ROYAL COLLEGE OF DEFENCE STUDIES

The nuclear strategy of two US allies –A comparative study of the UK and Japan

Toshinori Tanaka

SEAFORD HOUSE PAPER

2010

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Disclaimer The views expressed in this paper are those of the Author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the UK Ministry of Defence, any other department of Her Britannic Majesty’s Government, or those of the Author’s employer, national government or sponsor. Further, such views should not be considered as constituting an official endorsement of factual accuracy, opinion, conclusion or recommendation of the UK Ministry of Defence, any other department of Her Britannic Majesty’s Government, or of the Author’s employer, national government or sponsor.

© Japanese Ministry of Defence, 2010

ROYAL COLLEGE OF DEFENCE STUDIES

The nuclear strategy of two US allies –

A comparative study of the UK and Japan

Toshinori Tanaka Japanese Ministry of Defence

July 2010

© Japanese Ministry of Defence, 2010

Contents

Executive Summary

1. Introduction

- What is nuclear deterrence?

- Deterrent theory

- Effectiveness of nuclear deterrence in the current security environment

2. The nuclear deterrent structure in Europe and East Asia

- UK nuclear strategy and the security environment in Europe

- Japanese nuclear strategy and the security environment in East Asia

3. Analysis of the differences

- Historical perspective

- US strategy

- The neighbouring countries

- Costs

4. Conclusion

- Strategic effectiveness

- Cost effectiveness

- If Japan became a nuclear weapons state

- An appropriate Japanese nuclear strategy

2

Executive Summary

Both the United Kingdom and Japan have a security treaty with the United States,

and the reliability of the US’s extended deterrence is the most critical issue for both

countries’ security. The US now faces a lot of difficult challenges in the current

security environment, such as non-state actors or rogue states which cannot be

deterred by traditional deterrent strategy.

The nuclear strategies of both countries are diametrically opposed by several

reasons, but both countries have the grave responsibility to secure the appropriate US

commitment to regional and global security affairs as the most reliable countries in

each region, and ultimately have to go steadily on the path towards the realization of a

non-nuclear world.

3

1. Introduction

Both the United Kingdom and Japan have a security treaty with the United States,

- the UK as a member of NATO, Japan bilaterally. But the nuclear strategies of both

countries are diametrically opposed. Of course, the UK depends on the US nuclear

umbrella in the framework of NATO, but also has her independent nuclear capability.

On the other hand Japan totally depends on the US nuclear deterrent capability, and

underlines the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” as her basic national policy even

though she is surrounded by nuclear states – Russia, China and North Korea. In this

article I would like to compare the Japanese nuclear strategy with that of the UK, and

discuss the strategic effectiveness of possession of nuclear weapons including the

method of possession.

What is nuclear deterrence?

‘Deterrence is a coercive strategy.’1 In the Oxford English Dictionary ‘to deter’ is

defined as: ‘To discourage or turn aside or restrain by fear; to frighten from anything;

to restrain or keep back from acting or proceeding by any consideration of danger or

trouble.’

Nuclear deterrence is a strategy which is underlined by the ultimate coercion; the

threat of actual use of nuclear weapons. If you want to be free from this most terrible

fear, there are only two methods: you have to balance the threat and the fear by

possessing your own nuclear weapons or you must depend on the nuclear capability of

your ally.

1 Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), p26

4

Deterrent theory

‘The classic conventional and nuclear deterrence theory is based on three core

premises: (1) in order for deterrence to succeed, a deterrer should have sufficient

capability, (2) its threat should be credible, and (3) it should be able to communicate

the threat to its opponent.’ 2 In strategic deterrence there are ‘four important

distinctions: narrow and broad, extended and central, denial and punishment,

immediate and general.’3

Nuclear deterrence is broad deterrence because nuclear weapons deterred not only

the use of nuclear weapons but also war itself in the Cold War. Both the US and the

Soviet Union had a precise escalation ladder from conventional weapons to strategic

nuclear weapons and any type of war was strongly prevented between the two

countries by the fear of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD).

Concerning the second distinction, the UK has both extended and central nuclear

deterrence. On the other hand, Japan can only depend on the extended nuclear

deterrence of the US. The most important difference between extended and central

deterrence is reliability. Will the US really take the risk of nuclear war on behalf of

allied countries?

On the third point, nuclear deterrence is absolutely based on punishment. ‘The

proponents of deterrence through denial during the Cold War were not really thinking

about defending against nuclear attack.’4 In the case of ballistic missile attack, there

would be some limited denial by Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) systems, but the

essence of nuclear deterrence is ultimately, still now, the fear of retaliation.

2 T. V. Paul, ‘Complex Deterrence – An Introduction’, in Complex Deterrence – Strategy in the Global

Age, ed by T. V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz (Chicago: The University of Chicago

Press, 2009), p2. 3 Lawrence Freedman, op cit., p32 4 Ibid., p37

5

Regarding the last category, both types of theories, immediate and general, are

applicable to nuclear deterrence. A sufficient nuclear capability generally restrains war

or the use of nuclear weapons. Also a determined and solid political will for the use of

nuclear weapons in a crisis would be an important element of immediate deterrence.

But this was the story of the Cold War era. There is no doubt that the possibility of

nuclear war amongst rational state actors has decreased. The real problem is non-state

actors or rogue states which cannot be deterred by traditional deterrent strategy.

Effectiveness of nuclear deterrence in the current security

environment

The challenges to US nuclear deterrence post-Cold War can be classified into

three major categories:

The first category is the dysfunction of the precise nuclear strategy. ‘Deterrence

theory during the Cold War had reflected an underlying symmetry in military

capabilities.’5 Since the Cold War, the dysfunction of the precise escalation ladder

from conventional war to MAD has reduced effectiveness of the traditional nuclear

deterrent theory. Instead of this, for the US, its practical readiness for a series of more

limited wars, and operations other than war, has become the most urgent challenge.

There is a huge gap in the ladder of escalation between these limited conventional

operations (which do not threaten the state or even involve its territory) and the use of

nuclear weapons in that context, which makes this nuclear strategy seem unreasonable

and unjustifiable.

The second one is non-state and non-territorial actors. Deterrence strategy ‘rests

on premises that actors (1) are rational; (2) have common knowledge; (3) engage in

5 Ibid., p76

6

tacit and explicit communication; (4) accurately assess the risks, costs, and gains of

strategic games; (5) can control their emotions; and (6) hold normative assumptions

about the appropriateness and proportionality of military actions.’ 6 Obviously

terrorists groups do not share these premises. They ‘are highly motivated, have no

territorial base and are, along with their state sponsors, unlikely to be deterred by

punishment or death.’7

The third one is small nuclear states. If, for example, North Korea were to use its

nuclear weapons on an isolated, uninhabited island in Japan, it is very doubtful if the

US would use its nuclear weapons against North Korea. There would be political and

moral obstacles to using these weapons against the population of such small nuclear

states.

On 5 April, 2009, President Obama made a remarkable speech in Prague. He

presented an ambitious three-part strategy to address the international nuclear threat:

(1) proposing measures to reduce and eventually eliminate existing nuclear arsenals,

(2) strengthening the Non-proliferation Treaty and halting proliferation of nuclear

weapons to additional states, and (3) preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear

weapons or materials. He clearly stated America's commitment to seek the peace and

security of a world without nuclear weapons, but at the same time, he also mentioned,

‘This goal will not be reached quickly - perhaps not in my lifetime.’8 We will have to

face the threat of nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future.

This indispensable ally of both the UK and Japan now faces a lot of difficult

6 Emanuel Adler, ‘Complex Deterrence in the Asymmetric-Warfare Era’, in Complex Deterrence –

Strategy in the Global Age, ed by T. V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz (Chicago: The

University of Chicago Press, 2009), p88. 7 Ibid., p90 8 http://prague.usembassy.gov/obama.html/,Remarks of President Barack Obama in Prague, (Access

date; 1 Apr 2010)

7

challenges. Both countries have to return to the most fundamental question: in today’s

world can extended deterrence from the US be relied upon or not?

8

2. The nuclear deterrent structure in Europe and

East Asia

In this chapter, I would like to compare the nuclear strategies and security

environments of the UK and Japan. In particular, I intend to articulate the nuclear

deterrent structure in Europe and East Asia.

UK nuclear strategy and the security environment in Europe

According to the Future of the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent (December

2006), ‘The fundamental principles relevant to nuclear deterrence have not changed

since the end of the Cold War, and are unlikely to change in future.’ and ‘Nuclear

weapons remain a necessary element of the capability we need to deter threats from

others possessing nuclear weapons.’ And also this White Paper articulates “Five

enduring principles of the UK’s nuclear deterrence” as below.9

・our focus is on preventing nuclear attack.

The UK’s nuclear weapons are not designed for military use during conflict but instead to

deter and prevent nuclear blackmail and acts of aggression against our vital interests that cannot

be countered by other means.

・the UK will retain only the minimum amount of destructive power required to

achieve our deterrence objectives.

Since 1997, the Government has made a series of reductions in the scale and readiness of our

9 The Secretary of State for Defence and The Secretary of State for Foreign and

Commonwealth Affairs,UK, the Future of the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent, December 2006

(London: The stationery Office Limited, 2006), p17-18

9

nuclear forces in line with changes in the global security environment. We are now taking

further measures to reduce the scale of our deterrent. We are reducing the number of

operationally available warheads from fewer than 200 to fewer than 160, and making a

corresponding reduction in the size of our overall stockpile.

・we deliberately maintain ambiguity about precisely when, how and at what scale

we would contemplate use of our nuclear deterrent.

We will not simplify the calculations of a potential aggressor by defining more precisely the

circumstances in which we might consider the use of our nuclear capabilities. Hence, we will

not rule in or out the first use of nuclear weapons.

・the UK’s nuclear deterrent supports collective security through NATO for the

Euro-Atlantic area.

Nuclear deterrence plays an important part in NATO’s overall defensive strategy, and the

UK’s nuclear forces make a substantial contribution.

・ an independent centre of nuclear decision-making enhances the overall

deterrent effect of allied nuclear forces.

Potential adversaries could gamble that the US or France might not put themselves at risk of a

nuclear attack in order to deter an attack on the UK or our allies. Our retention of an

independent centre of nuclear decision-making makes clear to any adversary that the costs of an

attack on UK vital interests will outweigh any benefits. Separately controlled but mutually

supporting nuclear forces therefore create an enhanced overall deterrent effect.

Traditionally, the UK’s nuclear weapons have carried out a complementary

function to the US’s nuclear capability.

Europe was the primary front of confrontation between the West and the East. The

core forces of the West were the US forces in Europe which were stationed there after

the Second World War. However, concerning the conventional force level, the West

10

was inferior to the East in number. The US’s extended deterrence and quick

reinforcement in emergency were critically important for the West European countries.

These countries’ security depended highly on the effectiveness of the US’s

commitment to send conventional forces to reinforce Europe in a crisis and, ultimately,

on its nuclear capability. The UK’s independent nuclear capability has been one of the

methods to secure this US nuclear commitment and has assured her continued role at

the global top table. The UK had to be taken into account because she possessed a

freehand for escalating to nuclear war in the flexible response strategy.

On this point the French nuclear capability was somewhat different from the UK’s.

France also wanted to keep a freehand in her nuclear strategy, but was determined to

maintain full independence against the US, and to a less extent (Germany and the UK)

and was open about it. All elements of the French “force du fruppe” were developed

indigenously.

The UK currently has operated only a single nuclear weapon delivery system

since the withdrawal of the RAF WE.177 nuclear bombs in March 1998. The present

system consists of four Vanguard class submarines equipped with US Trident missiles

armed with UK warheads. The UK totally depends on the US SLBM technology.

Therefore, the UK’s nuclear deterrent capability does not have complete independence.

And the UK has made sharp reductions in the scale and readiness of her nuclear forces

as set out in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review.

In the next Strategic Defence Review, there are likely to be controversial

discussions concerning (1) what is the major nuclear threat against the UK, and (2)

why will the UK have to spent about ’20 billion pounds’10 for such ambiguous risks?

The Government of the UK intends to answer these questions referring to ‘(1) nuclear

10 Ibid., p26

11

weapons states still retaining significant nuclear arsenals, (2) the number of nuclear

weapons states increasing, (3) the proliferation of ballistic missile technology and (4)

the threat of biological, chemical weapons.’11 But this explanation may be too general

and diffuse to persuade the UK people. After the Cold War, there is not the sure sense

of nuclear threat in Europe as there is from North Korea in East Asia. Of course,

Russia still maintains a very substantial number of nuclear warheads. However the

Russian economy is totally dependent on its energy industries. So there would be no

reason for Russia to use its nuclear weapons against Western Europe, which are its

major energy market.

On 8 April, 2010, the US and Russia signed the New Strategic Arms Reduction

Treaty (START) in Prague. These countries possess over 90% of the nuclear warheads

in the world. Under this treaty, if ratified, each side within seven years would be

barred from deploying more than 1,550 strategic warheads (30% reduction from the

Moscow Treaty) or 700 launchers. Most people will recognize that US President

Obama is moving along a steady path towards a non-nuclear world which he promised

last year in the same place.

On the other hand, if the UK strategy is intended to cope with the terrorist or

radiological (dirty bomb) nuclear threat, there would be tremendous scepticism over

the need for the present nuclear weapon systems and submarines.

The UK has had ‘a bilateral agreement with the US (“Mutual Defence Agreement”

or MDA) that originated in the Cold War and permits the exchange of classified

nuclear information, advanced technology and a range of materials (including

plutonium, enriched and highly enriched uranium and tritium) which support both

11 Ibid., p6

12

countries’ nuclear weapons programmes.’12 The previous US administration planned

to develop a new generation of ‘mini-nukes’ and ‘bunker-busting’ nuclear weapons.

This was the Bush Administration’s answer to the real nuclear threat from rogue states

and terrorists. Recently the Obama Administration completed its Nuclear Posture

Review (NPR), and it clearly stated that the ‘United States will not develop new

nuclear warheads.’13 However, it still retains some possibility of future policy change.

If there were clear indications that a terrorist group had access to nuclear materials,

would the UK want to support US development of new nuclear warheads? These

kinds of nuclear weapons are clearly designed for real military use during a conflict.

Under the circumstance of the lower threshold of nuclear weapons’ usage, it would be

very difficult to maintain the current UK’s nuclear strategy: to deter and prevent

nuclear blackmail. Essentially, this strategy may no longer be effective against certain

terrorist groups which cannot be deterred at all by punishment or death.

Japanese nuclear strategy and the security environment in East

Asia14

Japan is surrounded by nuclear weapons states – Russia, China and North Korea.

But she has maintained the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” as her basic national

policy: Japan will not possess nuclear weapons, will not produce nuclear weapons,

and will not allow nuclear weapons into Japan. And also Japan is prohibited from

12 Nigel Chamberlain, Nicola Butler and Dave Andrews, US-UK nuclear weapons collaboration under

the Mutual Defence Agreement: Shining a torch on darker recesses of the ‘special relationship’

(London, British American Security Council, 2004), p3 13 US Secretary of Defence, Nuclear Posture Review Report , April 2010, p39 14 Japanese Ministry of Defence, Defence of Japan, 2009 (Tokyo, Erklaren Inc., 2009), p35-64, p121,

p183

13

manufacturing or possessing nuclear weapons under ‘the Atomic Energy Basic Law’15.

In addition, Japan ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

(NPT) and, as a non-nuclear weapons state, ‘is not permitted to produce or acquire

nuclear weapons’16.

The nuclear deterrent structure in East Asia is more complex than that in Europe.

The US does have a sufficient and solid foundation of common understanding to

provide a deterrent structure with China, but not with North Korea. ‘In particular, a

possible miscalculation by North Korea is a matter for concern, as North Korea, with

a closed system dependent on military power, is very antagonistic towards, and wary

of, foreign countries and it is unclear whether it grasps the intention of the outside

world correctly. As a result, feelings of anxiety have arisen as to whether deterrence

will work on North Korea, which heightens the sense of danger felt by the

international community.’ 17

As mentioned above, there would also be serious obstacles to the use of nuclear

weapons by the US against North Korea for the following four reasons: first, US

domestic public opinion would expect more proportional military action, rather than

mass destruction against such a small country where the people could be considered

innocent of the crimes of the regime. The second reason is the blame along similar

lines from international society. Russia and China, especially would oppose such a

unilateral and excessive retaliation. Despite the US’s dominant position as the nuclear

15 Article 2 of the Atomic Energy Basic Law states that “The research, development and utilization of

atomic energy shall be limited to peaceful purposes, aimed at ensuring safety and performed

independently under democratic management.” 16 Article 2 of the NPT states that “Each non-nuclear weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes….not

to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices….” 17 The Council on Security and Defence Capabilities, Japan, The Council on Security and Defence

Capabilities Report, August 2009 , p14

14

hegemon, other powers would exact a price in other areas. The third reason is the

immaturity of nuclear strategy for this kind of new nuclear state. Traditional nuclear

theory does not apply to these countries. To use the weapon of catastrophic mass

destruction, the rationale for such military action needs to be both logical and

transparent. The last one is technological innovation. In the case of North Korea, the

US would want to choose surgical strikes by conventional weapons rather than

nuclear attacks. This kind of smart and “clean” weapon enables the US to achieve an

appropriate military objective in a more moderate manner.

At the same time, amongst the countries surrounding Japan, Russia and China

have deployed quite a few ballistic missiles. In 2006, North Korea launched seven

ballistic missiles, and in April 2009 made what it described as a test launch of a

“communications satellite”. These events served to confirm that the threat from

ballistic missiles was and is a reality. North Korea’s nuclear development and ballistic

missiles contribute to make a direct threat to Japan’s security. If North Korea

continues to develop smaller nuclear weapons and acquires the capability to launch

ballistic missiles carrying a nuclear warhead, the threat to the region, especially to

Japan, would be huge because North Korea’s missiles do not have enough range to

attack other countries, except for Japan and South Korea. North Korea would never

use nuclear weapons against brother Koreans. On the other hand, there is a “historical

issue” between Japan and North Korea.

The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defence Cooperation, 1997 clearly state “U.S.

Forces and the Self-Defence Forces will cooperate and coordinate closely to respond

to a ballistic missile attack. U.S. Forces will provide Japan with necessary intelligence,

and consider, as necessary, the use of forces providing additional strike power.”

Japan totally depends on the US nuclear capability for both deterrence and

retaliation. On the other hand Japan concentrates her build-up of deterrent capability

15

on a strategy of denial – through BMD systems and conventional self-defence forces.

To speak frankly, BMD has been criticized for its cost-effectiveness and credibility.

The Japanese Self-Defence Force will spend about $10 billion to deploy the current

multi-tier BMD system – upper-tier interception by Aegis destroyers and lower-tier

interception by Patriot PAC-3. The Ballistic Missile is old technology. After more than

60 years, however, there is still scepticism about the effectiveness of missile defence

without a powerful nuclear deterrent capability. But BMD is the only option to

counter the ballistic missile threat for non-nuclear weapons states, and few countries

can access such capability because of its extremely expensive cost. This is the reason

that the BMD system in Japan is called “political weapon system”.

There is a similar situation in Japan to that of the UK. The reliability of the US’s

extended deterrence is the most critical issue. But the most important difference

between the UK and Japan is the existence or absence of some leverage over the US.

The UK has her own nuclear weapons capability and this assures that the UK can

continue her role at the global top table as one of the five permanent members of the

UN Security Council (P5). In addition, all the US NATO allies in Europe have the

same interest in maintaining the US nuclear umbrella and the combined importance of

all these European states, nuclear and non-nuclear, increases their influence on US

thinking and nuclear posture. But Japan has to act alone. In this meaning, the constant

nuclear posture dialogues and clear consensus about nuclear strategy with the US are

more significant for Japanese nuclear strategy. This is the only resort for Japan to

assure the US commitment to the defence of Japan.

16

3. Analysis of the differences

In this chapter, I would like to analyze some reasons for the differences of the

nuclear strategies between the UK and Japan, and to clarify how both countries’

nuclear strategies were shaped for the Cold War era.

Historical perspective

‘The UK’s nuclear weapons programme had its origins in the Second World War.

In 1941, the then Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, authorised the development of

an atomic bomb following a report that showed it was scientifically feasible. UK work

on developing a nuclear weapon progressed only slowly, leading in 1943 to an

agreement between Churchill and US President Roosevelt that the British work should

be subsumed into a larger joint effort – the Manhattan Project.’18 After the end of the

Second World War, the UK became the third state to test an independently developed

nuclear weapon, in October 1952. ‘In 1958, bilateral UK-US nuclear collaboration

was resumed and the Agreement for the Co-operation on Uses of Atomic Energy for

Mutual Defence Purposes was signed. The MDA became, and remains, the

cornerstone of UK-US co-operation on nuclear defence issues’19 within the larger

framework of the UK-US ‘special relationship’. Under this agreement, the UK

avoided the enormous costs of weapons system development while retaining political

independence thorough possessing her own nuclear warheads.

To the contrary, Japan had suffered the first and hopefully the last bombing by

nuclear weapons in 1945. The losses in both Hiroshima and Nagasaki were several

18 The Secretary of State for Defence and The Secretary of State for Foreign and

Commonwealth Affairs,UK, op cit., Fact sheet 5 p1 19 Idem.

17

hundred thousands. Naturally, a strong nuclear allergy still remains in Japan.

According to a public opinion poll by the Mainichi-shimbun in November 2006, the

support rate for Japanese possession of nuclear weapons was only 14%. On the other

hand, the rate of the opposition went up to 78%. Likewise, the “Three Non-Nuclear

Principles” have still maintained an extremely high support rate amongst Japanese

people. Under these circumstances, it has been almost impossible to have a rational

argument about the necessity for a nuclear deterrent capability in Japan. This is the

reason why the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” have sometimes been described as

the “Four principles” with an additional principle – Japanese will not discuss the

nuclear capability.

At the same time, it is also obvious that there has always been one great

international obstacle for the defeated nation in the Second World War to develop

nuclear capability - the NPT regime, which was essentially designed to never permit

any state outside the P5 to possess nuclear weapons.

The US strategy

As I have already mentioned, in Europe NATO’s tactical nuclear weapons played

an important role in plans to cope with the East’s superiority of conventional weapons.

They had a function to deter any type of war. On the other hand, in Japan this kind of

nuclear capability was not so critical for the US, because Japan is surrounded by the

sea and there was no possibility of a “Blitzkrieg” against Japan. It was not necessary

for the US to prepare the NATO type of nuclear deterrence, of graduated response,

which prevented the rapid escalation of any accidental war by conventional weapons.

Considering this kind of security environment, it is only natural that European

countries have wanted to obtain their independent nuclear capability from the

standpoint of autonomy. At the same time, it was not realistic for Japan to possess an

18

indigenous strategic nuclear capability, which had enough range to attack Moscow or

Beijing. Also this accorded with the US strategic requirements. European NATO allies,

even the UK which has a so-called “special relationship” with the US, cannot exclude

the risk of an unexpected policy change by the US. It is a fact that Japan is inferior to

the UK in terms of bargaining with the US’s regional strategy. Japan has little

leverage with the US because the Japan-US Security Treaty imposes unequal defence

obligations. So Japan is in a more difficult position than the UK: how can Japan

maintain the US’s commitment effectively? This difficulty has been amplified by

certain aspects of international relations: (1) the psychology between the victors and

the defeated, (2) a lack of historical, cultural and racial sympathy, and (3) a lack of

third party involvement and support because of the bilateral security arrangement.

The neighbouring countries

In Europe, apart from the nuclear weapons states (the UK and France), some

countries have maintained special arrangements within NATO concerning nuclear

capability management. ‘During the late 1950s and 1960s, there were intense

discussions within NATO on what form of nuclear sharing to establish within the

Alliance. Some European allies - Germany among them - pressed the US to allow

them some kind of participation in nuclear planning, decision-making and command

and control. However, the declared nuclear weapon states wanted to limit access to

nuclear weapons by other parties. As a compromise, the system of "nuclear sharing"

was established in NATO in the mid-1960s, which in its basic functions has remained

19

unchanged ever since.’20 In this way, the UK’s European allies countries have devoted

their energies to obtaining some leverage on US nuclear strategy. So it could be said

that almost all NATO European countries have been engaged with nuclear weapons in

some way. There has been no concern about the UK’s independent nuclear capability

destabilizing the regional security environment.

On the other hand in East Asia, three P5 states (the US, the Soviet Union and

China) have totally independent nuclear strategies. The US and the Soviet Union

confronted each other as in Europe. China also has had her indigenous nuclear

weapons (albeit extremely inferior to the other two countries). It is quite certain that

the Chinese have had nuclear weapons not only to deter both the US and the Soviet

nuclear capability, but also to prepare a master card against Japan. If Japan

demonstrated her intention to obtain nuclear weapons, it would be intolerable for

China. China would inevitably increase both nuclear and conventional weapons’

arsenals. This risk of nuclear proliferation could also take another direction, as South

Korea is also an actor in this region. Both China and Korea have an “historical issue”

with Japan, and have felt fear about the possibility of Japanese military expansion. If

Japan developed nuclear weapons, South Korea would certainly also want to possess

her own, and there would be a “nuclear domino” in this region. This would mean that

the only country in the world that has experienced nuclear bombing could trigger the

collapse of the NPT regime. In addition, South East Asian countries which have

supported Japan’s new roles in the Asia-Pacific region would have strong opposition.

In short, Japanese possession of nuclear weapons would mean nothing but her

20 Martin Butcher, Nicola Butler, Oliver Meier, Otfried Nassauer, Dan Plesch, Georg Schöfbänker and

Stephen Young, ‘NATO Nuclear Sharing and the NPT - Questions to be Answered’ , BASIC-BITS-

CESD-ASPR Research, Note 97.3, June 1997

20

isolation in this region and the destabilization of the security environment.

Costs

‘From 1940-1996, the United States spent a minimum of $5.5 trillion on its

nuclear weapons program. The lack of data for some programs and the difficulty of

segregating costs for programs that had both nuclear and conventional roles mean that

in all likelihood the actual figure is higher.’21 And ‘just seven percent of this figure

($409 billion) was spent on developing, testing, and building the actual bombs and

warheads. To make those weapons usable by deploying them aboard aircraft, missiles,

submarines, and a variety of other delivery systems consumed 56 percent of the total

($3.2 trillion). Another $831 billion (14 percent) was spent on command, control,

communications, and intelligence systems dedicated to nuclear weapons.’22 Also it is

said that ‘France has spent about $1.5 trillion’23 on her nuclear weapon programme.

As the US example above suggests, developing, testing, and building the actual

bombs and warheads were comparatively inexpensive.

According to the former Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone’s autobiography, he

ordered the (then) Japanese Defence Agency officials to conduct secret research

concerning the possibility of Japanese indigenous nuclear weapons’ development. He

stated that ‘the conclusion was “possible” within five years and with costs of about

200 billion yen’24 [about $2 billion], but also he added ‘it was actually “impossible”

21 http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_atomic_audit.html/, The Nuclear Threat Initiative’s Research

library, (Access date; 30Mar 2010) 22 Idem. 23 http://www.ippnw-students.org/NWIP/factsheets/money.html/, NWIP Fact Sheet, (Access date; 30

Mar 2010) 24 Yasuhiro Nakanone, Jiseiroku (Tokyo: Shincho-sha, 2004), p224-225

21

without a domestic nuclear test site.’25

If Japan just wanted to produce her own nuclear warheads, it would have been

possible on the cost aspect. But if she wanted to deploy and operate them effectively,

the cost would have increased by ten or twenty times according to the US example. At

that time, the amount of Japanese Defence Budget was one of the most controversial

issues in Japanese politics and this was strictly restrained by the political framework;

within 1% of GDP. Within the limited budget, Japanese Self-Defence Forces had to

build-up the capability of their conventional weapons’ systems (i.e. defence of Sea

Lanes of Communication (SLOC) and Air superiority), which was the first priority of

the US Far East Strategy. It could be argued therefore that it was unrealistic on cost

grounds for Japan to possess her independent nuclear capability.

The budget restriction was similar in the UK, but she placed comparative

importance on her own nuclear deterrent capability to assure her continued role at the

global top table as P5. Of course, MDA enabled the UK to avoid some of the

enormous costs of weapons’ system development, but she had to spend a huge amount

of money for this policy of nuclear deterrence.

25 Idem.

22

4. Conclusion

In conclusion, I would like to evaluate the meaning of the possession of nuclear

weapons in terms of their strategic utility by considering both countries’ situations. Is

it really effective in the force structure? Is it cost effective – both economically and

politically? Also I would like to consider the kinds of benefits and losses, if Japan

decided to obtain its own nuclear capability. And finally I will carry out a limited

discussion on a future nuclear strategy appropriate for Japan.

Strategic effectiveness

The end of the Cold War brought fundamental changes to the security

environments surrounding both the UK and Japan. As I mentioned above, even

between the US and Russia, the theories of MAD and the flexible response strategy

have not maintained their functionality as before. Also we face an increase in the

importance of multiple-state and non-state actors and the proliferation of Weapons of

Mass Destruction (WMD). Deterrence relationships are more ‘complex and

ambiguous’ 26 in the 21st century. However this situation does not mean nuclear

deterrence has become meaningless. Nuclear weapons are still not only the supreme

weapons but also effective against coercion by WMD. They will remain the ultimate

solution for national security problems.

In addition, there is the extremely crucial question for both the UK and Japan as to

whether the US’s extended deterrence can still be relied on or not. Japan especially

has not had any leverage over US nuclear strategy. The Japan- US Security Treaty was

a peculiar military arrangement which delayed its implementation arrangement for

over 20 years until the first Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defence Cooperation were

26 T. V. Paul, op cit., p8

23

formulated in 1978. This is because this treaty has been a so-called “political

arrangement” rather than a “military arrangement”. In the Cold War era, Japan’s

security concerns perfectly accorded with those of the US. Under these circumstances,

there might be no more necessity than the US’s oral commitment to the defence of

Japan. But in the days ahead, there is no doubt that the importance of dialogue about

nuclear strategy will increase. It is necessary especially for Japan to clarify the US’s

nuclear contingency planning and to share a common understanding about 5W1H

(Who, What, When, Where, Why and How) of the nuclear weapons’ operation.

Cost-effectiveness

I want to discuss the cost-effectiveness of the Japanese case in the next section. In

the UK, there are controversial discussions concerning the next generation of nuclear

capabilities. Most of the critical opinions are based on scepticism about cost-

effectiveness. Why should the UK have to spend about 20 billion pounds when her

Defence budget is under such pressure? The UK should invest more money on the

necessary equipment for the Afghanistan mission. That is right. On-going war is the

most important agenda, and sufficient resources should be allocated to it. But I

strongly believe that maintaining a reliable nuclear capability has as much importance

as making an appropriate contribution to global peace and security.

There is an interesting description about the cost-effectiveness of the nuclear

capability in the Strategic Defence Review, 1998 ‘There are very substantial costs but

they need to be seen in perspective. The annual cost (including the continuing costs

from earlier programmes) is little more than 3% of the defence budget. This is not a

disproportionate investment in a capability of such vital importance to our national

24

security.’27

Nuclear weapon capability has been a privilege only for P5 – now this is at risk of

being eroded. Each nuclear weapons state has a grave responsibility to secure its

nuclear arsenals and maintain the stable balance of nuclear deterrence. Of course, we

must ultimately get on the path to a non-nuclear world; therefore the UK should lead

non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through the NPT regime with her prestige. If the

UK were to eliminate her nuclear weapons, it would make a giant step to the

realization of a non-nuclear world.

But in reality, once a state owns these ultimate weapons, it has no option but to

retain them unless it can ensure their complete elimination on the earth. This

responsibility is priceless, and it is very difficult to calculate its cost-effectiveness.

If Japan became a nuclear weapons state

The situation surrounding Japan is totally different. We can say that the real

threats (i.e. North Korea’s ballistic missile capability and nuclear ambition, and

China’s enhancement of missile and nuclear arsenals) are now more imminent. But

would it be really effective in this security environment for Japan to possess nuclear

weapons?

If Japan became a nuclear state, this would mean that Japan took an initiative to

destroy the present NPT framework, as mentioned above. And Japan would have to

face a delicate problem relating to the US’s extended deterrence. Japanese

independent nuclear capability would not coincide with the US strategy in this region.

Therefore it would not add to the credibility of the US’s extended deterrence. In

27 http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/65F3D7AC-4340-4119-93A2-

20825848E50E/0/sdr1998_complete.pdf, Strategic Defence Review, July 1998, (Access date; 2 Apr,

2010)

25

addition, this behaviour would be regarded by neighbouring countries as a Japanese

ambition for an independent defence capability by leaving the framework of the

Japan-US Security Treaty. This would only lead to an arms race and the nuclear

domino effect would come to this region.

There is more to it. Japan would lose her moral high-ground as the only country

that has suffered from nuclear bombs. Japan has gained a tremendously effective ‘Soft

Power’28 as a result of this historical fact. Most of the developing countries, especially

in the Middle East and Africa have great esteem for Japanese peaceful and soft-sell

influence. Even though an economic super power, Japan never depends on her

military capability. According to the BBC survey about countries’ influence in the

world over four years (2005 – 2008) in 2008, Japan’s influence was the second most

positively viewed in the world, after Germany.29 This is the most valuable asset for

Japan who as a trading nation has to depend highly on peace and stability around the

world.

Considering these kinds of presumptions, a Japanese independent nuclear weapon

capability would have no meaning. This would only have the opposite effect of

damaging Japan’s standing and endangering her peace and stability.

It is strongly desired for Japan to enhance her standpoint to make a significant

contribution to the non-proliferation aspect by her advanced technology and moral

high-ground rather than to be a nuclear weapons state. Recently, Japanese Prime

Minister Hatoyama committed Japanese contributions about this point in the

Washington Nuclear Security Summit: i.e. developing the ‘technologies related to the

detection of nuclear material and nuclear forensics that contribute to the identification

28 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power, (New York: Public Affairs, 2004)

29 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7324337.stm, Global Views of USA Improve in Global Poll, (Access

date; 22 Apr, 2010)

26

of the sources (countries and facilities) of nuclear material illicitly trafficked or used

in terrorist attacks.’30 This is a useful and correct response.

An appropriate Japanese nuclear strategy

As mentioned above, Japanese possession of nuclear weapons would not be a

realistic measure. Therefore Japan has to prepare an answer for only one but quite a

difficult question. How can Japan ensure the reliability of the US’s extended

deterrence?

The US’s effective extended deterrence is not composed only of nuclear weapons.

The conventional weapon system and BMD capability are also significant parts of this.

And there is no doubt that the most important element to secure the US’s extended

deterrence is the forward-deployed US forces in the Western Pacific region. In that

sense the recent difficulty about the US Marine Corp base relocation programme in

Okinawa is a very serious problem.

Now Japan and the US are continuing dialogue to enhance their alliance. There

are three essential points in this dialogue: (1) reconfirmation of the nuclear extended

deterrence and BMD cooperation, (2) reconfirmation of the significance of the US’s

forward-deployed force, (3) an increase of Japan’s role in both regional and global

peace and stability.

Concerning the first point, recently the Japanese Government disclosed that it

gave silent approval to visiting US warships which were ambiguous about whether

they were carrying nuclear weapons or not.31 This was caused by an agonizing

30 http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/arms/nuclear_security/2010/national_statement.html,

Japan’s national statement in the Washington Nuclear Security Summit, (Access date; 17 Apr, 2010) 31 http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/mitsuyaku/pdfs/hokoku_yushiki.pdf, Report on So-called

“Secret Agreement” issue, (Access date; 2 Apr 2010)

27

compromise between a severe security environment in the Cold War and the strong

nuclear allergy of the Japanese people. I mentioned before that the Japan-US Security

Treaty is not a “military arrangement”. The so-called “Secret Agreement” issue

epitomizes this kind of unsound relationship. Concerning this point, Joseph Nye

accurately pointed out the Japanese dilemma. ‘Japan is concerned that it not be

subjected to nuclear blackmail from North Korea (or China) and relies on the

American extended nuclear deterrent. Ironically, Japan is torn between its desire to

see a non-nuclear world (and thus its endorsement of that objective), and the concern

of defence experts that if the US decreases its nuclear forces to parity with China, the

credibility of American extended deterrence will be weakened and Japan will suffer

the consequences.’32 It is necessary to clarify the US’s nuclear contingency planning

and to share a common understanding about the 5W1H of the nuclear weapons policy

through bilateral dialogue. In Japan there are also some discussions about the “nuclear

sharing” system, which is adopted by some NATO members. But I am quite sceptical

about the effectiveness of this system in Japan. The focus of NATO’s nuclear sharing

system was the use of tactical nuclear weapons. The US and some European members

shared the responsibility for deciding on the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Tactical

nuclear weapons were very important to cover the inferiority of conventional weapons,

but there is no necessity for Japan to share arrangements over tactical nuclear

weapons with the US. Extended deterrence by strategic nuclear weapons has the

decisive importance for the defence of Japan.

BMD cooperation is one of the most successful programmes between Japan and

the US. This is not only a driving force for enhancing this alliance, but also one of

32http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/nye062509.pdf., Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and the

Global Environment, Hearing on “Japan’s Changing Role” ,25 June, 2009, Testimony by Joseph S.

Nye, Jr., (Access date; 9 April, 2010)

28

only a few Japanese levers on US nuclear strategy. Japan has to increase her

importance further in this area.

The second point is the most imminent problem for Japan. ‘The absolute

superiority of US power remains unchallenged, but in certain areas movements are

growing to deny US intervention, as newly emerging countries gain power. This

means that the US will have to pay additional costs to continue to act as the “world’s

policeman,” and might possibly make commitments selectively depending on its own

benefits.’33 Historically, the US periodically has repeated overcommitment and

isolationism. Japan has an important responsibility to prevent the emergence of the

US’s isolationism as the UK has done in Europe. An appropriate US commitment to

the Asia-Pacific region has significant value for peace and stability and almost all

countries in this region hope to maintain this. It is necessary for Japan to update

‘common strategic objectives 2005’34 with the US, and to maintain an effective US

presence in this region.

About the third point, the Japan-US Security Treaty is an asymmetrical

arrangement in each party’s defence obligation. Originally, this kept Japan in a very

difficult position to leverage its relationship with the US. The US’s Quadrennial

Defence Review (QDR) 2010 clearly said ‘the United States will remain the most

powerful actor but must increasingly work with key allies and partners if it is to

sustain stability and peace.’35 Increasing Japan’s role for both regional and global

33 The Council on Security and Defence Capabilities, Japan, op cit., p13 34 http://www.usfj.mil/50th/English/Joint%20Statement%20U.S.-

Japan%20Security%20Consultative%20Committee%20(February%2019,%202005).html, Joint

Statement U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (February 19, 2005), (Access date; 2 Apr,

2010) 35 http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf, Quadrennial Defence Review

Report, (Access date; 2 Apr, 2010)

29

peace and stability (i.e. UN Peace Keeping Operations and the stable use of SLOC,

space and cyber-space) is significantly important and this harmonizes perfectly with

the US’s strategic objectives. This will also enhance the US’s commitment to the

defence of Japan and secure Japan’s peace and stability.

Continuing this kind of pragmatic dialogue would be the fastest way to make the

alliance profound and reliable. Japan will continue to carry forward the process of

new Defence Programme Guidelines, taking these discussions into account.

Both the UK and Japan have a grave responsibility to secure the appropriate US

commitment to regional and global security affairs as the most reliable countries in

each region. Both countries’ characters are quite different, but they have the common

objective of achieving the peace and stability of the world.

30

Bibliography

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- Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004

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collaboration under the Mutual Defence Agreement: Shining a torch on darker

recesses of the ‘special relationship’, London: British American Security Council,

2004

- Yasuhiro Nakanone, Jiseiroku, Tokyo: Shincho-sha, 2004

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31

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