social safety nets in indonesia: analysis and prospects - puguh bodro irawan, 2002

PART FOUR

Social Safety Nets in Indonesia:Analysis and Prospects*

* The study was based on a paper prepared for ESCAP by Mr Puguh B. Irawan, Social Economist,Central Board of Statistics; and Mr Erman A. Rahman, Mr Haning Romdiati and Ms UzairSuhaimi, National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS), Indonesia. The views expressedare those of the authors only. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations orits Secretariat.

Strengthening Policies and Programmes on Social Safety Nets

I. BACKGROUND

A. Impacts of the 1997 economic crisis

The most severe social impact of the crisis in Indonesia was the worsening of povertythat, in fact, had improved quite impressively in the two and a half decades preceding the1997 economic crisis. Between 1976 and 1996, poverty had declined from around 40 percent to just over 11 per cent (Table 1). The success of poverty alleviation was coupled withclear improvements in such areas as education and health. However, the crisis reversedthese developments, raising the number of poor people to 49.5 million by December 1998from 34.5 million in 1996.

The intensification of poverty was related to several factors: (a) the skyrocketingprices of basic commodities; (b) the contraction in production resulting in increases inunemployment; (c) the decline in household income in both urban and rural areas; and (d)the impact of El Niño.

Since then, however, the number of poor people has fallen from 48.4 million inFebruary 1999 to 37.5 million in August 1999. This favourable turn of events was greatlyinfluenced by the deflating prices of food commodities as well as the steady, although slow,recovery of the economy in general. To a certain extent, it may also have been a positiveeffect of social safety net programmes, such as Special Market Operations for Rice (OPK)and the labour intensive programme.

Notwithstanding the currently improved situation, the Government did not act quicklyenough in responding to the crisis when it erupted. It was stymied by an inadequatebureaucracy, the absence of early monitoring systems for social concerns, even by theunavailability of reliable and timely poverty statistics, as well as information on theidentification of the poor. It took some time, at least a full year, before it could mountmeaningful social safety net programmes.

B. Objectives of the study

The present country study has the following objectives:

(a) To assess the adequacy of policy formulation of social safety nets in Indonesia;

(b) To assess the efficacy of social safety net programme implementation; and

(c) To recommend measures to strengthen the responsiveness of social safety netprogrammes to short-term emergencies as well as to long-term strategies.

Social Safety Nets in Indonesia: Analysis and Prospects

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C. Anti-poverty policies

Long before the crisis, since the early 1970s, poverty alleviation has been one of themajor priorities in Indonesia’s national development strategy, although it was never statedexplicitly in any official document until the early 1990s. Various anti-poverty policies priorto the crisis in the country were carried out by both the Government and non-governmentalorganizations (NGOs), frequently with support in the form of financial assistance fromvarious donor agencies. The fundamental goal of this anti-poverty strategy was improvingthe welfare of the population and reducing the socio-economic gap or inequalities betweensub-groups of the population.

Table 1. Indonesia: Poverty line, estimated number and percentageof poor people, 1976-1999

Poverty line Percentage of poor people Number of poor people(rupiah/capita/m) (Po – Headcount Index) (in millions)

YearUrban & Percentage Urban & Absolute

Urban Rural Urban Rural rural points Urban Rural rural changechange (millions)

1976 4 522 2 849 38.8 40.4 40.1 – 10.0 44.2 54.2 –1978 4 969 2 981 30.8 33.4 33.3 – 6.8 8.3 38.9 47.2 – 7.01980 6 831 4 449 29.0 28.4 28.6 – 4.7 9.5 32.8 42.3 – 4.91981 9 777 5 877 28.1 26.5 26.9 – 1.7 9.3 31.3 40.6 – 1.71984 13 731 7 746 23.1 21.2 21.6 – 5.2 9.3 25.7 35.0 – 5.61987 17 381 10 294 20.1 16.1 17.4 – 4.2 9.7 20.3 30.0 – 5.01990 20 614 13 295 16.8 14.3 15.1 – 2.3 9.4 17.8 27.2 – 2.81993 27 905 18 244 13.4 13.8 13.7 – 1.4 8.7 17.2 25.9 – 1.31996 38 246 27 413 9.7 12.3 11.3 – 2.3 7.2 15.3 22.5 – 3.4

1996a 42 032 31 366 13.6 19.9 17.7 – 9.6 24.9 34.5 –Dec. 1998 96 959 72 780 21.9 25.7 24.2 6.5 17.6 31.9 49.5 15.0Feb. 1999 92 409 74 272 19.5 26.1 23.5 – 0.7 15.7 32.7 48.4 – 1.1

(19.4) (26.0) (23.4) (15.6) (32.4) (48.0)Aug. 1999 89 845 69 420 15.1 20.2 18.2 – 5.3 12.4 25.1 37.5 –10.9

(15.0) (20.0) (18.0) (12.3) (24.8) (37.1)

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, 2000, Penyempurnaan Metodologi Penghitungan Penduduk Miskin danProfil Kemiskinan 1999(The revised methodology of counting the poor and poverty profiles 1999).

Note: 1. Figures in brackets are without East Timor.2. The highlighted figures (1996a-Aug.1999) apply a consistent standard of defining minimum basic

food and non-food in the poverty line.

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Table 2. Indonesia: The averaged nominal (and real) expenditure, 1996-1999

(rupiah/capita/month)

URBAN RURAL

Lowest Middle Highest Lowest Middle Highest40 per 40 per 20 per All 40 per 40 per 20 per Allcent cent cent cent cent cent

1996 46 918 91 576 226 633 100 639 30 552 50 809 100 920 52 696

Dec. 1998 92 790 168 249 387 463 181 809 65 970 109 394 202 463 110 601(46 713) (84 700) (195 058) (91 527) (33 211) (55 071) (101 924) (55 679)

Feb. 1999 98 907 186 599 419 272 198 056 70 697 115 414 212 261 116 893(47 753) (90 092) (202 430) (95 624) (34 133) (55 414) (102 482) (56 437)

Aug. 1999 97 369 184 030 430 960 198 701 67 379 112 801 217 919 115 603(48 672) (91 992) (215 426) (99 325) (33 681) (56 386) (108 932) (57 787)

Percentage change:

1996-Dec. 1998 97.8 83.7 71.0 80.6 115.9 115.3 100.6 109.9 (–0.4) (–7.5) (–13.9) (–9.1) (8.7) (8.4) (9.9) (5.7)

Dec. 1998- 4.9 9.4 11.2 9.3 2.1 3.1 7.6 4.5Feb. 1999 (2.2) (6.4) (3.8) (4.5) (2.8) (0.6) (0.5) (1.4)

Feb. 1999- –1.6 –1.4 2.8 0.3 –4.7 –2.3 2.7 –1.1Aug. 1999 1.9) (2.1) (6.4) (3.9) (–1.3) (1.8) (6.3) (2.4)

Source: Irawan and Romdiati (2000).

Note: Numbers in brackets indicate the values of real expenditure/capita/month after the adjustment ofinflation rates in the respective periods.


Several programmes were implemented as part of the anti-poverty strategy. Amongthem, perhaps the most far-reaching, was the massive programme of intensification of ricecultivation, known by the acronym of Bimas and Inmas. The programme consisted of fourpillars: (a) introduction and dissemination of the Green Revolution technology, (b) distribu-tion of subsidized agricultural inputs (fertilizer and pesticide), (c) a massive programme ofinfrastructure development (irrigation and roads), and (d) a price support scheme operatedby the Food Logistics Agency. This programme accelerated rice production, from an annualgrowth rate of 3.7 per cent during the period 1972-1977 to 7.2 per cent during the period1977-1982. The rapid growth in agricultural production during the 1970s and the early1980s, in conjunction with the resulting employment creation in off-farm activities fromagricultural processing, transport and trade, was believed to have significantly contributed topoverty reduction, notably in rural Java.

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The Government also launched direct intervention programmes aimed at alleviatingpoverty in 1994. In this effort, it adopted two approaches: geographic targeting andindividual targeting. Geographic targeting is based on the characteristics of regions,directing the funding to less developed regions (village or sub-district level). Individualtargeting, on the other hand, is based on information about individuals or households, suchas their income (living below the predetermined poverty line) or their social status (thedisadvantaged, etc.), channelling the anti-poverty programme to the lowest-income ordisadvantaged groups. Two of the direct anti-poverty intervention programmes prior to thecrisis were Inpres Desa Tertinggal (IDT), a major geographic targeting programme, andPembangunan Kesejahteraan Keluarga (PKK), an individual targeting programme.

The IDT programme, operated during the period 1994-1996, involved block transfersof an annual 20 to 60 million rupiah per village to around 20,000 poor or less developedvillages (about one third of the villages in the country). It had three complementarycomponents: (a) roll-over funds for small business, (b) provision of business/activityadvisers, and (c) rural infrastructure development. The funds were allocated specifically topromote income-generating activities through various economic activities by the poor, andlabour-intensive public works that involved the poor. With regard to a family approach, thetarget group of the programme was the poor households in the less developed villages whowere gathered into community groups, which collectively received roll-over working capitalto be used for establishing their members’ own productive enterprises, with the hope ofhelping them move out of poverty.

Estimates about the number of poor people reached by IDT varied from 27 to 30 percent (Alatas, 1998) to approximately 50 per cent (Molyneaux and Gertler, 1999). Therewas, however, a contrary view. Manning (1999:141) argued that the IDT programme wasunlikely to have made much progress toward poverty reduction since the decline of theincidence of poverty was only 7 per cent during the period 1990-1995.

In relation to individual targeting programmes, the empowerment programme forfamily welfare (PKS), implemented in 1995-1996, had two subprogrammes: (a) saving forfamily welfare, and (b) business credit for family welfare. The programme provided grantsdirectly to poor families as classified by the National Family Planning Coordinating Agency(pre-prosperous family and prosperous family I) in both non-IDT and IDT villages (the firstimplementation was only in IDT villages). The main purpose was to train and assist poorfamilies to develop productive small-scale enterprises in order to enhance family welfare.

It is difficult to make a precise judgement on whether or not the PKS programmeachieved its original goals. Although data published by the Office of the CoordinatingMinister for Welfare and Poverty Alleviation Affairs (1998) show that in mid-1998, thebusiness credit for family welfare in IDT villages absorbed more credit than the totalamount of funding (131.6 per cent), some data also show that the credits had been investedin banks with the expectation of making gains from higher interest rates rather than indirectly productive activities.

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D. Social security schemes

The social security schemes, already in existence in Indonesia prior to the crisis,cover only those working in the formal sector, i.e. people in the Government and in theprivate sector. In general, social security benefits for civil servants and armed forcespersonnel comprise payment of retirement saving benefit and pension, and health care,whereas the benefits enjoyed by private and state enterprises’ employees, as covered inthe social security for private sector workers, include employment injury insurance, deathcompensation and retirement insurance.

A compulsory health insurance scheme for public servants, first introduced in1968, provided medical care for active workers, pensioners and their families. By1991, in an effort to provide better health services, the Government restructured thescheme. It provided comprehensive medical care to registered members and theirdependents either on capitation, budget or package system under the managed health-care concept.

A savings and insurance scheme for Government employees established in 1977provided two benefits: endowment insurance and pension. Endowment insurancerequires civil servants to contribute 3.25 per cent of their salaries to the scheme thatprovides a basis for a lump sum payment of over 16 months of the latest salary atretirement age (56 years) or in the event of death in service. To receive a monthlypension on retirement, civil servants are also compulsorily required to contribute 4.75per cent of their wage. By 1999, there were around 1.7 million retirees and around0.8 million survivors receiving a monthly pension in Indonesia. At the same time, thepension insurance scheme for government employees covered around 4 millionactive civil servants and around 160,000 state companies’ employees throughoutIndonesia. The insurance scheme for Indonesian armed forces personnel also providedtwo benefits to the armed forces personnel, endowment insurance and monthly pension,with the same portions of beneficiaries’ contribution as the one for governmentemployees.

The social security scheme for private sector employees, established in 1992,replaced a previous scheme that was first introduced in 1978. It applied to private andstate enterprises with 10 workers or more, or a monthly wage bill of 1 million rupiah.The scheme provided four benefits: compensation for work accidents, death benefit (terminsurance), old-age benefits (savings withdrawal) and health care.


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II. SELECTED SOCIAL SAFETY NET PROGRAMMESDURING THE CRISIS

A. Introduction

In an effort to mitigate the adverse impact of the crisis on the poor and the othergroups in the country, the Government launched a number of social safety net programmesfor them. These social safety net programmes can be classified under four major areas ofconcern: (a) food security for the poor centred on the distribution of subsidized rice to poorhouseholds; (b) access of the poor to basic social services such as health and education; (c)access of the poor to income or employment opportunities; and (d) access of the poor toimproved livelihood through small and medium-sized enterprises development.

B. Food subsidy programme

Special Market Operations for Rice (OPK: Operasi Pasar Khusus) was aimed atassisting food insecure and poor families nationwide to meet their most fundamental needs.The programme distributed 20 kilograms of rice per family every month at the subsidizedprice of 1,000 rupiah per kilogram.1 This was a special programme specifically designed inthe wake of food riots and soaring food prices in mid-1998.

The OPK programme was first launched in the period July 1998-March 1999 andthen was continued in the fiscal years 1999/2000 and 2000. Beneficiaries consisted ofpre-prosperous families and prosperous stage I families. The programme was administeredjointly by the State Ministry of Food and Horticulture and the Food Logistic Agency.

The number of beneficiaries covered in the programme rapidly increased from onlyaround 142,000 families in the July 1998 pilot test to almost 9.4 million families inDecember 1998. The OPK programme continued to expand in December 1999, reachingover 12.3 million families. The figure in October 2000 shows that the programme haddistributed 162,048 tons of rice, or around 93 per cent of the target, to over 10.4 millionfamilies with an average of 15.5 kilogram/month/family.

The distribution was carried out through some 45,000 distribution points spread over thecountry. Payment was in cash, when rice was received by beneficiaries. Later payment,usually a fortnight after rice was received, was permitted when beneficiaries who were unableto buy obtained a written guarantee from local authorities. Failure to pay in two weeks causedthe next rice allocation to be postponed until the beneficiary was able to pay his or her debt.

1 In the first six months of its implementation from July to November 1998, the ration was 10 kilograms/month/family. But since December 1998, the quantity of rice being provided was increased to 20kilograms/month/family. It is worth noting that the average market price of rice of medium quality wasaround 1,800 rupiah/kilogram.

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In financing this large-scale operation in food subsidy, the government spent around2.7 trillion rupiah (or an estimated 3.4 trillion rupiah at market prices) in the fiscal year1998/1999.

In terms of disseminating information, the OPK programme was given wide publicity,i.e. it was “socialized” through the mass media (television, local broadcasting radios andnewspapers); through social, religious and community groups; and through personal contactswith community leaders. The monitoring of the OPK programme was carried out throughdirect monitoring by implementing parties (local government, regional and subregional foodlogistics depots and relevant institutions), and through independent evaluation by NGOs anduniversities every six months.

The implementation of the OPK programme during the first year of operation waswidely criticized. The criticisms ranged from those directed at the readiness of theconcerned agencies to carry out their tasks, reports of corruption, exclusion of non-residentpoor (who had no identity cards), programme socialization, and probably the most impor-tant, the method used in determining the target group. Since then, the programme hassubsequently undergone significant design revisions, particularly with regard to geographictargeting.

Soon after the initial period of implementation, the programme was subjected to arapid field appraisal by the Social Monitoring and Early Response Unit (SMERU) (1998).SMERU carried out an appraisal in 21 urban areas and 19 rural areas in five provinces.The mission concluded that: (a) the administration of the OPK programme was notadequately done, partly because of the unavailability (or inadequacy) of an operationalbudget; (b) public information and outreach was inconsistent, inaccurate and ineffective; and(c) the quality of OPK rice was low and medium but in general, programme beneficiariesfound it acceptable. Another drawback of the OPK programme was the lack of operationalmechanisms to distribute cheap rice from distribution points to beneficiaries. This is thereason why the subsidized rice received by programme participants was less than 10kilograms. The community had to bear the indirect cost to collect and distribute the ricefrom the distribution points to the beneficiary’s households. These costs were generally notreimbursed by the programme.

SMERU has a more recent evaluation of the OPK programme. The SMERU reportshows that not all OPK beneficiaries were poor, defined as households within the firstquintile of the income spectrum. The target ratio of the OPK programme was 0.9,indicating that the programme was poorly targeted.2

2 Target ratio is defined as the ratio between the fraction of programme beneficiaries who are non-poorand the fraction of the overall population who are non-poor, and it ranges from 0 (refers to perfecttargeting) to 1.25 (refers to missed targeting).


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However, a study by the Centre for Food, Nutrition and Agricultural Studies andServices (CEFNAS) (2000) in the urban areas of West Java, Central Java, East Java,Yogyakarta, Lampung and South Sulawesi indicates somewhat opposite findings:

• The programme was quite popular, as 97.5 per cent of respondents had heard ofthe programme mostly from local task forces;

• OPK beneficiaries were more likely to be families with low social and economicstatus, as indicated by the fact that almost three quarters of respondents had percapita expenditure of less than 300,000 rupiah per month and, on average, spentover two thirds of their expenditure on food;

• Rice distribution points were generally not far from residential areas of OPKbeneficiaries, as 86 per cent of the beneficiaries travelled less than 1 kilometre tocollect the rice in person;

• The average amount of rice received was 13.32 kg/family/month;

• The rice price purchased by programme beneficiaries was 1,025 rupiah perkilogram, which was slightly higher than the official price (1,000/kg). This pricewas acceptable to most of the beneficiaries as it was still lower than the marketprice. However, it was found too high by some 18 per cent of respondents who,in fact, could not afford it;

• More than 90 per cent of respondents had no complaint about the programmeservices; and

• Of the complaints expressed, 47.5 per cent related to the quality of rice, 4.9 percent to the quantity, and 7.3 per cent to the price.

Another study (by the Institute for Economic and Social Research and Education)directed to the rural areas of eight selected provinces that covered about 1,300 sampledhouseholds came up with somewhat different conclusions. The study said that 61 per centof all programme beneficiaries were poorly informed about the programme; that thebeneficiary household on average received only 11 kilograms per month at 1,050 rupiah perkilogram; and that the income transfer of the programme to a beneficiary household was15,357 rupiah. This study recommended the discontinuation of the OPK programme, unlessit was significantly improved, especially in regard to programme targeting, the distributionmechanism, programme “socialization” and transparency.

After major revisions in programme design and operation, in response to thecriticisms, the OPK programme proved a remarkable success. Reviewers Tabor and Sawit(1999) for instance praised the programme for its accomplishments in nearly everyperformance area. They concluded that the programme was well-coordinated, well-targetedand extremely cost-effective, as indicated among other things by: (a) almost 90 per centcoverage of the total poor population; (b) an 85 per cent ratio of net transfer benefits

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received by target groups to total cost in the fiscal year 1998/1999; and (c) by the estimatedaverage transfer benefit of around 6,413 rupiah per month per beneficiary, which contributed6 per cent to the average income of poor households and 9 per cent to the average incomeof rural poor households. They also found that the OPK programme created some 72,000new jobs, contributed to price stability, enhanced consumer comfort, restored law and order,improved income distribution, and helped sustain the productivity of health and educationalspending.

C. Scholarship and block grants for primaryand secondary schools

Data suggest that Indonesia has achieved great success in improving the education ofits people during the last two and a half decades, especially at the primary and secondarylevels. Nevertheless, the country still faces many problems, recently exacerbated by theeconomic crisis. In response to this, the Indonesian government established the stay-in-school programme, under scholarships and block grants or operational assistance to primaryand secondary schools. This programme provides for scholarships to poor children andblock grants to poor schools. The programme was initiated in 1998, then expanded in thesecond and third year of implementation. The coverage of the programme was eligiblechildren and schools in all provinces in Indonesia. The scholarship programme usednational level data to target poor schools and local knowledge for the selection of individualparticipants. The executing agency is the Department of National Education, with theinvolvement of national, provincial, district, sub-district and school committees.

The scholarship programme was developed as an effort to prevent a large number ofchildren from poor families from dropping out of school (at primary, lower and uppersecondary schools) as a consequence of crisis-induced factors. During the crisis, many poorand near-poor families found it difficult to keep their children in school, as they found theirfinancial capacity too small relative to the school fees they had to pay. By providingfunding for those children, the Government enabled the poor families to let their childrenstay in school.

In addition, the Government, through the stay-in-school programme, extended supportto needy schools, both public and private, that provide services for the poor, to improve theschools’ ability to manage and maintain the quality of their services. The support consistedof block grants to primary, secondary and upper high schools.

The programme is planned to continue for a period of five years, with funding tocome from the state budget and loans from the World Bank and the Asian DevelopmentBank (ADB). The programme will spend a total of 5 trillion rupiah. Already it hasprovided scholarships to about 4.3 million students and block grants to approximately132,000 schools throughout the country.


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As a rescue package, this programme was prepared in a rush, hence, it received muchcriticisms, especially in the early implementation stage. In later years, improvements werepursued on the basis of inputs from: (a) communities, both through complaining and massmedia; (b) internal evaluation from organizations executing the programme; (c) externalevaluation from academic researchers; and (d) recommendations from NGOs. The improvedprogramme design, along with a good commitment from the executing bodies, broughtabout satisfaction and appreciation from donor agencies and other concerned parties. In1999, the World Bank presented a President’s Award for Excellence to the programme as anappreciation of the Bank for the programme’s greatly improved performance.

According to the World Bank, there were four criteria used as indicators of the goodperformance of social safety nets in education (Info JPS, 2000:4):

• High response in preventing a decreased enrolment rate and quality of educationservices, as well as preventing an increased drop-out incidence;

• High cost-effectiveness of the fund since the programme was not funded by anew loan but by state budgets and a loan from the World Bank and ADB for fiveyears;

• High innovation since it made a new breakthrough in distributing the fund notthrough bureaucratic mechanisms but directly to the school and scholarshipholders through local post offices; and

• The involvement of many institutions, both from government (National EducationDepartment, Religion Department, Finance Department, National DevelopmentPlanning Agency (Bappenas) and PT Pos Indonesia) and international agencies,such as, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Bank, theAsia-Europe Meetings (ASEM), and the Australian Government’s overseas aidprogramme (AusAID), in the planning process and implementation of theprogramme.

In general, the problems that faced the social safety net in education were related totechnical implementation and finance. Technical problems included lack of information onthe programme at the community level, low ability and comprehension in programmeimplementation, and a lack of reliable indicators for target groups. Financial problems wererelated to leakage of the fund and corrupt practices.

One deficiency frequently ignored was the fact that scholarships covered only schoolfees and other related expenses. In some instances, the amount was not even enough tocover the bare educational needs of children from the very poor, as access to schools was amore pressing problem than that of school fees. Even though poor families could afford topay for school fees and other expenses, they could hardly afford to pay for the transporta-tion costs, especially for those with children who were at lower and upper secondaryschools, because these schools were often located at a distant away from their places ofresidence.

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D. Programmes in the health sector

The social safety net programme in the health sector is the JPS-BK programme. Thishas the objective of helping poor families maintain their health and nutritional status whichmay have deteriorated as a consequence of crisis-induced factors. In operation since early1998, the JPS-BK programme extends basic health and reproductive health services and asystem of referrals to poor families, provided by community health centres and theirnetworks, including village midwives. The programme maintains and improves thenutritional status of pregnant women, children under two, post-partum women, as well asbabies of poor families.

The selection of the target group is based on a combination of the National FamilyPlanning Coordinating Agency’s list of PKS and Prosperous I families, and local criteriadetermined by village teams which consist of village midwives, the health section of villagecommunity councils, the village community reliance institutions, with assistance from theFamily Planning Field Officer.

To receive assistance, poor families selected into the programme were given a healthcard for seeking medical assistance and care from community health centres or other healthfacilities. The selected families were eligible to receive medical assistance for one fiscalyear and for the following fiscal year if they were selected again.

Based on the report covering the period from January to October 2000, the socialsafety net programme in the health sector has given health cards to around 10 million poorfamilies, or 92 per cent of the target, of which almost 39 per cent utilized health services,including nearly 20 per cent who made cumulative visits. In May 2000, the coverage ofpregnant mothers, birth-delivering mothers and post-natal mothers receiving basic midwiferyservices was 71 per cent, 49 per cent and 44 per cent of the targets, respectively. Underthe programme, every person received 10,000 rupiah for basic health services for the wholeyear. With that amount of money, it is very hard to get decent health services for thewhole year.

The social safety net in health was financed mainly by the state budget and two loanprojects from ADB. The total budget allocated to the programme was around 1,043 billionrupiah for fiscal year 1998/1999 and was 1,030.4 billion rupiah during fiscal year 1999/2000. Details of fund allocation and absorption are shown in annex III.

Both the fund for poor families and the fund for food and nutrition surveillance ofthe Health Security for the Community were distributed through post offices and regionaloffices of the Treasury.

Several independent studies on the performance of social safety net programmes inhealth have pointed to some apparent problems, including: (a) mis-targeting, (b) non-availability of data on prospective beneficiaries, (c) inconsistency of data, (d) administrative


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problems arising from the fact that many poor families living in urban slums did not holdidentity cards and thus were not eligible to receive benefits, (e) the tendency for latedistribution of funding to community health centres and village midwives, and (f) a lack ofsocialization between beneficiaries and programme implementors at local levels.

Naturally, these problems have been, and continue to be, addressed by the programmeimplementors. In particular, much attention has been directed towards solving themis-targeting problem. Efforts in this area have been aimed at collecting more data aboutpopulations of target villages, removing inconsistencies in the existing data, and extractingmore information from data currently available. Administrative problems are also beingaddressed.

E. Supplementary food for primary school students

Since mid-1996, Indonesia has undertaken a national school-feeding programme toprovide supplementary food for primary school students, of both public and private schools.In the first year of implementation, the programme was operated only in Java and Bali. Bythe second year, it was expanded to include all poor villages throughout Indonesia. Duringthe crisis, the programme was further expanded and placed under the umbrella of socialsafety nets in health.

The supplementary food programme is a multi-sectoral programme. Because of this,many parties are involved in its administration, including the National EducationDepartment, Internal Affairs, Agriculture, Health, and Religion and the community. Theseinstitutions work together at all administrative levels from national to village level.

The objective of the programme is to improve the status of nutrition and healthamong primary school children by providing them with food supplements and enhancing theschools’ capability for delivering nutrition and health services to their constituents. Forschool children, the aims of the programme are: (a) reducing absenteeism, (b) alleviatingshort-term hunger, (c) increasing total energy, (d) educating children on topics of health andnutrition, and (e) reducing worm infection rates. For the schools, the programme attemptsto improve the knowledge of teachers on teaching health and nutrition topics. Parents andthe community itself are not left out. The programme offers them knowledge andinvolvement in children’s health and nutrition.

Generally, the programme provides a nutritional snack three times weekly, and insome schools, up to four times weekly. The supplemental foods are given to the children inthe form of locally available and prepared snacks. The use of local material in snacks isintended to support the development of the local economy and involve the local community(including school administrators and parents) in managing the programme. By involving allelements potentially concerned with children’s education, the implementation of theprogramme becomes the responsibility of government, parents and community together.

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On the whole, the targeting of the programme seems to have been accurate. Thetarget group is all students at primary schools, including those at Islamic religious schoolsin the IDT villages across the country. Another target group is the community, especiallystudents’ parents and teachers. Targeting is continuously being improved to ensure thatstudents belonging to poor families in poor urban areas were included.

In the 1999/2000 fiscal year, the programme reached 100 per cent of targeted schoolsand almost 100 per cent of targeted students (roughly 9.5 million). The budget spent 489.9billion rupiah (94.5 per cent of the target), a fair amount reflecting the extent of coverageof schools and students.

In looking at the overall programme, at least two big issues appear, namely themanagement and the financing of the programme. As mentioned before, many individualsof various agencies are involved in the administration of the programme. In some cases,this situation gives rise to a lack of coordination which results in delays of fundallocations. This, in turn, leads to the reduction in the number of programme participants,and tardiness in the administration of projects, including the de-worming of children. Onthe positive side, this gives rise to an enhanced relationship among community members, akey aspect of human resources development and people’s empowerment, all vital elementsof community development.

In terms of financing, the funds allocated to the programme during five years(1996-2000) seem to have been well spent. The local implementors had the ability tocombine the social safety net fund with community support, thus achieving very goodresults. There were no reports of corruption or leakages from the fund.

F. Labour-intensive programmes

In response to the sharp increase of unemployment in the wake of the crisis, notablyamong unskilled workers, the government introduced a series of cash programmes to createpublic labour-intensive activities aimed at mobilizing the unemployed. The crashprogrammes were implemented in 10 cities across Java. In 1998, as the impact of the crisison people’s living standards became more severe, the government expanded the programmeinto a national social safety net to cover the whole country. Encompassed by the newsocial safety net, were labour-intensive public works projects aimed specifically at theunemployed in the urban and rural areas (under the project to overcome the impact ofdrought and employment problems programme), the unemployed skilled workers (under thelabour-intensive for skilled employment programme), and the unemployed in the forestrysector (under the labour-intensive programme in public works for slum and coastal areadevelopment). These programmes were implemented only in fiscal year 1998/1999 andwere later integrated into two larger programmes, the urban labour-intensive programme andthe special initiatives for unemployed women.


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The programme to overcome the impact of drought was implemented by the Departmentof Manpower in two stages. Stage I, for the period from April to December 1998, aimed atcreating 28 million working man-days, and Stage II, for the period December 1998 to March1999, aimed at providing 23 million working man-days. The programmes were to cover 215districts in Stage I, and 220 districts in Stage II in all 27 provinces. Eligible participantsreceived a daily remuneration of 7,500 rupiah/person, a rate comparable to the regionalminimum wage rate. The funding of the programme, amounting to over 317 billion rupiah forStage I, and to 279 billion rupiah for Stage II, was fully supported by the state budget.

The programme to overcome the impact of drought focused on the creation ofemployment opportunities for manufacturing and construction labourers, as well as theextension of assistance to poor communities to improve their housing and living conditions.The programme was launched by the Department of Public Works during the period October1998-March 1999, with a total budget at 442.5 billion rupiah from the state’s supplementarybudget. Activities in this programme were expected to generate 12.7 million working man-days, and the remuneration for beneficiaries ranged between 7,500 and 10,000 rupiah,depending on the location. Activities included public work for the improvement of urbanslum and coastal settlement areas, flooding control and drainage improvement in urban areas,and the development of public facilities. The programme covered 13 provinces in Indonesia.

The labour-intensive project in the forestry sector was implemented by the Departmentof Forestry and Estate during the period June 1998-March 1999. It aimed at overcomingunemployment and underemployment through public works in forestry, improving the foodsecurity of poor communities through agroforestry activities, and overcoming deforestationthrough tree replanting. The beneficiaries were farmers’ associations, the unemployed, anduniversity graduates with a forestry background. The total budget allocated was 490.5 billionrupiah, with a target of generating 30.6 million working man-days from public workactivities in 810 villages in 155 districts in 19 provinces throughout Indonesia.

The programme for the skilled unemployed was implemented by the Department ofManpower with the aim of providing job or business opportunities to skilled unemployedthrough its two models: the establishment of productive economic units and the establish-ment of new self-employed business. Both models were intended to provide jobs andincome, new skills and business networks to the skilled unemployed, as well as to stimulatelocal economic activities. The total budget allocation was almost 400 billion rupiah duringthe period April 1998-March 1999, with a target of creating some 69,320 jobs from 3,466activity units. It was implemented in 26 provinces.

The programme of special initiatives for unemployed women was implemented underthe Department of Settlement and Regional Development. This was designed to provide jobopportunities to poor and unemployed women in urban areas through their proposedeconomic activities. Beneficiaries were women in poor households without a permanentincome and those living in urban areas. They were between 15 and 60 years old, with nohigher than a high school diplopma. The total budget was 75 billion rupiah, and the target

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was to create 70,000 jobs for the poor urban unemployed, with a 80:20 female-malecomposition. It was implemented in six provinces with large urban centres (NorthSumatera, Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, East Java and South Sulawesi).

Finally, the urban public works programme was designed to provide job opportunitiesto around 400,000 unemployed with a 80:20 male-female composition and a compensationequal to the regional minimum wage. It was also implemented by the Department ofSettlement and Regional Development during the fiscal year 2000. Beneficiaries were theunskilled and poor unemployed in urban areas, aged 15-55 years, with no more than a highschool education. It was allocated with 366 billion rupiah from the state budget, and itcovered all provinces in Indonesia.

The programme to overcome the impact of drought has shown a fairly goodperformance in targeting. With a target of about 28 million working man-days in stage 1and some 23 million working man-days in stage 2, the programme succeeded in reaching110 per cent coverage and 88 percent in job creation, with the absorption of an allocatedbudget at 99.2 per cent and 78.9 per cent for stages 1 and 2, respectively, during the fiscalyear 1998/1999. A similar achievement was also made in the skilled public worksprogramme, which absorbed almost 90 per cent of the budget and provided 65,000 jobs, or100 per cent of the target, during the same fiscal year. Good performance was alsoindicated in other public works programmes, especially in the forestry sector whichabsorbed only 26.4 per cent of the allocated budget but created 44.6 per cent of the labour-intensive programmes in the slum and coastal areas. The budget absorption was relativelyhigh ranging between 75 and 96 per cent, but with low job-creation at around 20-60 percent of the target working man-days.

In designated regions implementing the programme to overcome the impact ofdrought, a study showed that the programme targeting was moderately effective, as less thantwo thirds of the variations in the allocations across regions can be explained by unemploy-ment and poverty levels (Lewis, 1999). This study also reported that the impact of theprogramme on job creation reached 59 million working man-days, with the estimated wageshare to the total budget allocation accounting for 75 per cent. The corresponding figuresfor the urban slum and coastal area improvement and public works programme were 57million working man-days and 45 per cent of the estimated wage share. Criteria selection-related mis-targeting, and male-biased benefit receivers are the two most frequently raisedproblems in the implementation of the programme.

In terms of targeting, the urban slum and coastal area improvement and public worksprogramme was fairly well-targeted, as 70 per cent of all beneficiaries were unemployed/laid-off workers, and 65 per cent of them were construction labourers. Nevertheless, theprogramme faced several problems. These included a lack of programme socialization andweaknesses in information delivery, as well as a lack of sustainability, especially since somecommunities could not maintain the completed projects and the proposed project/activitieswere sometimes not compatible with the actual needs of the village community.


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The performance of the programme of special initiatives for unemployed women wassimilarly commendable. By October 2000, 47.4 per cent of the total allocated budget of 75billion rupiah had been disbursed, with almost 39 per cent of the targeted working man-days being absorbed by women. At the same time, the urban labour-intensive programmeshowed good performance. In 80 per cent of the districts implementing the programme, 90per cent of the registered workers were employed within a month, and the programmecreated 6.6 million working man-days, or 84.5 per cent of the target.

G. Programme of empowerment for the regions

Finally, a programme focusing on the empowerment of regions to overcome theimpacts of the economic crisis (PDM-DKE) was also launched. The PDM-DKE programmewas formulated to assist poor communities in urban and rural areas to improve theirpurchasing power through employment creation, and to rebuild/improve socio-economic andpublic facilities to support the production and distribution of goods and services. Theprogramme was implemented by Bappenas and the Department of Home Affairs. It wasfirst launched for the period from December 1998 to March 1999, then it continued inOctober-December 2000. Target groups were poor populations in urban and rural areas,particularly those who had lost jobs and income sources, and were unable to meet theirdaily basic needs (food, basic health and education). Thus, the selection of location gavehigh priority to villages with high unemployment rates, outside of those who have alreadybeen receiving assistance. Geographic coverage of the PDM-DKE programme was urbanand rural villages within sub-districts which were not receiving fund allocations from theSub-District Development Programme and the Urban Poverty Alleviation Programme.

In the first year of programme implementation, the total budget allocated for thePDM-DKE programme was around 1.8 trillion rupiah, and then in the following year, it wasallocated with 792 billion rupiah. As the programme consists of community-based develop-ment activities, its performance is reviewed from this perspective. Allocated funding is alsoreviewed as to its assignment to specific programme activities. During the fiscal year 1998-1999, 1.45 trillion rupiah was disbursed to finance various activities covered in the PDM-DKE programme, accounting for 93.4 per cent of the total allocated budget. Based onreports of programme implementation from districts, the allocated budget was disbursed tovarious programme activities in 1998-1999, as follows: 47.8 per cent for infrastructuredevelopment and 52.2 per cent for economic activities/businesses. It was also reported thatthe number of PDM-DKE programme beneficiaries was 115,222 community groups, whichwas around 8.6 million people with 10,047,980 working man-days.

The data as of October 2000 indicated that less than 10 per cent of the total allocatedbudget had been distributed to the target groups. In relation to the planning processundertaken at the community level, the report suggests that in almost all target villages, villagecommunity discussions were held on two occasions, whereby 86 per cent of villages, over onefifth of poor households took a role in the first and second community discussions.

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H. Monitoring and evaluation

Much of what now takes place as monitoring and evaluation of social safety netprogrammes is self-initiated. Though this procedure has been well-appreciated in theimportance of its findings as guidance to programme implementation, it has been questionedon the grounds that it tends to be self-serving, i.e. exaggerating sucesses and minimizingfailures. As a result, NGOs have been encouraged to engage in the monitoring andevaluation of social safety nets at various levels. Among the NGOs that have been involvedin project monitoring and evaluation are the Social Monitoring and Early Response Unit orSMERU which assessed the impacts of several social safety nets on poverty, labour markets,health and education, gender, and crime, among others. After 18 months since itsestablishment, it had detailed its findings in more than 60 reports. The Civil SocietyIndependent Network for Transparency and Accountability of Indonesia Development, withits network in 40 districts in the country, has focused its efforts on improving transparencyand raising public awareness of government programmes. The Central IndependentMonitoring Unit and its provincial partners has monitored social safety net programmes inhealth and education.

In addition to moniting and evaluation, NGOs have also been involved in actualprogramme management of social safety nets and in the implementation of non-crisis relatedprogrammes.

III. OBSERVATIONS

A. Strengths and weaknesses

1. Targeting

In respect of targeting, several conclusions have been reached. With regard to thelink between geographic allocation of funds and the levels of unemployment and poverty, itwas ascertained that the variation in PDM-DKE funding allocation across districts was verystrongly associated with the variations in unemployment and poverty levels, with acoefficient R2 of 97 per cent. This means that the programme was extremely well-targetedas it was launched in regions with a high incidence of unemployment and poverty. It isimportant to note that the finding is merely an aggregate data-based analysis which oftenfails to reflect the reality. The results of the SMERU Rapid Field Appraisal Missionindicated that the database on the number of poor families (PKS and Prosperous I) andunemployed persons by districts used for budget allocation of the PDM-DKE programmewas in fact not consistent with the actual programme beneficiaries, causing many eligibleneedy people not to receive benefits. As a case in point, in the village of Kalirungkut,Surabaya, the mission found that only 6 per cent of total PKS in the village received funds


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for economic activities and that the allocated funds substantially varied between villages,ranging from 5 million rupiah to 1 billion rupiah. The reason for this state of affairs wasthat the method of determining the budget allocation was based on district potential or thenumber of poor families and unemployed persons.

The National Planning Agency (BAPPENAS) itself as one of two implementingagencies admitted various problems in the implementation of the PDM-DKE programme.The following problems were identified:

(a) Late distribution of funds from the Original Office of Treasury to beneficiarieswhich was related to administrative problems, bureaucractic bottlenecks,geographic coverage, and lack of understanding towards distribution procedureamong local implementers;

(b) Fund leakage;

(c) Mis-targeting to the unintended beneficiaries largely because the number of theproposed programme beneficiaries was larger than the actual one;

(d) Lack of skills of concerned personnel in executing the programme, and poorreporting systems that led to a difficulty in carrying out monitoring mechanisms;

(e) Lack of programme socialization potentially causing inadequate transparency indelivering information on the overall programme implementation and overwhelm-ing local authorities’ interventions to the use of funds by beneficiaries; and

(f) Lack of understanding towards the procedure of programme implementationwhich had caused institutional-related problems, bringing about poor coordinationbetween implementors.

2. Coordination

As admitted by the Government (TKPP-JPS, October 1999: 3), the lack of awarenessand understanding of the spirit of social safety net programmes, institutional weaknesses,and the practices of corruption and collusion were the major sources of inefficiency in thefirst year of implementation. Although the management of the programmes has improvedand more public involvement has been encouraged by the application of “safeguardingmechanisms”, implementation remains at a rudimentary stage (Sekretariat TKPP-JPS, 2000).

Coordination, both horizontally and vertically, may be the most important aspectin implementing any social safety net programme. As shown earlier, they were planned andimplemented by several line ministries/agencies, with their budgets being channelled throughdifferent mechanisms, making horizontal coordination difficult. Moreover, theseprogrammes were mainly central government initiatives. Although local governments andthe local communities were encouraged to be actively involved in planning and the

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subsequent steps (targeting, implementing, monitoring, etc.), they remained, for the mostpart, spectators to the process, lacking a “sense of belonging” as well as a “sense ofownership” of the programmes implemented in their localities. There is certainly a need todevelop more reasonable ways for coordinating activities of the government at the variouslevels, especially on the grass-roots level.

Again, the cancellation of PKP, PKPP, and PDM-DKE programmes in fiscal year1999/2000 may be a good example of a lack of coordination. Although such programmeswere repeatedly announced as a government priority in reducing the impact of the crisis, thelack of coordination between the programme implementing agencies and the financialauthority made the programme impossible to carry out, necessitating its cancellation duringthe fiscal year 1999/2000, and its late implemention in the following fiscal year. Thefinancial documents for those programmes were issued in the end of the first quarter offiscal year 2000 (PIN-JPS, 2000: 1), which is a 9-month fiscal year, and started deliveringbenefits to the beneficiaries only after three months of implementation at the end of theyear (TKPP-JPS, 2000).

3. Fund use

The crucial source of inefficiency in the social safety net programme implementationwas related to mismanagement and corruption of the programme funds. Fund misallocationand leakages occurred from the planning stage, implementing stage to evaluating andmonitoring stage. Misuse commonly occurs when programmes are delivered to targetbeneficiaries indirectly through the development of infrastructure projects. Mis-targetingproblems, such as the proposed projects being inconsistent with the actual needs of the poorcommunity, and limited benefits for the poor from the project implementation and outcome,are classical sources of inefficiency in programme implementation. In addition, the lack ofsound financial accountability and transparency are other important sources of fundleakages.

Table 3 provides an example of various practices of fund misuse potentially occur-ring in the implementation of any social safety net programme. This example is drawnfrom the result of an audit by the Financial and Development Auditing Agency on theimplementation of the PDM-DKE programme during the fiscal year 1998/1999 in eightprovinces. Overall, the proportion of fund misuse to the total budget allocated for theprogramme in these audited provinces was quite small, reaching only 3.4 per cent.However, an interesting feature appearing in the table is related to the types of misuse.Table 3 clearly indicates that mis-targeting and inefficient programme implementation werethe major sources of fund misuse, explaining around 57 per cent of the total financialmisuse. This was then followed by poor financial accountability and misuse over thedesignated criteria or procedures of programme implementation, leading to financial lossesfor the Government.


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Table 3. Fund misuse in the implementation of PDM-DKE and AMP programmesbased on the results of an audit in eight provinces (North and West Sumatera,

Jakarta, West and Central Java, South Kalimantan, South Sulawesiand West Nusatenggara) for the fiscal year 1998/1999

Percentage Type of fund misuse Millions of share to total

rupiah misuse

1. Poor financial accountability: 8 935 26.4

a. PDM-DKE (poor project administration & financial 8 402 24.8accountability)

b. AMP PDM-DKE (incomplete supporting documents for 533 1.6financial accountability report)

2. Misuse over the designated criteria/rules indicating 5 484 16.2financial loss for government:

a. PDM-DKE (corruption, fictitious official travel and 4 980 14.7materials purchase)

b. AMP PDM-DKE (failure to return fund residue to state’s 504 1.5treasury)

3. Inefficient use of project fund: 127 0.4

(marked-up budget, project activities incompatible tolocal conditions)

4. Mis-targeting, ineffective programme implementation: 19 359 57.1

a. PDM-DKE 16 323 48.1b. AMP PDM-DKE 3 036 9.0

Total misuse in audited fund in the implementationof PDM-DKE in 8 provinces 33 905 100.0

Total budget allocated for PDM-DKE & AMP programmein 8 provinces 995 110

Percentage fund misuse to total allocated budget in 8 provinces 3.41

Source: Summarized and calculated from an unpublished report by the Financial and DevelopmentAuditing Agency.

The actual magnitude of misallocation and leakage in the overall social safety netprogramme implementation is impossible to detect. The difficulty is related to the fact thatboth misallocation and leakage may occur at various levels of implementing agencies fromthe central to the community level. However, based on an unconfirmed report, themagnitude of misallocation and leakage in four programmes, as shown in table 4, wasaround 788 billion rupiah. Compared with the total budget allocated to each programme in

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the fiscal year 1998/1999, the proportions of misallocation and leakage were around 2 percent for the OPK programme, 32.6 per cent for the labour-intensive programme in forestry,37 per cent for the programmes to overcome the impact of drought and for skilled labour-intensive employment, and 11 per cent for the scholarship and the stay-in-schoolprogramme. Apart from the reliability of this report, financial-related mismanagement tendsto be frequent in the case of programmes or projects designed in a great rush andcontingent upon unpredicted events. This especially happens in the early implementationstage when those involved in the programmes do not know exactly how to proceed.

On the basis of complaints, the government has reviewed programme implementationand has tried to improve the outreach of social safety nets by using more accurate and timelydata for targeting, and by paying close attention to programme integration and women’sparticipation. The outcome of dialogues with community representatives was embodied in 13recommendations for the structural improvement of social safety net programme imple-mentation, followed by these five specific programmes for improvement: (a) intensification ofprogramme socialization; (b) development of mechanisms for complaint resolution; (c)provision of regular and clear performance indicators; (d) establishment of independentprogramme verification; and (e) increased involvement of civil society in monitoring.

B. Safeguarding the social safety net programmes

Although the social safety net programmes had a short-term perspective, it was placedin a long-term perspective when the Government placed it under the umbrella of ‘goodgovernance’. Starting in the fiscal year 1999/2000, the Government ruled that social safetynet programme implementation must have three essential characteristics, namely transpa-rency, participation and public accountability. These qualities were fostered in all socialsafety net transactions.

Table 4. Percentage crude estimates of fund misallocation and leakage in theimplementation of some reviewed social safety net programmes

during the fiscal year 1998/1999

Allocated fund Estimated misallocation/ Percentage Programme (in billions leakage (in billions misallocation/

of rupiah) of rupiah) leakage

Food subsidy of OPK 5 450 116.7 2.1Labour intensive in forestry 490.5 160 32.6PDKMK and P3T 997 370.2 37.1Scholarship and DBO 1 259 141.5 11.2

Source: Calculated from table 6 and report from the Ministry of Finance as quoted by Kompas, 17 May1999.


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1. Transparency

In pursuit of transparency, the implementing agencies of social safety nets wererequired to disseminate programmes widely through the media. As a result, at the nationallevel, each programme implementing agency and the Social Safety Net InformationClearinghouse, established under the Coordinating Team, disseminated social safety netinformation through advertisements and dialogues on television and radio stations, advertise-ments in the newspapers, and publications of bulletins, leaflets and booklets. These weredistributed through local governments down to sub-district and village level, as well asthrough units having worldwide web sites (PIN-JPS, 2000: 5). In addition, local socialsafety net information centres produced and distributed information materials to variousgroups in the locality.

In reviewing the performance of information dissemination, the question has arisen asto whether the information reached the intended target groups or not. Studies on thequestion have been given opposing answers with some saying that prospective beneficiarieshave been well-informed, while some others indicated that many prospective beneficiarieshave received inadequate information or have not received any information at all, and thatonly a few people have made inquiries through local social safety net information centres.To explain the difference in the conclusions, it has been suggested that the favourable resultswere of programmes that have been preceded by careful and intense information work.

As a starting point to increase accountability of programme implementation, socialsafety net programmes were required to base their reports on actual performance. The firstindicator of performance in this reporting system was the number of reports received at thecentral level. As a new system, it did not run as well as expected. Only a few reportswere received and of those received, mostly were either incomplete or late.

The ultimate indicator is, of course, output. On this account, the social safety netprogrammes varied widely. The amount of rice distributed, the numbers of students whowere given scholarships, the number of schools that received block grants, the number ofpersons who were employed, and the number of women who have been employed, areamong the indicators of direct output and are easy to measure. However, the ultimateimpact of the programmes on recipients, whether their needs were satisfied and to whatextent, has not been measured.3

The transparency and accountability of implementation can be improved and wherethey have been carried out, they have contributed to the encouragement of the public’sinterest and participation in social safety nets.

3 See the series of “Social Safety Net Performance Report” and “Monitoring Report” produced by TKPP-JPS Secretariat (unpublished).

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2. Independent verification

Another task pursued to lift the level of programme implementation is the programmeof independent verification. Here, the Controlling Team conducts field verification at thebeneficiary level on the monthly reports of “key social safety net programmes”4 in order toassess the reliability of reports. The results of the verification were interesting. Oneverification found that reports from the block grants for primary and secondary schoolsprogramme were reliable and reflected programme performance in the field.

Some reports, however, were considered “unverifiable”. These included the reports onthe OPK rice subsidy programme. The indicator chosen for the programme was ‘numbersof families receiving rice’ and the ‘amount of rice distributed’. There was no indicator setfor the quantity of rice distributed to each recipient which was what should have mattered,from the viewpoint of programme effectiveness.

3. Grievance resolution

The Coordinating Team and all programme implementing agencies established acomplaint resolution unit to handle and resolve any complaint relating to the socialsafety net programmes as well as to take up appropriate corrective measures. Thecomplaint resolution unit reported its actions to the general public and to the Coordinat-ing Team.

A monitoring report of October 2000 indicated that 73 per cent of the receivedcomplaints on the key social safety net programmes were resolved, and the remaining werestill being investigated. This performance is considered as on the low side. One reasonadvanced by one monitoring group for this low performance was the great number ofcomplaints that had to be tackled including complaints that dated back to the programme’sfirst year of implementation.

Although the results show significant achievement, there are several problems stillcrying out for a solution. The most important problem is the lack of information on theexistence of the local social safety net information centres. Another problem is that of nofollow-up by responsible institutions of the complaints after they have been made. Anotherproblem pertained to the status of “resolved complaints” which often required furtherfollow-up, particularly in referring criminal misconduct to the district attorney and/or localpolice offices.

4 The term “key social safety net programmes” refers to six social safety net programmes, i.e. OPK,Beasiswa & DBO Dikdasmen, JPS-BK, PKP, PKPP, and PDM-DKE.


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Table 5. Complaints received and handled by the complaint resolution unit,February 1999 – October 2000

Complaints Resolved

Complaints Under Complaints No Percentage Key SSN Program received Investigation Proven Evidence of Complaints

to Prove Resolved(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

= [(4)+(5)]/(2)

Special Market Operations 428 227 158 43 47.0%for Rice (OPK)

Scholarship and School Block 828 110 520 198 86.7%Grant (SBG)

SSN on Health Sector (JPS-BK) 118 39 47 32 66.9%Urban Labour-Intensive (PKP) 86 23 44 19 73.3%Special Initiatives for Women 42 6 12 24 85.7%

Unemployment (SIWU)Empowerment of the 354 99 76 179 72.0%Regions to Overcome theImpact of the EconomicCrisis (PDM-DKE)

Total 1,502 405 781 316 73.0%

Source: Drawn from the Coordinating Team, Social Safety Net Performance Report and MonitoringReport of October 2000.

IV. THE ROLE OF DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS

A. The role of the Government

In general, social safety net programmes were implemented by the central governmentthrough the line ministries/agencies, with their local offices and local units. Furthermore,these programmes are coordinated by a Coordinating Team headed by BAPPENAS at thecentral level, and by the provincial and district/municipal development planning boards atthe local level in the regions. At another level, there is a controlling team, whose membersare reputable individuals from government and non-governmental organizations that providesinputs to policy-making and verifies reports. A third unit is an independent unit mandatedto monitor programme implementation in the field.

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Province

INDEPENDENT MONITORINGTEAM/CIVIL SOCIETY

GROUPS

CONTROLLINGTEAM

COORDINATINGTEAM

Secretariat

CRU ICH

COORDINATINGTEAM

Secretariat

CRU IC

National

STAKEHOLDERS’FORUM

STAKEHOLDERS’FORUM

COORDINATINGTEAM

Secretariat

CRU IC

INDEPENDENT MONITORINGTEAM/CIVIL SOCIETY

GROUPS

Programmes

Programmes

Programmes

Figure I. National social safety net organizational setting

District/Municipal

The three components were expected to interact and discuss the results of theirrespective activities in a “stakeholders’ forum” that was to be set up at the national andlocal (district/municipal) levels. See figure I below.

Source: Adapted from the Coordinating Team for social safety net programmes (October 1999).

Notes: • Programmes = programme implementing agencies• CRU = Complaint Resolution Unit• ICH = Social safety net Information


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B. Public participation

The introduction of the local stakeholders’ forum nationwide is expected to givereality to the plan of fostering civil society participation in government activities at the locallevel. The forum is expected to provide a public sphere for consultation on the planningand monitoring of programmes and the handling of complaints (Tim Kerja Persiapan FLP,2000). Local governments have been instructed to support the establishment of such forumsin their jurisdiction.

As indicated in figure I, civil society is expected to monitor social safety netimplementation independently. The government did not provide funds for such monitoringbut encouraged donor agencies to channel their grants directly to interested organizations.At the same time, most social safety nets already incorporate civil society and localcommunity participation in their programmes, including the participation of monitoringand evaluation consultants (Association of South-East Asian Nations Secretariat, August2000).

C. Non-governmental organizations

The establishment of the local stakeholders’ forum was expected to increase theinvolvement of civil society in decision-making in social safety net programme implementa-tion. In this era of decentralization, the introduction of the local forum can be considered adevolution of power from district/municipal government (and legislative body) to the peoplethemselves. As of October 2000, some 226 forums have been formed in the regions (out ofmore than 350 districts/municipalities).

However, there are still many issues and problems about the stakeholders’ forum thatremain to be resolved. One important issue is that most forums have been transformed into“civil society monitoring teams”, with the limited involvement of NGOs, rather than being apublic space for communication and interaction between local stakeholders – government,legislative body, NGOs, academicians, community representatives, and the press – as howthey were designed to be. On the part of government, there is an unwillingness to involve“anti-government NGOs” in the discussion of issues. From the civil society side, there is aperception that the forum is part of the government’s co-optation effort.

The stakeholders’ forums have so far been successful in initiating public participation,monitoring implementation in the field, organizing local civil society, and buildinginteraction mechanisms among local stakeholders (Tim Kerja Persiapan FLP, 2000: 12-13).

As has been pointed out, NGOs have been active in two distinct areas of decision-making and action in relation to social safety nets, the monitoring and the programmemanagement. They have also been active in implementing non-social safety net crisisresponse programmes of the communities.

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V. FINANCING

A. Funding through the state budget

The social safety net budget totalled 14,820 billion rupiah, 11,873 billion rupiah, and5,463 billion rupiah in 1998/1999, 1999/2000, and 2000 respectively, as shown in Table 6.For each year, the total consists of a portion that comes from the development budget andanother portion that comes from the current or routine portion of the national budget. Thetable shows that social safety net budget is allocated to food security, education, health,employment creation, and community funds programmes.

Table 6. Budget allocation, implementing agency, and source of funds for socialsafety net programmes in Indonesia, 1998-2000

Budget allocation (billion rupiah)Intervention Sector and Implementing Budget

SSN Program 1998/1999 1999/2000 2000 Agency Source

Food Securlty: 633 117 8

Special Market Operation for Rice 0 5 8 BULOG and State budget(OPK), program management and DDN-ODsafeguarding only

National Food Security Program 633 0 0 Min. of State budgetthrough Farmers’ Empowerment Agriculture(PKPN-MPMP)

Development of Poultry Rural 0 57 0 Min. of JBICRearing Multiplication Centre Agriculture(RRMC)

Rehabilitation of Brackish Water 0 55 0 Min. of JBICShrimp Culture Infrastructures Agriculture

Education: 2 697 2 064 1 066

Scholarship and School Block 1 138 1 251 667 DEPDIKNAS ABD, WBGrant (SBG) and state

budget

Scholarship for University and 113 278 0 DEPDIKNAS State budgetBlock grant

Primary School Rehabilitation and 851 0 0 DEPDIKNAS State budgetDevelopment

Operational and Maintenance Funds 959 535 399 DEPDIKNAS, State budgetfor Primary Schools (DOP SD/MI) DEPAG, and

DDN-OD(continued)


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Table 6 (continued)

Budget allocation (billion rupiah)Intervention Sector and Implementing Budget

SSN Program 1998/1999 1999/2000 2000 Agency Source

Health: 2 273 1 664 1 280

SSN in Health Sector (JPS-BK) 1 043 1 030 867 Min. of ADB andHealth state budget

Social Welfare (JPS-BS) 95 102 68 Min. of Social ADB andAffairs/BKSN state budget

Specific Block Grant for Community 721 0 0 Min. of Health State budgetHealth Centres and DDN

OD

Supplementary Food for Primary 414 532 345 Intersectoral State budgetSchool Students (PMT-AS)

Employment Creation: 2 066 1 000 441

Labour-Intensive Program to Eradicate 997 0 0 Min. of State budgetCrisis Impacts (PDKMK) and Labour- ManpowerIntensive for Trained Working Forces(P3T)

Labour-Intensive Program in Forestry 490 0 0 Min. of State budgetSector Forestry

Labour-Intensive Program in Public 579 850 366 Min. of Public State budgetWorks Program (PKSPU-CK in Works/DEP-1998/1999) / Urban Labour- KIMPRASWILIntensive (PKP)

Special Initiatives for Women 0 150 75 DEPKIM- State budgetUnemployment (PKPP) PRASWIL

Community Funds: 1 701 792 435

Empowerment of the Regions to 1 701 792 435 DDN-OD State budgetOvercome the Impact of theEconomic Crisis (PDM-DKE)

Total Development Budget 9 370 5 638 3 230

Rice Price Subsidy of OPK program 5 450 6 235 2 232 BULOG State budget(current/routine budget)

Total Budget 14 820 11 873 5 462

Source: Drawn from PIN-JPS (2000), Programme-Programme Jaring Pengaman Sosial (social safety netprogrammes) and other TKPP-JPS publications.

Notes: 1. Three programmes (PKP, PKPP, and PDM-DKE) were not implemented in fiscal year 1999/2000owing to fiscal limitations.

2. Three programmes (development of the rural multiplication centre, the rehabilitation of brackishwater shrimp culture, and scholarships and university block grants) were implemented as a regulardevelopment programme (non-social safety net) in fiscal year 2000.

184

Table 7 shows the social safety net budget in the context of the national budget.Two things are immediately noticeable from the table: first, that the total and social safetynet budgets for 1998/1999 were quite high, and second, that both declined thereafter. In1998/1999, the total budget amounted to 263,888 billion rupiah of which 14,820 billionrupiah, or 5.62 per cent, was allocated to social safety nets. Both decreased in thefollowing year, the total budget declining to 212,699 billion rupiah and the social safety netbudget to 11,873 billion rupiah. The percentage of the social safety net budget alsodecreased to 5.58 per cent of the total. The decline continued in 2000, when the totalbudget fell to 183,069 billion rupiah, and the social safety net budget to 5,462 billionrupiah. The share of the latter to the former also fell to 2.98 per cent. That the socialsafety net budget should go on a decline can perhaps be attributed to the fact that thecrisis to which it was addressed to has lessened, and the worsely affected, as well as therest of the population, have been returning to normal life. The fall in the total budget ismore difficult to explain since the economy is said to have been on the mend in the lastyear or two, and therefore has been better able to support a larger budget, but that isbeyond the scope of this paper.

Table 7 also shows the sectoral composition of the development budget. This budgettotalled 71,600 billion rupiah in 1998/1999, 61,747 billion rupiah in 1999/2000, and 39,387bilion rupiah in 2000.

The source and composition of the social safety net budget can also be seen from thetable. The total social safety net budget of 14,820 billion rupiah, 11,873 billion rupiah, and5,462 billion rupiah in the fiscal years 1998/1999, 1999/2000, and 2000 respectively, canalso be seen. The distribution of the social safety net budget to the different programmesand projects (i.e. food security, education, health, and employment creation) to the sectoralbudget, regional budget, and project loan funded budget is also shown.

The portion of the social safety net budget that is funded by foreign loans deserves acloser look. It was 5.6 per cent in 1998/1999, 14.8 per cent in 1999/2000, and 22.4 percent in 2000.

B. External sources of financing

Foreign loans played an important role in the financing of the social safety netprogrammes in Indonesia, and for that matter, in the financing of the whole developmentbudget. As Table 7 shows, out of the total development budget of 71,600 billion rupiah in1998/1999, 40,541 billion rupiah, or 56.6 per cent, was funded by foreign loans. In 1999/2000, out of the total development budget of 61,747 billion rupiah, 30,000 billion rupiah, or48.6 per cent, came from foreign loans. In 2000, the figures were: 39,387 billion rupiah ofthe total development budget, 16,030 billion rupiah, or 46.0 per cent, from foreign loans.The portion of foreign loans in the development budget is thus high, even if it is declining.


185


Table 7. Comparison between social safety net programmesand total budget and gross domestic product (GDP),

1998-2000

Budget Allocation (billlion rupiah)No. Budget Items

1998/1999 1999/2000 2000

1. DEVELOPMENT BUDGET

1.1 Sectoral Budget

A. SSN Programs Funded by Sectoral Budget 4 252 2 020 827

a. Food Security 633 5 8b. Education 612 832 378c. Health 940 183 0d. Employment Creation 2 066 1 000 441

B. Total Sectoral Budget 17 253 15 618 8 218Percentage of SSN to Total Sectoral Budget (A/B) 24.64 12.94 10.06

1.2 Regional Budget

A. SSN Programs Funded by Regional Budget 4 282 1 859 1 179

a. Education 1 446 535 399b. Health 1 135 532 345c. Community Funds 1 701 792 435

B. Total Regional Budget 13 806 16 129 15 139Percentage of SSN to Total Regional Budget (A/B) 31.01 11.53 7.79

1.3 Project Loan Funded Budget

A. SSN Programs Funded by Project Loan 836 1 758 1 224

a. Food Security 0 112 0b. Education 639 697 289c. Health 198 949 935

B. Total Project Loan Funded Budget 40 541 30 000 16 030Percentage of SSN to Total Loan Funded Budget (A/B) 2.06 5.86 7.64

TOTAL DEVELOPMENT BUDGET

A. Total SSN Programs Funded by Development Budget 9 370 5 638 3 230(1.1.A + 1.2.A + 1.3.A)

B. Total Development Budget (1.1.B + 1.2.B + 1.3.B) 71 600 61 747 39 387

Percentage of SSN to Total Development Budget (A/B) 13.09 9.13 8.20

(continued)

186

Table 7 (continued)

Budget Allocation (billlion rupiah)No. Budget Items

1998/1999 1999/2000 2000

2. CURRENT (ROUTINE) BUDGET

A. SSN Programs Funded by Current Budget 5 450 6 235 2 232(Rice Price Subsidy, OPK)

B. Total Current Budget 192 288 150 952 143 682

Percentage of SSN to Total Current Budget (A/B) 2.83 4.13 1.55

TOTAL BUDGET

A. Total SSN Budget 14 820 11 873 5 462B. Total Budget 263 888 212 699 183 069

Percentage of SSN to Total Budget (A/B) 5.62 5.58 2.98C. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 951 975 1 224 200 910 432

Percentage of SSN to GDP (A/C) 1.56 0.97 0.60

Source: 1. Calculated from several publications of TKPP-JPS.2. Financial Notes and Proposed Budget (1999/2000 and 2000).

Notes: 1. Categorization of the budgets of fiscal year 1998/99 and 1999/2000 follows newly implementedsystem (started in fiscal year 2000).

2. Three programmes (PKP, PKPP, and PDM-DKE) with a budget amounting Rp 1,792 billion werenot implemented in fiscal year 1999/2000 owing to limited budget.

3. Fiscal year 2000 is a transition from April-March budget period to January-December (only 9months).

Only a small percentage of total foreign loans went to social safety nets: 2.1 per centin 1998/1999; 5.9 per cent in 1999/2000; and 7.64 per cent in 2000. But the foreign loansthat went to the social safety net programme, small as they were relative to the total foreignloans, were considerable when matched against the total social safety net budget. As shownin table 8, they represented 5.64 per cent in 1998/1999, 14.82 per cent in 1999/2000, and22.4 per cent in 2000. In other words, the share of foreign loans in the financing of socialsafety nets in Indonesia is rising.

Foreign loans supporting the Indonesian development programme, including socialsafety nets, consist of the following: (a) from the World Bank, US$ 600 million; (b) fromADB, US$ 71,390; (c) from the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, US$ 600 million;and (d) smaller amounts from the United Nations and other sources, i.e. the United StatesAgency for International Development (USAID), Australian Agency for International Devel-opment (AusAID), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the GermanGTZ, and the Dutch Aid.


187


Table 8. The role of international assistance in the funding ofsocial safety net (SSN) programmes by sector

1998/1999 1999/2000 2000

SSNIntervention

Total Foreign Proportion Total Foreign Proportion Total Foreign Progortion

SectorBudget Loan of Loan Budget Loan of Loan Budget Loan of Loan

Food Security 6 083 0 0.00 6 352 112 1.76 2 240 0 0.00Education 2 697 639 23.67 2 064 697 33.78 1 066 289 27.11Health 2 273 198 8.70 1 664 949 57.02 1 280 935 73.05Employment 2 066 0 0.00 1 000 0 0.00 441 0 0.00

CreationCommunity 1 701 0 0.00 792 0 0.00 435 0 0.00

Empowerment

Total 14 820 836 5.64 11 873 1 758 14.81 5 462 1 224 22.41

Source: Calculated from several publications of TKPP-JPS.

C. Remarks

Several considerations related to the social safety net programmes and the overallbudget need to be recognized. For all social safety net projects, there is a need to linkestimates of social impact to budget allocation. There is also a need to make clear thereturns that are expected from financial programmes. There are some obvious limitations todecentralization of budget allocation, including the lack of adequate planning capacity at thelocal level, problems in integrating local planning into national planning, and the ever presentreality of people at the community level “more often than not, still not directly involved inthe planning process” (Coveyers, 1982:109). These considerations should be addressed ifallocations are to correspond to their best sector, and if budgeting is to be decentralized.

The foreign loan component of the social safety net programmes also needs to beevaluated in the context of social safety nets as well as the whole national context. Theactual amount of this component is “small” at the present and does not appear to pose adanger to the sustainability of the system, but as a proportion to the total social safety netbudget, it is increasing. This rise, if not checked, will result in a heavy burden for presentand future generations of Indonesians.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

On the basis of the strengths and weaknesses of the Indonesian social safety netprogrammes uncovered in the preceding discussions, the following recommendations,intended for improving and enhancing policy formulation and programme implementation,are being put forward.

188

A. Improvement in the administrative capacityof local planners and executors

Although there is need for improvement in the quality of higher level leadership insocial safety nets, the need is more pressing and urgent at the local level. Here, theimprovement must start from planning, and goes on to the implementation, down tomonitoring and evaluation. It must encompass all local officials, individuals and agenciesinvolved in social safety net policy and programme implementation. This is the keyword toguarantee efficient and effective social safety nets to their ultimate beneficiaries.

B. Establishment and continuous strengthening of databases

This is the only way to begin solving the ubiquitous problem of mis-targeting. Sincethe target groups of social safety nets are the poor who tend to be hit most severely bycrises, identifying the poor accurately improves the targeting of social safety nets. Howpoverty is measured and quantified then becomes important to the accurate targeting ofsocial safety nets. By and large, there are two types of poverty statistics or information.The first is the number of population living below the predetermined poverty line by region,and the second is the identification (names and addresses) of the poor. Quantitativeinformation on the various socio-economic dimensions of poverty will also be useful.These pieces of information must be gathered and compiled systematically in order toprovide an accurate and adequate basis for targeting the victims of crises who happen, inthe majority of cases, to be poor.

The data, for both national and local agencies, must be slowly but steadily built up ina data bank by professionally qualified individuals and institutions. They must beconstantly updated to ensure their reflection of current realities.

The table below outlines the top-down and bottom-up approaches to targeting ofsocial safety net programmes, in particular, and anti-poverty programmes in general. Ifused in combination, the two approaches will help ensure more accurate targeting for socialsafety net programmes.

C. Shift from crisis-oriented social safety net programmesto longer-term programmes

This calls for the effective transformation of short-term social safety nets to long-termsocial security programmes, schemes that will be continued into the future and for all time,similar to the existing social security system for people in the formal sector, in order toprovide continuing support and assistance to poor people even in between crises. Thisobviously requires funding that is not dependent on government coffers which sufferprecisely when crises occur, nor upon foreign loans that impose a burden of unpredictedweight on present and future generations. Ways must be found to start independentfinancing for social safety nets.


189


Table 9. The combined top-down and bottom-up approach indefining the target groups

Mechanism Type and mechanism of determining target groups

Approach of distributingbudget to the Geographic Sectoral Individual

poor targeting targeting targeting

Top-down Determining Data on number Data on number 1. Data on numberdistribution of and names of the and percentage and percentage ofassistance target sub-districts of poor households poor populationprogramme budget and villages by sector (industry and poor householdsallocated to the according to & occupation) of by districtstarget groups by poverty typology main breadwinner 2. Establishingprovincial and by districts and by districts several nationallydistrict levels, standardized andaccording to the operational criterianumber of the poor* of the poor

Bottom-up Determining Determining the final and most eligible Applying self-distribution of target sub-districts and villages on the selection or self-budget allocated to basis of the real condition, and mutual targeting at villagethe target groups compromise of all relevant interests and lowerby sub-district and administrativevillage levels, levels using theaccording to the standard criterianumber of finally with some localdetermined target adjustment, with thegroups and localities following procedures:

1. Identification ofthe target groups isfirst based onknowledge of localauthorities, commu-nity leaders, orvolunteers regularlyinvolved in distribut-ing tithe or donationto the needy

2. Direct verificationof the identifiedtarget groups todecide the final andmost eligible targetgroups

Note: * One of the most common formulas used to estimate funding allocated to alleviate the living standardof the poor to the predetermined poverty threshold is the derivation of F-G-T Indices which can bewritten as follows: Fi = P1/P0*Z*NP, where Fi: total funding allocated to the poor per month inregion-ith; P1: poverty gap index in region-ith; P0: head-count ratio (per cent poor to total population)in region-ith; Z: poverty line (rupiah/capita/month) in region-ith; and NP: absolute number of poorpopulation in region-ith.

190

AN

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X I

.

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191


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192

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NE

X I

(c

ontin

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PR

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MM

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TAR

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CT

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p 1,

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ant:

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ary

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ty t

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s of

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of

fund

: st

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cont

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to

high

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loca

ted

to b

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prim

ary

stud

ents

FY 1

996/

1997

to

2000

scho

ol g

arde

ns t

opr

epar

ed a

nd o

rgan

ized

by

•So

urce

of

fund

: st

ate

impr

ove:

stu

dent

’sho

useh

olds

and

wom

en’s

Fisc

al y

ear

1999

/200

0:bu

dget

nutr

ition

al s

tatu

s;gr

oup

asso

ciat

ions

(PK

K)

Bud

get:

532

billi

on r

upia

h•

Cov

erag

e: a

ll pr

ovin

ces

food

div

ersi

fica

tion;

and

Targ

et:

9.8

mill

ion

prim

ary

the

agri

cultu

ral

prog

ram

me

stud

ents

of ‘

com

pact

soc

iety

’ or

Rea

lizat

ion:

9.5

mill

ion

mas

yara

kat

terp

adu

prim

ary

stud

ents (c

onti

nued

)


197


AN

NE

X I

(c

ontin

ued)

PR

OG

RA

MM

EA

IMS

TAR

GE

T G

RO

UP

SA

CT

IVIT

IES

TAR

GE

TA

LL

OC

AT

ION

•To

sup

port

gro

wth

of

Not

es:

Thi

s pr

ogra

mm

eFi

scal

yea

r 20

00:

rura

l ba

se e

cono

my

atac

tual

ly s

tart

ed i

n 19

96 i

nB

udge

t: 34

5 bi

llion

the

IDT

vill

ages

line

with

the

pro

gram

me

rupi

ah•

To b

uild

the

sen

se o

ffo

r te

enag

ers.

It

is e

xpec

ted

Targ

et:

9.6

mill

ion

prim

ary

“I l

ove

Indo

nesi

an F

ood”

that

thi

s pr

ogra

mm

e w

illst

uden

tssu

ppor

t th

e na

tiona

lR

ealiz

atio

n: 9

.5 m

illio

ned

ucat

iona

l co

mpu

lsor

ypr

imar

y st

uden

tspr

ogra

mm

e of

9 y

ears

of

The

bud

get

allo

cate

d fo

rpr

imar

y ed

ucat

ion

Food

this

pro

gram

me

is d

irec

tlysu

pple

men

t is

giv

en 3

tim

estr

ansf

erre

d to

the

acc

ount

per

day

over

a

9-m

onth

of t

he s

choo

l he

adm

aste

rpe

riod

via

the

post

off

ice

11.

Ban

tuan

Pra

sara

na•

To r

educ

e fl

ood

dam

age

•L

ocal

con

trac

tors

•C

lean

ing

up/

dred

ging

Tota

l bu

dget

:D

asar

Pem

ukim

anfo

r th

e pe

ople

of

Jaka

rta.

regi

ster

ed /

lic

ense

dla

rge

cana

ls a

nd83

,136

mill

ion

rupi

ahP

rogr

amm

e•

To c

reat

e em

ploy

men

tat

DK

Ise

wer

ages

usi

ng

heav

yPe

nang

gula

ngan

Ban

jiran

d w

ork

in f

lood

are

as•

Con

stru

ctio

n la

bour

ers

cons

truc

tion

tool

sPe

riod

of

wor

k:D

KI

Jaka

rta

part

ly f

or d

ism

isse

d an

dan

d co

nstr

uctio

n w

orke

rs•

Wat

er p

ump

inst

alla

tions

2-3

mon

ths

for

unsk

illed

Blo

ck g

rant

for

unem

ploy

ed p

erso

nsat

man

ager

ial

leve

l.fo

r hi

gh r

isk

area

sw

orke

rs a

nd v

ario

us f

orba

sic

settl

emen

t•

If t

he w

ork

is l

ess

than

of f

lood

thos

e us

ing

heav

y lo

adin

fras

truc

ture

and

50 m

illio

n ru

piah

, th

e•

Wid

enin

g th

e ar

eas

equi

pmen

tfl

oodi

ng c

ontr

olco

ntra

ctor

s ha

ve t

o be

for

wat

er r

eser

voir

s,pr

ogra

mm

e in

Jak

arta

sele

cted

fro

m l

ow l

evel

for

floo

d co

ntro

lB

y :

Dep

artm

ent

ofco

ntra

ctor

s.

If t

he w

ork

•Pr

ovid

ing

floo

d co

ntro

lPu

blic

Wor

ksis

mor

e th

an 5

0 m

illio

neq

uipm

ent

•Pe

riod

of

activ

ity:

rupi

ah,

free

sel

ectio

n ca

nFY

199

8/19

99ta

ke p

lace

•So

urce

of

fund

:st

ate

budg

et•

Cov

erag

e: J

akar

ta(c

onti

nued

)

198

AN

NE

X I

(c

ontin

ued)

PR

OG

RA

MM

EA

IMS

TAR

GE

T G

RO

UP

SA

CT

IVIT

IES

TAR

GE

TA

LL

OC

AT

ION

12.

Pro

gram

me

•To

pro

vide

hou

sing

for

•R

egis

tere

d co

ntra

ctor

s at

Man

agin

g sl

um a

reas

Tota

l bu

dget

:Pe

mba

ngun

an R

SSpe

ople

suf

feri

ng f

rom

the

Nat

iona

l H

ousi

ng B

oard

alle

viat

ion

prog

ram

me

14,5

21 m

illio

n ru

piah

Dilo

kasi

Sam

arin

dare

loca

tion

prog

ram

me

of(P

erum

nas)

and

loc

alal

ong

the

stre

am o

f th

eB

engk

uria

ng d

anth

e K

aran

gmum

us r

iver

adm

inis

trat

ive

offi

ces

Kar

angm

umus

riv

er.

Sam

buta

nin

Sam

arin

da•

The

sel

ectio

n of

cho

sen

Smal

l-si

zed

hous

ing

•To

cre

ate

empl

oym

ent

cont

ract

or i

s do

ne u

sing

deve

lopm

ent

prog

ram

me

and

job

oppo

rtun

ity f

orth

e st

anda

rd o

fin

Sam

arin

daw

orke

rs i

n th

e ar

eas

Peru

mna

s’s

requ

irem

ents

.B

y: D

epar

tmen

t of

of p

ublic

wor

kPu

blic

Wor

ks•

To p

rovi

de a

chie

vabl

e•

Peri

od o

f ac

tivity

:pr

ice

of h

ousi

ng f

orFY

199

8/19

99pe

ople

of

low

pur

chas

ing

•So

urce

of

fund

: st

ate

pow

er /

eco

nom

ical

lybu

dget

inca

pabl

e•

Cov

erag

e: 1

tow

n(

Sam

arin

da )

13.

Pro

gram

me

•To

pro

vide

hou

sing

for

•T

he p

oor

livin

g at

•It

is

esse

ntia

l th

at t

heTo

tal

budg

et p

repa

red

pem

bang

unan

peop

le l

ivin

g in

slu

mJa

kart

a’s

rive

r si

dew

ork

of t

he p

rogr

amm

efo

r th

e pr

ogra

mm

e:ru

suna

wa

Di

loka

siar

eas

alon

g th

e ri

ver

•C

ontr

acto

rs,

regi

ster

ed a

tus

es l

ocal

and

dom

estic

18,7

71 m

illio

n ru

piah

Sind

ang

Koj

a Ja

kart

asi

de o

f Ja

kart

a;

thos

e‘P

erum

per

umna

s’,

loca

lm

ater

ials

.U

tara

suff

erin

g fr

om t

hego

vern

men

t in

stru

men

ts•

Thi

s ty

pe o

f w

ork

isA

vera

ge p

erio

d of

Hou

sing

dev

elop

men

tre

loca

tion

prog

ram

me

and

rela

ted

pers

on t

ous

ually

don

e in

big

citi

esw

ork:

9 m

onth

spr

ogra

mm

e fo

r pe

ople

•To

cre

ate

empl

oym

ent

the

prog

ram

me

and

met

ropo

litan

citi

es.

at S

inda

ng K

oja

–an

d jo

b op

port

unity

for

deve

lopm

ent

•M

anag

ing

slum

are

asN

orth

Jak

arta

.w

orke

rs i

n th

e ar

eas

alle

viat

ion

prog

ram

me

By

: D

epar

tmen

t of

of p

ublic

wor

k.al

ong

the

stre

am o

fPu

blic

Wor

ks•

To p

rovi

de a

chie

vabl

eSu

nter

can

al.

•Pe

riod

of

activ

ity:

pric

e of

hou

sing

for

FY 1

998/

1999

peop

le o

f lo

w p

urch

asin

g•

Sour

ce o

f fu

nd:

pow

er /

eco

nom

ical

lyst

ate

budg

etin

capa

ble

(con

tinu

ed)


199


AN

NE

X I

(c

ontin

ued)

PR

OG

RA

MM

EA

IMS

TAR

GE

T G

RO

UP

SA

CT

IVIT

IES

TAR

GE

TA

LL

OC

AT

ION

14.

Pro

gram

me

Perb

aika

n•

To c

reat

e em

ploy

men

t•

Loc

al c

ontr

acto

rs,

•C

lean

ing

up s

lum

are

asTo

tal

budg

et:

Kam

pung

Kum

uh d

anan

d jo

b op

port

unity

regi

ster

ed a

t se

cond

ary

at f

ishe

rman

vill

ages

442.

5 bi

llion

rup

iah

Nel

ayan

Pad

at K

arya

part

ly f

or w

orke

rs i

nle

vel

of a

dmin

istr

ativ

e –

•R

educ

ing

swam

p ar

eas

Sekt

or P

eker

jaan

the

cons

truc

tion

indu

stry

‘DA

TI

II’,

alo

ng w

ith i

tsin

the

city

and

fix

ing

Targ

et:

56 m

illio

nU

mum

(P

KSP

U-C

K•

Rel

ease

peo

ple’

s bu

rden

sw

orke

rs a

nd p

erso

n in

sew

erag

e pi

pes

man

-day

sC

ipta

Kar

ya)

for

fixi

ng t

he h

ouse

char

ge f

or t

he p

rogr

amm

e•

Fix

ing

publ

ic f

acili

ties

Rea

lizat

ion:

52

mill

ion

Urb

an s

lum

and

and

thei

r en

viro

nmen

tde

velo

pmen

tm

ainl

y tr

aditi

onal

mar

kets

man

-day

sco

asta

l ar

eare

latin

g to

les

s•

Loc

al u

nem

ploy

ed•

Oth

er a

chie

vabl

e pu

blic

impr

ovem

ent

and

purc

hasi

ng p

ower

of

cons

truc

tion

labo

ur a

ndw

ork

in c

olla

bora

tion

Ave

rage

per

iod

of w

ork:

publ

ic w

ork

(PK

PS-

loca

l so

ciet

ype

ople

dea

ling

with

with

loc

al a

dmin

istr

ativ

e3

mon

ths

usin

g w

ell-

cipt

a ka

rya

prog

ram

me)

supp

ly o

f m

ater

ials

for

peop

le (

PEM

DA

)tr

aine

d co

nstr

uctio

n la

bour

By:

D

epar

tmen

t of

vari

ous

type

s of

Publ

ic W

orks

cons

truc

tion

wor

kA

vera

ge f

ee p

er w

orke

r•

Peri

od o

f ac

tivity

:pe

r da

y:FY

199

8/19

99R

angi

ng b

etw

een:

7,5

00 –

•So

urce

of

fund

:10

,000

rup

iah

depe

ndin

gst

ate

budg

eton

wor

k lo

catio

n•

Cov

erag

e: 1

3 pr

ovin

ces

15.

Pro

yek

pena

nggu

lang

an•

To p

rovi

de p

rodu

ctiv

e•

Une

mpl

oyed

per

sons

of

Bui

ldin

g an

d re

pair

ing

Tota

l bu

dget

:D

ampa

k ke

keri

ngan

and

cont

inue

dec

onom

ic c

risi

s an

dva

riou

s ty

pes

of p

ublic

317,

174

mill

ion

rupi

ahda

n m

asal

ahem

ploy

men

t fo

r th

e le

ssdr

ough

t vi

ctim

s in

bot

hw

ork

as f

ollo

ws:

kete

naga

kerj

aan

educ

ated

une

mpl

oyed

urba

n an

d ru

ral

area

s•

Dra

inag

e to

sup

port

the

Targ

et:

22 m

illio

n(P

DK

MK

) ta

hap

Ibo

th r

ural

and

urb

an•

Loc

al c

omm

unity

as

aag

ricu

ltura

l pr

oduc

tion

man

-day

sPr

ojec

t fo

r ov

erco

min

g•

To e

mpo

wer

loc

alw

hole

, pa

rtly

tho

se•

Vill

age

road

s, t

o su

ppor

tR

ealiz

atio

n: 2

1 m

illio

nth

e im

pact

s of

dro

ught

soci

ety

econ

omic

ally

suff

erin

g fr

om c

risi

str

ansp

orta

tion

and

man

-day

san

d em

ploy

men

t-re

late

d•

To s

uppo

rt l

ocal

and

drou

ght

pro

duct

ion

mar

ketin

gpr

oble

ms,

Sta

ge I

econ

omic

ins

titut

ions

via

•L

ocal

and

tra

ditio

nal

Ave

rage

wor

king

day

sB

y: D

epar

tmen

t of

man

agin

g va

riou

s pu

blic

mar

kets

per

prog

ram

me:

Man

pow

erw

orks

pro

gram

mes

•M

akin

g w

ater

res

ervo

irs

10 d

ays

usin

g ro

tatio

n•

Peri

od o

f ac

tivity

:•

To s

uppo

rt l

ocal

to s

uppo

rt w

et l

and

syst

em f

or a

ll av

aila

ble

FY 1

998/

1999

deve

lopm

ent

prog

ram

mes

irri

gatio

nsw

orke

rs a

t lo

catio

n

(con

tinu

ed)

200

AN

NE

X I

(c

ontin

ued)

PR

OG

RA

MM

EA

IMS

TAR

GE

T G

RO

UP

SA

CT

IVIT

IES

TAR

GE

TA

LL

OC

AT

ION

•So

urce

of

fund

: st

ate

•B

reed

ing

econ

omic

albu

dget

plan

ts–i

nten

sify

loc

al•

Cov

erag

e: 7

pro

vinc

espo

nds

and

dyke

for

(215

mun

icip

aliti

es)

prof

it-or

ient

ed a

ctiv

ities

•To

cre

ate

vari

ous

alte

rnat

ive

wor

k to

prod

uce

mat

eria

ls f

orco

nstr

ucti

on.

•To

bui

ld s

impl

e m

arke

tan

d ki

osk,

etc

16.

Pro

yek

pena

nggu

lang

an•

To p

rovi

de n

ew•

Une

mpl

oyed

per

sons

of

•B

uild

ing

and

repa

irin

gTo

tal

budg

et:

Dam

pak

keke

ring

anpr

oduc

tive

and

cont

inue

dec

onom

ic c

risi

s an

dva

riou

s ty

pes

of p

ublic

279.

43 b

illio

n ru

piah

dan

mas

alah

empl

oym

ent

for

the

less

drou

ght

vict

ims

in b

oth

wor

k re

latin

g to

the

kete

naga

kerj

aan

educ

ated

une

mpl

oyed

,ur

ban

and

rura

l ar

eas

aim

s of

the

pro

ject

Targ

et m

an-d

ays:

(PD

KM

K)

taha

p II

both

rur

al a

nd u

rban

•L

ocal

com

mun

ity a

s a

•Pr

ovid

ing

new

pro

duct

ive

23 m

illio

nPr

ojec

t fo

r ov

erco

min

g•

To e

mpo

wer

loc

alw

hole

, pa

rtly

tho

sean

d co

ntin

ued

empl

oym

ent

the

impa

cts

of d

roug

htso

ciet

y ec

onom

ical

lysu

ffer

ing

from

cri

sis

and

for

less

edu

cate

dR

ealiz

atio

n:an

d em

ploy

men

t-re

late

d•

To c

reat

e in

vest

men

tdr

ough

tun

empl

oyed

, bo

th r

ural

22 m

illio

n m

an-d

ays

prob

lem

s, S

tage

II

for

the

loca

l ec

onom

yan

d ur

ban

By:

Dep

artm

ent

of•

To c

reat

e co

mm

unity

•E

mpo

wer

ing

loca

lA

vera

ge w

ork

per

Man

pow

ersa

ving

pro

gram

me

soci

ety

econ

omic

ally

prog

ram

me:

•Pe

riod

of

activ

ity:

FY•

To u

se a

nd i

mpr

ove

•C

reat

ing

inve

stm

ent

for

1 m

onth

1998

/199

9te

chno

logy

im

plem

enta

tion

the

loca

l ec

onom

y•

Sour

ce o

f fu

nd:

stat

efo

r lo

cal

deve

lopm

ent

•C

reat

ing

com

mun

itybu

dget

savi

ng p

rogr

amm

e•

Cov

erag

e: 2

20 d

istr

icts

•Im

plem

entin

g ne

win

27

prov

ince

tech

nolo

gy f

or l

ocal

deve

lopm

ent

drai

nage

to

supp

ort

agri

cultu

ral

prod

ucti

on

(con

tinu

ed)


201


AN

NE

X I

(c

ontin

ued)

PR

OG

RA

MM

EA

IMS

TAR

GE

T G

RO

UP

SA

CT

IVIT

IES

TAR

GE

TA

LL

OC

AT

ION

•Su

ppor

ting

loca

l an

dtr

aditi

onal

mar

kets

•B

reed

ing

econ

omic

alpl

ants

–int

ensi

fy l

ocal

pond

s an

d dy

kes

for

prof

it-or

ient

ed a

ctiv

ities

•Im

prov

ing

vari

ous

alte

rnat

ive

wor

k to

prod

uce

mat

eria

ls f

orco

nstr

ucti

on

17.

Pro

yek

pada

t K

arya

•To

ove

rcom

e•

Gro

ups

of f

arm

ers

Dev

elop

men

t ac

tiviti

es c

over

:Tot

al b

udge

t:Se

ktor

Keh

utan

anun

empl

oym

ent

and

•U

nem

ploy

ed w

orke

rs•

Civ

il fo

rest

pro

gram

me

490.

52 b

illio

n ru

piah

Lab

our

inte

nsiv

edi

sgui

sed

unem

ploy

men

t•

Full

degr

ee g

radu

ate

for

50,9

00 h

ecta

res

proj

ect

in t

he f

ores

try

by c

reat

ing

vari

ous

jobs

with

for

estr

y ba

ckgr

ound

•In

dust

ry p

lant

for

est

Targ

et:

30 m

illio

nse

ctor

in t

he f

ores

try

and

51,3

40 h

a.m

an-d

ays

By:

Dep

artm

ent

ofpl

anta

tion

sect

or•

Bak

au F

ores

tR

ealiz

atio

n: 1

3.4

mill

ion

Fore

stry

•To

hel

p th

ose

fam

ilies

reha

bilit

atio

n, 2

110

ha.

man

-day

s•

Peri

od o

f ac

tivity

:at

hig

h ri

sk o

f hu

nger

•G

reen

lin

e fo

rest

FY 1

998/

1999

•To

pre

vent

for

est

prog

ram

me,

9,7

40A

vera

ge p

erio

d of

wor

k:•

Sour

ce o

f fu

nd:

dest

ruct

ion

hect

ares

Ran

ging

acc

ordi

ng t

ost

ate

budg

et•

To c

onso

lidat

e lo

cal

•Pr

otec

t fo

rest

pro

gram

me,

seas

on:

3–6

mon

ths

•C

over

age:

155

inst

itutio

ns i

n th

e vi

llage

4, 6

70 h

ecta

res

mun

icip

aliti

es•

To e

mpl

oy p

oten

tial

•Fo

rest

for

silk

(810

vill

ages

) in

wor

kers

and

fre

shpr

oduc

tion,

680

ha.

19 p

rovi

nces

grad

uate

s•

Wat

er r

eser

voir

and

abso

rptio

n di

g, 4

.330

hect

ares

.•

Mul

tifun

ctio

n la

nd,

105,

770

hec

tare

s

(con

tinu

ed)

202

AN

NE

X I

(c

ontin

ued)

PR

OG

RA

MM

EA

IMS

TAR

GE

T G

RO

UP

SA

CT

IVIT

IES

TAR

GE

TA

LL

OC

AT

ION

18.

Pro

yek

The

pro

gram

me

is•

Une

mpl

oyed

wor

kers

•U

nem

ploy

ed w

orke

rsTo

tal

budg

et:

Pena

nggu

lang

ande

velo

ped

by 2

mod

els:

with

spe

cifi

c sk

ills

supp

ort

by g

ivin

g liv

ing

399,

185

billi

on r

upia

hPe

ngan

ggur

an P

eker

ja•

Prod

uctiv

e ec

onom

ican

d ex

peri

ence

ince

ntiv

e fo

r 7

mon

ths

Tera

mpi

l (P

3T)

inst

itut

ion

•V

ictim

s of

eco

nom

icpe

riod

dur

ing

the

trai

ning

Targ

et:

Lab

our-

inte

nsiv

e fo

r•

New

sel

f-em

ploy

men

tcr

isis

(di

smis

sed

wor

kers

)•

For

the

new

-sel

f69

, 32

0 pe

rson

for

3.4

66sk

illed

lab

oure

rsbu

sine

ss•

Form

al w

orke

rs w

ithem

ploy

ed,

supp

ort

ispa

ckag

esB

y: D

epar

tmen

t of

lette

r of

dis

mis

sal

from

give

n in

ter

ms

of a

mou

ntM

anpo

wer

The

se a

im a

t pr

ovid

ing

form

al e

nter

pris

e or

of c

apita

l to

act

ivat

eM

inim

um i

ncen

tive

is•

Peri

od o

f ac

tivity

:in

depe

nden

t in

stitu

tions

com

pany

thei

r bu

sine

ss30

0.00

0 ru

piah

dur

ing

FY 1

998/

1999

:to

sup

port

ski

lled

7 m

onth

s of

tra

inin

g.•

Sour

ce o

f fu

nd:

unem

ploy

men

tst

ate

budg

et•

Cov

erag

e: 2

6 pr

ovin

ces

19.

Pem

berd

ayaa

n D

aera

h•

To i

mpr

ove

purc

hasi

ng•

Poor

peo

ple

in b

oth

•K

eepi

ng a

nd b

uild

ing

Fisc

al Y

ear

1998

/199

9:da

lam

Men

gata

sipo

wer

of

the

poor

in

urba

n an

d ru

ral

area

sva

riou

s in

fras

truc

ture

Bud

get:

1,70

1 bi

llion

Dam

pak

Kri

sis

both

rur

al a

nd u

rban

incl

udin

g th

ose

suff

erin

gfa

cilit

ies:

roa

ds,

irri

gatio

nru

piah

Eko

nom

i (P

DM

-DK

E)

area

s by

cre

atin

gfr

om a

los

s of

job

s an

dne

twor

k, w

aste

dis

posa

lB

enef

icia

ries

: 8

mill

ion

Em

pow

erm

ent

ofem

ploy

men

t an

d jo

bso

urce

of

inco

me,

tho

sepl

ace,

wat

er r

eser

voir

,H

Hs

regi

ons

to o

verc

ome

oppo

rtun

ities

who

can

not

ful

fil

floo

d co

ntro

l ar

eas,

and

the

impa

ct o

f th

e•

To i

nten

sify

the

thei

r ba

sic

need

sal

tern

ativ

e w

ork

for

Fisc

al y

ear

2000

:ec

onom

ic c

risi

sfu

nctio

n of

loc

al e

cono

my•

Vill

ages

with

hig

hest

unem

ploy

ed p

erso

nsB

udge

t: 43

5 bi

llion

By:

Bap

pena

s an

dby

reb

uild

ing

the

soci

alpo

pula

tion

of t

hose

•Fu

nds

for

mic

roru

piah

Min

istr

y of

Hom

eec

onom

y in

fras

truc

ture

to

men

tione

d ab

ove,

vill

ages

ente

rpri

ses

impl

emen

ted

Targ

et g

roup

: 1.

3 m

illio

nA

ffai

rssu

ppor

t th

e lo

cal

with

a h

igh

num

ber

by t

he p

oor

HH

s•

Peri

od o

f ac

tivity

: F

Ypr

oduc

tion

sys

tem

of t

otal

une

mpl

oym

ent

•B

enef

icia

ries

, ac

tiviti

es,

1998

/199

9 an

d FY

200

0an

d bu

dget

allo

catio

n•

Sour

ce o

f fu

nd:

stat

ear

e de

term

ined

by

budg

etth

e co

mm

unity

thr

ough

•C

over

age:

all

prov

ince

svi

llage

dis

cuss

ion

(con

tinu

ed)


203


AN

NE

X I

(c

ontin

ued)

PR

OG

RA

MM

EA

IMS

TAR

GE

T G

RO

UP

SA

CT

IVIT

IES

TAR

GE

TA

LL

OC

AT

ION

20.

Peng

emba

ngan

•To

inc

reas

e th

e•

Tho

se r

egis

tere

d in

2 co

mpo

nent

s in

Tota

l bu

dget

allo

cate

d:Pe

rbib

itan

dan

prod

uctiv

ity o

f lo

cal

farm

er a

ssoc

iatio

nspr

ogra

mm

e ac

tiviti

es:

57.3

bill

ion

rupi

ahB

udid

aya

Ayam

Bur

aspo

ultr

y ac

tiviti

es i

nse

ekin

g ca

pita

l su

ppor

t1)

Bui

lt-op

erat

e-tr

ansf

erTa

rget

:di

Per

desa

anru

ral

area

san

d ha

ving

pot

entia

lco

mpo

nent

s, i

nclu

ding

•E

stab

lishm

ent

of 6

2L

ocal

pou

ltry

rura

l•

To g

ener

ate

job

to i

mpr

ove

thei

rco

nstr

uctio

n/bu

ildin

gs,

loca

l po

ultr

y R

RM

Cre

arin

g m

ultip

licat

ion

oppo

rtun

ities

in

rura

lbu

sine

ss p

erfo

rman

ce.

mac

hine

ry,

othe

run

its,

cons

istin

g of

cent

re (

RR

MC

)ar

eas

thro

ugh

the

infr

astr

uctu

rem

ultip

licat

ion

cent

res,

By:

Dep

artm

ent

ofde

velo

pmen

t of

loc

al2)

Com

pone

nt o

f di

rect

poul

try

food

pro

cess

ing

Agr

icul

ture

.po

ultr

y ag

robu

sine

ssas

sist

ance

by

prov

idin

gun

its,

vete

rina

ry s

ervi

ce•

Peri

od o

f ac

tivity

:•

To i

mpr

ove

inco

me

and

a po

ultr

y pr

oduc

tion

cent

res

and

busi

ness

FY 1

999/

2000

wel

fare

lev

el o

f ru

ral

inpu

tsce

ntre

s, a

nd i

nvol

ving

•So

urce

of

fund

:fa

rmer

s24

8 fa

rmer

ass

ocia

tions

Fore

ign

loan

OE

CF

•Pr

oduc

tion

of 1

,875

(JB

IC)

for

soci

alch

icks

for

rea

ring

per

safe

ty n

ets

mon

th f

or e

ach

•C

over

age:

62

dist

rict

sR

RM

C u

nit

in 1

6 pr

ovin

ces

•Fa

rmer

s w

ill e

arn

150,

000

rupi

ah f

rom

this

bus

ines

s ac

tivity

21.

Peng

emba

ngan

Tam

bak

•To

inc

reas

e sh

rim

p•

Tho

se r

egis

tere

d in

•R

ehab

ilita

tion

of i

rrig

atio

nTo

tal

budg

et a

lloca

ted:

Rak

yat/

Inte

nsif

icat

ion

prod

uctio

n an

d th

ebr

acki

sh w

ater

far

mer

syst

em t

o su

ppor

t54

.974

bill

ion

rupi

ahof

bra

ckis

h w

ater

prod

uctiv

ity o

f br

acki

shas

soci

atio

ns f

acin

gbr

acki

sh w

ater

cul

tivat

ion,

Targ

et:

inte

nsif

icat

ion

ofcu

ltiva

tion

wat

er c

ultu

refi

nanc

ial

diff

icul

ty i

nco

veri

ng 5

,350

hec

tare

sbr

acki

sh w

ater

cul

tivat

ion

By:

Dep

artm

ent

of•

To g

ener

ate

job

and

runn

ing

thei

r bu

sine

sssp

read

ove

r 10

pro

vinc

esco

veri

ng a

tot

al a

rea

ofA

gric

ultu

rebu

sine

ss o

ppor

tuni

ties

and

havi

ng p

oten

tial

to•

Dis

trib

utio

n of

rol

l-ov

er5,

350

hect

ares

•Pe

riod

of

activ

ity:

•To

im

prov

e in

com

e an

dim

prov

e th

eir

busi

ness

fund

s fo

r pr

oduc

tion

Rea

lizat

ion:

2,0

40 h

ecta

res

FY 1

999/

2000

wel

fare

lev

el o

f fa

rmer

spe

rfor

man

ce,

and

they

inpu

ts f

or b

rack

ish

•So

urce

of

fund

:•

To i

ncre

ase

fore

ign

are

not

expe

cted

to

wat

er f

arm

ers

Fore

ign

loan

OE

CF

exch

ange

thr

ough

be n

ewco

mer

s.(J

BIC

) fo

r ag

ricu

ltura

lex

port

ing

of s

hrim

psan

d fo

rest

ry s

ecto

r•

Cov

erag

e: 1

4 di

stri

cts

in 1

0 pr

ovin

ces

(con

tinu

ed)

204

AN

NE

X I

(c

ontin

ued)

PR

OG

RA

MM

EA

IMS

TAR

GE

T G

RO

UP

SA

CT

IVIT

IES

TAR

GE

TA

LL

OC

AT

ION

22.

Pra

kars

a K

husu

sTo

pro

vide

em

ploy

men

tW

omen

fro

m p

oor

•G

ener

atin

g jo

bTo

tal

budg

et a

lloca

ted:

Bag

i Pe

ngan

ggur

oppo

rtun

ities

for

poo

rho

useh

olds

with

out

oppo

rtun

ities

and

75 b

illio

n ru

piah

Pere

mpu

an (

PK

PP

)un

empl

oyed

in

urba

npe

rman

ent

jobs

and

liv

ing

incr

easi

ng i

ncom

e fo

rTa

rget

: ov

er 7

0,00

0Sp

ecia

l in

itiat

ives

for

area

s, t

hrou

gh p

rogr

amm

esin

urb

an c

entr

es,

aged

unem

ploy

ed w

omen

,po

or u

nem

ploy

ed,

wom

en u

nem

ploy

men

tth

ey t

hem

selv

es p

ropo

se15

-60

year

s, m

axim

umth

roug

h co

nstr

uctio

nco

nsis

ting

of 8

0 pe

rB

y: D

ept.o

f Se

ttlem

ent

acco

rdin

g to

the

ir n

eed,

high

sch

ool

grad

uate

wor

k an

d ot

her

cent

fem

ales

and

20

and

Reg

iona

lth

us s

tren

gthe

ning

wom

en’s

The

se u

nem

ploy

ed w

omen

activ

ities

per

cent

mal

esD

evel

opm

ent

part

icip

atio

n in

are

requ

ired

in

grou

ps•

Incr

easi

ng w

omen

’s•

Peri

od o

f ac

tivity

:de

velo

pmen

t ac

tiviti

esto

set

leg

al s

mal

l-sc

ale

role

in

mai

ntai

ning

FY 2

000

firm

s to

be

elig

ible

to

publ

ic a

nd s

ocia

l•

Sour

ce o

f fu

nd:

stat

ere

ceiv

e fi

nanc

ial

assi

stan

cefa

cilit

ies

budg

etfo

r pr

ojec

ts/a

ctiv

ities

•E

mpo

wer

ing

wom

en•

Cov

erag

e: i

n m

ediu

m,

the

y pr

opos

ein

com

mun

ityla

rge

and

met

ropo

litan

deve

lopm

ent

activ

ities

citie

s in

6 p

rovi

nces

•In

crea

sing

eco

nom

ic(N

orth

Sum

ater

a,po

tent

ial

of f

emal

eJa

kart

a, W

est,

Cen

tral

wor

kers

, su

ch a

s th

roug

han

d E

ast

Java

, an

dth

e de

velo

pmen

t of

Sout

h Su

law

esi)

prod

uctiv

e ac

tiviti

es f

orw

omen

22Pa

dat

Kar

yaTo

pro

vide

em

ploy

men

tM

en a

nd w

omen

fro

m•

Con

stru

ctio

n an

dTo

tal

budg

et a

lloca

ted:

Perk

otaa

n (P

KP

)op

port

uniti

es f

or p

oor

poor

hou

seho

lds

with

out

impr

ovem

ent

of36

6 bi

llion

rup

iah

Urb

an l

abou

r-in

tens

ive

unem

ploy

ed i

n ur

ban

area

spe

rman

ent

jobs

and

liv

ing

urba

n in

fras

truc

ture

Targ

et:

400,

000

poor

By:

Dep

t. of

in u

rban

are

as,

aged

•O

pera

tion

and

unem

ploy

ed,

cons

istin

g of

Settl

emen

t an

d15

-55

year

s, m

axim

umm

aint

enan

ce o

f ex

istin

g20

per

cen

t fe

mal

es a

ndR

egio

nal

Dev

elop

men

thi

gh s

choo

l gr

adua

teur

ban

infr

astr

uctu

re80

per

cen

t m

ales

•Pe

riod

of

activ

ity:

and

regi

ster

ed a

t jo

b-FY

200

0se

eker

s re

gist

ratio

n un

its•

Sour

ce o

f fu

nd:

(at

sub-

dist

rict

lev

el)

stat

e bu

dget

(con

tinu

ed)


205


AN

NE

X I

(c

ontin

ued)

PR

OG

RA

MM

EA

IMS

TAR

GE

T G

RO

UP

SA

CT

IVIT

IES

TAR

GE

TA

LL

OC

AT

ION

•C

over

age:

59

dist

rict

s/•

Gen

erat

ing

job

mun

icip

aliti

es i

n al

lop

port

uniti

es a

ndpr

ovin

ces

incr

easi

ng i

ncom

e fo

run

empl

oyed

wom

en,

thro

ugh

cons

truc

tion

wor

k an

d ot

her

activ

ities

•In

crea

sing

wom

en’s

rol

ein

mai

ntai

ning

pub

lic a

ndso

cial

fac

ilitie

s•

Em

pow

erin

g w

omen

in

com

mun

ity d

evel

opm

ent

activ

ities

•In

crea

sing

eco

nom

icpo

tent

ial

of f

emal

ew

orke

rs,

such

as

thro

ugh

the

deve

lopm

ent

ofpr

oduc

tive

activ

ities

for

wom

en)

206

ANNEX II

Criteria of poor families categorized as Pre-prosperous family (PKS)and Prosperous I (KS I) according to the National Family

Planning Coordinating Agency

A family is defined as pre-prosperous if it does not meet a minimum of one of thefollowing five criteria:

1. All family members are able to practise their religious principles;

2. All family members are able to eat at least twice a day;

3. All family members have different sets of clothing for home, work, school andvisits;

4. The largest floor area of house is not made of dirt; and

5. The family is able to seek modern medical assistance and family planningservices for sick children and contraceptive users.

A family is classified as prosperous I if it does not fulfil any of the followingcriteria:

1. All family members are able to practise their religious principles;

2. The family is able to consume meat, fish or chicken at least once a week;

3. Each family member has at least one new pair of clothing every year;

4. Per capita house space area is a minimum 8 square metres;

5. All family members have been healthy for the last three months;

6. At least one family member aged 15 years or over has a fixed job/income;

7. All family members aged 10-60 years old are able to read and write;

8. All children aged 7-15 years are enrolled in school;

9. If the family has 2 or more living children and are still of the reproductive agegroup, then the couple uses contraceptive;

10. The family has the ability to improve its religious knowledge;

11. The family is able to save part of their earnings;

12. The family is able to eat together with all members at least once per day, tocommunicate among family members;

13. The family takes part in local community activities;

14. The family undertakes recreational activities outside home at least once every sixmonths;

15. The family is able to get access to information from newspapers, radio,television or magazines; and

16. All family members are able to use local transportation facilities.


207


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social safety nets in indonesia: analysis and prospects - puguh bodro irawan, 2002

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