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CASE NOTE

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—“Can’t Touch This”: The Failing Standard of New Jersey v. T.L.O. in School Searches; Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009)

Jeremy Shufflebarger*

IntroductIon

On October 8, 2003, Assistant Principal KerryWilson at Safford MiddleSchool inSafford,Arizona received information froma studentnamedJordanRomero concerning students potentially possessing illegal prescriptionpills onschoolgrounds,withtheintenttoingestthosepillsatlunchtime.1JordanhandedWilson one of the pills, informing Wilson that he received it from anotherclassmate, Marissa Glines.2 Wilson subsequently escorted Glines to his office,andinthepresenceofafemaleadministrator,HelenRomero,directedGlinestoemptyherpocketsandopenherwallet.3Glinesemptiedseveralpills,similartothepillJordanhandedtoWilson,fromherpockets,andwhenaskedfromwhomshe received the pills, she implicated Savanna Redding.4Wilson then directedRomerotoescortGlinestothenurse’soffice,whereRomeroorderedGlinestoliftupher shirtandpullout thebandofherbra,aswellas removeherpantsandstretchouttheelasticonherunderwear—revealingnofurthercontraband.5ActingonthetipbyGlines,aswellasotherinformation,WilsonsubsequentlyescortedReddingtohisoffice.6WilsonproceededtoquestionReddingaboutthepillsfoundonGlines;Reddingdeniedanyknowledgeofthepills.7Inthepresenceof Romero, Wilson instituted a search of Redding’s backpack, which revealednothing.8 Romero then escorted Redding to the nurse’s office, where RomeroorderedReddingtostripdowntoherbraandunderwear,pulloutherbra,andstretchouttheelasticonherunderwear—alsouncoveringnocontraband.9

* CandidateforJ.D.,UniversityofWyomingCollegeofLaw,2011.IwouldliketothankDianeCourselleandLisaRichfortheirassistanceinthisprocess.Iwouldliketogiveaspecialthank youtomywife,BrookBretthauer,forallofhersupportthroughthisprocess.

1 Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 (Redding II), 531 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9thCir.2008).

2 Id.JordanRomeroisnotrelatedtotheschool’sadministrativeassistant,HelenRomero.SaffordUnifiedSch.Dist.No.1v.Redding(Redding),129S.Ct.2633,2640(2009).

3 Redding II,531F.3dat1076.

4 Id.

5 Id.at1077.

6 Id.at1074–77.

7 Id.

8 Id.

9 Id.at1074.

Redding’smotherfiled suit againstSaffordUnifiedSchoolDistrictNo.1,Wilson,Romero,andNurseSchwallier(collectively,“Administrators”),allegingthe strip search violated her daughter’s Fourth Amendment right againstunreasonablesearchesandseizures.10AfterRedding’sdefeatinthedistrictcourt,whichaNinthCircuitpanelupheld,theNinthCircuitenbancreversed—holdingthe strip search violated Redding’s Fourth Amendment rights and grantingqualifiedimmunityforeveryoneexceptWilson.11

After granting the Administrators’ petition for certiorari, the UnitedStates Supreme Court, in an 8-to-1 decision, applied the New Jersey v. T.L.O.reasonableness standard, holding the search of Redding unreasonable in scopeand,thus,aviolationofherFourthAmendmentrights.12However,theCourtheldthedoctrineofqualifiedimmunityprotectedtheAdministratorsfromliability.13

ThiscasenotecriticizestheReddingCourtformissinganidealopportunitytorevisitandclarifytheconfusingreasonablesuspicionstandard(firstarticulatedinT.L.O.).Instead,theCourtexpandedandfurtherconfoundedschoolsearchlaw.14Moreover,thisnotedetailstheprogressionofFourthAmendmentstandardsforsearchesbeginningwiththeinitialprobablecausestandardincriminalcasesto the T.L.O. reasonable suspicion test currently utilized in schools.15 Finally,this case note argues for an adoption of the Gates probable cause standard inschoolsearches.16

Background

Probable Cause—Gates

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guaranteesfreedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.17 In Illinois v. Gates the

10 Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 (Redding III), 504 F.3d 828, 831 (9thCir.2007).

11 SaffordUnifiedSch.Dist.No.1v.Redding(Redding),129S.Ct.2633,2638(2009).

12 Id.at2643;NewJerseyv.T.L.O.,469U.S.325,341–42(1985)(holdingthereasonablenessofasearchdependsontwoinquiries:(1)whetheritwasjustifiedatitsinception;and(2)whetheritwasreasonablyrelatedinscopetothecircumstancesthatjustifiedtheinterferenceinthefirstplace).

13 Redding,129S.Ct.at2643.

14 See infranotes109–44andaccompanyingtext.



17 U.S.Const.amend.IV.TheFourthAmendmentstates:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,againstunreasonablesearchesandseizures,shallnotbeviolated,andnoWarrantsshall

576 WyomIngLaWrevIeW Vol.10

UnitedStatesSupremeCourtestablished thecurrentapproach todeterminingthe existence of probable cause.18 In Gates, the Bloomingdale, Illinois policedepartment commenced surveillance of Gates, and executed a search warrant,basedonananonymous letter informingpoliceofGates’s allegeddrug relatedactivities.19 Upon Gates’s challenge to the admissibility of the evidence foundinthesubsequentsearchandseizureofGates’shomeandcar,theCourtfoundthe traditionalAguilar v. Texas andSpinelli v. United States two-prong inquirytoolimiting.20TheCourtheldthedistincttwo-pronganalysisinAguilar–Spinellirepresentedimportantconsiderationsinatotalityofthecircumstancestest,whichtraditionallyhasguidedprobablecausedeterminations.21AccordingtotheGatesCourt,the“totalityofthecircumstancestest”operatesasabalancingofallthevarious“indiciaofreliability(andunreliability)attendinganinformant’stip.”22

Reasonable Suspicion Standard—Terry

InthelandmarkcaseofTerry v. Ohio theCourtestablishedamajorexceptiontotheprobablecausestandardinsearchcases.23Terryinvolveda“stopandfrisk”ofTerryand twoothermenbyapoliceofficer,basedonhisobservationsandsuspicions of the mannerisms of the men.24The subsequent search led to theseizureoftworevolversandbulletsfromTerry.25UponTerry’schallengetotheadmissibility of the pistols as evidence, the Court held law enforcement mayexecutelessintrusivesearchesandseizuresbasedonalesserquantumofevidencethantraditionalprobablecause—theCourtlabeledthisnewstandard“reasonablesuspicion.”26TheCourtdefinedthereasonablesuspicionstandardasatwo-part

issue,butuponprobablecause,supportedbyOathoraffirmation,andparticularlydescribingtheplacetobesearched,andthepersonsorthingstobeseized.

Id.

18 Illinoisv.Gates,462U.S.213,238(1983).

19 Id.at225.

20 Id.at233,238(referringtoAguilarv.Texas,378U.S.108,114–15(1964),overruled by Gates,462U.S.at233;Spinelliv.UnitedStates,393U.S.410,415–16(1969),overruled by Gates,462 U.S. at 233) (holding the Aguilar test focuses on two “largely independent channels”: thereliabilityofthetipsterpairedwithherbasisfortheknowledgeofthetip).

21 Id.at233.TheCourteffectivelyincorporatedthetwo-pronginquiryofAguilarandSpinelli intothenewGates totalityofthecircumstancesanalysis.Id.

22 Id.at234;see also2Wayner.LaFave,searchandseIzure:atreatIseontheFourthamendment§3.1(explainingtheCourtinGatesdevelopedthetotalityofthecircumstancestestastheapplicableruleforprobablecauseinsearchandarrestcases).

23 Terryv.Ohio,392U.S.1,19–20(1968);see infra notes26–28andaccompanyingtext.

24 Terry,392U.S.at5–7(statingtheofficerjustifiedhissuspicionforthestopandsearchofthemenbasedonhistrainingandyearsofexperiencewiththepoliceforce).

25 Id.at7.

26 1 Joshua dressLer & aLan c. mIchaeLs, understandIng crImInaL Procedure 145(LexisNexis&MatthewBendereds.,4thed.2006)(citingTerry,392U.S.at37).

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analysis:(1)whetherthesearchwasjustifiedatitsinception;and(2)whetherthescopeofthesearchreasonablyrelatedtothecircumstancesjustifyingtheinceptionofthesearch.27AccordingtotheCourt,atwo-parttestofreasonablesuspicionprevents “intrusionsupon constitutionally guaranteed rights basedonnothingmoresubstantialthaninarticulatehunches.”28

School Search Standard—T.L.O.

In 1985, the United States Supreme Court developed a separate rule fordeterminingthereasonablenessofschoolsearchesintheseminalcaseNew Jersey v. T.L.O.29 In T.L.O., a high school teacher escorted two students, includingT.L.O., to Assistant Vice Principal Choplick’s office after discovering themsmokingintheschool lavatory.30ChoplickquestionedT.L.O.,whodeniedtheaccusations.31ChoplickdemandedtoseeT.L.O.’spurse,andwhensheopenedit,Choplicknoticed a packof cigarettes.32Choplickproceeded to remove thepackofcigarettesfromthepurse,andthennoticedrollingpapers.33Suspectingmarijuana possession, Choplick thoroughly searched T.L.O.’s purse, whichrevealed marijuana, a pipe, plastic bags, a large amount of money, an indexcardlistingpeoplewhoowedT.L.O.money,andtwolettersimplicatingherinmarijuana dealing.34The Court originally granted certiorari to determine theissueofaremedyforanunlawfulschoolsearchinajuvenilecourtproceeding,buthadtofocusfirstonthethresholdissueofwhethertheFourthAmendmentrestrictstheactionsofschoolauthorities.35

InT.L.O., theStateofNewJerseyarguedtheFourthAmendmentappliedonlytolawenforcementofficers,anddidnotapplytopublicofficials,eventhoughthey are classified as state agents.36The Court rejected the State’s contention,holding the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searchesandseizuresappliestoschoolofficialswhoinstituteasearch;afterall,theCourtdidnotwanttorisk“strangl[ing]thefreemindatitssourceandteachyouthto

27 Terry,392U.S.at19–20.

28 Id.at21.

29 NewJerseyv.T.L.O.,469U.S.325,333–42(1985).

30 Id.at328.

31 Id.

32 Id.

33 Id.

34 Id.

35 Id.at332.

36 Id.at334(citingIngrahamv.Wright,430U.S.651,662(1977)).


discountimportantprinciplesofourgovernmentasmereplatitudes.”37TheCourtrecognizedschoolsrequireflexibilitytomaintainorderanddisciplineinlightoftherisingtrendofviolentcrimesanddruguseintheschoolsetting.38Moreover,theCourtfoundsearchespermissiblewithoutawarrantorprobablecausewhenthegovernmentpossessesaspecialneed,beyondnormalcrimecontrol.39Insteadof implementingtheprobablecausestandard,theT.L.O. majorityadoptedtheframeworkoftheTerry“reasonablesuspicion”balancingtest,butextendedittoapplytosearchesintheschoolsetting.40TheCourtheldthatinorderforasearchtobe justifiedat its inception, theremustbe a reasonablebasis to suspect thesearchwillrevealevidenceofaviolationofthelaworschoolrules.41Moreover,a search of a student is permissible in scope when “the measures adopted arereasonablyrelatedtotheobjectivesofthesearchandnotexcessivelyintrusiveinlightoftheageandsexofthestudentandthenatureoftheinfraction.”42

The T.L.O. reasonable suspicion standard has been applied in numerousFourthAmendmentsearchcases,butoftenwithinconsistentresults.43Themost

37 Id.at333–35(quotingW.Va.StateBd.ofEduc.v.Barnette,319U.S.624,637(1943))(listingnumerouscasesestablishingthattheFourthAmendmentappliedtocivilauthorities);see alsoMichiganv.Tyler,436U.S.499,506(1978)(holdingtheFourthAmendmentappliedtofiremenenteringprivatepremises);Marshallv.Barlow’s,Inc.,436U.S.307,312–13(1978)(holdingtheFourthAmendmentappliedtoOccupationSafetyandHealthActinspectors);Camarav.Mun.Ct.,387U.S.523,528(1967)(holdingtheFourthAmendmentappliedtobuildinginspectors).

38 T.L.O.,469U.S.at339.

39 Id. at325.TheT.L.O. school search exception represents justoneof the varied specialneedsexceptions.See, e.g.,Mich.Dep’tofStatePolicev.Sitz,496U.S.444,454–55(1990)(holdingtheoperationof sobriety checkpoints topreventdrunkdrivingwithout awarrantor individualsuspicionvalidundertheFourthAmendment);Nat’lTreasuryEmployeesUnionv.VonRaab,489U.S.656,678–79(1989)(holdingdrugtestingofgovernmentdruginterdictionagentsorofpeopleinpositionsthatrequirethemtocarryfirearmswithoutawarrantorindividualsuspicionvalidundertheFourthAmendment);Skinnerv.Ry.LaborExecutives’Ass’n,489U.S.602,632–34(1989)(holdingdrugandalcoholtestingofrailroademployees,afteranaccidenthasoccurredinvolvingthat employee,without awarrantor reasonable suspicionvalidunder theFourthAmendment);UnitedStatesv.Martinez-Fuerte,428U.S.543,566–67(1976)(holdingtheoperationofbordercheckpoints to detect illegal aliens without a warrant or individual suspicion valid under theFourthAmendment).

40 T.L.O.,469U.S.at337–42.TheCourtinT.L.O.adoptedtherequirementthatthesearchbejustifiedatinceptionandpermissibleinscopeinrelationshiptotheobjectivesofthesearch.Id.at341–42.TheCourtstated,“Ononesideofthebalancearearrayedtheindividual’slegitimateexpectations of privacy and personal security; on the other, the government’s need for effectivemethodstodealwithbreachesofpublicorder.”Id.at337.

41 Id.at337.

42 Id.at342.

43 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding (Redding), 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (2009)(findingrelevantthedivisiveholdingsoflowercourtjudgesinstripsearchcases); see, e.g.,Casonv.Cook,810F.2d188,190,193(8thCir.1987)(findingapatdownsearch,pursesearch,andlockersearchofastudentreasonablebasedoninformationthatitemshadgonemissinginalockerroomand the studentwas oneof four students in the locker roomat the time the itemswent

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notable example of the inconsistent T.L.O. decisions is a line of strip searchcasessince1985.44ThedivisivenessofthesedecisionsisbestevidencedbyMark Anthony B., aSupremeCourtofAppealsofWestVirginiadecision,where themajorityfirmlyrejectedstripsearchesunlessexigentcircumstancesarepresent,whencomparedwithWilliams,aUnitedStatesCourtofAppeals for theSixthCircuitdecision,wherethecourtgrantedsignificantdeferencetoschoolofficialstoutilizestripsearches.45ThedivideintheselowercourtdecisionsleadinguptoReddingrepresentsafundamentalconfusionregardinghowtocorrectlyapplytheT.L.O.standard,especiallyinastripsearchcontext.46

missing);Commonwealthv.DamianD.,752N.E.2d679,727,729(Mass.2001)(findingasearchofastudent’spersonbasedonthestudent’s“truantbehavior”unreasonableat its inception,andfurtherfinding the assistantheadmaster’sdecisionwasbasedon amisunderstandingofT.L.O.);In reJuvenile,931A.2d1229,1232,1234(N.H.2007)(holdingthesearchofastudent’slockerfora“largepotpipe”reasonableunderT.L.O.,butfindingfurtherguidancewasneededregardingfactorsforwhetherthesearchwasjustifiedatitsinception);Commonwealthv.Cass,709A.2d350,356(Pa.1998)(findingT.L.O.provideslimitedguidanceforageneralsearchofanentireschool); see also DavidC.Blickenstaff,Strip Searches of Public School Students: Can NewJerseyv.T.L.O. Solve the Problem?,99dIck.L.rev.1,43–44(1994)(statingthatsincetheT.L.O.decision,lowercourtscontinuetodifferontheconstitutionalityofstripsearchesinschools).

44 SeePhaneufv.Fraikin,448F.3d591,592–93,600(2dCir.2006)(holdingtheinceptionofthestripsearchofahighschoolstudentunreasonablebasedonatipbyafellowstudentthatPhaneufplannedonhidingmarijuanadownherpantsduringabagcheckonafieldtrip);Cornfieldv.Consol.HighSch.Dist.No.230,991F.2d1316,1319,1323(7thCir.1993)(holdingastripsearchofahighschoolstudentreasonableonthesuspicionhewashidingcontrabandinhiscrotch,becausehewastoowellendowed);Ex rel.Williamsv.Ellington,936F.2d881,882–83,887(6thCir.1991)(holdingastripsearchofahighschoolstudentreasonablebasedonasmallbrownvialofanover-the-counterinhalantWilliamspulledoutofherpurseandatipthatafellowstudentsawWilliamswithaglassvialofawhitepowderysubstance);Widenerv.Frye,809F.Supp.35,36,38(S.D.Ohio1992)(holdingastripsearchofahighschoolstudentreasonablebasedonateacher’sobservationsofthestudent);Calesv.HowellPub.Schs.,635F.Supp.454,455,457(E.D.Mich.1985)(holdingtheinceptionofthestripsearchofahighschoolstudentunreasonablebasedonthetipofaschoolsecurityguardthathewitnessedthestudentduckingbehindautomobilesintheparkinglot);Coronadov.State,835S.W.2d636,637–38,641(Tex.Crim.App.1992)(holdingastripsearchofastudentunreasonableinscopebasedonthestudentattemptingtoskipoutofschoolandatiptwoweekspriortothesearchthatthestudentwasinvolvedindrugdistribution);Stateex rel.Galfordv.MarkAnthonyB.,433S.E.2d41,42–43,49(W.Va.1993)(holdingastripsearchofa14-year-oldmiddleschoolstudentunreasonableinscopebasedonthestudent’sdutiesasanassistantjanitorinconjunctionwith$100thatwentmissingfromateacher’sclassroom).

45 Compare Ex rel. Williams,936F.2dat887,withMark Anthony B.,433S.E.2dat49.

46 ScottA.Gartner,Note,Strip Searches of Students: What Johnny Really Learned at School and How Local School Boards Can Help Solve the Problem,70S.caL.L.rev.921,950(1997);see also5LaFave,supra note22,§10.11(levyingadetailedcriticismattheT.L.O.majority’sdecisiontorejectprobablecauseinfavorofalesserreasonablesuspicionstandardinschools);Blickenstaff,supra note43,at43–44(observingsuchan“indefinite”standardfailstoadequatelyensuretheprotectionofstudents’rights,becauseitgrantscourtstoomuchleewayindecidingsearchcases).


PrIncIPaLcase

AweekpriortoRedding’sstripsearch,JordanRomeroandhismothermetwith Principal Beeman and Assistant PrincipalWilson, where Jordan’s motherexplainedthatafewnightsearlierJordanactedviolentlytowardherandthenlaterhebecame ill.47 Jordanexplainedhehad ingestedpillshe received fromfellowclassmates.48Healsoreportedcertainstudentswerebringingpillsandweaponstoschool.49Moreover,JordaninformedWilsonthatReddinghostedapartypriortoaschooldance,whereshesuppliedalcoholtofellowstudents.50Inaddition,teachersnotifiedWilson thatReddingandGlineswerepartof a rowdygroupofstudentsattheschooldancewheretheteachersdetectedthesmellofalcoholaroundthem.51Following theconclusionof thedance,administrators foundabottleofalcoholandcigarettesinthegirls’bathroom.52

Withthisbackgroundinformation,aswellasthepillJordanreceivedfromGlines, Principal Wilson went to Glines’s classroom and asked her to gatherherthingsandaccompanyhimtohisoffice.53WilsonnoticedanopenplanneronthedesknexttoGlines,inwhichhefoundsmallknives,acigarettelighter,andacigarette.54WilsonthenaskedGlinesabouttheplanner.55Sherespondedshedidnotknowthesourceofthecontraband.56WilsonreturnedtohisofficewithGlinesandaskedafemaleadministrator,HelenRomero,toobservewhilehedirectedGlinestoemptyherpocketsandopenherwallet.57Glinesemptiedseveral400mgIbuprofenpillsfromherpockets,aswellasabluepill.58WhenWilsonaskedGlineshowsheobtainedthebluepill,sheresponded,“IguessitslippedinwhenshegavemetheIBU400s.”59Whenaskedwho“she”was,Glines

47 Reddingv.SaffordUnifiedSch.Dist.No.1(Redding II),531F.3d1071,1076(9thCir.2008)(enbanc).

48 Id.

49 Id.

50 Id.

51 Id.at1075.

52 Id.

53 Id.at1076.

54 Id.

55 Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 (Redding III), 504 F.3d 828, 830 (9thCir.2007).


57 Id.; see also supra note2andaccompanying text (explaining JordanRomeroandHelenRomeroarenotrelated).


59 Id.

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implicatedafellowstudent,SavannaRedding.60PrincipalWilsonthenescortedReddingfromclasstohisoffice.61WilsonquestionedReddingabouttheplannerandsheinformedhimitbelongedtoher,butshelent ittoGlinesacoupleofdaysearlier.62Shedeniedknowledgeofthecontraband.63WilsonshowedReddingthepills,andstatedsheviolatedschoolruleJ-3050,whichprohibitedbringinganyprescriptionorover-the-counterdrugontheschoolcampuswithoutpriorpermission.64Reddingdeniedanyknowledgeofthepills.65WiththeinformationsuppliedbyGlines andRomero, aswell as the other tips,Wilson instituted asearch of Redding’s backpack and outer garments, which revealed nothing.66RomerosubsequentlyescortedReddingtothenurse’soffice,wheresheorderedReddingtostripdowntoherbraandunderwear,pulloutherbra,andstretchouttheelasticonherunderwear—alsouncoveringnocontraband.67

Lower Courts

Redding’smotherfileda§1983actionagainsttheAdministrators,allegingthesearchviolatedherdaughter’sFourthAmendmentrightagainstunreasonablesearches.68TheAdministratorsmovedfor summary judgment,assertinga two-prong defense: first, the search did not violate Redding’s constitutional rightsand, second, even if it did, the doctrine of qualified immunity protected theAdministrators from civil suit.69The United States District Court of Arizona

60 Id.

61 Id.at1074.

62 Id.at1075.

63 Id.

64 Id.SaffordMiddleSchoolinSafford,Arizona,adoptedapolicyprohibitingthe“nonmedicaluse,possession,orsaleofdrugsonschoolpropertyoratschoolevents.”Reddingv.SaffordUnifiedSch.Dist.No.1(Redding III),504F.3d828,829(9thCir.2007).Thepolicydefines theterm“drugs”asincluding,butnotlimitedto:(1)“[a]lldangerouscontrolledsubstancesprohibitedbylaw,”(2)“[a]llalcoholicbeverages,”and(3)“[a]nyprescriptionorover-the-counterdrug,exceptthoseforwhichpermissiontouseinschoolhasbeengranted.”Id.


66 Id.

67 Id.at1074.

68 Redding III,504F.3dat831(bringinga42U.S.C.§1983actionagainstthepetitioners);see also 42U.S.C.§1983(2006)(creatingamethodforindividualstoredressviolationsoftheirfederally protected rights from conduct by state or local government officials, who are usuallyprotectedfromtortliabilitythroughqualifiedimmunity).

69 Redding III,504F.3dat831.Administrators’qualifiedimmunitydefensestatedthelawwasnotclearlyestablishedatthetimeofthesearch.SeeHarlowv.Fitzgerald,457U.S.800,818(1982) (statingqualified immunityprotectsgovernmentofficials from liability forcivildamagesunless the courtfindsanofficial’s conductviolates clearly established statutoryor constitutionalrightsofwhicha“reasonableperson”wouldhaveknown);Woodv.Strickland,420U.S.308,316(1975)(holdingthereexistsa“goodfaith”exceptionforschoolofficialstoa§1983action).


found for the Administrators, holding the search did not violate Redding’sconstitutional rights.70 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for theNinthCircuitreviewedthecasedenovoandaffirmedthedistrictcourt’srulinginfavoroftheAdministrators.71TheNinthCircuitagreedtorehearthecaseenbancandinacloselydivideddecision,reversedthepanel.72TheNinthCircuitenbancheldthestripsearchunreasonableundertheT.L.O.standardandgrantedqualifiedimmunityfortheAdministrators,exceptPrincipalWilson,findingtheothersdidnotactasindependentdecisionmakers.73

Majority Opinion

TheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtgrantedcertioraritoaddresstheissueofwhetherthesearchbyschoolofficialsofRedding’sunderclothesviolatedRedding’sFourthAmendmentrightsand,ifso,whetherPrincipalWilsonshouldbegrantedqualifiedimmunity.74JusticeSouterwrotethemajorityopinion,joinedbyChiefJusticeRoberts and JusticesScalia,Kennedy,Breyer, andAlito.75Themajorityupheld the Ninth Circuit’s determination that the strip search resulted in aviolationofRedding’sFourthAmendment rights,but reversed thedecision todenyqualifiedimmunitytoWilson,andremandedbacktothedistrictcourttodecidethependingMonellclaim.76

Themajority beganby focusingon thefirst prongof theT.L.O. analysis:whether Wilson possessed reasonable suspicion to justify the inception of thebackpack search.77The majority found Wilson possessed enough informationto reasonably assume Redding carried pills on her person or in her backpack,


71 Id.

72 SaffordUnifiedSch.Dist.No.1v.Redding(Redding),129S.Ct.2633,2638(2009).TheNinthCircuitenbancsplit8-to-3ontheunconstitutionalityofthestripsearchofRedding,butsplit6-to-5ondenyingqualifiedimmunityforWilson.Redding II,531F.3dat1081–87.

73 Redding II, 531F.3d1081–89.

74 Redding,129S.Ct.at2637–38.

75 Id.at2633.

76 Id.at2644;see Monellv.NewYorkCityDep’tofSoc.Servs.,436U.S.658,663(1978)(holdingalocalgovernmentmaybeliableundera§1983actiononlyiftheinjuryinflictedbyitsemployeesoragentsoccurredintheexecutionofagovernment’sofficialpoliciesorcustoms);see also supranote68andaccompanyingtext(defininga42U.S.C.§1983claim).Monellclaimslieoutsidethescopeofthisnote.FormoreinformationabouttheMonellclaim,see1LaFave,supra note22,§1.10,and13am.Jur.3dProof of Facts§1.3(2009).

77 Redding,129S.Ct.at2641;see supranotes41–42andaccompanyingtext(statingT.L.O.consists of a two-fold inquiry: whether an official possessed reasonable suspicion to justify theinceptionofasearch,andwhetherthesearchwasreasonableinscopeinlightofthesexandageofthestudent).

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andthus,tojustifythesearchofthebackpackandRedding’soutergarments.78However, the majority found the next step in the search, from the backpackandoutergarmentstothestripsearchofRedding inNurseSchwallier’soffice,as “categorically distinct, requiring distinct elements of justification on thepart of school authorities for going beyond a search of outer clothing andbelongings.”79Inevaluatingthistypeofsearch,themajorityfoundparticularlyrelevantthereasonableexpectationofprivacy,andthedegreeofintrusivenessofastripsearch.80

Themajority’sopinionfocusedprimarilyonthesecondprongoftheT.L.O. standard—whetherthestripsearchofReddingwasreasonableinscope.81ApplyingT.L.O.,themajorityheldthesearchmustbereasonablyrelatedinscopetothecircumstancesthatjustifiedtheinceptionofthesearchandmaynotbeexcessivelyintrusive when considering the age and gender of the student, in light of thecharacter of the infraction.82The T.L.O. majority ruled (in light of Redding’ssexandage) the lowprescriptionstrengthof the400mgIbuprofencombinedwiththequantityofthepillsfailedtopresentenoughofadangerousthreattothe students to justify escalating to such an intrusive search.83 In finding thesearchunreasonable,theCourtalsofoundrelevantthelackofanyinformationshowingReddingactuallypossessedpillsinherunderclothingatthetimeofthe

78 Redding,129S.Ct.at2641n.3(“Thereisnoquestionherethatjustificationfortheschoolofficials’ searchwas required in accordancewith the T.L.O. standard of reasonable suspicion.”).TheCourtfoundavarietyoffactorsrelevantincluding:theteachers’suspicionthatReddingandGlinespossessedandconsumedalcoholattheschooldance,Jordan’stipregardingthepartywithalcohol thatReddinghostedatherhouse, evidence thatReddingandMarissawere friends, thecontrabandintheplanner,Jordan’stipthatMarissasuppliedthepillstohim,thetipthatstudentswereintendingtoingestthepillsduringlunchtime,andGlines’ssubsequenttipthatshereceivedthepillsfromRedding.Id.at2641.

79 Id.at2641(findingsubjectiveandreasonablesocietalexpectationsofpersonalprivacytosupportcategorizingthestripsearchasadifferentkindofsearch).TheCourtrefusedtospecificallydefineastripsearch,andinsteadfocusedontheimpactonthestudentsfromthistypeofsearch.See id.

80 Id.at2641–42(citingBriefforNationalAssociationofSocialWorkersetal.asAmiciCuriaeSupportingRespondents,Redding,129S.Ct.2633(2009)(No.08-479),2009WL870022;IrwinA.Hyman&DonnaC.Perone,The Other Side of School Violence: Educator Policies and Practices that May Contribute to Student Misbehavior,36J.schooLPsychoL.7,13(1998)(findingastripsearchcanleadtosevereemotionaldamage);NewYorkCityDep’tofEduc.,Reg.No.A-432,p.2(Sept.13,2005)(“Undernocircumstancesshallastrip-searchofastudentbeconducted.”)).


82 Id.(quotingNewJerseyv.T.L.O.,469U.S.325,341–42(1985)).

83 Id.at2642n.4(“AnAdviltablet,caplet,orgelcaplet,contains200mgofibuprofen.”)(citing PhysIcIans’ desk reFerence For nonPrescrIPtIon drugs, dIetary suPPLements, andherBs674(28thed.2006));id.at2642(“Wilsonhadnoreasontosuspectthatlargeamountofthedrugswerebeingpassedaround,orthatindividualstudentswerereceivinggreatnumbersofpills.”).TheReddingmajorityneverclarifiedhowtheseconsiderationsfitintothescope-pronginquiryoftheT.L.O.standard.See id.at2642.


search.84Ultimately,theCourtheld,“[t]hemeaningofsucha[strip]search,andthedegradationitssubjectmayreasonablyfeel,placeasearchthatintrusiveinacategoryofitsowndemandingitsownspecificsuspicions.”85

Finally,themajorityreversedtheNinthCircuit’sholdingandgrantedWilsonqualifiedimmunity,followingitsrecentPearson v. Callahandecision,becausethelawwasnotclearlyestablishedatthetimeofWilson’sconduct.86Themajorityfoundcompellingtheinconsistentholdingsinthestripsearchcasesthroughoutthedistrictandcircuitcourts,aswellas thedivisivenessof theNinthCircuit’spreviousholdingsinthiscase.87

Stevens’s Concurring & Dissenting Opinion

The two concurring opinions in Redding affirmed the majority’s holdingthatRedding’s searchviolatedherFourthAmendmentrights,butdivergedfromthe majority on the question of whether Wilson should be denied qualifiedimmunity.88 JusticeStevens found theRedding searchviolated the scopeprongof the T.L.O. reasonableness inquiry, categorizing the strip search as a classiccasewhere“clearly established lawmeets clearlyoutrageousconduct.”89 JusticeStevenswentontoeschewthemajority’sfindingthatthedivisivenatureoftheNinthCircuit’sdecisionsinthiscasewascompellingenoughtomeetthePearsonstandardingrantingWilsonqualifiedimmunity.90

84 Id.at2642(“[T]hereisnoevidenceintherecordofanygeneralpracticeamongSaffordMiddleSchoolstudentsofhidingthatsortofthinginunderwear.”).

85 Id.at2643.

86 Id.(holdingaschoolofficialisentitledtoqualifiedimmunitywhereestablishedlawcannotdemonstratethesearchofthestudentviolatedtheFourthAmendment);seePearsonv.Callahan,129S.Ct.808,813(2009)(holdingapetitionerpossessesqualifiedimmunityasashieldfromliabilityifthelawwasnotclearlyestablishedthatthesearchwasunconstitutional).Thequalifiedimmunitydiscussion liesoutside the scopeof thisnote.Formore informationonqualified immunity, see1LaFavesupra note22,§1.10,and WesleyKobylak,Annotation,Immunity of Public Officials from Personal Liability in Civil Rights Actions Brought by Public Employees under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, 63A.L.R.Fed.744(1983&Supp.2010).

87 Redding,129S.Ct.at2644(“[T]hecasesviewingschoolstripsearchesdifferentlyfromthewayweseethemarenumerousenough,withwell-reasonedmajorityanddissentingopinions,tocounseldoubtthatweweresufficientlyclearinthepriorstatementoflaw.”).

88 Id.at2644–46(Stevens&Ginsburg,JJ.,concurring&dissenting).

89 Id. at 2644 (Stevens, J., concurring & dissenting) (finding the strip search of Reddingresultedinafarmoreintrusivesearchwithlessjustificationstosupportit,thanthesearchofthepurseinT.L.O.).

90 Id.at2645(findingthe lawclearlyestablishedat thetimeofRedding’s search,andtheinconsistentlowercourtdecisionsinsufficienttoupholdqualifiedimmunityforWilson).

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Ginsburg’s Concurring & Dissenting Opinion

Justice Ginsburg’s opinion also concurred with the majority’s holdingthat Redding’s search violated the scope prong of the T.L.O. test, but furtheremphasizedtheextremelyintrusivenatureofastripsearchofathirteen-year-oldgirlandthe lackof sufficientevidence todeemthe searchreasonable.91 JusticeGinsburgagreedwithStevens’sdissentindenyingWilsonqualifiedimmunity.92

Thomas’s Dissenting Opinion

Justice Thomas wrote an opinion dissenting in part and concurring inpart.93HearguedthestripsearchdidnotviolateRedding’sconstitutionalrights,but agreed with the majority in grantingWilson qualified immunity.94 JusticeThomas,inexaminingthereasonablenessofthesearch,focusedonthesystemicproblemsofschoolofficialsinmaintainingorderanddiscipline,especiallyinlightoftherisingtrendofviolenceanddruguse.95

JusticeThomasarguedthereasonablesuspicionstandardallowsschoolofficialstoretainexpansivediscretiontopromoteasafeandpropereducationalexperienceforstudents.96Hereiteratedthatasearchsatisfiesthepermissible-in-scopeprongoftheT.L.O.inquiryaslongas“itisobjectivelyreasonabletobelievethattheareasearchedcouldconcealthecontraband.”97AccordingtoJusticeThomas,Wilson’sreasonablesuspicionthatReddingpossessedandintendedtodistributepillstootherstudentsdidnotdissolveoncethesearchofthebackpackfailedtorevealcontraband.98ThomasinsteadcontendedthatafterWilsondiscoverednopillsinherbackpackoroutergarments,WilsonreasonablyconcludedReddingsecretedpillsunderherclothing.99ThomassupportedtheAdministrators’positionthatstudentswillroutinelyhidecontrabandundertheirclothing.100

91 Id.(Ginsburg,J.,concurring&dissenting)(findingnoevidenceexistedinthiscasenorweretheresufficientpriorexperiencesattheschoolthatwouldleadareasonablepersontobelieveReddingwouldsecretpillsunderherclothes).

92 Id. at 2646 (finding the law clearly established at the time of Redding’s search, andWilson’sactionsamountedtoanabuseofauthority,thusinvalidatinganyjustificationtogranthimqualifiedimmunity).

93 Id.(Thomas,J.,dissenting&concurring).

94 Id.

95 Id.at2646(citingGossv.Lopez,419U.S.565,580(1975));see also NewJerseyv.T.L.O.,469U.S.325,340(1985)(findingschoolshaveacompellingneedtomaintainasafeenvironmenttopromotelearning).

96 Redding,129S.Ct.at2647(Thomas,J.,dissenting&concurring).

97 Id.

98 Id.at2650.

99 Id. (arguingWilson’sconclusionwas“eminently reasonable,”especiallyconsidering thatstudentsroutinelyhidecontrabandundertheirclothing).

100 Id.


Justice Thomas also attacked the majority for defying traditional T.L.O.reasoningbyinterpretingthe“natureoftheinfraction”portionofthepermissible-in-scopeprongtoallowjudgestosubstitutetheirjudgmentforaparticularschoolpolicyor rule.101Heargued the school rule J-3050,prohibiting thepossessionof prescription drugs on school property, not only parallels a similar Arizonacriminal statute, but also was implemented to combat a troubling trend ofteenageabuseofprescriptionandover-the-counterdrugs.102AccordingtoJusticeThomas,thistrendisparticularlytroublingforofficialsduetothemythamongstudentsthatthesedrugsprovidea“safehigh.”103Furthermore,JusticeThomasnotedthelikelihoodofinjuriesordeathsthatcouldresultfromstudentsingestingpotentiallylethalcombinationsofthesedrugs.104

JusticeThomasconcludedthemajority,ineffect,managedtoreplaceaschoolrulethatdoesnotdistinguishbetweendrugs,withalawthatdoes.105AccordingtoThomas,themajority’sholdingcreatedan“unworkableandunsound”test,wheretheCourtpermitsasearchofastudentforaprohibiteddrugonlyiftheofficialcandemonstrate a sufficient showingof thedangerouspotencyof thedrug.106Thomasfearedthemajority’sapproachinRedding risksyieldingcontrolof thepublic school system to its students.107Alternatively, JusticeThomas suggestedreturningtothecommonlawdoctrineofin loco parentis,whichwouldreturntheparentalauthoritybacktotheteacherstomaintainasafeandeducationallearningenvironmentforstudents.108

101 Id. (“ThisapproachdirectlyconflictswithT.L.O. inwhichtheCourtwas ‘unwillingtoadopta standardunderwhichthe legalityofa search isdependentupona judge’sevaluationoftherelativeimportanceoftheschoolrules.’”)(quotingNewJerseyv.T.L.O.,469U.S.325,342n.9(1985)).

102 Id.at2653(citingKenSchroeder,Get Teens Off Drugs,educ.dIgest75(Dec.2006));see alsoarIz.rev.stat.ann.§13-3406(A)(1)(Supp.2008)(“Apersonshallnotknowingly...[p]ossess or use a prescription-only drug unless the person obtains the prescription-only drugpursuanttoavalidprescriptionofaprescriberwhoislicensedpursuantto[statelaw.]”).

103 Redding,129S.Ct.at2653(Thomas,J.,dissenting&concurring)(citingoFFIceoFnat’LdrugcontroLPoLIcy,teensandPrescrIPtIondrugs:ananaLysIsoFrecenttrendsontheemergIngdrugthreat3(2007)(notingyouthages12to17abuseprescriptiondrugsmorethananyotherillegalnarcoticscombined)).

104 Id.at2654(citingnat’Lctr.onaddIctIonandsuBstanceaBuseatcoLumBIaunIv.,under the counter: the dIversIon and aBuse oF controLLed PrescrIPtIon drugs In theu.s. 25 (2005)); see also Press Release, Substance Abuse&MentalHealth Servs.Admin.,U.S.Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Emergency Room Visits Climb for Misuse of Prescriptionand Over-the-Counter Drugs (Mar. 13, 2007), available at http://www.samhsa.gov/newsroom/advisories/0703135521.aspx (“[Hospital] visits involving the nonmedical use of prescription orover-the-counterdrugsincreasedfrom495,732to598,542.Themajorityofthesevisitsinvolvedmultipledrugs.”).

105 Redding,129S.Ct.at2651(Thomas,J.,dissenting&concurring).

106 Id.

107 Id.at2655(citingMorsev.Frederick,551U.S.393,421(2007)).

108 Id.Formore informationon in loco parentis, see59am. Jur.2dParent and Child§9(2009),and67AC.J.S.Parent and Child §346(2009).

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anaLysIs

Redding v. Safford Unified School District No. 1representsyetanotherexampleof a long lineofFourthAmendment caseswhere themajoritydevelopednewrequirementsforacasespecificsituation—Redding’sstripsearch.109Forasearchto satisfy the permissible-in-scope prong, Redding now requires a court—inadditiontoutilizingthetraditionalT.L.O.standard—toconsiderevidenceofthedangerouspowerandquantityofthecontrabandaswellasevidencethesuspectactuallysecretedcontrabandunderhisorherclothes.110Reddingoperatesasanextension of the T.L.O. rule, specific to severe invasions of privacy.111 Reddingand T.L.O. continue to fail in providing clear guidelines for practitioners andschoolofficialswhendealingwithFourthAmendmentsearchesinschools.112TheclearalternativeistheexistingFourthAmendmentstandardofprobablecause,supportedbyalonghistoryofcaselawtoguideschoolofficialsonhowtoconductconstitutionallyvalidsearchesinschools.113

The Inadequacies of Redding and the Failing T.L.O. Standard

ReddingandT.L.O. leaveschoolofficials,courts,andpractitionerswithanunpredictablestandard,whichwillapplyinconsistentlydependingonthespecificfacts of a case.114 First, the Redding Court never explained how to apply thefactorsproperlyintheT.L.O.permissible-in-scopeprong.115Thisprongrequires

109 Redding,129S.Ct. at2643; see, e.g.,NewJerseyv.T.L.O.,469U.S.325,341 (1985)(establishingatwo-prongreasonablesuspiciontestforsearchesinschools);NewYorkv.Belton,453U.S.454,460(1981)(creatingaseparaterulespecifictoautomobilesearchesincidenttoarrest);Chimelv.California,395U.S.752,756(1969)(establishingthecurrentruleforthesearchincidenttoarrestexception,whichlimitedtheareapoliceofficerscouldsearchtothelimitedareaaroundthedefendant);Terryv.Ohio,392U.S.1,19–21(1968)(establishingareasonablesuspicionstandardforlesserintrusivesearcheslikea“stopandfrisk”search);Carrollv.UnitedStates,267U.S.132,162(1924)(establishingtheautomobileexceptionforthewarrantrequirementinvehiclesearches).


111 Id.(findingtheextremelyintrusivenatureandimplicationsofastripsearchplaceitinadistinctcategoryrequiringamuchgreaterlevelofspecificsuspicions).

112 See Blickenstaff, supra note 43, at 54–55 (observing there is much confusion for whatpreciselyisreasonableinstudentstripsearchcases);see also infranotes114–41andaccompanyingtext (describing the case specific nature of the Redding holding and trouble lower courts haveencounteredinapplyingthereasonablenessstandardtoschoolsearches).

113 See infra notes147,154 and accompanying text (listing the caseswhere theCourthasdevelopedtheprobablecausestandard).

114 See infranotes114–41andaccompanyingtext;see alsoMartinR.Gardner,Student Privacy in the Wake of T.L.O.: An Appeal for an Individualized Suspicion Requirement for Valid Searches and Seizures in the Schools,22ga.L.rev.897,922(1988)(voicingfearsthatT.L.O. opensthefloodgates for abandonment of decades of rule-focused jurisprudence for a case-by-case analysisofreasonableness).

115 Redding,129S.Ct.at2641–43.TheCourtbrieflymentionedthedamagingeffectsofastripsearchonyoungpeopleingeneral,butneverprovidedanyanalysisoftherelevanceofRedding’sspecificage,hergender,orthenatureofherallegedinfraction.See id.


thesearchtobereasonablyrelatedtothesearch’sobjectives,withoutresultinginan“excessively intrusive”searchin lightofthestudent’sageandsex,aswellasthenatureoftheinfraction.116AmajorcriticismoftheoriginalT.L.O.decisiontargetedtheCourt’scomplete lackofguidanceontherelevanceofandweightgiveneachfactorinthepermissible-in-scopeprong.117Twenty-fiveyearslater,theRedding decisionofferedanidealcasefortheCourttofinallyprovideguidanceon how to correctly apply these factors, bearing in mind Redding’s youngadolescent age, her gender, and the nature of her alleged unlawful possessionof low-strengthprescriptiondrugs.118However, theReddingCourtavoided thediscussionaltogether,thusfailingtoprovideanyclearguidelinesforhowschoolofficials,courts,andpractitionersmaycorrectlyanalyzeeachfactoroftheT.L.O. permissible-in-scopeprong.119

Moreover,inRedding boththemajorityanddissentmanagedtoapplyonlypartsoftheT.L.O.permissible-in-scopeprong.120TheReddingmajorityfocusedsolelyon“excessive intrusiveness,”withoutexplainingwhy the search failed torelatetotheobjectivesofthesearch.121TheReddingmajority’sfaultyanalysisof

116 NewJerseyv.T.L.O.,469U.S.325,342(1985).

117 See Gardner,supra note114,at922(statingtheT.L.O.majorityneverexplainedhoworwhythesefactorsarerelevant);see also T.L.O.,469U.S.at365(Brennan&Marshall,JJ.,concurring&dissenting)(“Ascomparedwiththerelativeeasewithwhichteacherscanapplytheprobable-causestandard, theamorphous ‘reasonablenessunderall thecircumstances’ standardfreshlycoinedbytheCourttodaywilllikelyspawnincreasedlitigationandgreateruncertaintyamongteachersandadministrators.”).TheUnitedStatesCourtofAppealsfortheEleventhCircuitprovidedascathingcriticismofT.L.O.’scompletelackofguidanceforthescopefactors:

[N]o reasonable school official could glean from these broadly-worded phraseswhether the search of a younger or older student might be deemed more or lessintrusive;whetherthesearchofaboyorgirlismoreorlessreasonable,andatwhatage or grade level; and what constitutes an infraction great enough to warrant aconstitutionallyreasonablesearchor,conversely,minorenoughsuchthatasearchofpropertyorpersonwouldbecharacterizedasunreasonable....

Indeed, not only does the language used by the Court to announce a legalstandardregardingthepermissiblescopeofareasonableschoolsearchlackspecificitybut,itappears,purposefullyso.

Jenkinsv.TalladegaCityBd.ofEduc.,115F.3d821,825–827(11thCir.1997).

118 Redding,129S.Ct.at2637,2642.

119 See id.at2641–43.TheCourtinRedding focusedsolelyontheexcessiveintrusivenessofthestripsearchinlightofthelackofsufficientsuspicionsbyWilson.See id.(“[T]hecontentofthesuspicionfailedtomatchthedegreeofintrusion....[The]meaningofsuchasearch,andthedegradationthesubjectmayreasonablyfeel,placeasearchthatintrusiveinacategoryofitsowndemandingitsownspecificsuspicions.”);see also Jenkins,115F.3dat828(“[T.L.O.]didnotattempttoestablishclearly thecontoursofaFourthAmendment rightasapplied to thewidevarietyofpossibleschoolsettingsdifferentfromthoseinvolvedin[T.L.O.]”).

120 See infra notes121–26andaccompanyingtext.

121 See Redding,129S.Ct.at2641–43.Instead,themajoritytookparticularcaretopointouttheextremelyintrusivenatureofastripsearchandtheresultingpsychologicaldamageitcausestochildrenandadolescents.See id.at2641–42(describingastripsearchas“embarrassing,frightening,andhumiliating”).

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thepermissible-in-scopepronglackssupportfromcaselaw.122AseriesofFourthAmendmentcaseshaveheldthereasonablenessofasearch’sscopedepends“onlyonwhether it is limited to thearea that is capableof concealing theobjectofthe search.”123 Accordingly, once the search of Redding’s backpack and outergarmentsrevealednocontraband—withtheinformationWilsonpossessed—hereasonablyassumedReddinghidthepillsinaplaceshethoughtnoonewouldlook:underherclothes.124ButevenJusticeThomasinhislengthydissentfailedto assess completely T.L.O.’s scope requirement.125 The discrepancy betweenthe opinions ofThomas and the majority represents a further example of thenumerousdifficultiesschoolofficials,courts,andpractitioners face incorrectlyapplyingtheT.L.O.standardtoschoolsearches.126

Next, the Redding majority included additional factual considerationsbeyond those required under the T.L.O. permissible-in-scope prong.127 Themajorityinsistedontwo“distinctelements”tojustifysuchanintrusivesearch,

122 See infra note123andaccompanyingtext.

123 Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2649 (Thomas, J., dissenting & concurring) (emphasis added)(citingWyomingv.Houghton,526U.S.295,307(1999)(holdinglawenforcementofficersmaysearch the belongings of passengers in a vehicle without individualized probable cause that thepassenger’sbelongingscontainthesuspectedcontraband);Floridav.Jimeno,500U.S.248,251(1991)(holdingthescopeofasearchisdefinedbyitsexpressedobject,thusholdingthatasearchofacontainerinacarthatcouldcontainnarcoticswasreasonable);UnitedStatesv.Johns,469U.S.478,487(1985)(holdingthesubsequentsearchofpackagesintruckswasreasonablebasedonthereasonablebeliefthetruckscontainedillegalcontraband);UnitedStatesv.Ross,456U.S.798,820(1982)(holdingalawfulsearchofapremisesextendstotheentireareatheobjectcouldbefoundin,includingcontainersorpackages)).

124 Id.at2650.

125 Compare id.at2646–59(failingtomentiontherelevanceofRedding’sageorsexinhisdissent),with NewJerseyv.T.L.O.,469U.S.325,342(1985)(holdingasearchwillbepermissibleinitsscopewhenitisnotexcessivelyintrusiveconsideringtheageandsexofthestudentandthenatureoftheinfraction).

126 See supra notes 121–25andaccompanyingtext. CommentatorsAveryandSimpsonlistedexamplesofareasofsearchlawleftunansweredbyT.L.O.:

1. How does this standard relate to the general search versus the particularizedsearch?

2. How does police involvement, prior or otherwise, alter the lawfulness of thesearch?

3. Underwhatcircumstances,ifany,isastripsearchjustified?

4. Arearticlesplacedinastudent’scarorlockergivenlessprotectionthanarticlesplacesonastudent’spersonorpurse?

5. In short, what are the consequences and legal safeguards associated withparticulartypesofsearches?

CharlesW.Avery&RobertJ.Simpson,Search and Seizure: A Risk Assessment Model for Public School Officials,16J.L.&educ.403,407–08(1987).

127 See infranote128andaccompanyingtext.However,theReddingmajoritycorrectlyappliedthefirstprongoftheT.L.O.test,findingWilsonpossessedsufficientreasonablesuspiciontojustifytheinceptionofthesearch.See Redding,129S.Ct.at2641.


whichhavenoplaceinschoolsearchjurisprudence:evidenceofthedangerouspower or quantity of the pills and evidence the student secreted the pillsunderherclothes.128Accordingly, in futurecasesa stripsearchcouldbe foundlegitimate if,undera similar factpattern, theprescriptiondrugwasa strongerpainkiller.129Themajority’sholding,contrary toprovidingguidance for schoolofficialsonconductingstripsearches,managesonlytofurtherentangleanalreadyperplexingstandard.130

Also,theRedding majority’smisapplicationoftheT.L.O.standardwillresultinafurtherlackofpredictabilityforschoolofficials,courts,andpractitioners.131Thisbecomesespeciallysignificantwhenconsideringmanyeducatorsalreadydonotunderstandthebreadthofastudent’sFourthAmendmentprotectionfromunreasonablesearches.132ReddingillustratesthedifficultycourtsatalllevelsfaceinattemptingtoapplytheT.L.O.standardtoschoolsearches.133InalineofstripsearchcasessinceT.L.O.,lowercourtshavemanagedtofallacrossthespectruminattemptingtoapplythestandardproperly.134Inmanyofthesecases,thecourts

128 See Redding, 129S.Ct.at2641–43; id.at2649(Thomas,J.,dissenting&concurring)(contendingthemajority’sapproachis“anunjustifiabledeparturefrombedrockFourthAmendmentlaw”intheschoolsetting).ThemajorityneverrequiredtheseadditionalconsiderationsintheT.L.O.two-prongtest.See T.L.O.,469U.S.at341,347–48.

129 See JohnDayton&AnneProffittDupre,Searching for Guidance in Public School Search and Seizure Law: From T.L.O. to Redding,248educ.L.reP. 19,32 (2009) (“Even if the lawconcerningstripsearcheswasnotwellestablishedpriortoRedding,afterRedding,stripsearchesfornon-dangerouscontrabandbasedoninsufficientevidencewilllikelyresultinbothinstitutionalandindividualliabilityforschoolofficials.”).

130 See supra notes115–29andaccompanyingtext; see also StevenF.Shatzetal.,The Strip Search of Children and the Fourth Amendment,26u.s.F.L.rev.1,8(1992)(“[T.L.O.’s]departurefromestablisheddoctrine,itsvaguereasoning,anditslackofstatedstandardsmakeitsapplicationtochildstripsearchesextremelyproblematic.”).

131 See Gartner, supra note 46, at 949, 951–52, 955 (observing case law subsequent toT.L.O.demonstratesthestandardfailedtooffersufficientguidancetoschoolofficialsandcourts,and even if the Supreme Court heard a strip search case without requiring a probable causestandard,inconsistentadjudicationswouldcontinue,andthuswouldfailtoprovideguidanceforschoolofficials).

132 Id. at 955 (statingnews accounts and research studies indicate a lackof knowledgeonthepartofschoolofficialsregardingthelegalityofsearchesandseizuresinschools—adirectresultfrom the lack of training and experience of school officials in Fourth Amendment search andseizurematters).

133 Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2643 (referring to a number of divisive lower court stripsearchdecisions).

134 E.g.,Ex rel.Williamsv.Ellington,936F.2d881,882–83,887(6thCir.1991)(holdingastripsearchofahighschoolstudentreasonablebasedonasmallbrownvialofanover-the-counterinhalantWilliamspulledoutofherpurseandatipthatafellowstudentsawWilliamswithaglassvialofawhitepowderysubstance);Stateex rel.Galfordv.MarkAnthonyB.,433S.E.2d41,42–43,49 (W. Va. 1993) (holding a strip search of a 14-year-old middle school student unreasonableinscopebasedonthestudent’sdutiesasanassistantjanitorinconjunctionwith$100thatwentmissingfromateacher’sclassroom);see also supra note44andaccompanyingtext(listingnumerousinconsistentlowercourtstripsearchdecisions).

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failed to assess relevant factors in thebalancing test, suchas the student’s age,historyofdruguseorviolenceinschools,orthestudent’sdisciplinaryrecord.135EventheT.L.O.majoritymanagedtooverlooktheageandsexofthestudent,aswellasthenatureoftheintrusionfacetofthepermissible-in-scopeprongofthestandarditcreated.136

Furthermore, the T.L.O. reasonableness standard has left courts andpractitionerswithlittledirectioninhandlingvariousotherFourthAmendmentsearch issues in schools.137 These unanswered issues include: whether theexclusionary rule is applicable; what standard of suspicion is sufficient whenthe search involves school officials and law enforcement working together;and whether students’ privacy rights extend to unique school property, suchas lockers.138 The Redding majority expressed concern with the decades ofinconsistentapplicationsoftheT.L.O. standard.139Nevertheless,theCourtchose

135 Tamela J. White, Note, Williams by Williams v. Ellington: Strip Searches in Public Schools—Too Many Unanswered Questions,19n.ky.L.rev.513,539–40(1992)(“Althoughthesewerenotrequirementsofthe[T.L.O.] decision,theseareattributesthatweighheavilyinthebalanceofthecompetinginterestsathand.”);see, e.g.,Ex rel. Williams,936F.2dat882–83,887(holdingthestripsearchofahighschoolgirlunreasonable,failingtomentionthestudent’sactualageatallintheopinion,andfailingtoanalyzethesexofthestudentaswellasthenatureofherinfraction);Widenerv.Frye,809F.Supp.35,36,38(S.D.Ohio1992)(holdingastripsearchofahighschoolstudentreasonable, failingtomentiontheboy’sage,anyhistoryofhimbreakingpreviousrules,andnevermentioninganyinfractionofschoolrulesorthelawbytheboy);Mark Anthony B.,433S.E.2dat42–43,49(holdingastripsearchofafourteenyear-old-boyunreasonableinscope,failingtomentionanyotherrelevantfactorsbeyondthenatureoftheinfraction).

136 NewJerseyv.T.L.O.,469U.S.325,342(1985)(holdingasearchispermissibleinscopewhenitisnotexcessivelyintrusiveconsideringthesexandageofthestudentaswellasthenatureoftheinfraction);see also Jenkinsv.TalladegaCityBd.ofEduc.,115F.3d821,825(11thCir.1997)(“Specificapplicationofthefactorsestablishedtodefinetheconstitutionallypermissibleparametersofaschoolsearch...isnotablyabsentfromtheCourt’sdiscussionandconclusionwithrespectto[T.L.O.]”).

137 See Jason E. Yearout, Note, Individualized School Searches and the Fourth Amendment: What’s a School District to Do?,10Wm.&maryBILLoFrts.J.,489,495–96(2002)(listingthevariousareasofFourthAmendmentsearchlawforwhichT.L.O.hasfailedtoprovideguidance);see also Avery&Simpson,supra note126,at407–08(listingexamplesofunansweredquestionsthattheT.L.O.standardimparts).

138 Yearout,supra note137,at495–96.

139 SaffordUnifiedSch.Dist.No.1v.Redding(Redding),129S.Ct.2633,2643–44(2009);see, e.g.,Thomasv.Roberts,323F.3d950,956–57(11thCir.2003)(holdingagroupstripsearchoveramissing$26unreasonablebutgrantingqualifiedimmunitybecausethelawwastoouncleartoputtheschoolofficialonnoticethathisconductviolatedthestudents’constitutionalrights);Jenkins,115F.3dat828(“[T.L.O. representsa]seriesofabstractionontheonehand,andadeclarationofseemingdeferencetothejudgmentsofschoolofficials,ontheother.”);Ex rel. Williams,936F.2dat882–83,887(holdingastripsearchofahighschoolstudentforadrugreasonable,withoutanysuspicionthecontrabandwashiddennexttoherperson);see also supra note44andaccompanyingtext (listingnumerousdivisiveholdingsof strip searchcases amongst the lower courts since theT.L.O. decision).


nottoreevaluateT.L.O.—insteaditeffectivelyproclaimedthefault inReddingexisted intheactionsofWilson,not intheT.L.O. standard.140Asaresult, theRedding decisionofferslimitedguidancetocourtsandschoolofficialsonlywhenhandlingfactuallyparallelcases,thusforcingcourtsandofficialsinfutureschoolsearchcasestorelyonthealreadyproblematicT.L.O.standard.141

In sum, Redding illustrates that even the United States Supreme Courtresortstothecreationofadhoc,additionalconsiderationswhenapplyingT.L.O. to certain fact-specific situations.142 The Supreme Court specifically designedthe T.L.O. standard to provide school officials with a common sense methodtoregulateconductwhileupholdingstudents’privacyinterests.143However,theT.L.O.standardremainstooinconsistent,broad,andvagueforschoolofficialstoeffectivelyutilizeitintheschoolsetting.144

Instituting a Probable Cause Standard in Schools

Thepost-T.L.O.schoolstripsearchcases,culminatinginRedding,conclusivelydemonstrate the need for a workable standard in the school setting: probablecause.145TheCourt inTerry v. Ohio created the reasonable suspicion standard

140 Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2643–44. Justice Ginsburg’s concurring and dissenting opinionmostclearlyillustratesthispointbylabelingWilson’s“humiliatingstripdownsearch”ofReddingasan“abuseofauthorityof[an]order[that]shouldnotbeshieldedbyofficialimmunity.”Id.at2645(Ginsburg,J.,concurring&dissenting).

141 See id.at2642–43(majorityopinion)(givingnoindicationthatifthecontrabandwasanarcoticordangerousweaponofsomesorttheCourtwouldrequirethesameconsiderationsasinRedding); see alsoDayton&Dupre, supranote129,at30–31(“TheCourt’sopinioninReddingmakesitclearthatwhenthesearchispremisedonfindinganon-dangerousitem,schoolofficials’legitimateinterestinfindingandseizingthenon-dangerousitemisunlikelytowarrantanintrusivesearch . . . . [T.L.O.] remains the standard for searchesof studentsbypublic schoolofficials.”);Gerald S. Reamey, New Jersey v.T.L.O.: The Supreme Court’s Lesson on School Searches, 16 st.mary’sL.J.933,948–49(1985)(“[T.L.O.’sreasonablenesstest]requiresgreatcaretoavoidabuse,andwhateveritsvirtue,itislikelytofosterinconsistencyofapplicationandresult.”).

142 See supranote128andaccompanying text (describing the twoadditional requirementsthemajorityusedtodecideRedding);see alsoDayton&Dupre,supra note129,at32(“[T]hemostintrusive searches, if ever reasonable, would require credible evidence of urgency, danger, and areasonablebasisforbelievingthatthedangerishiddeninanintimatearea.”).


144 Blickenstaff, supranote43, at54–55;Gartner, supranote46, at949–50; see also SunilH.Mansukhani,School Searches After NewJerseyv.T.L.O.: Are There Limits?,34J.Fam.L.345,360(1995)(claimingtheT.L.O. reasonablenessstandardfailstoprovidecourtswithacleartesttoapplytovariousfactspecificsituations);Reamey,supra note141,at948(“[R]eductionofthelevelofsuspicionjustifyingasearchwillinevitablyincreasetheincidenceofmistake,particularlyintheabsenceofreviewbyamagistrate.”).

145 See Blickenstaff,supra note43,at41(statingunderT.L.O. substantialinconsistenciesanddifficultiesexistsinhowtocorrectlyapplyT.L.O., asevidencedbythedivisivestripsearchcasesinthelowercourts);see also SaffordUnifiedSch.Dist.No.1v.Redding(Redding),129S.Ct.2633,2638(2009)(evidencingthesplitintheNinthCircuit’sdecisionintheRedding case,andtheclosely

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(whichT.L.O.adopted)tofitthespecificmoldofastopandfrisksearch,neverintending it to apply in a full-scale search.146 Justice Brennan in his prescientdissent in T.L.O. aptly criticized the majority’s test as a “sizable innovation inFourthAmendmentanalysis”that“findssupportneitherinprecedentnorpolicyandportendsadangerousweakeningofthepurposeoftheFourthAmendmenttoprotecttheprivacyandsecurityofourcitizens.”147ReasonablesuspicionwouldbelegitimateforaminimallyintrusiveTerry “stopandfrisk”search,butbecausetheT.L.O.majorityconcededstudentspossesslegitimateexpectationsofprivacyandFourthAmendmentrights,probablecauseshouldbetheonlyapplicablestandardforafullsearch.148

The T.L.O. majority voiced two primary justifications for adopting areasonable suspicion standard in schools: (1) the T.L.O. standard would spareeducators the “necessity of schooling themselves in the niceties of probable

dividedNinthCircuitenbancdecision);NealI.Aizenstein,Fourth Amendment—Searches by Public School Officials Valid on “Reasonable Grounds”: NewJerseyv.T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985),76J.crIm.L.&crImInoLogy898,923–24(1985)(observingthereasonablesuspicionstandardlacksauthorityandpromotesinconsistencyincaselaw);supranote44andaccompanyingtext(listingthesplitincircuitcourtdecisionsregardingstripsearches).

146 See Gardner,supra note114,at920(“Severalcriticshavetakenthe[T.L.O.]Courttotaskforitsmisuseofpriorprecedentinattemptingtojustifytherejectionoftheprobablecausestandardinschoolsearches infavorofthereasonablegrounds,balancingapproach.”);Mansukhani, supra note144,at351(explainingtheTerry Court’srationaleinadoptingalesserstandardofsuspicionwastoensureofficerandthepublic’ssafety,byallowinganofficertoengageinaquickpatdownsearchofapersonsuspectedofhidingaweapon—notafull-scalesearch);see also Terryv.Ohio,392U.S.1,27(1968).TheTerry majorityheld:

[T]here must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable searchforweapons for theprotectionof thepoliceofficer,wherehehas reason tobelievethatheisdealingwithanarmedanddangerousindividual,regardlessofwhetherhehasprobablecausetoarresttheindividualforacrime.

Terry,392U.S.at27.

147 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 358 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring & dissenting). JusticeBrennan cited a long line of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence which holds probable cause isaprerequisite for any full-scale search. Id. at358–59; see UnitedStates v.Ortiz,422U.S.891,896(1975)(“Asearch,evenofanautomobile,isasubstantialinvasionofprivacy.Toprotectthatprivacyfromofficialarbitrariness,theCourtalwayshasregardedprobablecauseastheminimumrequirementforalawfulsearch.”(citationomitted));Chambersv.Maroney,399U.S.42,51(1970)(“In enforcing the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures,theCourthas insisteduponprobable cause as aminimum requirement for a reasonable searchpermittedbytheConstitution.”);Carrollv.UnitedStates,267U.S.132,149(1925)(“[O]nreasonandauthoritythetrueruleisthatifthesearchandseizure...aremadeuponprobablecauses...thesearchandseizurearevalid.”).

148 T.L.O.,469U.S.at362(Brennan,J.,dissenting&concurring);see also Aizenstein,supra note 145, at 930 (stating only a probable cause standard sufficiently protects students’ privacyinterests in schools); Mansukhani, supra note 144, at 351–61 (observing a Terry stop and frisksearchfailstoamounttoafull-scalesearch,andwouldbeappropriateinsituationswhereanofficerhasreasontobelieveapersonpossessesanobjectthatcouldharmthepersonconductingthesearchorbystanders).


149 T.L.O.,469U.S.at340–43(findingthesearchwouldfailtomeettheonerousrequirementsofFourthAmendmentjurisprudenceforprobablecause).

150 Illinoisv.Gates,462U.S.213,238–39(1983)(“Weareconvincedthatthisflexible,easilyapplied standardwill better achieve the accommodationofpublic andprivate interests that theFourthAmendmentrequires.”);see Aizenstein,supra note145,at927–30(observingtheprobablecausestandardhasdevelopedoveryearsofcase lawtobecomeacommonsense testhingingonan assessment of the totality of circumstances, which is particularly well suited to the schoolenvironment);see also 5LaFave,supra note22,§10.11(assertingtheCourtinT.L.O.couldnotdemonstratehowtheprobablecausestandardwouldfailintheschoolcontext,anduntilitcanbeproventheprobablecausestandard(withdecadesofjurisprudencesupportingit)isunworkable,then probable cause should be the only standard in schools); Mansukhani, supra note 144, at351–61(listingnumerousoftencitedjustificationsforlesserstandardsthanprobablecausecitedincaselawanddemonstratinghowtheydonotapplyintheschoolsetting,thusprovingprobablecauseisperfectlyapplicableintheschoolsetting).

151 See Aizenstein, supra note145,at923(“Unlike theprobablecause standard,whichhasmanycourtdecisionsandlegalauthoritiesdefiningitsmeaning,thereis littleauthorityavailabledefininga[reasonablesuspicionstandard].”); see also Avery&Simpson,supra note126,at407–08(listingthenumerousareasofpotentialconflictinsearchcaseswhereT.L.O. hasfailedtoprovideaclearstandardforschoolofficialsandcourtstofollow);Blickenstaff,supra note43,at43(describingtheT.L.O. standardasindefiniteandtoomushy).

152 See 5 LaFave, supra note 22, § 10.11 (noting that most school search cases satisfy thetraditionalprobablecauserequirement)(citingIn reDoe,91P.3d485(Haw.2004);In reL.A.,21 P.3d 952 (Kan. 2001); Commonwealth v. Lawrence L., 792 N.E.2d 109 (Mass. 2003)); see also Mansukhani, supra note 144, at 360 (“[T]he Court took the ‘easy’ case [in] announcing a[reasonableness]standardthatwouldgovernsubsequentschoolsearches....[T]herewasnoneedfor the Court to depart from the traditional probable cause standard to reach the same resultinT.L.O.”).

153 Reamey,supra note141,at947–48.

154 See 2LaFave,supranote22,§3.2(referringtoalonghistoryofcaselawdevelopmentfortheprobablecausestandard);see also NewJerseyv.T.L.O.,469U.S.325,360(1985)(Brennan,J.,concurring&dissenting)(findingthatprobablecausedeterminesthelegitimacyofanysearches

cause,” and (2) a probable cause standard would allow students engaged incriminal activity, like T.L.O., to escape punishment.149 However, neither ofthesejustificationsholdsuptoscrutiny.First,theCourtdecidedIllinois v.Gatesspecificallytocreatea“commonsense”and“practical”probablecausestandard,hingingonanevaluationofthe“totalityofthecircumstances,”thatwouldapplyneatly innumerousareas, suchas schools.150 Ironically, in its search for suchacommon sense standard theT.L.O.majority createda farmore confusing andmuddledstandardthanthealreadyexistingpost-Gatesprobablecausestandard.151Second, inT.L.O. andmanyof the searchcasesapplyingT.L.O., thereexistedsufficientlydetailedandspecificevidenceofcriminalactivitytomeettheprobablecause“totalityofthecircumstances”test.152Moreover,schoolofficialsoftenworkinapositiontogather farmorereliableandverifiable informationthanpoliceofficers, due to the amountof time theofficials spendwith a limited amountof students and the reliability of student and teacher informants.153The clearsolution for the increasingly inconsistent andunworkableT.L.O. standard is areversiontoprobablecause.154

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Applyingtheprobablecausestandardintheschoolsettingbecomesespeciallyappropriateinlightoftheever-increasingsimilaritiesbetweenlawenforcementofficers and schoolofficials.155 Innumerous searchcases reaching theappellatecourts,theofficialinvolvedworkedasaschooladministrator,notateacher.156Theroleofschooladministratorsseemsanalogoustothedutiesoflawenforcementofficers:schoolofficialsoperateasagentsofthestate,enforcerulesandregulations,mandate compulsory attendance of students, and much of what they uncoverinsearchesof studentsmay leadtocriminalprosecutionorschooldisciplinarymeasures.157 In search cases involving both administrators and police officers,manycourtsallowedtheuseofthelesserstandardofreasonablesuspicion,onlyresortingtoaprobablecausestandardinverynarrowcircumstances.158Requiring

beyondaminimalTerry-typestopandfrisksearch);GeraldS.Reamey,When “Special Needs” Meet Probable Cause: Denying the Devil Benefit of Law, 19 hastIngs const. L.Q. 295, 329 (1992)(“Itmayseempeculiartoarguethatprobablecauseismorepredictablethansomeotherformofanalysis.Considerableprecedentexists,however,construingwhatprobablecausemeansinvariouscontexts....[C]ourtswillsufferfromthelackofconsistencyandpredictabilityofthenewspecialneedsandreasonablenessanalyses.”);Shatzetal.,supra note130,at8(“The[T.L.O.]decisionisimpossibletosquarewiththeCourt’spriorFourthAmendmentjurisprudence.”).

155 See Josh Kagan, Reappraising T.L.O.’s “Special Needs” Doctrine in an Era of School-Law Enforcement Entanglement, 33 J.L. & educ. 291, 316–20 (2004) (observing the exceedinglydifficultnatureofdistinguishingthelevelofsuspicionrequiredinasearch,especiallyinlightoftheincreasingcoordinationbetweenschoolofficialsandlawenforcementinschools).

156 SeeSaffordUnifiedSch.Dist.No.1v.Redding(Redding),129S.Ct.2633,2638(2009)(AssistantVicePrincipal);T.L.O.,469U.S.at328(AssistantVicePrincipal);Phaneufv.Fraikin,448F.3d591,593(2dCir.2006)(Principal);Cornfieldv.Consol.HighSch.Dist.No.230,991F.2d1316,1319(7thCir.1993)(Dean,equivalenttoaprincipal);Ex rel.Williamsv.Ellington,936F.2d881,882–83,882(6thCir.1991)(Principal);Widenerv.Frye,809F.Supp.35,36(S.D.Ohio1992)(DeanofStudentsandaformerdetectivewiththeCincinnatiPoliceDepartment);Calesv.HowellPub.Schs.,635F.Supp.454,455(E.D.Mich.1985)(AssistantVicePrincipal);Coronadov.State,835S.W.2d636,637(Tex.Crim.App.1992)(AssistantPrincipal);Stateex rel.Galfordv.MarkAnthonyB.,433S.E.2d41,43(W.Va.1993)(Principal).

157 SeeReamey,supranote141,at942;see also Kagan,supra note155,at307–08(identifyingmany state regulations and school board policies require school officials often to act in a lawenforcementtypecapacityandroutinelyworkwithlawenforcementofficialsinsearchandseizuresituations);MichaelPinard,From the Classroom to the Courtroom: Reassessing Fourth Amendment Standards in Public School Searches Involving Law Enforcement Authorities, 45 arIz. L. rev.1067,1069(2003)(statinginmanycases,courtshaveatendencytointerchangetherolesoflawenforcementofficersandschoolofficialsinschoolsearches).

158 See Pinard,supra note157,at1082–83(“[T]ensionsinherentintheserelevantfactors,aswellastheinconsistentmannerinwhichcourtsweighthesefactors,thecaselawdoesnotestablishclearparameterstoguideschoolofficialsandlawenforcementauthorities.”);see also Mansukhani,supra note144,at366(citingIn reP.E.A.,754P.2d382,384(Colo.1988))(statingthereexistsathreatpoliceofficerscould,andhave,attemptedtouseschoolofficialstocarryoutsearchesthatwouldordinarilyfailtomeetaprobablecausestandard).


probablecauseinallbuttheleastintrusiveTerry-typesearcheswouldprovideaclearstandardacrosstheboard,regardlessofwhetherthesearchinvolvesaschooladministrator,lawenforcementofficer,orboth.159

The Exclusionary Rule Safeguards Students’ Rights

Requiringaprobablecausestandardinschoolsearcheswouldalsoresultinamuchneededbenefitofinstitutingtheexclusionaryruleinschoolsearches.160The majority in T.L.O. ignored the original issue it granted certiorari for: todetermineiftheexclusionaryrulehadaplaceinschoolsearches.161AsevidencedbyRedding, studentswith legitimateFourthAmendment claims experience analmost impassable roadblock in upholding their rights against intrusions.162Currently,thequalifiedimmunitydoctrine,thereducedprotectionsinherentintheT.L.O.reasonablesuspicionstandard,andthelackofawarrantrequirement“dramatically reduce the likelihoodof success for theplaintiff student.”163Theprobable cause standard with the exclusionary rule attached would provide asignificant degree of deterrence to unreasonable conduct by school officials.164Thus,evenifcourtscontinuetoupholdqualifiedimmunityincaseslikeRedding,studentswill at leastpossess recourse through the exclusionary rule topreventevidence gathered in anunconstitutional search frombeing admissible againstthemincriminalorjuvenileproceedings.165

159 See Kagan, supra note 155, at 325 (claiming in light of the close cooperation betweenschoolofficialsandlawenforcement,T.L.O.representsafailingstandardallowingstudentstofindthemselves subjected to routine law enforcementprocedureswithnoneof the sameprotectionsfrompoliceabusesadultspossess);see also supranotes155–58andaccompanyingtext.

160 See1LaFave, supra note22,§1.1 (explaining theexclusionaryrulehasbeenprimarilyutilizedtodeterunconstitutionalsearchandseizuresbythegovernmentandthatevidencefoundinanunconstitutionalsearchbythegovernmentisinadmissibleincriminalproceedings).


162 SaffordUnifiedSch.Dist.No.1v.Redding (Redding),129S.Ct.2633,2644 (2009).Redding’sonlyremainingrecourseistopursuetheMonellclaim.Id.;see also PamelaS.Karlan,The Paradoxical Structure of Constitutional Litigation,75FordhamL.rev.1913,1920(2007)(assertinginordertoestablishaMonellclaimplaintiffshavetoprovethegovernmententitydeprivedthemof theirconstitutional rights,andthatdeprivationoccurredpursuant to thegovernmententity’sofficialpolicy,whichcanbeextremelydifficultforstudentstosatisfy).

163 Reamey, supra note 141, at 943–44; see also supra note 76 and accompanying text(explainingthatReddingonlycanpursuetheMonell claimagainsttheschooldistrictfollowingtheReddingCourt’sholding,whichgrantedWilson,Romero,andSchwallierqualifiedimmunity).

164 Reamey, supranote141, at944 (“Theexclusionary rule assumesgreater significance indeterringmisconductbyschoolofficialswhenconsideredinlightoftheratherrestrictedavailabilityofthecivilremedy.”).

165 Id.at944.Thisnotedoesnotadvocatefortheadoptionoftheexclusionaryruleinschooldisciplinaryhearings,only criminalproceedings.See Thompsonv.CarthageSch.Dist.,87F.3d979,981–82(8thCir.1996)(holdingthe implementationof theexclusionaryrule infeasible inschooldisciplinaryproceedings).

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166 SeeSheltonv.Tucker,364U.S.479,487(1960)(“ThevigilantprotectionofconstitutionalfreedomsisnowheremorevitalthaninthecommunityofAmericanschools.”).

167 See Aizenstein, supra note145, at930 (observing the statementsmadeby theSupremeCourt indicate the importance of schools in educating students about democratic principles);see also NewJerseyv.T.L.O.,469U.S.325,385–86(1985)(Stevens,Marshall,&Brennan,JJ.,dissenting&concurring).Stevensstated:

Through[theschool]passeseverycitizenandpublicofficial,fromschoolteacherstopolicemenandprisonguards.Thevaluestheylearnthere,theytakewiththeminlife.Oneofourmostcherishedideals is theonecontainedintheFourthAmendment:thatthegovernmentmaynotintrudeonthepersonalprivacyofitscitizenswithoutawarrantorcompellingcircumstance.TheCourt’sdecisiontodayisacuriousmoralfortheNation’syouth.

Id.

168 See Gardner,supra note114,at907(statingthatoutsideofschools,courtsgrantyouthsthefullprotectionoftheFourthAmendmentinsearchesandseizuresbypolice);see also Tinkerv.DesMoinesIndep.Sch.Dist.,393U.S.503,506(1969)(“Itcanhardlybearguedthatstudents...shedtheirconstitutionalrights...attheschoolhousegates.”);W.Va.StateBd.ofEduc.v.Barnette,319U.S.624,637(1943)(“[Schools]areeducatingtheyoungforcitizenshipisreasonforscrupulousprotectionofConstitutionalfreedomsoftheindividual,ifwearenottostranglethefreemindatitssourceandteachyouthtodiscountimportantprinciplesofourgovernmentasmereplatitudes.”).

169 Doev.Renfrow,451U.S.1022,1027–28(1981)(Brennan,J.,dissenting).

170 See Aizenstein,supra note145,at930(statingthatimplementingaprobablecausestandardin school searches would demonstrate to students the importance of the Fourth Amendmentprotectionsofprivacyinterestsforeveryoneinademocraticsociety).

The Merits of Probable Cause in Schools

Beyond the importance of implementing a clearer standard for officials,courts, and practitioners is the need for schools to properly educate studentsin the powers of the government and of their constitutional rights.166 Theschool setting represents the first opportunity for children to experience theirconstitutional rights in conjunction with the power of the government.167By retaining the T.L.O. lesser suspicion standard in schools, the Court set adangerousprecedent in theeducationof children—the fullprotectionof theirprivacy interest ends themoment they steponto school grounds.168As JusticeBrennancritically stated inhisdissentingopinion inDoe v. Renfrow: “Schoolscannot expect their students to learn the lessonsofgoodcitizenshipwhen theschoolauthoritiesthemselvesdisregardthefundamentalprinciplesunderpinningour constitutional freedoms.”169 Implementing a probable cause standard inschoolswouldemphasizetoAmerica’syouthfromthebeginningtheimportanceoftheirFourthAmendmentprotectionsandlegitimateexpectationsofprivacy.170

concLusIon

The majority in T.L.O. created a standard it thought would adequatelyprovideabalancebetween students’ legitimate expectationsofprivacyand thecompellinginterestofeducatorstomaintainorderanddisciplineintheschool


setting.171However, as evidencedby the last twenty-fiveyearsof school searchjurisprudence,especiallyinlightofRedding,thereasonablesuspicionstandardistooinconsistenttoadequatelyprotectstudents’FourthAmendmentrights,andtooconfusingtoprovideschooladministratorswitha“flexible,”“commonsense”standardforsearches.172Thesolutionistorelyontheonlystandardwithasolidfoundation in the Constitution and a long history of jurisprudence: probablecause.173AGatesprobablecausestandardwouldprovideschoolofficialswithaclear,easytounderstandframeworkforhandlinganysearchbeyondaminimallyintrusive Terry “stop and frisk” search, while providing a clear protection forstudents’ legitimate expectations of privacy.174 Finally, no other forum ismoreappropriatetoteachourstudentsthecoreconceptsofdemocracy,andtheinherentrightswhichfollow,thanourschools.175

171 See supranotes36–42andaccompanyingtext.


173 Seesupra notes147,154andaccompanyingtext.

174 Seesupra notes145–65andaccompanyingtext.


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