the sigfried line campaign

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T H E S I E G F R I E D L I N ECAMPAIGN


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UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

T h e European Thea te r of Operat ions

T H E S I E G F R I E D L I N ECAMPAIGN

brCharles B . MacDonald

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORYUNITED STATES ARMY


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Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 6260001

First Printed 1963CMHPub 771


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UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR IIStetson Con n, General Editor

Advisory Committee(As of 24 May 1961)

Fred Harvey HarringtonUniversity of Wisconsin

William R. EmersonYale UniversityOron J. Hale

University of VirginiaW. Stull Holt

University of WashingtonBell I. Wiley

Emory UniversityC. Vann Woodward

Johns Hopkins University

Office of the Chief of Military HistoryBrig. Gen . James A . Norell, Ch ief of Military History

Chief HistorianChief, Histories DivisionChief, Publication DivisionEditor in Chief

Maj. Gen. Louis W. TrumanU.S. Continental Army Command

Maj. Gen. Evan M . HousemanIndustrial College of the Armed Forces

Brig. Gen. Bruce Palmer, Jr.U.S. Army War College

Brig. Gen. William A. Cunningham IIIU.S. Army Command and General Staff College

Col. Vincent J. EspositoUnited States Military Academy

Stetson ConnCol. Leonard G. RobinsonLt. Col. James R. HillardJoseph R. Friedman


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. to Those Who Served


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ForewordTo many an Allied soldier and officer and to countless armchair strategists,

World War II in Europe appeared near an end when in late summer of 1944Allied armies raced across northern France, Belgium, and Luxembourg to thevery gates of Germany. That this was not, in fact, the case was a painfullesson that the months of September, October, November, and December wouldmake clear with stark emphasis.The story of the sweep from Normandy to the German frontier has beentold in the already published Breakout and Pursuit. The present volumerelates the experiences of the First and Ninth U.S. Armies, th e First AlliedAirborne Army, an d those American units which fo ught und er British an dCanadian command, o n t he northe rn flank of t he battle fron t that stretchedacross the face of Europe from the Netherlands to the Mediterranean. Th eoperations of the Third U.S. Army in the center, from mid-September throughmid-December, have been recounted in The Lorraine Campaign; those of theSeventh U.S. Army on the south will be told i n The Riviera to the Rhine, avolume in preparation.

Unlike the grand sweep of th e pursuit, t he b reaching of the West Wallcalled for the most grueling kind of fighting. Huge armies waged the campaigndescribed in this book, but the individual soldier, pitting his courage a ndstamina against harsh elements as well as a stubborn enemy, emerges as themoving spirit of these armies. In the agony of the Huertgen Forest, thefrustration of MARKET-GARDEN,he savagery of the struggle for Aachen, the valorof the American soldier and his gallant comrades proved the indispensableingredient of eventual victory.

Washington, D C.24 May 1961JAMES A. NORELLBrigadier General, USAChief of Military History


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T h e AuthorCharles B. MacDonald, a graduate of Presbyterian College, is the authorof Co mp a n y Co mman d er , 1 anaccount of his experiences as an officer of the

2d Infantry Division in the European theater during World War II. He iscoauthor and compiler of Three Bat t les: Arnavi l le , A l tuzzo , and Schmid t anda contributor to Command Decis ions . Since 1953 he has supervised thepreparation of other volumes in the European and Mediterranean theater sub-series of UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II and is currentlywriting another volume in the European theater subseries. In 1957 he re-ceived a Secretary of the Army Research and Study Fellowship and spent ayear studying the relationship of terrain, weapons, and tactics on Europeanbattlefields. A lieutenant colonel in the Army Reserve, he holds the PurpleHeart and the Silver Star.

1Washington,1947


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PrefaceSome who have written of World War II in Europe have dismissed the

period between 11 September and 16 December 1944 with a paragraph or two.This has been their way of gaining space to tell of the whirlwind advancesand more spectacular command decisions of other months. The fighting duringSeptember, October, November, and early December belonged to the smallunits and individual soldiers, the kind of warfare which is no less difficult andessential no matter how seldom it reaches the spectacular.

It is always an enriching experience to write about the American soldierinadversity no less than in glittering triumph. Glitter and dash were conspicu-ously absent in most of the Siegfried Line fighting. But whatever the periodmay lack in sweeping accomplishment it makes up in human drama andvariety of combat actions. Here is more than fighting within a fortified line.Here is the Huertgen Forest, the Roer plain, Aachen, and the largest airborneattack of the war. The period also eventually may be regarded as one of themost instructive of the entire war in Europe. A company, battalion, orregiment fighting alone and often unaided was more the rule than the exception.In nuclear war or in so-called limited war in underdeveloped areas, of whichwe hear so much today, this may well be the form the fighting will assume.As befits the nature of the fighting, this volume is focused upon tacticaloperations at army level and below. The story of command and decision inhigher headquarters is told only when it had direct bearing on the conduct ofoperations in those sectors under consideration. The logistics of the campaignlikewise has been subordinated to the tactical narrative. It is a ground storyin the sense that air operations have been included only where they had directinfluence upon the ground action. It is also an American story. Althoughconsiderable attention has been paid British and Canadian operations whereU.S. units were involved, this is designed only to place U.S. operations inproper perspective.

In the fullest sense of the term, this volume represents a co-operative enter-prise. Reference in the footnotes and the bibliographical note can give onlypartial credit to the scores of officers and men who furnished information orunraveled questions of fact. Nearly every officer who held the post of divisioncommander or above during the campaign has read the manuscript of thisvolume, and at least one ranking officer from each division, corps, and armyheadquarters has read and commented upon the manuscript.

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T o list all present and former officials of the Office of the Chief of MilitaryHistory who by their advice and support helped make the work possible wouldbe prohibitively lengthy. Those of my colleagues whose invaluable contribu-tions to this co-operative enterprise can be precisely noted are as follows:

The historian who performed most of the original research in Germanmaterials and by his monographs on German actions provided in effect acompanion manuscript to the authors American story was Lucian Heichler.The editor was Miss Ruth Stout, who accomplished her task with high pro-fessional skill and commendable tact and understanding. Copy editing wasdone by Mrs. Marion P. Grimes. Th e maps, which serve not only to illustratethe narrative but also to tie diverse actions together, are the work of CharlesV. P. von Luttichau. Miss Ruth Phillips selected the photographs. Mrs. LoisAldridge of the World War II Records Division, National Archives and Rec-ords Service, displayed remarkable patience in assisting the authors explorationof mountains of records from the European theater.

The contributions of Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield, chief historian at thetime this volume was prepared, cannot be so precisely stated, yet no individualcontributed more. It was he who first brought the author into the field ofmilitary history and patiently and astutely guided his early efforts.

Any credit for this volume should be divided among all those who helpedmake it possible. O n the other hand, the author alone is responsible forinterpretations made and conclusions drawn, as well as for any errors ofomission or commission which may appear.

Washington, D.C. CHARLES B. MACDONALD15 May 1961

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ContentsPART ONE

Breaching the Siegfried LineChapter P a g e

I . THE ROAD TO GERMANY . . . . . . . . . . . . 3A l l i ed S t r a t eg y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6T h e S h a d o w of L o gis ti cs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10T h e G e rm a ns in t h e W e s t . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

II THE FIRST U.S. ARMY . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20W e a p o n s a n d E q u i p m e n t . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25T h e T e r ra in and t h e W e s t Wall . . . . . . . . . . . 28A P a u s e at t h e B o r d er . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

III . V CORPS HITS THE WEST WALL . . . . . . . . . 39T h e R a c e for t h e W e s t W a l l . . . . . . . . . . . . 41In to G e r m a n y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43B a t t l e of t h e S c h n e e E i f e l . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49B r i d g e h e a d a t W a l l e n d o r f . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56D ef en s e of t h e B r i dg e h e a d . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

IV VII CORPS PENETRATES THE LINE . . . . . . . . 66G e r m a n D e v e lo p m e n ts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69T h e B a t tl e of t h e S t o lb e r g Corridor . . . . . . . . . . 71T h e D r iv e o n t h e S ec on d B a nd . . . . . . . . . . . 75A W a l l About A a c h e n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80B a t t l e of t h e M o n s c h a u C o r ri do r . . . . . . . . . . . 82T h e G e r m a n s S tr ik e B ac k . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86T h e O n s e t of Posi t ion W a r f a r e . . . . . . . . . . . 90T h e F ir st F i g ht in t h e F o re s t . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

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C h a p t e r PageV. ACTION ON THE NORTH WING . . . . . . . . . 96Defense of the A lber t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98From the Albert to the Border . . . . . . . . . . . 101Delay in the Assault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

PART TWOAn Airborne Carpet in the North

VI. OPERATION MARKET-GARDEN . . . . . . . . . . 119T h e G e rm a ns in the Ne therlands . . . . . . . . . . 123Se v e n D ay s f o r Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127W h a t D i d t h e Germans Know? . . . . . . . . . . . 134T h e F li gh t t o the Corridor . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

VII. INVASION FROM THE SKY . . . . . . . . . . . . 140a remarkably beautiful late summer day . . . . . . . 140Hells Highway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143Six Bridges and a Ridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154Tak ing the Objec t ives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150T h e R e d D ev il s a t A r n h e m . . . . . . . . . . . . 170

VI II DECISION ON TH E GROUND . . . . . . . . . . . 174Developments o n D Plus 2 (19 Se p te m be r ) . . . . . . . 174T h e F ig ht f o r the Ni jmegen Br idges . . . . . . . . . 179Firs t A t tempts To Drive on A rnhe m ......... 184Ke e p ing the Corr idor O pe n . . . . . . . . . . . . 186T h e O u tc o m e at A r n h e m . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195T h e A c h i e v e m e n t s and the Cost . . . . . . . . . . . 198Release of the U.S. Divisions . . . . . . . . . . . . 201

IX. THE APPROACHES TO ANTWERP . . . . . . . . . 207T h e Cont rove rsy A bou t A n tw e rp . . . . . . . . . . . 209T h e B at tl e of the Sche lde . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215Baptism of Fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222Sou th Beve land and Walch eren . . . . . . . . . . . 227Something Beast ly in A n t w e r p . . . . . . . . . . . . 229

X. THE PEEL MARSHES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231Firs t Army Draws the Ass ignment . . . . . . . . . . 231T h e Br it ish A t t e m p t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241A Spoil ing Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242

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PART THREEThe Battle of Aachen

C h a p t e r P ageXI. A SE TATTACKAGAINSTTHE WEST WALL . . . . . 251First A rm y Readjus ts the Front . . . . . . . . . . . 251

Planning the We s t W al l Assault . . . . . . . . . . . 252Thos e infantrym en have guts . . . . . . . . . . . 260C o m m i t m e n t of C C B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269

XII. CLOSING THE CIRCLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281T h e 1 8 t h I n f a nt r y D r iv es N o r t h . . . . . . . . . . . 287T h e 30th Division Str ikes South . . . . . . . . . . . 293Seal ing the Gap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304

XIII ASSAULT ON THE CITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307T h e Assault Begins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309Holding the Las t L ink . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313T h e F inal B low . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314W h a t A a c h e n C o st . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317

PART FOURThe Roer River Dams

XIV T HE FIRST ATTACK ON SCHMIDT . . . . . . . . 323T h e Ne g lec t ed O b je c ti v e . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324Objec t ive : Schmid t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328T o t h e F i r s t C l e a r i n g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331To w ar d Raffelsbrand and Vossenack . . . . . . . . . 334Regiment Wege le in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337

XV. THE SECOND ATTACK ON SCHMIDT . . . . . . . 341P lann ing the T hrus t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343O bje c t i v e : Sc hm id t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348T h e G e r m a n s R ea c t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352Events A long the Tra i l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359Catastrophe in Vossenack . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364T h e K a l l G o r ge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366Climax a t Kommersche id t . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368Withdrawal Across the Kal l . . . . . . . . . . . . 369New Miss ions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372

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PART FIVEThe Huertgen Forest

Chapter P ageXVI TH E BIG PICTURE IN OCTOBER . . . . . . . . . 377A ir Suppor t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381

A n E n igm a Nam e d L og is ti cs . . . . . . . . . . . . 382XVII . NEW PLANS TO DRIVE TO THE RHINE ....... 390

Ge rm an Resurgence and Deception . . . . . . . . . . 392First A r m y Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397Nin th A rm y P lans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400O p e r a t i o n Q U E E N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 403T h e R o er R i v e r D a m s a nd t h e W e a t h e r . . . . . . . . 406

XVI II VI I CORPS MAKES TH E MAIN EFFORT . . . . . . 408T he S ta t e o f t h e L X X X I C o r p s . . . . . . . . . . . 409Preliminary Bombardment . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411T h e Push Nor theas t From Schevenhue tte . . . . . . . . 415Armor in the S to lberg Corr idor . . . . . . . . . . . 421T h e Second Bat tle of the Donnerberg . . . . . . . . . 424A n o t h e r V i c t i m of the Huer tgen Forest . . . . . . . . . 428

XI X V CORPS JOINS THE OFFENSIVE . . . . . . . . . 440A Fourth Fight on the Bloody Plateau . . . . . . . . 440T h e F igh t f o r H ue r tge n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 447A n A rm ore d D r ive on K le inhau . . . . . . . . . . . 448Broadening the Effort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 451Bergstein and Castle Hill . . . . . . . . . . . . . 457

XX TH E FINAL FIGHT T O BREAK OUT OF THE FOREST 464T h e F ru it s of Deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 464A H a n d f u l of O ld M e n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 470Resum ing the C orps M ai n Effort . . . . . . . . . . . 474Tow ns. Woo ds. Hills. and Castles . . . . . . . . . . 479German Re in forcements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 487Debacle at Merode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 490

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PART SIXBattle of the Roer Plain

Chapter Pa g eXXI. CLEARING THE INNER WINGS O F THE ARMIES . . . 497T h e F ig ht N o r t h of the Boundary . . . . . . . . . . 499

T h e Fi gh t S o u t h of the Boundary . . . . . . . . . . 503T h e P us h t o t h e In d e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 506T a k i n g the H igh G round . . . . . . . . . . . . . 510

XXI I THE ROER RIVER OFFENSIVE . . . . . . . . . . 516Planning Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 516D D ay on the R oe r P la in . . . . . . . . . . . . . 522A rm or A t t rac t s A rm or . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 530Finding the Formula . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 534T h e Push to Gereonswe iler . . . . . . . . . . . . . 540

XXI II TH E GEILENKIRCHEN SALIENT . . . . . . . . . 545O p e r a t i o n C L I P P E R . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 546T h e Jump-off . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 550A n Exercise in Frustrat ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . 554

XXI V NINTH ARMYS FINAL PUSH T O TH E ROER . . . . 558. . . n effect we are there . . . . . . . . . . . . . 560A H undre d M e n of the XI I I Corps ......... 566A S h i f t i n t h e M a i n Effort . . . . . . . . . . . . 571Gu t Hasenfe ld and the Spor tp la tz . . . . . . . . . . 574

PART SEVENConclusion

XXV TH E APPROACHES T O DUEREN . . . . . . . . . 581O n t h e P l a i n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 583I n t h e F o r e s t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 587T o t h e R i v e r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 590

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C h a p t e r Pa g eXXVI OBJECTIVE: TH E ROER RIVER DAMS . . . . . . . 596

T h e Ne gle ct e d O b je c ti v e . . . . . . . . . . . . . 596T h e Sec ond B a tt le of the Monschau Corr idor . . . . . . 602Heartbreak Crossroads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 606Som e th ing i n t he Air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 611The VIII Corps in the Ardennes-Ei fe l ........ 612

XXVII . THE END OF THE CAMPAIGN . . . . . . . . . . 616

A p p e n d i xA . TABLE OF EQUIVALENT RANKS . . . . . . . . . . . 623B RECIPIENTS OF THE DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS . 624C. FIRST ARMY STAFF ROSTER AS OF 11 SEPTEMBER 1944 . 627D . NIN TH ARMY STAFF ROSTER AS OF 4 OCTOBER 1944 . . 628

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 629GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 633CODE NAMES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 636BASIC MILITARY MAP SYMBOLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 637INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 641

Maps1 Drive From the Albert Canal to the West Wall. XIX Corps. 1019

September 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 . The Battle of the Schelde. 2 October-8 November 1944 . . . . . . 2163 Operations in the Peel Marshes. 29 September-3 December 1944 . . . 2344 Encirclement of Aachen. 720 October 1944 . . . . . . . . . . 2825 The Roer River Dams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3246. The First Attack on Schmidt. 9th Division. 616 October 1944 . . . 3297. The Second Attack on Schmidt. 28th Division. 29 November 1944 . . 3448 Tanks Along the Kall Trail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3459 Objective: the Roer River Dams. V Corps. 1315 December 1944 . . 599

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M a p s IIX are in accompanying ma p envelopeP a g e

I. Pursuit to the Border. 26 August11 Septe mber 1944II. V Corps Hits the West Wall. 1119 September 1944

III. Breaching the West Wall South of Aachen. VII Corps. 1229September 1944IV. Invasion from the Sky. OperationMARKETGARDEN. 1726September 1944V. XIX Corps Breaks Thr oug h the West Wall. 27 October 1944VI. T h e Huertgen Forest. 16 November-9 December 1944

VII . Drive to the Roer. 16 November-9 December 1944VIII. Th e Approaches to Dueren. 1016 December 1944IX. T h e Siegfried Line Campaign. 11 September15 December 1944

IllustrationsThe Siegfried Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . FrontispieceThe Our River . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Facing 1Field Marshal Sir Bernard L . Montgomery and General Dwight D.

Eisenhower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt . . . . . . . . . . . . 17Lt Gen. Courtney H Hodges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21Thirteen Commanders of the Western Front . . . . . . . . . . 22Captured Panzerfaust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26Captured Nebelwerfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28Plan of Typical German Pillbox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32Interior of German Pillbox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33Maj Gen Leonard T . Gerow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41Dragon's Teeth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51W allendorf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58Maj Gen J Lawton Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67General der Panzertruppen Erich Brandenberger . . . . . . . . . 69Task Force Lovelady . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73Remains of a Pillbox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79Maj Gen . Charles H. Corlett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98Fort Eben Emael . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104The Albert Canal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105MARKET-GARDEN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117Lt Gen Lewis H Brereton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128Generaloberst Kurt Student . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141Maj Gen . Maxwell D. Taylor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143

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Pa g e101st Airborne Division Landings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144506th Parachute Infantry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149Maj Gen James M. Gavin and Lt Gen. Sir Miles C . Dempsey . . . . 15582d Airborne Division Drop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159Dutch Farmer Near Zon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183Hells Highway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194Nijmegen Highway Bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202General der Infanterie Gustav von Zangen . . . . . . . . . . . . 218Troops of the 104th Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225The Peel Marshes Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239Aachen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Facing 249Practicing Flame Thrower Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256Abandoned Crossing at the Wurm River . . . . . . . . . . . . 265Rimburg Castle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268Slag Pile and Tower Used for Observation . . . . . . . . . . . . 271A German Boy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300Civilian Refugees Leave Aachen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308Rifleman in Burning Aachen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311Col. Gerhard Wilck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317Aachen Munster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318View of Ruined Aachen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319Urft Dam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Facing 321Schwammenauel Dam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325Kall Trail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354 and 356Weasel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370The Huertgen Forest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . acing 375Lt Gen. William H Simpson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 380A Winter Overcoat Reaches the Front Line . . . . . . . . . . . 387Lt. Gen Omar N. Bradley and Generals Eisenhower and Gerow . . . . 391General der Panzertruppen Hasso von Manteuffel . . . . . . . . . 394A Rest Period Behind the Lines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 398155-mm Self-Propelled Gun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415American Tank Burning Outside Hamich . . . . . . . . . . . . 423Struggling up a Wooded Hillside . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435V Corps Rocket Launchers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 443Engineers Repair a Road . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 447A Tank Moves Through Huertgen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 449A Sea of Mud in the Huertgen Forest . . . . . . . . . . . . . 456Veterans of the Huertgen Forest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 458Medics Aid a Wounded Soldier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 468Infantry and Tanks Near Huecheln . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 483The Frenzerburg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 486The Roer Plain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 495Maj Gen. Raymond S McLain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 499xx


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P a g eDevastated Duerwiss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 504Maj Gen . Alvan C. Gillem, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 517Captured German Tiger Tank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 531British Flail Tank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 549British Churchill Tanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 552British Flame-Throwing Crocodile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 553Gut Hasenfeld . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 575Entrance to Swimming Pool Near Sportplatz . . . . . . . . . . 578Winter Battlefield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . acing 579Men of the 331st Infantry Advance on Gey . . . . . . . . . 5882d Division Troops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 605Maj Gen Troy H Middleton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 613

Illustrations are from Department of Defense files

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PART ONEBREACHING THE SIEGFRIED LINE


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CHAPTER I

T h e Road to GermanyThe shadows were growing long as five

men from the Second Platoon, Troop B,85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron,5th U.S. Armored Division, reached thewest bank of the Our River. To crossand claim credit as the first patrol onGerman soil, their commander had toldthem, they would have to hurry.

Though the bridge over the Our hadbeen demolished, the water was shallowenough for the men to wade across. Onthe far bank they climbed a hill to a clusterof farm buildings. Nearby they could seesome nineteen or twenty concrete pill-boxes. Around one somebody had built ashed for chickens.

The men made only a hasty inspectionbefore starting back. An hour later thereport of their crossing was on the way upthe chain of command. At 1805 on 1 1September 1944, the report read, a patrolled by S. Sgt. Warner W . Holzingercrossed into Germany near the village ofStalzemburg, a few miles northeast ofVianden, Luxembourg.Sergeant Holzingers patrol precededothers only by a matter of hours. Inearly evening, a reinforced company of the109th Infantry, 28th Division, crossed the

1 Other members of the patrol: Cpl. Ralph F .Diven, T/5 Coy T. Locke, Pfc. George F.McNeal, and a French interpreter, a LieutenantDeLille. V Corps G3 Jnl, 11 Sep 44; CombatInterv with Lt. L. L. Vipond, Ex O, Troop B,85th Rcn Sq.

Our on a bridge between Weiswampach,in the northern tip of Luxembourg, andthe German village of Sevenig. Almost co-incidentally, southeast of St. Vith, Bel-gium, a patrol from the 22d Infantry, 4thDivision, also crossed the Our near the vil-lage of Hemmeres. Men of this patrolspoke to civilians and, to provide proof oftheir crossing, procured a German cap,some currency, and a packet of soil.2

The armored and infantry divisionswhich furnished these patrols were unitsof the V Corps of the First U.S. Army.Their presence along the German bordermarked the start of a new phase in theexecution of a directive that the Com-bined Chiefs of Staff of the Allied Powershad given earlier in World War II toGeneral Dwight D. Eisenhower, SupremeAllied Commander in Europe. GeneralEisenhower was to undertake operationsaimed at the heart of Germany and thedestruction of her armed forces. 3

As the First Armys patrols crossed theborder, three Allied army groups andseven armies were deployed in a grand arcstretching from the North Sea to Switzer-land. On the Allied left wing was the 2 1Army Group under Field Marshal Sir

2 28th Div G3 Jnl, 1 1 Sep 44; 4th Div AA R,Sep 44. A patrol from the 28th Divisions I 10thInfantry crossed a short while later near thevillage of Harspelt.

3 For details, see Forrest C: Pogue, T h e S u -preme Command, UNITED STATES ARMYI N WORLD WAR II (Washington, 195 4), pp.4955.


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4 THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGNBernard L. Montgomery, consisting of theFirst Canadian and Second British Armies.( M ap I)* In the center was the 12thArmy Group under Lt. Gen. Omar N.Bradley, with the First and Third US.Armies and the new Ninth US. Army,which had become operational on 5 Sep-tember and was reducing the Bretoncoastal fortress of Brest, far behind thecurrent front lines. On the right wingwere the 1st French and Seventh U S .Armies, destined to become on 15 Sep-tember the 6th Army Group under Lt.Gen. Jacob L. Devers.4The crossing of the German border on

September was another strong draughtcontributing to a heady optimism withwhich Allied troops and their commanderswere reeling. Operating along the Chan-nel coast, the Canadians already hadcaptured Dieppe and the 1st British Corpsof the First Canadian Army was puttingthe finishing touches to conquest ofLe Havre. The Second British Army hadoverrun Brussels and Antwerp, the latterwith its deepwater port facilities almostintact.5 The First Army had taken Ligeand the city of Luxembourg. The ThirdArmy in northeastern France was buildingup along the Moselle River and alreadyhad a bridgehead near the Lorraine city of

* M a p s numbered in Roman are placed ininverse order inside the back cover.4For the story of the creation of the 6th ArmyGroup, see Robert Ross Smith, The Riviera to

the Rhine, a volume in preparation for the seriesUNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR11.5Accounts of British and Canadian operationsmay be found in: Field Marshal the ViscountMontgomery of Alamein, Normandy to the Baltic(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948) ;Charles P. Stacey, The Canadian Army, 1939-1945 (Ottawa: E. Cloutier, King's Printer,1948); and Maj. Gen. Sir Francis de Guingand,Operation Victory (New York: Charles Scrib-ner's Sons, 1947).

Metz.6 Having successfully landed insouthern France on 15 August, the twoarmies in the south soon would becomepart of a single western front. During 11September a patrol from the Third Armymade contact with French units from thesouth near Dijon.

Most of the fighting immediately pre-ceding the crossing of the German borderhad been pursuit warfare. The Germanswere on the run. Except for the ThirdArmy, which had been handicapped forfive days while bearing the brunt of a gen-eral transportation shortage and gasolinedrought, the Allied drive had reached itszenith during the period 1-11 eptember.During these eleven days the British hadtraveled approximately 250 miles, fromthe Seine River to the Belgian-Dutchborder. The First US. Army had takentime out near Mons, Belgium, to bagabout 25,000 Germans in a giant pocketand make an abrupt change in direction,but still had covered approximately 200miles. By 11 September the Allies hadreached a general line which pre-D-Dayplanners had expected would be gainedabout D plus 330 ( 2 May 1945). Theadvance thus was far ahead of schedule,some 233 days.7

A most encouraging feature of Alliedsuccess was that casualties had beenlighter than expected. Exclusive of theforces in southern France, Allied casualtiesfrom 6 June to 11September were 39,961killed, 164,466ounded, and 20, 142

6For Third Army operations in Lorraine, seeH. M. Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, UNITEDSTATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Wash-ington, 1950).7 Maps in Post NEPTUNE Planning Forecast I.27 May 44, SHAEF SGS 381 Post OVERLORDPlanning, I. The planners expected the surrenderabout D plus 360.
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THE ROAD TO GERMANY 5missing, a total of 224,569, or a littlemore than 10 percent of the totalstrength committed.' Since the landingsin Normandy, the Germans had lost ap-proximately 300,000 men, while another200,000 were penned in various redoubts.

Despite an acute shortage of ports,Allied build-up in men and mattriel hadbeen swift. By the afternoon of 1 1 Sep-tember a cumulative total of 2,168,307men and 460,745 vehicles had landed inNormandy. General Eisenhower, whohad assumed direct operational commandin the field on 1 September, controlled onthe Continent 26 infantry divisions (in-cluding 1 airborne division) and 13 ar-mored divisions (not including a numberof cavalry groups and separate tank bat-talions). Of this total the British andCanadians had furnished I 6 divisions (in-cluding Polish armored division), whilethe Americans had provided 23 (includingI French armored division).10 As soon asGeneral Eisenhower assumed direct com-mand of the forces in southern France, hewould gain 3 American infantry divisions(not including an airborne task force ofapproximately divisional size), 5 Frenchinfantry divisions, and 2 French armoreddivisions. The total for the Western Frontwould then be 35 infantry and 14 armoreddivisions. In addition, 2 U.S. and 2British airborne divisions, I Polish air-borne brigade, and a British airportableinfantry division were in Supreme Head-quarters reserve.General Eisenhower's49 divisions wereopposed, theoretically, by about 48 infan-try and 15 panzer-type divisions, plusseveral panzer brigades. As noted byGeneralfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt,

8 SH AE F G3 War Room Summary 1 0 2 .9 SHAEF G3 War Room Summary 99.10 I b i d .

who on 5 September began a second touras Oberbefehlshaber West (Commander inChief West), these forces actually existedonly on paper.11 While Allied units wereclose to full strength, hardly a Germandivision was. Most had incurred severelosses in both men and equipment, andmany were badly demoralized from con-stant defeat in the field. The equivalentof five divisions had been corralled in theChannel Islands and the coastal for-tresses. Rundstedt estimated that hisforces were equivalent to about half thenumber of Allied divisions. Allied su-periority in guns was at least 2 to 1 andin tanks approximately 20 to 1.2

The disparity between forces was lessstriking on the ground than in the air.The Allies had three tactical air forces:the IX and XIX Tactical Air Commands(both under the Ninth Air Force) and the2d Tactical Air Force (British). Operat-ing from bases in the United Kingdomand France were 5,059 American bombers,3,728 American fighters, 5,104 combataircraft of the Royal Air Force, and addi-tional hundreds of miscellaneous types forreconnaissance, liaison, and transport.13

1 1 The German term Oberbe f eh l shaber Wes tmeans either the Commander in Chief West orhis headquarters. I n this volume, the term Com-mander in Chief West will be used to refer tothe person holding the title OberbefehlshaberW e s t , while the abbreviated form O B W E S T willrefer to his headquarters.

12 O B W E S T ; A Study in Command, pp. 176,1 8 0 . This manuscript, by Generalleutnant BodoZimmermann (G3, O B W E S T ) and others, waswritten under the auspices of the Department ofthe Army Historical Division in 1946 and is filedin OCMH. Matriel estimates are from Cole,T h e Lorraine Campaign , p. 3 .

1 3 AAF Staff Control Aircraft Inventory. Corn-bined Allied vs. Axis Air Strength Rpts, 1 Sep 44.All U.S. air records used in this volume arelocated at the Air University Library, Maxwell AirForce Base, Montgomery, Ala.


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6 THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGNThe enemys one tactical air force in theWest, the Third Air Force (Luftflotte 3 ) ,had only 573 serviceable aircraft of alltypes. In the entire Luftwaffe the Ger-mans had only 4,507 serviceable planes,and most of these had to be retainedwithin Germany to contest Allied strategicbombers.14

The ground front was too fluid duringthe early days of September for FieldMarshal von Rundstedt to accomplishmuch toward forming one of the new lineswhich Adolf Hitler designated with febrilefrequency. Nevertheless, by 11 Septem-ber Rundstedt and his subordinates weremaking honest efforts to conform to thelatest decree, to man a new line that wasto be held under any conditions. Theline ran from the Belgian coast, includingthe banks of the Schelde estuary-whichmight be employed to deny use of Antwerpeven though the port had been lost-southeastward along the Dutch-Belgianborder to the West Wall (the SiegfriedLine) and along the West Wall tothe western boundaries of Lorraine andAlsace. 15

For all the catastrophic nature of theretreat from France, Rundstedts order ofbattle at army and army group levelslooked on 1 1 September much as it hadbefore the Allied invasion. On the rightwing, along the Dutch border and withinthe northern half of the West Wall oppo-site the 21 Army Group and the First U.S.Army, was Army Group B under Gen-eralfeldmarschall Walter Model. Model,whom Rundstedt had replaced as Com-mander in Chief West, controlled the

14German -figures furnished from Luftwafferecords by the British Historical Section, as citedby Cole, T h e L o r r ai n e C a m p a i g n , p. 4.

15 O B W E S T , A Study in Command, pp.17578.

Fifteenth, First Parachute, and SeventhArmies. On the left wing was ArmyGroup G (Generaloberst Johannes Blasko-witz), composed of the First Army, whichconfronted the Third U.S. Army, and theNineteenth Army, which faced what wasto become the 6th Army Group. Whatwas left of the Fifth Panzer Army wasassembling behind the German border.The Germans had a sound frameworkupon which to hang reinforcements-ifreinforcements could be found.16

Allied StrategyAllied strategy, as expressed in pre-D-

Day planning at Supreme Headquarters,Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF)looked toward the ultimate objective ofBerlin; but on the way the Allies wantedan economic objective, which, if captured,would rapidly starve Germany of themeans to continue the war. This wasthe Ruhr industrial area, the loss of which,together with Belgium and Holland, woulddeprive Germany of 65 percent of itsproduction of crude steel and 56 percentof its coal.17

The widespread deployment of the Al-lied armies on 11 September reflectedGeneral Eisenhowers pre-D-Day decisionto go after the Ruhr and Berlin on a broadfront. Later to become known as thebroad front policy, this concept was notappreciably different from the time-testedmilitary strategy of multiple parallel col-umns.

16 Opns Maps (1 : 1,000,000) dtd 11 Sep 44,Opera t ionskar te Wes t . See also O B W E S T , AStudy in Command, p. 177.17 SHAEF Planning Staff draft of PostNEPTUNE ourses of Action After Capture of theLodgment Area, Main Objectives and Axis ofAdvance, I, 3 May 44, SHAEF SGS 381, I. An

exhaustive study of Allied strategy may he foundin Pogue, T h e S u pr e m e C o m m a n d .


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TH E ROAD TO GERMANY 7In considering which routes of advance

were best, SHAEF planners had seriouslystudied four: ( I ) the plain of Flanders;2 ) the Maubeuge-Likge-Aachen axis

north of the Ardennes; ( 3 ) the Ardennes;and ( 4 ) the Metz-Kaiserslautern gap.18After deliberation, they had ruled outFlanders, because of too many water ob-stacles, and the Ardennes, because ofrugged terrain and limited communica-tions. The other two avenues meritedgreater attention.19

The northern route via Maubeuge-Lige-Aachen (the Aachen Gap ) obvi-ously leads more directly to the Ruhr.The terrain is relatively open, particularlybeyond Aachen on the Cologne plain.Although an advance via Metz-Kaiser-slautern leads also to another industrialprize, the Saar Basin with its mines andsmelters, the terrain in both Lorraine andthe Saar is broken. Advance to the Ruhrafter reaching the Rhine along this routeis canalized up the narrow Rhine valley.Although both avenues had exercised at-traction in modern and earlier wars, thenorthern route had commanded almostobligatory attention since the northwardshift of German industry about 1870and since the neutrality of Belgium andthe Netherlands ceased to command re-spect. In terms peculiar to the war athand, the northern route offered promisingintermediate objectives: a chance to meetand conquer major German forces ex-pected to be concentrated in defense ofthe Ruhr ; elimination of the enemysstrategic reserve; access to the best air-

18Two others, the Belfort and Saverne gaps,were too far south to afford any appreciablethreat to the Ruhr or Berlin.

19SHAEF Planning Staff draft, 3 May 44; seealso SHAEF Planning Staff draft, 3 0 May 44.Both in SHAEF SGS 381, I.

fields between the Seine and Germany; asecure left flank resting on the coast;proximity to air bases in England; andaccess to the Channel ports, includingAntwerp, lack of which would severelylimit the forces that could be maintained.20

Before the invasion, General Eisenhowerhad concurred in the planners recommen-dation that the main advance be directedtoward the northeast with the object ofstriking directly at the Ruhr by the routenorth of the Ardennes. He also hadagreed that a subsidiary axis be main-tained south of the Ardennes to provide athreat to Metz and the Saar. This wasunderstood to mean an advance on abroad front North and South of theArdennes, which would avoid committingthe Allied forces irretrievably to one or theother of the comparatively narrow gaps.21General Eisenhower looked to Field Mar-shal Montgomerys 21 Army Group tomake the main thrust in the north; theAmericans under General Bradley, thesubsidiary effort in the south.

When the breakout from the Normandybeachhead had turned into wholesalepursuit, Allied commanders had beenconfronted with glittering opportunitiesat every turn. Yet the whirlwind advancealso introduced logistical complicationsof a distressing complexity. Though sup-plies already ashore were for the mo-ment adequate, the explosive advance sostretched lines of communication that atransportation system geared for slower,more methodical moves proved totallyunequal to the prodigious tasks suddenlythrust upon it. Having neither thestrength nor the transport to exploit allthe tempting possibilities, the Supreme

20 Ibid.21 Ibid.


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8 THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGNCommander had to face the fact that somekind of deviation from the original conceptof a broad front advance had to be made.Out of this undeniable reality emergeddecisions which were to affect the conductof operations in the fall of 1944 through-out the course of the Siegfried Line Cam-paign.

Meeting with Bradley and Montgomeryon 23 August, General Eisenhower re-marked the likelihood that the logisticalsituation soon might crimp Allied opera-tions severely. The crux of the problem,as General Eisenhower saw it, was in theports. To provide a solid base forsustained operations, an invasion forcemust have ports; yet the Allies at this pointhad only the Normandy beaches andCherbourg. Perhaps it would be best,while the momentum of the advance con-tinued, to forego some of the glamoroustactical opportunities in favor of moreutilitarian objectives.

Between the Seine River and the Pas deCalais, on a direct route north toward theChannel ports and Antwerp, sat theenemys Fifteenth Army, the only sizablereserve the Germans still possessed innorthern France. Were the 2 1 ArmyGroup to attack northward through theplain of Flanders, this reserve might beeliminated even as the Channel ports werecaptured, whereupon, with a firm baseassured, Montgomery might reorient hisdrive more specifically in keeping with thedirection SHAEF planners had intended.In the process, the other intermediateobjectives along the northern route, likethe airfields and the flying bomb launch-ing sites, also might be attained. In themeantime, the Americans might be es-tablishing their own firm base by openingthe Brittany ports and might be preparingto continue their subsidiary thrust.

Though Field Marshal Montgomeryproved receptive to General Eisenhowersplan, he insisted on having an entireAmerican army moving along his rightflank. Since General Eisenhower alreadyintended reinforcing the British with theairborne troops at his disposal, he thoughtMontgomery overcautious; but in order toassure success, he acceded to the request.The location of the First U.S. Armydictated its selection for the supportingrole, while the Third Army was to clearthe Brittany ports and amass supplies foran advance eastward through Metz. 22As developed in detail by Field MarshalMontgomery, the First Armys mission wasto support the British advance by estab-lishing forces in the area of Brussels-Maastricht-Likge-Namur-Charleroi. Atthe suggestion of General Bradley theboundary between the two army groupswas adjusted so that Brussels was allottedto the British, the boundary then swingingdistinctly northeast at Brussels. This ad-justment would eliminate the possibilitythat the British might be pinched out atAntwerp.23

In essence, the decision emerging fromthe 23 August meeting resulted in atemporary shift of the main effort from theMaubeuge-Likge-Aachen axis to the plainof Flanders, a route that preinvasionplanners had blackballed as a primary axisinto Germany. Yet the shift was more

22Eisenhower to Gen George C. Marshall,CPA 90235, 2 2 Aug 44, SHAEF cable log; Ltr,Eisenhower to Montgomery, 24 Aug 44, SHAEFSGS 381, I ; Eisenhower to Marshall, 5 Sep 44,Pogue files.23Montgomery to army comdrs, M-520, 26Aug 44, SHAEF SGS 381, I ; 12th A Gp L tr ofInstrs 6 , 25 Aug 44, 12th A Gp Rpt of Opns,V, 85-87; Ltr, Bradley to Montgomery, 26 Aug44, 12th A Gp 371.3 Military Objectives, I ;Montgomery, N o r m a n d y t o the Balt ic , p. 200.


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THE ROAD TO GERMANY 9

FIELDMARSHAL ONTGOMERYNDGENERALISENHOWERuring an in-formal discussion at Montgomerys head-quarters in France early in September 1944.

tactical than strategic in that it was madefor the purpose of gaining intermediateobjectives vital to a final offensive alongthe lines of the original strategic concept.It could be argued that it involved noreal shift of any kind because of the broadinterpretation that had come to be ac-corded the route north of the Ardennes.

The most salient change from originalplanning was the new location of the FirstArmy. General Eisenhower had intendedto employ both the First and Third Armiessouth of the Ardennes. Though bothEisenhower and Bradley were to try to getat least parts of the two armies movingtogether again, the fact was that throughthe course of the Siegfried Line Campaignthe First and Third Armies were to be

separated by the barrier of the Ardennes.The First Army-not the British-was toattack through the preferred Aachen Gapand eventually was to be designated theAllied main effort.

More than the shift of the First Army,the fact emerging from the August discus-sions which upset General Bradley wasthat the priority assigned the northernthrust meant severe restrictions on suppliesfor the Third Army. Both Bradley andthe commander of the Third Army, Lt.Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., reacted to thedecision as if Montgomery had stolen theirbirthrights.24 General Bradley wanted in-stead a modified double thrust, one thatwould achieve the goals in the north withthe help of only one American corps, whilethe rest of the First Army joined the Thirdon the southern route.25 Patton, for hispart, thought his army by itself could getacross the German border in record timeif properly supplied. Even after GeneralPatton had felt the stringent logisticalpinch which held him immobile for fivedays along the Meuse, he still had visionsof one thrust taking the Third Armyacross the Rhine River.26

General Eisenhower had no intention ofabandoning the subsidiary thrust. Revel-ation of this fact prompted Field MarshalMontgomery to voice an objection as

24Omar N. Bradley, A Soldiers Story (NewYork: Henry Holt and Company, 195 1), pp.400403; George S. Patton, Jr., W a r A s I K n e wIt (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947),PP. 114, 1 1 7 132.25Bradley, A Soldiers Story, p. 399.26 Patton, War As I Knew It, pp. 114, 117, 132.As late as 19 October, General Patton felt that,given proper maintenance and supplies, he couldreach the Siegfried Line in two days and standa high probability of penetrating i t and thus bein position to make a rapid advance to theRhine. Patton to Bradley, 19 Oct 44, 12th AGp 371. 3 Military Objectives, II.


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10 THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGNstrong or stronger than those registered byBradley and Patton. The crux of Mont-gomerys argument was that the thrusttoward Antwerp should not be lookedupon as a limited objective operation butshould be broadened into one powerfulfull-blooded thrust across the Rhine andinto the heart of Germany, backed by thewhole of the resources of the AlliedArmies . . . . This would involve rele-gating some sectors of the Allied front toa purely static role. 27

Both Montgomerys and Pattons one-thrust theories probably will attractpolemic disciples through the years, des-pite the damage done these theories byGerman tenacity in later stages of the war.Yet even as Montgomery and Pattonpromoted their ideas, planners at SHAEFlabeled them castles of theory built uponsand. A drive by General Pattons armyalone was logistically and tactically feasi-ble, the planners noted, only so far as theRhine and thus was unlikely to force anydecisive result. One thrust in the north,the planners admitted, might succeed incapturing the Ruhr and even in reachingBerlin; but it was neither tactically norlogistically feasible unless certain condi-tions were met. One was that by Sep-tember all Allied armies would havereached the Rhine; another, that by thesame date Antwerp would have beenreceiving at least 1,500 tons of supply perday. Neither premise had shown anyimmediate signs of becoming a reality.28

27Montgomery, N o r m a n d y t o the Balt ic, pp.193, 196; see also Ltr, Montgomery to Eisen-hower, M-160, 4 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS 381, I.28An exhaustive discussion of the subject isfound in Roland G. Ruppenthal, Logistical Sup-port of the Armies, Vol. II, UNITED STATESARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington,1959).

As an army commander, General Pattonhad few channels for making his voiceheard on the subject after the first refusal.Not so Field Marshal Montgomery, whowas both an army group commander andthe top military representative in thetheater of one of the major Allies. In oneform or another, Montgomery was to raisethe issue repeatedly, though the SiegfriedLine Campaign was to open in an atmos-phere of accord because of a temporarysettlement reached on 10 September.Meeting Montgomery at Brussels, GeneralEisenhower refused to accept the view thatthe field marshals priority should prevailto the exclusion of all other operations.Nevertheless, he agreed to a temporarydelay in clearing the seaward approachesto Antwerp, a project which he felt shouldhave chief emphasis, while Montgomeryextended his northern thrust to gain abridgehead across the Neder Rijn (LowerRhine) in the Netherlands. AlthoughMontgomery had failed to gain unquali-fied support for his northern thrust, hisarmy group still retained the role of Alliedmain effort.29

T h e Shadow of LogisticsThe fervor with which Allied comman-

ders contended for supplies stemmeddirectly from the critical nature of thelogistical situation. Perhaps the mostdramatic and widely publicized result ofthe supply crisis was the enforced halt ofthe entire Third Army when it ran out offuel along the Meuse River from 1 to 6September. Yet the units in the north

2 9 Notes on mtg at Brussels, I O Sep 44, by AirChief Marshal Sir Arthur W. Tedder, OCMH;Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (NewYork: Doubleday and Company, 1948), pp.30607.


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THE ROAD TO GERMANY 11had their problems as well, despite thepriority assigned the northern thrust. Acorps of the Second British Army, forexample, was halted for two weeks west ofthe Seine so that its transport could helpsupply the rest of the army. A corps ofthe First Army also had to halt for fourdays in Belgium for want of gasoline.

It was not shortage of supplies on theContinent that plagued the Allies. Build-up of supplies in Normandy had exceededexpectations. It was shortage of trans-portation, a problem created and intensi-fied mainly by the sporadic and explosivenature of the tactical advance.30

For all the lack of deepwater portfacilities and a steady, orderly advance,supply echelons could have built a soundlogistical structure had they been affordeda reasonable pause after the breakoutfrom the confined Normandy beachhead.That was how the invasion had beenplanned: a pause at the Seine River forregrouping and amassing supplies. Butthe planners had not foreseen the natureof the German defeat in France. Everypath strewn with gems of tactical oppor-tunity, Allied field commanders had feltcompelled to urge their armies to gofaster, faster. They had leaped the Seinebriskly and kept going.

While the timetable prepared by pre-invasion planners was admittedly con-jectural, it was nevertheless the only basisupon which those charged with deliveringsupplies could estimate the men, matriel,and transport needed. In gaining the Dplus 330 line by D plus 97 ( II Septem-ber), the armies had covered almost the

30Unless otherwise noted, this study of supplyis based upon Roland G. Ruppenthal, Logis t icalS u p p o r t of t h e Armies, Vol. I, UNITEDSTATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Wash-ington, 1953), and Vol. II.

entire distance in the last 48 days. Thekind of logistical system that planners hadexpected would be developed over 2 3 3days obviously could not be created in 48.Furthermore, the preinvasion planners hadstipulated that in early September twelveU.S. divisions could be supported as fareast as the Seine; in actuality, sixteen U.S.divisions were more than 2 0 0 miles beyondthe Seine in early September and severalothers were fighting in Brittany. The factthat these divisions could be maintainedin any fashion under these circumstancescame under the heading of a near miracle,for the exploitation of the tactical situa-tion had produced a ruthless disregard foran orderly development of a sound com-munications zone.

During the period of confinement inNormandy, the inadequacy of the Normanrail net had not been felt too keenly.Distances were short and trucking provedequal to the demands placed upon it.When the armies spurted eastward, theyuncovered a more extensive rail network,but it had been damaged severely by Alliedbombing and French sabotage. Truckingcompanies had to carry their loads fartherand farther forward. Despite extensiveimprovisation and emergency supply, de-liveries to the armies during the last fewdays of August dwindled to a few thou-sand tons.

At the end of August the First Armyestimated its daily average tonnage re-quirement as 5,500 tons. Even afterGeneral Eisenhower vested supply priorityin the First Army and halted the ThirdArmy, only 2,225 tons daily reached theFirst Army.31 In addition to immobiliz-ing an entire corps for four days for want

31By using its own transportation, the armyraised this to 3,000 tons.


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12 THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGNof gasoline, the First Army had to halt thearmored divisions of the two advancingcorps for periods as long as twenty-fourhours. 2 When ecorded receipts took aturn for the better on 5 September toreach 7,000 tons, General Bradley al-tered the previous allocation to split theavailable tonnage equally between his twoarmies, providing each with 3,500 tons.That was how the Third Army got movingagain.

The day the new allocation went intoeffect the First Army claimed that theCommunications Zone had failed by 1,900tons to meet the 3,500 figure. This kindof thing was all the more serious becausethe armys meager reserves had long sincebeen exhausted. By the end of August90 to 95 percent of all supplies on theContinent lay in depots near the beaches.

There were two solutions: I ) Pausewhile the Communications Zone moveddepots forward. Doing this would upsetthe momentum of a victorious advanceand afford the enemy additional time toput the West Wall into shape. ( 2 ) Getnew ports closer to the front. This Hitlerhimself had circumvented, over the objec-tions of his generals, by designating theports as fortresses and directing thatthey be held to the last, even thoughvaluable troops would be sacrificed in theprocess.

The alternative to these solutions was avariation of the first. The 12th ArmyGroup stated it as early as 27 August.It is contemplated, the army groupnoted, that the Armies will go as far aspracticable and then wait until the sup-ply system in rear will permit furtheradvance. 33 The pursuit would come to32F U S A A A R , Sep 44.33 12th A Gp Admin Instrs 1 3 , 2 7 Aug 44,

PUSA AAR, Sep 44 .

no dramatic end. It would sputter out.In an effort to keep the armies moving,

commanders from divisional units all theway back to the Communications Zonetook extraordinary measures. That theadvance carried as far as it did wasattributable in no small part to theseimprovisations.

Though rail reconstruction was pushedwith vigor, it hardly could have beenexpected to keep pace with the violentspurts of the combat formations. Never-theless, by 30 August, railroad engineersand French civilians working round theclock had pushed two main routes as faras Paris. The network beyond the Seinewas less severely crippled; but to getsupplies through the damaged yards ofParis and beyond the destroyed railbridges of the Seine, they had to be un-loaded and trucked through the city. Inthe First Army area, reconstruction crewsquickly opened a line from Paris northeastthrough Soissons and by 18 Septemberwere to push it to a point just west ofLige.34

For all the accomplishments under thisprogram, motor transport had to assumethe principal burden, even though produc-tion difficulties in the United States hadimposed limitations on trucks long beforeD-Day. When confronted with the en-gulfing demands of the pursuit, availablemotor transport could not deliver evendaily maintenance, much less providestocks for intermediate or advance depots.To make the most of available facilities,commanders decided on 2 3 August toestablish a special truck route, the RedBall Express. By closing off civiliantraffic on two parallel routes to points

3 4 FUSA Rpt of Opns, I Aug 4422 Feb 45,p. 62.


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THE ROAD TO GERMANY 13southwest of Paris and by pushing thetrucks and their drivers to the limit, theydelivered 89,939 tons in eight days be-tween 25 August and 6 September. Be-ginning on 25 August with 67 truckcompanies, the Red Ball attained peakcapacity on 29 August when 132companies, using 5,939 trucks, moved12,342 tons of supplies. The Red Ballwas to continue operation for anothereleven weeks and was to serve as theprototype for several less ambitious expressservices.

The armies themselves took over muchof the hauling. On 2 2 August GeneralBradley told both his armies to leave theirheavy artillery west of the Seine and usethe artillery trucks for transporting sup-plies. Because Communications Zone de-pots were far in the rear, trucks of theFirst Army often had to make round tripstotaling 300 miles or more. On a fewoccasions truck companies searched forsupplies all the way back to the invasionbeaches. The First Army quartermasterscouted for advancing gasoline trains froma cub airplane. The First Army had 43Quartermaster truck companies, whichwere supplemented by I O to 2 0 provisionalcompanies made up from artillery andantiaircraft units. The infantry divisionsadvanced either on foot or by shuttling intrucks borrowed from their organic artil-lery and attached antiaircraft. 5Though emergency air supply provedhighly valuable, tonnage delivered by thismethod fell short of 1 ,000 tons per day.Most of this went to the Third Army.The vagaries of weather, lack of service-able Continental airfields, and the need towithhold planes for their primary missionof training for and executing tactical air-

3 5 FUSA AAR, Sep 44.

borne operations imposed severe restric-tions on the airlift program. Anotherrestriction developed when the city ofParis was liberated far ahead of schedule.Responsible for providing 1,500 tons ofsupplies daily for civil relief in the capital,the 12th Army Group had to obtain 500tons of this from the airlift.

Major efforts were made to speed con-struction of fuel pipelines, but this taskwas inherently slow and was retardedfurther by the limitations on moving pipeimposed by the transportation shortage.While construction sometimes reached arecord 30 to 40 miles a day, the combattroops were going even faster. Duringthe early days of September the terminusof the pipeline was some 170 miles south-west of Paris.

Combat commanders urged strictestsupply economy.36 All units rationedgasoline. Food was of emergency types,mostly C and K rations, supplemented inthe First Army by approximately 75,000captured rations that added a new mo-notony of canned fish to the diet. TheThird Army captured huge quantities ofGerman beef, not to mention the excitingacquisition of great stores of champagne.Cigarettes became so scarce in the FirstArmy that the soldiers accepted even themostly ersatz German cigarettes with relish.

Gasoline was the main problem, notbecause enough had not reached the Con-tinent but because it could not be movedforward overnight and because worn-outvehicles used inordinate amounts. Am-munition presented no great problemduring the mobile warfare of the pursuit,but it would, should a pitched battledevelop at the gates of the West Wall.With all available transport used for daily

3 6 See, for example, FUSA AAR, Sep 44.


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14 T HE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGNmaintenance and none for reserve stocks,what would happen should the armies runinto intense fighting? How to equip themen with heavier clothing now that winterwas coming on? How to replace theworn-out items of signal, quartermaster,medical, engineer, and ordnance equip-ment?

Had the effects of the logistical crisisdisappeared with the close of the pursuit,the costly, miserable fighting that came tocharacterize the Siegfried Line Campaignmight never have occurred. Yet the factwas that the pursuit ended because of theeffects of the logistical crisis. The imprintof a weakened logistical system on theconduct of operations was to be markedfor at least two more months. As manyan Allied commander was to discoverduring the fall of 1944, a logistical head-ache is a persistent illness.

The Germans in the WestFor all the implications of the logistical

crisis, sober appreciations of the situationwere none too common during late sum-mer 1944. The German army was nolonger a cohesive force but a number offugitive battle groups, disorganized andeven demoralized, short of equipment andarms. 37 This was the Allied view.Political upheaval within Germany or in-surrection within the Wehrmacht waslikely to hasten the end. 8 The FirstArmy G2 believed that the enemy wasconcentrating all he had left opposite Metzand along the Lower Rhine, leaving a gapfrom Trier to Maastricht which he is

37SHAEF Weekly Intel Summary 23, weekending 2 Sep 44.38FUSA G2 Estimate 24, 3 Sep 44, FUSARpt of Opns; TUSA G2 Estimate 9, 28 Aug44, TUSA AAR, Vol. II.

attempting to fill with everything on whichhe can lay his hands. This, the G2declared, had proved his undoing. 39

This kind of optimism reflected no fleet-ing impression. In mid-September, whena corps commander took temporary leaveof his troops for a short assignment else-where, he declared it probable that thewar with Germany would be over beforehe could return. 40 On 15 September theFirst Army was almost sanguine over thepossibility of enemy collapse in the Rhine-land and the enormous strategic op-portunity of seizing the Rhine bridgesintact.41 As late as the last week inSeptember, the First Army commanderbelieved that, given two weeks of goodweather, Allied air and ground forcescould bring the enemy to their knees. 42Although a few dissenting voices tried tomake themselves heard, caution was notthe fashion during the late summer seasonof 1944.

In many respects the true German situ-ation nurtured optimism. In five yearsof war the German armed forces had lostI 14,215 officers and 3,630,274 men, notincluding wounded who had returned toduty. The bulk of these had been Armylosses. Many had been incurred duringthe recent months of June, July, andAugust, which had brought the Germanstheir most disastrous defeats in both East39 FUSA G2 Estimate 26, Sep 44.40Memo, Maj Gen Leonard T. Gerow forOs and EM of V Corps, 1 7 Sep 44, V Corps

Operations in the ETO, 6 Jan 429 May 45,p. 256.41FUSA G2 Estimate 28, 15 Sep 44.42Personal Diary of M aj William C. Sylvan,former aide to the First Army Commander, LtGen Courtney H. Hodges. Entry of 24 Sep 44.Major Sylvan kept his diary, dealing primarilywith General Hodges activities, with the ap-proval of General Hodges. A copy is on file inOCMH through courtesy of Major Sylvan.


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THE ROAD TO GERMANY 15and West. During these three monthsthe Army alone had suffered losses indead, wounded, and missing of 1,210,600,approximately two thirds of which hadbeen incurred in the East where bothsides employed larger masses of men.Losses in transport and equipment alsowere tremendous ; during August alone,for example, a total of 254,225 horses werelost.43

Not counting paper units, which hadheadquarters but no troops, the ThirdReich in early September possessed some252 divisions and 15 to 2 0 brigades,greatly varied as to strength and capabil-ities. They were deployed in five theaters.In Finland, the East, and the Balkansthey were supplemented by approximately55 allied divisions (Finnish, Hungarian,and Bulgarian), for which the Germanshad little respect. Most of the total ofsome 7,500,000 men were in the FieldArmy (Feldheer ) , the Replacement Army( E r s a t z h e e r ) , or the services of supply.About 207,000 were in the Waf len-SS , amechanized Army-type force originallymade up of volunteers from Nazi-partyorganizations.Of the 48 infantry and 15panzer orpanzer-type divisions which Field Marshalvon Rundstedt controlled in the West, tworepresented a new class of 18 divisionswhich had been in process of formationsince early July. These 18 divisions15of which went to the East and I toScandinaviawere the first of the volksgrenadier divisions, an honorific selectedto appeal to the national and militarypride of the German people ( d a s V o l k ) .The troops were hospital returnees, con-

43A detailed annotated account of Germanstrength, losses, and organization may be foundin Cole, T h e L o r r ai n e C a m p a i g n , pp. 2943.

verted naval and Luftwaffe personnel,previously exempt industrial workers,and youths just reaching military age.

When Hitler in late August began toconsider how to stop the headlong retreatin the West, he settled upon a plan toincrease the number of volks grenadierdivisions. O n 2 Septemberalready seri-ously planning a large-scale operationdesigned to regain the initiativehe di-rected creation of an operational reserveof twenty-five new volks grenadier divi-sions. They were to become available inthe West between 1 October and 1December.

Organization and equipment of the newdivisions reflected a tendency, current inthe German Army since 1943, to reducemanpower while increasing fire power.Early in 1944 the standard infantry divi-sion had been formally reduced fromabout 17,000 men to 12,500.44 By cut-ting each of the conventional three infan-try regiments to two rifle battalions apieceand by thinning the organic service troops,the volks grenadier divisions were furtherreduced to about 10,000 men. Attemptswere made to arm two platoons in eachcompany with the 1944 model machinepistol (known to Americans as the burpgun), increase the amount of field artil-lery, and provide a larger complementof antitank weapons and assault guns(self-propelled tank destroyers). Approx-imately three fourths of the divisionaltransportation was horse drawn, while oneunit, the Fuesilier battalion, had bicycles.

To supplement divisional artillery andantitank guns, Hitler ordered formation44The 1944-type division and other divisional

organizations are discussed in Gordon A. Harri-son, Cross-Channel Attack, UNITED STATESARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington,1951), PP. 23641.


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16 THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGNof a number of general headquarters(Heeres) units; I 2 motorized artillerybrigades (about 1,000 guns), 10Werfer(rocket projector) brigades, 10 assaultgun battalions, and 12 20-mm. machinegun battalions. These were to be readyalong with the last of the 25 volksgrenadier divisions. In addition, Hitleron 4 September assigned the West priorityon all new artillery and assault guns.

Two other steps were of a more immedi-ate nature. As the month of Septemberopened, 10 panzer brigades were eitherjust arriving at the front or were beingformed. These were built around a pan-zer battalion equipped with about fortyMark V (Panther) tanks. On the theorythat the Mark V was tactically superior tothe U.S. Sherman tank, the panzer bri-gades were expected to make up tempo-rarily for Allied numerical superiority inarmor.

The other step was to commit to battleapproximately a hundred fortress in-fantry battalions made up of the oldermilitary classes and heretofore used only inrear areas. About four fifths of thesewere to be assigned to the West. Callingthe battalions a hidden reserve, the FirstU.S. Army later was to credit them withmuch of the German tenacity in the Westw a11.45

Had Allied commanders been aware ofthe enemys necessity to resort to expedi-ents like these, it probably would have fedtheir optimism. Neither could they havebeen impressed by the command situationas it had developed at the top level. Afterthe reverses on the Eastern Front during194142, Hitler had assumed more andmore the role of supreme military leader,so that by the fall of 1944 the concept of

4 5 FUSA AAR, Oct. 44.

maneuver had been all but stultified bya complete centralization of command.Hardly anybody could do anything with-out first consulting Hitler. After theunsuccessful attempt on his life in July, helooked upon almost every proposal from afield commander with unalloyed suspicion.

To reach the supreme military leader,field commanders in the West had togo through a central headquarters in Ber-lin, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht(OKW) which was charged with opera-tions in all theaters except the East.Oberkommando des HeeresOKHwatched over the Eastern Front.) Hit-lers impression of the situation thusstemmed directly from a staff far removedfrom the scene of action.O B WEST, the headquarters in theWest that was comparable to SHAEF,was a supreme headquarters in theoryonly, for the ties imposed by OKW werestringent. The jealousies that playedamong the Army, the Luftwaffe, the Navy,the Waffen-SS, and Nazi party politicalappointees also limited O B WEST inde-pendence.

Hitlers order for early September tohold under any conditions a line fromthe Schelde estuary along the face of theWest Wall and the western borders ofLorraine and Alsace had shown littleappreciation of the difficulties facing O BWEST. This was despite the fact thatField Marshal Model, who had precededRundstedt as Commander in Chief West,had done his best to convey some sense ofthe crisis by sending report after reportcouched in dire terms. The retreatingtroops, Model had warned, possessed fewheavy weapons and little else except car-bines and rifles. Few of the eleven panzerdivisions had more than five to ten tanksin working order. Artillery in both in-


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THE ROAD TO GERMANY 17

FIELDM A R S H A L O D E L FIELDM A R S H A LON RUNDSTEDTfantry and panzer divisions was almost athing of the past. The troops weredepressed by Allied superiority in planesand tanks and by the contrast betweentheir own horse-drawn transport and themotors of their enemy. In Alsace a widegap had developed between the two groupsof armies that could not be filled with lessthan three fresh infantry divisions. Hardlyhad Model reported this gap than hewrote it off as no longer of primary con-cern. The entire Western Front, hepleaded, needed propping up lest it giveway completely.46

On 4 September Model had given adetailed appraisal of the front of ArmyGroup B, which Model himself com-46Heeresgruppe B (hereafter cited as A Gp B ) ,

Lagebeurteilungen, l a .

manded in addition to his major post asCommander in Chief West. His armygroup alone, Model had said, needed aminimum of 25 fresh infantry divisionsand 5 or 6 panzer divisions.47

To this plea Model received not even thecourtesy of a reply. It was at this pointthat he was replaced in the top halfof his dual command responsibility byRundstedt.Field Marshal von Rundstedts returnto his former command on 5 Septembercame on the heels of personal indoctrina-tion from Hitler. The Allies, Hitler hadtold him, were outrunning their suppliesand soon would have to halt, at whichtime counterattacks could cut off thearmored spearheads and stabilize the

47 Ib id .


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18 THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGNfront. The West Wall, Hitler insisted,had all the elements of impregnability andwould afford the much-needed respite.Hitlers final instructions were much likethe earlier order to hold under any con-ditions. Rundstedt was to stop the Alliesas far to the west as possible, then was tocounterattack along the boundary be-tween the two army groups into the southflank of the Third U.S. Army.48

After assuming command in the mainO B W E S T command post near Koblenz,Rundstedts most urgent problem was therestoration of a collective strategy for thewhole of the Western Front, something towhich Model, in his preoccupation withArmy Group B, had paid scant attention.Rundstedt correctly held out little hopefor the counterattack; for continued ad-vances by the Third Army denied mount-ing one in any appreciable strength. Yetthe very fact that any troops were on handto counterattack lessened this particularthreat. He could see no solution for twoother threats: one against the Ruhr, par-ticularly via Aachen, and another in un-committed Allied airborne forces, whichhe expected might attack either in rearof the West Wall or east of the Rhine.

Rundstedts first estimate of the situa-tion, forwarded to OKW on 7 September,echoed Models pessimistic reports. Afteremphasizing the overwhelming Allied su-48 MS # T122, Ceschichte des Oberbefehls-haber West, edited by Generalleutnant BodoZimmermann (G3, OB WEST), hereafter citedas MS # T122 (Zimmermann et al.), Part II,Kampf in Belgien und Holland von Mitte Sep-tember-Mitte December 1944. MSS # T121,122, and 123History of OB WESTmake upa million-word manuscript prepared in part byZimmermann, in part by generals and generalstaff officers associated with OB WEST, OKW,OKH, OKL, OKM, and various subordinatecommands. No page numbers are cited becausethe manuscripts exist in several differently

paginated versions.

periority in divisions and in armor, Rund-stedt insisted on the immediate need of atleast five, and better ten, infantrydivisions. He needed tanks and tankdestroyers desperately, he said, to counterthe threat at Aachen. At the momentthe only reserves of any description werea weak 9th Panzer Division, a weakSturm panzer battalion, and two assaultgun brigades. All of these already wereon the way to Aachen. 9

The answer from Berlin must have beenas frustrating to Rundstedt as earlierresponses had been to Model. Spikedown the front as far to the west aspossible. Pull out the shattered divisionsfor reconstitution. Counterattack intothe flank of the Third U.S. Army. Nopromise of any immediate assistance. Asthe American First Army noted, Themoment called for a real soldier. 50

Subsequent events might prove that inField Marshal von Rundstedt the momenthad found the soldier it called for. TheGerman situation in the West was bad,even desperate. Yet it was a situationthat a strong leader still might make some-thing of.

The true German .situation was perhapsmost aptly described by one of the fewvoices of caution raised on the Allied sideduring the halcyon days of pursuit. On2 8 August the Third Army G2 had putit this way:

Despite the crippling factors of shatteredcommunications, disorganization and tre-mendous losses in personnel and equipment,the enemy nevertheless has been able tomaintain a sufficiently cohesive front toexercise an overall control of his tacticalsituation. His withdrawal, though continu-ing, has not been a rout or mass collapse.Numerous new identifications in contact in49A G p B , L a g e b eu r t ei l u ng e n , l a .50FUSA AAR, Sep 44.


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THE ROAD TO GERMANY 19recent days have demonstrated clearly that,despite the enormous difficulties under whichhe is operating, the enemy is still capableof bringing new elements into the battlearea and transferring some from otherfronts . . . .It is clear from all indications that thefixed determination of the Nazis is to wage alast-ditch struggle in the field at all costs.It must be constantly kept in mind thatfundamentally the enemy is playing for time.Weather will soon be one of his most potentAllies as well as terrain, as we move east tonarrowing corridors . . . . 1

The fact was that the German penchantand respect for organization and disciplinehad preserved organization at the head-quarters levels basically intact. Thoughsome top commanders and many staffofficers had been lost, the Germans stillhad enough capable senior officers to re-place them. Nor had the Germans as anation resorted to total mobilization beforethe fall of 1944. 2

51TUSA G2 Estimate 9, 28 Aug 44, TUSAAAR, Vol. II.5 2 See Charles V. P. von Luttichau, The

Ardennes Offensive, Germanys Situation in theFall of 1 9 4 4 , Part III, The Strategic Situation,MS in OCMH.

This is not to say, the Germans had notfull justification for alarm as the firstpatrols crossed their border. The situa-tion still was chaotic, but the ingredientsfor stabilization were present. In thenorth, for example, opposite the Britishand the First U.S. Army, though theS even th and Fif teen th Armies were skele-tons, the army and corps staffs stillfunctioned and each army had at least tendivision staffs capable of attempting toexecute tactical assignments. Upon newsof the fall of Antwerp, Hitler had rushedto the Netherlands headquarters of atraining command, the First ParachuteArmy, to fill a gap between the S even thand Fif teen th Armies . Though the FirstParachute Army brought with it littlemore than its own headquarters, it wasable in a matter of days to borrow, con-fiscate from the retreating masses, orotherwise obtain functioning staffs of onecorps and several divisions. Winning awar with a setup like this might beimpossible, but it could be effective instopping an overextended attacker longenough to permit creation of somethingbetter.


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CHAPTER II

T h e First U.S. ArmyIn crossing the German border, the

First U.S. Army had added another justi-fication for its numerical name to thatalready earned in establishing the firstAmerican foothold in Normandy. Afterthe landings, the First Army had forgedthe gap through which the more flamboy-ant Third Army had poured from thebeachhead. Not to be outdone, the FirstArmy also had taken up the pursuit, withless fanfare than its sister army, perhaps,but with equally concrete results. In lessthan a month and a half the First Armyhad driven from St. L to Paris, thencenorthward to Mons, thence eastward tothe German border, a distance of approxi-mately 7 5 0 miles. (See Map I . ) Thisit had accomplished against the bulk ofthe German forces, including Germanarmor, still opposing an American army innorthern France.

At the beginning of September the FirstArmy numbered 256,351 officers and men.It had 3 corps made up of 5 infantrydivisions, 3 armored divisions, and 3 mech-anized cavalry groups. The 8 combatdivisions were almost at full strength:109,517 officers and men. Also a part ofthe army were 9 separate tank battalions( 7 medium, 2 light), 1 2 tank destroyerbattalions, 3 I antiaircraft battalions (in-cluding automatic weapons and gun bat-talions), 3 field artillery observationbattalions, 46 separate field artillerybattalions, 3 chemical (mortar) battalions,

and a number of engineer, signal, quarter-master, and other service units.1

Though the First Armys strength inmedium tanks was a theoretical 1 , 0 1 0 ,only some 85 percent was actually onhand. Many of even these were badly inneed of maintenance following the rapiddash across France and Belgium. The 3dArmored Division, for example, reportedon 18 September that of an authorizedmedium tank strength of 232, only 70 to75 were in condition for front-line duty.2

The commander of the First Army wasa calm, dependable, painstaking tactician,Lt. Gen. Courtney H. Hodges. Afterthe manner of his predecessor in commandof the First Army, General Bradley, Gen-eral Hodges was a soldiers soldier, atitle to which no other American armycommander and few corps commanders inaction in Europe at the time could laymore just claim. No other was more sin-cere and sympathetic toward his troopsand none except Hodges and one corpscommander had risen from the ranks.3Though General Hodges had sought acommission at West Point, he had flunked

1 12th A Gp and FUSA G1 Daily Summaries,12 Sep 44; FUSA, Order of Battle, CombatUnits, 20 Sep 44, FUSA G2 TAC Misc file,Sep 44. C f . Third Army strength as found inCole, T h e Lorraine C a m p a i g n , p. 18.2 3d Armd Div AAR, Sep 44, and CombatInterv with 3d Armd Div G4.

3 Maj Gen Troy H. Middleton, VIII Corps.
http://mapi.pdf/http://mapi.pdf/http://mapi.pdf/http://mapi.pdf/


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THE FIRST U.S. ARMY 21out in geometry during his first year. Aman of determination, as he was to dem-onstrate often during the fall of 1944, hehad enlisted in the Army as an infantryprivate and had gained his commissiononly a year later than his former class-mates at the Military Academy. Heserved in the expedition against PanchoVilla in Mexico and was one of a smallfraternity of top American commanders inWorld War II who had seen combat be-fore at a line company level, in theMeuse-Argonne campaign of World War I.

Upon completion of a stint of occupa-tion duty after World War I, GeneralHodges had served the usual tours oftroop duty in the United States andattended the Army schools. During ad-ditional service in the Philippines his pathcrossed that of the future Supreme Com-mander in Europe. Later he served suc-cessively as assistant commandant andcommandant of The Infantry School. In1 9 4 1 General George C. Marshall, Chiefof Staff, who had first been impressedwith Hodges while he himself was assistantcommandant of T he Infantry School,brought Hodges to Washington as Chiefof Infantry. His performance as anadministrator already proved, GeneralHodges showed his ability as a fieldcommander while directing the ThirdArmy during the 1943 Louisiana ma-neuvers.In early 1944 General Hodges had leftfor England to become deputy commanderof General Bradleys First Army and todirect the training and co-ordination ofthe various corps and divisions readyingfor D-Day. I t was a foregone conclusionthat Hodges would take over whenBradley moved upstairs. On I August hehad become commanding general of theFirst Army.

GENERAL HODGES

General Hodges was fifty-seven yearsold at the start of the Siegfried LineCampaign. Tall, erect, his moustacheclosely clipped, he was an impressive-looking soldier. Averse to tumult and glit-ter, he preferred restrained behavior topublicity-provoking eccentricities. Disci-pline, General Hodges maintained, couldbe achieved without shouting.

A close friend of the Third ArmysGeneral Patton, Hodges shared Pattonsenthusiasm for what machines and bigguns could do for his infantrymen. TheFirst Army almost always had moremedium tanks than did the Third Army,despite the myth that the Third was top-heavy with armor. That Hodges knewhow to use tanks had been demonstratedamply during the pursuit. He was alsoalert to what artillery could do. GeneralHodges worked no more closely with nor


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22 THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN

THIRTEENOMMANDERSF T H E WESTERNRONThotographed in Belgium, 10 Octo-ber 1944. Front row, left to right: General Patton, General Bradley, General Eisenhower, Gen-eral Hodges, Lt. Gen. William H. Simpson. Second row: Maj.. Gen. William B. Kean, Maj.Gen. Charles E . Corlett, M aj . Gen. J . Lwton Collins, Maj. Gen. Leonard P. Gerow, Maj.Gen. Elwood R. Quesada. Third row: Mai. Gen. Leven C . Allen, B rig . G en. Charles C. Hart,Brig. Gen. Truman C. Thorson.depended more on the advice of any manon his staff than his chief of artillery,Brig. Gen. Charles E. Hart.4The First Army headquarters underGeneral Hodges was vitally concernedwith precision and detailed planning.When you did a situation report for the4 nte rv with Maj Gen Truman C. Thorson,

former G3, FUSA, 1 2 Sep 56; Sylvan Diary,passim.

Third Army, said a former corps G3,you showed the positions of the regi-ments. When you did one for the FirstArmy, you had to show platoons. 5 Thearmys concern for detail was clearly re-flected in the presence within the office ofthe Assistant G3 for Plans and Opera-tions alone of sixteen liaison officers5 Interv with Brig Gen John G. Hill, former

G3, V Corps, 15 Oct 54.


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THE FIRST U.S. ARMY 23equipped with jeep and radio.6 A goodarmy headquarters, General HodgesG3 believed, is always right on top ofthe corps and divisions, else you cannotcarry out the orders and wishes of thecommander. 7

The staff which General Hodges in-herited from General Bradley was basicallyintact at the start of September. Possiblyreflecting the primary interest of bothBradley and Hodges, it was strong ininfantry officers.

The chief of staff was a specialist in therole, a forty-seven-year-old infantryman,Maj. Gen. William B. Kean. GeneralBradley had brought General Kean alongfrom earlier service as chief of staff of aninfantry division to fill the same role, firstwith the II Corps in Tunisia and Sicily,and later with the First Army. Keanbecame very close to General Hodges asadviser and confidant and a leadinglight in the First Army headquarters.It was Kean, one of his associates re-called, who would crack the whip. Wecalled him Old Sam Bly. 8 Both theG2, Col. Benjamin A. Dickson, and theG3, Brig. Gen. Truman C. Thorson, alsowere infantrymen.

Like almost all American units in actionat this stage, the corps and divisions underthe First Armys command were thor-oughly seasoned. Two of the 3 corps and6 of the 8 div

the sigfried line campaign

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