sellars, w. 1956, empiricism & the philosophy of mind

8/11/2019 Sellars, W. 1956, Empiricism & the Philosophy of Mind

1/39

P E.

MeehI and WiIfr id Sellars

being absorbed

into

the

physical system

But apparently they

want

their

laws

to be

both effectual and

a t

the same

time

no part

of

the physical

system pp.

2 4 W )

First

a

terminological point. Among the

various

meanings of the word

physical

let us

distinguish the

following for present

purposes:

Physical,: an event or entity is

physical,

if it belongs in the space-

Lime

network.

Physk12:an

event

or entity

s

php*ca12

f

it

is definable in

terms

of

theoretical primitives adequate

to describe

completeIyr the actual

states

though

not necessarily the potentiaIities

of

the universe

before

the appearance of

life.

Now, an cmergentist account (of

the kind

we

have

been construct

ing)

of raw

feds

denies that the latter are physicalx. But

this

in

no way

involve

the denial

that

they are

physicall.

And indeed this

emergentist

account

definitely gives

them

a physical, status. And

if

the

equations

a

=

g(qrr)

b

=

h s , t )

permit the elimination

of

a and

b from the

descriptive function relat-

ing the physicale vakbles q,r,s, and t this fact,

as

we have just seen,

by

no means

involves tbat the

emergent

entities with which the

vaiables and b

a re

associated

mast

also be physicalz.

Whether or not there are any

emergents in

the sense

we

have sought

t o clarify

is

an

empirical question. Our

only

aim

has

bcen

to

show

that Pepper's

formal

demonstration

of

the

impossibility

of

non-

epiphenomena1

emagents is

invalid.

REFERENCE

I Pepper, Stqlien C. Emergence, JournaI of Philamphy,

2 3 :241-45

I926).

wTL#FRID

SELLARS

Em irjCisnz and the

Philosophy

o Mind

I. An Ambiguity in Sense-DatumTheories

I

PRESUME that no philosopher who has attacked the philosophical

idea

of

givenness or

t o

use the HegeIian

term

mmediacy, has intended to

deny that

there

is a difference between inferring that

something

is

the

case and, for ample, seeing

it

to be the

mse I f

the m given

referred

merely

to what

is

observed

as

being observed,

ar

perhaps

to

a

proper

subset

of

the

things

we

are

said

to

determine by

observa-

tion,

the existence of data would

be

as

noncontroversial

as the

exisfence of

phiFowphica1 perplexities.

But,

of

course, this just isn't

so. The phrase the

given as

a piece

of

p0fessional~istemolo~ca1-

slgoptaTk carries

a subsbntiaf

theoretical

commitment,

and one can

deny

that there are

datayy hat

anything is,

in this sense,

given

without flying

in

the

face of reason.

Many

things have been mid to be ' venW:

sense

contents

material

objects, universals,

propositions, real

connections, first

principles, even

givenness itself. And

there is, indeed, a certain way

of

construing the

situations

which

philosophers

analyze

in

t h e

terms

which

can

be

s id ta be the

framework

of givenness. This framework

has been

a

common

fcature of

most of the major systems

of philosophy, includ-

ing,

t~ use a Kantian

turn

of

phrase,

both

'%gmatic rationalism

and

skeptical

empiricism.

It has,

indeed been so p m s i v e that

few

if

any,

philosopliers

have een ltogether free

of it;

certainly not: Kant,

and, I

would

argue, not even

Hegel, that great

foe

of immediacy.

Often what

is

attzcked nnder its

name

are only specific vaticties

of

given. Inkuitclcl First

principles and synthetic necessary co~mccions

WE

This r p c r

was i r i t

as

the

University

of

h n d n n

Spccinl

Ixlch~rc~:n

I'l~ilosophy or

1955-Th

on March 1, 8,

and

1 5 1'156, i~titlcr llc titlc

'I'ltc Myth of

tllc

Civcii: 'l'l~rccLcct~ircs on E~ip ir i r~s mnd ~ l i c 'liil{~st~pliy

t

Mind.


2/39

KMPI RI CI SM

AND THE

PHILOSOPKIY OF

MIND

were

the first to come under atkack. And many who today attack the

whole idea of givennessV-and they are an increasing number-are

really only attacking sense data. For they transfer to other items, say

physical objects or relations of appearing, the characteristic fcatlrres of

the given. If, however, I begin my argument with a n attack on sense

datum theories, it is only as a first

step

in

a

general critique of the

entire framework

of

givenness.

2,

Sense-datum theories characteristically distingu ish bctween

an

act

of

awareness

and, for example, the color patch which is

its

ohject.

The act

is

usually called

sensing.

Classical

exponents

of the theory

have

often

characterized these acts as phenomenologicaIly simple

and not further analyzable. But other sense-datum theoris s-some

of

them

with

an equal

claim to

be

considere d classical expon ents7'-

h ve

held

that sensing is analyzable.

And

if

some

philosophers seem

to have thought that if sensing is analyaable, then i t can't be an

act.,

this has by

no

means been the general opinion. There

are, indeed,

deeper roots for the doubt that sensing (if there is

such

a

thing

is

an act, roots which

can

be traced to one of two lines of thought tangled

together in classical

sense-datum theory.

For the moment,

however,

I

shall simpIy assume that however complex (or simple) the fact that

x

is

sensed may be,

it

bas the form, whatever exactly it

may

be, by

virtue of

which for x

to be

senscd is for

it

to

be

the object of an

act.

Being

a

sense

datum,

or sensum,

is a

relational property of the

item that is

sensed.

To refer

to

a n item which is sensed in

a

way

which does not entail that it is sensed, it is ilecessary to use some

other locution. Sensibile

has

the disadvantage that it implies that

sensed

items

could

exist

without

being sensed,

and

this is

a

matter of

controversy

among sense-datum

theorists. Sense

content is,

perhaps,

as

neutral a term as

any.

There

appear to be varieties of sensing, referred to by some

as visual

sensing, tactual sensing,

etc.

ancl by others as dire tly seeing, directly

hearing, etc. But it is not clar whethcr these are species of

sensing

in any ftill-blooded sense, or whether

x

is visually senscd am oun ts

to

no

more than x is a color patch which is sensed,

x

is directly

hcard

than

x

is a sound whiclz is sensed and so on. In the

latter

case, being a

visual

sensing

or

a direct hcaririg would bc a rc la t ion~l

property

of

an

act

of

sensing, just

as

being a sense datum

is

n

rclational

prrrlwrty

of

a

scnqe

contcnt.

3

Now

i we l xa r

in mind

that

the point of thc epistemological

category of the given is, presumably, to explicate

thc

idea that empiri-

cal knowledge rests on a 'foundation' of non-inferential knowledge

of

matter

of

fact,

w

may well experience a fccling

of

surprise on noting

that according to sense-datum theorists, it is particulars that are sensed.

For

what

is

known,

even

in

non-infcrential knowledge,

is

facts rather

than particulars, items

of

the form something's being thus-and-so or

something's standing

in a certain relation

to something

clse.

It would

seem,

then, that the sensing of sense contents cannot collstitute knowl-

edge, inferential or non-inferential; and if so,

we

nlay well ask,

what

light

does the

concept

of

a sense datum throw

on

the 'foundations of

empirical knowledge?' The sense-datum theorist, it would

secm, must

choose between saying

a) It: is particulars

which are sensed. Sensing is

not knowing.

T h e

existence of sense-da does no t IogicaIIy imply the existence of

knowledge.

or

(b)

Sensing

is

a

form of knowing.

It is facts

rather than particulars

which are sensed.

On alternative (a) the

fact

that

a

sense content

was

sensed would be

a

non-cpistemic fact about the sense content.

Yet it

would

be

hasty

to conclude that this alternative precludes any logical connection be-

tween

th e sensing of sense contents a nd

the

possession of non-inferential

knowledge.

f i r

even if

thc

sensing of sense contents did not logically

imply the existence of non-infcren tial knowledge, the converse might

well be true. Thus, the non-inferential knowledge of particular matter

of fact might I6gicaIIy imply the existence of sense data (for example,

seeing

tha t

a certain

physical

object is red

might

logically imply

sens

in a

red sense

content) even though the sensing of a red sense con-

tent werc not itself a cognitive fact

a n d

did not imply the possession

of non-inferential knowledge.

On the second alternative, (b), the sensing of sense contents would

logically imply the

existence

of

non-infcrcntigl

knowledge for the

simple reason that it WOII~C~

c

th is ktiowlcdgc. Rut,

oncc s p i n ,

it

would

I)c facts rathcr Ihan 1~7rticul;lrswl~icli uc

acnsccl.

4. Now it migllt accni 1hi1I wllcrl c clrlflnor~lcd y Illis clioicc,

thc

scnsc-dati~m llcnrisl

hccks Io

liilvc 11;s r.ilke

~ ~ t l t l:bI it.

I 2 ~ 1 i ' II llnrac-

tcristic:tlly ir~sists

hot11 Illrrl

s c ~ ~ s i r ~ g

s s

k ~ r i l w i ~ ~ ~

r r r

t l ~ t

i is

p:~rt icr~-


3/39

EMPIRICIShl AND TH PHILOSOPHY OF

MIMD

lars which

are

sensed.

Yct

his position

is

by no means

as

hopeless

as

this formulation suggests. For the 'having' and the 'eating'

can be

combined without logical nonsense provided that

he

uses the word

know

and, correspondingly, the word given

in two

senses. He

must

say something like the following:

The

non-inferential knowing on which our world picture rests

is

the

knowing that catair1 items,

e.g.

red

sense

contents,

arc

of

a

certain

character, e.g. red. m n

such

a

fact

is non-inferentially

known

about

a

sense content,

I

will

say

t ha t

the

sense conten t is sensed as being, e.g.

red . I

will then

say

that

a sense

content is

sensed (full

stop) if

it

is

sensed as eing

of

a certain character, e.g. red. Finally,

I

will say

of

a sense content

that

i t

is nown if

it is sensed (full s t op ) ,

to

empha-

size that sensing is a cognitive or episternic fact.

Notice that given these stipulations, it is logically necessary that:

if

a s ns content

be

sensed it

be

sensed as being

of

a certain character,

and

that

if

i t be

sensed

as being of

a

certain character the fact that

it is of this characte~

e

non-inferentially

known.

Notice also that the

being

sensed

of

a

sense content would

be

knowledge

only

in

a

stipu-

lated

sense of

know . To say of

a sense

c o n t e n t 4

color

p t c h , f o r

example-that it

was

'known' would

be

to

say

that some

fact

about it

was non-inferentially known, e.g. that it was red. Thi s stipulated

use

of

know

would, however, receive

aid and

comfort from the fact

that

there is, in ordinary usage, a sense of know in which it

is

followed

by

a noun or descriptive phrase which refers

to a

particular, thus

Do you know John?

Do

you know

the

President?

Because

these questions

are equivalent

to Arc

you acquainted

with

John?

and

Are

you acquainted

with

the

President?

the pfirase

knowledge by acqua intance reconlm ends itself as a useful inetaphor

for this stipulated sense of know and like other useful metaphors, has

congealed into a technical term.

5

We have seen t ha t

the

fact that a sense content

is a datum

if,

indeed, there are such

facts)

will logically imply th at some one lws non-

inferential knowledge only if to

say

that

a sense

content

is

given is

contextually defined in terms

of

non-inferential knowledge of

a

fact

about this sense content. If this is not clearly realized or

held

in mind,

sct~sc-datum

heorists

may

come

to

think of the givenncss

of

scnse

cot cnts IS t 1 ~ asic or prin~itiveconccpt of the scnsc-


4/39

EMPIRICISM

ND TH PHILOSOPHY OF

MIND

irreducible and knowings, they have without exception taken them

to

be fundamental

in

another sense.

6. For

they have taken

givenness to be

a

fact

which presupposes

no

learning, no

forming

of associations, no sett ing up

of

stimulus-response

connections.

In

short,

i ey

have tended to

equate

sensing

sense

contents

with eing conscioris,

as a person

who has been h i t on the head

is

not

coi~sciouswhereas a new

born

babe, alive a n d kicking, is conscious.

They would admit,

of

course, t h a t t h e

ability

to know that a person

namely oneself,

is now, at a

certain time, feding

a

pain,

is

acquired

and does presuppose a (complicated) process of concept formation.

But, they would insist,

to

suppose that the siinple ability to feel a pain

or see a color, in short, to sense sense contents, is acquired and involves

a process of coilcept formation, would be very

odd

indeed.

But

if

a

sense-&turn philosopher

takes

the ability to sense sense

contents to be unacquired,

he

is clearly precluded from offering an

analysis of x senses sense

content

which prcsuppuses acquired abilities.

I t follows that

he

could analyze

x

senses

red

sense

content

s

s

x

non

inferentially knows th t s is red

only

if

he is

prepared to admit

that

th e ability to havc

such

non-inferential knowledge

as

that, for example,

a red

sense

content is red, is itself unacquircd. And this brings

us

face

to face with the

fact

that most empirically minded philosophers are

strongly inclined to think that all chssificatory consciousness, all knowl-

edge

tha t

something

is thus-and-so

or, in logicians' jargon,

a11

s u b s u m p

tion

of

particulars under universals, involves learning, concept forina-

tion, even the use of symbols. I t is clcar from the above analysis, there-

fore, that classical sense-d atum theories-I emphasize tlle adjective, for

there

are other, 'heterodox,'

s ens e -datk

theories

to

he

t ken

into

ac-

count-are confronted

by an

inconsistent triad inade up of

the

follow-

ing three propositions:

A . X senses red sense conten t s entails

x

non-inferentially

kllows that

is

red.

13.

T h e

ability

to sense

sense contents is unacquired.

C. The ability to know

facts

of

the form x

is is acquired.

A

and

B

together cntail not-C;

B

and

C entail

not-A;

A

and

C

entail

not-B.

Once

the classical sense-datum theorist faces up to the

fact

that

A,

R,

ancl C

do

form

an inconsistent triad, which of thein will he

c1ux)sc

to

abandon?

1 He

can

abandon

A,

in which case the sensing of sense contents

becomes a noncognitive

fact-a

noncognitive fact, to be sure which

may be a necessary condition, even a

logicaIIy

necessary condition, of

non-inferential knowledge, but a fact, nevertlieless, which

cannot

constitute this knowledge.

2 He can abandon B,

in

which

case

he must pay the price O

cutting

off

the concept of

a sense d a tu m from its

connection with

our ordinary talk about sensations, feelings, afterimages, tickles and

itches, etc., wIlicI~

are

usually thought by sensedatum theorists to

be i ts common sense counterprts.

3

But

to

abandon

C is

to do violence to the predominantly

nomii~alistic roclivities of the empiricist tradition.

7.

It

certainly begins to look as though the classical concept of a sense

datum

were

a

mongreI

resulting from a

crossbreeding

of

two ideas:

(1) The idea that there

are

certain inner episodes-e.g, sensations

of

red or

of C which can

occur

to human beings (and brutes} with-

out

any

prior process of learning

or

concept formation; and without

which it would in some

sense

be impossible to

see,

for example, that

the

facing

surface

of a p11ysicaI object is red and triangular, or hcar

th a t a certain physical sound is C .

2) T h e

idea

that

there are

certain

inner

episodes

which

are

the

non-inferentiaI knowings that certain items arc,

for

example, red

or C ; and that these episodes are

the

necessary conditions of em-

pirical knowledge as providing the evidence for all other empirical

propositions.

And

I

think that once

we arc

on the Iookout

for them,

it is

quite

casy

to

see

how

these

two ideas

camc

to

be

Mended together in

traditional cpistcmology.

T h e first

i d a clearly arises

in the

at tempt

to explain the

facts

of

sense perception

in

scientific style. How does

it happen tlmt people can

have

t h e experience which they

describe

by saying

It is as thougl~

were

seeing a red and triangular physical

object when either therc is no physicaI object ther e at all, or, if iller e

is,

i t is ~leithcred nor triangular?

Thc

explanation, roughly, posits tha t

in

evcry

case

in which a

pcrsou

has

a n

cxpcrieucc

of this kind, w h d h c r

vcricli~alor

not,

lic Ilas w h a l

is

cnllctl sousakio~~ r iinl)rr.ssionl 'of

a rccl hinnglc.' l l ic corc ida i

is

Ili:it tlrc ~)roxiru:itco~usu f l;11c1i

sensatiotl

is

o i ~ l y lr

l f ~ e

rrosl

1,;1sl 11ro~1fl111~l o l~ l

y

t l w

I>i cscrlcc

in

t l ic ~lcigl~l,nrl~ootlf l ~ c >crrcivcl. t 11 rctl n ~ i t l I r111~uiir ~ lrysic;~l


5/39

Wilfrid Sellars

object;

and that

while baby

say

can have the sensation

of a

r e

triangle' without either s ing or sccming

to

see th t th facing side

of a physical

object

is

red and

triangular, there usually looks to

adults,

to e

a pllysical object

with a

red

and

triangular

facing

surface,

when

they

are

caused

t o

have a 'sensation

of

a red triangle'; while without

such

sensation, no such experienoe can be

bad.

I

shall

have

a

gre t

deal

more

to

say

about

this

kind

o

'explanation'

of perceptual situations

in

the

course

of my

argument.What 1

want ta

empl~asize or

the

moment, however, is

that,

as

far

as

the above formu-

lation

goes,

there is no

reason to

suppose

t l u t having

the sensation of

r e d

triangle is

a cognitive

or epistemic

fact.

There is, of

course,

a

temptation to assimiIate having a sensation of a red triangle to

thinking

of

a celestial city

and

to attribute to the former

the

epistemic character, the

'intcntionality'

of

the

latter. B u t this tempta-

tion could be resisted, and it could be held that

having a

sensation

of

a

red

triangle is

a

hct

S U ~

ene ,

neither epistemic

nor

physical,

having its

own logical

grammar.

Unfortunately, the

idea

that

there

are such things as sensations of

red triangles-in

itself, s wc: hall

see

cjuite legitimate, thougll

not

without its

p ~ z z l e ~ se e m s

o fit

the

requirements af

another

and less

fortunate,

line of thought so well

that

it has almost invariably

been

distorted

to

give the latter a rein-

forcement witl~out

which it

would

Iong ago have colIapsed. This

an-

fortunate, but

familiar,

line of thought Tuns as foIlows:

The

seeing that the facing surface of a

physiml

object

is

red

and

triangular is

a

veridical

member

of

a

class

of

experiences-let us call

them

'ostensiMe

secingsr-some of the rnen~bersof which are non-

veridical; and there is no inswible Izallrnark which guarantees that

any such

experience

is veridical. To suppose that the non-inferen tial

knowledge on which

our

world picture rests

consists

of sucll

osten&ble

seeings,

hearings, etc, as f iappc~~o be veridical i s to place empirical

knowledge on too precarious a

footing-indeed,

to opcn the door to

skepticism by making a niockery of t he word knowledge

in

the phrase

empirical know2edge.

Now

it

is,

of

course,

possible to delimit subdasses of ostensible see-

ings, hearings

etc.,

which

are

progressively less precarious, i.e. more

reliable,

by specifying the

circumslances

in

which they

occur,

and the

vigilance

of

the perceiver.

Bn

the

possibility

that any given

ostcnsi1)lc

seeing,

hearing,

etc.

is nm-veridical

can never be en

irely d i m

ns crl.

1J~crcforc

iven that

the

foundation of empirical knowlccFgc cnnuok

mrlsist

of the verictical members of

a

class not all

t11e

m a r n l ~ ~f

2T f l

EMFIRICXSM AND

THE EELOSOPEW OF

MLND

which re veridical and from which the non-veridical rnanbers

cannot

be

weed

out by inspection, this foundation cannot consist of such

items

as

seeing

that the facing

surface of

physical object is

red and

triangular.

Thus baIdly

puf

scarcely anyone would accept this conclusion. Rather

they

would take the

contrapositive of the

argument, and reason that

since

the

foundation of empirial knowledge is the non-inferential

knowledge

of

such

facts,

it does consist of members of a

class which

contains

non-veridicaI members But

before

it: is

thus

baldly

put, it

gets

tangled

up with the first line

of

thought. The idea springs t

mind that sensations of

red

triangles

have

exactly the

virtues

which

ostemi bIe

seeings

of r e triangularphysical

surfaces

lack. To begin with,

the

grammatical

similarity of kensation

of

a

red

triangle' to 'thought

of a celestial city is interpreted to mean or better

gives

rise to the

presupposition, that sensations belong in the same generat pigeonhole

as

thoughts-in

short, are

cognitive facts.

Then t is noticed

that

sensations

are

ex

hypothesi

far

more intimately related

to

mental

proc-

esses

than external physical objects. I t would

seem easier

to get at

a red

triangle of

which

we are having

a

sensation, than to get

at

a

red

and triangular physical surface. But,

above

all,

i t is the

fact

that

it doesn't make

sense

to speak of unveridical sensations which strikes

these philosophers, though for it to strike them

as

it does they must

overlook the fact that if it m a b

sense

to

speak

of

an

experience

as

W

it must correspondingly make sense to speak

of

it as unveridi-

d

et.

me emphasize

that

not

a T

sensedatum theorists-even of

the

classical type-have

been

gudty of all these confusions; nor are these an

the confusions

of which sense-datum

theorists have been guilty.

I

shall

have more

f a

say an this topic later. B u t the confusions

I

have men-

tioned are central to the tradition, and will serve

my present

purpose.

For the upshot of blending all these ingredients

together

is

the

idea

that a sensation

of

a red triangle is the very

paradigm of empirical

knowledge. And I think that it can readily be

seen

tha t this idea

lmds

straight

to the

ortl~odox ype

of sense-datum

theory

and

accounts

for

the

perplexities

wliich arise when one hies to think i t

through.

11.

Ailetl~erLanguage?

8. I shall now cxa~llinc ricfly a heterodox s u g p t io n 1)y, for cxnmplc,

Aycr I 2) to tllc cfl~'ct

hat

rliscotrrse ab o ~ ~ lense r l : ~: ~ s so 1 0 sl*c;lk,


6/39

another language, a language contrived by the epistemologist, for situa-

tions which the

plain man

describes

by means

of such l o ~ ~ t i o n s

s Now

the book

looks

green to

me'

and There seems

to

be a r e d and

triangular object otm

there.

The

core

of this suggestion is the idea

th t

the

vocabulary of sense data embodies no increase

in

the content

of

descriptive discourse,

as over

and

against

the

plain

man's language

of physical obi& in

Space

and Time, and

the

properties they

have

and

appear

to have. For it holds that sentences of the

form

X

presents

S with

a +

scnse

datum

are

simply

stipulated

to

have

the

same force as sentences of the form

X ooks

+

to s.

Thus

The

t om to presents S with bulgy xe

sense-daturn

would be

the contrived counterpart of The tomato looks rod

and

bulgy to S

and

would

mean exactly

what

the latter

means for

thc

simple reason

that

it was stipulatd to do

so.

As

an

aid

to

explicating

this

suggestion, I

am going

to

make

use

of

a certain picture.

I

am going to start with the idea of code,

and

I

am

going

to enrich this notion until the d e s I am talking about are

no ongermere codes. W~cther ne

wants

to a I L these enriched codes

codes at

all

is a matter which

I

shall

not

attempt

to

d d e .

Now a code,

in the scnse in which sllall use the term,

is a

system

of

symbols each of which represents

a

complete

sentence.

Thus, as

wc

initially view

the

situation, there are two

characteristic features

of

a code: (1) Each

d e ymbol

s a unit; th parts of a code

symbol

are

not

themselves

code

qmbols.

(2 )

Such

logical

relations

as

obtain

among code symbols are completely parasitid; they derive entirely

rom logical reIations

among

the sentences they repraent.

Indeed, to

speak about logical relations among codc sjlmbols is

a

way of

ta+ing

which

is introduced in

terms

of the logical relations among

the sen-

tences

they represent.

Thus,

f

0 &nds for Everybody

on

board

i~ ick and A?' or Somebody on hoard is sick, then

A

would

follow from 0 n the sense that

the

sentence qresenkscl by A

fdlows rom the sentence represented Iby 0 .

Let

me bwn to modify this austere

conception of

a code.

There

s

no reason

why

a

code symbol might not

have

parts which, withoat

bccoming full-fledged symbols on their own,

do

play

a

rolc i t1 fllc

systmn.

T'hns they

might

play

the role

of

mnemonic

rFcviccs serving to

I M I ~ in

mind of fmtnrcs

of

the

scntcnw~ cpresmtctl

by

he sy~nlmls

of which they are parts. For examplc, the

code

symbol for Sommne

on

b a r d is sick might conbin

the

letter S

a

m i n d ns

of

the

word

sick, and, perhaps,

the

reversed letter E to remind those of

us

w11o

haw a

background in

logic of the word

someone. Thus, the

flag for

Someone an

board

is sick might

be

'3 5.'

Now

thc suggestion at

wliich

I

am

obviously driving is

that

someone

might

introduce

so-called

sendatum sentences as d e ymbols or 'flags, and introduce the

vocables and @tables

they

cotltain

to

stme

the

role

of reminding

us

of certain features of the

scnterlces

in

ordinary

perceptual discourse

which

the

flags as

whole7

represent. In particular, the role

of

the

voable or

printable

sensc datum wonId

be

that of jndimti~lg hat

the

s p h l i x c d

sentence contains

the context . looks , he

vocable

or

printable

red

that

the correlated

sentence contains the

contcxt . ooks red

. .

and

so

on.

9.

Now to take this conaption of sense

datum

'sentenoes' seriously

is of

course,

to

take

scriausly

thc

idea

that

t h m

are no independent

logical relations betwain sensedatum 'sentences.' I t

looks s

though

there were such

independent

logical relations,

for

these

sentences' look

like

sentences, nd thcy

have

as

prop

parts

vocahles or pintables

which

function in

ordinary usage as

l o g i d words. Certainly if sensedatum

talk is

a code,

it is a code which is

easily

mistaken

for a

language proper.

]Let m e llustrate. A t

fitst

sight it m h i n l y seems that

A. T h e omato pram& S with

a

red sense datum

entails

both

B.

%here

are

red

sense

d t

and

C.

h e

omato

prwents

S

wid1

a

sense datum which has some specific

shadc of

red.

This, however, on the kind

of v m

I am considering, would

be

a

mistake.

(B) would follow-wen

in

the invwted commas

sense

of

'follows'

appropriate

to code

s~rmbls-from (A)

only h n s c

(B) is

the

flag

for P ) ,

Something looks

r d o somebody,

which docs

follow

from a), Tlic tomato looks rctl

to

Joncs 'k l l ich is

rcprcsci~t.cd n

the code by

( A ) .

And C)

ni~lrl follow'

fro111

( A ) , ill sljiic

of nlq,c;lr-

anccs,

only if

C )

crc tllc

f l :~g

or

:I

SUH l c ~ ~ c

llirll

Irllluws

froill

1).

I s11all Imvc

tawrc

i o

s:~y

iltot~i llis cx;krt~pIc ll 8 ~ I I O I I I V I I 1 1 1 ~ p i 1 1

to x strcwctl 11ow is t l r :~ t to wr r y old Ihis

vivw

nritairlr~~llyrrrr

raast

d a y

l o s1ic11von11)lt:s

wl pril~elllw os cllr~t li l

,'

ir, ' rrtl, rrjlor,


7/39

EMPIRICISMAND THE PHILOSOPHY OF

MIND

miimson,

d&erminabIe,

detaminatq all, 'some, exists, etc

etc., s they

=cur

in

se~lsedatum alk, the full-blooded s t a tus

of

their

counterparts in ordinary

usage.

They are rather

clues which

serve to

remind

us which

sense-datum 'flag'

it would

be proper to fly

along

with which other scnsedatum 'flags.' Thus, the vocables which make

up tbe

hvo

'flags'

(D)

All

sensedata

are red

and

E) ome sense

data

are not red

remind

us of the

genuine logica1 incompatibility

ktween, for example,

{I;)

All elephants

are

gr y

and

G)Some

elephants

are

not

grey

and

serve,

thedore as

clue

to the impropriety

of

flying these two

flags together.

For the sentences

they symbolize are, presumably,

8) Everything looks

red

to everybody

and

c) There

is s color other than red

which

something looks to

s ome

body to

have,

and

these

are

inmpatib1e.

But one would

have

to be cautious in

using

these clues.

Thus,

from

the fact that:

it is

proper

t o infer

H)

ome

elephants

have

a

determinate

shade of

pink

from

{I)

Some

elephants are pink

it would clearly

be

a

mistake

to

infer

that

the right

to

fly

K) Some

sense

data are pink

carries with it the right t fly

(L) Some sense data have

determinate shade

af pink.

9.

Rut

if sense-datum

sentences

are rally

sense-datum 'sentences'-i.e.

code

flags-it follows, of course, that sensdakurn talk neitlaer

clarifies

nor explains facts of

the

form x looks g

to S

or x is

4.

That it would

appear to

do

so

would

be bemuse

it

would

take

an

almost

superhuman

effort

to

keep from taking the vocables

and

printabla which occur in

the code (and let

me

now add to our earlier Fst the m b l e directly

known ) to be words

which

if homonyms of words in

ordinary

usage,

hnvc tlteir ordinary sense, and which, if invented,have

a

meaning

spcci-

ficcl

ly

tllcit

rcllation to the ot1ms. One

would

be constantly tanptcrl,

that is to treat sensedatum

flags

as

though

they were sentences in a

theory and

senssdatum taIk as

a language which

g e t s its

use by

coordi-

nating

sense-datum

sentences with

sentences

in ordinary perception talk,

as rnoIecuIe talk gets its

use by

coordinating sentences about popula-

tions o f

moIecuIes with

talk about the pressure of gases

on th

walls

of their containers. After

all,

x

looks

red

to

S

=

there

is class

of

red

sense

data

which

belong to x, and

are

sensed by

S

has t

least

supdcial raemblmce

to

g exerts pressure on w there is a class

of

molecules

which

make

up

g,

and

which

are

bouncing

off

w,

resemblance which becomes

wen

mme striking once it

is

granted

that the furrner is not an analysis

of

x looks red to S

n t m s

of sense

data

Therc is,

therefore,

.reason to believe that it

is

the fact that both

codes and theories are

contrived

systems which

are

under

the

control

of the Ianguage with

which

they are

coordinated, which

has given aid

and comfort

to the

idea that

sense-datum talk

is another language

for

ordinary discourse about

perception.

Yet

although

the logical re-

lations between sentences in a theoretical Tanguage are, in

an

imporhnt

sense, under the

control of logical rcla.tions

between sentcnca

in the

o h t i m anguage, neverBeless

within

the

framework of this con-

trol, the theohcat language

has an

autonomy which contradicts

the

very idea of

a

code. If this essential difference

b e h ve n

theories and

codes

is overlooked,

one

may

be

tempted

to

try

to

e t

his

mke

and

have it. By

thinking

of scnsedatum talk as merely another Janguagc,

one

draws on

the

fact that codes have no surplus value. By thinking of

sense-datum talk

as

illuminating the languageof

appearing,

one

draws

on the

fact that

theoretical languages, though

contrived,

and

depend-

ing for

their

meaningfulness on a coordination with the language of

observation,

have

an expl n tory flmction. Unfortunately, these

two

characteristics are

incompatible; for

it is

just because

theorics

hnvc

surplus

valac

that thcy can provide

explanations.

No

one,

of coursc,

wlia thinks-as,

for example, docs Aycr-of the

cxistcncc of

anst: dnhl aa CIItailing the existmcc

of

'dirwt k~lowlculgc,

would

wish to

;by

Illat sc~lscdata arc

thcorctic;ll

cutitiCs.I t collld

scarcely hc a tF~llnrctilaFI:td t l ~ : ~ tnnl dircctly

kllowing

tIut r ccrhrin


8/39

EMPIRICISM

ND

THE PHILOSOPHY

O

MWl3

sense content is red. On the other hand the idea that sense ontents

are

theoretical mtities

is

not

obviously absurd--

absurd as

to preclude

the ahovc interpretation of

the

plamibility

of

the another-language

approach.

For v n

those who introduce thc

expression

sense con-

tent by means of the context

'

is directly know11

to

be . may

fail

to

keep this

fact in mind when

putting

this expression to use-for

cxamyle,

by developing

the

idea

that physical

objects

and

prsons

alike

are patterns of

sense

contents. In such a

spccific context, it

is possible

t o

forget

that sense

contents,

thus introduced,

are essentially

sense data

and not merely items which exemplify

sense

qualities. Indeed,

one

may

men Iapse into

thinking

of

the

s nsing of sensc

contents,

the

givenness

of sense datar as

non-epistemicfacts.

I think it

fair

to say that

thos

who

offer the another-language in-

terpretation of smx data find the illumination it provides to consist

primarily in the fact

that in the

language of sense

data, physical objects

are patterns

of

sense conbts,

so

that, viewed in this framework, there

is no iron

curtain

between

the

knowing mind and the physical

world.

Jt is

to

elaborating

plausible

i f schematic) translations of physical-

object statements

into statements

about: sense contents,

rather

than

ta

spelling

out the force

of

such sentences

as

Scnse content s is directly

known

to he red, tlmt the greater part of their

phi1osophical

ingenuity

has

becn

directed.

Howcvcr

this may

be,

one thing can be said with confidence. If the

language of sense data

w r

rnerely a code, a notational device, then

thc cash value of any plidosophical darification it might provide

must

lie

in

its

ability

to

illuminate

logical

relations

within

ordinary

discourse

about physical objects and our perception of them. Thus, the fact if

it were a fact)

that

a d e

xn

be constructed for ordinary

pmqption

talk which Speaks' of

a

relation of identity

between

the compnmts

I('scnse

data )

of minds and

of

things, wo~ildpresumably have as

its cash valuc the insight that ordir~ary iscourse about

physical

objects

and

perceivers

could

( in

principle)

bc constructed fro111

sentences

of

the

form There looks

to

be

a

physical objcct with a red and triangular

facing surface

over

there (the

counterpart

in ordinary language of the

basic

expressioi~s

of

the code).

T

more traditional

terms, the

clarifica-

tion

wolrfd consist

in making

manifcst the

fact that persons and tl~ilrgs

arc

alikc logical consh~ct ions

ut of looking or appc;lrings (not

a p p r -

: ~ ~ ~ c c s l ) .nt any claim l o this

cffect

soor1 mns into instzpcr~ldc iifi-

culties

which

become

apparent

once

the

role of

'leaks or

appears

is

understood. And

it is to an emmination of this

role that I now turn.

111.

h e

Logic

of 'Looks'

10. Before

turning aside to examine

the suggestion

that the

language

of sense

data

is another language for the situations described by the

so-called

l a n p g e

of

appearing,

I

had

conduded

that

classical

sense-

datum

theories when pressed

reveal tl~emselvesto

bc

thc result: of

a

mimating

of two ideas: 1)

The

idca

that

thcrc arc

ccrtain

inner

episodes, e.g. the

sensation

of

a

red

triangle or of a

C $

sound,

which

occur to human beings and brutes

without

any prior process of Team-

ing or concept formation, and without which it would-in sonte sense-

be impossible

to see far example, that tlie

facing

surface of a

yllysical

object is

red

and triangular, or hcar t h t

a

n physiml sound is C ;

(2) The

idca that

therc

are certain

inner

episodes

which are

the

non-inferential knowfngs that, for

example, a

certain item

is

red and

triangular, or, in the case of sounds Cg which

inncr

episodes are the

necessary

conditions of empirical knowledge as providing the evidence

for

all other empiriml

propositions. If

this diagnosis

is

correct a

reason-

able

next step would

be

to examine

these

twa ide s and

determine how

that

which survives

criticism

in each is properly

to

be cornbilled with

the other. Clearly we would have t o come to grips with the idea of

inner episodes, for this s common

to

lmth.

Many who attack the

idea

of the given

seem to

have thwght that

the centraI mistake en~beddedn this idea s

exactly

the

idca that

there

are

inner

episodes,

whether

thoughts

or

so-called

immediate

e x p i -

ences, to

whicll e ch of us has privileged

access.

I shall

argue that this

is just

not so, and that the Myth

of

th

Given

c ar 1 be

displled with-

out

resortingto the crude

vcrificationimsor

aperationalisms characteris-

tic

of the

more dogmatic

forms of recent empiricism. Then there are

those who hile

they

do

not

reject the idea of inner

cpisodes find

the

Myth of the Given to consist in the idea

that

knowledge of that cpi-

sodes

furnishes prerniscs on which cmpiriral knowledge rcab

as on

a

foundatian. nut

whilc this idea

has indeed, been the most

widcsl,rcad

form

of

t l ~c

Myfi .

it

is

far

from

constituting its

esscncc.

1l:vcrylliing

llingcs on why tllcsc plrilosolhlcrs rcjcct it. If,

for

cmmplc, i l is on tltc

gnmntl

that

tl~cc ;a~~iag

f :Baagungc

s

a public p r p r o s s wliir.11~m)cccds

in

a domain

of

ptlhlk

c.)lrjtx-ts11t 1 is

govcrnccl

by ptrhlic s:utc.tions,

so

tlatt


9/39

private episodes-with the amption of

a

mysterious

nod

in their direc-

tion-must needs

escap the net of rational

dismrse ,

then, while these

philosophers are

immune to the

farm of

the myth which has flowered

in

sensedatum

theories, they

have

no defense

against

th myth in

the

form of the givenness of such facts as

that physical

object x

looks

red

to

person S a t

time t,

or that

thac looks to person

a t time

to e

a

red

physical object

over

these.

It

will

be

useful

to

pursue

the

Myth

in

this direction for a while before more general issues

are

raised.

11. Philosophers have found it easy to suppose that

such

a sentence

4s The tomato

looks

red to

Jones says that a

certain triadic relation,

looking or appearing, obtains among a physical object, a person, and a

quality.

A

ooks to

S

is

assimilated to x gives

y

to 2 -or,

better,

since

giving

is strictly speaking, an action

rather

than a relation-to x

is between y

and

z,

and

taken to

be

a case of the

general form

R(qy,z). Ehving

supposed this, they

turn

without further

ado

to

the

question,

1s

this relation

analyzab1e? Sensedatum

theorists

h v e ,

on the

wllole, answered

Yes; ' and

chimed tlut facts of

the

form

x

looks

red t o

X

are to be analyzed in terms of sense

data.

Some of

them, without necessarily rejecting this claim,

have

argued that facts

of

this

kind

are, at the very least, to be explained in terms of sense

data. Thus, when Broad (4)

writes

If, in fact, nothing elliptical is

before

my mind, it

is very

hard to

understand

why the penny should

seem

elliptic l

rather

tlun

of

any

other shape

(p. 240),

he

is

appeal-

ing to

sense-data

as a means of explaining facts

of

this form. The dif-

ference, of

course s

that

whereas if x looks

to

S is correct1y

analyzed

in

terms

of sense

dab,

then

no one

could believe th t x looks to

S

without believing that

S

has sense dab, the same

need not

be

true if

x I

to is

explaind

in

terms of sense data, for, in the

case

of

some

types of exphtion, at least, one can believe a fact without be-

lieving its explanation.

On the

other hand,

those philosophers

who

reject

sense-datum theo-

ries

in favor

of

so-calIed theories of appearing have characteristically held

that facts of the form x looks

4

to S are ultimate and irreducible, and

that

sense data are

needed neither

for their

analysis

nor fdr

their

explanation.

If

asked,

Doesn't

the

statement: looks

red

to

S'

have

as

part of

its

meaning

the idea that s

stands

in

some

relation to

something

that is

r d 7

their answer

is in

the negative, and, I believe, rightly so.

A trscful discussion

of views of

t h i s typc is to

bc

fo i~nd

n 9 )

nnd

(

3

) .

68

EMPIRICISM AND

T H E

PHILOSOPHY

O

M I N D

12.

I

shall

begin

my emmination of

X looks

red

to S at t

with

the

simple but fundamental p i n t that

the

sense

of

red in which

things look

red

is

on the

face of ic the same as

that

in

which

things

are

red.

When one gIimpses an object and decides

that i t

1mks

red

(to

me, now, from here) and wonders wl~et l~ett really is xed one is surely

wondering whether

the

color-d-which it looks to have is the one

it

r a l l y

d m

have.

This

point

can

be obscured

by

such

verbal

rnanipu-

lations as hyphenating the words looks and red and claiming that

it is the insoluble nnity looks-red

and

not just

1ooks

which is the

relation.

Insofar as

this

dodge is h s e d

on

insight

it

is

insight

into the

fact

that

looks is not a relation between person,

a

thing, and a

quality. Unfortunately,

as we

shall see, the reason for this fact is one

which gives no comfort a t all

to

the idea that

it

is looks-red

rather

than

looks which is the relation.

I

havq in ect, bmn claiming that

being

red is logically prior,

is

a

logimlly

simpler

notion,

than

looking

red;

the

frtnction

x

is

d

o

'x

looks

r e d

to

y.

In short

that it just won't

do

to say

that: x

is red

is analyzable in Z m s of

x

looks

red 2 y. But

what,

then,

are we to

make

of the

necesmry truth-and it is

of

course,

a

n-ry truth-that

x

is red = x wquld

look

o standard

observers

in standard

conditions?

There

is

&inly some

ense

to

the idea that

this is at

least

the

schema

for a de6nition of physical redness in terms of

Imking

red.

One

begins

to see the plausibility of

the

gambit that looking-red is an

insoluble

unity, for the minute one

gives

red'yon the right-hand side) an inde-

pendent status, it

becomes what

it obviously

is,

namely 'red as

a

predicate of physial objects, and the supposed definition beco ma an

obvious

circle.

13.

The

way out

of this troubling situation

has

two parts. T h e

second

is to show how

k

is

red can

be

necessarily

eguivalent

t o

x

would

look

ml to standard obsmrers in standard situations

without

this b h g a definition

of

X is fed ' n terms of x

ooks

red. But the

first, and IogicaIly prior,

step is to show

that 'k I d s red to S does

not assert either an

unanalyzable

triadic

relation

to

obtain

between

x,

r d , and

S, or

an

nrnanalyable

dyadic relation

to obtain

betwcen

x

and 5.Not,

howcvcr,

h a u s e

i t

asserts

an

analyzablc

relation to

obtain,

but because

looks is

not a relation at all. Or, to put

the

matter in

a

familiar way,

onc

can say that: looks is a

relation

if hc

likcs,

for the


10/39

sentenccs in which this word a p p r s show some

grammatical analogies

to scntcnca

built

around

wards w l ~ i c l ~e should

not

haitate

to

classify

as

relation

wards; but once

one

has

I m m e aware

of &in

other

features which

make them

vcry

anlike

ordinary relation

sentences, he

will

I>c

lcss

inclined to

vicw

his

task as

that

of

finding

the answer

to

the

question Is looks a relation?

14.

'1'0

bring

out

the essential

features

of

the

use

of

Iooks, I

shall

migage

in a little historical fiction. A young man, whom I shan a l l

John, works in a necktie shop.

e

has learned the use of color words

in the

usual way?

with

t i s

exception.

I

shall

suppose that

he has never

lookcd

at

an

object in

other than

standard conditions.

As he examines

his stock

every evening

before

closing

up shop, he says This is red,

' at

is grcen,

This

is

purple, etc,, and such of his linguistic peers

as

happen to

be present nod their heads approvingly.

Let us suppose, now,

that

at

this p i n t in the story,

e I d c ighting

is invmted. His friends

and

neighbors rapidly adopt this

new ineans

of illumination, and wrestle with

the

problems it presents. John

how-

ever, s the last to

succumb.

Justafter it has been installed in

his

shop,

one

of his

neighbors,

Jim, comes

in

to buy

a

nccktic.

Here is a handsome green on%

s p

John.

But

it isn't grcen,' says Jim, and takes John outside.

Well, xlgs John, it was mm in

there, but now

it is

Hue.*'

'No, says Jim, yu h o w that neckties

don't

change their color

merely as

a

result of being taken rom place

to

placc.

Rut

perhaps

electricity

cllanges

their color

and they

change back

again in daylight?

Tl~atwould

be

a

queer

kind of change,

wouldn't

it?

says Jim.

I

suppose

so,

says

bewildered John. But

we

saw that i t was green

in

there.

No,

we

didn't sce that

it

was

green

in

there, because it wasn't

green,

and you

can't see

what isn't

so "

Well,

this

is a pretty

pi~klq

ays John. ''I just don't know what

t o say.

T h e

slext time

John picks

up

this tie

in his shop and

son1eone

asks

what color

it

is,

his

first

impulse is

ta

say

It

is

green.

We

S U ~ ~ T B S C S

t h i s imprtl~c

nd, rcmembcring what h a p p e d

Idore,

comes

orrt

with

l r

is

Mac. Je doesn't see

th t it

is bluc, nor

wou11d

he say

that

hc

s w s

i t

to

bc

blue.

What docs 11cscc? Lck

us ask him.

EMPIRICISM AND TEIL PHILOSOPHY

OF

MKND

I don't know what. to say. If I didn't know

that the

tie is blue-

and the alternative to

grarititlg

this is odd indeed-I would

swear that

I was

seeing

a

green

tic and seeing that it is grcen. I t is as though. I

were secing the

necktie to be gecn,

If we bear in rniild that such sentences as

This

is green

have

both

a fact-stating and

a reporting

use

we can

put the point I have just

been

making

by

saying that

once

John

learns

to

stifle thc

report

l'his

necktie

is green w h

ooking

at

i t

in the shop, there

is no other report

about color and the necktie which he knows haw to make. To

be

sure,

he now

says

This necktie is blue. But he

is

not making

a reporting

use of this

sentence. He uses

it as

the conclusion

of

an

inference.

25

We

return to the shop after

an

interval,

nd

we

find that when

John

is

asked

What s the

color

of

this necktie?'

he makes suclr s ta t e

rnents as

It looks

green, but

take it

outside

and see.

lt

occurs to

us

that

perhaps

in

learning to

say

This tie looks green when in the shop,

he

has learncd

to

make

a

new

kind

of report.

Thus, it. migI1t

seem as

ttlough

his linguistic peers have helped

him

to

notice

a new kind of

objective fact, one which, though a relational

fact

involving a per-

ccivcr, is as logically indcpmdent of the belitfs, the conceptual

frame

work

of thc perceiver, as the fact that the ridtie

is

blue; but a

minimal

fact

one

which

it

is safer to report beattse

me

is

less

l&cly to e

nlistcaken. Such a

minimal fact

~vould e the fact that the necktie looks

green

to John on

a

certain

occasion,

and

it

~vouldbe

properly reported

by using

the

sentence

'%is necktie

looks green.

I t

is

this

type of

account

of

course, which

have

already rejected

Btrt

what

is

the

aIternative? If ,

that

is, we are

not

going

to

adopt

the

sense-datum

analysis.

Let me bcgin by noting

that

there certainly seems

to be soinetbing to the

idea

that

the

sentence This looks

grccn

to me

now has a reporting role.

Indeed,

it would seem to be esseiltially a

report.

But

if

so, what does it

report,

if

not

a minimal objective fact,

and

if

what i t

reports is not to be

analyzed

in tenns

of

sense

data?

16. k t me next call attention

to the

fact

that

the experience

of

l~aving

omething look

grml t o one at

a

certain

time

is, insofar as it

is an cxperiencc, 01wi011sly m y

nlucll

like that of seeing

wmcdr i l l g

to

lx

grcen,

illsofar as

the

lattm

is

3x1

expericncc.

Rut

the

latter,

of

course,

is

no t

just

s n cxpuricncc. 11ild this

i s the hmrt of

hhc n1:lthcr. I ior to

my that a c~rt:lia xlxricrlcc is a s~ c i r g

k;~Z

mnctl~itag s t l lc alsc, is

to

[lo

ntorc tlrnlr tlcqcrillc t l ~ cxpcricrrcu. t is to

cl~:~r;rulcri;r.c

t :IS, so


11/39

WiIfrid

SeIlars

to

speak,

making an assertion

or

claim,

and-which is

t he

point I wish

to

sh.ess-to

endone

that

claim. As a

matter 5

fact as we shall

see,

it

is

much more

easy

to see

that

the

statement

Jones sees

that

the

tree

is

green ascribes a

propositional

claim to Jones' xperience and en-

dorses

it, than to specify how he statement de9crt.i

Tones'

experience

1

realizc

that

by

spaking of

experiences as conbining

propositional

claims,

1

may

seem

to

be

knocking

at

closed

doors.

ask

the

rcadcx

to b a r

with

me, bowever,

as the

justification of

this

way of

talking

is

one of my major aims, If am

permitted

to issue this verbal currency

now, I

h o p to

put it

on

the gold

standard

before concluding the

argument.

16.

I t

is clear that

the

experience of seeing that something is green

is

not merely the occurrence of the propositional claim this is

green -

not wen if xve add, as must, that this claim

is

so to speak, evoked

or wrung from

the

perceiver

by

the object perceived.

Here Nature-

to

turn Kant's

simile

(which

he

uses

in

another

context) on

its

head-puts

us

to the

question.

The something more is

c l d y

what

philosophers have in mind

when

they

speak

of visual impressions or

immediate visual

experiences.

W h a t exactly is

the

logical status of

these impressions 'or 4ajmraediatexperiences

is

a problem which will

be with

m fox

the

remainder of this arprment. For the moment it is

the

propositjonal

claim which concerns us.

I

pointed

out

above

that

when we

use

the

word

see

as in S S ~ C S

that the

tr

is green

we

are

not only

ascribing

a claim to the

e x p i -

ence,

but

endorsing

it. t

is

this

endorsement w hich

Ryle

has

in

mind

when he ~eferso seeing that

something is

thus

and so as

an achieve-

ment, and to sees

as

an aclzievernent word. prefer to call i t a so

it is or

just

so word, for the root

idea

is that of

truth

o ham-

terize S's experience as

a

seeing is

in

a

suitably broad

sense-which

I

shall

be

concerned

to explicate-to apply the

sernantical

concept of

truth to that

experience.

Now the suggestion I

wish

to make is, in its simplest

terms,

that

the statement X looks green to

Jones differs

from Jones

sees that

x

is green in that whereas the latter bath ascn'bes a ~ropo sitional laim

to Jon&

experience

and

cndofses

it, the former ascribes

the

claim but

does

not endorse

it.

This is

the

essential difference between

the twor

far it is c l a r

that

two

experiences

may

be

identiml as cxpcricnca, and

yct

OIIC bc properly

referrerl to

as

a sccing

that

something is green,

and

EMPIRICISM

KD THE

PEOSDPHY

OF Id-

the other merely as a case of something's looking green. f course, i

I say X merely

looks gr n to

S I am ot only failing

t o

endorse

the

claim, I am rejecting

it,

Thus, when I

say X

looks grecn

to me

now am

reporting

the fact

that my experience is,

so

ta speak, intrinsically, as

an

experience,

in-

distinguishable

from a veridical one of seeing tha t x is green. Involved

in

the

report

is

the

ascription to

my

experience

of

the

claim

'x

is

green';

and

the

fact

that I make this report rather than the simple

report

X s

green indicates t h t certain

considerations

have

operated

to

raise, so

to speak in

a

higher

court, the

puntion

to endorse

or not

to endorse.'

I

may have

reason to think that x may not after all bep

If I

make

at

one

time the

report

X ooks to be gram -which is

not w l y

a

report, hut the

withholding

of an endorsement-I may later,

when the original

reasons

for

withholding endorsement

havc

been

rebutted,

endorse the

original claim by

saying I saw that it

was

green,

though

a t

the

time

I

was

only

sure

that i t looked green. Notice

that

I

will

only say I see that x is green (as opposed to

X

is

green )

when the question

to endorse or not to

endorse

has

come

up. I see

that x is green belongs, so to speak, on

the same

level as X

looks

p e e n and X merely looks green.

17.

There

are

many

interesting and

subtle

questions about the dialec-

tics of

looks t lr into which I

do

not

lmve

the space

to

enter.

Fortunately,

the abwe distinctions suffice for wr

present

purposes. Let

us suppose,

then,

that to

say khat X

looks green

to S

at f'

is,

in

&t,

to s y that S

has

that kind

of

experience

which, if m e

were

prepared

to

endorse the px~positional aim it involves,

one

would char-

acterize as seeing x

fo

be

green

at t Thus when

our

friend John

learns

to use the sentence This

necktie

looks green to

me he learns a

way

of reporting an experience of

the

kind

tvhich,

as

far as

any

categories

I have yet permitted him to have are

concerned, he

can only charac-

terize

by saying

that

as an experience

it

does not differ from secing

something to b e green,

and

that

evidence

for the proposition

'Tbis

necktie is

green'

is

ipso facto

evidmcc

for the

proposition

that the

cxpiencc in ql~cstion s sccing

khat

the necktic is grccn.

Naw

onc

of

the

cllicf

111crits

of

this

amant

s

that

it

pcrn~its

1~1callcl

trenhnmt

of

'qanlit;\tivc' and 'cxistcnthl' sccalirg rrr lonki~~g.

III~Is,

whcn 1

my Thc

~ C L T

I H ~ S

IPL II~

atn c ~ ~ d o r s i ~ l ~ll:lt p r t of 1E1eclaim

ittvt>lvcd n m y

xpcricr~cu

lriuh colrcurlrs t l ~ u

x ix tc~ tc .~

f

tlrc

IF

bat


12/39

EMPIRICISM A N D

TH PHILOSOPHY O MIND

withholding endorsement from

the

rest.

On

the other hand,

when

I

say There looks to be a bent tree over there I am

refusing

to endorse

any hut the

most

general aspect of the claim, namely, that there is an

'over there' as opposcd to a here. Another merit of the account is

that

it explains how a necktie, for example, can look

red

to at t, without

looking scarlet or crimson or

any

other determinate shade of

red.

In

short

it

explains

how

things can

Imve a merely

generic look,

a

fact which

would be puzzliilg indeed

i

Iooking red were a

natural

as opposed to

epistemic fact about objects. The core

of the

explanation, of

course,

is

that the propositional claim involved in such

a n

experience may be,

for example, either the more determinable claim 'This

is

red'

or

the

more determinate claim 'This is crimson.'

The

complete story is more

complicated, and requires

somc

accolrnt of the role in these experiences

of the 'impressions' or 'immediate experiences

the

logical status of

which remains to be detcrmined. But even in the abscnce of these addi-

tional details, we can note the resemblance between the fact that x c n

look

red

to

S,

without it

being

true of some specific shade

of

red that

x looks to S to be of that shade, and the fact

that

S can believe that

Cleopatra's Needle is tall, without its being t ru e

of

some determinate

number of feet tlmt S believes it to hc that

number

of fcet

tall.

18. The point 1 wish

to

stress

a t

this time, however,

is

that the con.

cept

of

looking

green, the ability to recognize that something

looks

green,

presupposes

the concept of

eing

green, and that the latter con-

cept involves the ability to tell what colors objects have

by

looking at

them-which, in turn, involves knowing in what circumstances

to

place

an object if one wishes to ascertain its color by looking at it. Let me

develop this latter point.

As

our friend John becomes more and more

sophisticated about his own and other

p p l e s

visual experiences, he

lmrns under what conditions it is as though one were seeing a necktie

to

be

of one color whcn in

fact

it

is

of another. Suppose someone asks

him Why does

this

tie look green to me? John

may

very well reply

Because it is blue,

and blue

objects look green in this kind of light.

And if someone asks this question when looking at

the

necktie in plain

daylight, John

may

very well reply Because

the

tie is greenp-to

which

he may add We

are in

plain daylight, and

in

daylight

things

look wlrat

they

are.

We

thus

sce

that

x is red =. looks red to standard observers in slanclnrrl

con

ditions

is

a

necessary

truth not

because the

right-hand side is

the

definition

of ' is

red,

but because standard conditions means conditions in

which things look what they are. And, of course, which coilditions are

standard

for a given

mode

of perception is, a t the common-sense le~ ~e l,

specified by a list of conditions which exhibit the vagueness and open

texture characteristic of ordinary discourse.

19.

I

have

arrived at

a

stage

in my argument which

is,

a t

least

prima

facie,

out of

step

with the basic presuppositions of logicaI atomism.

Thus, as long as looking

green

is t ken

to be the

notion to which

being green is reducible, it could

be

claimed with considerable plausi-

bility that fundamenfa1 concepts pertaining to observable

fact

have

that logical independence of one another which is characteristic of the

empiricist tradition. Indeed, at first sight the situation is quite disquiet-

ing, for if

the

ability to recognize that x looks green presupposes

the

concept of heing green, and if this

in

turn involves knowing in what

circumstances to view an object to ascertain

its

color, then, since onc

can

scarcely determine

what

the

circumstances

are

without noticing that

certain objects have certain perceptibIe

characteristics-incl~~ding

col-

ors-it would seem that

one

couldn't form the concept of

beirrg

green

and,

by

parity

of

reasoning, af

the

other colors, unless

he

aIrady had

them

Now, it just won't do to reply that to have the concept of green, t o

know wlmt it

is

for something to

be

p e n it. is sufficient

to

respond,

when

one is in point of fact in standard conditions, to green objects

with the vocable This is green. Not only

must

the conditions be of

a sort that is appropriate for determining

the

color of an object by

looking, the subject

must

know that: conditions of this

sort

are

appro-

priate. And

while

this does not imply that one must have concepts

before one has them, it

does

imply that one can have the concept of

grecn only by

having

a whole battery of concepts of which it is one

clcment. I t implics that while the process

of

acquiring the concept of

green may-indeed does-involve a Iong history of acquiring piecemeal

habits of responsc to various

abjects

in various circumstances, there is

an important scnsc in wliich one has no concept pertaining to the

o1)scrvable propcrtics of pllysical objects in Space and Timc unIess

one

has

thcm all-and, inclcctl, as

we

sl~all

ee

a great dcal more besides.

20. Now, 1 thi11k i t is rlcar what a logical atomist, supposiilg that

lic found i111y

nrcrit

[I i l l

illc

: ihr~vc rgumcnt, would say.

I-Ic

woulcl


13/39

EMPIRICISM AND

THE PHILOSOPHY

O MIND

s y that I am

avcrlooking

the fact that the logical space of physical

objects in

Space and Time rests

on

the logical

space

of

sense contents,

and he would argue

that

it is concepts pert ining

to

sense contents

which

hare the logical indepmdence of one another which s character-

istic

of

traditional empiricism. After all,

he

would point out

con-

cepts

pertaining

to

theoretical

entitieE-rnolecules

for example-have

the mutuaI

dependence you

have,

perhaps rightly, ascribed

to

concepts

prtaining

t physical

fact. But, he

would

continue,

thearctical

con-

epts

have

empirical content because they rest on are

coordinated

with-a more fundamental logical

s p c e .

UntiI

you

have disposed, there-

fore of the

idea that there

is

a

mare fundamental

logiml

space

than

that of physical

objects

in

Space

and Time,

or

shown that

it too

is

fraught

with coherence, your

incipient Meditations I IegeliPnnes are

premature.

And we can imagine sense-datum theorist to interject the follow

ing complaint: You have begun

to

write as though

you had

shown

not

only

that

physical

redness

is

not

to

be

anal@

in

t m s

of

lookiug

red-which

I will grant-but abo that phpical red~ress s not to be

analyzed a t all, and, in particular, not to

be

analyzed in terms of the

redness of

red sense

contents.

A e n you have

begun to write

as

though

you had shown not only that observing tha t x looks

red

is not

more basic than

observing

that x is red, but also

that

there

is no form

of visual noticing more basic

than

seeing that x s red, such as

the

sensing of a red sense content.

I grant,

he continues, that the tend-

ency of sensedatum

theorists

has

been

to daim that the redness of

physical

objects

is

to

be

analyzed

n

terms

of

looking

red,

and

then

to

claim

that

looking red

is

itself

to

be analyzed

in terms

of ~ e d

ense

contents and that you m a y have undercut this

line of

arm1ysis. But

what

is

to

prevent the sense-datum

theorist

from taking

the

line tlut

the properties

of

physical

objects

are

directly

analyzable

into

the quali-

ties and phenomenal relations o

s ns

contents?

Very well.

But

once

again

we inust ask How

does

the sense-datum

theorist ome

by the

framework

of sense

contents?

and H o w

is he

going

to

convince us that

there

are such things? m even if looking

red doesn't enter into

the

analysis of physical redness, it:

is by

asking

us to

reflect on

the experience

of having

something look red

t.0

us that

he

hopes

to

make this framework

convincing.

And t therefore bccomcs

rclcvnnk

to note that my analysis of x looks red

t

S at. t has not, at

least

as

far as

I

have pushed it to date, revealed any such items as sense-

contents. And it

may

be relevant to suggest that

once

we see clearly

that physical redness is not to be given a dispositional analysis

in

terms

of

looking

red, the idea that it is to be given any kind of dispositional

analysis loses

a

large measure of its phusibility. In

any

cvent, the next

move must be

to press

furthcr the above account of qualitative and

existential looking.

IV.

Explaining Looks

21. i have already noted that sense-datum theorists are inlpressed

by

the question How can a physical object look red to S, unless some-

thing in that situation is red and

S

is taking account of it?

If

S isn't

experiencing something red, how does it

happen

that the physical

object Iooks red, rather than green or streaky? There

is, I

propose to

show, something to this line of thought, though the story turns out to

be

a

complicated one.

And

if,

in

the course of

telling

the story,

I

shall

be

led

to

make

statements

which

resemble

some

of the things sense-

datum theorists

have

said, this

story will

amount to a sense-datum

theory only in a

sense

which robs this phrase of an

entire

dimension

of its traditional epistemologial force, a dimension which is character-

istic of even such heterodox

orms

of sense-datum

theory

as the an-

other

language

approach.

Let

me begin

by formulating the question: Is the

fact

that an

object looks to S to be red and triangular, or that there looks to S to

be

a

red a n d triangular object over there, to bc explained

in

terms of

the idea

that Jones has

a

sensation-or impression, or immediate experi-

ence-of a red triangle?

O n e

point

can

be

made

right

away,

namely

t ha t

i thcse expressions are so undcrstood

that,

say, the immediate

experience of a

red

triangle implies the existence of something-not a

physical object-which is red

and

triangular,

and

if the redness which

this

item has

is the

same as the

redness

which the

physical object looks

to

have,

then

the suggestion runs up

against

the objection that the red-

ness physical objects

look

to

have

is the

same

as the redness physical

sellars, w. 1956, empiricism & the philosophy of mind

Documents