signal by the

enemy’s introduction of false data.81 Spoofing allows an enemy to confuse a GPS locator-signal

by introducing bad data into the transponder, mimicking a legitimate GPS signal.82 If introduced

24

during times of heavy congestion at busy airports, or during conditions of low-visibility, the

position and timing errors would undermine effective management of commercial air traffic, or

throw-off the Ops Tempo, in theater.83 Recognizing that spoofing is a primary threat, as early as

2006, the Department of Defense published guidance on GPS-resilience, through its Selective

Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) program.84 Despite the military directive that all

newly-fielded military GPS systems use SAASM-compliant Precision Position System (PPS)

devices, many military and federal agencies are operating without the upgraded GPS, even 11

years later.85 With the ADS-B deadline only three years away, the military and other defense

agencies are scrambling to acquire and install SAASM-compliant GPS (which is critical to ADS-

B’s efficacy) in their aircraft. With over 5,500 aircraft the total Air Force inventory, and with the

federal acquisition process so complex, the cost of ADS-B installation is only worsened by the

tight time-horizon left until the mandate’s effective-date. A complete study of whether the Air

Force is ready for NextGen 2020, must assess the sheer volume of planes to be retrofitted for

ADS-B within the next three years.

SECTION IV: DISCUSSION OF THE CASE STUDY’S RESULTS

THE AIR FORCE’S ADS-B COMPLIANCE APPROACH

This case study of the Air Traffic Management’s modernization paradigm-shift and its

impact on the Air Force’s inventory, explores the Air Force’s ADS-B compliance status and

implementation strategy, reports its current posture, and assumes future events based on

Congressional testimony by Air Force senior leadership. In his September 14, 2016 testimony,

General Fay discusses the different challenges facing the Air Force, and the plan for both

meeting the deadline with some, and missing the deadline with other, airframes. Exploring the

25

different airframes operated by the United States Air Force, as measured by NextGen 2020’s

deadline for likely on-time compliance, I study both quantitative and qualitative data.

First, the size of the total inventory has to be established, so that the exploration of ADS-

B compliance’s prioritization, can be properly understood.86 ADS-B compliance can be

accomplished through several means: 1) installation of retrofitted ADS-B transponders into in-

service aircraft, 2) as part of a larger Avionics Modernization Program (AMP), or 3) as a part of

the initial requirements for the Air Force’s newest aircraft like the KC-46.87 Second, a

qualitative analysis of the Air Force’s entire inventory will establish a natural prioritization

schedule for ADS-B implementation, based on logistical factors such as that particular aircraft’s

mission, capability, and useful-life. Finally, cost-data analysis relies on the various aircraft

types, and the procurement avenues and timelines, available to those airframes.

The Air Force has over two dozen different, manned-airframes and four different,

unmanned-airframes that will require ADS-B.88 Defining the Air Force’s total inventory into

mission-sets loosely tied to their parent-Command, will help in the exploration and analysis of

this research paper. I have designated Cargo, Attackers and Bombers, Fighters, Helicopters and

VIP aircraft into Figure IV below, entitled “Breakdown of Different Airframes,” using their

common prefix.

Some airframes, like cargo jets, have different models which reflect generations of

technological, mechanical and avionic-improvements.89 For instance, there are nine different

versions of the C-130. For ease of analysis, I have combined all those models under a single, C-

130 category, as I study how time, prioritization, and cost, influence the Air Force’s readiness for

NextGen 2020.

26

CARGO AIRFRAMES

C-5 KC-10 KC-46 C-17 C-130 C-135

52 59 1 213 576 440

BOMBER/ATTACKERS

B-52 B-1 B-2 A-10

76 66 20 21

FIGHTERS

F-15 F-16 F-22 F-35

449 1,200 187 200

HELICOPTERS/VIP AIRCRAFT

UH-1 H-60 V-22 VIP

59 98 46 88

FFiigguurree IIVV:: BBrreeaakkddoowwnn ooff tthhee DDiiffffeerreenntt AAiirrffrraammeess

As evidenced in the data presented above, the Fighters have the largest number of aircraft in

the Total Force.90 Major General Timothy Fay, in his September 14, 2016 testimony before the

House Armed Services Committee: Seapower & Projection Forces Subcommittee, explained the

time limitations the Air Force is facing, distinguishing the aircrafts and their various missions.91

Gen. Fay discussed how the diversity of airframes, sheer number of aircraft involved, as well as

competing avionics upgrades already in the works, make a fleet-wide, timely-compliance

unworkable.92 Furthermore, lack of available parts to accomplish a mass-ADS-B upgrade,

compounded by the fact that so many of the in-service aircraft are currently deployed throughout

the world with demanding Ops-Tempos, result in not all aircraft meeting the deadline.93 Closing

out his remarks to the Committee, and in a flat exchange with Congressman Forbes, Gen. Fay

reinforced the military’s concern with security of ADS-B’s open-source broadcast.94

As evidenced by the Congressional testimony of senior leadership, a “one-size-fits-all”

approach to ADS-B installation into military aircraft, will not work.95 Gen. Fay reported that

“even if resources were available for all ADS-B Out installations, only approximately 70% of

DoD aircraft could be equipped by 2020…the other 30% will meet the requirement no later than

2028.”96 Therefore, as Gen. Fay describes, the sheer volume of aircraft-type does not dictate

27

ADS-B retrofit-priority over the next three years. Rather, aircraft with the most exposure to

congested Class B and C airspace, or those aircraft which regularly travel outside the United

States to Europe and parts of Asia, will be ranked higher in compliance-planning priority.97

THE CALCULUS OF COMPLIANCE

While Figure IV above, illustrates that F-16s make up the largest, raw-number of Air Force

aircraft, because the transport fleet has to travel through civil airspace more regularly, Brig. Gen.

Jon Thomas states “the mobility aircraft will be ready.”98 Reinforcing Gen. Thomas’s testimony,

more recently, in a telephone-interview I conducted on May 28, 2017, with the program manager

for the upgrade, Mr. Berhalter, asserted that the KC-135s “will be on-time.”99

Accordingly, the below chart, denominated as Figure V, entitled “Weighted Priority, by

Airframe,” reflects a scoring range of one (1), to five (5), based on the priority for ADS-B,

derived from public testimony, the parent-Command’s mission, and the scope of the particular

aircraft’s typical flight plans, I have assigned a score of 1, to reflect that the particular aircraft is

not in immediate commercial airspace, placing it lower on the NextGen 2020 compliance-

priority schedule. A score of 5, means that the particular airframe has an immediate need to be

compliant with FAA’s (and ICAO’s) NextGen 2020 ADS-B mandate, in its daily mission-

essential movements. Because these priority aircraft fly in congested commercial airspace so

regularly, they must be compliant within the deadline, or they face being grounded.100

Once particular airframe earns its Priority Score, I cross-referenced that score by the raw

number of total aircraft in the airframe, as set out in Figure IV above, resulting in the aircraft’s

weighted priority, illustrated in Figure V, below.

28

FFiigguurree VV:: WWeeiigghhtteedd PPrriioorriittyy,, bbyy AAiirrffrraammee

Napoleon said “an Army fights on its stomach.”101 Likewise, Air Superiority relies on

fuel. As the Figure V above shows, the KC-135 earns the highest priority score, as do the

Transport Command’s over 200 C-17s, which haul cargo in international and domestic airspace,

daily. Adding logistical ease to the ADS-B roll-out, Gen. Thomas reported to the House Armed

Services Committee that, “the entire KC-135 fleet is also projected to be compliant, since the

modification for this aircraft only requires a software update.”102 The KC-10 and the KC-135 are

both set to be replaced by the KC-46, the Air Force’s newest tanker. Cost overruns and the

government acquisition process have stalled development and delayed the KC-46’s delivery-

date.103 With the delay of the KC-46, the Air Force has to weigh the risk associated with not

having KC-135s as a top priority for ADS-B compliance. Additionally, VIP aircraft (such Air

29

Force One), while having unique security concerns, also earn the highest priority-score, for

FAA-compliance, because flight limitation cannot be an option for their particular mission.

By contrast, aircraft lower on the priority axis include helicopters, because they are

mostly flown below 10,000 feet (below the FAA’s compliance threshold) and generally remain

outside controlled airspace, so they earn a Priority Score of only 1. Some older aircraft like the

B-52s, will require additional upgrades to their avionics, in order to meet the GPS standards

required of ADS-B technology, received a lower score.104 The factors which influence aircraft

compliance with NextGen 2020, include the aircraft’s age, mission, and ATM exposure. The

timeline for ADS-B compliance will not be the same for all of the Air Force’s 33 different

airframes.

THE COST OF COMPLIANCE

America’s defense budget, more specifically the Air Force budget, is complex. Because

of this, one effort made by the Air Force to resolve the problem of competing priorities is to have

a separate budget-line for avionics upgrades.105 With only three years left until the mandate’s

effective date, ADS-B compliance, per aircraft, is reported publically as estimates, since ADS-B

transponder acquisitions are still in-process, and price-tags are not yet published in final

acquisition summaries. For instance, in answering Representative Vicky Hartzler’s (R-MO)

question regarding the cost-estimates on the B-2 bomber, Gen. Fortney reported that ADS-B

compliance, could cost $4.8 million for each of the twenty B-2s.106 Complicating the study of

costs, is that ADS-B, depending on the airframe, may be rolled into larger, existing avionics-

upgrade contracts. For instance, the C-130H Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) is

estimating to cost $3.8 million, per plane, with over 220 needing upgrades.107 Furthermore,

many of the ADS-B acquisition documents called “statements of work,” although heavily-

30

redacted, recite the typical, five-year contract term, for delivery of bundles of avionics

modernizations.

Complicating the Air Force’s cost-timing analysis for ADS-B compliance by 2020, is the

decision whether to retrofit existing aging aircraft, or whether to procure altogether new

airplanes, with ADS-B as already installed.108 The 59 UH-1 “Huey” helicopters listed in Figure

IV above, which started their service life in Vietnam, and which still currently fly in congested,

controlled airspace, are facing enormous ADS-B retrofit costs. In my June 13, 2017 telephone

interview with Major Scott Ruppel, Staff Acquisitions Officer at the Pentagon, he stated that the

decision is not a matter of money, but more a matter of the “negative effect it would have on the

bidding process.”109 According to Maj Ruppel, the number of aircraft manufacturers bidding on

the contract to replace the Vietnam-era UH-1 could be reduced if Requests for Proposals (RFPs)

were written to require ADS-B built-into the aircraft, on delivery.110 If federal contracts pull too

few qualifying bidders, the federal acquisition process could get slowed by bid-protest litigation,

which could jeopardize the contracts, thus the eventual completion-dates for delivery of the new

aircraft.111

There are two main options being considered by the Acquisitions Office. First, the Air

Force could simply demand that the aircraft delivered off-the-line meet the FAA’s ADS-B

compliance standard, which would reduce the bidding pool of potential aircraft manufacturers

creating the impression of a closed procurement. Or two, the Air Force can continue with full

competition under the traditional requirements, allowing companies to deliver the aircraft as non-

compliant, then retrofit ADS-B into them, post-production.112 According to Maj Ruppel, the

latter option will be more costly, but gets new, more reliable aircraft to Airmen in the field who

are currently operating Vietnam-era Hueys.113 The alternative choice, namely to consolidate

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ADS-B modifications to a given airframe while it is in production (or while already out of

service), may prove just as costly.

For example, delays in the B-2 modernization program are a direct result of a

“synergistic” approach to an aircraft overhaul.114 Gen Fay, in his Opening Statement to the

House Armed Services Committee, discussed that, with the B-2, accomplishing more than one

upgrade, while you have the aircraft broken apart, is the more efficient approach.115 The B-2

Defensive Management System Modernization program, the most invasive modification since

the aircraft was initially produced, must meet stringent “tolerance limits” for airframe installation

requirements because of its stealth requirements.116 B-2 systems also require tightly-coupled

hardware and software integrations, built intimately into its avionics. It takes a high degree of

skilled manpower, resources, and time for an upgrade of this caliber, simply “throwing more

money” at it, will not solve the problem.117

In its 2017 annual Assessment of Defense Spending, the GAO’s Department of

Acquisition & Sourcing Management reports that NextGen software system procurements have

faced cost overruns, and that the Air Force “acknowledged the program and contractor

understanding of key requirements, especially cybersecurity, was deficient.”118 That same GAO

Report sets out some of the cost estimates for the modernization packages for certain airplanes,

which includes ADS-B retrofit.

For example, the Air Force awarded a contract for T-38, which is a trainer airplane, for

both Trainer Models A and B, and the A-10 Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast

(ADS-B) services, IAW the Performance Work Statement (PWS). The period of performance

established in this contract is May 2017 through May 2022, echoing the industry’s typical, 5-year

ordering period.119 This demonstrates that the Air Force is applying a mix of on-time ADS-B

32

compliance, and contemplating a post-2020 roll-out schedule as well. Another example of the

cost-time horizon for combined avionics upgrades, are the B-2 DMS-B procurement; its cost

totaled $747.5 million dollars in 2017 alone.120

As mentioned above, the Air Force is hoping to include ADS-B installation into certain

aircraft, concurrent with other modernization installations, to reduce aircraft-downtime,

exploiting this “synergy.”121 For instance, the GAO reports that the avionics modernization for

twenty B-2 bombers, totals $130Million, including Northrup Grumman’s Research &

Development and the ultimate Procurement Cost, for the contract. By contrast, the KC-46 cargo

tanker modernization program, contracted out to Boeing, is totaling to $34,266.5 Million for the

179 cargos jets, with delivery set for February 2018, and ADS-B will be installed, at delivery.

The beset F-35 program, which is expected to eventually replace aging F-16s and A-10s

(and perhaps even the Marine Fighter/Attack F-18 and “The Prowler” AV-8B inventory,) had a

total program cost of $336,152.4 Million in 2015.122 Buying 2,457 of these sterling aircraft

reflects a unit cost of $136.814 Million, per F-35.123 And even though the acquisition cycle for

the F-35 is approximately 237 months, ADS-B is not expected to be installed on delivery; rather,

an upgrade will need to be accomplished, post-delivery.

Gen Fortney, in his remarks before Congress, stated that with past budget restraints,

Global Strike Command “has been unable to fund this [ADS-B] program” and that they are

hoping to get funding in the 2018 budget.124 However, Representative Randy Forbes (R-VA)

pointed out that the Generals had not asked for additional funds for the project and that it would

be unfair to accuse Congress of not providing the funding, when the Air Force knew about the

looming mandate deadline, but had not sought funds for the implementation of ADS-B.125

33

SECTION V: RECOMMENDATIONS

From the data researched for this paper, the FAA’s NextGen 2020 mandate works as two,

separate mandates: first, the Air Force must upgrade location/navigation systems, like the actual

geo-locator systems on each aircraft, because ADS-B technology requires precision, locating

functions. In order to guard against possible spoofing attacks or other hacks to the geo-locators,

the Air Force requires special, hardened GPS systems. Second, according to federal regulation,

all qualifying Air Force inventory must have ADS-B retrofitted into the plane, or have ADS-B

written into the Procurement Requirements for all new-purchase planes, in order to be completed

by the FAA’s Air Traffic Management modernization paradigm-shift.126

In Congressional testimony, the Air Force has provided explanations for its likely non-

compliance. The size of the fleet, the complexity of the upgrade, post-Recession budget

austerity, and the shortage of necessary parts all operate as logistical constraints on timely

compliance. At the September 2016 hearing on ADS-B, Congress seemed surprised by the cost

implications of NextGen 2020’s modernization. Based on the tenor of Congressman Forbes’

colloquy with General Fay, it appears that the Air Force’s implementation plan did not build-in

enough time to alert Congress of the complex, federal acquisition process and expenses, even

though NextGen 2020 was passed into law over five years ago.127

This case study reveals that both civilian and military leadership, failed to elevate the

ABS-B mandates to a higher priority in the contemplative, project-management process, before it

was too late. With only three years until 2020, ADS-B has, as Colonel Shields says “sucked all

the air out of the room.”128 If the Air Force is in the business of “Fly, Fight, Win!” and

NextGen’s ADS-B mandate is directly-jeopardizing its unrestricted flight, the FAA ATM

modernization has made the Air Force leadership its own, worst enemy. If essential mission

34

movements will be denied by the FAA in domestic airspace because the Air Force procurement

divisions were not given enough lead-time to get ADS-B transponders installed, the Air Force

will have lost use of its own sovereign airspace. Gen Fay makes the claim that, even if denied

access to optimum airspace, giving the jet no choice but to fly under 10,000 feet, the Air Force

readiness could suffer.129

Accordingly, my recommendation is that the Air Force continues to strategically

prioritize its planes, based on each airframe’s mission, weighing the needs of Combatant

Commanders and the downtime required to accomplish the necessary upgrades. Second, when

the Air Force leadership evaluates a federal mandate issued by the FAA, whose plenary authority

covers the American skies, they should build-out their strategic, fleet-wide, compliance-plan

with the typical five year federal contracting cycle in mind. When NextGen 2020’s deadline was

set in 2012, they should have been preparing ADS-B acquisitions immediately after its

enactment could have been initiated. Furthermore, I recommend that the Air Force take the FAA

at its word regarding exemptions for ADS-B compliance, and plan as though none will be given

to the Air Force. As this ADS-B case study shows, the federal acquisition process should have

been examined, with an eye to building-in more modification flexibility, when Congressional

mandates and industry-changes forced a change to the contracts.

Finally, I recommend that the Air Force absorb the cost of primary and secondary radar

maintenance throughout the U.S., even if the FAA ultimately abandons them as ADS-B becomes

the norm, because of their particular value against airborne threats by bad-actors who will

inevitably turn-off any ADS-transponders on their aircraft, in order to evade detection.

SECTION VI: CONCLUSION

NextGen 2020 sets out FAA’s vision for Air Traffic Management modernization, which

was first approached in the 1990s, but whose reform was stalled by the 9/11 attacks. ADS-B,

35

and the move away from land-based radar systems, is one aspect of the FAA’s much larger

Concept of Modernized Operations, where aircraft will self-report their location through onboard

transponder broadcasting, providing Air Traffic Controllers with a more precise position, aircraft

registration, and route-of-flight data. While NextGen will relieve the FAA of its need to support

aging and expensive land-based radar systems, its implementation will have budgetary, logistical

and security consequences to all aircraft owners; particularly the military.

With only three years until the FAA’s mandate for all aircraft to have ADS-B technology,

this research paper explores the Air Force’s ADS-B readiness, given the federal acquisition

timelines, mission-priority, and costs of compliance. Because the FAA enjoys plenary authority

to regulate the domestic skies, and because they have both a technological and budgetary motive

to shift from the use of costly land-based radar systems, the FAA sees NextGen 2020 as firm

deadline for all qualifying aircraft, whether commercial or military. Despite Air Force

leadership’s lingering pursuit of a default ADS-B waiver, the FAA is not currently considering

exemptions or extensions to the 2020 ADS-B mandate’s deadline. The Air Force has testified as

recently as last year, that many of its airframes will be ADS-B compliant, on-time.

With that caveat in place, an exploration of the Air Force’s strategic approach to

prioritizing its 5,500 aircraft for ADS-B install, includes a study of the entire Air Force

inventory, by the over two dozen airframe-types. These aircraft are categorized and classified by

the command-mission they serve and range in age, capacity, and useful life. For instance, the Air

Force still flies seventy-six B-52 Bombers that were originally built in the 1950s, and it also has

contracted for the delivery of over 1,700 F-35s, which are arriving off the assembly-line, in the

next few years. Both the oldest, and the newest, airplanes will require ADS-B transponders to be

added into their avionics.

36

With General Fay’s Congressional testimony from December 2016 as the basis for much

of the research on the current status of Air Force ADS-B-readiness, I assigned a weighted

Priority Score to each of the airframes, to illustrate how the aircraft’s mission, fleet size, and

useful-life contribute to the level of effort to move that particular airframe toward timely ADS-B

compliance. Logistical and security concerns with ADS-B technology also play a role in the Air

Force’s approach to when, how, and whether, to retrofit ADS-B into its air fleet.

Unlike private air carriers, who are also currently converting their planes to ADS-B, the

Air Force is required to observe federal acquisition procedures, which adds substantial time to

the purchase and installation of avionics technology for the ATM modernization efforts.

Procurement documents provide valuable cost estimates for the ADS-B and other avionics

modernization initiatives, and follow a predictable, five year contract cycle.

In addition to the Air Force’s procurement and effective installation challenges, the

military has serious OPSEC and COMSEC concerns with ADS-B, because of its lack of

encryption capability. ADS-B technology presents as much vulnerability to military Air Defense

Management, as it presents promise to FAA’s Air Traffic Management. Absent an exemption

for military aircraft, the 2020 mandate will restrict flight to non-compliant aircraft wanting to fly

in controlled airspace. NextGen2020 is a non-discretionary, Congressional mandate that reaches

the entire air travel industry operating in the National Airspace System, covering all commercial,

general aviation, and military aircraft flying in controlled airspace. Non-compliant aircraft may

be grounded, denied entry into congested sectors, or will be instructed that they have to fly below

10,000 feet, which will severely impact the Air Force’s effectiveness and could impair transport

and training missions. Nonetheless, ready or not, ADS-B is coming.

37

Notes

1 National Business Aviation Association (NBAA), “President Obama Signs FAA

Reauthorization Bill into Law; First Long-Term Funding Bill for Agency Since 2007,” February

15, 2012. https://www.nbaa.org/advocacy/issues/modernization/20120215-obama-signs-faa-

reauthorization-bill-into-law.php

2 FAA, NextGen Works, https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/works/

3 Holm, Ron. "Why convert to a SAASM-based Global Positioning System?" Military

Embedded Systems, October 2005. Accessed June 27, 2017. http://mil-

embedded.com/pdfs/Symmetricom1.Oct05.pdf.

4 Don Walker, FAA ADS-B project manager, a discussion with the author, June 13, 2017.

5 Silversmith, It Being Dead, 1.

6 49 USC 40101(d)(4). https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-

title49/html/USCODE-2011-title49-subtitleVII.htm

7 Dan Reed, “In a Dangerous World, U.S. Commercial Aviation in on a Remarkable Safety

Streak,” Forbes, Dec 28, 2016.

8 FAA, Final Environmental Assessment for Greener Skies over Seattle, (Washington, DC)

Volume 1, Main Document, 31 October, 2012.

9 Doug Gould (Program Manager, FAA ATO Systems Operations Security, Special

Operations), in discussion with the author, 17 May, 2017.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 14 CFR 91.227

13 https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/equipadsb/ins_and_outs/

14 http://interactive.aviationtoday.com/avionicsmagazine/december-2016-january-2017/pay-

to-play-the-cost-of-ads-b-and-where-to-find-financial-assistance/

38

Notes

15 Ibid

16 Gould, FAA discussion

17 FAA, Impact of Shutting Down En Route Primary Radars within CONUS Interior,

(Washington, DC) June 1993, 1-1.

18 Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century, H.R. 1000,

106th Congress, 1999. <https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/106/hr1000>

19 Ibid.

20 Lester, Military Position Source Challenges, X.

21 Gould, FAA discussion

22 NORAD mission statement, http://www.norad.mil/About-NORAD/Vision/

23 Quote in NORAD and USNORTHCOM Public Affairs news article “In Their Own

Words, NORAD Members Recall September 11: William Glover,” September 11, 2011.

http://www.norad.mil/Newsroom/Article/578479/in-their-own-words-norad-members-recall-

september-11-william-glover/

24 Ibid

25 CARLVALERI, “Understanding ATC Handoffs,” ExpertAviator.com (blog), 15 July,

2016, https://expertaviator.com/2016/07/15/understanding-atc-handoffs/

26 William Glover, Quoted in USNORTHCOM article, September 11, 2011.

27 Dave Hirschman, “Hijacked,” Dell Publishing, 1997.

28 14 CFR 91.225

29 FAA, Airworthiness Approval of ADS-B, A2-3.

30 BBC online, “Radar,” http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/topics/radar

31 Online Radar Tutorial, http://www.radartutorial.eu/01.basics/Slant%20Range.en.html

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid, http://www.radartutorial.eu/01.basics/Time-dependences%20in%20Radar.en.html

39

Notes

34 Jay Ferrell, (FAA watch-stander at the National Capital Region Coordination Center

(NCRCC)), a discussion with the author, June 22, 2017.

35 Vabre, Air Traffic Services, http://www.airwaysmuseum.com/Surveillance.htm

36 3-1 Brevity code word, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a404426.pdf

37 Vabre, Air Traffic Services, http://www.airwaysmuseum.com/Surveillance.htm

38 Ibid

39 U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, “Identification Friend-or-Foe,”

https://www.nrl.navy.mil/accomplishments/systems/friend-or-foe/

40 Specialized Aviation, “Pilot Training; Transponder Modes,”

http://www.specializedheli.com/study-blog/2015/1/20/transponder-codes

41 Ibid

42 Ferrell, demonstrating on his radar scope how “ident” changes appearance, June 22, 2017.

43 Ibid

44 FAA, The Business Case, 2014.

45 Gould, FAA discussion

46 FAA, FAA Aerospace Forecast, 27.

47 Ibid

48 Matt McFarland, “UPS drivers may tag team deliveries with drones,” CNN, 21 February

2017, http://money.cnn.com/2017/02/21/technology/ups-drone-delivery/index.html

49 FAA, FAA Aerospace Forecast, 32.

50 International Civil Aviation Organization, “NextGen Modernization and its Alignment

with the Aviation System Block Upgrade Program,” 30 October 2015, 2.

https://www.icao.int/SAM/Documents/2015-

RAAC14/RAAC14_IP07%20USA%20NextGen.pdf

51 FAA, Why NEXTGEN Matters, 7.

52 FAA, The Economic Impact, 5.

40

Notes

53 FAA, Why NEXTGEN Matters, 7.

54 Ibid, 8.

55 Ferrell, a discussion with the author, June 7, 2017.

56 Farrell, a discussion about radar principles, June 22, 2017.

57 Robert Poole, Jr., “Organization and Innovation in Air Traffic Control,” Hudson Institute,

Jan. 2014

58 Ibid, FAA https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/equipadsb/benefits

59 Ibid, FAA https://www.faa.gov/

60 Gould, interview

61 Ibid

62 Ibid

63 Haines, Brad, Hackers + Airplanes; No Good Can Come of This,” Defcon 20 presentation

64 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-26503141

65 https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/programs/adsb/pilot/

66 FAA, FAA’s Business Case, 14.

67 Gould, discussion, 24 May, 2017.

68 Ibid

69 Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-701, Operations Security (OPSEC), 8 June2011, 5.

70 Ibid

71 Ibid

72 National Security Presidential Directive 51 (May 4, 2007).

41

Notes

73 Brad Haines, “Hackers + Airplanes; No Good Can Come of This,” Defcon 20

presentation, Slide 27. https://korben.info/wp-content/uploads/defcon/

SpeakerPresentations/Renderman/DEFCON-20-RenderMan-Hackers-plus-Airplanes.pdf

74 Ibid, slide 30.

75 Title 49 U.S.C. §46308 https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/49/46308

76 Keller, Iran-U.S. RQ-170 incident, 3 May, 2016.

77 Ibid

78 Infosec Institute, “ISIS Cyber Capabilities,” posted on Security Awareness, 9 May, 2016.

http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/isis-cyber-capabilities/

79 Gen Darren McDew, “Our Shared Transportation Future,” Volpe, The National

Transportation Systems Center, February 22, 2017. https://www.volpe.dot.gov/news/our-shared-

transportation-future-with-general-darren-w-mcdew

80 Haines, slide 30.

81 Holm, Why Convert to a SAASM, July 2006.

82 Ibid

83 Ibid

84 DOD, Global Positioning System (GPS) 2008, 4.

85 Ibid, 22-23.

86 U.S. Department of Defense, United States Air Force, (2017), Air Force Fact Sheets,

http://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/

87 Gen Darren McDew, Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, testimony before the

Senate Armed Services Committee, May 2, 2017, minute 31-33.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wIla6XOanMw

88 USAF, http://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/

89 Gen Fay, Congressional Hearing, September 14, 2016, minute 29.

90 USAF, http://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/

42

Notes

91 Gen Fay, Congressional Hearing, September 14, 2016, minute 35.

92 Ibid, minute 29.

93 Ibid, minute 35.

94 Ibid

95 Ibid, minute 8.

96 Gen Fay, Congressional Hearing, September, 14, 2016.

97 Brig Gen Jon Thomas, Presentation to the House Armed Services Committee,

Subcommittee on Seapower and Projections Forces, U.S. House of Representatives, September

14, 2016, minute 17.

98 Ibid.

99 Raymond Berhalter, Program Manager for the KC-135 upgrades, Telephone Interview

with the author, 19 May 2017.

100 Rebecca Autrey, “In a Fix: How C-130s Lack Equipment to Meet 2020 Airspace

Regulations,” National Guard Magazine, May 2015.

101 Paraphrasing a quote often credited to Napoleon Bonaparte, “An Army Marches on its

Stomach,” referring to an Army cannot function properly without proper sustenance.

102 Gen Fay, Congressional Hearing, September 14, 2016, minute 45.

103 Ibid, minute 18.

104 Gen Fortney, Congressional Hearing, September 14, 2016, minute 43-44.

105 Gen Thomas, Congressional Hearing, September 14, 2016, minute 17.

106 Gen Fortney, Congressional Hearing, September 14, 2016, minute 65-66.

107 General James Holmes quoted in Defense News, “USAF Threatens Cuts over C-130

Upgrades,” March 5, 2015, updated March 6, 2015.

http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/air-space/support/2015/03/05/usaf-pushing-case-

against-c130-amp/24391383/

108 Maj Scott Ruppel, Air Acquisition Office, Pentagon. Telephonic interview conducted on

June 13, 2017 at 1:00pm EDT.

43

Notes

109 Ibid.

110 Ibid.

111 Ibid.

112 Ibid.

113 Ibid.

114 Gen Fay, Congressional Hearing, September 14, 2016, minute 9.

115 Gen Fortney, Congressional Hearing, September 14, 2016, minute 66.

116 GAO-17-333SP, 132.

117 Gen Fay, Congressional Hearing, September 14, 2016, minute 8.

118 Government Accountability Office, GAO-17-333SP, “Next Generation Operational

Control System (GPS OCX),” 151. https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/683838.pdf

119 FedBizOpps.gov, “T-38 A/B and A-10 Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast

(ADS-B), FA8220-17-R-0001.

https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=bb64a49449dba0b60debaf46fd3af1

0c&tab=core&_cview=1

120 Government Accountability Office, GAO-17-333SP, “B-2 Defensive Management

System Modernization (B-2 DMS-M),” 131. https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/683838.pdf

121 Gen Fay, Congressional Hearing, September 14, 2016, minute 9.

122 Government Accountability Office, GAO-17-333SP, “F-35 Lightning II Program (F-

35),” 165. https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/683838.pdf

123 Ibid

124 Gen Fortney, Congressional Hearing, September 14, 2016, minute 66-67.

125 Congressman Randy Forbes, Chairman House Armed Services Committee, September

14, 2016, minute 24-25.

126 14 CFR 94.227

44

Notes

127 Congressman Forbes, Congressional Hearing, September 14, 2016, minute 24-25.

128 Col Tom Shields, USAF Senior Advisor to the FAA, Telephone interview by the author,

June 13, 2017.

129 Gen Fay, Congressional Hearing, September 14, 2016, minute 23-24.

45

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