some situational factors improving cognitive conflict reduction and interpersonal understanding

Some Situational Factors Improving Cognitive Conflict Reduction and InterpersonalUnderstandingAuthor(s): Henry McCarthySource: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Jun., 1977), pp. 217-234Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/173737 .

Accessed: 08/05/2014 20:56

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Sage Publications, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal ofConflict Resolution.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 169.229.32.137 on Thu, 8 May 2014 20:56:19 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sage

http://www.jstor.org/stable/173737?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


Some Situational Factors Improving Cognitive Conflict Reduction and Interpersonal Understanding

HENRY McCARTHY Department of Psychology University of Kansas

An important program of psychological laboratory research on cognitive conflict is based on Hammond's (1965) lens model. Most representative of this work is the triple- system case in which two persons conflict in their judgments on a mutual task of known structure and properties. Built into this case are two constraints reflecting characteristics of some conflict settings: task outcome feedback and the requirement that the conflicting parties reach a consensus. Minimal conflict reduction is evidenced in these experiments because the demands of outcome feedback orient the subjects to adapt to the changing policy dictated by the task rather than that defined by the other person. To examine the situational limits of these findings, a study was designed for a double-system case comprised of the two policy makers, but in which the structure and properties of the task are undetermined. Hence, no feedback was provided; moreover, joint judgments were made optional. Another deviation from the paradigm involved selecting subjects with already divergent belief systems rather than inducing discrepant policies through different training. Results clearly demonstrated considerable conflict reduction when persons with socially acquired opposing policies, which happened to be linear, were simply allowed free discussion and were not evaluated by task-accuracy feedback. Afterwards, subjects privately made another series of judgments as well as predictions of their partner's judgments. Overall, subjects sustained the substantial level of agreement achieved and revealed an even higher degree of assumed similarity. Limitation of the findings in view of the uniformly linear policies tested is emphasized.

INTRODUCTION

LENS MODEL COGNITIVE CONFLICT RESEARCH

Psychological laboratory research on cognitive conflict generally has dealt with one of three classes of variables: characteristics of the

AUTHOR'S NOTE: This paper is based on an M.A. thesis submitted to the Psychol- ogy Department, University of Kansas. Grateful acknowledgment is given to Dr. David

JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, Vol. 21 No. 2, June 1977 ? 1977 Sage Publications, Inc.

[217]



[218] JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

subjects, of the task, or of the situation. Each of these areas of investigation is exemplified in this paper by selected studies conducted within the lens model paradigm (Hammond, 1965). This model has generated intensive international research activity and stimulated the present study.

Examples of subject variables investigated are analytical versus intuitive orientation (Rappoport, 1965), cooperative versus persuasive orientation (Summers, 1968), nationality (Summers et al., 1968; Brehmer et al., 1970), and sex (Schaeffer, reported in Hammond and Brehmer, 1973). Task variables studied include substantive versus abstract content (Bonaiuto et al., reported in Hammond and Brehmer, 1973), linear versus curvilinear form of cue-criterion correlations (Brehmer and Kostron, 1973), degree of criterion predictability from the cues (Brehmer, 1973a, 1974a, 1974b), and intercorrelated versus independent cues (Brehmer, 1975).

Feedback and the goal of communication are two variables reflecting the structure and process of the conflict situation which are of direct relevance to the present study. Specifically, Hammond's model was designed to isolate the components of interpersonal conflict that is cognitive (i.e., based on divergent belief systems) rather than competi- tive (i.e., based on differential gain). Thus, the goal of the communication process between the conflicting parties is a variable of obvious interest. Furthermore, the paradigm was developed from Brunswik's (1952, 1956) lens model of behavior, an analytical tool for conceptual- izing the probabilistic relations from which a distal criterion variable (unknown event or condition) is inferred from multiple proximal variables (cues or information available). Consequently, whether or not precise outcome feedback on the criterion is structured into the domain or problem environment of the conflict situation is another variable of concern.

Several studies have dealt directly with the variables of communication and feedback. These researches employed the triple-system case in which each subject confronts not only an opponent but also a task system with definitive results. An early investigation by Hammond, Todd, Wilkins, and Mitchell (1966) revealed no main effects of com-

Summers, who served as the thesis advisor; to Karene Will, who assisted with the data analysis; and to three anonymous reviewers for this journal, whose criticisms contributed substantially to this revision of an earlier draft.



McCarthy / SITUA TIONAL FACTORS [219]

munication style between subjects trained to discuss both their own and their opponent's viewpoints compared to subjects who focused only on their own interpretations. All subjects showed comparable reduction in conflict. In their experiment, Miller et al. (1970) demonstrated significant differences in conflict between dyads who discussed their policies and dyads who did not. Effects of feedback versus no feedback were, however, not reliably different. The authors concluded that communication accounts for what conflict reduction is evidenced. Their results were corroborated and further specified by Brehmer (1971). He showed that communication increased agreement due to its incremental effect on policy similarity, and that it did not increase policy consistency. Part of the conventional procedure in this research is to require the members of each dyad to reach a joint judgment on each trial. Hence, the communication process must focus on satisfaction of that stipulation by some form of compromise or capitulation. It is also worthy of note that the communication manipulations employed have been, perhaps perforce, not clean and sharp ones. Subjects in the no- communication condition work individually, and subsequently their responses are randomly paired with those of another subject of whom they have no awareness. So the only manifestation of the conflict is statistical, and whatever dynamics of interpersonally cognized conflict might come to play are never activated. And as Brehmer (1971) admitted, subjects in the communication group actually interact, so that yoked processes (e.g., social facilitation) additional to communication itself may be active. For these reasons, the author chose simply to structure the conflict situation so as to foster free communication without imposing the stipulation of trial-by-trial consensus.

Brehmer's (1971) results also confirmed Miller et al.'s (1970) finding with regard to the lack of difference in rate of conflict reduction between groups which were given versus not given response feedback. This was further replicated by Brehmer and Kostron (1973). Another study by Brehmer (1972) revealed that dyads with dissimilar policies changed their policies more rapidly than did those with similar policies, despite the fact that achieving accuracy demanded that both groups modify their policies to the same extent. All these data suggest that the subjects aim more at conflict reduction than task adaptation. However, other data indicate the opposite. For example, Brehmer (1973a) lent support to the notion of task adaptation by demonstrating greater policy




consistency when task predictability was high and greater agreement when the task was simpler (i.e., linear and predictable).

A critical experiment was conducted by Brehmer and Kostron (1973) and replicated by Brehmer (1973b) to disentangle the effects of the task from the effects of the conflicting fellow subject. Previous experiments had been structured such that the type of policy change required for task accuracy was the same as for agreement with the conflicting partner. Subjects in Brehmer and Kostron (1973) and Brehmer (1973b) approached but did not totally achieve the optimal policy for the task. In fact, all subjects, even those with original policies appropriate for the new outcome feedback, reduced the weight they had been trained to apply to their cue and adopted some of the weight the other subject had been trained to apply to the other, no longer valid, cue. Thus, the process of policy change was influenced by both outcome feedback and the presence of a conflicting fellow subject. Because the structural changes in policy occurred so rapidly, however, the opportunity for conflict reduction diminished, and its effects were, consequently, smaller than those of task adaptation. The behavioral priority of task adaptation over conflict reduction was more definitively demonstrated by Brehmer and Garpebring (1974). Policy similarity was greater for naive dyads who jointly adapted to the task than for naive individuals paired with an experimental confederate who adamantly maintained a maladaptive policy while they proceeded to respond to the feedback.

In discussing the relative importance of task performance vis-a-vis interpersonal consensus, Brehmer (1971) and Brehmer and Garpebring (1974) acknowledged the limits of their finding in light of the demand characteristics of the experiments. Yet they also expressed some circum- spection as to the probability with which subjects would achieve conflict reduction in situations where it is the goal and there is no competing task adaptation involved; to quote from Brehmer and Garpebring (1974: 195),

the instructions used in the "lens model" interpersonal conflict experiments stress the importance of the task, rather than the importance of agreement ... present results indicate, however, that the results of the "lens model" interpersonal conflict experiments, as they are now performed, should be generalized only to situations where the parties are focused on the task. . . This points to a problem not con- sidered in the conflict literature, namely, the problem of how persons assess the relative importance of judgment errors and disagreement in conflict situations.... The characteristics and structure of policy conflicts may very well be quite similar



Mc Carthy / SITUA TIONA L FA C TORS [221]

in both cases, however, at least in a "lens model" analysis of behavior, for according to this kind of analysis, persons and tasks are basically systems of the same kind (Brunswik, 1952; Hammond, 1972), and there is no reason to believe that there would always be conflict reduction if the subjects really tried to reduce their conflict instead of the inaccuracies of their policies (see Hammond and Brehmer, 1973).

The purpose of the present study was to determine the subjects' ability to reach agreement in a simulated conflict situation of the double-system type with the task system removed, which precludes outcome feedback and thus favors conflict resolution through interpersonal communication.

LENS MODEL ANALYSIS AND PROCEDURE

The statistical statement of the relationship of policy similarity and policy consistency to the global index of agreement was originally specified in the lens model equation of Hursch et al. (1964). It was modified by Tucker (1964) and first applied to cognitive conflict research by Brehmer (1971) as:

r= GRsiRs2

where ra, the correlation between the judgments made by subject 1 and those made by subject 2, describes the extent of overt agreement between the subject. G is the correlation between the linear prediction of the judgments of subject 1 and the linear prediction of the judgments of subject 2 from the cue values. Beta weights produced by the multiple regression analysis provide descriptors of the relative importance a subject applies to the different cues; G is a covert measure of policy similarity because it indicates the degree of correspondence between the beta weights of the two subjects. Rs, is the multiple correlation between the cues and the judgments made by subject 1; RS2 is the same index for subject 2. These are measures of the degree of control the subjects exercise in integrating their evaluations into consistent judgments.

Lens model cognitive conflict research has almost exclusively used subjects who were laboratory-trained to hold certain policies covertly prescribed by the experimenter. Three studies (Summers, 1968; Rappo- port, 1969; Helenius, 1973), however, were conducted to examine conflict arising from policies that were formed not in an experimental



[222] JO URNA L OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

laboratory but rather through the subjects' unmanipulated personal experience and education. These three investigations of socially developed cognitive differences, however, were completed before the lens model equation used in the present study had been formulated. Thus, while they supported the discriminant validity of the selection procedure, they did not substantiate the isomorphism of changes in the similarity and consistency of conflicting socially acquired vis-a-vis laboratory-induced policies.

Typical procedures employed by Hammond, Brehmer, and their colleagues are as follows. Training Phase: Subjects learn a multiple-cue judgment task alone to a high degree of consistency. Feedback after each trial is determined by two different sets of less than perfect cue- criterion correlations. Thus, generally accurate but not infallible policies are developed which lead subsequently paired subjects to make conflicting judgments. Conflict Phase: (1) Each subject makes a private judgment about the criterion based on the given cues and reveals the judgment to the other subject. (2) They discuss their differences until they reach a joint judgment, after which they are usually instructed to make another private judgment which is kept covert. (3) A correct answer is provided which this time, however, is determined by a new set of cue-criterion correlations (e.g., midway between the original two sets). Then the cues for the next trial are presented. Significant modifica- tions of these procedures were implemented in the present study. As discussed below, they were (1) selecting rather than training subjects, (2) optional joint judgments, (3) no feedback. The last noted was a necessary consequence of the author's choice to investigate the double- system case, about which Brehmer and Garpebring (1974) conjectured in the earlier quote.

METHOD

SELECTION PHASE

The subjects, University of Kansas introductory psychology students who participated to satisfy a course requirement, did not undergo the conventional training stage. Instead, subjects were selected for participation and systematically were paired together on the basis of statistical




properties of their own policies as demonstrated on a pretest. Sixty cards, each of which defined by means of four cues an imaginery under- developed country, were displayed individually. The cues, elaborated for the subjects in the instructions, were foreign investment, government influence, foreign aid from the United States, and socialist deputies. Cue values were indicated on each card by a bar-graph scale from 1 (low) to 10 (high). On the basis of the cues, subjects predicted the level of socioeconomic growth each nation will have achieved over the next 50 years. Predictions were made on an economic and social development scale from 1 (low) to 20 (high). Descriptions for different levels of the scale were provided in the instructions. The subjects were asked to assume that all nations were currently at level 1 and that it was possible to reach level 20 within 50 years. Cue values were generated randomly and were not intercorrelated. This statistical condition was crucial in order to ensure that neither of the agreement indices (ra or G) was produced artifactually by a correlated system of cues.

The prediction and cues for each of the 60 trials were intercorrelated by multiple regression analysis on a subject-by-subject basis. For each subject this yielded a multiple correlation index of policy consistency. Selection of subjects was restricted to those for whom the four cues accounted for more than half (approximately, R > .70) of the variance in their 60 predictions. Adherence to this criterion directly satisfied not only the essential characteristic of consistency but also indirectly produced the nonessential characteristic of uniformity of function. That is, subjects who achieved multiple Rs high enough to be selected shared a linear function form as evidenced by the considerable percentage of variance accounted for by the linear regression model.

It was necessary that each pair of subjects, at the outset, have com- parably divergent judgment policies. This was determined by the lens model equation given earlier. A series of simple correlations between the 60 judgments by each subject and those by all other subjects of the same sex were computed. This provided a list of overt agreement measures for all possible same-sex dyads. Then, by inserting the individual R values and the joint ra measures for each possible subject pair into the lens model equation, and by transposing terms, G was calculated. A criterion of G less than .25 (not significantly different from a correlation of .00) was employed to pair subjects with different judgment policies. Of those selected on these criteria and contacted by phone




to arrange an appointment for the Conflict Phase, 54 subject pairs consented to continue participation in the study.

CONFLICT PHASE

In addition to the situational variables concerning consensus and feedback, the present study also manipulated two subject variables: expectancy set and communication style. Immediately prior to begin- ning the Conflict Phase trials, dyads were induced to believe that the pretest match between their policy and their partner's was (a) similar, or (b) dissimilar, or (c) they were provided with no expectancy set (control condition). At this time they also received one of the following three discussion recommendations: (x) other-focus subjects were instructed to try to grasp their partner's policy by asking specific questions; (y) self- focus subjects were instructed to try to clarify their own policy through additional remarks, examples, and repetitions of their viewpoint; a control group (z) was given no discussion recommendations.

The judgment task was the same as described above, but new values for the cues were displayed. Except for the following two modifica- tions, the procedures of the Conflict Phase were identical to those which are conventionally followed in lens model conflict research.

First, subjects were not instructed to make a second private judgment after discussion on each trial, nor were they required to reach a joint judgment. Discussion on each trial continued until the two subjects freely chose to come to a joint judgment, or until either of them wished for any reason to terminate the discussion-in which case that member would request that the experimeter display the next card.

Second, no "correct answer" feedback was provided. In his principle of probabilistic functionalism, which is the theoretical framework of the lens model paradigm, Brunswik (1955) encouraged research designs representative of reality and emphasized the "uncertainty- geared" manner in which persons interact with the "semi-erratic medium" of the environment. Moreover, Azuma and Cronbach (1966), Bjorkman (1965), and Brehmer and Lindberg (1970) demonstrated that removal of outcome feedback increased the consistency of linear laboratory-induced policies.

Time scores were recorded in seconds per trial. To determine the relative proportion of optional consensus behavior, a percentage score



Mc Carthy / SITUA TIONA L FA C TORS [225]

was calculated by dividing the number of joint judgments a dyad reached per block of ten trials by the number of opportunities, per block, for reaching a joint judgment (i.e., ten minus the number of trials for each block on which the two subjects' private judgments were identical).

INTERPERSONAL UNDERSTANDING PHASE

After the 30 trials of the Conflict Phase, the subjects immediately entered the Interpersonal Understanding Phase, during which the experimenter displayed ten new stimulus cards. For each of these stimuli, however, subjects recorded not only their own judgment but also a prediction of the other subject's judgment. Moreover, discussion was not permitted, nor were judgments and predictions revealed. This procedure provided four correlational indices of the degree of interpersonal learning and understanding of the other's policy that each subject acquired through the Conflict Phase discussions. Assumed similarity was measured for each subject by calculating the correlation of a subject's judgment with his or her prediction of the other subject's judgment on the same trial. A joint index of actual similarity was obtained by correlating the individual judgments of the subjects in each dyad. This correlation is identical to the agreement index (ra) of the Conflict Phase data. Predictive accuracy was determined for each subject by correlation of the prediction made by one subject with the actual judgment on the same trial made by the other subject. To estimate the actual accuracy of prediction, a partial correlation was computed between the actual judgment by one subject and the partner's corresponding prediction by holding constant the degree of assumed and actual similarity. This partial correlation represents the genuine predictive accuracy that would be demonstrated if the con- founding effects of assumed and actual similarity were eliminated. The experiment was completed with the termination of the Interpersonal Understanding Phase, at which time the study was explained to the subjects.




RESULTS

Prior to the data analysis, all simple correlations were transformed to Fisher's Z-coefficients, and all multiple R values were squared. These are common transformations to reduce the nonnormality of correlational distributions. Similarly, the relative percentage of joint judgments underwent an X' = arc sin X% transformation. For determining significance, effects of the repeated-measures (blocks) factor were evaluated by conservative degrees of freedom (Wike, 1971).

SELECTION PHASE

Analyses of variance were applied to the overt agreement (ra), policy similarity (G), and policy consistency (R) characteristics the 108 selected subjects had displayed on the pretest of the Selection Phase. Only one significant difference, found with respect to the sex variable, was revealed by the three analyses. Male subjects were more consistent in executing their policies than were female subjects. Respectively, their mean individual R values were .78 versus .74; their respective mean dyadic Rs, RS2 indices were .61 versus .55. Otherwise, the subjects showed uniform policy consistency as well as uniform lack of policy similarity and of overt agreement. Thus, it was felt that the preexperi- mental assumptions had been satisfied-that the subject pairs had developed policies sufficiently consistent (mean R = .76) and adequately divergent (mean G = .03 and mean ra = .02)-and that analyses of the experimental data were justified.

CONFLICT PHASE

Analyses of variance were likewise performed on the policy characteristics (ra, G, R) the subjects demonstrated during the Conflict Phase. No significant sex differences were obtained on these data, but a very significant (p < .001) increasing effect was found for all three measures over blocks of trials. Paired comparisons of group means by t-tests showed increase in policy consistency and policy similarity to be reaching asymptotic levels by the end of the Conflict Phase (difference between Blocks II and III in each case was not significant), while overt




agreement continued to increase (difference beteween Blocks II and III, p < .05). There were no other significant main effects.

As shown in Table 1, block means of the policy characteristics indicate considerable overt agreement and policy similarity between subjects and reveal that in this phase over 75% of the averaged variance in each subject's response system can be accounted for by the different cue values (mean R = .88). Comparison of the two covert components, G and RsRs2, to overt agreement indicates that, initially, consistency contributes considerably more to ra than does similarity. While consistency remains high, similarity increases over trials to the point where the two are approximately equal determinants of the level of agreement achieved.

The discussion time scores, in minutes, underwent analysis of variance. Again, there was a highly significant (p < .001) blocks effect demonstrated, but on this measure blocks had a decremental influence. Mean time scores were 11.3, 6.3, and 5.2 minutes for Blocks I, II, and III, respectively. There were no other significant main effects on this variable.

The transformed percentage measures of the number of times a joint judgment was reached relative to the number of opportunities available were subjected to an analysis of variance. No significant effects at all were revealed. Dyads chose to reach a joint judgment on 51% of the possible trials on Block I, 55% on Block II, and 56% on Block III. Although consensus behaviour thus increased over trials, it also remained just around 50%, which is 'What would result if it were determined on the basis of chance alone.

TABLE 1 Conflict Phase Means of Agreement (ra) and its Components

for Three Blocks of Ten Trials Each

Male Female I II III I II III

ra .31 .67 .74 .39 .59 .64

G .45 .78 .84 .50 .77 .74

R .85 .92 .90 .84 .88 .90

Rsi Rs2 .70 .84 .81 .68 .78 .80




INTERPERSONAL UNDERSTANDING PHASE

The single significant difference found on the four measures obtained from the subjects' judgments and predictions on the ten trials of the Interpersonal Understanding Phase was an obvious one. The Expec- tancy Set variable had its logical effect on the assumed similarity of the subjects' predictions. Nonetheless, it is evident from the group means (similar = .88, dissimilar = .60, control = .84) that the effect was achieved solely by informing subjects that they are different from each other. Individual t-tests applied to the group means yielded .01 level significance for both similar-dissimilar and dissimilar-control comparisons, whereas there was no significant difference between similar and control groups, indicating that subjects assume they are similar unless told otherwise. Generally, the psychological literature (e.g., Cronbach, 1955; Hammond, Wilkins, and Todd, 1966; Newcomb, 1958) has substantiated this tendency, although a study by Balke et al. (1973), using factory union and management personnel as subjects, revealed a context where dissimilarity was (correctly) assumed.

The males' index of actual similarity evidenced significant (p < .05) deterioration from their level of agreement (.74) on the immediately preceding Block III of the Conflict Phase to .61 on the no-discussion trials of the Interpersonal Understanding Phase. Females maintained the exact level of agreement (.64) they had achieved in the last block of the Conflict Phase.

A very high degree of assumed similarity (mean = .78) was revealed. Predictive accuracy was likewise high (.67), but was substantially weakened by partialing out the strong effects of assumed and actual similarity. When these factors were controlled, the actual accuracy of prediction averaged only .31. Deflation of contaminated predictive accuracy scores had previously been reported by Hammond, Wilkins, and Todd (1966) and Summers et al. (1970).



McCarthy / SITUATIONAL FACTORS [229]

DISCUSSION

IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS

The present research clearly demonstrated the subjects' ability to reduce their socially developed cognitive differences in considerable measure when the structure of the conflict situation precluded response feedback and forced consensus. In the absence of task demands to match judgments with immediate environmental outcomes and to concede to a common decision, conflicting parties engaged in free communication were increasingly successful at converging their private judgments.

Two important implications emerge from these findings. First, they serve to support the usefulness, in such conflict situations, of simple verbal exchange. Substituting the Selection Phase in the present study for the conventional Training Phase may have provided the subjects with more of an opportunity to reflect upon and clarify to themselves their evolved beliefs about the problem, so that policies could be communicated more articulately to the other subject during the Conflict Phase. Although agreement continued to increase over all 30 trials of the Conflict Phase, it did not increase on the immediately succeeding trials of the Interpersonal Understanding Phase, during which discussion was not permitted. Indeed, it even significantly deteriorated for male subjects. This finding corroborates previous research (Brehmer, 1971; Miller et al., 1970) by demonstrating the conflict-reducing effects of communication. Style of communication, however, did not differen- tially affect conflict resolution, a result in accord with Hammond, Todd, Wilkins, and Mitchell (1966).

Second, the data suggest some limiting conditions or boundary parameters to the widely replicated results of lens model conflict research (Hammond and Brehmer, 1973). Specifically, all triple-system studies based on the model-except those which, like this research, have omitted outcome feedback-have shown overt disagreement to persist, despite considerable and increasing policy similarity, because of decreasing policy consistency. Yet the significant blocks effects obtained in the present double-system study reveal not only the well-established increasing policy similarity but also increasing policy consistency and, consequently, increasing overt agreement during the course of interaction.




LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

Every research design and strategy involves some compromise or trade-off. It is recognized that the present research suffers from a major limitation.

Opting for selection as opposed to training of subjects considerably reduced the experimenter's control over the nature of their judgment policies. Because linear principles of information processing are simpler and more easily acquired and executed, it is not surprising that the "naturally occurring" policies of the selected subjects were substantially linear. Furthermore, the specific selection procedure, based on the criterion of a high R value, undoubtedly served to screen out not only unreliable subjects but also ones with curvilinear policies not appropriately fitted to the linear regression model. Unfortunately, the conse- quent lack of nonlinear functions among subjects created a much less rigorous and impressive demonstration of conflict reduction. Combined with the removal of constraints toward task adaptation, this limitation attenuates the results and restricts their generalizability. Indeed, current reviews (Dawes and Corrigan, 1974; Wainer, 1976) of applications of linear models point to the importance of function forms rather than weights (attended to in this study) as sources of cognitive conflict. Nor can this restriction of the results' generality be excused as merely a matter of recent theoretical discussion for the greater contribution to inconsistency of nonlinear policies which had previously been demonstrated within the lens model paradigm by Brehmer (1971, 1973a) and Brehmer and Hammond (1973).

Their limitations notwithstanding, the present findings with regard to conflict reduction stand as valuable and robust for a number of reasons. The effect was reliable across three subject groups with different expectancy sets and communication styles. Although conflict reduction (responding to one's imprecise partner) should be much more difficult than task adaptation (responding to explicit environmental feedback), the subjects easily accomplished conflict reduction when task adaptation did not interfere. The present experiment's four-cue task, compared to a simpler two-cue task used in most of the other cognitive conflict researches, would be expected to complicate the conflict reduction process. Even though optional joint judgments removed the impetus for the subjects to come to terms with each other in



McCarthy / SITUA TIONAL FACTORS [23 1]

order to progress with the experiment, they succeeded in doing so nonetheless.

Not only do the results corroborate those of previous comparable researches, but they also fit together in a mutually validating way. The subject selection procedure proved again-as earlier in the work of Helenius (1973), Rappoport (1969), and Summers (1968)-an appropriate alternative to laboratory training. Excluding response feedback resulted in higher levels of policy consistency, as already confirmed by Azuma and Cronbach (1966), Bjorkman (1965), and Brehmer and Lindberg (1970). Accordingly, the relatively greater contribution of policy consistency vis-a-vis policy similarity to agreement obtained here replicated what Brehmer and Kostron (1973) found. Similar discussion time scores and blocks effects were produced by Brehmer (1974b) and the present study. Appropriately, as agreement increased over blocks, discussion time decreased. During the subsequent Interpersonal Understanding trials, subjects expressed a high degree of assumed similarity and displayed moderate levels of predicting their partner's judgments.

MULTIMETHOD ANALYSIS

Inasmuch as feedback and forced consensus are inherent elements of the triple-system case, the methodology of the present double-system experiment permits complementary simulation of conflict situations where these variables are not in effect. The diversity of actual conflict phenomena demands a multiplicity of models and methods, as Hammond et al. (1975) so cogently argued. Hospital planning boards and college admissions committees are just two specific examples of groups faced with judgment tasks (often bureaucratically forced and thus requiring a joint judgment) from which they anticipate relatively reliable feedback within reasonable time. On the other hand, issues such as the projected status of developing countries tested in the present study and many others in urban, national, or international concern are not usually characterized by the demand of a deadline or the prospect of dependable feedback for decades, if ever. Thus, the methodology of the present study-selection of socially acquired cognitive differences, no response feedback, optional joint judgments-may be particularly appropriate for investigation of cognitive conflict over certain long-




range and multifaceted issues; but neither the double-system nor triple-system case is necessarily of general advantage or applicability for all cognitive conflict settings.

In summary, it is recognized that not only the complexity and nature of the issue, and the characteristics of the participants, but also the structure of the situation determine the course and prospect of conflict resolution. Recent conflict research within other frameworks (Oltman et al., 1975; Vinacke et al., 1974) has similarly argued for and demonstrated the significance of situational factors as moderator variables of conflict phenomena.

REFERENCES

AZUMA, H. and L. CRONBACH (1966) "Cue-response correlations in the attainment of a scalar concept." Amer. J. of Psychology 79: 38-49.

BALKE, W., K. HAMMOND, and G. MEYER (1973) "An alternative approach to labor-management negotiations." Admin. Sci. Q. 18: 311-327.

BJORKMAN, M. (1965) "Studies in predictive behavior: explorations into predictive

judgments based on functional learning and defined by estimation, categorization, and choice." Scandinavian J. of Psychology 6: 129-156.

BREHMER, B. (1975) "Policy conflict and policy change as a function of task charac-

teristics: IV. The effect of cue intercorrelations." Scandinavian J. of Psychology 16: 85-96.

(1974a) "Policy conflict and policy change as a function of task characteristics: III. The effect of the distribution of the validities of the cues in the conflict task." Scandinavian J. of Psychology 15: 135-138.

--- (1974b) "Policy conflict, policy consistency, and interpersonal understanding." Scandinavian J. of Psychology 15: 273-276.

--- (1973a) "Policy conflict and policy change as a function of task characteristics: II. The effect of task predictability." Scandinavian J. of Psychology 14: 220-227.

--- (1973b) "Single-cue probability learning as a function of the sign and magnitude of the correlation between cue and criterion." Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 9: 377-395.

--- (1972) "Policy conflict as a function of policy similarity and policy complexity."

Scandinavian J. of Psychology 13: 208-221. (1971) "Effects of communication and feedback on cognitive conflict." Scan-

dinavian J. of Psychology 12: 205-216. --- and S. GARPEBRING (1974) "Social pressure and policy change in the 'lens

model' interpersonal conflict paradigm." Scandinavian J. of Psychology 15: 191-196. BREHMER, B. and K. HAMMOND (1973) "Cognitive sources of interpersonal conflict:

analysis of interactions between linear and nonlinear cognitive systems." Organiza- tional Behavior and Human Performance 10: 290-313.



McCarthy / SITUATIONAL FACTORS [233]

BREHMER, B. and L. KOSTRON (1973) "Policy conflict and policy change as a

function of task characteristics: I. The effects of cue validity and function form." Scandinavian J. of Psychology 14: 44-55.

BREHMER, B. and L. LINDBERG (1970) "Retention of probabilistic cue-criterion relations as a function of cue validity and retention interval." J. of Exper. Psychology

86: 331-334. BREHMER, B., H. AZUME, K. HAMMOND, L. KOSTRON, and D. VARANOS

(1970) "A cross-national comparison of cognitive conflict." J. of Cross-Cultural

Psychology 1: 5-20. BRUNSWIK, E. (1956) Perception and the Representative Design of Experiments.

Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. --- (1955) "Representative design and probabilistic theory in a functional psy-

chology." Psych. Rev. 62: 193-217. -- -(1952) The Conceptual Framework of Psychology. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago

Press. CRONBACH, L. (1955) "Processes affecting scores on 'understanding of others' and

'assumed similarity'." Psych. Bull. 52: 177-193. DAWES, R. and B. CORRIGAN (1974) "Linear models in decision making." Psych.

Bull. 81: 95-106. HAMMOND, K. (1972) "Inductive knowing," in J. Royce and W. Rozeboom (eds.)

The Psychology of Knowing. New York: Gordon and Breach. --- (1965) "New directions in research on conflict resolution." J. of Social Issues 21:

44-66. --- and B. BREHMER (1973) "Quasi-rationality and distrust: implications for

international conflict," in L. Rappoport and D. Summers (eds.) Human Judgment and

Social Interaction. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. HAMMOND, K., M. WILKINS, and F. TODD (1966) "A research paradigm for the

study of interpersonal learning." Psych. Bull. 65: 221-232.

HAMMOND, K., T. STEWART, B. BREHMER, and D. STEINMANN (1975) "Social

judgment theory," in M. Kaplan and S. Schwartz (eds.) Human Judgment and

Decision Processes. New York: Academic Press.

HAMMOND, K., F. TODD, M. WILKINS, and T. MITCHELL (1966) "Cognitive conflict between persons: application of the 'lens model' paradigm." J. of Exper. Social

Psychology 2: 343-360. HELENIUS, M. (1973) "Socially induced cognitive conflict: a study of disagreement over

childrearing practices," in L. Rappoport and D. Summers (eds.) Human Judgment

and Social Interaction. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.

HURSCH, C., K. HAMMOND, and J. HURSCH (1964) "Some methodological con-

siderations in multiple cue probability studies." Psych. Rev. 71: 42-60.

MILLER, M., B. BREHMER, and K. HAMMOND (1970) "Communication and

conflict reduction: a cross-cultural study." Int. J. of Psychology 5: 75-87.

NEWCOMB, T. (1958) "The cognition of persons as cognizers," in R. Taguiri and

L. Petrullo (eds.) Person Perception and Interpersonal Behavior. Stanford, CA:

Stanford Univ. Press. OLTMAN, P., D. GOODENOUGH, H. WITKIN, N. FREEDMAN, and F. FRIED-

MAN (1975) "Psychological differentiation as a factor in conflict resolution." J. of

Personality and Social Psychology 32: 730-736.




RAPPOPORT, L. (1969) "Cognitive conflict as a function of socially induced cognitive differences." J. of Conflict Resolution 8: 143-148.

--- (1965) "Interpersonal conflict in cooperative and uncertain situations." J. of Exper. Social Psychology 1: 323-333.

SUMMERS, D. (1968) "Conflict, compromise, and belief change in a decision-making task." J. of Conflict Resolution 12: 215-221.

-, T. STEWART, and C. ONCKEN (1968) "Interpersonal conflict in heterocultural dyads." Int. J. of Psychology 3: 191-196.

SUMMERS, D., J. TALIAFERRO, and D. FLETCHER (1970) "Judgment policy and interpersonal learning." Behavioral Sci. 15: 514-521.

TUCKER, L. (1964) "A suggested alternative formulation in the developments by Hursch, Hammond, and Hursch, and by Hammond, Hursch, and Todd." Psych. Rev. 71: 528-530.

VINACKE, W. C., R. MOGY, W. POWERS, C. LANGAN, and R. BECK (1974) "Accommodative strategy and communication in a three-person matrix game." J. of Personality and Social Psychology 29: 509-525.

WAINER, H. (1976) "Estimating coefficients in linear models: it don't no nevermind." Psych. Bull 83: 213-217.

WIKE, E. (1971) Data Analysis. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton.

Henry McCarthy is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Psychology of the University of Kansas. His interest in conflict research is primarily concerned with the doctor-patient dvad. He presented a paper, "The British National Health Service: A folk psychology of patient power and physician strategy," at the 1976 American Psychological Association convention in Washington, D.C.



some situational factors improving cognitive conflict reduction and interpersonal understanding

Documents