THESIEGFRIEDLINE CAMPAIGN UNITEDSTATESARMYINWORLDWARII TheEuropeanTheaterof Operations THESIEGFRIEDLINE CAMPAIGN by CharlesB.MacDonald CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY UNITEDSTATES ARMY WASHINGTON,D.G. ,1993 Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 62-60001 First Printed 1963-CMH Pub 7-7-1 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.Government Printing Office Washington, D.C.20402 UNITEDSTATESARMYINWORLDWARII StetsonConn,GeneralEditor AdvisoryCommittee (Asof 24May1961) FredHarveyHarrington Universityof Wisconsin WilliamR.Emerson YaleUniversity Oron J.Hale Universityof Virginia W.StullHolt Universityof Washington Bell1.Wiley EmoryUniversity Maj.Gen.LouisW.Truman US.ContinentalArmyCommand Maj.Gen.EvanM.Houseman IndustrialCollegeoftheArmedForces Brig.Gen.BrucePalmer,Jr. US.ArmyWarCollege Brig.Gen.WilliamA.Cunningham III US.ArmyCommandandGeneralStaff College Col.Vincent J.Esposito UnitedStatesMilitaryAcademy C.VannWoodward JohnsHopkinsUniversity Office0/ theChiif 0/ MilitaryHistory Brig.Gen.JamesA.Norell,Chief of MilitaryHistory Chief Historian Chief,HistoriesDivision Chief,PublicationDivision EditorinChief StetsonConn Col.LeonardG.Robinson Lt.Col.JamesR.Hillard JosephR.Friedman ..toThoseWhoServed Foreword Tomany an Alliedsoldier and officer andtocountlessarmchair strategists, WorldWarIIinEuropeappearednearanend wheninlatesummerof 1944 Alliedarmiesracedacrossnorthern France,Belgium,andLuxembourgtothe verygatesof Germany.Thatthiswasnot,infact,thecasewasapainful lessonthat the months of September, October,November,and December would make clear with stark emphasis. Thestory of thesweepfromNormandytotheGerman frontierhasbeen toldinthealreadypublishedBreakoutandPursuit.Thepresent volume relatestheexperiencesof theFir:standNinthU.S.Armies,theFirst Allied AirborneArmy,andthoseAmericanunitswhichfoughtunderBritishand Canadiancommand,onthenorthernflankof thebattle frontthat stretched acrossthefaceof EuropefromtheNetherlandstotheMediterranean.The operations of the Third U.S.Army inthecenter, frommid-September through mid-Decem.ber,havebeenrecountedinTheLorraineCampaign;thoseof the SeventhU.S.ArmyonthesouthwillbetoldinTheRivieratotheRhine,a volume in preparation. Unlikethegrandsweepof thepursuit,thebreachingof theWestWall called for the most grueling kind of fighting.Huge armies waged the campaign described' inthisbook,buttheindividualsoldier,pittinghiscourageand staminaagainstharshelementsaswellasastubbornenemy,emergesasthe movingspiritof thesearmies.Intheagonyof theHuertgenForest,the frustration of MARKET-GARDEN,the savagery of the struggle for Aachen, the valor of theAmericansoldierandhisgallantcomradesprovedtheindispensable ingredient of eventual victory. Washington, D.C. 24 May 1961 JAMES A.NORELL Brigadier General, USA Chief of Military History TheAuthor CharlesB.MacDonald,agraduateofPresbyterianCollege,istheauthor ofCompanyCommander/anaccountofhisexperiencesasanofficerofthe 2dInfantryDivisionintheEuropeantheaterduringWorldWarII.Heis coauthorandcompilerofThreeBattles:Arnaville,Altuzzo,andSchmidtand acontributortoCommandDecisions.Since1953hehassupervisedthe preparationofothervolumesintheEuropeanandMediterraneantheatersub-seriesofUNITEDSTATESARMYINWORLDWARIIandiscurrently writinganothervolumeintheEuropeantheatersubseries.In1957here-ceivedaSecretaryoftheArmyResearchandStudyFellowshipandspenta yearstudyingtherelationshipofterrain,weapons,andtacticsonEuropean battlefields.AlieutenantcolonelintheArmyReserve,heholdsthePurple HeartandtheSilverStar. 1Washington,1947. Preface SomewhohavewrittenofWorldWarIIinEuropehavedismissedthe periodbetween11Septemberand16December1944withaparagraphortwo. Thishasbeentheirwayofgainingspacetotellofthewhirlwindadvances and more spectacular commanddecisionsofother months.Thefightingduring September,October,November,andearlyDecemberbelongedtothesmall unitsandindividualsoldiers,thekindofwarfarewhichisnolessdifficultand essentialnomatterhowseldomitreachesthespectacular. It isalwaysanenrichingexperiencetowriteabouttheAmericansoldier-in adversitynolessthaninglitteringtriumph.Glitteranddashwereconspicu-ouslyabsentinmostoftheSiegfriedLinefighting.Butwhatevertheperiod maylackinsweepingaccomplishmentitmakesupinhumandramaand varietyofcombatactions.Hereismorethanfightingwithinafortifiedline. HereistheHuertgenForest,theRoerplain,Aachen,andthelargestairborne attackofthewar.Theperiodalsoeventuallymayberegardedasoneofthe mostinstructiveoftheentirewarinEurope.Acompany,battalion,or regimentfightingaloneand oftenunaidedwasmoretherulethantheexception. Innuclearwarorinso-calledlimitedwarinunderdevelopedareas,ofwhich wehearsomuchtoday,thismaywellbetheformthefightingwillassume. Asbefitsthenatureofthefighting,thisvolumeisfocusedupontactical operationsatarmylevelandbelow.Thestoryofcommandanddecisionin higherheadquartersistoldonlywhenithaddirectbearingontheconductof operationsinthosesectorsunderconsideration.Thelogisticsofthecampaign likewisehasbeensubordinatedtothetacticalnarrative.Itisagroundstory inthesensethatairoperationshavebeenincludedonlywheretheyhaddirect influenceuponthegroundaction.ItisalsoanAmericanstory.Although considerableattentionhasbeenpaidBritishandCanadianoperationswhere U.S.unitswereinvolved,thisisdesignedonlytoplaceU.S.operationsin properperspective. Inthefullestsenseoftheterm,thisvolumerepresentsaco-operativeenter-prise.Referenceinthefootnotesandthebibliographicalnotecangiveonly partialcredittothescoresofofficersandmenwhofurnishedinformationor unraveledquestionsoffact.Nearlyeveryofficerwhoheldthepostofdivision commanderoraboveduringthecampaignhasreadthemanuscriptofthis volume,andatleastonerankingofficerfromeachdivision,corps,andarmy headquartershasreadandcommenteduponthemanuscript. Xl To listallpresentandformerofficialsoftheOfficeoftheChiefofMilitary Historywhobytheiradviceandsupporthelpedmaketheworkpossiblewould beprohibitivelylengthy.Thoseofmycolleagueswhoseinvaluablecontribu-tionstothisco-operativeenterprisecanbepreciselynotedareasfollows: ThehistorianwhoperformedmostoftheoriginalresearchinGerman materialsandbyhismonographsonGermanactionsprovidedineffecta companionmanuscripttotheauthor'sAmericanstorywasLucianHeichler. TheeditorwasMissRuthStout,whoaccomplishedhertaskwithhighpro-fessionalskillandcommendabletactandunderstanding.Copyeditingwas donebyMrs.MarionP.Grimes.Themaps,whichservenotonlytoillustrate thenarrativebutalsototiediverseactionstogether,aretheworkofCharles V.P.vonLuttichau.MissRuthPhillipsseleCtedthephotographs.Mrs.Lois AldridgeoftheWorldWarII RecordsDivision,NationalArchivesandRec-ordsService,displayedremarkablepatienceinassistingtheauthor'sexploration ofmountainsofrecordsfromtheEuropeantheater. ThecontributionsofDr.KentRobertsGreenfield,chiefhistorianatthe timethisvolumewasprepared,cannotbesopreciselystated,yetnoindividual contributedmore.Itwashewhofirstbroughttheauthorintothefieldof militaryhistoryandpatientlyandastutelyguidedhisearlyefforts. Anycreditforthisvolumeshouldbedividedamongallthosewhohelped makeitpossible.Ontheotherhand,theauthoraloneisresponsiblefor interpretationsmadeandconclusionsdrawn,aswellasforanyerrorsof omissionorcommissionwhichmayappear. Washington,D.C. 15May1961 XlI CHARLESB.MAcDONALD Chapter Contents PARTONE BreachingtheSiegfriedLine I.THEROADTOGERMANY AlliedStrategy. TheShadowofLogistics TheGermansintheWest II.THEFIRSTU.S.ARMY WeaponsandEquipment TheTerrainandtheWestWall APauseattheBorder III.VCORPSHITSTHEWESTWALL TheRacefortheWestWall IntoGermany BattleoftheSchneeEifel BridgeheadatWallendorf DefenseoftheBridgehead IV.VIICORPSPENETRATESTHELINE GermanDevelopments TheBattleoftheStolbergCorridor TheDriveontheSecondBand AWallAboutAachen BattleoftheMonschauCorridor TheGermansStrikeBack TheOnsetofPositionWarfare TheFirstFightintheForest XIll Page 3 6 10 14 20 25 28 36 39 41 43 49 56 63 66 69 71 75 80 82 86 90 92 Chapter V.ACTIONONTHENORTHWING DefenseojtheAlbert. VI. VII. VIII. IX. X. FromtheAlberttotheBorder DelayintheAssault. PARTTWO AnAirborneCarpetintheNorth OPERATIONMARKET-GARDEN TheGermansintheNetherlands SevenDaysforPlanning WhatDidtheGermansKnow? TheFlighttotheCorridor. INVASIONFROMTHESKY aremarkablybeautifullatesummerday" Hell'sHighway SixBridgesandaRidge. TakingtheObjectives TheRedDevilsatArnhem DECISIONONTHEGROUND DevelopmentsonDPlus2(19September) TheFightfortheNijmegenBridges FirstAttemptsToDriveonArnhem KeepingtheCorridorOpen T heOutcomeatArnhem TheAc'hievementsandtheCost ReleaseoftheU.S.Divisions THEAPPROACHESTOANTWERP TheControversyAboutAntwerp TheBattleoftheSchelde BaptismofFire. SouthBevelandandWalcheren SomethingBeastlyinAntwerp THEPEELMARSHES FirstArmyDrawstheAssignment TheBritishAttempt ASpoilingAttack XIV Page 96 98 101 112 119 123 127 134 136 140 140 143 154 100 170 174 174 179 184 186 195 ~ 8201 207 209 215 222 227 229 231 231 241 242 PARTTHREE TheBattleofAachen Chapter XI.ASETATTACKAGAINSTTHEWESTWALL FirstArmyReadjuststheFront PlanningtheWestWallAssault "Thoseinfantrymenhaveguts!" CommitmentofCCB. XII.CLOSINGTHECIRCLE The18thInfantryDrivesNorth The30thDivisionStrikesSouth SealingtheGap XIII.ASSAULTONTHECITY TheAssaultBegins HoldingtheLastLink TheFinalBlow. WhatAachenCost PARTFOUR TheRoerRiverDams XIV.THEFIRSTATTACKONSCHMIDT TheNeglectedObjective Objective:Schmidt...... TotheFirstClearing...... TowardRaffelsbrandandV ossenack RegimentWegelein...... XV.THESECONDATTACKONSCHMIDT PlanningtheThrust Objective:Schmidt TheGermansReact EventsAlongtheTrail CatastropheinVossenack TheKallGorge.... ClimaxatKommerscheidt WithdrawalAcrosstheKall NewMissions xv Page 251 251 252 260 269 281 287 293 304 307 309 313 314 317 323 324 328 331 334 337 341 343 348 352 359 364 366 368 369 372 PARTFIVE TheHuertgenForest Chapter XVI.THEBIGPICTUREINOCTOBER AirSupport...... AnEnigmaNamedLogistics... XVII.NEWPLANSTO DRIVE TO THE RHINE GermanResurgenceandDeception FirstArmyPlans. NinthArmyPlans...... OperationQUEEN..... TheRoerRiverDamsandtheWeather XVIII.VIICORPSMAKESTHEMAINEFFORT TheStateoftheLXXXI Corps... PreliminaryBombardment..... ThePushNortheastFromSchevenhuette ArmorintheStolbergCorridor.. TheSecondBattleoftheDonnerberg AnotherVictimoftheHuertgenForest XIX.VCORPSJOINSTHEOFFENSIVE AFourthFightontheBloodyPlateau TheFightforHuertgen... AnArmoredDriveonKleinhau Page 377 381 382 390 392 397 400 403 406 408 409 411 415 421 424 428 440 440 447 448 BroadeningtheEffort451 BergsteinandCastleHill457 XX.THEFINALFIGHTTOBREAKOUTOFTHEFOREST464 TheFruitsofDeception...464 AHandfulofOldMen....470 ResumingtheCorpsMainEffort.474 Towns,Woods,Hills,andCastles479 GermanReinforcements487 DebacleatMerode......490 XVI PARTSIX BattleoftheRoerPlain Chapter XXI.CLEARINGTHEINNERWINGSOFTHEARMIES TheFightNorthoftheBoundary TheFightSouthoftheBoundary ThePushtotheInde.. TakingtheHighGround... XXII.THEROERRIVEROFFENSIVE Planning Period.... DDayontheRoerPlain ArmorAttractsArmor FindingtheFormula.. ThePushtoGereonsweiler XXIII.THEGEILENKIRCHENSALIENT OperationCLIPPER.. TheJump-off.... AnExerciseinFrustration XXIV.NINTHARMY'SFINALPUSHTOTHEROER " ... ineffectwearethere...". AHundredMenoftheXIIICorps AShiftintheMainEffort.. GutHasenfeldandtheSportplatz. PARTSEVEN Conclusion XXV.THEAPPROACHESTODUEREN OnthePlain IntheForest TotheRiver XVll Page 497 499 503 506 510 516 516 522 530 534 540 545 546 550 554 558 560 566 571 574 581 583 587 590 ChapterPage XXVI.OBJECTIVE:THEROERRIVERDAMS596 TheNeglectedObjective596 TheSecondBattleoftheMonschauCorridor602 HeartbreakCrossroads606 SomethingintheAir611 TheVIIICorpsintheArdennes-Eifel612 XXVII.THEENDOFTHECAMPAIGN616 Appendix A.TABLEOFEQUIVALENTRANKS623 B.RECIPIENTSOFTHEDISTINGUISHEDSERVICECROSS624 C.FIRSTARMYSTAFFROSTERASOF11SEPTEMBER1944627 D.NINTHARMYSTAFFROSTERASOF4OCTOBER1944628 BIBLIOGRAPHICALNOTE629 GLOSSARY.633 CODENAMES636 BASICMILITARYMAPSYMBOLS637 INDEX...........641 Maps 1.DriveFromtheAlbertCanaltotheWestWall,XIXCorps,10-19 September1944................97 2.TheBattleoftheSchelde,2October-8November1944...216 3.OperationsinthePeelMarshes,29September-3December1944234 4.EncirclementofAachen,7-20October1944.......282 5.TheRoerRiverDams..............324 6.TheFirstAttackonSchmidt,9thDivision,6-16October1944329 7.TheSecondAttackonSchmidt,28thDivision,2-9November1944344 8.TanksAlongtheKallTrail...........;.345 9.Objective:theRoerRiverDams,VCorps,13-15December1944599 XVlll Maps I-IX are in accompanying map envelope I.Pursuit tothe Border,26 August-IISeptember1944 II.VCorpsHitstheWest Wall,11-19 September1944 III.Breachingthe West WallSouth of Aachen,VIICorps,12-29 September1944 IV.Invasion fromtheSky,Operation MARKET-GARDEN,17-26 September1944 V.XIXCorpsBreaksThroughthe West Wall,2-7October1944 VI.The Huertgen Forest,16 November-9 December1944 VII.DrivetotheRoer,16November-9December1944 VIII.The ApproachestoDueren,10-16 December1944 IX.The Siegfried Line Campaign,11September-15December1944 Illustrations Page TheSiegfriedLine. TheOurRiver. .Frontispiece FieldMarshalSirBernardL.MontgomeryandGeneralDwightD. Eisenhower. GeneralfeldmarschallWalterModel. GeneralfeldmarschallGerdvonRundstedt Lt.Gen.CourtneyH.Hodges. ThirteenCommandersoftheWesternFront CapturedPanzerfaust. CapturedNebelwerfer. PlanofTypicalGermanPillbox InteriorofGermanPillbox. Maj.Gen.LeonardT.Gerow Dragon'sTeeth. Wallendorf. Maj.Gen.J.LawtonCollins GeneralderPanzertruppenErichBrandenberger TaskForceLovelady RemainsofaPillbox Maj.Gen.CharlesH.Corlett FortEbenEmael TheAlbertCanal MARKET-GARDEN Lt.Gen.LewisH.Brereton GeneraloberstKurtStudent Maj.Gen.MaxwellD.Taylor XIX Facing1 9 17 17 21 22 26 28 32 33 41 51 58 67 69 73 79 98 104 105 117 128 141 143 101stAirborneDivisionLandings. 506thParachuteInfantry. Maj.Gen.JamesM.GavinandLt.Gen.SirMilesC.Dempsey 82dAirborneDivisionDrop DutchFarmerNearZon. Hell'sHighway NijmegenHighwayBridge GeneralderInfanterieGustavvonZangen Troopsofthe104thDivision ThePeelMarshesArea Aachen PracticingFlameThrowerTechnique AbandonedCrossingattheWurmRiver Rim burgCastle. SlagPileandTowerUsedforObservation AGermanBoy CivilianRefugeesLeaveAachen RiflemaninBurningAachen Col.GerhardWilck AachenMunster ViewofRuinedAachen UrftDam SchwammenauelDam KallTrail. Weasel TheHuertgenForest Lt.Gen.WilliamH.Simpson AWinterOvercoatReachestheFrontLine Lt.Gen.OmarN.BradleyandGeneralsEisenhowerandGerow GeneralderPanzertruppenHassovonManteuffel ARestPeriodBehindtheLines I55-mm.Self-PropelledGun AmericanTankBurningOutsideHamich StrugglingupaWoodedHillside VCorpsRocketLaunchers. EngineersRepairaRoad. ATankMovesThroughHuertgen ASeaofMudintheHuertgenForest VeteransoftheHuertgenForest. MedicsAidaWoundedSoldier InfantryandTanksNearHuecheln TheFrenzerburg. TheRoerPlain Maj.Gen.RaymondS.McLain xx Page 144 149 155 159 183 194 202 218 225 239 Facing249 256 265 268 271 300 308 311 317 318 319 Facing321 325 .354 and 356 370 Facing375 380 387 391 394 398 415 423 435 443 447 449 456 458 468 483 486 495 499 DevastatedDuerwiss Maj.Gen.AlvanC.Gillem,Jr. CapturedGermanTigerTank BritishFlailTank BritishChurchillTanks BritishFlame-ThrowingCrocodile GutHasenfeld EntrancetoSwimmingPoolNearSportplatz WinterBattlefield Menofthe331stInfantry AdvanceonGey 2dDivisionTroops Maj.Gen.TroyH.Middleton. Illustrations arefrom Department of Defensefiles. XXI Page 5CJ4 517 531 549 552 553 575 578 Facing579 588 605 613 The U.S. Army Center of Military History TheCenter of Military History prepares and publisheshistoriesasrequiredby the U.S.Army.It coordinates Army historical matters, including historical proper-ties,and supervises the Army museum system.It also maintains liaison with public andprivateagenciesandindividualstostimulateinterest and study inthe field of militaryhistory.TheCenterislocatedat109914thStreet,N.W.,Washington, D.G 20005-3402. XXll PARTONE BREACHINGTHESIEGFRIEDLINE CHAPTERI TheRoadtoGermany Theshadowsweregrowinglongasfive menfromtheSecondPlatoon,TroopB, 85thCavalryReconnaissanceSquadron, 5thU.S.ArmoredDivision,reachedthe westbankoftheOurRiver.Tocross andclaimcreditasthefirstpatrolon Germansoil,theircommanderhadtold them,theywouldhavetohurry. ThoughthebridgeovertheOurhad beendemolished,thewaterwasshallow enoughforthementowadeacross.On thefarbank theyclimbedahilltoacluster offarmbuildings.Nearbytheycouldsee somenineteenortwentyconcretepill-boxes.Aroundonesomebodyhadbuilta shedforchickens. Themenmadeonlyahastyinspection beforestartingback.Anhourlaterthe reportoftheircrossingwasonthewayup thechainofcommand.At1805onII September1944,thereportread,apatrol ledbyS.Sgt.WarnerW.Holzinger crossedintoGermanynearthevillageof Stalzemburg,afewmilesnortheastof Vianden,Luxembourg.1 SergeantHolzinger'spatrolpreceded othersonlybyamatterofhours.In early evening, areinforced company of the 109thInfantry,28thDivision,crossedthe 1Othermembersofthepatrol:Cpl.RalphF. Diven,T/5CoyT.Locke,Pfc.GeorgeF. McNeal,andaFrenchinterpreter,aLieutenant DeLille.VCorpsG-3Jnl,IISep44;Combat IntervwithLt.L.L.Vipond,Ex0,TroopB, 85thRcnSq. OuronabridgebetweenWeiswampach, inthenortherntipofLuxembourg,and theGermanvillageofSevenig.Almostco-incidentally,southeastofSt.Vith,Bel-gium,apatrolfromthe22dInfantry,4th Division,alsocrossedtheOurnearthevil-lageofHemmeres.Menofthispatrol spoketociviliansand,toprovideproofof theircrossing,procuredaGermancap, somecurrency,andapacketofsoi1.2 Thearmoredandinfantrydivisions whichfurnishedthesepatrolswereunits oftheVCorpsoftheFirstU.S.Army. TheirpresencealongtheGermanborder markedthestartofanewphaseinthe executionofadirectivethattheCom-binedChiefsofStaffoftheAlliedPowers hadgivenearlierinWorldWarIIto GeneralDwightD.Eisenhower,Supreme AlliedCommanderinEurope.General Eisenhowerwasto"undertakeoperations aimedattheheartofGermanyandthe destructionofherarmedforces."3 AstheFirstArmy'spatrolscrossedthe border,threeAlliedarmygroupsand sevenarmiesweredeployedinagrandarc stretchingfromtheNorthSeatoSwitzer-land.OntheAlliedleftwingwasthe2 I ArmyGroupunderFieldMarshalSir 228thDivG-3Jnl,IISep44;4thDivAAR, Sep44.Apatrolfromthe28thDivision'sIloth Infantrycrossedashortwhilelaternearthe villageofHarspelt. 3Fordetails,seeForrestC:Pogue,TheSu-premeCommand,UNITEDSTATESARMY INWORLDWARII(Washington,1954),pp. 49-55 4 BernardL.Montgomery,consistingofthe FirstCanadianandSecondBritish Armies. (Mapl) 1ftInthecenterwasthe12th ArmyGroupunderLt.Gen.OmarN. Bradley,withtheFirstandThirdU.S. ArmiesandthenewNinthU.S.Army, whichhadbecomeoperationalon5Sep-temberandwasreducingtheBreton coastalfortressofBrest,farbehindthe currentfrontlines.Ontherightwing werethe1stFrenchandSeventhU.S. Armies,destinedtobecomeon15Sep-temberthe6thArmyGroupunderLt. Gen.JacobL.Devers.4 ThecrossingoftheGermanborderon IISeptemberwasanotherstrongdraught contributingtoaheadyoptimismwith whichAlliedtroopsandtheircommanders werereeling.OperatingalongtheChan-nelcoast,theCanadiansalreadyhad capturedDieppeandthe1stBritishCorps ofthe CanadianArmywasputting thefinishingtouchestoconquestof LeHavre.TheSecondBritishArmyhad overrunBrusselsandAntwerp,thelatter withitsdeepwaterportfacilitiesalmost intact. 5 TheFirstArmyhadtakenLiege andthecityofLuxembourg.TheThird ArmyinnortheasternFrancewasbuilding upalongtheMoselleRiverandalready hada neartheLorrainecityof I" MapsnumberedinRomanareplacedin iriverseorderinsidethebackcover. 4Forthestoryofthecreationofthe6thAnny Group,seeRobertRossSmith,TheRivierato theRhine,avolumeinpreparationfortheseries UNITEDSTATESARMYINWORLDWAR II. o AccountsofBritishandCanadianoperations maybefoundin:FieldMarshaltheViscount MontgomeryofAlamein,NormandytotheBaltic (Boston:HoughtonMifHinCompany,1948); CharlesP.Stacey,TheCanadianArmy,1939-1945(Ottawa:E.Cloutier,King'sPrinter, 1948);andMaj.Gen.SirFrancisdeGuingand, OperationVictory(NewYork:CharlesScrib-ner'sSons,1947). THESIEGFRIEDLINECAMPAIGN Metz.6 Havingsuccessfullylandedin southernFranceon15August,thetwo arniies.inthesouthsoonwouldbecome partofasinglewesternfront.DuringII SeptemberapatrolfromtheThirdArmy madecontactwithFrenchunitsfromthe southnearDijon. Mostofthefightingimmediatelypre-cedingthecrossingoftheGermanborder hadbeenpursuitwarfare.TheGermans wereontherun.ExceptfortheThird Army,whichhadbeenhandicappedfor fivedayswhilebearing brunt ofagen-eraltransportationshortageandgasoline drought,theAllieddrivehadreachedits zenithduringtheperiod.I-oJISeptember. DuringtheseelevendaystheBritishhad traveledapproximately250miles,from theSeineRivertotheBelgian-Dutch border.TheFirstU.S.Armyhadtaken timeoutnearMons,Belgium,tobag about25,000Germansinagiantpocket andmakeanabruptchangeindirection, butstillhadcoveredapproximately200 miles.ByIISeptembertheAllieshad reachedagenerallinewhichpre-D-Day plannershadexpectedwouldbegained aboutDplus330(2May1945).The advancethuswasfaraheadofschedule, some233days.7 AmostencouragingfeatureofAllied successwasthatcasualtieshadbeen lighterthanexpected.Exclusiveofthe forcesinsouthernFrance,Alliedcasualties from6JunetoIISeptemberwere39,96 I killed,164,466wounded,and20,142 6ForThirdArmyoperationsinLorraine,see H.M.Cole,TheLorraineCampaign,UNITED STATESARMYINWORLDWARII(Wash-ington,1950). 7MapsinPostNEPTUNEPlanningForecastL 27May44,SHAEFSGS381PostOVERLORD Planning,I.Theplannersexpectedthesurrender about Dplus360. THEROADTOGERMANY missing,atotalof224,569,oralittle morethan10percentofthetotal strengthcommitted.s Sincethelandings inNormandy,theGermanshadlostap-proximately300,000men,whileanother 200,000werepennedinvariousredoubts. Despiteanacuteshortageofports, Alliedbuild-upinmenandmaterielhad beenswift.Bytheafternoonof1 1Sep-temberacumulativetotalof2,168,307 menand460,745vehicleshadlandedin Normandy.9GeneralEisenhower,who hadassumeddirectoperationalcommand inthefieldon1September,controlledon theContinent26infantrydivisions(in-cluding1airbornedivision)and13ar-moreddivisions(notincludinganumber ofcavalrygroupsandseparatetankbat-talions) .OfthistotaltheBritishand Canadianshadfurnished16divisions(in-cluding1Polisharmoreddivision),while theAmericanshadprovided23(including 1Frencharmoreddivision) .10Assoonas GeneralEisenhowerassumeddirectcom-mandoftheforcesinsouthernFrance,he wouldgain3Americaninfantrydivisions (notincludinganairbornetaskforceof approximatelydivisionalsize),5French infantrydivisions,and2Frencharmored divisions.The totalfortheWesternFront wouldthenbe35infantryand14armored divisions.Inaddition,2V.S.and2 Britishairbornedivisions,1Polishair-bornebrigade,andaBritishairportable infantrydivisionwereinSupremeHead-quartersreserve. GeneralEisenhower's49divisionswere opposed,theoretically,byabout48infan-tryand15panzer-typedivisions,plus severalpanzerbrigades.Asnotedby GeneralfeldmarschallGerdvonRundstedt, 8SHAEFG-3WarRoomSummary102. 9SHAEFG-3WarRoomSummary99. 10Ibid. 5 whoon5Septemberbeganasecondtour asOberbefehlshaberWest(Commanderin ChiefWest),theseforcesactuallyexisted onlyonpaperYWhileAlliedunitswere closetofullstrength,hardlyaGerman divisionwas.Mosthadincurredsevere lossesinbothmenandequipment,and manywerebadlydemoralizedfromcon-stantdefeatinthefield.Theequivalent offivedivisionshadbeencorralledinthe ChannelIslandsandthecoastal"for-tresses."Rundstedtestimatedthathis forceswereequivalenttoabouthalfthe numberofAllieddivisions.Alliedsu-periorityingunswasatleast2 Y2to1and intanksapproximately20tol.u Thedisparitybetweenforceswasless strikingonthegroundthanintheair. TheAllieshadthreetacticalairforces: theIXandXIXTacticalAirCommands (bothunder theNinthAirForce)andthe 2dTacticalAirForce(British).Operat-ingfrombasesintheV nitedKingdom andFrancewere5,059Americanbombers, 3,728Americanfighters,5,104combat aircraftoftheRoyalAirF0rce,andaddi-tionalhundredsofmiscellaneoustypesfor reconnaissance,liaison,andtransport. 13 11TheGermantermOberbe/ehlshaberWest meanseithertheCommanderinChiefWestor hisheadquarters.Inthisvolume,thetermCom-manderinChiefWestwillbeusedtoreferto thepersonholdingthetitleOberbefehlshaber West,whiletheabbreviatedformOBWESTwill refertohisheadquarters. 120BWEST,AStudyinCommand,pp.176, 180.Thismanuscript,byGeneralleutnantBodo Zimmermann(G-3,OBWEST)andothers,was writtenundertheauspicesoftheDepartmentof theArmyHistoricalDivisionin1946andisfiled inOCMH.MaterielestimatesarefromCole, TheLorraineCampaign, p.3. 13AAFStaffControlAircraftInventory,Com-binedAlliedvs.AxisAirStrengthRpts,ISep44. AllU.S.airrecordsu ~ e inthisvolumeare locatedattheAirUniversityLibrary,MaxwellAir Force Base,Montgomery,Ala. 6 Theenemy'sonetacticalairforceinthe West,theThirdAirForce(Luftflotte3), hadonly573serviceableaircraftofall types.IntheentireLuftwaffetheGer-manshadonly4,507serviceableplanes, andmostofthesehadtoberetained withinGermanytocontestAlliedstrategic bombers.14 Thegroundfrontwastoofluidduring theearlydaysofSeptemberforField MarshalvonRundstedttoaccomplish muchtowardformingoneofthenewlines whichAdolfHitlerdesignatedwithfebrile frequency.Nevertheless,byIISeptem-berRundstedtandhissubordinateswere makinghonesteffortstoconformtothe latestdecree,tomananewlinethatwas tobeheld"underanyconditions."The lineranfromtheBelgiancoast,including thebanksoftheScheldeestuary-which might beemployed todenyuseofAntwerp eventhoughtheporthadbeenlost-southeastwardalongtheDutch-Belgian bordertotheWestWall( theSiegfried Line)andalongtheWestWallto thewesternboundariesofLorraineand Alsace.15 Forallthecatastrophicnatureofthe retreatfromFrance,Rundstedt'sorderof battleatarmyandarmygrouplevels lookedonIISeptembermuchasithad beforetheAlliedinvasion.Ontheright wing,alongtheDutchborderandwithin thenorthernhalfoftheWestWalloppo-sitethe2IArmyGroupandtheFirstU.S. Army,wasArmyGroupBunderGen-eralfeldmarschallWalterModel.Model, whomRundstedthadreplacedasCom-manderinChiefWest,controlledthe 14German-figuresfurnishedfromLuftwaffe recordsbytheBritishHistoricalSection,ascited byCole,TheLorraineCampaign,p.4. i50BWEST,AStudyinCommand,pp. 175-78. THESIEGFRIEDLINECAMPAIGN Fifteenth,FirstParachute,andSeventh Armies.OntheleftwingwasArmy-GroupG(GeneraloberstJohannesBlasko-witz),composedoftheFirstArmy,which confrontedtheThirdU.S.Army,andthe NineteenthArmy,whichfacedwhatwas tobecomethe6thArmyGroup.What wasleftoftheFifthPanzerArmywas assemblingbehindtheGermanborder. TheGermanshadasoundframework uponwhichtohangreinforcements-if reinforcementscouldbefound.16 AlliedStrategy Alliedstrategy,asexpressedinpre-D-DayplanningatSupremeHeadquarters, AlliedExpeditionaryForce(SHAEF), lookedtowardtheultimateobjectiveof Berlin;butonthewaytheAllieswanted aneconomicobjective,which,ifcaptured, "wouldrapidlystarveGermanyofthe meanstocontinuethewar."Thiswas theRuhr industrialarea,thelossofwhich, togetherwithBelgiumandHolland,would depriveGermanyof65percentofits -productionofcrudesteeland56percent ofitscoalY ThewidespreaddeploymentoftheAl-liedarmiesonIISeptemberreflected GeneralEisenhower'spre-D-Daydecision togoafter theRuhr andBerlinonabroad front.Latertobecomeknownasthe "broadfrontpolicy,"thisconceptwasnot appreciablydifferentfromthetime-tested militarystrategyofmultipleparallelcol-umns. 1 GOpnsMaps(I:1,000,000)dtdIISep44, OperationskarteWest.SeealsoOBWEST,A StudyinCommand,p.177. 17SHAEFPlanningStaffdraftofPost NEPTUNECoursesofActionAfterCaptureofthe LodgmentArea,MainObjectivesandAxisof Advance,I,3May44,SHAEFSGS381,I.An exhaustivestudyofAlliedstrategymaybefound inPogue,TheSupremeCommand. THEROADTOGERMANY Inconsideringwhichroutesofadvance werebest,SHAEFplannershadseriously studiedfour:(I)theplainofFlanders; (2)theMaubeuge-Liege-Aachenaxis northoftheArdennes;(3)theArdennes; and(4)theMetz-Kaiserslauterngap. IS Afterdeliberation,theyhadruledout Flanders,becauseoftoomanywaterob-stacles,andtheArdennes,becauseof ruggedterrainandlimitedcommunica-tions.Theothertwoavenuesmerited greaterattention.I9 ThenorthernrouteviaMaubeuge-Liege-Aachen(theAachenGap)obvi-ouslyleadsmoredirectlytotheRuhr. Theterrainisrelativelyopen,particularly beyondAachenontheCologneplain. AlthoughanadvanceviaMetz-Kaiser-slauternleadsalsotoanotherindustrial prize,theSaarBasinwithitsminesand smelters,theterraininbothLorraineand theSaarisbroken.AdvancetotheRuhr afterreachingtheRhinealongthisroute iscanalizedupthenarrowRhinevalley. Althoughbothavenueshadexercisedat-tractioninmodernandearlierwars,the northernroutehadcommandedalmost obligatoryattentionsincethenorthward shiftofGermanindustryabout1870 andsincetheneutralityofBelgiumand theNetherlandsceasedtocommandre-spect.Intermspeculiartothewarat hand,thenorthernrouteofferedpromising intermediateobjectives:achancetomeet andconquermajorGermanforcesex-pectedtobeconcentratedindefenseof theRuhr;eliminationoftheenemy's strategicreserve;accesstothebestair-18Twoothers,theBelfortandSavernegaps, weretoofarsouthtoaffordanyappreciable threattotheRuhrorBerlin. 19SHAEFPlanningStaffdraft,3May44;see alsoSHAEFPlanningStaffdraft,30May44. BothinSHAEFSGS381,I. 7 fieldsbetweentheSeineandGermany;a secureleftflankrestingonthecoast; proximitytoairbasesinEngland;and accesstotheChannelports,including Antwerp,lackofwhichwouldseverely limittheforcesthatcouldbemaintained.20 Beforetheinvasion,GeneralEisenhower hadconcurredintheplanners'recommen-dationthatthemainadvancebedirected towardthenortheast"withtheobjectof strikingdirectlyattheRuhrbytheroute northoftheArdennes."Healsohad agreedthata"subsidiaryaxis"bemain-tainedsouthoftheArdennestoprovidea threattoMetzandtheSaar.Thiswas understoodtomeanan"advanceona broadfrontNorthandSouthofthe Ardennes,"whichwouldavoidcommitting theAlliedforcesirretrievablytooneorthe otherofthecomparativelynarrowgaps.21 GeneralEisenhowerlookedtoFieldMar-shalMontgomery's2IArmyGroupto makethemainthrustinthenorth;the AmericansunderGeneralBradley,the subsidiaryeffortinthesouth. WhenthebreakoutfromtheNormandy beachheadhadturnedintowholesale pursuit,Alliedcommandershadbeen confrontedwithglitteringopportunities ateveryturn.Yetthewhirlwindadvance alsointroducedlogisticalcomplications ofadistressingcomplexity.Thoughsup-pliesalreadyashorewereforthemo-mentadequate,theexplosiveadvanceso stretchedlinesofcommunicationthata transportationsystemgearedforslower, moremethodicalmovesprovedtotally unequaltotheprodigioustaskssuddenly thrustuponit.Havingneitherthe strengthnorthetransporttoexploitall thetemptingpossibilities,theSupreme 20Ibid. 21Ibid. 8 Commander had tofacethefactthat some kindofdeviationfromtheoriginalconcept ofabroadfrontadvancehadtobemade. Outofthisundeniablerealityemerged decisionswhichweretoaffecttheconduct ofoperationsinthefallof1944through-outthecourseoftheSiegfriedLineCam-paign. MeetingwithBradleyandMontgomery on23August,GeneralEisenhowerre-markedthelikelihoodthatthelogistical situationsoonmightcrimpAlliedopera-tionsseverely.Thecruxoftheproblem, asGeneralEisenhowersawit,wasinthe ports.Toprovideasolidbasefor sustainedoperations,aninvasionforce must haveports;yettheAlliesat thispoint hadonlytheNormandybeachesand Cherbourg.Perhapsitwouldbebest, whilethemomentumoftheadvancecon-tinued,toforegosomeoftheglamorous tacticalopportunitiesinfavorofmore utilitarianobjectives. BetweentheSeineRiverandthePasde Calais,onadirectroutenorthtowardthe ChannelportsandAntwerp,satthe enemy'sFifteenthArmy,theonlysizable reservetheGermansstillpossessedin northernFrance.Werethe2IArmy Grouptoattacknorthwardthroughthe plainofFlanders,thisreservemightbe eliminatedevenastheChannelportswere captured,whereupon,withafirmbase assured,Montgomerymightreorienthis drivemorespecificallyinkeepingwiththe directionSHAEFplannershadintended. Intheprocess,theotherintermediate objectivesalongthenorthernroute,like theairfieldsandtheflyingbomblaunch-ingsites,alsomightbeattained.Inthe meantime,theAmericansmightbees-tablishingtheirownfirmbasebyopening theBrittanyportsandmightbepreparing tocontinuetheirsubsidiarythrust. THESIEGFRIEDLINECAMPAIGN ThoughFieldMarshalMontgomery provedreceptivetoGeneralEisenhower's plan,heinsistedonhavinganentire Americanarmymovingalonghisright flank.SinceGeneralEisenhoweralready intendedreinforcingtheBritishwiththe airbornetroopsathisdisposal,hethought Montgomeryovercautious;butinorderto assuresuccess,heaccededtotherequest. ThelocationoftheFirstU.S.Army dictateditsselectionforthesupporting role,whiletheThirdArmywastoclear theBrittanyportsandamasssuppliesfor anadvanceeastwardthroughMetz.22 AsdevelopedindetailbyFieldMarshal Montgomery,theFirstArmy'smissionwas tosupporttheBritishadvancebyestab-lishingforcesintheareaofBrussels- At thesuggestionofGeneralBradleythe boundarybetweenthetwoarmygroups wasadjustedsothatBrusselswasallotted totheBritish,theboundarythenswinging distinctlynortheastatBrussels.Thisad-justmentwouldeliminatethepossibility thattheBritishmightbepinchedoutat Antwerp.23 Inessence,thedecisionemergingfrom the23Augustmeetingresultedina temporary shiftof themain effortfromthe Maubeuge-Liege-Aachenaxistotheplain ofFlanders,aroutethatpreinvasion plannershadblackballedasaprimaryaxis intoGermany.Yettheshiftwasmore 22EisenhowertoGenGeorgeC.Marshall, CPA90235,22Aug44,SHAEFcablelog;Ltr, EisenhowertoMontgomery,24Aug44,SHAEF SGS38 I,I;EisenhowertoMarshall,5Sep44, Poguefiles. 23Montgomerytoarmycomdrs,M-520,26 Aug44,SHAEFSGS38 I,I;12thAGpLtrof Instrs6,25Aug44,12thAGpRptofOpns, V,85-87;Ltr,BradleytoMontgomery,26Aug 44,12thAGp371.3MilitaryObjectives,I; Montgomery,NormandytotheBaltic,p.200. THEROADTOGERMANY FIELDMARSHALMONTGOME RYAND GENERALEISENHOWERduringanin-formaldiscussionatMontgomery'shead-quartersinFranceearlyinSeptember1944. tacticalthanstrategicinthatitwasmade forthepurposeofgainingintermediate objectivesvitaltoafinaloffensivealong thelinesoftheoriginalstrategicconcept. Itcouldbearguedthatitinvolvedno realshiftofanykindbecauseofthebroad interpretationthathadcometobeac-cordedtheroute"northoftheArdennes." Themostsalientchangefromoriginal planningwasthenewlocationoftheFirst .Army.GeneralEisenhowerhadintended toemployboth theFirstandThirdArmies southoftheArdennes.Thoughboth EisenhowerandBradleyweretotrytoget atleastpartsofthetwoarmiesmoving togetheragain,thefactwasthatthrough thecourseoftheSiegfriedLineCampaign theFirstandThirdArmiesweretobe 9 separatedbythebarrieroftheArdennes. TheFirstArmy-nottheBritish-wasto attackthroughthepreferredAachenGap andeventuallywastobedesignatedthe Alliedmaineffort. MorethantheshiftoftheFirstArmy, thefactemergingfromtheAugustdiscus-sionswhichupsetGeneralBradleywas thatthepriorityassignedthenorthern thrustmeantsevererestrictionsonsupplies fortheThirdArmy.BothBradleyand thecommanderoftheThirdArmy,Lt. Gen.GeorgeS.Patton,Jr.,reactedtothe decisionasifMontgomeryhadstolentheir birthrights.24 GeneralBradleywantedin-steada"modifieddoublethrust,"onethat wouldachievethegoalsinthenorthwith thehelpofonlyoneAmericancorps,while therestoftheFirstArmyjoinedtheThird onthesouthernroute.25 Patton,forhis part,thoughthisarmybyitselfcouldget acrosstheGermanborderinrecordtime ifproperlysupplied.EvenafterGeneral Pattonhadfeltthestringentlogistical pinchwhichheldhimimmobileforfive daysalongtheMeuse,hestillhadVISIOns ofonethrusttakingtheThirdArmy acrosstheRhineRiver.26 GeneralEisenhowerhadnointentionof abandoningthesubsidiarythrust.Revel-ationofthisfactpromptedFieldMarshal Montgomerytovoiceanobjectionas 24OmarN.Bradley,ASoldier'sStory(New York:HenryHoltandCompany,1951) ,pp. 40,0-403;GeorgeS.Patton,Jr.,WarAsIKnew It(Boston:HoughtonMifHinCompany,1947) , pp.114,117,132. 25Bradley,ASoldier'sStory,p.399. 26Patton,WarAs IKnewIt,pp.114,117,132. Aslateas19October,GeneralPattonfeltthat, givenpropermaintenanceandsupplies,hecould reachtheSiegfriedLineintwodaysand"stand ahighprobabilityofpenetratingitandthusbe inpositiontomakearapidadvancetothe Rhine. "PattontoBradley,19Oct44,12thA Gp 371.3Military Objectives,II. 10 strongorstrongerthanthoseregisteredby BradleyandPatton.ThecruxofMont-gomery'sargumentwasthatthethrust towardAntwerpshouldnotbelooked uponasalimitedobjectiveoperationbut shouldbebroadenedinto"onepowerful full-bloodedthrustacrosstheRhineand intotheheartofGermany,backedbythe wholeoftheresourcesoftheAllied Armies...."Thiswouldinvolverele-gatingsomesectorsoftheAlliedfrontto a"purelystaticrole."27 BothMontgomery'sandPatton's"one-thrust"theoriesprobablywillattract polemicdisciplesthroughtheyears,des-pitethedamagedonethesetheoriesby Germantenacityinlater stagesofthewar. YetevenasMontgomeryandPatton promotedtheirideas,plannersatSHAEF labeledthemcastlesoftheorybuiltupon sand.AdrivebyGeneralPatton'sarmy alonewaslogisticallyandtacticallyfeasi-ble, theplannersnoted,onlysofarasthe Rhineandthuswasunlikelytoforceany decisiveresult.Onethrustinthenorth, theplannersadmitted,mightsucceedin capturingtheRuhrandeveninreaching Berlin;butitwasneithertacticallynor logisticallyfeasibleunlesscertaincondi-tionsweremet.OnewasthatbySep-temberallAlliedarmieswouldhave reachedtheRhine;another,thatbythe samedateAntwerpwouldhavebeen receivingatleast1,500tonsofsupplyper day.Neitherpremisehadshownany immediatesignsofbecomingareality.28 27Montgomery,NormandytotheBaltic,pp. 193,196;seealsoLtr,MontgomerytoEisen-hower,M-160,4Sep44,SHAEFSGS381,1. 28Anexhaustivediscussionofthesubjectis foundinRolandG.Ruppenthal,LogisticalSup-portoftheArmies,Vol.II,UNITEDSTATES ARMYINWORLDWARII(Washington, 1959) THESIEGFRIEDLINECAMPAIGN Asan army commander,GeneralPatton hadfewchannelsformakinghisvoice heardonthesubjectafterthefirstrefusal. NotsoFieldMarshalMontgomery,who wasbothanarmygroupcommanderand thetopmilitaryrepresentativeinthe theaterofoneofthemajor Allies.In one formoranother,Montgomerywastoraise theissuerepeatedly,thoughtheSiegfried LineCampaignwastoopeninanatmos-phereofaccordbecauseofatemporary settlementreachedon10September. MeetingMontgomeryatBrussels,General Eisenhowerrefusedtoaccepttheviewthat thefieldmarshal'spriorityshouldprevail totheexclusionofallotheroperations. Nevertheless,heagreedtoatemporary delayinclearingtheseawardapproaches toAntwerp,aprojectwhichhefeltshould havechiefemphasis,whileMontgomery extendedhisnorthernthrusttogaina bridgeheadacrosstheNederRijn(Lower Rhine)intheNetherlands.Although Montgomeryhadfailedtogainunquali-fiedsupportforhisnorthernthrust,his armygroupstillretainedtheroleofAllied maineffort.29 TheShadowofLogistics ThefervorwithwhichAlliedcomman-derscontendedforsuppliesstemmed directlyfromthecriticalnatureofthe logisticalsituation.Perhapsthemost dramaticandwidelypublicizedresultof thesupplycrisiswastheenforcedhaltof theentireThirdArmywhenitranoutof fuelalongtheMeuseRiverfromIto6 September.Yettheunitsinthenorth 29NotesonmtgatBrussels,10Sep44,byAir ChiefMarshalSirArthurW.Tedder,OCMH; DwightD.Eisenhower,t;;rusadeinEurope(New York:DoubledayandCompany,1948),pp. 306- 07. THEROADTOGERMANY hadtheirproblemsaswell,despitethe priorityassignedthenorthernthrust.A corpsoftheSecondBritishArmy,for example,washaltedfortwoweekswestof theSeinesothatitstransportcouldhelp supplytherestofthearmy.Acorpsof theFirstArmyalsohadtohaltforfour daysinBelgiumforwantofgasoline. I twasnotshortageofsuppliesonthe ContinentthatplaguedtheAllies.Build-upofsuppliesinNormandyhadexceeded expectations.Itwasshortageoftrans-portation,aproblemcreatedandintensi-fiedmainlybythesporadicandexplosive nature of thetactical advance.3o Forallthelackofdeepwaterport facilitiesandasteady,orderlyadvance, supplyechelonscouldhavebuiltasound logisticalstructurehadtheybeenafforded areasonablepauseafterthebreakout fromtheconfinedNormandybeachhead. Thatwashowtheinvasionhadbeen planned:apauseattheSeineRiverfor regroupingandamassingsupplies.But theplannershadnotforeseenthenature oftheGermandefeatinFrance.Every pathstrewnwithgemsoftacticaloppor-tunity,Alliedfieldcommandershadfelt compelledtourgetheirarmiestogo faster,faster.TheyhadleapedtheSeine brisklyandkeptgoing. Whilethetimetablepreparedbypre-invasionplannerswasadmittedlycon-jectural,itwasneverthelesstheonlybasis uponwhichthosechargedwithdelivering suppliescouldestimatethemen,materiel, andtransportneeded.IngainingtheD plus330linebyDplus97(I ISeptem-ber),thearmieshadcoveredalmostthe 30Unlessotherwisenoted,thisstudyofsupply isbaseduponRolandG.Ruppenthal,Logistical SupportoftheArmies,Vol.I,UNITED STATESARMYINWORLDWARII(Wash-ington,1953),and Vol.II. 11 entiredistanceinthelast48days.The kindoflogisticalsystemthatplannershad expectedwouldbedevelopedover233 daysobviouslycouldnotbecreatedin48. Furthermore,thepre invasionplannershad stipulatedthatinearlySeptembertwelve U.S.divisionscouldbesupportedasfar eastastheSeine;inactuality,sixteenU.S. divisionsweremorethan200milesbeyond theSeineinearlySeptemberandseveral otherswerefightinginBrittany.Thefact thatthesedivisionscouldbemaintained inanyfashionunderthesecircumstances cameundertheheadingofanearmiracle, fortheexploitationofthetacticalsitua-tionhadproducedaruthlessdisregardfor anorderlydevelopmentofasoundcom-municationszone. Duringtheperiodofconfinementin Normandy,theinadequacyoftheNorman railnethadnotbeenfelttookeenly. Distanceswereshortandtruckingproved equaltothedemandsplaceduponit. Whenthearmiesspurtedeastward,they uncoveredamoreextensiverailnetwork, but ithadbeendamaged severelyby Allied bombingandFrenchsabotage.Trucking companieshadtocarrytheirloadsfarther andfartherforward.Despiteextensive improvisationandemergencysupply,de-liveriestothearmiesduringthelastfew daysofAugustdwindledtoafewthou-sandtous. AttheendofAugusttheFirstArmy estimateditsdailyaveragetonnagere-quirementas5,500tons.Evenafter GeneralEisenhowervested. supplypriority intheFirstArmyandhiltedtheThird Army,only2,225tonsdailyreachedthe FirstArmy.31Inadditiontoimmobiliz-inganentirecorpsforfourdaysforwant 31Byusingitsowntransportation,thearmy raisedthisto3,000tons. 12 ofgasoline,theFirstArmyhadtohaltthe armoreddivisionsofthetwoadvancing corpsforperiodsaslongastwenty-four hours.32Whenrecordedreceiptstooka turnforthebetteron5Septemberto reach7,000tons,GeneralBradleyal-teredthepreviousallocationtosplitthe availabletonnageequallybetweenhistwo armies,providingeachwith3,500tons. That washow theThird Armygotmoving again. Thedaythenewallocationwentinto effecttheFirstArmyclaimedthatthe CommunicationsZonehadfailedby1,900 tonstomeetthe3,500figure.Thiskind ofthingwasallthemoreseriousbecause thearmy'smeagerreserveshadlongsince beenexhausted.BytheendofAugust 90to95percentofallsuppliesonthe Continentlayindepotsnearthebeaches. Thereweretwosolutions:(I)Pause whiletheCommunicationsZonemoved depotsforward.Doingthiswouldupset themomentumofavictoriousadvance andaffordtheenemyadditionaltimeto puttheWestWallintoshape.( 2)Get newportsclosertothefront.ThisHitler himselfhadcircumvented,overtheobjec-tionsofhisgenerals,bydesignatingthe portsas"fortresses"anddirectingthat theybeheldtothelast,eventhough valuabletroopswouldbesacrificedinthe process. Thealternativetothesesolutionswasa variationofthefirst.The12thArmy Groupstateditasearlyas27August. "Itiscontemplated,"thearmygroup noted,"thattheArmieswillgoasfaras practicableandthenwaituntilthesup-plysysteminrearwillpermitfurther advance."33Thepursuitwouldcometo 32FUSA AAR,Sep44. 3312thAGpAdminInstrs13,27Aug44, FUSAAAR,Sep44. THESIEGFRIEDLINECAMPAIGN nodramaticend.Itwouldsputterout. Inanefforttokeepthearmiesmoving, commandersfromdivisionalunitsallthe waybacktotheCommunicationsZone tookextraordinarymeasures.Thatthe advancecarriedasfarasitdidwas attributableinnosmallparttothese improvisations. Thoughrailreconstructionwaspushed withvigor,ithardlycouldhavebeen expectedtokeeppacewiththeviolent spurtsofthecombatformations.Never-theless,by30August,railroadengineers andFrenchciviliansworkingroundthe clockhadpushedtwomainroutesasfar asParis.ThenetworkbeyondtheSeine waslessseverelycrippled;buttoget suppliesthroughthedamagedyardsof Parisandbeyondthedestroyedrail bridgesoftheSeine,theyhadtobeun-loadedandtruckedthroughthecity.In theFirstArmyarea,reconstructioncrews quicklyopenedalinefromParisnortheast throughSoissonsandby18September weretopushittoapointjustwestof Liege.34 Foralltheaccomplishmentsunderthis program,motortransporthadtoassume theprincipalburden,eventhoughproduc-tiondifficultiesintheUnitedStateshad imposedlimitationsontruckslongbefore D-Day.Whenconfrontedwiththeen-gulfingdemandsofthepursuit,available motortransportcouldnotdelivereven dailymaintenance,muchlessprovide stocksforintermediateoradvancedepots. Tomakethe o ~ t ofavailablefacilities, commandersdecidedon23Augustto establishaspecialtruckroute,theRed BallExpress.Byclosingoffcivilian trafficontwoparallelroutestopoints 34FUSARptofOpns,IAug44-22Feb45, p.62. THEROADTOGERMANY southwestofParisandbypushingthe trucksandtheirdriverstothelimit,they delivered89,939tonsineightdaysbe-tween25Augustand6September.Be-ginningon25Augustwith67truck companies,theRedBallattainedpeak capacityon29Augustwhen132 companies,using5,939trucks,moved 12,342tonsofsupplies.TheRedBall wastocontinueoperationforanother elevenweeksandwastoserveasthe prototypeforseverallessambitiousexpress serVIces. Thearmiesthemselvestookovermuch ofthehauling.On22AugustGeneral Bradleytoldbothhisarmiestoleavetheir heavyartillerywestoftheSeineanduse theartillerytrucksfortransportingsup-plies.BecauseCommunicationsZonede-potswerefarintherear,trucksofthe FirstArmyoftenhadtomakeroundtrips totaling300milesormore.Onafew occasionstruckcompaniessearchedfor suppliesallthewaybacktotheinvasion beaches.TheFirstArmyquartermaster scoutedforadvancinggasolinetrainsfrom acubairplane.TheFirstArmyhad43 Quartermastertruckcompanies,which weresupplementedby10to20provisional companiesmadeupfromartilleryand antiaircraftunits.Theinfantrydivisions advancedeitheronfootorbyshuttlingin trucksborrowedfromtheirorganicartil-leryandattachedantiaircraft.35 Thoughemergencyairsupplyproved highlyvaluable,tonnagedeliveredbythis methodfellshortof1,000tonsperday. MostofthiswenttotheThirdArmy. Thevagariesofweather,lackofservice-ableContinentalairfields,andtheneedto withholdplanesfortheirprimarymission oftrainingforandexecutingtacticalaIr-35FUSA AAR,Sep44. 13 borneoperationsimposedsevererestric-tionsontheairliftprogram.Another restrictiondevelopedwhenthecityof Pariswasliberatedfaraheadofschedule. Responsibleforproviding1,500tonsof suppliesdailyforcivilreliefinthecapital, the12thArmyGrouphadtoobtain500 tonsofthisfromtheairlift. Majoreffortsweremadetospeedcon-structionoffuelpipelines,butthistask wasinherentlyslowandwasretarded furtherbythelimitationsonmovingpipe imposedbythetransportationshortage. Whileconstructionsometimesreacheda record30to40milesaday,thecombat troopsweregoingevenfaster.During theearlydaysofSeptembertheterminus ofthepipelinewassome170milessouth-westofParis. Combatcommandersurgedstrictest supplyeconomy.36Allunitsrationed gasoline.Foodwasofemergencytypes, mostlyCandKrations,supplementedin theFirstArmybyapproximately75,000 capturedrationsthataddedThevillageofKoslarcameinfora shareofthepounding.Justbeforeday-lighton25November,twocompaniesof theI16thInfantrybrokeintoKoslarina determinedbayonetcharge."Wemoved outatarapidruninwaveswithfixed bayonets,onefollowingbehindtheother," 13See,forexample,NUSAOpns,IV,214, 218- 19. 14XIX CorpsArtyAAR,Nov 44. 15LXXXICorpsKTB,Arty.-Lageu.Art.-Gliederungen. THESIEGFRIEDLINECAMPAIGN relatedacompanycommander,Capt. DanielE.Kayes."Wejumpedoverthe thirdrowoftrenchesandinlessthan10 minuteswereinsideKoslar....Itwas stilldarkandmygreatestdifficultywas inslowingdownthecompany.Themen scatteredallovertown."16 Thestrongestcounterattacksatboth KoslarandBourheimcamesoonafter dawnon26November.Thecommander oftheLXXXI Corps,GeneralKoechling, plannedcounterattacksonbothvillages asaco-ordinatedmajorefforttore-establishtheinnerdefensivearcabout J uelichYBoththeregimentsofthe 340thDivisionthatwereintheJuelich bridgeheadparticipated.Theyhadthe supportoffourteenbattalionsofartillery andtwenty-eightarmoredvehicles(the 30 IStTigerTankBattalion,the34ISt AssaultGunBrigade,andfourassault gunsborrowedfromthe3dPanzerGren-adierDivision). ThoughtheGermanslamentedthat theirartillerywashamstrungbydrastic ammunitionshortagesandthattheirtanks couldnotprovidepropersupportinthe narrowstreetsofthevillages,fewonthe Americansidecouldhavedetectedthat theenemyhadhisproblems.TheGer-mansplowedthrougheveryAmerican artilleryconcentration.Fightingmoved intothestreetsofthevillages. Hamperedbyamountingshortageof arnmunition,thetwobattalionsofthe 175 thInfantryinBourheimappealedfor help.Theregimentalcommanderrushed acompanyfromhisreserveintothevil-lage.Jeepsloadedwithammunition racedforwardalongaroadblanketed 1GNUSAOpns,IV,220,citingCombatInterv withKayes. 17LXXXICorpsGefechtsbericht,AARfor 25and26Nov44. NINTHARMY'SFINALPUSHTOTHEROER563 byGermanshellfire.At1030fighter-bombersonlyrecentlyunleashedbyim-provementintheweatherarrived.Not untilnoonwasthesituationbroughtunder control. TheGermansisolatedthetwocom-paniesoftheI16thInfantryinKoslar. Theywerenotsurrounded,insistedGen-eralGerhardt;theyweremerelyinclose contact,"rightupagainsttheKrauts." 18 Inanyevent,patrolsfromotherunitsof theI16thInfantrycouldnotreachthem. During26Novemberpilotsofthe29th Division'sartilleryobservationplanesflew elevenmissionsoverKoslartodropsorely neededfood,ammunition,andmedical supplies.Outofelevenbundles,eight wererecovered.Despiteintensesmall armsfire,notaplanewaslost. Beforedaylighton27Novemberthe I16thInfantrysentabattaliontobreak throughtothetwocompanies.Though thisbattalionbecameinvolvedinarduous house-to-housefighting,contactwasmade bylateafternoon.Whentherestofthe I16thInfantryenteredthevillagethe nextmorning,theenemyhadgone. Asthisfighthaddeveloped,General Gerhardthadcommittedhisthirdregi-menttosubdueKirchberg,lastofthe threevillagescomprisingtheinnerde-fensivearcaboutJuelich.Kirchberglies neartheconfluenceoftheIndeandthe Roer.OntheassumptionthattheGer-manswouldbealerttoattackfromthe directionofBourheim,wheretheconflict hadwaxedsohotfordays,theregimental commanderchosetostrikeinsteadfrom thevicinityofPattern.Thesituationat thisvillageinthe30thDivision'szone hadbeenstaticforseveraldays. WhileabattalioninBourheimmadea feintbyfire,anothermovedfromPattern 1829thDiv G-2-G-3Jnl,26Nov 44. duringthemorningof27Novemberwith-outartillerypreparationbutbehinda smokescreen.Bythisstratagemthe I15thInfantryachievedalmostcomplete surprise.Bylateafternoon,Kirchberg wassecure.Forallpracticalpurposes, the29thDivisionhadcloseduptothe Roer.Onlytwostrongpointsinasmall partofJ uelichonthewestbankofthe riverremainedtobecleared.The enemy's340thDivisionwithdrewitstwo regimentstotheeastbank,leavingonly arearguardinthetwostrongpoints. Takeyourtimeinclosingtotheriver,the Americancorpscommander said. ThoughtheAmericancommander, GeneralMcLain,hadsanctionedpauses intheattacksofthe2dArmoredand 30thDivisions,hehaddirectedon26 NovemberthatthefinalpushtotheRoer beresumedallalongthecorpsfront. Inconjunctionwiththe29thDivision's attackonKirchberr-,the2dArmored Divisionwastocon;lletecaptureof MerzenhausenandPUSlontoBarmen. The30thDivisionwastotakeAltdorf. Thoughboththeregimentalanddivi-sioncommandersfavoredanightattack onAltdorf,theybowedtoGeneralMc-Lain'sdesiretoco-ordinatewiththe29th Division'spushonKirchbergandanew attemptbytheFirstArmy's104thDi-visiontotakeInden.Inmidmorningof 27November,abattalionofthe119th Infantry,attachedtoColonelPurdue's 120thInfantry,struckforAltdorf.As fearedfrominformationdevelopedearlier bypatrols,firefromatleasttwelve machinegunsemplacedinareverseslope defense800yardswestofAltdorfforced themenofthisbattaliontotheground. Heretheexposedplateaulyingbetween PatternandAltdorfdropsoffsharply; anyforcethatsomehowgotthisfar 564 withoutdetectionn9longerhadachance toescapeobservation.Deprivedoftank supportbecauseofmuddyground,a dearthofroads,andthesharpgradenear thevillage,menofthisbattalionhad nothingreadilyathandcapableofelimi-natingtheGermanmachineguns.They hadnorecoursebuttodigin. Theregimentalcommander,Colonel Purdue,decidedatlengththatanight attackwastheonlysolution.Having desiredanightattackfromthefirst,he had aplan ready.Beforedaylightthenext morning,hesent abattalionunderLt.Col. EllisV.Williamsontomovebystealth throughthepositionsreachedbythe attachedbattalionofther r 9thInfantry. Asluckwouldhaveit,artilleryofthe r 04thDivisionbegantoshoottimedfire ontheneighboringvillageofInden soonafterColonelWilliamson'sbattalion crossedthelineofdeparture.Only momentarily,butlongenoughtoalertthe Germangunners,theairburstsillumi-natedthemenofther 20thInfantry. Foramomenttheattackappeared doomed.Thenaspecialattackforma-tionColonelWilliamsonhadadopted paiddividends.Hehadpositionedfour squadsinalineofskirmishersformation infrontofthemainbodyofhisforce. Eachmanintheskirmishlinehadarifle grenadeattheready.AsaGerman machinegunopenedfire,somepartof theskirmishlinewouldsilenceitquickly withgrenades. HavinggainedentrancetoAltdorfby thismethod,ColonelWilliamson'smen facedatwo-hourfightbeforetheycould labelthevillagesecure.Themaindiffi-cultycamefromsevenenemytankswhich roamedthevillageinsearchofescape. HastyminefieldsthatColonelWilliam-THESIEGFRIEDLINECAMPAIGN son'smenplacedateveryexitsoonafter gainingentryhadturnedthevillageintoa cage.Twoofthetankseventuallywere destroyed-onebyawhitephosphorus grenadeafterthetankhadblundered intoabuilding,anotherbyabazooka. Afteronehair-raisingcat-and-mouseepi-sodeafteranother,theotherseventually escapedbybreakingthrougharoadblock theAmericanshadestablishedonabridge acrosstheIndeRiver. Exceptforaminorassignmentof clearinganarrowtriangleoflandbe-tweentheIndeandtheRoer,which wouldbeaccomplishedlaterwithout incident,the30thDivisionby28Novem-berhadcompleteditsroleinthedriveto theRoer.Thedivisioncouldfeelrelieved thatitscasualtylist,fornearlytwoweeks offighting,wascomparativelysmall:r60 menkilled,r,058wounded. OntheoppositewingoftheXIX Corps,the2dArmoredDivisioninre-newingtheattackonMerzenhausenon 27Novemberturnedtoathree-pronged attack.DiscerningthekeytoMerzen-hausentobetheelevations-Hills100.3 tothenorthwestand98. rtotheeast-the CCAcommander,ColonelCollier,as-signedabattalionofinfantrytoeach. Coincidentally,anotherbattalionofin-fantrywastotaketheremaininghalfof thevillage. In thissector,theregimentofthe340th V olksGrenadierDivisionthatwasdesig-natedtoholdabridgeheadaboutLinnich, afewmilestothenorth,hadrelieved theremnantsofthe246thDivisioninand aboutMerzenhausen.Thereupon,the villagehadbecome thesouthernanchor fortheLinnichbridgehead.19 19LXXXICorpsGefechtsbericht,AARsfor 22-27Nov44. NINTHARMY'SFINALPUSHTOTHEROER565 OnHill98.1abattalionofthe41St ArmoredInfantry,attackingon27No-vemberoversoggygroundwithouttank support,ranintoheavyfirenearthe crest.Acounterattackfollowed.By utilizingtrenchesearlierclearedofGer-mans,themenmanagedtohold,butthey couldnotpushtothecrest. WithinMerzenhausen,theattached2d Battalion,11 9thInfantry,resumedtedious house-to-housefighting.Thoughabrace oftanksandtankdestroyerstriedto assist,minesandpanzerfaustsdiscouraged theiruse.It tooktheinfantryalldayto dothejobalone,buttheyendedthe assignmentinablazeofsuccesswith captureoftheenemycommanderandhis entirestaff.Adrivingforceintheattack was2dLt.HaroldL.Holycross,whoas asergeanthadplayedaleadingroleIn the30thDivision'sWestWallassaultIn October. Ofthethreeassignments,ColonelCol-lierconsideredthattankswereneeded mostagainstHillIOO.3.Yetbecauseof variousobstacles,includinganescarp-ment,asmallstream,andanantitank ditch,hesawnowaytoemploythem. Intheend,hecommittedtheattached1st Battalion,11 9thInfantry,alonetothe task,thoughhetoldthecommander,Lt. Col.RobertH.Herlong,thatifhefound adefiladedroutewithreasonablygood traction,tankswouldjoinhim. Concealedbyearlymorningmists, ColonelHerlong'sinfantrygotwithin400 yardsofthecrestofHill100.3before discovery.Tocounteractintensesmall armsfirethatfollowed,ColonelHerlong calledforarollingartillerybarrageto precedeafinalassault.Thoughseem-inglyaccurate,theartilleryfailedtosilence theGermanfire.Inamatterofminutes thebattalionlostfivekilledandfifteen woundedandgainedbutfiftyyards. Inthemeantime,someonehaddis-coveredaroutealongarailroadembank-mentwhencetanksmightproceedupa narrowdrawontothehill.Advisedof thisdevelopment,ColonelCollierimmedi-atelydesignatedacompanyofthe66th ArmoredRegiment.Anhourandahalf later,thetanksreachedtheinfantry positions. Effectontheenemywasmarked.As thetanksadvancedwithinfantryfollow-ingatfrom100to200yards,German fireslackened,thenceasedaltogether.At leastfortyGermanswerekilledor woundedandanequalnumbercaptured. Bylateafternoon,HillIOo.3wassecure. Tomakethedayacompletesuccess, ColonelColliersoonafterdarkcommitted asecondbattalionofthe41stArmored InfantrytotheattackonHill98.1.A positionthatindaylighthadfailedto cracknowdissolvedrapidly.Bymidnight CCAheldallthreeoftheday'sobjectives. Atank-supportedcounterattackagainst Merzenhausengotnoplaceinthefaceof accuratedefensiveartilleryfires.Because thetwohillsnearMerzenhausenover-lookedtheremainingobjectiveofBarmen, capturingthatvillageandpushingpatrols anotherfewhundredyardstotheRoer wasaroutinetask.It progressedwithout incidentthenextday,28November. ExceptfortwoGermanpositionson thewestbankoftheRoernearJuelich inthezoneofthe29thDivision,theXIX Corpsby28Novemberhadreachedthe river.Sincenooneconsideredcapture ofthetworemainingpoints' eitherparticu-larydifficultorpressing,the29thDivision wasnottobeginthetaskforseveraldays. Inthemeantime,GeneralMcLain,his 566 staff,andhisdivisionsturnedtopllnning forcrossingtheriver,thoughtheshadow ofthedamsontheupperreachesofthe Roerstillloomedoverallpreparations.20 AHundredMenoftheXIIICorps NotuntilthedayaftertheXIXCorps reachedtheRoerdidtheNinthArmy's othercomponent,GeneralGillem'sXIII Corps,commencethepushtotheriver. Bynightfallof24November,General Gillemhadassumedresponsibilityfor aboutsixmilesoffrontfromtheWurm RiveratMuellendorf tothenewboundary withtheXIXCorpsbelowEderen. Nevertheless,thehardfightingexperi-encedbythe84thDivisioninOperation CLIPPERandthedispersionoftheI02d Division'sregimentsmadeitimpossible fortheXIIICorpstobereadytoattack until29November.Atleastonecom-mander,theI02dDivision'sMaj.Gen. FrankA.Keating,thoughteventhiswas rushingthings;notuntiltwenty-four hoursbeforethejump-offdidthelastof hisregimentsreturntothefold.Though GeneralKeatinghadyettocommandhis divisionasanentityinoffensivecombat, oneregiment already had engagedin heavy fightingwhileattachedtothe84th Divisionandanotherwhichhadfoughtas theinfantrycomponent of the2dArmored Division'sTaskForceXwasmarkedly fatigued. Thesix-milelinewhichtheXIIICorps heldransoutheastfromtheWurmnear Muellendorftoapointaboutmidway betweenPrummernandBeeck,thence easttoahighwayleadingnorthfrom GereonsweilertothevillageofLindern, 20Notevariousmessagesofconcernaboutthe damsincorpsanddivisionjournalsduringthis period. THESIEGFRIEDLINECAMPAIGN thencesoutheastinanarcextendinga thousandyardseastofGereonsweilertoa pointofcontactwiththe2dArmored DivisionsoutheastofEderen.The84th Divisionheldthelefthalfoftheline,the I02dDivisiontheright,whilethe7th ArmoredDivisionstillrecuperatedIn corpsreservefromtheearlierfightinthe PeelMarshes. Highgroundinthenorthalongan extensionoftheXIIICorpsboundary withthe30BritishCorpswasaprimary considerationinattackplanning.Ina broadsense,thecorpszoneslopedgradu-allyupwardtothishighground,whichis markedbytheAachen-Geilenkirchen-Muenchen-Gladbachrailroadandbythe villagesofWuerm,Leiffarth,andLindern. Evenbeyondanormalprecautionof protectingtherearofasubsequentRoer crossing,GeneralGillemconsideredpos-sessionofthisterrainvital.Hewas concernedlesttheGermanscommitthe SixthPanzerArmy,whichtheyreputedly weremusteringbetweentheRoerandthe Rhine,inacounteroffensiveagainstthe corpsnorthflank.21 BeforeOperationCLIPPERhadrevealed howdeterminedtheGermanswereto holdthishighground,GeneralGillemhad intendedtakingthebulkofitwithTask ForceBiddle,composedoftheI 13th CavalryGroupreinforcedbyincrements ofmediumtanksandartillery.There-upon,theI02dDivisionwastohave capturedLinnichontheRoerandtohave preparedtocrosstheriver.The7th Armoredand84thDivisionsweretohave beenavailabletoexploitabridgehead. Intherevisedplan,GeneralGillem 21On22November,forexample,thecorps artillerycommander,Brig.Gen.R.P.Shugg,had recommendedthattwoadditionaltankdestroyer battalionsbeattachedtothecorpstoprotectthe northflank.XIIICorpsArtyAAR,Nov44. NINTHARMY'SFINALPUSHTOTHEROER567 displayedfullappreciationofhowhardit mightbetotakethehighground.Dis-solvingTaskForceBiddle,heattached theI13thCavalrytothe84thDivision, inorderthatthecavalrymightholdsome ofthe84thDivision'sfrontopposite MuellendorfandWuerm,anddirected the84thDivisiontomakethecorpsmain effort.NotLinnichbutthehighground alongthenorthboundarywastobethe objective.MeanwhiletheI02dDivision wastostagelimitedobjectiveattacksto protectthe84thDivision'srightflankand eventuallywastoreducethreevillages nearthecorpssouthboundary,capture Linnich,andoccupyhighgroundnorthof LinnichoverlookingGermansupplyroutes throughtheRoervillageofBrachelen.22 Thedecisiontosendgreaterstrength againstthehighgroundstemmedinpart fromthecontemporaryintelligencepic-ture.Inadditiontosurvivorsofthe9th Panzer)15thPanzerGrenadier)and183d V olksGrenadierDivisions)whichhad opposedearlierattacksinthissector, Americanintelligenceofficersanticipated meetingthe10thSSPanzerDivision) veteranoftheMARKET-GARDENfighting inHolland.23 Sometookthisasevidence thatotherSSdivisionsfromtheSixth PanzerArmywouldbesenttothis sector.24 Germanartillery,notedthosewho plottedthefires,wasgroupedinthe northbehindthehighgroundandtothe northeastbeyondLinnichandtheRoer. It was"apotentiallydestructiveweapon." 22NUSALtrofInstrs8,25Nov,andXIII CorpsFO2,27Nov,bothinXIIICorpsG-3 Jnlfile,24-28Nov 44. 23AnnexIto84thDivG-2PerRpt8,25 Nov,andXIIICorpsG-2PerRpt17,25Nov, bothinXIIICorpsG-2Jnlfile,25-26Nov44. 24See,forexample,XIXCorpsG-2Estimate, 26Nov,XIIICorpsG-2Jnlfile,27Nov44. Asfortanks,theGermanswereexpected toemployonlysmallgroups,despite additionofthelothSSPanzerDivision. Fortificationsincludedpillboxesofthe WestWallinthenorthwestnearMuellen-dorf,Wuerm,andBeeckandelsewhere theusualextensivefieldfortificationsthat hadcometotypifytheRoerplain.An antitankditchextendingmorethanamile andahalffromBeecknortheasttoapoint beyondLindernwasofparticularnote. ExceptthattheprojectedArdennes counteroffensivemadetheSixthPanzer Armyuntouchable,thetrueenemypicture wasmuchasAmericanG-2'Sdivinedit. Aftertheunsuccessfulcommitmentofthe 9thPanzerand15thPanzerGrenadier Divisionsincounterattackscontrolledby theXLVIIPanzerCorps)thesedivisions hadpassedtotheXIISSCorps.Thus GeneralBlumentrittand theXII SSCorps againboreresponsibilityfortheentire sectorfromtheMaasRivertotheRoer nearFlossdorf.TheXLVIIPanzer Corpsapparentlystoodbyasahead-quarterstemporarilywithouttroops. ThelothSSPanzerDivisionwasthe firstunittobealertedformovementearly inthefightingwhenFieldMarshalvon RundstedthaddeterminedthattheAllies intendednocomplementaryattackin Holland.Thedivisionhadbegunto movesoutheastwardon20Novemberand threedayslaterhadstartedrelievingthe 9thPanzerDivision)whichwastobe rehabilitatedfortheArdennes.25 The frontwasstrengthenedbycommitment ofthe407thVolksArtilleryCorpsnear Linnich,andavolksgrenadierdivision earmarkedfortheArdenneswasmovedto 25Order,GruppevonManteuffeltoXIISS andLXXXICorps,204519Nov44,andTWX, GruppevonManteuffeltoLXXXICorps,2225, 23Nov,bothinLXXXICorpsKTB,Bef.H.Gr. u.Armee. 568 apositioneastoftheRoerfromwhichit mightbackuptheXIISSCorps.26 WhiletheGermansmadethesemoves, theXIIIU.S.Corpswasspendingfive daysinreorganizationandattackprepara-tions.Boththe84thandI02dDivisions werestrengthenedwithattachments,and thecorpsartillerywasfleshedoutwith unitstransferredfromtheXIXCorps. ThreebattalionsofXIXCorpsartillery revertedtoNinthArmycontrol,inorder tofacilitatetheiruseinsupportofboth corps;whileeightbattalionsoftheXIX CorpsartillerypasseddirectlytotheXIII Corps.ThisincreasedGeneralGillem's corpsartillerytothirteenbattalions,of whichtwoandabatteryofself-propelled 155-mm.gunswereattachedtothe84th Division.Thebulkofartilleryremaining undercorpscontrolwastogivepriority tothemaineffortofthe84thDivision. InadditiontheBritishwerecapableof firingintothe84th'ssectorwithafield regimentof25-pounders,abatteryof 4'5-inchguns,andaregimentof5.5-inch guns.Boththe84thandI02dDivisions receivedseparateself-propelledtankde-stroyerbattalions,theI02d as e p r t ~ tank battalion,andthe84thatankbattalion attachedfromthe7thArmoredDivision.27 Toachievetheassignedmission,the 84thDivisionneededtotakefivevillages -Muellendorf,Wuerm,Beeck,Leiffarth, andLindern-andanelevationnorth-eastofBeeckwhichborethecodename, ToadHill(87.9).Havingattacked frontallyandwithoutsuccessagainstthree ofthesevillagesforthreedaysinOpera-26TWX,GruppevonManteufJeltoXIISS andLXXXICorps,0050,25Nov44,LXXXI CorpsKTB, Bet.H.Gr.u.Armee. 27XIIandXIXCorpsArtyAARs,Nov44, andAnnex3toXIIICorpsFO2,27Nov,XIII Corps G-3Jnlfile,24-28 Nov 44. THESIEGFRIEDLINECAMPAIGN tionCLIPPER,the84thDivisioncom-mander,GeneralBolling,hadnotastefor arepeatperformance.Flankingaction totheright,henoted,"wouldnotforce attackingtroopsdirectlyagainstpillboxes andvillagesthatareofnoparticular tacticalvalue."Insteadofassaultingas beforefromthesouthwestagainstMuel-lendorf,Wuerm,andBeeck,hewantedto strikefromthesoutheastandsouthto takefirstToadHillandLindern,the latterbecauseitoccupiesanelevation comparabletoToadHill.Thesetwo pointsinhand,thedivisionthenmight turnwestandsouthwesttohittheother fourvillagesfromtherear.28 TotakebothToadHillandLindern, GeneralBollingdesignatedthe335thIn-fantry,whichhadmissedOperation CLIPPERbecauseofastintasanun-committedreservewiththeXIXCorps. The333dInfantrywastosupportthe attackbyfireand,togetherwiththe I 13thCavalry,tostageafrontaldemon-strationagainstBeeck. Becauseroutesofattacktowardboth ToadHillandLindernweredevoidof concealment,the335thInfantrycom-mander,Col.HughC.Parker,electeda nightattack.Fromalineofdeparturein openfieldssoutheastofBeeck,the2 d BattalionunderMaj.RobertS.Kennedy wastomovetowardToadHillwhilethe 3dBattalionunderMaj.RobertW.Wal-laceguidedontheGereonsweiler-Lindern highwaytotakeLindern.Theattacks weretobeginwithoutartilleryprepara-tionat0630on29November.Colonel Parkerhopedthatsystematicartilleryand fighter-bomberattacksforseveraldays preceding29Novemberwouldsufficeas 28MemotoCGXIIICorps,24Nov,and84th DivFO7,28Nov,bothinXIIICorpsG-3Jnl file,24-28Nov44. NINTHARMY'SFINALPUSHTOTHEROER569 preparationfires.Acompanyofthe 40thTankBattalionwasattachedtoeach infantrybattalionforclosesupport.29 Anhourbeforedawnon29November therebegananodysseyinvolvingfinally aboutahundredmenofMajorWallace's 3dBattalionthatwastohavemarked effectuponthepushtotheRoer.At thathour,CompaniesIandKmoved northwardthroughthedarknessalong eithersideoftheGereonsweiler-Lindern road.Strippeddowntogasmasksand essentials-riflebelts,twobandoleersof ammunition,andthreebarsofchocolate Drationperman-thesecompanieswere imbuedwithoneidea:speed.Getacross themileofopenground toLindernbefore daylight. Germanfireatfirstwashesitant.A flarehere,aburpgunthere,amortar shellortwo.Yetsometimesevenone bulletcanbefateful.Thatwasthecase whenastraybulletcuttheaerialof CompanyK'sSCR-300.Thoughthe radiooperatorfellbacktotheendofthe columntopickupaspare,noonesaw himagain.Thatincidentwastoassume moreandmoreimportanceastheattack progressed. Attheantitankditchwhichstretched fromBeecktoLindern,twoleadingpla-toonsofCompany KandoneofCompany Iran,jumped,fell,crawled,andslithered across.Don'tholdupintheditch,their leadershadtoldthemtimeaftertime; Germanmortarsandartillerycouldruin youthere. Thesethreeplatoonsmadeit.Their companiesdidnot.Nosoonerhadthe 29Unlessotherwisenoted,theaccountofthe 84thDivisionactionisbaseduponofficialdivi-sionandcorpsrecords;Draper,The84thDivi-sion,pp.50-74;andNUSAOpns,Vol.IV. Thelastcontainsrichcombatinterviewmaterial. leadingplatoonsslippedthroughthanthe Germansinamainlineofresistancecen-teredontheantitankditchcametolife. Withartillery,mortars,machineguns,and rifles,theydrovebacktheremainderof CompanyKandinflictedseriouslosseson CompanyI. Accompanyingthetwoplatoonsof CompanyKthatcrossedtheantitank ditchwasthecompanycommander,1st Lt.LeonardR.Carpenter.ThoughLieu-tenantCarpenterknewthathalfhis companyhadfailedtogetacross,he hopedthatCompanyIhadfaredbetter. The leader oftheoneplatoon ofCompany Iwhichactuallyhadsucceeded,1stLt. CreswellGarlington,Jr.,trustedt ~ tCompanyKwasintact.Neitherforce hadanyformofcommunicationwiththe battalioncommander.CompanyI'sra-dioswerewiththecompanyheadquarters; CompanyK'sradiooperatorhadtaken thatcompany'sSCR-300totherearafter Germanfirehadsnappedtheaerial. ThoughLieutenantCarpenterhadan-otherradio,anSCR-509,itdidnotwork. Deludedinthedarknessabouttheir combinedstrength,thethreeplatoons pressedontowardLindern.Theyreached thefringeofthevillageasdaywasbreak-ing.Thoughuncertainatfirstwhether theyhadcometotherightobjective,they neverthelessattacked.Theyhadbeen toldtoavoidtrouble,ifpossible;toleave mop-uptothosewhocamebehind. Racingthroughbackyardsandorchards, thementossedanoccasionalgrenade wheneversomelonesentryopenedfire. Butforthemostpart,Lindernslept. At0745thethreeplatoonsweredigging inbeyondtherailroadenbankmentafew hundredyardsnorthofLindern.Only thendidLieutenantsCarpenterand Garlingtondiscoverthattogethertheyhad S70 onlyaboutahundredmen.Thislittle bandhadreachedoneofthe84thDivi-sion'sprimaryobjectives,yetnobodyelse ontheAmericansideknewaboutit. TheGermansknew.Inlessthana quarter-hourthreeTigertanksap-proachedtheposition.Someonefireda bazooka.Thetanksretreatedtothe vicinityoftwopillboxesnotover400 yardsaway.Later,severaltruckloadsof Germaninfantrydismountedatthepill-boxes.StilltheGermansdidnotattack. Apparentlytheydidnotrecognizehow smalltheAmericanforcewas.Thetwo lieutenantshadchosentodiginona gentlereverseslopewheretheywerepar-tiallyscreenedbyarisetothenorthand bytherailroadenbankmentattheir backs. Thoughthesituationwasobviously precarious,theAmericanswerenottoo concernedatfirst.Theyexpectedrelief momentarily.Yetthehourspassed,and noreliefcame.Atlength,Lieutenant Carpentersentvolunteersbacktothe railroadwherehehadabandonedthe SCR-sogafterhavingdespairedofget-tingittofunction.Aftertwohoursof tinkering,theyfinallypickedupfaint voicesemanatingfromradiosofAmerican tanks,buttheycouldnottransmit.As alastresort,fourmenvolunteeredtogo backonfootinsearchofhelp.Noone sawthemagain. Thesituationactuallywasmoreob-scurethanevenLieutenantsCarpenter andGarlingtonrealized.Attheantitank ditchsouthofLindern,thebattalion commanderhadlostcontactnotonlywith theleadingplatoonsbutalsowiththe restofCompaniesIandK.Thoughthe regimentalcommander,ColonelParker, hadcommittedhisreservebattalionin midmorningtooutflankLindernfromthe THESIEGFRIEDLINECAMPAIGN west.communicationstothatunittoohad failed.Acompanyofthe40thTank Battalion,whichwastohavefollowedthe infantrytoLindern,waitedinGereons-weilerwithnowordthattherewasany infantrytofollow. Perhapsbecausetheyhadnoother hope,thelittlebandofmennorthof Linderncontinuedtotinkerwiththe SCR-sog.Aboutanhourpastnoon, someonesuggestedtheytapeanaerial fromalittle,short-rangeSCR-S36toa highfenceandrunatelephoneWIre fromthefencetotheSCR-sog.The expedientworked.Somewherearadio operatorinanAmericantankpicked magicwordsoutoftheair:"Wem ~ e a touchdownat074S." 30 Thecommanderofthe40thTankBat-talion,Lt.Col.JohnC.Brown,acted .withouthesitation.Heorderedacom-panyoftankstoLindern.Behinda smokescreenfiredbyartillery,sixSher-mansmadeit."It wasabout1430when wesawthosesixGeneralShermans," someonerecalledlater."Boy!Wefig-uredthewholeGermanarmycouldn't driveusoutofthere." 31 Asduskfell,therestofthecompanyof tanksreachedLindernalongwiththe reservecompanyofthe33SthInfantry's 3dBattalion,CompanyL.Soonthere-after,ColonelBrownorderedanother tankcompanyintothevillage.Therethe tankersfrettedforanhourorsoforlack ofinfantryprotection,untilatlastthe 33SthInfantry'sreservebattalionarrived. Havingbeencommittedinmidmorning, thisbattalionhadswunginawidearcto comeuponthevillagefromthewest;but firealongtheantitankditchandfrom pillboxeshadimposedtellingdelays. :"'f'C ,."...... .......N1,..'-., III" ! ,.-

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