“survival of the nimble”

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Tina Byles Williams, CEO & CIO December 10, 2008 MANAGER OF EMERGING MANAGERS STRATEGIES “Survival of the Nimble” Why Smaller Investment Managers Outperformed Large Managers Despite a Challenging Five Years for Fundamentally Based Active Management Strategies By Tina Byles Williams, CIO & Portfolio Manager, Global Equities FIS Group July 13, 2011 Presented to: Atlantic Connection’s 6 th Annual Economic & Financial Conference “Fund of Funds: Where are the Opportunities?

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Presented to: Atlantic Connection’s 6 th Annual Economic & Financial Conference “Fund of Funds: Where are the Opportunities?. “Survival of the Nimble” - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: “Survival of the Nimble”

Tina Byles Williams, CEO & CIO December 10, 2008

MANAGER OF EMERGING MANAGERS STRATEGIES

“Survival of the Nimble”Why Smaller Investment Managers Outperformed Large Managers Despite a Challenging Five Years for Fundamentally Based Active

Management StrategiesBy

Tina Byles Williams, CIO & Portfolio Manager, Global EquitiesFIS Group

July 13, 2011

Presented to:Atlantic Connection’s

6th Annual Economic & Financial Conference

“Fund of Funds: Where are the Opportunities?

Page 2: “Survival of the Nimble”

Macro Events that Dominated the Last Five Years Led to Heightened Volatility and Correlation “Bubble”

2

Page 3: “Survival of the Nimble”

Heightened Correlations Have Diminished the Alpha Generated from Fundamental Stock Selection by Active Managers

3

Diminishing excess return troughed in 2009

Page 4: “Survival of the Nimble”

What Forces Have Elevated Correlations and Will They Normalize? Structural Forces• Increased use of index based products (S&P 500 futures contracts or ETFs)• Increased use of high frequency trading

Cyclical Forces• Macro uncertainty encourages trading methods that heighten correlations (index trading and

arbitrage). • With greater macro certainty these trading techniques should also self-reinforce to push

correlations down

4

ANSWER – YES AT SLIGHTLY HIGHER LEVELS AND THEY HAVE ALREADY BEGUN TO DO SO

RESULT – ACTIVE MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES’ PERFORMANCE SHOULD IMPROVE AND HAVE ALREADY BEGUN TO DO SO

Correlations averaged .27 pre 2007; peaked at .7 in the fall of 2008, early 2009, May 2010 and December 2010 and have subsequently subsided

Page 5: “Survival of the Nimble”

How Have Entrepreneurial Managers Fared?

5

• ENTREPRENEURIAL MANAGER defined as:

Asset Class Assets no more than:Large Cap Equity $2 billionMid/Small Cap Equity $300 million Global Ex-US Equity $2 billion

Page 6: “Survival of the Nimble”

Over the last Five Years, Developing Managers have Outperformed Established Managers Without Incurring Appreciably More Risk

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Page 7: “Survival of the Nimble”

Entrepreneurial Managers’ Performance Advantage Most Pronounced in Down Markets

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Page 8: “Survival of the Nimble”

Portfolio Structure:

Investment insight amplified through more concentrated portfolios and “Best ideas” less diluted

With smaller AUM, Entrepreneurial Managers can more efficiently invest in less liquid segments of the market opportunity set

In certain cases, they can trade more nimbly with negligible market impact

Organizational Dynamics

Compensation more directly tied to alpha production; whereas managers at established firms have greater “safety net” from baseline fee income from large asset pools and the firm’s franchise value

Passion for success and focus unencumbered by bureaucracy and “Committee think”

What Characteristics lead to the Performance Advantage?

Page 9: “Survival of the Nimble”

Entrepreneurial Managers Held More Concentrated Portfolios

• Most Entrepreneurial Managers employ active management strategies and tend to hold more concentrated portfolios

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Page 10: “Survival of the Nimble”

Tracking Error vs. Annualized Return – Large Growth Managers

10

-8.00

-6.00

-4.00

-2.00

0.00

2.00

4.00

6.00

8.00

10.00

12.00

0.00 2.00 4.00 6.00 8.00 10.00 12.00 14.00

Annu

aliz

ed R

etur

n %

Tracking Error %

Large Growth - 5 Years ending 12/31/2010

Established Managers Entrepreneurial Managers

Linear (Established Managers) Linear (Entrepreneurial Managers)

Entrepreneurial Managers Established ManagersMedian 5.49 4.44Mean 5.54 4.81

Tracking Error (5 Years)Entrepreneurial Managers Established Managers

Median 4.18 4.02Mean 4.08 4.17

Annualized Return (5 Years)

Page 11: “Survival of the Nimble”

Tracking Error vs. Annualized Return – Large Value Managers

11

-8.00

-6.00

-4.00

-2.00

0.00

2.00

4.00

6.00

8.00

10.00

12.00

0.00 2.00 4.00 6.00 8.00 10.00 12.00 14.00

Annu

aliz

ed R

etur

n %

Tracking Error %

Large Value - 5 Years ending 12/31/2010

Established Managers Entrepreneurial Managers

Linear (Established Managers) Linear (Entrepreneurial Managers)

Entrepreneurial Managers Established ManagersMedian 6.08 4.52Mean 6.06 4.99

Tracking Error (5 Years)Entrepreneurial Managers Established Managers

Median 3.50 2.61Mean 3.36 2.59

Annualized Return (5 Years)

Page 12: “Survival of the Nimble”

Tracking Error vs. Annualized Return – Large Core Managers

12

-6.00

-4.00

-2.00

0.00

2.00

4.00

6.00

8.00

10.00

12.00

0.00 5.00 10.00 15.00 20.00 25.00 30.00Annu

aliz

ed R

etur

n %

Tracking Error %

Large Core - 5 Years ending 12/31/2010

Established Managers Entrepreneurial Managers

Linear (Established Managers) Linear (Entrepreneurial Managers)

Entrepreneurial Managers Established ManagersMedian 4.50 3.66Mean 5.18 3.92

Tracking Error (5 Years)Entrepreneurial Managers Established Managers

Median 3.14 2.91Mean 3.59 3.24

Annualized Return (5 Years)

Page 13: “Survival of the Nimble”

Tracking Error vs. Annualized Return – Small Cap Managers

13

-5.00

0.00

5.00

10.00

15.00

20.00

0.00 2.00 4.00 6.00 8.00 10.00 12.00 14.00 16.00 18.00

Annu

aliz

ed R

etur

n %

Tracking Error %

Small Cap - 5 Years ending 12/31/2010

Established Managers Entrepreneurial Managers

Linear (Established Managers) Linear (Entrepreneurial Managers)

Entrepreneurial Managers Established ManagersMedian 8.60 6.20Mean 9.19 6.44

Tracking Error (5 Years)Entrepreneurial Managers Established Managers

Median 4.14 1.32Mean 2.41 1.13

Annualized Return (5 Years)

Page 14: “Survival of the Nimble”

Developing Managers Incurred Greater Tracking Error which Produced More Excess Return than for Established Managers

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Page 15: “Survival of the Nimble”

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Most Compelling Performance Advantage is the Opportunity Cost

Firm A Firm B Firm C Firm D

Assets Under Management $ 0 B $ 5 B $ 20 B $ 50 B

Invested Positions 50 50 50 50

Average percent of Float 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5%

Annual Portfolio Turnover 50% 50% 50% 50%

Investible Universe R1000V R1000V R1000V R1000V

Percent of Index Holdings accessible for investment 100% 100% 60% 30%

Opportunity Cost Zero Zero SignificantVery

Significant

Source: Huber Capital Management

Page 16: “Survival of the Nimble”

Increased AUM Limits Access to Lower Liquidity Quintiles

Underlying assumptions:• White = 0%-5% of the float• Red = 5%-10% of the float• Yellow = 10% - 15% of the float• Green is >15% of the float

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0.0%10.0%20.0%30.0%40.0%50.0%60.0%70.0%80.0%90.0%

100.0%

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50

% of n

ames

/Sco

res

AUM ($B)

R1000V % of Company Owned

UNABLE TO PURCHASE ZONE

EXTREMELY ILLIQUID ZONEILLIQUID ZONE

5% Co.

10% Co.

15% Co.

00.10.20.30.40.50.60.70.80.9

1

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000

% of n

ames

/Sco

res

AUM ($MM)

R2000V % of Company Owned

UNABLE TO PURCHASE ZONE

EXTREMELYILLIQUID ZONE

ILLIQUID ZONE

5

1

1

Source: Huber Capital Management

Page 17: “Survival of the Nimble”

But Lower Liquidity Quintiles Have Generally Outperformed

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--

5.00

10.00

15.00

20.00

25.00

30.00

35.00

<===Lowest to Highest Market Cap segment===>

% In

dex w

eigh

t

Market Cap Distribution of Russell 1000

--5.00

10.0015.0020.0025.0030.0035.0040.0045.0050.00

<===Lowest to Highest Market Cap segment===>

% In

dex w

eigh

t

Market Cap Distribution of Russell 2000

-10.00

--

10.00

20.00

30.00

40.00

50.00

60.00

70.00

% In

dex r

etur

n

Market Cap Return Distribution of Russell 1000

<===Lowest to Highest Market Cap segment===>-10.00

-5.00

--

5.00

10.00

15.00

20.00

25.00

% In

dex r

etur

n

Market Cap Return Distribution of Russell 1000Market Cap Return Distribution of Russell 1000Market Cap Return Distribution of Russell 1000Market Cap Return Distribution of Russell 2000

<===Lowest to Highest Market Cap segment===>

Page 18: “Survival of the Nimble”

For Value Segments

18

--

5.00

10.00

15.00

20.00

25.00

30.00

35.00

<===Lowest to Highest Market Cap segment===>

% In

dex w

eigh

t

Market Cap Distribution of Russell 1000 Growth

--

10.00

20.00

30.00

40.00

50.00

60.00

70.00

80.00

90.00

100.00

<===Lowest to Highest Market Cap segment===>

% In

dex r

etur

n

Market Cap Return Distribution of Russell 1000 Growth

--5.00

10.0015.0020.0025.0030.0035.0040.0045.0050.00

<===Lowest to Highest Market Cap segment===>

% In

dex w

eigh

t

Market Cap Distribution of Russell 2000 Growth

-80.00

-60.00

-40.00

-20.00

--

20.00

40.00%

Inde

x ret

urn

Market Cap Return Distribution of Russell 2000 Growth

<===Lowest to Highest Market Cap segment===>

Page 19: “Survival of the Nimble”

And Growth Segments

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--

10.00

20.00

30.00

40.00

50.00

<===Lowest to Highest Market Cap segment===>

% In

dex w

eigh

t

Market Cap Distribution of Russell 2000 Value

-100.00

-80.00

-60.00

-40.00

-20.00

--

20.00

% In

dex r

etur

n

Market Cap Return Distribution of Russell 2000 Value

<===Lowest to Highest Market Cap segment===>

--

5.00

10.00

15.00

20.00

25.00

30.00

35.00

<===Lowest to Highest Market Cap segment===>

% In

dex w

eigh

t

Market Cap Distribution of Russell 1000 Value

-15.00

-10.00

-5.00

--

5.00

10.00

15.00

20.00

% In

dex r

etur

n

Market Cap Return Distribution of Russell 1000 Value

<===Lowest to Highest Market Cap segment===>

Page 20: “Survival of the Nimble”

Conclusions

• Heightened macro uncertainty over the last five years as well as the increased use of index trading products diminished the relationship between security price changes and fundamental characteristics. Active long-only and long-short managers have struggled to generate alpha.

• Increased macro certainty should be more hospitable for active management strategies going forward.

• Even though most Entrepreneurial Managers offer active management strategies, they outperformed their Established Manager Peers over the last five years.

• Entrepreneurial managers exhibited more concentrated, higher conviction portfolios with higher tracking error than their Established manager peers.

• Entrepreneurial firms produced more excess return per unit of tracking error for 4 of the 5 major equity categories studied (Large Value, Large Growth, Small Cap and Global Ex-US Equity).

• The combination of large asset pools with commonly used guidelines that limit a manager’s exposure to a maximum percentage of the outstanding shares of listed companies likely constrained Established managers’ ability to take advantage of the higher returns generated by smaller and less liquid stocks.

• The structural performance advantage caused by Entrepreneurial Managers’ greater flexibility to access less liquid and higher returning segments of the liquidity spectrum is likely to continue.

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