spieltheorie ii
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Spieltheorie II. SS 2005 Avner Shaked. Game Theory II. SS 2005 Avner Shaked. http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/shaked/ST-II/. Game Theory II. K. Binmore Fun & Games A Text on Game Theory D.C. Heath & Co., 1992. Game Theory II. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
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Spieltheorie IISpieltheorie II
SS 2005SS 2005
Avner ShakedAvner Shaked
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Game Theory IIGame Theory II
SS 2005SS 2005
Avner ShakedAvner Shaked
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http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/shaked/ST-II/http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/shaked/ST-II/
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Game Theory IIGame Theory II
K. BinmoreK. Binmore Fun & GamesFun & Games A Text on Game TheoryA Text on Game Theory D.C. Heath & Co., 1992 D.C. Heath & Co., 1992
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M. Osborne & A. RubinsteinM. Osborne & A. Rubinstein Bargaining and MarketsBargaining and Markets Academic Press, 1990Academic Press, 1990
Game Theory IIGame Theory II
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K. BinmoreK. Binmore Fun Fun & Games& Games A A Text on Game TheoryText on Game Theory D.C. D.C. Heath & Co., 1992Heath & Co., 1992
M. Osborne & A. RubinsteinM. Osborne & A. Rubinstein Bargaining and MarketsBargaining and Markets Academic Press, 1990Academic Press, 1990
Game Theory IIGame Theory II
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A Bargaining Problem
• S - a feasible set• d - a disagreement point
Nash Bargaining TheoryNash Bargaining TheoryNash VerhandlungstheorieNash Verhandlungstheorie
John Nash
d S s S s d , ,
2 is compact & convexS
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Nash Bargaining TheoryNash Bargaining Theory2 is compact & convexS
u2
u1
S
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Nash Bargaining TheoryNash Bargaining Theory
u2
u1
bounded
closedS
2 is compact & convexS
limn nn
x S x S
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αA+ 1 - α B
0 α 1
Nash Bargaining TheoryNash Bargaining Theory
u2
u1
A
BS
2 is compact & convexS
S
A,B S
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Nash Bargaining TheoryNash Bargaining Theory
d S s S s d , ,
u2
u1
d
S
2 is compact & convexS
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Nash Bargaining TheoryNash Bargaining Theory
d S s S s d , ,
is a bargaining problem< S,d >
is a bargaining problem{ }= < S,d > < S,d >B
u2
u1
d
S
2 is compact & convexS
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Nash Bargaining TheoryNash Bargaining Theory
d
A Nash Bargaining Solutionis a function
2:
( , )S d S
f
f
Bu2
u1
S
is a bargaining problem{ }= < S,d > < S,d >B
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Nash Bargaining TheoryNash Bargaining Theory
A Nash Bargaining Solutionis a function
2: f B
u2
u1
S
( ) ( )
( )
f S,d f S x | x d ,d
f S x | x d ,d S x | x d
( , )S d dfd
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Axioms A1-A4
A1 (Pareto)
if then x > f(S,d) x S
A2 (Symmetry)
d
S
&i i i ii x y i x y x > y
1 2 2 1( , ) ( , )x x x xα
f(S,d)
( , ) α α αf S d f S,d
S
α S
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Axioms A1-A4
A3 (Invariance to affine transformation)
A4 (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives IIAIIA)
1 2 1 2( , ) ( , ) , 0x x x x α
( , ) α α αf S d f S,d
d S T
f T,d S f S,d f T,d
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Axioms A1-A4
A4 (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives IIAIIA)
d S T
f T,d S f S,d f T,d
u2
u1
d
f T,dT S = f S,d
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Axioms A1-A4
A4 (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives IIAIIA)
d S T
f T,d S f S,d f T,d
Gives f(T,d) a flavour of maximum
PastaFishMeat
IIA IIA is violated whenis violated when