al-qaida chief ayman al-zawahiri the coordinator 2016 part 19-141-caliphate- hybrid warfare-10

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Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2016 Part 19-141-Caliphate- Hybrid Warfare-10

Are we ready? “I call on all Muslims who can harm the countries of the crusader coalition not to hesitate. We must now focus on moving the war to the heart of the homes and cities of the crusader West and specifically America,” Zawahiri Sep 2015.

To the question how far off is Al Qaida Strategy from what we call Modern Hybrid warfareHybrid War is not new but became the preferred option with estimates of a decade of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan costing the US some $6 trillion and the combined figure of 57,694 killed and wounded Americans.

Michael Flynn, former director US Defence Intelligence Agency, went on record to say that the rise of Jabhat al Nusra and ISIS was a “willful decision of the US”.

While the United States has been practicing hybrid warfare in earnest since at least World War II, it is still a far different hybrid threat than Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda must be categorized as an almost entirely irregular threat though the means and operational reach of Al Qaeda are greater than other hybrid threats.

ISIS, Al Qaeda, Boko Haram, Al Shabab, the Taliban are all separate manifestations of a new non-state dynamic which has begun to drive international conflict and which now represents a new form of asymmetric and hybrid warfare.

A guerilla force may possess the capacity of inflicting huge blows on the enemy, but it may be better for it to restrain from doing so in situations when the reaction of the enemy may be overwhelming.

Al Qaeda continues to seek out citizens of enemy countries, especially converts to Islam, who possess "clean" passports and thus can be more easily deployed for attacks I Western countries...

With the tragic attacks on a concert hall and several bars and restaurants in Paris, the rise of Da’esh and its threat to international security has reached Europe. While countries such as Turkey, Tunisia and Lebanon are suffering devastating attacks since October 2015, it barely comes as a surprise that also major European capitals are on Da’esh’s target list. In the past years, the concept of ‘Hybrid Threats’ and ‘Hybrid Warfare’ witnessed quite a hype. The term ‘hybrid threat’ is commonly used as a warfare tactic including low-level conventional operations and targeted Special Forces operations against an adversary. In addition, the aggressor uses psychological warfare tactics including social and traditional media that have an influence on public perception and international opinion. It is a mix of conventional warfare, terrorism and asymmetric warfare, and other criminal actions. Together with modern means of warfare such as cyber warfare and CBRNe attacks, hybrid threats can pose a disruptive threat to especially unstable countries. U.S. President Barack Obama already said in 2014 that Da’esh is a terrorist network that poses a hybrid threat to Iraq and Syria, and lately he stated to other parts of the world. They have territorial ambitions while applying tactics and strategies of a professional Army. They apply means of conventional warfare such as bombings and artillery, while also relying on ways of non-conventional warfare including suicide attacks and chemical warfare against adversaries such as the Peshmerga Forces. In addition, Da’esh sophisticatedly uses social media for a worldwide propaganda campaign that managed to attract thousands of foreign fighters from Europe, the Maghreb and Asia. Altogether, their way of combining conventional and non-conventional warfare with terrorist operations ticks many boxes when describing a

“Know your enemy and know yourself and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster”― Sun Tzu, The Art of War

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hybrid threat. But with the devastating attacks in Beirut, Ankara, Tunis, the Sinai Peninsula and Paris since October 2015, something in Da’esh’s strategy

has changed – and a lot is speaking for the fact that Da’esh will increasingly export this strategy to Europe. 1

Da’esh vs. Al-Qaeda – New Escalation of Hybrid Threats

As said before, modern ways of hybrid warfare include means of cyber warfare, propaganda and, at the last level of escalation, attacks including CBRN material. At the first look, one may think that the Al-Qaeda attacks in Madrid and London in the early 2000s and the recent attacks committed by Da’esh are comparable kinds of hybrid threats. But the potential of escalation an all levels makes the difference. In contrast to Al-Qaeda, Da’esh’s perceives its fight against its adversaries as an existential conflict which translates into far more indiscriminate methods of action. Bringing the conflict with the Western community to a new level of escalation by means of CBRNe attacks would perfectly fit to the organization’s psychological warfare strategy that included images of beheadings, the live burning of adversaries and mass executions. And we must take this scenario serious: Da’esh possesses a state-like territory that gives them access to significant funding. Also, many CBRN experts of the former Saddam Hussein regime joined their ranks. Da’esh is actively recruiting experts with a background in physics and chemistry, and has already proven its capability to use chemical agents against its adversaries in Syria and Iraq. In Libya, Syria and Iraq they control facilities that stored raw CB material, including traces of sarin-type chemical weapons, ricin-type biological weapons and mustard agents. And in July 2014, the International Atomic Energy Agency disclosed that militants linked to Da’esh seized low-grade nuclear material from Mosul University in northern Iraq.

Capitalizing on Chaos: AQAP Advances in YemenPublication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 15 Issue: 4February 19, 2016 11:08 AM Age: 5 daysBy: Michael Horton

AQAP members in Yemen (source: YouTube)Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has more men, is better equipped and funded, and holds more territory than at any time in its history. The only point at which the organization has enjoyed comparable strength was in the aftermath of the popular uprising against former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2011. However, the conditions that allowed AQAP to seize and hold territory after the 2011 uprising are far more pronounced now than they were then. These include: disarray within the Yemeni Armed Forces, severe and increased poverty, economic turmoil, an absence of governmental authority, and widening sectarian divisions. All of these factors make Yemen — particularly southern and eastern Yemen — fertile ground for the expansion of AQAP.1 http://www.cbrneportal.com/daesh-as-a-hybrid-threat-to-european-security-the-cbrne-dimension/





In March 2015, Saudi Arabia launched “Operation Decisive Storm,” a campaign that ostensibly aimed at restoring the internationally-recognized but

exiled government of Yemeni president Abd Raboo Mansur al-Hadi. Hadi and his government had fled the Yemeni port city of Aden for the safety of Saudi Arabia as Yemen’s Houthi rebels advanced. The Houthis — who refer to themselves as Ansar Allah (Supporters of Allah) — are a Zaidi Shi’a movement that has deep roots in northwest Yemen. They are now nominally allied with former president Ali Abdullah Saleh and military forces loyal to him, but are believed by Saudi Arabia to be backed by Iran.The resulting ten month-long naval blockade by Saudi and its allies and their thousands of airstrikes on civilian and military targets across the country have failed to dislodge the Houthis, who remain in control of the capital, Sana’a, and much of northwest Yemen. The airstrikes and the naval blockade have, however, succeeded in ravaging the poorest country in the Middle East. The United Nations estimates that more than eighty percent of Yemen’s population of 26 million are now in need of humanitarian assistance (UNOCHA, January 2016). Yemen’s already limited infrastructure has been decimated and what little central government control there was before the war no longer exists. Perhaps most seriously, the months of war are dismantling the social structures that have long provided Yemen with a measure of at least localized stability. This multi-front war in Yemen is a gift to groups like AQAP and the Islamic State. Both organizations thrive in areas where poverty and sectarian tensions are pronounced. AQAP, and, to a lesser degree the Islamic State, have consequently lost no time in capitalizing on the chaos in Yemen.Filling the VoidThe Saudi-led coalition succeeded in forcing the Houthis and allied forces to vacate Aden and the parts of southern Yemen that they briefly occupied. However, the coalition, and the exiled Yemeni government that it supports, failed to secure these areas, including the temporary capital of Aden. The Saudi-led campaign relies heavily on airstrikes and thus far has deployed only a limited number of ground troops, many of which are mercenaries (Middle East Eye, December 23, 2015; al-Bawaba, December 14, 2015).The retreat of the Houthis and military forces allied with them from parts of southern Yemen left a vacuum that AQAP has been quick to fill. Shortly after the initiation of Operation Decisive Storm in March 2015, AQAP took over al-Mukalla, Yemen’s fifth largest city and the capital of Hadramawt governorate. AQAP has long maintained a presence in the Hadramawt and in the neighboring governorate of Shabwa. These are both areas where the Houthis have little or no influence. The elements of the Yemeni Armed Forces and security services deployed in Mukalla offered little resistance to the takeover. Following their takeover of Mukalla, AQAP advanced throughout the southern parts of Hadramawt. The only real resistance that AQAP faced was in the northern part of the Hadramawt where forces under the command of Major General Abdul Rahman al-Halili, commander of Yemen’s First Military District, blocked their advance.While AQAP was halted in its attempts to push into the northern parts of Hadramawt, the organization is expanding across much of southern Yemen. AQAP has infiltrated its operatives into Aden where it enjoys a complex relationship with a matrix of anti-Houthi, separatist, and Salafi militias. During the four-month battle to evict the Houthis and their allies from Aden, which ended in July 2015, AQAP operatives worked closely with many of the militias fighting the Houthis, some of which were backed by the Saudis and the Hadi government. AQAP’s operatives, particularly at more senior levels, were far more experienced fighters than the often raw recruits that made up the bulk of the militias fighting the Houthis. AQAP has also effectively inserted its operatives into the bitterly contested city of Taiz. Houthi allied forces and a loose alliance of "popular committees,"





pro-government, and Salafi militias are battling each other for control of the strategically and culturally important city. AQAP’s seasoned and increasingly

battle-hardened operatives are comparatively well-versed in urban warfare, bomb making, and assassinations. While an overwhelming majority of those fighting against the Houthis and their allies are opposed to AQAP and its ideology, the need for well-trained and relatively disciplined fighters has likely trumped such ideological differences; some of those fighting against the Houthis increasingly view AQAP as a useful source of well-trained, disciplined fighters.

Beyond infiltrating operatives into large urban areas like Aden and Taiz, AQAP is also now holding more territory than it ever has in its history. As mentioned above, AQAP has occupied Mukalla since April 2015 (Yemen Times, April 6, 2015). In early December 2015, AQAP launched an offensive in the governorate of Abyan, located to the west of Hadramawt. AQAP last occupied parts of Abyan in 2011, when it took over the towns of Zinjibar and Ja’ar and declared Abyan to be an "Islamic Emirate." By December 5, 2015, in a repeat of 2011, AQAP had secured the towns of Zinjibar and Ja’ar as well as the surrounding areas. Just as it has in other parts of southern Yemen, AQAP filled the void left by an absence of both government-controlled military forces and those controlled by the nominally pro-Hadi popular committees. In the latter's case, the popular committee forces had successfully pushed Houthi and allied forces out of Abyan but subsequently moved onto the neighboring governorate of Lahej to resist a renewed Houthi offensive, leading to a power vacuum in Abyan.Just as it has done in Mukalla, AQAP targeted key political figures in Abyan — and particularly those figures that cannot be easily co-opted or bought off. For instance, during its takeover of Zinjibar and Ja’ar, AQAP killed Ali al-Said, a mid-level commander within the Abyan-based popular committee (The National [UAE], December 3, 2015). The organization also targeted five other key tribal and militia figures. Despite the assassinations, AQAP’s commanders have largely implemented the same “light-footprint” strategy in Abyan that they have used in Mukalla (al-Jazeera, September 16, 2015). As will be explained below, this new light footprint strategy arises from the lessons that AQAP learned in the aftermath of its 2011-12 takeover of parts of Abyan.Lessons Learned and a New StrategyIn June 2012, a coalition of tribal militias — referred to as popular committees — and units from the Yemeni Army forced AQAP to withdraw from the parts of Abyan that they controlled. The leadership of AQAP had, however, already learned a great deal from the year during which they held and—to some degree governed—territory for the first time. In May and August of 2012, the emir of AQAP, Nasir al-Wuhayshi, now deceased, wrote two letters to his counterpart in al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). [1] Here Wuhayshi sought to impart some of the lessons learned by his own organization in the preceding months.Foremost among these lessons was the need for al-Qaeda to take a more gradual approach to imposing Sharia law and, in particular, to enforcing severe punishments for relatively minor offences. When AQAP took control of parts of Abyan and the neighboring governorate of Shabwa in 2011, the organization stoked local and specifically tribal anger when it flouted long-established tribal laws and traditions in favor of its own reductionist interpretation of Islamic law. As an example of this, AQAP sought to end the traditional trade in, and consumption of, the mild narcotic qat. Qat is viewed as halal, or permitted by many tribal religious authorities in Yemen, and is a core part of the Yemeni economy. AQAP's prohibition therefore struck at both traditional and economic sensitivities.





AQAP’s heavy-handed approach to governance in Abyan and Shabwa through the qat ban and other comparable measures cost it critical local

support. As a result, while units of the Yemeni Armed Forces played a key role in evicting AQAP from its strongholds in Abyan, it was tribal militias made up of men from the governorate that proved critical to defeating AQAP — at least temporarily.

Wuhayshi and his deputies — including the current AQAP emir, Qasim al-Raymi — used the lessons learned in 2011-12 to redesign their organizational structure and most importantly their approach to governing and holding territory. AQAP’s takeover and subsequent management of Mukalla are both clear examples of these changes.AQAP’s takeover of Mukalla in early 2015 was swift and resulted in few casualties and relatively little damage to private property. In the days and weeks following their takeover, AQAP targeted those members of the local government and security apparatus who did not accept their authority. However, after they consolidated their hold on the city, AQAP’s leadership left the day-to-day governance of the city to a local council. As part of their effort to indigenize their organization, AQAP began referring to its members who operate in the Hadramawt — Mukalla is the capital of the governorate of the Hadramawt — as the “Sons of Hadramawt” (al-Jazeera, September 16, 2015). In addition, just as Wuhayshi counseled in his letters to the leader of AQIM, AQAP has maintained a relatively low profile in Mukalla. AQAP for instance provides security for the city and has undertaken some “public works” programs like repairing water mains and providing aid in the wake of the November 2015 cyclone. [2]AQAP’s more recent campaign to retake Abyan in December 2015 appears to be of a similar design. Those members of AQAP who are active in Abyan refer to themselves as the “Sons of Abyan” and, apart from targeting a few key figures within the popular committees, the takeover has been relatively bloodless. Much as it has done in Mukalla, it is likely that AQAP will maintain its light footprint strategy and work to re-insert itself into the local governing structures in Abyan.Out-maneuvering the Islamic State in YemenFor all its advantages, AQAP’s light footprint strategy is replete with risks to the group. Foremost among these is AQAP’s potential to be perceived as lacking radical zeal by more hardline militants. . This perception could intensify what is already a simmering conflict between AQAP and Islamic State. Since the Houthi-led offensive and Saudi Arabia’s subsequent commencement of Operation Decisive Storm in March 2015, the Islamic State — which had only a limited presence in Yemen — has expanded. In March 2015, the group claimed credit for four suicide attacks on two mosques in Sana’a (al-Bawaba, March 20, 2015). These attacks killed more than 140 people; Islamic State claimed to be targeting what were predominately Zaidi mosques. However, as with the majority of mosques in north Yemen, the two mosques that were targeted were used by both Zaidis and Sunnis. Notably, AQAP condemned the bombing of the mosques (Middle East Eye, March 20, 2015).Islamic State’s attacks in Yemen have largely been directed at targets associated with the Houthis. The militant Salafi ideology that Islamic State and AQAP embrace means that both groups view all Shi’a as heretics. While AQAP is also locked in a battle with the Houthis, its leadership has thus far been careful not to target mosques and other strictly civilian targets. This is not to say that AQAP is not just as brutal and dangerous an organization as Islamic State; however, AQAP takes a pragmatic view and, following its 2011-12 experience, is keenly aware of how important it is to not lose the still limited local support that it enjoys. For instance, local support is critical for maintaining supply





chains and evading detection. [3] AQAP is therefore engaged in a delicate balancing act: it must restrain itself and its operatives so as not to alienate and

anger local people in the areas that it has nominal control over yet it must also prove that it is as dynamic and “Islamic” as Islamic State.In addition to the lessons that AQAP learned from its 2011-12 attempt to hold territory, the tactics of Islamic State in Yemen have also forced AQAP to moderate its own tactics. AQAP therefore appears to be pursuing something of a “middle way” in Yemen. Its light footprint strategy allows it to hold territory and enables it to claim that it is making progress toward establishing the caliphate that al-Qaeda (and Islamic State) desires. Yet at the same time, the strategy means that it is able to make the most of its still limited, albeit rapidly increasing, resources. For example, by leaving day-to-day governance to local councils, it is able to effectively co-opt local and regional stakeholders while being able to focus on battling the Houthis and Houthi-allied forces, which remain the primary threat to AQAP.The Near or Far Enemy?The debate about whether to pursue the near or far enemy remains contentious within both al-Qaeda central and AQAP. AQAP has a history of pursuing both the near enemy in the Yemeni state and now the Houthis and the far enemy in the West. Since the beginning of the civil war in Yemen, AQAP has focused most of its efforts on attacking the near enemy. The Houthi offensive that saw the Sana’a takeover in September 2014 also put considerable pressure on AQAP. With their allies in the Yemeni Army, the Houthis pushed south into al-Bayda, Abyan, and Shabwa areas where AQAP has long operated and exerted influence. The Houthis and their allies were initially successful at pushing AQAP out of these areas, to the extent that many of AQAP’s operatives fled east to the Hadramawt, where they subsequently regrouped.The Houthis’ push into the south however inflamed what were minimal sectarian divisions and helped — at least to some degree — bolster local support for AQAP and the Salafist militias that fought alongside them. With the entrance of Saudi Arabia and its allies into the war in March 2015, AQAP was therefore able to rapidly regroup and seize large amounts of military hardware and cash from Yemeni Army installations, and banks – in particular, the Yemeni Central Bank branch in Mukalla.AQAP’s counter-offensive against the Houthis and allied forces has been its primary focus in the eleven months since Saudi Arabia entered the war. Only now does AQAP arguably have the operational room and resources to again focus on the far enemy. Most worryingly, AQAP now enjoys more resources and operational freedom that it ever has before. However, with parts of the country, namely Taiz, Lahej, and al-Bayda still being bitterly contested by a host of militias and state-backed forces, AQAP’s short-term focus is likely to remain on the near enemy.In addition to now having considerable resources and operational freedom to carry out attacks on the far enemy, AQAP may also be motivated to at least partially renew its focus on the far enemy by Islamic State. The Islamic State’s attacks in Yemen have focused on sectarian and high profile targets, including a deadly attack on the governor of Aden, the temporary headquarters of the Yemeni government in exile, and the presidential palace in Aden (al-Jazeera, December 7, 2015; al-Arabiya, January 30). These attacks are audacious and belie the fact that Islamic State’s branch in Yemen is still — relative to AQAP — a small organization. While AQAP has made significant progress in terms of seizing territory and growing its organization, it has generally eschewed high-profile attacks in favor of fighting along more traditional lines. This is a key part of its light footprint strategy but the lack of high profile attacks also leaves it vulnerable to criticism from





hardcore members of the jihadist community. An attack on a Western target, whether that be in Yemen or abroad, would demonstrate the fact that AQAP

remains a dynamic force that is still committed to and capable of “global jihad” and thus reassure its hardline supporters who might otherwise be attracted to Islamic State.OutlookThe ongoing civil war and the destruction wrought by eleven months of aerial bombardment by Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners ensure that Yemen will remain fertile ground for the growth of both AQAP and Islamic State over both the medium and long-term. Terrorist organizations by their very nature are predatory, adaptive, and thrive in power vacuums like the one that exists throughout much of Yemen. AQAP in particular has proven itself to be highly resilient and capable of learning from its mistakes and modifying its organizational structure accordingly.The ability to learn and evolve has been clearly demonstrated by AQAP over the last two years. Despite drone attacks that have successfully targeted some of its senior leaders, AQAP has retained and improved upon its ability to interface with local stakeholders, plan and participate in relatively complex offensive operations, and perhaps most importantly, it is also learning how to govern through proxies.Over the medium and even long-term, AQAP’s future in Yemen looks secure. While it may be compelled to take a more combative approach to confronting Islamic State, this is unlikely to significantly weaken AQAP. The only real potential threat to AQAP’s expansion in Yemen are stability and assertive and efficient governance at the local and federal levels. However, neither stability nor the formation of an effective government appear likely. Even when the war in Yemen does end, AQAP will continue to benefit from the destruction of the country’s armed forces, infrastructure, and perhaps most importantly, the intensifying hatred between rival political and religious groups.Michael Horton is an analyst whose work primarily focuses on Yemen and the Horn of Africa.Notes:[1.] See: http://www.longwarjournal.org/images/al-qaida-papers-how-to-run-a-state.pdf[2] See: https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/aqap-video-focuses-on-cyclone-relief-efforts-for-civilians-in-hadramawt.html[3] In December 2013, AQAP apologized to the Yemeni people for what its own communique described as a “brutal” attack on the Yemeni Ministry of Defense and the hospital inside the ministry. The attack left 56 dead. AQAP took full responsibility for the attack and promised to pay blood money to the relatives of the dead.

Files:February_19__2016_TM_03.pdf

*Why Hybrid Warfare is Tactics Not Strategy” which was subsequently published in Infinity Journal, 2012. All too often scholars and policy-makers argue about constructing a strategy for the future that is all too often framed in tones of black of white. Currently the principals are at loggerheads over the notion that the United States is in an irregular “long war” versus a newer argument coming from Air/Sea Battle proponents that the United States should prepare for a potential major conventional fight with China. Again, if hybrid warfare proponents posited their concept in the hopes of breaking scholars and policy-





makers out of this bipolar thinking, then the intent of hybrid warfare needs to be reconsidered and the ramifications of the movement must be reconsidered.

With this new perspective in mind, a complex civilian/military relations problem is exposed. While scholars can and, perhaps, should introduce concepts to shake others from locking into lines of thought, practitioners are constantly searching for answers to pressing complex warfare problems. Military leaders and doctrine 2writers are attracted to faddish ideas not because they are stupid but because they are attempting to find a way to conceptualize and deal with the complexities of war. The danger with this is that if military leaders grasp onto vague or contested concepts, intellectual contractors will also gravitate to these concepts, redefine them to suit their own purposes, and then create a fancy power point presentations to offer to political and military leaders as the answer to all of their problems. Therefore, in an academic world, a proper and vigorous debate ensues but, unfortunately, in the practical world confusion abounds. If the main thrust behind the hybrid warfare concept is indeed to shake scholars and policy-makers out of the bipolar doldrums, especially in regard to categorizing enemies, then more fidelity for the hybrid construct is needed. Under the new, more rigorous conception of hybrid threats, the U. S. military is classified as the most potent. The United States possesses the most potent conventional forces in the world and this is where most assessments of U. S. military prowess dwell. What most analysts discount is the U. S. military’s unconventional capacity. In response to unconventional cyber threats, the U. S. military stood up Cyber Command. Long before the counterinsurgency fights in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U. S. military had developed a robust irregular war fighting capacity. U. S. Special Operating Forces have been so successful recently in advising and building the capacity of their Filipino counterparts that the Filipino government has recently deepened military ties with the United States.

While the United States has been practicing hybrid warfare in earnest since at least World War II, it is still a far different hybrid threat than Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda must be categorized as an almost entirely irregular threat though the means and operational reach of Al Qaeda are greater than other hybrid threats. Al Qaeda has demonstrated the ability to operate in multiple states simultaneously. While terrorism seems to be the tactic of choice, Al Qaeda has recently delved into the economic sphere enacting rudimentary village stability operations in several

2 ADP 3.0 defines a hybrid threat as “the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, criminal elements, or a combination of these forces and elements all unified t o achieve mutually benefitting effects.”





African nations. Al Qaeda has also provided logistical and training support to insurgent groups in Southeast Asia, Africa and other parts

of the world.Far below Al Qaeda and, perhaps, at the end of the hybrid spectrum are groups like Abu Sayyaf. Abu Sayyaf formerly was the militant/terrorist wing of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) insurgency in the Philippines. Since splitting from the MILF, Abu Sayyaf has dwindled to roughly seventy-five members whose sole purpose is to engage in illicit drug trade and ransoming civilians.

*The Islamic State’s hybrid warfare strategy does not necessarily distinguish it from al-Qaeda, which has employed similar tactics in some theaters 3. What makes the Islamic State unique is the way it showcases its military operations, using virtually all of them as propaganda pieces. While one function of the Islamic State’s military actions is to showcase the group’s strength, al-Qaeda has systematically sought to conceal the size of its network and downplay its capabilities. The group has masked its involvement in emerging theatres of conflict and established covert relationships with unacknowledged affiliate organizations.Consequently, many analysts underestimate al-Qaeda’s strength, and counterinsurgent forces have allowed al-Qaeda front groups to thrive in some theaters. Concealing affiliates’ relationships with al-Qaeda allows these groups to gain public support and attract resources from individuals and entities that might otherwise be wary of assisting an overt al-Qaeda entity.Al-Qaeda’s military approach and preference for more covert activities is shaped by its patient worldview. Ostentatious, tactical victories that expose the network to attack and undermine its long-term prospects are of little value to the organization from a strategic perspective. In an article published in al-Qaeda’s online magazine Resurgence, jihadist strategist Abu Ubaydah al-Maqdisi explained the rationale behind this policy of restraint:A guerilla force may possess the capacity of inflicting huge blows on the enemy, but it may be better for it to restrain from doing so in situations when the reaction of the enemy may be overwhelming.Essentially, al-Qaeda’s senior leadership wants the organization to slowly develop its capabilities and resources in preparation for a longer campaign. At the same time, al-Qaeda leadership instructs its affiliates to begin destabilizing state regimes. This two-pronged strategy of enhancing its capabilities and destabilizing enemy regimes positions al-Qaeda to capitalize on state weakness and collapse in the long term. The Islamic State’s rise has reshaped the global jihadist landscape, which for nearly two decades was dominated by al-Qaeda. With the Islamic State seizing the world’s attention, the age of unipolarity within the jihadist movement is over, replaced by intense internal conflict. Each group is firm in the belief that its organizational model is superior to that of its opponent. The transnational jihadist movement is likely to be shaped in the coming years by this competition. It is essential that the United States and western leaders understand the two groups’ strategies and pay close attention as their approaches continue to evolve. The United States has tremendous opportunities to exploit the cleavages between the Islamic State and al-Qaeda. But if we fail to understand the two organizations’ strengths, weaknesses, and strategic and tactical postures, the jihadist movement may emerge from this period of competition stronger than before.

3 THE ISLAMIC STATE VS. AL-QAEDA: THE WAR WITHIN THE JIHADIST MOVEMENT. http://warontherocks.com/2016/01/the-islamic-state-vs-al-qaeda-the-war-within-the-jihadist-movement/





*It is seductive to conclude that "hybrid war 4" is a creature of the 21st century in which technology now offers an alternative and indeed

reinforcement to the blunter use of military force. Based on successful Russian encroachment into Ukraine and occupation of Crimea with hybrid war tactics, it is fair to ask if that could happen to the Baltic States. It is 1924. Lenin had his sights set on swallowing the Soviet Union's tiny neighbor. In those days, cyber warfare meant occupying and controlling the telephone exchange. And so-called "little green men" who swarmed into eastern Ukraine and Crimea were the great grandchildren of those Lenin ordered into Estonia. Fortunately, Lenin failed. Indeed, going back a decade earlier to World War I, hybrid war was very much in evidence. The cyber portion was waged in code breaking and either tapping into or disrupting the undersea telegraph cables that linked London, Paris and Berlin with their overseas bases and colonies. Economic sanctions were imposed by unrestricted submarine warfare and blockade. Propaganda labeled the enemy as barbarians committing countless atrocities against innocent civilians. And Zeppelins and Gotha bombers panicked Londoners with nighttime terror bombings.Thus, hybrid war is as old as war in many ways. Yet, technology and globalization have transformed parts of hybrid war in the 21st century. First, in the past, military force was often the ultimate arbiter of victory or defeat. But when the enemy today lacks an army, navy or air force, even the most powerful militaries in the world are limited in what can be achieved. But before the prospect of hybrid war overwhelms our capacity to respond, the use of a little brainpower can help identify the means to defeat it. This is especially important in neutralizing revolutionary movements such as the Islamic State (IS) who use the perversion of Islam to legitimize and justify political intent and objectives. Force is, of course, always present. In the Clausewitzian view, war is the admixture of policy with "other means." These other means constitute a force multiplier that may not be countered by powerful armies, navies and air forces.

One lesson is evident. Governments must be better prepared to deal with these "other means." Cyber is one area. Messaging and propaganda are another. In this latter case, IS is clearly winning the war of ideas. And, unlike waging war in which unconditional surrender is the objective, these other means that constitute hybrid war are the new strategic centers of gravity that could determine success or failure.

Because states too often rely excessively on military force as the key or main policy instrument, shifting focus is not easy.

2009, FROM FOURTH GENERATION WARFARE TO HYBRID WAR, Colonel Steven C. Williamson United States ArmyIn the late 1980s, Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) theorists began to recognize a shift in warfare which they assumed was both in the character and nature of war. Their ideas and publications triggered a captivating dialogue on how warfare was changing. This debate helped prompt the U.S. military to recognize the change and begin its transformation. However, over the ensuing years, a number of military thinkers and strategists demonstrated that the 4GW theorists did not get it all right. They set the stage for a generation of subsequent theorists to follow with their own predictions of future warfare. The nation must be able to adaptively and effectively combine these new capabilities to prevail in the hybrid conflicts that will dominate the near to mid-term. In the end, 4GW’s goal is to exploit an adversary’s weaknesses and undermine its strengths in order “to convince the enemy’s political decision-makers that their strategic goals are either 4 Hybrid War: Old Wine in a New Bottle? BY HARLAN ULLMAN http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/articles/hybrid-war-old-wine-in-a-new-bottle





unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit.Predicting some of the capabilities of future warriors, Richard Shultz and

Andrea Dew in Insurgents, Terrorists and Militias, believe that these armed adversaries will be very flexible, adaptable, and able to perform diversified operations. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui in Unrestricted Warfare assert that future warfare will not be limited to the military realm. Instead, adversaries will employ unlimited measures – military, economic, informational. They will attack from all directions – from outside a nation, from within a nation and its people, through air, space, and cyberspace. A multi- dimensional coordination by the military, government, corporations, and private entities will conduct synchronized operations to completely destroy the enemy. Or they will use their collective power to assume control of a particular strategic entity or process. These scholars and many more like them predict a future of war that is more complex, interconnected, dynamic, and volatile than ever. Most tend to agree that within the current and future strategic environment, the character of war continues to evolve. Most see the probability of major state-on-state conflict as low in the near term. Instead, the U.S. will face mostly non-state and individual actors. These adversaries will use a full range of capabilities, including all political, economic, informational and military means available. In doing so, we can expect that they will not be bound by limits on the use of violence.

Frank G. Hoffman, a research fellow at the Marine Corps’ Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities, defines a hybrid threat as one that can “incorporate a full range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal

disorder.” Hybrid war can be conducted by states, a variety of non-state actors, or a combination of the two. The complexity of hybrid threats makes it essential that our future leaders understand the implications and trade-offs between preparing for and performing counterinsurgency, partner building, stability operations and maintaining our conventional warfighting edge. Education and training must extend beyond traditional military and government schools to include the study of history, anthropology, economics, geopolitics, culture, law, and strategic communications.

Regards Cees***Some observations from multiple documents:

‘No matter how clearly one thinks, it is impossible to anticipate precisely the character of future conflict. The key is to not be so far off the mark that it becomes impossible to adjust once that character is revealed’.

Ideological movements, based on religion and identity, will remain a significant factor and people will continue to fight for their beliefs. Ideology will not be geographically bounded.

al-Qaeda has inflicted relatively little physical damage upon the military capabilities of the West. Its success lies mainly in its expert exploitation of the ideological and information arenas, where Western governments are ill-prepared, combined with its ability to survive despite the most determined efforts of those governments to destroy it. For many non- state actors, including Hezbollah and al-Qaeda, survival represents success

In future conflict smart adversaries will present us with hybrid threats (combining conventional, irregular and high- end asymmetric threats) in the same time and space.





“If an enemy chooses, or has no practical alternative other than to wage warfare in a regular conventional way, US air power will defeat it long

before US ground power comes into contact. - Professor Colin Gray

AL QAEDA'S STRATEGYBy: Professor Bruce HoffmanAl Qaeda's senior leadership is indisputably being pressed to an extent not seen since the opening phases of the war on terrorism ten years ago. Members of the CTFP community should recognize that the systematic killing of well over thirteen key senior al Qaeda commanders in unmanned drone attacks since July 2008 has appreciably thinned al Qaeda's once deep bench of battle-hardened operatives, to say nothing of their loss of Osama bin Laden himself. Reports that U.S. Treasury Department initiatives have seriously impacted al Qaeda's finances are also often cited as proof of the movement's faltering capabilities. At the same time, however, throughout the past few years, al Qaeda has made fresh inroads in countries as diverse as Afghanistan, Algeria, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. Al Qaeda's success in this respect is the product of an identifiable strategy. More disquieting, its progress in these diverse arenas has again raised the threat of a significant terrorist attack occurring in the United States, Europe or elsewhere. FOUR FUNCTIONING, LONGSTANDING OPERATIONAL LEVELSAl Qaeda's continued survival has been facilitated in large measure by a loose organizational structure that uniquely embodies both top down and bottom up approaches. Unlike most other terrorist groups, which tend to be organized hierarchically—in a rigid pyramidal fashion with a commander at the top, issuing orders to the individual cells arrayed below—from its beginning, al Qaeda was conceived to function as a flatter and more linear-type network. This bi-furcated structure has served the movement well and likely accounts for its continued longevity despite the significant measures directed against it. The al Qaeda movement thus comprises four distinct, but not mutually exclusive, dimensions. They are:1. Al Qaeda Central Senior Leadership. This category comprises the movement's core leadership. It is believed that this hardcore remains centered in or around the Afghanistan and Pakistan borders and continues to exert actual coordination, if not some direct command and control in terms of commissioning attacks, directing surveillance and collating reconnaissance, planning operations, and approving their execution.2. Al Qaeda Affiliates and Associates. This category embraces formally established insurgent or terrorist groups that over the years have benefited from al Qaeda's largesse and spiritual guidance and continue to receive training, arms, intelligence, and other assistance. Among these groups who are ones who have adopted the al Qaeda moniker (e.g., al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb [aQIM], al Qaeda in Iraq, and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula); as well as key allies like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks; or the al Shabaab ("the youth") group in Somalia, among others. Both the number and geographical diversity of these entities is proof of al Qaeda's continued influence and vitality.3. Al Qaeda Network. These are sleepers or local, dispersed cells of al Qaeda adherents who have or have had some direct connection with al Qaeda, including training.4. Al Qaeda Galaxy. These are home-grown Islamic radicals—from North Africa, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia—as well as local converts to Islam mostly living in Europe, Africa and North America as well, who have no direct connection with al Qaeda (or any other identifiable terrorist group), but nonetheless are prepared to carry out attacks in solidarity with or support of al Qaeda's radical jihadi agenda.





AL QAEDA'S SIX CORE, SUBORDINATE STRATEGIESIn service to its global strategy, al Qaeda today pursues six separate lines of

operation or subordinate strategies:1. Attrition. Al Qaeda seeks to overwhelm, distract, and exhaust its adversaries. Given both the U.S. and the world's profound economic travails and attendant financial upheaval, al Qaeda likely perceives the imminent success of this strategy of attrition as more tangible than at any previous time.2. Division. In tandem with the above, al Qaeda also actively seeks to create, foster, and encourage fissures and divisions within the global alliance arrayed against it. This entails the selective targeting of coalition partners in the U.S.-led war on terrorism both in operational theatres like Afghanistan and at home—through attacks on mass transit and other "soft" targets in the national capitals and major cities of European countries allied with the U.S.3. Failing states. Meanwhile, al Qaeda continues to conduct local campaigns of subversion and destabilization in critical operational theaters where failed or failing states provide new opportunities for al Qaeda to extend its reach and consolidate its presence. Countries and regions such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Algeria, the Sahel, East Africa, and Somalia fall within this category.4. Force Multiplier. Al Qaeda also actively provides guidance, assistance, and other help to local affiliates and associated terrorist movements. Al Qaeda thus works behind the scenes in these theaters "plussing-up" the capabilities of indigenous terrorist groups both in terms of kinetic as well as essential non-kinetic operations—including information operations, propaganda, and psychological warfare.5. Converts and "Clean Skins." Al Qaeda continues to seek out citizens of enemy countries, especially converts to Islam, who possess "clean" passports and thus can be more easily deployed for attacks in Western countries without necessarily arousing suspicion.6. Opportunism. Al Qaeda continues to be as opportunistic as it is instrumental: seeking to identify defensive gaps that can be quickly and effectively exploited for attacks.In sum, al Qaeda stubbornly continues to pursue strategies that, however unrealistic or fruitless, extend its longevity, and sustain its potential to cause death, destruction, and global disruption.About the Author(s): Bruce Hoffman is the Director of the Center for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University's Walsh School of Foreign Service.




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