1  

         

 

Title: Singapore and Finland: Why So Clean? Author: Felipe Garcia-Andrade Date: December 2012 Institution name/journal where submitted: McGill University

The use of this database indicates agreement to the terms and conditions Academia is a database that promotes the free exchange of exceptional ideas and scholarly work, setting a platform on which to foment and improve student discourse                                

         

  2  

Singapore and Finland: Why So Clean? Felipe Garcia-Andrade INTD 497 260266070 Introduction.

Corruption is a widespread phenomenon that affects all countries to varying

degrees. It is an affliction, which due to its corrosive social, economic, and political

effects must be actively fought and eliminated by governments. In the struggle

against corruption, there is no widely accepted remedy since social, political, and

economic idiosyncrasies vary by country, leading them to adopt different anti-

corruption strategies. Two countries that represent deeply contrasting narratives in the

realm of anti-corruption are Singapore and Finland. Despite profound cultural,

institutional, and historical divergences Singapore and Finland share a common

feature: remarkably low levels of corruption. This essay seeks to answer the question

of why, despite numerous differences, Singapore and Finland have fared so well in

corruption indices. Can we attribute their “integrity” to distinct cultural traits? Does

the answer lie in understanding electoral politics, or is it a result of historical

specificities? While these factors significantly help us to understand the exemplary

record of Singapore and Finland in relation to corruption, I will argue that the critical

factor explaining the outstanding lack of corruption in these countries is political will,

as materialized through good administration and a strong legal framework. In the case

of Singapore a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy was adopted due to rampant

corruption, while in Finland there has been a continuous process aimed at deepening

good administration.

  3  

The essay will briefly begin by discussing key concepts such as corruption

and political will. Moreover, to contextualize each case, a brief overview, first of

Singapore and then on Finland will be given, discussing the specificities of each

country that are important in assessing levels of corruption. The essay will then make

use of the countries in question to challenge conventional explanations for the

pervasiveness of corruption. Finally, a conclusion framing the implications and

presenting the relevant themes that emerge out of the analysis will be provided.

Definitions.

Defining corruption, as Colin Leys has argued, continues to be a contentious

matter.1 It has been challenging mainly as a result of determining what forms of

transactions between individuals can constitute an illicit transaction that excludes the

general public. Corruption is commonly defined as the ‘misuse of public office for

private gain.2 However, this essay will embrace the definition provided by the United

Nations Development Program (UNDP) that defines corruption as “the misuse of

public power, office or authority for private benefit – through bribery, extortion,

influence peddling, nepotism, fraud, speed money or embezzlement.”3 The UNDP’s

definition is far more comprehensive because rather than purely highlighting the

public face of corruption it also recognizes the private sector’s role, which can be a

                                                                                                               1 Colin Leys. “What is the Problem About Corruption?” The Journal of Modern African Studies, 3(2): 215-230. 2  Susan Rose-Ackerman. “Corruption”, The Encyclopedia of Public Choice, Part 1, 67-76,2003  3 United Nations Development Program (UNDP), “Fighting Corruption to Improve Governance”, New York 1999

  4  

major player in both fighting and fostering corruption. To fight corruption, a

comprehensive approach is required to either root it out, or merely to work at

preventing it from taking root in the private and public sector. Political will is one of

the important determining factors in eliminating corruption because it emphasizes the

state, the dominant actor in the affairs of a country.

Political will, as it will be discussed throughout the essay, represents the

critical variable in understanding why Singapore and Finland have achieved such low

corruption indices. Political will refers to “the demonstrated credible intent of

political actors (elected or appointed leader, civil society watchdogs, and stakeholder

group among others) to attack perceived causes or effects of corruption at a systemic

level.” 4 Without political will sincere attempts by governments to enhance

transparency, fight corruption, enact structural reforms, advance accountability, or

reinvent state-civil society relationships remain purely rhetorical.

Singapore: The Top-Down Model

Singapore today rightfully prides itself on being one of the cleanest countries

in terms of corruption, having repeatedly ranked in the top ten of Transparency

International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI), published since 1995.5 However,

Singapore’s anti-corruption fight has not forever been a success.

Singapore was a British colony from 1824 to August 1964 when official

independence was recognized, although self-government had been attained earlier in

                                                                                                               4 Kpundeh J. Sahr. “Political Will in Fighting Corruption” Integrity Improvement Initiatives in Developing Countries. 5 Transparency International. Policy and Research, Surveys and Indices, CPI. http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi

  5  

1959. Throughout the period of colonization corruption in Singapore was rampant

due to the fact that the British had failed to seriously address the matter. The official

fight against corruption in Singapore could be dated to 1871 with the enactment of

the Penal Code of the Straits Settlements. However, it was only in 1959, when the

ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) attained self-government that the course of

corruption in Singapore gradually but firmly changed as a result of a visionary

government with the political will to pursue national development. The PAP

government has remained in power since its first election, being labeled a “soft”

authoritarian state. To appreciate the radical but positive upheaval associated with

limiting corruption in Singapore, it is first necessary to understand the causes of

corruption.

Throughout the colonial period Singapore experienced extensive corruption in

the police and civil service. For example, an analysis of police corruption by the

Straits Times from 1845 to 1921 showed that 172 cases were reported during this

period with bribery being the most common form of police corruption (109 cases or

63.4%), followed by 42 cases (24.4%) of involvement in direct criminal activities

such as theft and robbery.6 Leslie Palmier in a study on corruption in Indonesia,

India, and Hong Kong contends that bureaucratic corruption is a result of low salaries,

an opportunity structure allowing for corruption, and a low risk of detection and

punishment:

Bureaucratic corruption seems to depend not on any one of the [three] factors identified, but rather on the balance between them. At one extreme, with few

                                                                                                               6 Jon S.T. Quah. “Police Corruption in Singapore: An Analysis of its Forms, Extent and Causes', Singapore Police Journal, Volume 10, Number 1, pp. 7-43, 1979.

  6  

opportunities, good salaries and effective policing, corruption will be minimal; at the other, with many opportunities, poor salaries and weak policing, it will be considerable.7

In Singapore the incentives for the civil service to engage in corruption were present

due to poor economic conditions – persistently low wages paid to the civil service

coupled with high inflation during the Japanese occupation between 1942 and 1945 –

and an existent opportunity structure resulting from poor monitoring by the Anti-

Corruption Branch (ACB).8 These conditions enabled corruption to become “a way of

life for many people as it was perceived by the public as a low risk, high reward

activity since corrupt officials were seldom caught and even if they were caught, they

were not severely punished.”9 This resulted in an incompetent and ineffective

bureaucracy that hampered the country’s development until the rise of the PAP in

1959, who was committed to eradicating corruption. In essence, Singapore’s top-

down model led by the PAP has been faced with the daunting task of transforming a

poor and endemically corrupt society and civil service into a developed and upright

one.

Upon taking office in 1959, the PAP inherited a corrupt Singapore Civil

Service (SCS) that was not concerned with the country’s long-term development, and

a powerless Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB). As a result, the newly elected political

elite, anxious to see the country develop and prosper, recognized that in order for the

                                                                                                               7 Leslie Palmier. The Control of Bureaucratic Corruption: Case Studies in Asia, Allied Publishers 1985, New Dehli, India, p. 271-272 8 Jon S.T. Quah. “Wielding the Bureaucracy for Results: An Analysis of Singapore’s Experience in Administrative Reform,” Asian Review of Public Administration, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1996. 9 Jon S.T. Quah. “Combating Corruption in Singapore: What Can Be Learned?” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2001.

  7  

SCS to attain the country’s development goals, a new approach to curbing the

problem of corruption was necessary. Consequently, political will was channeled into

designing a new anti-corruption strategy that would be based on the logic of

controlling corruption by “minimizing or removing the conditions of both the

incentives and opportunities that make corrupt behavior irresistible.”10 The new

strategy would be comprehensive, accounting for legislative, administrative, and

preventive measures. The approach would consist of two parts: 1) amending the

Prevention of Corruption Ordinance (POCO) enacted by the British and, 2) the

improvement of the Singapore Civil Service (SCS) through salaries and working

conditions. The political will of Singaporean authorities in seriously addressing

corruption was thus demonstrated in the first part by updating the inefficient POCO

through the Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA), which provisioned the state with

stricter legislation and the empowerment of the Corrupt Practices, secondly through

the creation of the Investigation Bureau (CPIB), which replaced the ineffective ACB.

Lee Kuan Yew’s government, Singapore’s Prime Minister at the time,

continued to demonstrate political will by redrafting legislation, reflected by the

enactment of the 1960 POCA, an updated version of the Prevention of Corruption

Ordinance (POCO) passed by the British during colonization. The renewed political

commitment was displayed in the strengthened POCA vis-à-vis the POCO as

follows. 11 First, the POCA's scope, contrary to the POCO’s 12 sections, was

                                                                                                               10 Jon S.T. Quah “Singapore's Experience in Curbing Corruption,” in Heidenheimer, A.J., Johnston, M. and LeVine, V. (Eds), Political Corruption: A Handbook, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, p. 842 11 Prevention of Corruption Act (Chapter 241).

  8  

increased to 32 sections with a final increase to 37. Moreover, to enhance the POCA's

deterrent effect, the penalty for corruption was first increased to imprisonment for

five years and/or a fine of S$10,000, and was further raised to $100,000 in 1989. The

POCO, in contrast, penalized individuals guilty of corruption with a prison term of

two years and/or a fine of S$10,000. Thirdly, a person found to have engaged in

corruption and receiving money illegally had to pay the amount taken as a bribe in

addition to any other punishment imposed by a court. Lastly, and most importantly,

the POCA provided the CPIB more powers and a new lease on life. For example,

section 15 provided CPIB officers with the power to arrest and search arrested

persons, Section 17 empowered the Public Prosecutor to authorize the CPIBs Director

and his senior staff to investigate ‘any bank account, share account or purchase

account' of any one suspected of having committed an offence against the POCA, and

Section 18 enabled the CPIB officers to inspect a civil servant's banker's book and

those of his wife, child or agent, if necessary.12 The POCA has served to provide as a

legal deterrent for potential wrongdoers, and more importantly has “armed” the CPIB

with the necessary powers to persecute, investigate, and charge anyone engaging in

corrupt activities.

When the PAP was elected to government it found itself with a widely

corrupt SCS. It quickly recognized the need to transform the corrupt and inefficient

SCS into a first-class civil service agency through administrative and attitudinal

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/aol/home.w3p 12 Prevention of Corruption Act (Chapter 241).

  9  

reforms in order to achieve long-term development. However, four major weaknesses

affecting the SCS must be recognized first.

First, while the SCS could perform “housekeeping” functions, it was unable

and unprepared to analyze and implement potentially beneficial socioeconomic

policies. This meant, essentially that the SCS, under British rule, played a minor role

in national development.13 Moreover, the SCS, during British rule suffered from

rampant corruption. For instance, a Commission of Inquiry in 1884 found that there

was systematic corruption in the police forces of Singapore.14 The third factor that

made the SCS weak during colonial rule was the “colonial mentality” and

insensitivity to the needs of the population. The final element hampering the abilities

of the bureaucracy to effectively advance developmental goals was that “the British

colonial government failed to curb corruption mainly because of its lack of

commitment, as reflected in its adoption of an incremental rather than a

comprehensive anti-corruption strategy.15

The SCS was, accordingly, the critical instrument for the PAP government,

not only because it was composed of the most select recruits, but also because these

recruits would be well-paid and an effective anti-corruption agency would be

established.

                                                                                                               13 Jon S.T. Quah “Wielding Bureacracy for Results: An Analysis of Singapore’s Experience in Administrative Reform.” Asian Review of Public Administration 14 Jon S.T. Quah. “Sustaining quality in the Singapore Civil Service”, Public Administration and Development, Vol. 15, 335-343, 1995. 15Jon S.T. Quah. “Controlling corruption in city-states: A comparative study of Hong Kong and Singapore” Crime, Law & Social Change 22: 391--414, 1995. p. 393

  10  

To attract the brightest individuals the PAP government employed the Public

Service Commission (PSC). The PSC not only provided funds to offer scholarships to

the most outstanding students in order for the locals to pursue an education at home

or abroad, but also raised awareness about the employment opportunities at the SCS

by conducted briefing sessions.16 These sessions were done with the purpose of

graduating students in order to attract the necessary human capital to foster

development. Furthermore, the PAP Government adopted a policy of ensuring

competitive pay for its bureaucrats by periodically revising civil service salaries to

keep pace with rising wages in the private sector, enabling the SCS not only to retain

its high caliber personnel but also to sustain its quality service.17 As a result of its

efforts, the state has been able to attract the most prepared individuals and has created

a remarkable bureaucracy based on a culture of merit. Edgar Schein has said that

“having the best and brightest in government is probably one of Singapore’s major

strengths in that they are potentially the most able to invent what the country needs to

survive and grow and to overcome” problems.18

Moreover, further evidence of the Singaporean political elite’s efforts at

advancing the anti-corruption cause was the creation of the Service Improvement

Unit (SIU), formed in April 1991 with the following provisions. First, it was designed

to measure, review, audit and assess the present level and speed of service provided

by Government departments and statutory boards to the community. Its mandate was

                                                                                                               16 Jon S.T. Quah 17 Jon S.T. Quah “Sustaining quality in the Singapore Civil Service” 18  Edgar Schein. Strategic Pragmatism: The Culture of Singapore’s Economic Development Board. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996, p. 221-222  

  11  

also to identify problem areas and make recommendations to the ministries concerned

for remedial action to be taken. Moreover, another task has been to foster amongst

“Singaporeans a sense of common ownership and collective responsibility by inviting

their participation in improving the standard of public service through dialogue with

organizations, and inviting them to suggest alternatives to government systems and

procedures which need improvement, and to compile and consider these proposition

through the Quality Service Managers.”19 Lastly, a permanent Ministry Secretary is

responsible for ensuring that each department under him has a committee to review

anti-corruption measures and to ensure that reasonable and adequate measures are

taken to prevent corrupt practices including improving working conditions,

improving cumbersome work methods, reviewing procedures that promote corrupt

practices in order to prevent them from occurring, rotating the officers periodically,

and ensuring that besides routine checks, surprise checks are carried out

systematically and regularly by senior officers.20

As discussed above, the political elite of Singapore has been extremely

committed to the fight against corruption through a comprehensible strategy that has

been based on political will and the development of a first-class civil service and a

strong legal framework.

Finland: A Legalistic and Democratic Model

Finland, like Singapore, stands out for having an irreproachable record in

fighting and preventing corruption. As with Singapore, Finland also experienced                                                                                                                19  Jon S.T. Quah “Sustaining quality in the Singapore Civil Service”  20 Muhammad Ali. “Eradicating Corruption – The Singapore Experience”, Seminar on International Experiences on Good Governance and Fighting Corruption, 2000.

  12  

foreign occupation, first being part of Sweden until 1809, and then under Russian

imperial control until independence in 1917. Nevertheless, contrary to Singapore, the

challenge since independence has not been so much with endemic corruption as it has

been with the continuous task of maintaining and reforming a comprehensible system

of good governance and administration. Finland has had a strong anti-corruption

record as a result of the inheritance from Sweden of a tradition honoring the rule of

law, and, more importantly, due to political will in the post-independence period.

Finnish authorities upheld the legal system by developing a corruption-free society

through a comprehensive political system advancing equality, good governance, and

good administration. The political and social architecture that the Finish political elite

developed over time is one that includes accountability in governance, an efficient

administration comprised of a competent and meritocratic civil service, and a strong

cultural context characterized by social trust and state-society transparency. These

high levels of public trust, coupled with efficient and responsive political institutions

and a predilection for the rule of law have translated into a political culture in which

the population is intolerant of any corrupt and dishonest behavior and closely

monitors the government.21

It is almost impossible for a country to achieve relatively low levels of

corruption without a trusted and empowered legal system. In Finland, the

administration of justice is performed by the lower courts, district courts, the

Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court. The lower courts are

                                                                                                               21 Darren Zook. “The Curious Case of Finland’s Clean Politics”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 20, No. 1, John Hopkins University Press 2009

  13  

composed of a judge and a jury comprised of a number of laymen elected by the

people. If they differ in a decision, it is the jury that unanimously makes the final

decision. In a country with a legalistic tradition, these courts have played a key role in

creating and sustaining popular confidence in the legal system.22

While Singaporean authorities inherited an ineffective legal system from the

British that had to be strengthened, the Finnish elites have worked to develop a strong

and egalitarian rule of law from the outset. Finland appears to best reflect a robust

legal system, not only because it ranks highly on corruption indices but also because

it is founded on a legalistic tradition inherited from Sweden that dates as far back as

1809. John Wuorinen describes this legal tradition and its possible effects saying that

“Finland was, after 1809, ‘a nation with a constitution’ or, to put it differently, a

nation whose government was rationally organized; its traditional institutions

included, among other things.”23 Moreover, a quintessential element of a well

functioning rule of law that deters corruption is an independent judiciary. The Finnish

political elite, visionary and faithful to their legalistic tradition, enshrined in the 1919

constitution the precedent of an autonomous judiciary, but also codified other critical

legal provisions necessary for the fostering of a transparent, equal, and accountable

political culture:

The constitution contained provisions which embedded in the fundamental law the tradition and practice of judiciary independence that had been a fact long before the nineteenth century. It likewise included a bill of rights which contained not only the usual safeguards of individual liberty, the right of free speech, assembly and the inviolability of property, but others less common.24

                                                                                                               22 Wuorinen, p. 254 23 John Wuorinen “A History of Finland”, Columbia University Press 1965 24 Wuorinen, p. 235

  14  

The foundation of Finland’s legal culture was laid during the 700 years under

Swedish rule, providing Finland with an enduring and “strong legalistic tradition.”25

Finnish authorities have continued to deepen these government traditions, including

an anti-corruption stance. The political elite has demonstrated its will to ensure

integrity and transparency through the Penal Code, especially chapter thirteen, the

enactment in 1994 of the State Civil Servants Act and in 2004 the Administrative

Procedure Act (APA).

The basic legislative idea of the APA has been to unite administrative

principles and good administration into one law, with the purpose of achieving and

promoting good administration, access to justice in administrative matters, and

promotion of the quality and productivity of administrative services.26 To accomplish

its objectives and reduce corruption, legal principles in the Act emphasized than an

authority shall treat members of the public on an equal basis and exercise its

discretion only for purposes acceptable under the law. Furthermore, the Penal Code,

apart from penalizing anyone in the public for illicit personal enrichment, is

provisioned with chapter forty, which concerns “Offences in Office.” The following

are the crimes listed in the Code, including 1) acceptance of a bribe and aggravated

acceptance of a bribe, 2) bribery violation, 3) acceptance of a bribe as a Member of

Parliament, 4) breach and negligent breach of official secrecy, 5) abuse of public

                                                                                                               25 Matti Joutsen, Raimo Lahti and Pasi Pölönen. “Criminal Justice Systems in Europe and North America: Finland”, European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, Finland 2001, p. 3 26 Ministry of Justice. Administrative Procedure Act (434/2003) http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/2003/en20030434.pdf

  15  

office and aggravated abuse of public office, and 6) violation of official duty and

negligent violation of official duty.27 The effectiveness of the Finnish legal system

can best be depicted by the fact that the average prison population in Finland has

decreased from a high of almost 5,600 in 1976 to slightly below 3,200 during 1993.

In addition, in 1986 there were 86 prisoners per 100,000 in population. By 1993, this

had decreased to 67.28

These Acts and chapter thirteen of the Penal Code reflect the legislative will

of Finnish authorities and its profound commitment to the rule of law as a means for

achieving a corrupt-free society. With this strong legal framework deterring both

public and private wrongdoers, the Finnish civil service has proven to be highly

effective and honest. For instance, in the aftermath of World War II Finland lost 12%

of its territory and had to pay severe war-indemnities to the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, through state-led development Finland experienced rapid growth in the

1950s and especially in the 1960s and early 1970s, raising economic levels to those

of neighboring Scandinavian countries, and became one of the economic leaders in

the agricultural sector among OECD-countries during the 60s and 70s. 29 This

economic growth in Finland was coupled with an enlarging public sector. The

combination of state-led development and a burgeoning economy would have led

many to believe that the ground was fertile for corruption to flourish. However,

                                                                                                               27 Ministry of Justice. The Penal Code of Finland (39/1889; amendments up to 650/2003 included) 28 Joutsen, Lahti and Pölönen, p.49 29 Matti Alestalo and Stein Khunle. “The Scandinavian Route: Economic, Social and Political Developments in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden”, Research Reports, No. 31, Research Group for Comparative Sociology, University of Helsinki, 1984. p. 25

  16  

Finland was never significantly corrupt in these years but only had been in the

immediate post-war period and in the 1980s, and never during the years of economic

growth. Additionally, bribery has been decreasing exponentially over a period of time,

especially if we take into account the growth of the public sector, and the number of

civil servants.30 These two developments are quite indicative of the efficacy and

integrity of Finland’s public sector and also of the state and its political will to foster

both economic growth at the hands of an honest civil sector.

The elements that explain why the civil sector in Finland has proven be honest

and professional are various. First, Finnish welfare has provided for a relatively equal

society. The Finnish welfare model has been based on the rule of law, with higher

education being a requirement for the 4.5 million that has helped the country prosper.

Finns have all been provided with a basic retirement pension, free education from

kindergarten through university, free healthcare, and excellent unemployment

benefits. All this has reduced the necessity of bribing civil servants, and has limited

civil servant interest in accepting bribes. 31 Rothstein and Uslaner argue the

importance of an equitable society:

We argue that the roots of generalized trust lie in a more equitable distribution of resources and opportunities in a society. Countries with histories of greater equality such as the Nordic nations also had histories of less repressive and more honest arguments.32

                                                                                                               30 Tiihonen, p. 101 31 Tiihonen, p. 109 32 Rothstein, Bo and Eric Uslaner. All for all: Equality, Corruption and Social Trust. World Politics, Volume 58, Number 1, October 20, p. 44

  17  

Other factors include the referendary system and the collegiate decision structure. 33

The former is an old pillar of legalism in the Finnish administration that ensures that

civil servant opinions are seriously considered. Essentially how it works is that a

referendary is a civil servant who does research and who has a right – only him/her –

to make a proposal about a decision, in a legal sense. What this means is that even

though a minister can make a political decision, and differ from the proposal of the

referendary, only the civil servant is legally responsible for decisions, so he/she has

the final say. The latter is about how collective decision-making by a collegiate body

can cause corruption to become much more difficult and uncertain, but not

impossible. More people must be convinced, one way or another, of the advisability

of deciding in favor of an interest group, and there is always the possibility of a

potentially corrupt individual acting as a whistle-blower. Additionally, the

bureaucracy is comprised of non-political servants who are obliged to keep diaries

and records of the public administration open to the public in order to promote

transparency. They also continuously check corruption standards as set by the

Supreme Court, who from time to time clarifies what are the necessary norms at a

given point in time.34 The Ombudsman and the Office of the Chancellor are two

institutions that serve to further advance and supervise legality in Finland, and are

empowered with all the necessary resources and have been established with the

overall aim of safeguarding the rights of citizens.35 Though a lengthy description,

                                                                                                               33 Tiihonen, p. 109 34 Tiihonen, p. 110-111 35 Ari Salminen, Ollie-Peka Vinamari & Rinna Ikola-Norbacka. “The Control of Corruption in Finland”. Administratie Dministraţie Şi Management Public, 2007

  18  

Wuorinen accurately captures and summarizes the legal, honest, and transparent

system that governs Finland:

Even good laws and institutions may bear heavily upon the citizen if their application and work depend upon incompetent or corrupt civil servants and officials. In the main government administration, the courts in Finland were and are in hands of competent personnel. Public opinion, which has been a force of utmost importance since full political emancipation and an extensive press and the like were achieved over half a century ago, demands honesty and impartially of public servants. Law requires that appointment be based on “merit and ability.” The civil service has escaped the blight of party politics and has remained independent of outside influences. As a result, the civil servant may be, and occasionally is, an over bearing secure officeholder in his job but more frequently he is a good more than a mere cog in the machine: an incorruptible and efficient servant of the public.36

For centuries the Finnish state has been committed to upholding the rule of law in

order to attain a comprehensive system of governance free of corruption. The success

at achieving the persistent and remarkable scores against corruption is a result of the

states’ determination in affirming its legal tradition and an equally important

contribution from a first-class civil service characterized by its professionalism and

integrity.

After having analyzed the successes in combating corruption by Finland and

Singapore, their examples appear to challenge conventional accounts for the

prevalence of corruption. First, the argument that corruption is a colonial legacy,

voiced under dependency theory by Raul Prebisch and Hans Singer, among others.

Finland and Singapore were occupied by Sweden and Russia, and Great Britain and

Japan respectively. While Finland’s transition to independence was through a full-

fledged civil war that could have cemented a weak institutional structure and allowed

                                                                                                               36 Wuorinen, p. 254

  19  

corruption to flourish, Singapore endured a lack of political will on behalf of the

British administration who were unwilling to tackle the corruption issue at root.

Despite these grievances both countries have recently demonstrated the necessary

political determination to rise to the upper echelons of anti-corruption rankings.

Moreover, another argument commonly articulated is that wealth is associated with

low corruption while poverty implicates high levels of corruption. Finland and

Singapore were both initially poor and have gradually achieved enormous economic

growth rates, but they have also done so by means of an interventionist government.

This in turn questions the commonly accepted view that a “big state” equates higher

opportunity for corruption.

Singapore and Finland, while representing geographically, culturally, and

institutionally distinct cases, have both achieved significant progress in the fight

against corruption. Singapore is a small and culturally heterogeneous country whose

power has been monopolized by the PAP since 1959. Finland, on the other hand, has

been under democratic governance since its independence in 1917 with a relatively

homogeneous population. As a result of the successes by Singapore and Finland in

controlling, eliminating, and preventing corruption, some general features are worth

highlighting.

First, whether it is in the context of rampant corruption, as in Singapore, or in

constructing a country founded on good governance principles, as in Finland, a robust

legal system is a requirement for preventing corruption. Both cases seem to fit the

argument that colonial heritage and historical legacies influence current corruption

  20  

levels.37 The colonial legacy in question is that of a well-founded legal system.

Although this is an exogenous feature that Singaporean and Finnish elites found

themselves with, both cases have a different trajectory within their legal systems. The

PAP government in Singapore inherited a British common law system that at the time

of independence was ineffective in preventing corruption due to a lack of political

will by the British administration, and that the elected government decided to

strengthen. Sweden, on the other hand,fc had a 700-year-old legalistic tradition at the

time of independence that was further deepened and updated by a committed political

leadership. In sum, while all countries have some form of legal base, inherited or not,

it is the political will, or lack thereof, of a sovereign state to firmly employ and

empower their rule of law that will determine whether or not they continue to suffer

the effects of corruption.

Moreover, once political will is channeled into the anti-corruption struggle,

“politicians must have the willpower to pass legislation to put structures in place and

arm them with the capacity to effectively accomplish their goals.”38 This essentially

means that to fight corruption a long-term and comprehensible approach must include

civil society actors, and all the necessary institutions must be empowered with the

required instruments and policies – investigation, prosecution, research, and

prevention.

Both Singapore and Finland are at present in solid standing in the fight against

corruption. Nevertheless, they cannot lower their guard at any point but instead must

                                                                                                               37 Daniel Treisman. The causes of corruption: a cross-national study. Journal of Public Economics 76, 399–457, 2000. 38 Kpundeh, p, 105  

  21  

continue to expand and enact measures that will close any doors for potential

wrongdoers.

References Rose-Ackerman, Susan. “Corruption”, The Encyclopedia of Public Choice, Part 1, 67-76,2003 Ali, Muhammad . “Eradicating Corruption – The Singapore Experience”, Seminar on International Experiences on Good Governance and Fighting Corruption, 2000. Ari Salminen, Ollie-Peka Vinamari & Rinna Ikola-Norbacka. “The Control of Corruption in Finland”. Administratie Dministraţie Şi Management Public, 2007. Joutsen, Matti; Lahti; Raimo and Pölönen, Pasi. “Criminal Justice Systems in Europe and North America: Finland”, European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, Finland 2001. Kpundeh, J. Sahr. “Political Will in Fighting Corruption” in “Integrity Improvement Initiatives in Developing Countries” ed. G. Shabbir Cheema Leys, Colin. “What is the Problem About Corruption?” The Journal of Modern African Studies, 3(2): 215-230. Ministry of Justice, Finland. The Penal Code of Finland (39/1889; amendments up to 650/2003 included) Ministry of Justice, Finland. Administrative Procedure Act (434/2003). http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/2003/en20030434.pdf Palmier, Leslie . The Control of Bureacratic Corruption: Case Studies in Asia, Allied Publishers 1985, New Dehli, India, p. 271-272 Prevention of Corruption Act (Chapter 241). http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/aol/home.w3p Quah, Jon S.T. “Police Corruption in Singapore: An Analysis of its Forms, Extent and Causes', Singapore Police Journal, Volume 10, Number 1, pp. 7-43, 1979. Quah, Jon S.T. “Sustaining quality in the Singapore Civil Service.” Public Administration and Development, Vol. 15, 1995. Quah, Jon S.T. “Controlling corruption in city-states: A comparative study of Hong Kong and Singapore” Crime, Law & Social Change 22: 391--414, 1995.

  22  

Quah, Jon S.T. “Wielding the Bureaucracy for Results: An Analysis of Singapore’s Experience in Administrative Reform,” Asian Review of Public Administration, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1996. Quah, Jon S.T. “Combating Corruption in Singapore: What Can Be Learned?” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2001. Quah Jon S.T. “Singapore's Experience in Curbing Corruption,” in Political Corruption: A Handbook eds. Heidenheimer, A.J., Johnston, M. and LeVine, V. . Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, pp. 841-853. Rothstein, Bo and Uslanerm Eric. All for all: Equality, Corruption and Social Trust. World Politics, Volume 58, Number 1, 2005. Schein, Edgar H. Strategic Pragmatism: The Culture of Singapore’s Economic Development Board. Cambridge, the MIT Press, 1996 Tiihonen, Paula. “Good Governance and Corruption in Finland,” in “The History of Corruption in Central Government,” ed. Seppo Tiihonen, IOS Press, 2003 Transparency International. Policy and Research, Surveys and Indices, CPI. http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi United Nations Development Program. Country Profiles and International Human Development Indicators, Singapore. http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/SGP.html United Nations Development Program (UNDP), “Fighting Corruption to Improve Governance”, New York, 1999. Wuorinen, John. “A History of Finland”, Columbia University Press 1965 Zook, Darren . “The Curious Case of Finland’s Clean Politics”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 20, No. 1, John Hopkins University Press 2009