v100 dissertation 2

HIST 398 The United States and Vietnam, 1956-1965

Thomas Charles Beresford200443725

HIST 398 - Dissertation (V100)

THE UNITED STATES AND VIETNAM, 1956-1965.

Word Length: 10,032

Date Submitted: 27/4/2009

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………….3

CHAPTER ONE

The Eisenhower Years – 1956-61……………………………………...11

CHAPTER TWO

The Kennedy Years – 1961-1963………………………………………18

CHAPTER THREE

The Johnson Years – 1963-1965……………………………………….26

CONCLUSION………………………………………………………..38

BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………..43

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INTRODUCTION

By 1975 when the North Vietnamese finally captured the South Vietnamese

capital of Saigon, bringing an end to the major fighting in Vietnam, just over fifty

eight thousand American personnel had lost their lives through acts of terrorism or

front line combat1. Alongside them were over two hundred and twenty thousand

South Vietnamese killed, and over one million North Vietnamese dead. Returning

soldiers were not given heroes welcomes, instead they faced protestations from the

large number of anti-war protesters that had built up over the course of America’s

involvement in Vietnam. American prestige both domestically and internationally was

seriously tarnished and its involvement in Vietnam came to be known by some as the

“American Tragedy”2.

The question therefore is how and why did the United States become so

heavily involved with a small, almost backwater, nation in Vietnam? It is in the

course of this study that I hope to shed some light onto the series of events,

discussions and planning that went on in both the United States and on the ground in

Vietnam between the years of 1956 and 1965. To do this I will mostly focus on

documentation and primary source material, such as memorandums, security

estimates, meetings and memoirs.

I have chosen to begin in the year of 1956, because I believe it was in that year

when American involvement in Vietnam started on its downward spiral towards a

major conflict. 1956 had been the year when the temporary divide along the 17th

parallel between North and South Vietnam was planned to be removed and the

1 Statistical information about casualties of the Vietnam War, reproduced at http://www.archives.gov/research/vietnam-war/casualty-statistics.html.2 D. Kaiser, American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson and the Origins of the Vietnam War (Belknap Press, 2002).

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country re-united under an ‘All-Vietnam’ election3. This election never occurred

mainly due to the intervention of the United States, and it was from this point on that

the Hanoi-sponsored insurgency into the South began with earnest and the US was

dragged deeper into a tangled mess of terrorism, upheaval, political instability and

eventually war.

This study ends in the year of 1965, due to the fact that this is the point where

the United States involvement went beyond the theoretical ‘point of no return’. As it

was in 1965 when the US Administration under President Lyndon Baines Johnson

initiated a series of air strikes against North Vietnam, known as “Rolling Thunder”. It

was also in March of 1965, when the first American combat troops set foot on

Vietnamese soil, as previously to 1965 the American personnel in Vietnam had been

there in an advisory and training capacity. The US Marine battalions that landed in

1965 were therefore the first Americans assigned to Vietnam in a strictly combat role.

Between these two ‘watersheds’ in American foreign policy towards Vietnam,

there were a number of crucial events and decisions made that can give important

insight onto the why and how of America’s folly into a disastrous war. The

assassination of American backed South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem in

1963, and the events in the Gulf of Tonkin in August of 1964 to name but two

examples. It is in the course of this study that I will be looking into such events,

among other elements of American involvement to chart an interpretation of to why

American became so involved in the struggle of South Vietnam against North

Vietnam.

3 D. Anderson, ‘Dwight D. Eisenhower and Wholehearted Support of Ngo Dinh Diem’, in D. Anderson, ed, Shadow on the White House, Presidents and the Vietnam War, 1945-1975 (Kansas, 1993), p. 48.

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The Situation by 1956

To begin this study, I believe it is important to give a background to the period

covered, as it is important to cover previous events to give an understanding of the

position the United States found itself in, in the year of 1956.

The region of Southeast Asia had been a substantial thorn in the side for the

United States since the early 1930’s, when the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in

1931 had interfered with America’s dealings with the Chinese in trade, and effectively

cut off the ‘Open door’ policy that America had extended to the Chinese since the

very beginning of the 20th century.

Problems with Southeast Asia reached a high point in 1941, when it was

through a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that the United States became involved in

the Second World War. It was from this point on that the United States became a

major factor in the affairs of Southeast Asia. The war that occurred in the Pacific

against Japan was a war almost exclusively fought by the United States, with only

limited support from its Allies of the British Empire and the Soviet Union. It was also

in Southeast Asia that many saw the first act of the Cold War being carried out. The

first atomic bombs were dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in

August of 1945, and although they achieved the aim that President Harry S. Truman

had hoped for, the ending of the war with Japan, they also created an atmosphere of

criticism and suspicion both at home and abroad. Historians such as Gor Alperovitz

have even suggested that the use of the Atomic bombs were for political means, a way

of intimidating the Soviet Union to accept American ideals4.

In addition, the end of the war in the Pacific did not bring about the end of

American involvement and interest in Southeast Asia. The United States maintained

an occupation force within Japan for a number of years after the end of the Second

4 W. Pemberton, Harry S. Truman: Fair Dealer and Cold Warrior (Boston, 1989), p. 50.

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World War, and it would be this force that would later become involved in America’s

next stage of deepening involvement in the affairs of Southeast Asia. It was also only

four years later that grave concern was raised over the future of Southeast Asia

through the victory of Mao Zedong’s Communists in China.

America’s involvement increased dramatically only five years later in June

1950, when the Korean War broke out as the Communist led Democratic People’s

Republic of Korea (DPRK) invaded in southern Republic of Korea in an attempt to

reunify the country under Communist leadership after it had been split in two during

the course of the Second World War. Acting under the driving policy behind US

foreign relations, “containment” first established by George F. Kennan5, America led

a United Nations combat force into what became a costly and embarrassing conflict in

Korea. It was in Korea that the United States was forced to make one of its longest

retreats in military history, and is not looked upon favourably by many who

experienced the conflict. Korea was also a major source of criticism for the Truman

administration at the time, especially from a Congress that they had failed to consult

about entering into the war.

It was at this same period in time that the situation in Indochina (Vietnam,

Laos and Cambodia) was also taking a turn for the worse. The French had held

Indochina as an imperial colony since the 19th century. But after the catastrophe it

faced in the Second World War, France struggled to hold onto these colonies in the

late 1940’s. This struggle against a Communist led Nationalist movement within

Vietnam eventually led to the First Indochina War. The war lasted for a period of

around seven years of bloody fighting and false French hopes of victory6. The United

States had become heavily involved with the conflict in Vietnam around 1950, when

5 X., ‘The Sources of Soviet Conduct’, Foreign Affairs, 4 (July, 1947), p. 5666 F. Logevall, The Origins of the Vietnam War (Essex, 2001), p.25.

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through the Mutual Defence Assistance Act they began to supply economic aid and

military supplies. However, even with the backing and substantial support of the

United States the French were unable to achieve victory against Ho Chi Minh’s

Vietminh army. The terrain had strongly acted against them, and the French army was

not suited to fighting a guerrilla style of warfare. Subsequently the humiliating defeat

at Dien Bien Phu led the French to call a cease-fire and head to the negotiating table,

even though Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles had urged the French to only

negotiate when they had the upper hand7.

The Geneva Conference was held in July 1954, and the resulting accords

established the crucial split between North and South Vietnam along the 17th Parallel,

as well as establishing the principle that this division was meant to be temporary

measure8, resulting in elections to be held in 1956. During the conference the United

States had held a passive involvement, engaging in “holding action” diplomacy9, and

even went as far as not signing up to the Geneva Accords, although they did publicly

acknowledge the terms10. The reasoning behind the actions of the United States was

two fold; firstly President Eisenhower had wanted to avoid any criticism that had had

compromised with Communists, and secondly; Eisenhower wanted to have an

element of freedom of action over Vietnam11.

The Eisenhower administration quickly realized in the course of 1954, that the

Accords presented a very grave problem. The government that had been established in

South Vietnam was a weak regime, under the Emperor Bao Dai, a figure who was

largely unpopular with his own people. On the other hand, the newly formed

Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in the North was now in a position of

7 Ibid, p. 25.8 D. Anderson, ‘Dwight D. Eisenhower and Wholehearted Support of Ngo Dinh Diem’, p. 48.9 F. Logevall, The Origins of the Vietnam War, p. 26.10 D. Anderson, ‘Dwight D. Eisenhower and Wholehearted Support of Ngo Dinh Diem’, p. 48.11 F. Logevall, The Origins of the Vietnam War, p. 27.

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strength. The DRV now had an international sanction for its existence and a

leadership that had the praise and adulation of its own people through its defeat of the

French imperialists.

As a response to this situation, the Eisenhower administration drew up a

document known as NSC 5429/2. A section of which was to become crucial to the

United State’s future actions in Vietnam:

“The United States must protect its position and restore its prestige in the Far East

by a new initiative in Southeast Asia, where the situation must be stabilized as soon as

possible to prevent further losses to Communism through (1) creeping

expansion and subversion, or (2) over aggression.”12

The document also provided for the establishment of what came to be known

as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). A haphazard collection of allies

for collective defence over Southeast Asia. The establishment of SEATO was the

initial response by the United States to justify its attempts to intervene with the affairs

of Vietnam13, and most importantly at the time, to interfere with the proposed

elections in 1956.

In conjunction with the establishment of SEATO, the Eisenhower

administration had begun what historian Frederick Logevall calls “The Diem

Experiment”14. Ngo Dinh Diem was appointed by Emperor Bao Dai as President of

the Republic of South Vietnam in early 1955, largely because Bao Dai knew of

Diem’s virulent anti-Communism and hoped that it would appeal to the United States,

and encourage them to continue to assist South Vietnam. Diem was not a practical

choice for a number of reasons; he had a reclusive, arrogant nature, and lacked 12 F. Logevall, The Origins of the Vietnam War, p. 28.13 W. LaFeber, The American Age (New York, 1989), p. 524.14 F. Logevall, The Origins of the Vietnam War, p. 25.

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popular support outside of his own family15. However, he was seen as the only real

choice by American officials, mainly because his competition were even worse, “we

are prepared to accept the seemingly ridiculous prospect that this yogi-like mystic

could assume the change he is apparently about to undertake only because the

standard set by his predecessors is so low”16. Even so, in public, President Eisenhower

hailed Diem as a “tough miracle man” and the supposed “saviour” of South

Vietnam17. However, Diem was to turn out to be a poor choice by the United States as

a leader for South Vietnam, partly because of his arrogant nature and his handling of

government that became more autocratic and dictatorial as the years progressed.

As 1956 approached, the United States worked consistently to attempt to

subvert the Geneva Accords of 1954. By 1955 Diem, most likely under American

influence and his own anti-Communist feelings, refused to even hold consultations

with the North that had been part of the Geneva agreements. Hanoi in the North was

bitterly disappointed, as they had been hoping to achieve a reunification of Vietnam

not by bullets, but by ballots18. As 1955 became 1956 it was clear that a confrontation

was brewing on the horizon as the deadline for the All-Vietnam elections approached.

Diem and his American backers were not going to see eye to eye with the Communist

led North, and the opportunity to gain unification of Vietnam through an election

came and went with Diem’s refusal to hold the election as he believe they would not

be “absolutely free”19.

The stage by 1956 was set for a clash between North and South, and the

United States had already become involved on the side of Ngo Dinh Diem, with its

15 F. Logevall, The Origins of the Vietnam War, p. 29.16 G. Hess, Vietnam and the United States: Origins and Legacy of War (New York, 1998), p. 55.17 D. Anderson, ‘Dwight D. Eisenhower and Wholehearted Support of Ngo Dinh Diem’, p. 54.18 F. Logevall, The Origins of the Vietnam War, p. 36.19 Katsiaficas, G., ed, Vietnam Documents: American and Vietnamese Views of the War (New York, 1992), p. 36.

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anti-communist, “containment” stance. Therefore, the United States was from then on,

committed to assisting in an ever escalating conflict that would drag them deeper and

deeper, resulting in a tragic war.

CHAPTER ONETHE EISENHOWER YEARS, 1956-1961

President Dwight D. Eisenhower was elected in November 1952 and came to

office in early 1953, with his entrance into the Presidency he took over overseeing the

end of the largely disastrous conflict in Korea that had begun in June 1950. From that

point on, Eisenhower placed a greater emphasis on Southeast Asia than his

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predecessors had done so. This importance was embodied in his ‘domino’ theory that

he publicly voiced in a press conference on April 7th 1954, “Finally, you have broader

considerations that might follow what you would call the "falling domino" principle.

You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will

happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could

have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences”20.

It was this principle that Eisenhower directly applied to situations occurring in

Southeast Asia, however he gave a greater importance to the struggle of Laos21 than

he did that of Vietnam. This fact is clear in Eisenhower’s memoirs ‘Waging Peace’

which directly cover his time in office from 1956 to 1961. The absence of attention to

issues in Vietnam is clear, and at the same time Eisenhower gives more of his time

towards the Laos situation, stating that he and his administration were determined to

preserve the independence of Laos22. Coupled with this focus more towards Laos in

Southeast Asia, was the fact that Eisenhower was often distracted with events

elsewhere in the international turmoil that was the Cold War, such as the launching of

the Russian satellite Sputnik 1 in October of 1957 and problems with China. Because

of this, Eisenhower is accused by historians as providing no direction to policymakers

on the worsening problems in Vietnam23.

Despite Eisenhower’s apparent lack of interest in the situation brewing in

Vietnam, it is clear that America’s growing involvement in the small Southeast Asian

country began strongly under the Eisenhower administration. The obvious starting

point for this growing influence and direction of South Vietnam was during 1956, the

year when the All-Vietnam elections were scheduled to be held, as put forward by the

20 Public Papers of the President, 73 – The President’s News Conference of April 7th, 1954, reproduced at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=10202&st=&st1=21 D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace 1956-61 (London, 1966), p. 607.22 Ibid, p. 607.23 D. Anderson, ‘Dwight D. Eisenhower and Wholehearted Support of Ngo Dinh Diem’, p. 55.

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Geneva Accords of 1954. The decision was made by South Vietnamese President Ngo

Dinh Diem not to participate in the proposed elections that would have led to

reunification of Vietnam under a single government. It is highly likely that Diem had

his own personal reasons for this decision, mainly that he would have feared losing

his position of power to a North Vietnamese government. However, Diem was not

alone in his decision, as the Eisenhower administration backed Diem’s decision

wholeheartedly for their own purposes24, as it was widely believed in Washington that

the All-Vietnam elections would lead to a Communist takeover of the entire country.

This takeover would then invoke the falling of the dominoes (Cambodia, Laos, Korea,

Thailand etc.) that Eisenhower strongly believed in. This event in 1956 was the first

time that the United States became involved in the political workings of Vietnam, and

it would simply be the start of many more such occasions, leading to almost complete

American control over the actions of the South Vietnamese government.

It was also in 1956, due to Diem’s refusal to hold elections that the insurgency

into South Vietnam really began. In December of 1956, a Communist leader residing

in the South, Le Duan, published a lengthy report entitled, ‘The Path to Revolution in

the South’. The report called upon all those North Vietnamese cadres that still

remained in the Southern half of Vietnam to prepare for a long-term political struggle,

as well as making the suggestion that Hanoi in the North should prepare itself for

overt military action in future25. Initially Hanoi had reservations about supporting the

newly proposed insurgency in South Vietnam, but as years passed with little change

in the South Vietnamese position towards the North and no real prospect of

unification through elections, Hanoi gradually shifted more towards support for

subversion through the insurgency. By 1959, Hanoi recognized the fact that Diem’s

24 F. Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and Escalation in Vietnam (California, 1999), p. 1.25 F. Logevall, The Origins of the Vietnam War, p. 37.

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oppressive regime in the South had created an atmosphere that was ripe for a

revolution26. Thus by the spring of 1959, Hanoi decided to put its full support behind a

Southern insurgency, authorizing the start of armed struggle and took steps towards

actively supporting it, including; establishing a task force to establish infiltration

routes such as the now infamous Ho Chi Minh Trail, as well as sending a number of

Vietminh veterans back into the Southern half of Vietnam. By December of 1960,

Hanoi had directed the establishment of the ‘National Front for the Liberation of

South Vietnam’ (NLF)27, and it was from this point on that the insurgency really

began to make a strong impact upon the situation in South Vietnam.

Within the United States, the growing problems in Vietnam did not go

unnoticed by members of the Eisenhower administration. Numerous officials and

departments believed in the importance of the survival of Vietnam as a free and

independent state, such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Admiral Arthur Radford,

and the incumbent Ambassador in Saigon, Elbridge Durbrow. This recognition is

evident in a number of documents published throughout Eisenhower’s time in office.

For example as early as June 1956, the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented to the National

Security Council an outline plan for United States military participation in the event

of Vietminh aggression in Vietnam28. This plan implied a substantial amount of

assistance towards the Government of Vietnam (GVN) against Northern overt

invasion, including the suggestion of the necessity to use atomic weapons29. Also as

early as 1957 the US officials on the ground in Vietnam were not blind to the fact that

the situation was in need of increasing American assistance. In a memorandum sent

from the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (MAAG),

26 Ibid, p. 37.27 Ibid, p. 37.28 Paper presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 7 June 1956, Foreign Relations of the United States 1955-1957, Vietnam: Volume I (hereafter FRUS 1955-57, Vol. I), Doc. 333.29 Ibid, p. 708.

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Lieutenant General Samuel Williams to Ambassador Durbrow in October, it states

that the country needed ‘pacifying’ and a reorientation of the entire populace towards

American democratic ideals30.

As the months went by from 1957 into 1958 terrorist activity and instances of

armed insurrections were on the rise, largely as retaliation against Diem’s increasingly

repressive regime31. Both Vietnamese and American officials had a shared feeling that

a crisis was mounting in Vietnam. In 1959, even President Eisenhower himself lent

more than a passing remark to the situation in Vietnam, stating in April that, “the loss

of Vietnam would…have grave consequences for us and for freedom”32

By the final years of the Eisenhower administration in 1959 and 1960, the

problems in Vietnam had only gotten worse. A National Intelligence estimate

published in May of 1959 stated that, “the prospect of reunification…remains remote”

and that political stability in South Vietnam relied heavily upon Diem33, a harrowing

prospect considering the concerns over Diem’s own difficult situation and autocratic

tendencies. A year later in March 1960, Ambassador Durbrow sought to bring

attention to South Vietnam’s worsening security situation to the Department of State.

In his despatch, he stated that there had been an intensification of Viet Cong activities

and a rise in kidnappings and assassinations. Coupled with this, Durbrow refers to a

lack of appropriate anti-guerrilla training for the South Vietnamese army and the

amount of torture, extortion and corruption that is occurring with local officials34.

Durbrow also presents the evaluations of the MAAG in Vietnam, stating that the

30 Memorandum from the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (Williams) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow), 9 October 1957, FRUS 1955-57, Vol. I, Doc. 398.31 D. Anderson, ‘Dwight D. Eisenhower and Wholehearted Support of Ngo Dinh Diem’, p. 55.32 The Importance to the United States of the Security and Progress of Vietnam, Address 4th April 1959, reproduced at http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/eisen.htm33 National Intelligence Estimate, 26 May 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-1960. Vietnam: Volume I (hereafter FRUS 1958-60, Vol. I), Doc. 76.34 Despatch from the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State, 7 March 1960, FRUS 1958-60, Vol. I, Doc. 112.

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Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) is failing in its campaign against the Viet

Cong due to “security leaks, inadequate planning, lack of aggressive leadership” as

well as communication failures and the failure of supporting units35. Durbrow also

makes the stark and foreboding statement that, “the GVN is unable to cope with the

internal security situation”36.

The Durbrow despatch of March 7th 1960, is also important for one other

reason that will become more apparent in later years, especially during the Johnson

administration; as it mentions the recent appointment of a new military commander,

Colonel Nguyen Khanh37, a name that will in the later 1960’s become a symbol for all

that is wrong in South Vietnam.

It was only in the waning months of Eisenhower’s presidency, that US

officials began to take the situation in Vietnam more seriously, evident by the drawing

up of a plan for counterinsurgency in Vietnam by the Military Assistance Advisory

Group, giving the reason that the communist inspired and directed insurgency requires

the development of such a plan38. However, it seems more like an occasion of too

little too late, as the insurgency in South Vietnam had gained a strong foothold by

1960, and had already caused a number of serious incidents such as the Tay Ninh

incident in January 195939.

By the end of Eisenhower’s time in the White House, the situation in Vietnam

had continued to degrade alongside its neighbour Laos, despite Eisenhower’s deeper

interest. There was no concrete US policy towards Vietnam, the men on the ground,

Durbrow and Williams were bickering with one another over what Vietnam really

35 Ibid, p. 305.36 Ibid, p. 306.37 Ibid, p. 316.38 Outline Plan Prepared by the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam, 27 October 1960, FRUS 1958-60, Vol. I, p. 614.39 Despatch from the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State, 7 March 1960, FRUS 1958-60, Vol. I, Doc. 112.

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needed; political reform or military support. This lead to Williams accusing Durbrow

of being “insulting, misinformed and unfriendly” towards President Diem in an

attempt to get him removed from office40. An overbearing and autocratic dictator in

Diem was ruling over a disaffected population, creating even more favourable basis

for the Viet Cong insurgency, while Hanoi in the North remained stable and in

complete control of its own people. A report published by General Lansdale in

January 1961, stated that South Vietnam was in a “critical condition” and that the

Vietcong “have started to steal the country and expect to be done by 1961”41.

Overall, under the Eisenhower administration the situation in Vietnam had

been allowed to grow worse, and the United States was being dragged down with it,

the seven hundred military personnel sent to Vietnam by Eisenhower having little

positive effect42. In the words of historian, David Anderson, Eisenhower left a record

of non-solution and ever-narrowing options in Vietnam for newly elected President

John F. Kennedy43.

Eisenhower did however make one important statement that was to become

resoundingly true in later years, especially as the aforementioned Nguyen Khanh

came to power; “The difficulties facing the free world…can be handled with

confidence and success if those who love freedom will work together in the

knowledge that individual self-interest must never prevail over the welfare of the total

free community”44

All in all, President John F. Kennedy faced a difficult and confusing situation

to deal with right from the beginning in Vietnam, as Eisenhower had failed to truly

get to grasp with what was occurring.40 D. Anderson, ‘Dwight D. Eisenhower and Wholehearted Support of Ngo Dinh Diem’, p. 56.41 Ibid, p. 57.42 JFK in History: Vietnam, reproduced at http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/JFK+in+History/Vietnam.htm43 D. Anderson, ‘Dwight D. Eisenhower and Wholehearted Support of Ngo Dinh Diem’, p. 59.44 D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace 1956-61, p. 629.

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CHAPTER TWOTHE KENNEDY YEARS, 1961-1963

Although the Presidency of John F. Kennedy is well remembered more for his

actions in the Cuban missile crisis that occurred in the early 1960’s, Kennedy was

also heavily involved in the situation in Vietnam, much more so than his predecessor

had been. Kennedy had a unique fascination in Special Forces and

counterinsurgency45, tactics that he was to push quite firmly for within South

Vietnam. Coupled with this interest was the fact that Kennedy had read General

45 L. Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos and Vietnam (Oxford, 2000), p. 287.

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Lansdale’s report on Vietnam only recently before his entrance into office, and had a

“keen interest”46. Kennedy was also further pushed into confronting the problems of

Southeast Asia as a whole by the failures of his predecessor, Eisenhower, who himself

admitted that he had left, Laos in particular, in a state of strife and confusion47. It is

therefore no surprise that Kennedy took a deeper and more direct interest into the

problems of Vietnam.

It was not long after Kennedy’s inauguration into office that he began to make

decisions that were to change the face of US involvement in Vietnam for years to

come, mainly concerning the men he brought into office along with him in 1961. Not

only was his Vice President, Lyndon B. Johnson, an important choice in itself, but it

was also Kennedy’s choice of staff that was to have a long term impact. Kennedy

appointed Robert McNamara as his Secretary of Defence, Dean Rusk as Secretary of

State and McGeorge Bundy as National Security Advisor. These three men

throughout both Kennedy’s and Johnson’s administrations become increasingly more

important in the decision making on Vietnam, eventually becoming known as the

“Inner War Cabinet” or the “Awesome Foursome” alongside Lyndon Johnson48.

Appointments such as these showed that Kennedy’s approach to Vietnam was going

to be a stark contrast to that of Eisenhower before him.

Within Vietnam itself, the situation was still on a downward spiral, and

throughout the course of Kennedy’s administration, policy makers and officials were

deeply involved in a number of discussions, reports and planning in an attempt to

reverse the course of South Vietnam. South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem

still held tenuous power in the country, and was a grave concern for many US

46 Summary Record of a Meeting, The White House, 28 January 1961,Foreign Relations of the United States 1961-1963, Volume I: Vietnam (hereafter FRUS 1961-63, Vol. I), Doc. 3.47 D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace 1956-61, p. 612.48 F. Logevall, Choosing War, p. 387.

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officials in both Washington and on the ground in Saigon. It was not lost on those US

officials involved that Diem was in a precarious position, with little popularity and a

weakened amount of respect among his own people49, but there was little in the way

of alternatives in the early 1960’s and so the United States continued to support his

regime. Also in early 1961, there was a determined drive by the Kennedy

administration to push for a basic counterinsurgency plan within South Vietnam as

reports kept coming in from the field about the various military, political and

economic situations within the country, such as agricultural economist, Wolf

Ladejinsky’s letter in February, which concluded that “everything must be brought

into play to ensure the survival of Vietnam”50. However, the push for a plan that

would ultimately assist the struggle of South Vietnam was resisted by the Government

due to Diem himself, mostly because of his own personal insecurity at sharing power

with other individuals51. Although the counterinsurgency plan (CIP) was eventually

accepted by Diem, this was just one example of how Diem was more of a hindrance

than help to the cause of South Vietnam, and subsequently the efforts of the United

States to assist.

Throughout the duration off Kennedy’s first year, the United States

implemented a number of actions within Vietnam or with the purpose of assisting

efforts in Vietnam. These actions included counter-guerrilla operations under

direction of the Military Advisory and Assistance Group as well as the Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA)52. In addition, and more importantly, Kennedy himself

directed the establishment of a Presidential Task Force in April 1961, with the sole

49 Notes on a Meeting between the Secretary of State and the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons), 28 January 1961, FRUS 1961-63, Vol. I, Doc. 5.50 Editorial Note, FRUS 1961-63, Vol. I, Doc. 14.51 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, 1 March 1961, FRUS 1961-63, Vol. I, Doc. 16, Footnote 4.52 Memorandum from the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to the President, 3 April 1961, FRUS 1961-63, Vol. I, Doc. 24.

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purpose to counter the Communist influence and pressures on South Vietnam as well

as strengthen US actions within the country, headed by Deputy Secretary of Defence,

Roswell Gilpatric53. The task force’s main contribution was to draft up programs of

action for the United States against Communism in Vietnam. Another contribution by

Kennedy in May 1961, was to instruct Secretary McNamara to divert one hundred

million dollars towards encouraging military reorientation towards guerrilla war54. In

June of 1961, Vice President Lyndon Johnson made a fact-finding trip to Vietnam,

and reported back to Washington after five days of investigation. His principal

conclusions were similar to those that had been voiced by US officials previously,

such as; the lack of alternatives to Diem’s government, the need for sustained US aid

to Vietnam and that military force must be “firm and powerful”55. Johnson’s final

conclusion however was rather foreboding in nature, stating that there is no visible

solution to Vietnam’s instability and warned that even US military involvement may

be required56. A rather ironic statement, as it would be the directive of Johnson as

President that led to US military involvement in Vietnam.

As 1961 entered its final months, the situation in Vietnam took more turns for

the worse, even after the months of presidential directives, plans and numerous

reports attempting to improve matters in the country. In September, there came in

reports of increased Viet Cong activity, now utilising battalion sized units, arming

themselves with modern weaponry and, for the first time since the first Indochina

War, wearing “khaki uniforms into battle”57. These new developments in the

insurgency led President Diem to believe that open warfare was now beginning in

53 Program for the Presidential Task Force on Vietnam, 22 April 1961, FRUS 1961-63, Vol. I, Doc. 32.54 L. Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos and Vietnam, p. 289.55 Report by the Vice President, Undated, FRUS 1961-63, Vol. I, Doc. 60.56 Report by the Vice President, Undated, FRUS 1961-63, Vol. I, Doc. 60.57 Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State, 5 September 1961, FRUS 1961-63, Vol. I, Doc. 127.

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Vietnam58, and to coincide with this fear, Hanoi received full public backing from

both the Soviet Union and China in its objective to take power in South Vietnam59. It

seemed that full blown overt invasion from the North was just around the corner.

The reaction of the United States to the increasingly problematic situation in

Vietnam was to send General Maxwell Taylor to Southeast Asia from October

through to November 1961. One of the crucial conclusions that Taylor was to come to

at the end of his mission to Southeast Asia was that it would be the actions of the

United Sates that would be “decisive to the end result”60, clearly stating that the fate

of Vietnam now seemed to no longer rest with the Vietnamese, but with the United

States government. However, conversely Taylor did reach the conclusion that overt

invasion, as had been predicted by Diem, was not likely to occur due to the threat of

SEATO intervention61. Taylor also offered recommendation on dealing with what he

calls “the famous problem” of Diem as an administrator, including ideas of removing

him from office, but ultimately concludes that engineering a coup against Diem would

be far too dangerous62. Coinciding with recommendations of the Taylor report, the

United States along with South Vietnam decided to throw off the limitations of the

1954 Geneva Accords in November of 1961, citing the violations made by North

Vietnam as probable cause to do so63.

As 1961 turned to 1962, the United States was still in an uncertain and messy

situation with Vietnam, causing the administration to implement a number of

58 Memorandum from the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to the President, 15 September 1961, FRUS 1961-63, Vol. I, Doc. 131.59 Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State, 18 September 1961, FRUS 1961-63, Vol. I, Doc. 133.60 Paper prepared by the President’s Military Representative (Taylor), 3 November 1961, FRUS 1961-63, Vol. I, Doc. 210, Attachment 1.61 Paper Prepared by the Members of the Taylor Mission, 3 November 1961, FRUS 1961-63, Vol. I, Doc. 210, Attachment 2.62 Ibid, Doc. 210.63 Memorandum from Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow), 16 November 1961, FRUS 1961-63, Vol. I, Doc. 260.

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reorganization efforts, including Kennedy’s establishment of the Special Group

(Counterinsurgency) to be chaired by Maxwell Taylor in January64, and Command

structure reorganization in Vietnam itself from January through to February.

However, as reported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a ‘Talking Paper’ the problem of

Diem still persisted, stating that he had “not followed through on the agreed GVN

measures as fully as hoped or desired”65. This problem was further emphasized by the

Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Robert Johnson, who posed the

question, “how much more failure of performance do we tolerate from Diem?”66.

Throughout the Kennedy administration, Diem was the major problem in

Vietnam, which is not surprising as he had been brought into office through

appointment and had a very weak political base. His unpopularity among the South

Vietnamese was evident by the assassination attempt against him on February 27th

1962. He was not only unpopular with his own people, but also with members of the

US Government, “we cannot with the war with the Diem-Nhu methods” commented

Ambassador Durbrow’s political counsellor, Joseph Mendenhall67. By 1963, Diem

created more problems and frustrations for the US aid efforts, as he became more

autocratic and more paranoid about political opponents, rather than fighting the Viet

Cong. Diem furthered his unpopularity amongst the population with a series of

affronts towards the influential Buddhist population, treating them with increasingly

harsh measures68. President Kennedy was caught unawares when the domestic crisis

erupted in South Vietnam, occurring at a time when Ambassador Durbrow had taken

64 L. Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos and Vietnam, p. 289.65 Talking Paper prepared by Colonel Robert M. Levy, J-3, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 4 January 1962, Foreign Relations of the United States 1961-1963, Volume II: Vietnam (hereafter FRUS 1961-63, Vol. II), Doc. 6.66 Memorandum from the Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Johnson) to the Director (Rostow), 11 January 1962, FRUS 1961-63, Vol. II, Doc. 12.67 H. Ford, ‘1963-1965: CIA Judgments on President Johnson’s Decision To “Go Big” in Vietnam’, in H. Ford, CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes: 1962-1968 (Central Intelligence Agency, 1998), p. 2.68 Ibid, p. 2.

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a vacation. Kennedy thus decided to replace Durbrow with Henry Cabot Lodge, a

man who had no record of sympathy for Diem unlike Durbrow had69.

A crucial point in the Diem situation came on the 24th of August 1963, when a

cable sent to Ambassador Lodge by members of the State Department signalled that

he should advise members of the Vietnamese military that the US will not continue to

support Diem if he did not respond promptly to the Buddhist crisis70. This directive

was by other US officials, including Vice President Johnson, seen as giving a “green

light” to a coup against Diem71. However, for some members of Kennedy’s

administration this was not a bad thing, such as George Carver, Vietnam specialist in

Saigon, who stated that the risks of not attempting to overthrow Diem “are even

greater than those involved in trying it”72. On the other hand, Director of the CIA,

John McCone, opposed this thinking believing that the removal of Diem would result

in a succession of coups and political disorder73, a statement which would later be

proved entirely accurate.

Eventually a coup did occur against Diem resulting in his death, on November

1st 1963, executed by generals of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, led by Duong

Van Minh, also known as “Big Minh”. President Kennedy was reported to have

reacted with shock and dismay at the news of Diem’s death, not because he had

supported Diem’s regime, more because he had always insisted that Diem never

suffer more than exile from Vietnam74. In Vietnam itself the coup was initially greeted

with rejoice and enthusiasm, because they finally felt themselves free of the Diem

69 Ibid, p. 3.70 Ibid, p. 4.71 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, 24 August 1963, Foreign Relations of the United States 1961-1963, Volume III: Vietnam January-August 1963 (hereafter FRUS 1961-63, Vol. III), Doc. 281.72 H. Ford, ‘1963-1965: CIA Judgments on President Johnson’s Decision To “Go Big” in Vietnam’, p. 5.73 Ibid, p. 6.74 M. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares (De Capo, 1990), p. 301.

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regime that had become increasingly repressive over its nine year term. However, this

rejoicing quickly faded as the regime that replaced Diem, under a military junta led by

Big Minh proved to be totally incapable of handling the position it had forcefully

taken over. Subsequently the security situation in Vietnam worsened dramatically,

with the Viet Cong taking full advantage of the political confusion by expanding the

range, intensity and frequency of their armed attacks. Commander of the Military

Advisory Command Vietnam (MACV), General Paul Harkins, stated VC activity had

“shot up 300-400% of what they were before”75. The death of Diem also made it

harder for the US to withdraw from Vietnam, as policy was so clearly geared to

creating a new government better able to prosecute the war76.

US-Vietnam relations were thrown into even greater turmoil less than three

weeks after the assassination of President Diem77, when President Kennedy was

assassinated on November 22nd in Dallas, Texas. His assassination meant an untried

President entered the White House with a lack of foreign policy experience who

ultimately escalated Vietnam into the full blown conflict it became, and has led a

number of historians down ‘What If?’ roads concerning the path JFK may have taken

in Vietnam78.

Overall the period under the Kennedy administration did more to aggravate

the problems in Vietnam than they did help. The numerous reports, plans and

statements created in attempt to rescue the situation rarely held water. This fact was

mainly due to the uncooperative and paranoid nature of the US backed President Ngo

Dinh Diem. Although Kennedy had greatly increased the number of US military

75 Memorandum of Discussion at the Special Meeting on Vietnam, Honolulu, 20 November 1963, Foreign Relations of the United States 1961-1963, Volume IV: Vietnam August-December 1963 (hereafter FRUS 1961-63, Vol. IV), Doc. 321.76 L. Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos and Vietnam, p. 416.77 L. Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos and Vietnam, p. 398.78 F. Logevall, Choosing War, p. 395.

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advisors in Vietnam (to around 16,000) and increased the amount of aid to the

country79, it did little to turn the tables on the Viet Cong, who continued to grow and

become bolder in their insurgency. When crisis struck the country in November of

1963, Kennedy had been unprepared to respond to it, as for a long period of his

administration he had viewed Vietnam as simply a test bed for ill-prepared theories of

counterinsurgency80.

As Kennedy was tragically removed from office at the end of 1963, the

situation in Vietnam was worse than ever before, with an unstable and divided

government harassed by an ever confident Viet Cong adversary. Newly appointed

President, Lyndon B. Johnson was faced with a major foreign policy failure to avert81,

and a serious dilemma in aiding a broken and imperilled South Vietnam.

79 JFK in History: Vietnam, reproduced at http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/JFK+in+History/Vietnam.htm80 L. Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos and Vietnam, p. 416.81 H. Ford, ‘1963-1965: CIA Judgments on President Johnson’s Decision To “Go Big” in Vietnam’, p. 8.

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CHAPTER THREETHE JOHNSON YEARS, 1963-1965

The developing situation in Vietnam may not have been a central focus for

either Eisenhower or Kennedy, with their attentions directed elsewhere, Vietnam was

often treated more as a side issue. When crisis really did hit home in Vietnam during

the November of 1963 making it an undeniable central concern to the United States,

President Kennedy had had little chance to react. However, from the moment Lyndon

B. Johnson was sworn into office as Kennedy’s replacement, it was clear that

Vietnam was going to take centre stage, not only in US foreign policy, but as a central

concern for the entirety of the Johnson administration.

As stated in his own memoirs, when Johnson took office as a result of the

tragic death of President Kennedy, he stated he would devote every hour of every day

during the remainder of JFK’s unfulfilled term to achieving the goals he had set. In

1963 and beyond, this meant seeing things through in Vietnam82. Even with this

intention to follow the ‘Kennedy way’ as President, Johnson took a very different

82 L. Johnson, The Vantage Point, Perspectives of the Presidency 1963-1969 (London, 1972), p. 42.

26


stance on policy in Vietnam to his predecessor. He often had the tendency to

personalize all issues that related to the war occurring in Vietnam, and viewed any

attacks on US policy towards the country as personal attacks on himself83. Johnson

also believed that what the US was doing in Southeast Asia was simply an extension

of what America had done for Europe in the Second World War84.

Johnson also had an extensive experience of the situation in Vietnam before he

entered into office, due to his previous position as Vice President. Plus the fact that

President Kennedy had, as we have previously seen, sent Johnson on a fact-finding

mission into Vietnam. He had witnessed the situation grow and escalate into

something more than a simple aid program, and had always been on the sidelines

when some new and controversial event occurred in the country. In addition, Johnson

had witnessed the results of the Kennedy-Senator James Fulbright discussion in May

1961, which had pointed to the idea that the US may have to spill blood to keep its

word in Vietnam85. It was therefore clear that if something dramatic was to happen

with US involvement in Vietnam it was going to occur under the guidance of

President Johnson.

It is also important to note that Johnson made very few changes to the core of

his administration from what Kennedy had appointed. The important and influential

figures of Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk and McGeorge Bundy all retained their

positions in the administration, and continued to exercise the greatest of control over

the situation in Vietnam alongside Johnson. In operating the administration however,

Johnson took a different approach to his predecessor. Whereas Kennedy had sought

the views of a wide spectrum of foreign policy advisors, Johnson on the other hand

had a tendency to only listen to those who agreed with what he thought. In the words

83 F. Logevall, Choosing War, p. 392.84 L. Johnson, The Vantage Point, Perspectives of the Presidency 1963-1969, p. 48.85 L. Johnson, The Vantage Point, Perspectives of the Presidency 1963-1969, p. 55.

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of National Security Council staffer Chester L. Cooper, Johnson “seemed to have a

blind mind-set which made him pay attention to people who said that (a) he was right,

(b) there was a way out, and (c) there were no other alternatives to what he wanted to

do”86. This approach immediately locked out a number of individuals in the State

Department who had previously had more influence over Vietnam under Kennedy.

In the closing months of 1963, Johnson’s initial involvement with policy over

Vietnam was a simple case of reinforcement of present policy. Sticking to his belief in

the policy laid down by Kennedy, he stated on the 27th November 1963 in a speech

entitled ‘Let Us Continue’, that the United States, “will keep our commitments from

South Vietnam to West Berlin”87. In addition to this public declaration, Johnson made

a more official commitment to continuing the support of South Vietnam one day

earlier, by passing National Security Action Memorandum 273. NSAM 273 stated

that, “it remains the central objective of the United States in South Vietnam to assist

the people and Government of that country to win their contest against the externally

directed and supported Communist conspiracy”88. At the same time that Johnson was

re-establishing US commitment towards Vietnam, he was receiving numerous reports

from a number of high ranking officials about growing concerns over the current

situation. Director of the CIA, John McCone declared that “there is no organized

government in South Vietnam at this time”89 referring to the incompetent and divided

military junta that had overthrown President Diem. Defence Secretary McNamara

returned from a visit to Saigon in December 1963 to report that the situation was

86 H. Ford, ‘1963-1965: CIA Judgments on President Johnson’s Decision To “Go Big” in Vietnam’, p. 9.87 Let Us Continue Speech, November 27th 1963, reproduced at http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/lbjletuscontinue.html88 National Security Action Memorandum 273: South Vietnam, reproduced at http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/Johnson/archives.hom/NSAMs/nsam273.asp89 H. Ford, ‘1963-1965: CIA Judgments on President Johnson’s Decision To “Go Big” in Vietnam’, p. 10.

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http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/lbjletuscontinue.html


“very disturbing” and that unless current trends were reversed quickly, developments

would be highly in favour of the Communists90.

The absence of optimism towards the situation in Vietnam continued into

early 1964 both domestically and from Saigon itself. Senator Mike Mansfield, the

Senate Majority leader at the time, stated in January that the US was “close to the

point of no return in Vietnam”91 and in the same month, Secretary McNamara stated

that “the security situation is very serious” and that the US should “go on bending

every effort to win”92. It was not long after these warnings and bleak outlooks were

reported to President Johnson, that the situation in Vietnam did take yet another turn

for the worse, although at the time it occurred it may not have been viewed to be as

disastrous as it became.

On the 29th January 1964, another successful coup was staged in South

Vietnam93, less than three months after the previous one that had removed Diem from

office. The coup itself was led by General Nguyen Khanh, the military commander

appointed by Diem during the Eisenhower administration. Khanh’s reasoning behind

the coup was that he believed the old government was contemplating neutralization of

South Vietnam, which would have brought a favourable situation for takeover by the

Communist North. Initially the coup was greeted with a feeling of enthusiasm and

optimism by US officials, such as Michael Forrsetal of the National Security Council,

who reported to the President at the end of January that Khanh “may prove to be

stronger than the present set-up”94. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge added to this

90 Ibid, p. 10.91 Memorandum from Senator Mike Mansfield to the President, 6 January 1964, Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968, Volume I: Vietnam (hereafter FRUS 1964-68, Vol. I), Doc. 2.92 Memorandum from the Secretary of Defence (McNamara) to the President, 7 January 1964, FRUS 1964-68, Vol. I, Doc. 8, Tab B.93 Memorandum from the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Denney) to the Acting Secretary of State, 29 January 1964, FRUS 1964-68, Vol. I, Doc. 20.94 Memorandum from Michael V. Forrsetal of the National Security Council Staff to the President, 30 January 1964, FRUS 1964-68, Vol. I, Doc. 22

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optimistic appraisal by stating that “Khanh is cool, clear-headed, realistic planner; has

good record; is tough, ruthless, farsighted”95. President Johnson himself also gave a

feeling of optimism towards Khanh, stating in a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff

in March that the United States should make him “our boy”96.

As 1964 progressed from March through to May, the major activity of the

Johnson administration was to send a number of missions to South Vietnam, to attain

an updated appraisal of the situation under the new leadership of General Khanh. The

first mission in early March through to April was led by Defence Secretary

McNamara and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Maxwell Taylor, the purpose of

this mission was to “appraise the current strength of the SVN government”97. This

first mission ultimately concluded an optimistic appraisal of the new situation, stating

that if the Khanh government could remain in power, in addition to US aid, then the

situation in South Vietnam “can be significantly improved”98. The second mission

sent to South Vietnam in the early months of 1964 was headed by another of

Johnson’s ‘awesome foursome’ Secretary of State Dean Rusk, in which Rusk sought

to obtain a greater understanding of the country and to reaffirm the United States

support for the fight against the Viet Cong insurgency99.

Around the same time that Rusk was travelling to South Vietnam, there was

also evidence of tentative early planning for pressures against North Vietnam, on the

basis of, as Assistant Secretary William Bundy called, “tit-for-tat actions”100. Many

95 Memorandum from the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Green) to the Secretary of State, 30 January 1964, FRUS 1964-68, Vol. I, Doc. 23.96 Memorandum of a Conversation between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President, 4 March 1964, FRUS 1964-68, Vol. I, Doc. 70.97 Memorandum from the Secretary of Defence (McNamara) to the Members of the McNamara-Taylor Mission to Vietnam, 5 March 1964, FRUS 1964-68, Vol. I, Doc. 74.98 Memorandum from the Secretary of Defence (McNamara) to the President, 16 March 1964, FRUS 1964-68, Vol. I, Doc. 84.99 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, 9 April 1964, FRUS 1964-68, Vol. I, Doc. 111.100 Letter from the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge), 4 April 1964, FRUS 1964-68, Vol. I, Doc. 108.

30


military planners had come to assume that punishing the North would result in them

ceasing their activities in the South101. This is one of the earliest indications of the idea

for attacks against the North and going beyond simple counterinsurgency that had

been advocated by President Kennedy previously. However, the concept of giving any

substantial US military aid was still, at this time, out of the question, “we do not

intend to provide military support nor undertake the military objective of ‘rolling

back’ Communist control in North Vietnam”102

The third US directed mission to visit South Vietnam in May 1964 was yet

again headed by McNamara and Maxwell Taylor. The reasoning for this mission was

due to President Johnson’s impatience with the lack of visible progress in the war in

Vietnam, and so he required a second look at the situation103.

Shortly after these fact-finding missions into South Vietnam, the appraisal of

the situation became increasingly bleak in nature. Dean Rusk began suggesting

sending US troop divisions into Southeast Asia, Director McCone expressed the need

to go in hard, while Secretary McNamara stated that “the situation is still going to

hell. We are continuing to lose. Nothing we are now doing will win.”104 The turn

towards military escalation seemed to be well under way by the end of May 1964, and

as further evidence of this new course of action, Secretary Rusk presented a

memorandum entitled, “Legal Basis for Sending American Forces to Vietnam”105.

Secretary McNamara cancelled previous plans made under Kennedy to withdraw US

101 H. Ford, ‘1963-1965: CIA Judgments on President Johnson’s Decision To “Go Big” in Vietnam’, p. 11.102 Talking Paper prepared for the Secretary of Defence (McNamara) by the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for Vietnam (Sullivan), 7 May 1964, FRUS 1964-68, Vol. I, Doc. 145.103 Editorial Note, FRUS 1964-68, Vol. I, Doc. 146.104 Summary Record of the National Security Council Executive Committee Meeting, 24 May 1964, FRUS 1964-68, Vol. I, Doc. 172.105 Memorandum from the Secretary of State to the President, 29 June 1964, FRUS 1964-68, Vol. I, Doc. 226.

31


military personnel from Vietnam106 and in addition President Johnson replaced

Ambassador Lodge with the more military minded General Maxwell Taylor in July

1964107. The concept of negotiated settlements and a withdrawal from Vietnam

seemed a very distant memory by this time.

US-Vietnamese relations took yet another drastic turn for the worse in August

1964, with events in the Gulf of Tonkin. On August 2nd the US destroyer Maddox

reported that it had been attacked by three North Vietnamese patrol craft, and reported

2 days later that another attack appeared imminent108. This event was greeted with

outrage by a number of US officials as well as General Khanh who pushed strongly

for US retaliation. Secretary Rusk stated that the “unprovoked attack on the high seas

is an act of war for all practical purposes”109 and President Johnson strongly agreed

that a retaliatory attack was needed in response. However, support for this idea was

not unanimous, as Director McCone stated his belief that the attacks on the Maddox

were simply a response “out of pride and on the basis of defence considerations”110

due to recent gunboat raids that had been carried out by the South Vietnamese.

Despite these objections, the result of the Gulf of Tonkin events was retaliatory

bombing strikes against North Vietnamese targets by US forces. In addition Congress

passed a Joint Resolution that authorized the future use of appropriate force in

response to unprovoked attacks111. The first major step towards US military

involvement in Vietnam had been taken.

106 H. Ford, ‘1963-1965: CIA Judgments on President Johnson’s Decision To “Go Big” in Vietnam’, p. 17.107 Letter from the President to the Ambassador to Vietnam (Taylor), 2 July 1964, FRUS 1964-68, Vol. I, Doc. 228.108 Editorial Notes, FRUS 1964-68, Vol. I, Doc. 255 and Doc. 272.109 Summary Notes of the 538th Meeting of the National Security Council, 4 August 1964, FRUS 1964-68, Vol. I, Doc. 278.110 H. Ford, ‘1963-1965: CIA Judgments on President Johnson’s Decision To “Go Big” in Vietnam’, p. 20.111 Draft Joint Resolution on Southeast Asia, 4 August 1964, FRUS 1964-68, Vol. I, Doc. 278, Attachment.

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Map showing the course of events on August 2nd 1964

33


Artist’s interpretation of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident.

Following the events in the Gulf of Tonkin, the situation domestically in South

Vietnam began to take a further downward turn as General Khanh began to show his

ineptitude at being a politician. He began to become paranoid towards his opposition

similar to how Diem had once been, and once again clashed with the influential

Buddhist elements in his attempts to form a more presidential form of government.

Attempts which seriously stalled the working of government and subsequently stalled

the war against the Viet Cong112. Ambassador Taylor stated in a memorandum to the

State Department that the situation had tarnished Khanh’s reputation and that

circumstances now lent themselves dangerously to another coup113. A Special

National Intelligence Estimate published in September of 1964 provided the bleak

conclusion that “the odds are against the emergence of a stable government” in South

Vietnam114.

112 Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State, 31 August 1964, FRUS 1964-68, Vol. I, Doc. 333.113 Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State, 2 September 1964, FRUS 1964-68, Vol. I, Doc. 336.114 Special National Intelligence Estimate, 8 September 1964, FRUS 1964-68, Vol. I, Doc. 341.

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Although a High National Council (HNC) was eventually established in South

Vietnam, and progress had been made to bring about a stable government through the

HNC, it was not to last. A Military Council headed once again by General Khanh took

the decision on the 19th December 1964 to dissolve the HNC; an action which

Ambassador Taylor believed would look to be yet another military coup in the

international sphere115. US officials were keenly distraught over the actions by

General Khanh, as their hopes for a workable and stable government were dashed.

Taylor began to lash out at Khanh and his compatriots, stating that they had “lost the

confidence” of the US government and that there would be little chance of

improvement over Khanh’s former “sorry performance”116. Khanh became

increasingly difficult towards the US, proclaiming that Vietnam was not a vassal of

the United States and proclaiming Ambassador Taylor as a ‘persona non grata’

(unwelcome person)117.

As 1964 became 1965, South Vietnam descended into a mess of political

turmoil, continuously spurred on by the actions of General Khanh who was

attempting to maintain his position of power, with little regard to the real pressing

matter of war against the Viet Cong. President Johnson in his memoirs, characterized

this period by stating that the South Vietnamese often seemed to have a strong

impulse toward political suicide, and described how General Khanh seemed to be in

and out of Government constantly118.

At the same time, US officials were continuing to debate over whether to

expand US involvement in Vietnam. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were still concerned

115 Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State, 20 December 1964, FRUS 1964-68, Vol. I, Doc. 451.116 Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State, 20 December 1964, FRUS 1964-68, Vol. I, Doc. 453.117 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, 24 December 1964, FRUS 1964-68, Vol. I, Doc. 464, Footnote 3.118 L. Johnson, The Vantage Point, Perspectives of the Presidency 1963-1969, p 64.

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over the “domino theory” of President Eisenhower, and Ambassador Taylor

proclaimed the US was “playing a losing game in South Vietnam” and that

“immediate and automatic reprisals” were needed to change course119. The debate

reached a dramatic conclusion when the Viet Cong launched an attack on US

installations at Pleiku on February 7th 1965, killing eight Americans and wounding

many others120. This attack was followed a few days later by a second attack on a US

base at Qui Nhon. In response to these attacks, President Johnson made what he called

his third major decision on Vietnam121, the initiation of bombing operations against

North Vietnam, under the name of ‘Rolling Thunder’. A month after the initiation of

Rolling Thunder, the President authorized the landing of the first troops into Vietnam.

Two Marine battalions numbering around 3,500 men were landed at Danang as a

defence force for the airbase there122. American involvement had reached a

completely new level of escalation, which the Johnson administration could not easily

turn back on.

Thus by early 1965 the war in Vietnam had more or less changed from being a

war between South and North, to a war between the North and the United States. The

South Vietnamese government was still in a shambles, and the power hungry

disruptive figure of General Khanh was only eventually exiled by February 1965. The

arrival of US combat troops on Vietnamese soil signalled the end of any hopes for

diplomacy and negotiated settlement, the United States was now in the situation it had

vowed to avoid for over a decade.

119 H. Ford, ‘1963-1965: CIA Judgments on President Johnson’s Decision To “Go Big” in Vietnam’, p. 23.120 Ibid, p. 23.121 L. Johnson, The Vantage Point, Perspectives of the Presidency 1963-1969, p. 132.122 Editorial Note, Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968, Volume II: Vietnam January-June 1965, Doc. 188.

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CONCLUSION

In September of 1963, President Kennedy declared in an interview that

Vietnam was “their war. They are the ones that have to win it or lose it. We can help

them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers, but

they have to win it, the people of Vietnam, against the Communists.”123. But by the

spring of 1965, Walter Lippmann the influential and award-winning American

journalist commented on the situation in Vietnam, “it used to be a war of the South

Vietnamese assisted by the Americans. It is now becoming an American war very

inefficiently assisted by the South Vietnamese”124. In the space of two years the

eventuality that President Kennedy and numerous members of the US government

had protested against ever happening had become a shocking reality.

The reasoning behind this drastic change in policy can be accounted to a

number of factors, from bad luck, poor planning, surprising turns of events, through to

the actions of certain individuals. Escalating American involvement in Vietnam to

123 JFK in History: Vietnam, reproduced at http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/JFK+in+History/Vietnam.htm124 F. Logevall, Choosing War, p. 375.

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some historians, such as Frederick Logevall, is viewed as being a choice that was

taken mainly by Johnson and his advisors, apparent in the fact that the title of one of

his recent books is Choosing War. I would however argue that there was little room

for choice in the situation that developed over the nine year period that I have covered

in this study, due to a number of factors outside the control of those who actually had

to make the decisions.

Initial US involvement in Vietnam had come from a simple execution of

foreign policy that they had utilised in a number of countries since the end of the

Second World War, that of ‘containment’. The Soviet Union had come out of the

Second World War as a new threat to world security, a view that was not simply

exclusive to the United States. Other nations such as the United Kingdom, France and

various democratic nations worried about the influence and spread of Communism

throughout Europe and globally. The fall of China to Communism and the conflicts

occurring in both Laos and Vietnam simply made Southeast Asia the focus of this

fear, a fear that the United States hoped to stand against, as they had done in Iran a

number of years earlier.

In addition to this committed effort to resist what was widely viewed as a

hostile ideology, the United States saw their commitment to Southeast Asia and

Vietnam in particular as an extension of the assistance they had lent to Europe during

the course of the Second World War. As President Kennedy stated in the same

interview in September 1963, “The United States made this effort to defend Europe.

Now Europe is quite secure. We also have to participate – we may not like it – in the

defence of Asia.”125 It should therefore be seen as no real surprise that the United

States became involved in the way that they did with Vietnam in the earlier

125 JFK in History: Vietnam, reproduced at http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/JFK+in+History/Vietnam.htm

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Eisenhower years. Also I would argue that this involvement was always intended to

serve as a program of aid and advice towards the South Vietnamese, nothing more so.

The course that American involvement subsequently followed after the

justifiable initial involvement of American aid was not a course that had been plotted

out by American officials from the beginning. It is impossible to believe that anyone

in the US Government in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s could have desired the

course of events that would follow in Vietnam. Many of the decisions that were later

made concerning American involvement were hastily made reactions or responses to

unexpected turns in the road, perpetrated more often than not by South Vietnam,

rather than the United States itself.

The regime of Ngo Dinh Diem, which had been a United States influenced and

backed government, had initially held the nation of South Vietnam relatively intact,

despite Diem’s numerous personal flaws and weak political base. Many US officials,

as has been revealed in the course of this study, believed Diem to be a liability and

even went as far as considering the options for his removal. However, it is also

important to note that many other members of Kennedy’s administration vocally

stated their belief that the removal of Diem would be a dangerous idea, including

Lyndon Johnson and John McCone. An even more important factor to note is the

numerous problems and crises that followed the actual removal of Diem in November

1963.

The coup was carried about by untried and politically inexperienced

individuals, none of which had any explicit backing from the United States, even if

the Kennedy administration did give “tacit approval”126 for the coup itself. The

appearance of “Big Minh” and his incapable military junta was not something that

126 JFK in History: Vietnam, reproduced at http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/JFK+in+History/Vietnam.htm

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members of the Kennedy administration or the subsequent Johnson administration had

hoped for, a fact that is evident in the numerous reports of how unstable and divided

the government had become.

The subsequent government that came into power under General Nguyen

Khanh was even less of a desirable occurrence to the US government at the time, and

proved to be one of the more fatal events out of US control. General Khanh came to

be a highly disruptive, unresponsive character, who consistently hampered US efforts

to reverse the downward trend of the situation in South Vietnam. Most notably his

actions to dissolve the High National Council signalled the end of the last chance

South Vietnam had of establishing a stable and workable government.

However, the United States cannot be devoid of blame for the way the

situation developed into conflict. President Johnson had vowed that he would not be

the President to lose Vietnam127, and the fact that numerous individuals in the US

Government stressed the need to go all out and win in Vietnam meant that the

possibility of entering into full scale conflict was always there, especially in the early

to mid 1960’s. There can also be staunch criticism for how the idea of bombing the

North was carried out, especially as the concept was proved to be ill advised on a

number of occasion’s months previous to ‘Rolling Thunder’. War games held in 1964

(SIGMA I and SIGMA II) had proved beyond much doubt that the bombing of North

Vietnam would not help in achieving success in South Vietnam128. However, this

advice was largely ignored by senior decision makers who embarked on the bombing

course regardless.

Blame can also be placed upon the United States for largely disregarding the

option of negotiation, it was only in the later stages of 1964 and early 1965 that the

127 F. Logevall, Choosing War, p. 390.128 H. Ford, ‘1963-1965: CIA Judgments on President Johnson’s Decision To “Go Big” in Vietnam’, p. 21.

40


Johnson administration even entertained the idea of approaching the United Nations

with the problems in Vietnam.

However, it is important to note that a lot of the reasoning behind the way the

US acted towards the Vietnam situation can be explained due to the heavy investment

that the United States placed in the security of Southeast Asia. Eisenhower and

subsequent administrations adhered strongly to his concept of the “domino theory”,

and thus the very idea of losing Vietnam to Communism especially after China had

already fallen was completely inconceivable to almost every member of the various

administrations. In addition, as US involvement became deeper the prestige of

America itself in the international sphere was put on the line, similar to how it had

been in Korea. As historian Frederick Logevall has stated, US “prestige, reputation

and credibility…were on the line in Vietnam”129. Therefore if there was any viable

option for the US Government besides withdrawing and sacrificing their credibility at

the time, they would take it. The attacks that occurred in 1964 and 1965 were an

affront to American prestige and failure to respond would have created an image of

the US as a ‘paper tiger’. It is also important to note that the US at this time was

confident in its abilities to execute a successful conflict in Vietnam.

It was thus a combination of a number of mixed together factors, not all of

which were the fault of the US that led to war. Factors such as; unfortunate and

unforeseen circumstances, uncooperative and disruptive individuals, a strong and

unwavering commitment to defend against the ‘evils’ of Communism and the fact that

US prestige abroad as a whole was in jeopardy, largely led to the eventual decision to

“Go Big”130 in Vietnam.

129 F. Logevall, Choosing War, p. 388.130 H. Ford, ‘1963-1965: CIA Judgments on President Johnson’s Decision To “Go Big” in Vietnam’, p. 1.

41


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