an analysis of hydropolitics of the nile:...
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AN ANALYSIS OF HYDROPOLITICS OF THE NILE:
THE ROLE OF SOUTH SUDAN AS AN ADDITIONAL RIPARIAN STATE
OPANGA VALENTINE
R67/35470/2010
A PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
OF THE BACHELOR OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, INSTITUTE OF
DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (IDIS),
UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI
AUGUST, 2014
ii
DECLARATION
This dissertation is my original work and has not been submitted for examination to any
institution of higher learning.
………………………………………… …..………………………
Opanga Valentine Date
This research project has been submitted for examination with my approval as the university
supervisor.
………………………………………….. …………………………….
Martin Nguru Date
iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
It takes a great team of skilled and dedicated people to see a concept and turn into reality. I have
been blessed to have such a team and I appreciate each and everyone who has contributed to this
research.
First, I would like to thank God for His grace which has manifested in my life as the loving
support of many people who have stood by me as demonstrations of unconditional love.
I would like to thank my supervisor Mr. Martin Nguru who poured immense advice and helped
me clear my project. Thank you for your support, for your generosity with time, directions and
advice and guidance during the course of this research.
Appreciation goes to Dr. Ibrahim Farah for his contribution to this project. He has helped build
an infrastructure that has greatly contributed to my academic endeavors. I thank you for the
investment you have made in me; each and every success I have known is part of your legacy.
To my parents and siblings, I am grateful to you for laying the strong foundations on which most
of what I do is built. Thank you for the values of integrity and discipline that you instilled in me.
Thank you all for making this research a success.
iv
DEDICATION
This research is dedicated to my loving parents. To dad, the late “Sir” Walter Raleigh Opanga,
thank you for building a strong foundation in my life. To my mum Ruth Opanga, thank you for
being an incredible mum; I would have not been who I am without your guidance and advice.
To my sisters and brothers, thank you for believing in me. You inspire me to greater heights;
your friendship and love make each living day a gift. You are not only beautiful on the outside
but also on the inside. I love you all.
v
ABSTRACT
The aim of this research was to analyze the hydro-politics of the Nile with a focus on South
Sudan. The central question examined the role of South Sudan as a middle riparian state in the
hydro-politics of the Nile. In this thesis, hydro-politics of the Nile are compared to those of other
trans-boundary rivers i.e. hydro-politics of the Zambezi river.
The findings indicated that before its independence, the Nile had 10 riparian states; after
South Sudan‟s independence, the Nile riparian states increased to eleven. South Sudan‟s
independence comes at a time when there are tensions amongst Nile riparian states; there also
lacks of an international legal agreement to guide the distribution, use and control of the Nile
river water.
For the longest time, hydro-politics of the Nile have been dominated by downstream
countries, thereby leaving the upstream countries out of key decision making processes. Water
sharing has therefore been and continues to be the foundation upon which conflicts in the Nile
basin region emerge. There continues to be threats of war and tensions between the upstream
countries who are fighting for equitable use and distribution of the Nile River water while the
downstream countries continue to dominate the Nile based on the 1959 Treaty.
This study concludes that state interests have over time become much more important
than state positions; therefore, South Sudan as a middle stream state has a responsibility to bring
all Nile riparian states on table so that they can negotiate a lasting solution to the river Nile basin
conflict besides negotiating a lasting peace.
vi
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
BCM Billion Cubic Meters
CBOs Community-Based Organizations
CFA Cooperative Framework Agreement
CSO Civil Society Organization
DM Decision Making
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
ENB Eastern Nile Basin
GERD Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
IWMI International Water Management Institute
NBI Nile Basin Initiative
NGOs Non Governmental Organizations
TECONILE Technical Cooperation for the Promotion of the Development and
Environmental Protection the Nile River Basin
UNEP United Nations Environmental Program
UN United Nations
WB World Bank
WUA Water User Associations
vii
LIST OF TABLES
Table1: A Summary of the Time Sequence of Hydro politically Relevant Events (1891-
2013).Error! Bookmark not defined.
Table 2: A Summary of International Legal Aspects of the Nile……………………………
............................................................................................................ Error! Bookmark not defined.
Table 3: A summary of the Preferences of Players in the Nile Basin Hydro-politics ................. 40
viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Declaration ..................................................................................................................................... iii
Acknowledgement ........................................................................................................................ iiii
Dedication ...................................................................................................................................... iv
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... v
List of Abbreviations ..................................................................................................................... vi
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................ vii
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
1.1.Background Information ........................................................................................................... 1
1.2 Statement of the Research Problem .......................................................................................... 2
1.3. Objectives of the Research ....................................................................................................... 3
1.3.1.Overall Objective ................................................................................................................... 3
1.3.2.Specific Objectives ................................................................................................................ 3
1.4. Justifications of the Study ........................................................................................................ 4
1.4.1. Policy Justifications .............................................................................................................. 4
1.4.2. Academic Justifications ........................................................................................................ 4
1.5.Literature Review...................................................................................................................... 5
1.5.1. Literature on the Nile basin conflict ..................................................................................... 5
ix
1.5.2. Literature on the actors, issues and processes in the River Nile basin conflict .................... 7
1.5.3. Forms of Cooperation in the Nile ......................................................................................... 8
1.5.4. South Sudan‟s Position over the use of the River Nile Water .............................................. 9
1.5.5. Literature gap ...................................................................................................................... 10
1.6.Theoretical Framework ........................................................................................................... 11
1.6.1. Game theory ........................................................................................................................ 11
1.6.2. Theories of International Law on International Water Courses .......................................... 13
1.7. Hypotheses ............................................................................................................................. 14
1.8 Research Methodology ........................................................................................................... 14
1.9S cope and Limitations............................................................................................................. 15
1.10. Chapter Outline .................................................................................................................... 15
CHAPTER TWO
HYDRO-POLITICS OF THE NILE BASIN: AN OVERVIEW
2.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 17
2.2. The Nile Basin Conflict: An overview .................................................................................. 17
2.3. Hydro-politics of the Nile ...................................................................................................... 19
2.4. Effects of the Nile basin conflict on the Socioeconomic Development of the Nile Riparian
states .............................................................................................................................................. 21
2.5. International Legal Aspects of Trans-boundary Rivers: The Nile River Conflict ................. 22
2.6. The importance of Non- State Actors in the Nile basin conflict............................................ 24
2.6.1. The Role of Community Based Organizations and Non Governmental Organizations in the
Nile hydro-politics ........................................................................................................................ 24
x
2.6.2. The Role of Development Partners and Financial Institutions in the Nile basin conflict
Hydro-politics ............................................................................................................................... 26
2.7. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 27
CHAPTER THREE
THE ROLE OF SOUTH SUDAN AS AN ADDITIONAL RIPARIAN STATE
3.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 29
3.2.The Importance of the Nile to South Sudan............................................................................ 29
3.3.The Use of the Nile Waters ..................................................................................................... 31
3.3.1.South Sudan ......................................................................................................................... 32
3.3.2.Other Riparian states ............................................................................................................ 32
3.4.Hydro-politics of the Nile: Actors, Issues and Perspectives ................................................... 33
3.4.1. The rise of China in the Horn of Africa Region ................................................................. 33
3.4.2. South Sudan ........................................................................................................................ 34
3.4.3. Water Stress ........................................................................................................................ 34
3.5. Players, Options and Preferences: Application of Theory ............................................. 35
3.5.1. Players and Options ............................................................................................................ 35
3.5.1.1. Upstream Nations............................................................................................................. 35
3.5.1.2. Ethiopia ............................................................................................................................ 36
3.5.1.3. Sudan (North)................................................................................................................... 37
3.5.1.4. Egypt ................................................................................................................................ 38
3.5.2.South Sudan ......................................................................................................................... 38
3.5.2.1 Preferences ........................................................................................................................ 39
xi
3.6. The role of South Sudan in the Nile diplomatic game ........................................................... 41
3.7. Cooperation in the Nile Basin Region: The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) and the
Comprehensive Framework Agreement (CFA) ............................................................................ 43
3.7.1 The NBI and the CFA .......................................................................................................... 43
3.7.2. South Sudan‟s Legal Rights under the CFA ....................................................................... 46
3.8. National Strategies towards Water Resources in the Nile Basin Region............................... 46
3.9. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 48
CHAPTER FOUR
AN ANALYSIS OF THE HYDROPOLITICS OF THE NILE RIVER
4.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 49
4.2. Emerging Issues ..................................................................................................................... 49
4.2.1. Complexity of the Nile Basin Hydro politics ..................................................................... 49
4.2.2. Egypt-Ethiopia Conflict ...................................................................................................... 51
4.2.3. Significance of South Sudan as a new actor in the Nile Hydro-politics ............................. 55
4.2.4. The Nile Basin Initiative and the Comprehensive Framework Agreement: Lessons Learnt
....................................................................................................................................................... 57
4.2.5. Water Security in the Nile................................................................................................... 58
4.2.6. Agriculture .......................................................................................................................... 59
4.2.7. Security Threats in Africa: The Horn of Africa and the Middle East Regions ................... 60
4.2.8. Other Issues ......................................................................................................................... 63
4.3. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 66
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CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMENDATIONS
5.1. Summary of Chapters One to Four ........................................................................................ 67
5.2. Key Findings .......................................................................................................................... 69
5.3. Recommendations .................................................................................................................. 70
Appendix 1: Nile Basin Countries ................................................................................................ 73
Appendix 2: The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam .................................................................. 74
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................. 75
1
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
1.1. Background Information
Conflicts are prevalent in society; they usually arise from an incompatibility of goals between
two or more people or groups of people, ideas or interests. When an inherent incompatibility of
interests, values and objectives of two or more characters or forces takes place, a conflict is
inevitable. 1
Therefore, the term „conflict‟ may be defined as an antagonism that occurs between
two or more adversative peoples, groups, ideas and interests as a result of an incompatibility of
goals.
Natural resources based conflicts account for a big percentage of conflicts that occur in
Africa and have resulted from oil and minerals in many countries in Africa. Examples include
conflicts over diamonds in Angola, oil in Nigeria and Angola, and gold and other minerals in
DRC Congo. Water as a natural resource has increasingly become a source of conflicts not only
in Africa but also the world over. In an ideal world, water is supposed to be uniformly distributed
and easily accessed by all parties involved. In reality, there is a challenge in water sharing
because of the increasing demand for water which results from an increase in population
especially in Africa.
When shared water source are neither evenly distributed nor effectively managed,
conflicts are bound to occur amongst riparian states. The Nile river riparian states have many at
times experienced numerous conflicts resultant from uneven distribution of water, management
and control of the river Nile; the downstream countries which do not contribute water to the Nile
1 Mwagiru M., Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management, (Nairobi: Watermark, 2006), p 1.
2
control the Nile waters while the upstream countries which contribute to the flow of water to the
River Nile are left out of all processes that relate to distribution and control of the river.
In this region, the demand for water is aggravated by an increase in population growth,
rising economic development, increased levels of poverty, political instability and the changing
regional values that have deepened competition over water resources. Water scarcity has become
part and parcel of some countries‟ national interests and foreign policies. For example, Egypt‟s
national interests and thereby its foreign policy is centered on the issue of water security.
The recent trend in the increase in competition over water resources is likely to lead to
more future conflicts over shared water supplies. This study seeks to explore the relationship
between South Sudan and the Nile basin hydro-politics. The recent independence of South Sudan
is bound to have effects on the conflict that exists amongst the Nile riparian states. This research
therefore seeks to investigate the role that the new state of South Sudan plays in the hydro
politics of the Nile basin region.
1.2. Statement of the Research Problem
Conflicts, especially trans-boundary natural resource based conflicts, create a focal point to the
study of international relations of African countries. Such conflicts have in the past had adverse
political, social and economic consequences among the riparian states and the African region as
a whole. In the Nile river basin, continuous wrangles between Ethiopia and Egypt over the use of
the Nile river have had numerous undesirable effects on every sector of the economy and the
security of African states in the region.
The Nile is Egypt‟s source of life but its control is in the hands of other governments.
Turton argues that Ethiopia controls 86 percent of all water entering Egypt whose population has
3
been growing rapidly.2 The control and equitable use of the river Nile water amongst the riparian
states has been a long standing issue in the region. To Egypt, the control of the Nile is a matter of
national and cultural pride. This has contributed greatly to non development and political
disintegration in the region.3
The independence of South Sudan has increased the number of Nile riparian States to
eleven. Unfortunately, the Nile does not have an all-inclusive legal regime to regulate its use and
to ensure that this indispensible natural resource is conserved for future generations.
Accordingly, with the increase in the number of riparian states from ten to eleven this research
seeks to answer the following question: What role will South Sudan as an extra riparian state
play in the Nile Basin hydro-politics?
1.3. Objectives of the Research
This study has two sets of objectives:
1.3.1. Overall Objective
To examine the role of South Sudan in the already existing Nile basin hydro-power
politics.
1.3.2. Specific Objectives
More specifically, the study aims to:
Examine the role of South Sudan in the Nile basin conflict as an additional riparian state;
Critically analyze the role of Non-riparian states in the Nile basin conflict;
Investigate the status of hydro-politics in the Nile Basin region
2 Turton A.R, A Cryptic Hydro political History of the Nile Basin for Students of Hydro Politics, Study Guide for
Pretoria University, Pretoria, 2000. 3 Green Cross International, National Sovereignty and International Watercourses, (Geneva: Green Cross
International, 2000), p98.
4
1.4. Justifications of the Study
This study aims to provide insights into the significance of South Sudan in the Nile basin hydro-
politics. Water is quickly becoming a real challenge across the world and has a potential to
induce interstate conflict.4 It is clear that water as a natural resource is a limiting factor for
economic development since it is limited, valuable, and vulnerable. Competing demands for
water may exist among basin countries, and among different sectors within each country.5
1.4.1. Policy Justifications
The Nile riparian states have spent significant time resolving the existing issues through
establishment of institutions to foster cooperation amongst them. The real problem that exists is
how to achieve the proper management of the basin resources. However, there is an opportunity
to transform the Nile, through collaborative and visible actions on the ground, into a unifying
force that builds regional and international interdependencies and promotes economic activities
which could enable co-basin states to participate as partners in emerging regional and global
trade. Effective water management, including water harvesting and conservation, can bring
benefits to all involved riparian states.
1.4.2. Academic Justifications
This study seeks to provide adequate information to investigate the hypothesis that South Sudan
will significantly affect the Nile hydro-politics. The rarity of literature that attempts to critically
analyse the role of an additional riparian state in the Nile hydro-politics creates a gap. Therefore,
this research seeks to fill this gap; it will add to the growing body of literature in the field of
resource-based conflicts. Additionally, this research will look into policies that may help various
4 Metawie A.F, Lessons Learnt from cooperation in the River Nile Basin, 2008.
5 Ibid
5
actors find solutions to the existing impasse. This study also lays a foundation for further
research studies aimed at guaranteeing water security for South Sudan and peace in the Nile
basin region as a whole.
1.5. Literature Review
In Africa today, access to water is crucial for human survival; a third of its population lack water.
With the ever increasing population riparian states are now forced to take a stake in the Nile
Basin unlike before. This section analyses actors, issues and processes, forms of cooperation
within the Nile basin region and the position of South Sudan on the Nile hydro-politics.
1.5.1. Literature on the Nile basin conflict
There are diverse uses for resources such as water, forests, pastures and land. People have
endeavored to manage these resources in different ways and understanding the interests of these
people can cause them to manage resources well thus avoid conflicts. Resource-based conflicts
often result from competition for these resources and power if parties believe that they cannot
achieve their needs or their values and interests have been threatened.
The Nile Basin region is made up of eleven riparian states; nine upstream countries with
four tributaries which are vital sources to the river Nile and two downstream countries. Upstream
countries include: Burundi, DRC Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, Uganda and Tanzania.
The two downstream countries are: Sudan and Egypt. Of the four tributaries in the upstream
countries, three tributaries come from Ethiopia- the Blue Nile, the Sobat and the Atbara.6
Therefore, Ethiopia contributes the most water to the River Nile.
6 Terje T., The River Nile in the Age of the British; Political Ecology and Quest for Economic Power, (American
University Press: 2006), p10.
6
Conflicts have frequently occurred because of competition for oil and water. The modern
history of hydro politics in river Nile has had greater consequences for both regional and global
developments. Oil has been a principle cause of regional economic growth in the Nile Basin
region and adequate water supply has been a product. Some scholars such as Selby and Gnyra
regard hydro-politics as a non issue; they argue that foreign policy, ideological, economic and
strategic relations among neighboring states outweigh water politics.7
Nile water disputes expanded into the entire Nile basin after Egypt envisioned a single
unified basin under its control. Forty percent of the River Nile population continues to depend on
the river for their livelihood. Most of the population in the upstream countries is less developed
and is characterized by the poverty alleviation agenda.8 Over the past half century, there has been
rapid regional development and all riparian states continue to concentrate on establishing water
projects in the form of mega dams for hydropower and irrigation9 despite Egypt‟s and Sudan‟s
continued use of threats and intimidation.10
Today, the Nile continues to be dominated by Egypt. Waterbury argues that Sudan is
currently entitled to one third of the amount of water Egypt takes. Egypt has many at times
threatened to go to war over the Nile water to protect its interests; this has prevented other
riparian states from benefiting from river Nile. Therefore, the preferences of the upstream
countries are defined by their desire to change the status quo.11
7 Selby J. and Gnyra T., The Geopolitics of Water in the Middle East Fantasies and Realities in the 3rd World,
(Quarterly, vol. 26 (2), 2005) , pp 329-349. 8 Taffasse T., The Nile Question: Hydro politics legal wrangling. Modus Vivendi and Perceptives, London:
Transaction Publishers, 2001. 9 Tekle M., Legal Framework for Equitable and Sustainable Utilization of the Nile River Waters: Agreement of the
Riparian States for Cooperative Basin Management, 2010. 10
Tevdt T., The River Nile in the Age of the British: Political Ecology and Quest for Economic Power. op. cit 11
Waterbury J., Hydro politics of the Nile Valley, University of Syracuse press: 1979.
7
1.5.2. Literature on the actors, issues and processes in the River Nile basin conflict
Conflicts usually occur where there is a difference in preferred outcomes in a bargaining
situation. Trans-boundary conflicts usually arise from a power imbalance amongst the riparian
states. In this case, one state usually has the power to exert its authority over other states. 12
Upstream countries are less influential while the downstream countries are more
powerful; hence, the question of the use of the Nile water is subject to political interactions
amongst the Nile riparian states. An extra riparian state therefore has a vital role to play in
shaping the issues of water security, peace, economics and the River Nile region as a whole.
1.5.2.1. Causes of the Nile basin conflict: The 1929 and the 1959 Treaty
Scholars of international relations of Africa attribute conflicts to historical animosities and
colonial legacies. In this case, the advent of River Nile basin conflict can be attributed to colonial
legacies, that is, treaties and agreements that were signed by colonial masters on behalf of
African countries‟ governments. Natural resources are expected to breed cooperation rather than
conflict; they can be used to strengthen both military and environmental security. Twentieth
century cooperation programs in the Nile have often epitomized Egyptian domestic
considerations.13
Earlier agreements and treaties that were signed amongst colonial powers have proved
defective over time. In 1929, the Agreement between Egypt and Anglo Egyptian Sudan bolstered
Egypt‟s grip by giving it more control of 48bn m3 and 4bn m3 of the Nile flow annually.
Additionally, the Nile would be in Egypt‟s full control during the dry season while it monitored
12
Goldstein J., International Relations, 5th
E.D., (Pearson Publications; 2005), p225. 13
Gledistch P., and Hamner J., Shared Rivers: Conflict, and Cooperation‟, Paper Presented at the 42nd Annual
Meeting of the International Studies Association, (Chicago, IL, 2001), pp21-24.
8
activities of other upstream riparian states. Egypt would also undertake activities on the Nile
without any consent from other riparian states besides having a right to veto any construction
projects that would adversely affect her interests. 14
Efforts by Ethiopia and other upstream countries to recover their use of the Nile have
been thwarted by the 1959 agreement signed between Egypt and Sudan which increased their
water use to 55.5bn m3 and 18.5b m3. The treaty also postulates that any claim from the
remaining riparian states would be addressed by Egypt and Sudan. These treaties gave much
more power to Egypt and Sudan. Egypt‟s source of power over the Nile remains the 1959 Nile
Treaty.15
1.5.3. Forms of Cooperation in the Nile
Nile riparian states have time and again carried out negotiations in a bid to establish principles of
equitable use of the Nile water. The yielding of positive results from each of the cooperation
phases had a direct impact on the launching the phases that followed. The first attempt at
cooperation was Undugu (1959-1960s); it set to improve agriculture, resource and economic
development, among other projects. Undugu provided an institutional locus for sharing expertise
as a group. It failed to lead to meaningful and concrete riparian cooperation primarily due to lack
of genuine commitment.16
The second was HYDROMET (1967–1992). HYDROMET, an initiative of the Upper
Nile region, was a project designed to collect hydro meteorological information within the basin.
14
Mekonnen K., The Defects and the Effects of Past Treaties and Agreements on the Nile River Waters: Whose
Faults were they? 1999. 15
Ibid 16
Brunnee J., and Toope S., The Changing Nile Basin Regime: Does Law Matter? Vol. 43 (Harvard int‟l, 2002), pp
122-131.
9
Thirdly, the Technical Cooperation Committee for the Promotion of the Development and
Environmental Protection of the Nile Basin (TECCONILE) was established in 1992 by Egypt,
Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaire (DRC), with the other riparian states participating
as observers.17
Its role was to foster cooperation for development and environmental protection
of the Nile region.18
The fourth attempt at cooperation was the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) that was established
in 1999 and still exists to date. It aims to promote sustainable socio economic development
through the utilization of and benefit from the common water resource besides promoting
efficient water use and drainage. The fifth is the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) that
was established in 1997. So far, it has been signed by six countries which include: Kenya,
Uganda, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Burundi. Eritrea has not been involved in negotiations
while South Sudan is yet to come on board. The CFA seeks to advance negotiations for equitable
utilization of the Nile waters but Egypt and Sudan have frozen any attempts at cooperation under
this arrangement.19
1.5.4. South Sudan’s Position over the use of the River Nile Water
South Sudan's economy is one of the worlds weakest and most underdeveloped. Most villages in
the country have no electricity or running water, and its overall infrastructure is lacking with few
paved roads anywhere.20
The country's economy, like many other developing countries, is
17
Nile Basin Initiative, Sequences of Major Events of the Nile Basin Initiative Process. Retrieved from
http://www.nilebasin.org/nbihistory.htm 18
Ayebare A., A Political Storm over the Nile, New York, 2010. 19
Brunnee J., and Toope S., The Changing Nile Basin Regime: Does Law Matter? Vol. 43 (Harvard International,
2002), pp 122-131. 20
Elbagir N., and Karimi F., South Sudanese Celebrate the Birth of Their Nation, CNN, 2011. Retrieved from
https://www.google.com/#q=N.+Elbagir%2C+and+F.+Karimi%2C+South+Sudanese+Celebrate+the+Birth+of+The
ir+Nation%2CCNN%2C+2011 Accesed 12th
October, 2013.
10
heavily dependent on agriculture. It is also amongst the poorest countries in Africa and will need
to use water from the Nile for agriculture.21
South Sudan plays a critical role in the balance of power between upstream and
downstream countries. If South Sudan accedes to signing the CFA, power will shift to the
upstream countries; this will force Egypt and Sudan to renounce the 1959 treaty and accept
cooperation on the basis of the CFA. However, if it doesn‟t, the upstream countries may decide
to act unilaterally to the detriment of the lower riparian states. In this case, with a new regime in
power, Nile riparian states may renegotiate an agreement that includes the needs of all Nile basin
countries.22
1.5.5. Literature gap
The Nile offers enormous development opportunities to all Nile basin countries. Actually, future
prospects for the people living in the region fully depend on the river. The current diplomatic
game can be a win-win situation if every country manages to make compromises. The CFA will
help establish a comprehensive agreement that will deal with the utilization of the waters of the
Nile. At the moment, it is unclear if South Sudan will sign the CFA.
From the literature review, it is clear that different perspectives of shared rivers have
been discussed, amongst them the role of Non state actors, conflict management, cooperation and
the media but there is an information gap with regards to the role of an extra riparian state in the
hydro-politics of trans-boundary rivers. It is also clear from the literature review that South
21
Sudan Tribune, South Sudan Tells Egypt It Will Respect Existing Nile Water Treaties, March 28th 2011, Retrieved
From http://Www.Sudantribune.Com/South-Sudan-Tells-Egypt-It-Will,38423 Accesed 12th
October, 2013. 22
Waterbury J., Hydro politics of the Nile Valley, University of Syracuse press: 1979.
11
Sudan is critical to the achievement of peace and cooperation in the Nile region. This research
therefore seeks to fill this gap.
1.6. Theoretical Framework
This study will focus on non-cooperative game theory. This theory will be used later in this study
to analyze the Nile basin conflict. Theories of international law and international water courses
are also analyzed under this section.
1.6.1. Game theory
Nation-states rarely go to war over water; conflicts in an international river basin can be resolved
through cooperation among the riparian states that share resources. The complexity of the river
Nile conflict can be simplified and analyzed using game theory to explore potential outcomes
resulting from various strategies employed by players of the game.23
Game theory is a set of
concepts aimed at decision making in situations of competition and conflict under specified
rules.24
This theory provides the best approach for cooperative solutions for water resource
conflicts in international river basins.
Zagare defines game theory as the science of interactive decision making. A game is any
situation in which an outcome depends on the choices of two or more decision makers; most
interstate conflicts qualify as games. Decision makers are called players; they can be individuals,
groups of individuals operating as coherent units or states. Kings, queens, foreign secretaries,
23
Wu X., Applying Game Theory to Conflict Basins in International River Basins: A Case Study of the Nile Basin
Paperback, 2009. 24
Business Dictionary-Game Theory
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/game-theory.html Accessed 20th November, 2013.
12
presidents and Prime ministers amongst others are categorized as players. Additionally, decisions
players make lead to outcomes which may end up as compromises or conflicts.25
This theory has two branches: cooperative and non-cooperative game theory.26
This
research will focus on non-cooperative game theory concepts and apply them to determine
possible outcomes in the Nile river conflict. Non-cooperative game theory is any game in which
the players are unable to permanently commit themselves to a particular course of action. Due to
anarchy in the International System, Non cooperative Game theory holds a particular attraction
for theorists of interstate conflict.27
Solutions to the game prescribe decisions that each player
might make.28
This theory is used to analyze strategies that each player seeks to use to maximize
their chance of winning and to predict possible results of the game.
The Nile river has been the center of water resources development tensions among four
main riparian actors: Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia and other upstream nations. Each player has a
desire to meet its national demands under increasingly stressed limited resources. Egypt, the
most economically advantaged of the actors, strives to secure water supply for its growing
population. Sudan is wedged between its 1959 treaty with Egypt and potentially economically
beneficial cooperation with Ethiopia. Ethiopia strives to increase its water share to secure its
food supply and facilitate economic development. Upstream nations seek to be released from the
25
Zagare F., Game Theory, In Security Studies: An Introduction eds. P. Williams, (Rutledge: 2008), pp44-48, 53-56 26
Wu X., and D. Whittington, Incentive Compatibility and Conflict Resolution in International River Basins: A
Case Study of the Nile Basin, 42(2), (Water Resources Research, 2002). 27
Zagare F., and Kilgour M., Perfect Deterrence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 28
Madani K., and Lund J., “A Monte Carlo Game Theoretic Approach for Multi Criteria Decision Making under
Uncertainity”, 35 (5), (Advances in Water Resources, 2011), pp 607-616.
13
water development restrictions placed on them by the 1959 treaty.29
A claim on the Nile waters
by other players has created a potential for war to occur.
1.6.2. Theories of International Law on International Water Courses
Adar argues that there are four main international theories that relate to the legal stalemate in the
Nile river basin.30
They include: The Absolute Territorial Sovereignty theory, also known as
Riparian Rights, postulates that a sovereign state has unlimited rights to natural resources within
its territorial jurisdiction. This approach cannot be applied in the Nile Basin region because it
might escalate the existing and cause new inter-state conflicts.
Secondly, the theory of Community of Co-Riparian States, also Called Community
Interests, implies that upstream countries should not engage in any activities that may interfere
with the flow of the Nile to the low riparian states. This theory may be invoked if states feel that
their security is threatened. It has been used by Egypt and Sudan and has a potential for conflict.
Thirdly, the community of co-riparian states, also known as the community interests
theory, is pegged on the doctrine of equitable use and distribution of water codified in the
Helsinki Rules and the 1997 UN Convention on Non Navigational watercourse. It stipulates that
the river community consists of a common Geographic and economic entity beneficial to all
states. Its integrated management involves collaboration by riparian states to form institutions to
implement joint policies. This doctrine is being applied by the upstream countries of the Nile
river basin region.
29
Elimam L., Rheinheimer D., Connell C., and Madani K., “An Ancient Struggle: A Game Theory Approach to
Resolving the Nile Conflict”, (World Environmental and Water Resources Congress, 2008), pp. 1-10. 30
Adar G.K., “Kenya‟s Foreign Policy and Geopolitical Interests: The Case of the Nile River Basin” (African
Sociological Review 11 (1), 2007), pp 63-80.
14
Lastly, the limited territorial sovereignty theory, also known as the theory of sovereign
equality and territorial integrity argues that any state through which a river flows has the right to
use the river water. It recognizes rights of both upstream and downstream riparian states.
1.7. Hypotheses
This study will test the following hypotheses:
1. South Sudan‟s entry in the Nile basin conflict as an additional riparian state will dramatically
change hydro politics of the Nile.
2. The use of water among the Nile riparian states may increase in future, creating the potential
for a real conflict.
3. Non- Nile riparian states have immensely influenced hydro-politics of the Nile River Basin.
1.8 Research Methodology
This study will be done using a Case Study Design within a qualitative framework. A case study
is defined as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real
life context when the boundaries between phenomena and context are not clearly evident and in
which multiple sources of evidence are used”31
This method was chosen because it is valuable, has distinctive characteristics that include
looking out for all the relevant evidence, looks at different interpretations of the situation,
identifies the most significant aspects in the area under study and calls for the use of the
researcher's prior expert knowledge to further the analysis. It can also be used in combination
with other methods.
31
Yin R., Case Study Research: Design and Methods, Newbury CA: Sage publishing, 1991.
15
This research will therefore use information from the library and the internet as the main
sources of information. In this case, published and unpublished secondary data will be used to
put issues into context and to justify the research study. Data from books, journals, protocols,
reports and other relevant published materials will be incorporated in the study to build on the
literature and put issues in the Nile basin conflict into perspective. All these materials will be
explored to provide a better understanding of prevailing situations in trans-boundary rivers in
other parts of the world, thereby putting the Nile Basin hydro-politics and conflict into context.
1.9 Scope and Limitations
This study is bound to encounter several constraints; it is limited by the time factor in two main
ways: First, it will be carried out within three months, a time too short to gather enough data on
the subject. Therefore, both secondary and published and unpublished primary data will be used
instead. Secondly, time constraints limit the scope of research. It is not possible to conclusively
collect primary data. More time is required to collect enough information from each and every of
the 11 Nile river riparian states. Thus this study is limits itself to the understanding of the
significance of South Sudan in the river Nile hydro politics. Additionally, this research does not
investigate all issues pertaining to the Nile basin conflict; it limits itself to understanding how
South Sudan influences hydro politics of the Nile River.
1.10. Chapter Outline
This study is structured around five chapters. Chapter one is the proposal; it introduces the
subject of study and lays the foundation of the dissertation. This chapter captures the statement
of the problem, objectives of the study, literature review and research methodology. Also
included are the limitations and problems of the study and the structure of the study. Chapter two
16
focuses on the overview of the hydro-politics of the Nile Basin. Chapter three analyses the
hydro-politics of the Nile with a focus on the role of South Sudan as an additional riparian state.
Chapter four critically analyses the role of South Sudan in hydro-politics of the Nile. Chapter
five offers conclusions, recommendations and areas for future studies.
17
CHAPTER TWO
HYDRO-POLITICS OF THE NILE BASIN: AN OVERVIEW
2.1. Introduction
Chapter one, which forms the basis of this research, introduced the study. It presented the
statement of the problem, objectives, literature review and a theoretical framework from which
hypotheses of the study are derived. It also looked at the research methodology.
Chapter two will look at the Nile Basin hydro-politics. It will examine the hydro-politics
of the Nile and the effects of the Nile basin conflict on the socioeconomic development of the
Nile basin riparian states; it will also analyse international legal aspects of trans-boundary
Rivers. Additionally, it will investigate the role of Non-state actors in the Nile basin hydro-
politics and conflict.
2.2. The Nile Basin Conflict: An overview
Water is a critical resource for all countries that share the basin, but it is especially important for
the development and survival of Egypt, Ethiopia and the Sudan. Water will be even more critical
in the future as these countries face larger populations and therefore an even greater demand for
water. For many years, there have been tensions among these countries over the use of the Nile.32
Egypt and the Sudan have monopolized and controlled the utilization of the Nile waters for
almost a century without properly sharing with the other countries through which the River Nile
flows the former with 85 percent of the water while the latter with about 15 percent of the annual
flow.
Water scarcity has increasingly become an issue that is likely to drag countries into
32
Tesfaye A., Hydro politics and regional stability in the Nile Basin, (Wayne, New Jersey: William Patterson
University, 2005), p 41.
18
conflicts as they struggle to meet the increased economic and social challenges in their respective
countries. 33.
Water as a scarce resource has become a serious concern to all Nile riparian states. Egypt
views the Nile as part of it, given their history; the two are inseparable. A reduction in the
quantity of water entering Egypt water has been an area of concern for Egypt; hence, the Nile
waters remain a vital resource. Ethiopia, where most of the river's water originates, also wants to
make use of it and has been planning a huge dam for years. Egypt depends on the Nile for 98 per
cent of its water - and water is in increasingly short supply.34
Despite many attempts at cooperative agreements among Nile riparian states, River Nile
riparian states have not yet been able to come up with a water sharing agreement. River Nile is a
unique example because other international rivers have established water sharing systems; this
framework guides them on how to solve disputes whenever they arise. For example, a water
sharing agreement exists between the USA and Mexico over the Colorado River; between India
and Bangladesh over Ganges River; and between China and its neighboring Southeast Asian
countries over the Mekong River.35
Egypt and Sudan still retain the right of veto on projects that are bound to influence or
change the river's course as provided in the 1959 treaty. Other riparian states are working on
changing the status quo; Ethiopia's parliament has now passed the ratification of a treaty
intended to replace the old Nile Water Agreement, in terms of which a joint forum will decide on
how the waters are used. Egypt has rejected this, insisting on its prior rights.
33
Kameri-Mbote P., Water, Conflict and Cooperation: Lessons from the Nile river Basin, Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, Navigating Peace no. 4., 2007 34
Hultin J., The Nile: Source of Life, Source of Conflict, in Hydro politics Conflicts Over Water as a Development
Constrains, ed. Leif Ohlsson, (London: Zed Books Ltd, 1999), p29 35
Nickum J., Hydraulic Pressures: Into the Age of Water Security, Council on Foreign Relations 89 (5), 2010.
19
2.3. Hydro-politics of the Nile
The Nile river basin conflict exists between two groups of states: the downstream and upstream
countries. On one hand, downstream Nile riparian countries operate on the principle of no harm;
they believe in acquired rights and prior use and seek to retain existing agreements and
allocations. Additionally, they insist that they should be consulted before any country can
establish any project on the Nile.36
On the other hand, upstream Nile riparian states believe in the
principle of equitable utilization; they believe that a new comprehensive agreement for the whole
basin should be established and that new uses of water should be developed. Additionally, new
allocation agreements should be negotiated to allow for new investments without notification or
downstream veto; this will ensure access to international funding, thereby changing status quo.37
The Nile basin is a region replete with instability and conflict, with one of the key
contentious questions centered on the utilization of the waters of the Nile river predating the
independence years. The 1929 Agreement between Great Britain (on behalf of its colony, Sudan)
and Egypt and concluded after “exchange of notes” between the two countries laid the
foundation for the long-standing dispute among the riparian states on equitable utilization of the
waters of the Nile.38
Of all the riparian states, Egypt is the most vulnerable with 97 percent of its water
coming from other countries in the region. Most of the countries in this region fall in the bracket
of least developed countries in the region except for Kenya and Egypt. All these countries
36
Moustafa M., and Gichuki F., The Nile Basin profile: Strategic research for enhancing agricultural water
productivity, ( Draft Edition: Challenge Program on Water and Food., 2003) 37
Ibid 38
Korwa G., Ripples in the Nile Waters, African Review: Nation Media Group, 2013. http://www.africareview.com/Special-Reports/Ripples-in-the-Nile-waters/-/979182/1740128/-/mta36l/-/index.html
Accessed 20th November, 2013
20
depend on the Nile for their survival. The establishment of a legal regime to manage river Nile
Basin and its drainage system continues to be a challenge.39
In the past, Egypt established itself as a water hegemon that controlled a majority of the
water resources of the region. This status has recently been challenged by developments and
alliances of the upstream countries, increasing the tension between Egypt and some of its
neighbors. Link et al argue that unfavorable shifts in precipitation patterns can augment the
pressure on the downstream countries, causing them to consider shifting towards strategies that
are based on threats rather than on cooperation.40
Hydro-politics of the Nile have occurred as
summarized in the table below.
Table1: A Summary of the Time Sequence of Hydro politically Relevant Events (1891-
2013)
TIME EVENTS
1891-
1948
This era can be called the "Egyptian Colonial Period". It is characterized by British
domination in the affairs of Egypt, and the development of basin-wide planning for the
Nile river of which the 1928 Nile Waters Agreement is an example.
1952-
1959
This era can be called the "Bilateral Period" as it is dominated by political interaction
between Egypt and Sudan. The 1959 Agreement on the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters
was signed between Egypt and Sudan. Other Nile basin states are excluded from this
process, even though Ethiopia asserted its right to use the waters of the Blue Nile.
39
Turton A.R., A Cryptic Hydro Political History of the Nile Basin for Students of Hydro Politics, Study Guide for
Pretoria University, Pretoria, 2000. 40
Link M., Pointek F., Scheffron J., and Schilling J., On Foes and Flows: Water Conflict and Cooperation in the
Nile river Basin in Times of Climate Change, Research Group Climate Change and Security (CLISEC), Klima
Campus; University of Hamburg, 2011
21
1960-
1964
This era can be called the "Upper Basin Post-Colonial Period" as it is dominated by the
Nyerere Doctrine that is invoked in one form or another by various British colonies on
attaining their independence.
1965-
1975
This era can be called the "Early High Dam Period" as it spans the time from the first
closure of the Nile to the first filling of Lake Nasser. This is a turbulent era where the
dynamics of the Cold War became inter-linked with national politics at the basin level.
1976-
2000
This era can be called the "Post High Dam Period" as it spans the time after the first
filling. It is characterized by the disintegration of most of the states south of Egypt,
heralding in an era of unprecedented civil war, coups d'état, famine, poverty and mass
migration of people on a scale that had never been known before.
2000-
2013
This era is characterized by signing of cooperative frameworks, the independence of
South Sudan and the continued control of the Nile by Egypt. There are calls for an all
inclusive legal framework that will allow for the equal distribution, control and benefits
from the Nile river.
Source: Adar G.K, The Interface between National Interest and Regional Stability: The Nile
river and the Riparian States. (African Sociological Review; 2007), pp 4-9.
2.4. Effects of the Nile basin conflict on the Socioeconomic Development of the Nile
Riparian states
Apart from water resources, other issues have over time shaped the Nile hydro-politics. The final
years of the last century saw a dramatic swing in the international relations of the Horn of Africa
region. The apparent change was occurring in the realm of traditional Egyptian influence in the
Horn of Africa. 41
41
Gleick P., Coping With the Global Fresh Water Dilemma: The State and Global Governance in the Global
Environment in the 21st Century, Prospects for International Cooperation on Market Forces, 2009.
22
The Eastern Nile Basin (ENB) countries, namely Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, are facing
dynamic changes, such as rapid growth of population, poverty, land degradation, and food and
water insecurity. The land in the ENB states is given to geographical extremities, varying from
the deserts of Sudan and Egypt to the highlands and wetland areas of Ethiopia. Every riparian
state has an entirely different capacity for using the Nile waters; this depends on a combination
of geographical position, economic capacity, and the potential to develop resources.42
In most African countries, agriculture is an integral sector that supports the livelihoods of
the rural population, which is in many cases already facing severe degradation of natural
resources. Cascao argues that effects of climate change such as droughts and famines have
contributed to water scarcity in the region, thereby adversely affecting agriculture. According to
the International Water Management Institute (IWMI), vulnerable groups are those living in
hotspots with high population densities in mixed rain fed agricultural systems as experienced by
the Nile upstream states.43
2.5. International Legal Aspects of Trans-boundary Rivers: The Nile River Conflict
At the moment, there is no one overarching agreement on the Nile Basin agreement on the use of
water amongst the Nile riparian states. The only legal agreement upon which water is distributed
between these riparian countries is the 1929 Treaty that includes only Egypt and Sudan. This
treaty was revised in 1959, also leaving other riparian states out of the agreement.44
Korwa
42
Winpenny J., Managing water as an economic resource, New York: Overseas Development Institute, 1994. 43
Cascao A., Climate Change and Hydro-politics: Trans-boundary Water Governance in the Nile Basin,
Copenhagen, Denmark: Danish Institute of International Studies, 2012. 44
Shema N, The Falling Future of Nile Basin Management, Political Science Honors Thesis, April, 2007.
23
stipulates that the legal agreements on international river systems have evolved over time. As
shown in the table below, there are four main competing theoretical rights to river waters.45
Table 2: A Summary of International Legal Suspects of the Nile
THEORY EXPLANATION APPLICATION TO THE RIVER
NILE
The Absolute
Territorial
Sovereignty theory
Associated with the Harmon doctrine,
this theory postulates that a sovereign
state has unlimited rights to natural
resources within its territorial
jurisdiction.
This approach cannot be applied in the
Nile Basin region because it might
escalate the existing and cause new inter-
state conflicts.
The Theory of
Absolute
Territorial
Integrity, also
known as Riparian
Rights;
If applied in the Nile, it implies that
upstream countries should not engage
in any activities that may interfere with
the flow of the Nile to the low riparian
states.
This theory may be invoked if states feel
that their security is threatened. It has been
used by Egypt and Sudan and has a
potential for conflict.
The Community of
Co-Riparian States
also Called
Community
Interests;
It stipulates that the river community
consists of a common geographic and
economic entity beneficial to all states.
Its integrated management involves
collaboration by riparian states to form
institutions to implement joint policies.
This theory may be invoked if states feel
that their security is threatened. It has been
used by Egypt and Sudan and has a
potential for conflict.
The Community of
Co-Riparian States
also Called
Community
Interests;
It stipulates that the river community
consists of a common geographic and
economic entity beneficial to all states.
Its integrated management involves
collaboration by riparian states to form
institutions to implement joint policies.
This doctrine is being applied by the
upstream countries of the Nile river
region.
The Limited
Territorial
Sovereignty.
This theory provides that states
through which a river flows have the
right to use its river water.
It recognizes the rights of both upstream
and downstream riparian states
Source: T. K. Woldetsadik, “International Watercourses Law in the Nile River Basin: Three States at a
Crossroads,” British Yearbook of International Law, (London: Rutledge, 2013), pp33-36.
45
Adar G.K., “Kenya‟s Foreign Policy and Geopolitical Interests: The Case of the Nile River Basin”, (African
Sociological Review, 2007), pp 63-80.
24
2.6. The importance of Non- State Actors in the Nile basin conflict
Non State Actors46
possess increasingly salient capabilities to structure global politics and
economics; they can influence and cause changes in the international system even though they do
not belong to any organizations that belongs the state. They include Non Governmental
Organizations, Multinational Corporations and violent Non state actors.47
Article 6 of the
Cotonou Agreement defines non state actors as civil society groups, economic and social
partners e.g. Trade Unions, the private sector organizations such as Community Based
Organizations, Women groups, religious groups, universities and research institutions amongst
other groups.
The role of states is limited to state borders. The Nile basin riparian states are
characterized by water scarcity, poverty, and a long history of dispute, insecurity and rapidly
growing populations. There exists several different Non State Actors that focus on the various
aspects of the Nile basin conflict. Non-Governmental organizations and other non-state actors
come up with programs that target drought stricken areas across the borders and are present in
almost all riparian states.48
Moreover, these organizations empower local residents with drought
resilience methods which they help to implement in planting crops for food.
2.6.1. The Role of Community Based Organizations and Non Governmental Organizations in
the Nile hydro-politics
Several non-state actors exist within the Nile basin but this research focuses basically on
community-based organizations and Non Governmental organizations because of the role they
46
A non state actor is any entity that acts or participates in International Relations; it is not owned by a state, neither
does it posses the qualities of a state. 47
Bayne N., and Woolcock S., State and Non-State Actors, in The Economic Diplomacy: Decision Making and
Negotiation in International Economic Relations, (Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005), p45. 48
World Bank, World Development Report – Development and the Environment, Washington DC: World Bank
1992
25
play in the region. Community-based organizations are civil society nonprofit entities that
operate within a single local community. These organizations are often run on a voluntary basis
and are self funded. Studies argue that they have been effective in addressing needs of local
people.49
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are legally constituted corporations that are
created by natural or legal people that operate independently from governments but work closely
with some specific government institutions. They engage in activities that range from human
rights to environmental and to development work.50
For instance, the Nile Basin Discourse
(NBD), registered in Uganda as a regional NGO, is a regional network of civil society
organizations established to facilitate and support civil society engagement in Nile Basin
Cooperation and development processes.51
These organizations aid in opinion building in international affairs and act as
implementing partners in the national context. Additionally, they act as managers and investors
of utilities in the private sector. In a conflict situation, they play roles such as mediators,
providers of humanitarian services and facilitators in the resolution and management of
conflicts.52
The lack of active community participation in project creation, that results from lack of
participation of these non state actors often leads to the failure of such projects. When CBOs and
NGOs are not incorporated in project creation, project designs fail to integrate the communities‟
49
Political Studies Review, International Relations, Vol2 (1), pp127-137, Retrieved 2014-02-02 50
Akil A., Confronting the classification problem: Toward Taxonomy of NGOs, (World Development, 1997),
2057–2070 51
Elkareem A., Report on the Development and Advocacy for Nile Basin Benefit Sharing and Tension Reduction
Plans, EN Watershed Management Project in Khartoum, Sudan, 2012. 52
Hassine K., Regularizing Property Rights in Kosovo and Elsewhere, 2010, ISBN 978-3-86553-340-1
26
intricacies hence they cannot be fully implemented. In this case, conflict resolution negotiations
have collapsed severally.
Tesfaye adds that these programs are also complicated by the demands, conditions and
types of loans and investments made by numerous entities, which in the end is likely to
bureaucratize the process of implementation. Therefore, the role of Non state actors in the region
is imperative for peace programs and other developmental programs within the Nile river basin.
2.6.2. The Role of Development Partners and Financial Institutions in the Nile basin conflict
Hydro-politics
The involvement of third parties in a conflict usually complicates the political, social and
economic interests of riparian states and thereby hindering regional cooperation. Development
partners and financial institutions continue to play an imperative role in the Nile basin conflict.
Ashok argues that they have been key players in environmentally induced conflicts through the
creation of policies and programs.53
Canada, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, UK, UNDP, the World
Bank and African Development Bank amongst others have played a critical role in the Nile
Basin region as key financiers. Whittington and Waterbury argue that to date, out of the total
program cost, donor partners have pledged three quarters, which is being disbursed as projects
become operational. Other than funding, the World Bank frequently provides supervision
support to the projects it funds. Additionally, it undertakes mid-term reviews of projects, during
the development of projects.54
53
Swain A., Ethiopia’s Dam Project Reflects Shifting Balance of Power in the Nile Basin, Op cit 54
Waterbury J., and Whittington D., Playing Chicken on the Nile? The Implications of Micro-dam Development in
the Ethiopian Highlands and Egypt's New Valley Project, 22 Natural Resources Forum,1998, p 157.
27
The Council of Ministers of Water Affairs of the Nile basin states established the Nile
Basin Trust Fund in March 2001 and requested the World Bank to establish a trust fund to
implement the Shared Vision Plan. The Shared Vision Program is the first phase of the NBI
Strategic Action Program designed to help realize the shared vision of the Nile Basin countries:
harnessing the resources of the river to create a better life for the 300 million people who depend
on it.55
Many developing countries, especially many of the Nile riparian states still face various
internal concerns ranging from poverty to massive corruption to debt burdens to conflicts among
a myriad of crises. This means that cannot fund all of Nile river basin related programs, hence
rely on financial institutions like the World Bank and development partners like Canada through
the Canadian International Development Agency. These institutions have worked towards the
eradication of poverty, promote economic growth and reverse environmental degradation
through several regional water development projects. Therefore, the role of development partners
and financial institutions in the Nile Basin region cannot be disregarded.
2.7. Conclusion
This chapter discussed causes of the Nile basin conflict with a focus on the 1959 treaty;
international legal aspects of the Nile; socio-economic development of the Nile basin region and
the role of Non-state actors. It is clear that hydro-politics of the Nile basin have changed over
time. At the moment, there is a power struggle between upstream and downstream countries;
upstream countries struggle to change the status quo on the basis of the CFA while downstream
Nile riparian states struggle to maintain the status quo with historical rights and the 1959 treaty
as their defense.
55
Tesfaye A., Hydro politics and regional stability in the Nile Basin, Op Cit
28
Therefore, the issue of equitable and reasonable utilization of the waters of the Nile and
water security remains contentious and will continue to divide the riparian states. However, due
to the commitment on the part of the upstream riparian states to adhere to the provisions of the
CFA and the fact that they have historically been disadvantaged, it is likely that Egypt and Sudan
will eventually come on board.
29
CHAPTER THREE
THE ROLE OF SOUTH SUDAN AS AN ADDITIONAL RIPARIAN STATE
3.1. Introduction
The previous chapter focused on the Nile basin conflict and its causes. It also explained the role
of the Nile basin conflict on the socioeconomic development of the Nile basin riparian states. It
also looked at the role of the non-state actors in the Nile basin hydro-politics.
This chapter focuses on the role of South Sudan in the Nile basin hydro-politics. It seeks
to accomplish this by examining if South Sudan as an additional riparian state will have any
effect on the power politics of the Nile. It will also critically analyze the role of non-Nile riparian
states in the region. Lastly, this section will investigate options that South Sudan has when it
comes to balancing power in the Nile basin hydro-politics. It will also look at the status of hydro-
politics in the Nile basin region.
3.2. The Importance of the Nile to South Sudan
There are basically two methods by which a new entity may gain its independence as a new
state: by constitutional means, that is by agreement with the former controlling administration in
an orderly devolution of power, or by non-constitutional means, usually by force, against the will
of the previous sovereign.56
South Sudan was created under the principal of self determination.
Where a state gains its sovereignty in opposition to the former power, as in the case of South
Sudan, new facts are created and the entity may well comply with the international requirements
as to statehood, such as population, territory and government. Other states will then have to make
56
Shaw M., Title to Territory in Africa: International Legal Issues, Oxford University Press, 1986. See also Grieg
D., International Law, (2nd ed), London, 1976, p. 156.
30
a decision as to whether or not to recognize the new state and accept the legal consequences of
this new status.57
So far, South Sudan is recognized by the international community of states.
While the global community usually celebrates a nation‟s independence, the existence of
a new state also means an additional competitor for common resources of differing scarcities. Of
all common resources, water is the most valuable, not only for the sustenance of human life, but
for economic development as well. Caponera argues that water is essential for economic
development because “it is through the combination of water with one or more natural resources
that other „secondary‟ resources are made available.”58
South Sudan‟s independence is yet another new dimension in the existing water scarcity
problems in the Nile river basin. South Sudan plays a big role at the heart of the Nile Basin hydro
politics because ninety percent of its surface area falls under the Nile Basin. In addition, most
rivers that feed the Nile have confluence in South Sudan. The Nile river is therefore not only
critical to South Sudan‟s survival but also exposes South Sudan to conflicts not only with Sudan
but also with other regional actors for instance Egypt.59
The use of the Nile river waters has led to an increase in the regional competition for
water.60
All Nile basin countries are experiencing population growth at high rates.61
Aboul-Enein
argues that population increase would bring about the desire to explore water resources within
57
Shaw M., Title to Territory in Africa: International Legal Issues, Oxford University Press, 1986. See also Grieg
D., International Law, (2nd eds), London, 1976, p. 156. 58
Caponera D., Principles of Water Law and Administration: National and International (2nd
e.d), Tylor and Francis
Publications, 2007 59
Ufulle F., Water Security and Hydro politics of the Nile River: South Sudan’s National Security in the 21st
Century, Master‟s Thesis, (Brookes University: Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2011). 60
Arsano Y., Negotiations for a Nile Cooperative Framework Agreement, (Occasional Paper 222, 2011), p5 61
Tadesse D., Post Independence South Sudan: The Challenges Ahead, Working Paper No.46, (International
Institute of Politics), 2012.
31
their borders.62
At the same time, Nile riparian states continue to depend on this river. Reports by
the United Nations confirm that the Nile waters have been on the decrease over the past hundred
years. In this case, South Sudan‟s demand for water is bound to increase rapidly in the coming
years, thereby reducing Nile waters by a bigger percentage.63
South Sudan‟s populace has been marginalized for decades. After signing the 2005
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), leaders of South Sudan vowed to make use of its
enormous agricultural potentials realized to attain food security to meet its food demand for its
ever growing population. South Sudan plans to construct dams on the Nile to generate its
hydroelectric power and economic development.64
3.3. The Use of the Nile Waters
South Sudan as an extra riparian state is bound to significantly reshape hydro-politics of the Nile
river basin. Water as a scarce resource has been of concern to Egypt and other Nile riparian
states especially Ethiopia, Sudan and South Sudan whose lives depend on the Nile river. These
countries dominate the Nile river but are at the same time experiencing „water stress‟. A water
stressed country is that country whose demand for water exceeds the available amount during a
certain period or when poor quality restricts its use. Water stress causes deterioration of fresh
water resources in terms of quantity e.g. over exploitation and dry rivers and quality e.g. organic
water pollution and saline intrusion.65
62
Aboul- Enein Y., Nile basin conflict: Perspectives on Water Sharing, Food shortages, Civil wars and Terrorism,
(Small Wars Journal, 2011). 63
Ibid. 64
Link M., Pointek F., Scheffron J., and Schilling J., On Foes and Flows: Water Conflict and Cooperation in the
Nile river Basin in Times of Climate Change, Research Group Climate Change and Security (CLISEC), (Klima
Campus, University of Hamburg, 2011). 65
European Environmental Agency Glossary; Water Stress
http:www.eea.europa.eu/alphabetical.php?letter=W&igd=108#viewtwerm ( accessed 2nd
November, 2013)
32
3.3.1. South Sudan
Contrary to the North, South Sudan has ample water resources and plenty rainfall, and investors
are eying large tracts of fertile land in the Upper Nile, Unity State and Equitoria states.66
Currently, there is no scientific data to show how much water South Sudan has used since it got
independence in July 2011.67
Tadesse argues that since the signing of the CPA, South Sudan is expected to invest in
agriculture to meet the food demands of its ever increasing population. Currently at 8.3.million,
South Sudan‟s population is expected to triple to twenty five million by 2050. The Nile basin
countries continue to plan the construction of dams which would aid in the production of hydro
electric power. 68
3.3.2. Other Riparian states
At the moment, Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan are the dominant actors of the Nile; other riparian
states are sidelined. The 1959 treaty still applies today but other riparian states want it dissolved
so that a framework for equitable distribution of the Nile water can be negotiated. Gledistch
argues that with persistent droughts, poverty, food insecurity conflicts and famines, water
availability is critical to eradicating these problems.69
Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi and DRC Congo have invested so much in
the construction of dams to produce power and manage water for irrigation. For instance,
66
Collins R., The Waters of the Nile: Hydro-politics and the Jonglei Canal 1900-1988, (Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 1990). 67
Ibid 68
Tadesse D., Post Independence South Sudan: The Challenges Ahead, Working Paper No.46, (International
Institute of Politics, 2012). 69
Gleditsh P., and Hamner J., Shared Rivers, Conflict, and Cooperation Shared Rivers, Conflict, and Cooperation‟,
Paper Presented at the 42nd Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago, IL, 21-24 February
2001.
33
Tanzania is working on building a multimillion pump that will help draw water from Lake
Victoria.70
3.4.Hydro-politics of the Nile: Actors, Issues and Perspectives
Hydro-politics of the Nile is complicated by factors such as the Independence of South Sudan,
China‟s presence in the Horn of Africa region and water stress.
3.4.1. The rise of China in the Horn of Africa Region
China has been strengthening its economic ties with Africa through colossal investments in
natural resources extraction, oil, infrastructure projects, construction, textile and other
commodity sectors. In 2007, the value of trade between the two parties had reached US$ 65
billion. China‟s main oil and gas supplier in Africa is Sudan. Oil exports from Sudan now
constitute one tenth of China‟s total oil imports.71
Large argues that the state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC)
possesses and controls the largest single share of oil in the Nile basin region. Dams and hydro
engines are a source of soft power and are also crucial for China‟s own transformation. 72
Verhoeven observes that Beijing has been constructing dozens of hydroelectric dams abroad
including in the Nile Basin.73
China has also established hydro infrastructure in Ethiopia. China‟s
growing influence has reduced Western leverage over both Addis and Khartoum.74
Conversely,
70
Naluyaga R., Saving the Nile by a Drop of Blood: Egyptian President‟s Only Option, (Daily Nation Reporter,
28.06.2013), p26. 71
Tekle M., Africa-China Trade Tops 65bln USD, Sudan Tribune, 2008. 72
Large D., As the beginning ends: China returns to Africa, in African perspectives on China in Africa, F. Manji and
S. Marks (eds.), (Nairobi and Oxford: Fahamu, 2007), p2. 73
See footnote No. 17 74
Verhoeven H., Hydro politics of the Nile in Sudan after Separation: New Approaches to a New Region (vol. 28),
(Henrich Boll Stiftung Publications, 2010) , pp104-107
34
Lassana argues that China‟s presence in the region has helped fund the Janjaweed militia and the
genocide in Darfur.75
3.4.2. South Sudan
The allocation of water and establishment of hydro- infrastructure are central to economic,
ecological and demographic development. South Sudan depends on oil revenues for ninety eight
percent of its state budget; it also has great potential for Agriculture. It also has potential for
agricultural production. Building hydro infrastructure could help generate electricity and divert
water for irrigation.76
There has been a historic rivalry between North and South Sudan. South Sudan would
face the greatest challenge of balancing cooperation with its own unilateral objectives which its
people sorely need. Governments of both countries are aware of the potential of the challenge of
securing water, so they guard their own, while constantly looking for more to exploit; this fear
leads countries to act unilaterally.77
3.4.3. Water Stress
Water stress is taking its toll on the Nile basin region; devastating droughts which have resulted
from drops in the levels of Lake Victoria have adversely affected both pastoralists and
agriculturalists. For instance, Uganda has had to reduce water outflow from the Owen falls dam
to counteract the recent drop in the levels of the dam‟s water. Reduced levels of water at the
Owen falls dam have undermined the productivity of the dam‟s Hydro electric power facility,
75
Lassana K., The Impact of China’s Presence in the Horn of Africa: Human Rights, Oil and Weapons, 2010 76
Ibid 77
Ibid
35
increasing the country‟s power shortage.78
Other riparian states are experiencing water stress
hence seek to get a share of the Nile to increase their water security. Increase in demand for
water by the Nile riparian states will further complicate the existing conflict.
3.5.Players, Options and Preferences: Application of Theory
In game theory, there are three elements: the players, the options and their preferences for both
outcomes. Madani et al states that the Nile river hydro-politics has four key players; these
include:
3.5.1. Players and Options
3.5.1.1. Upstream Nations
Upstream nations include Eritrea, Kenya, Uganda Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, DRC Congo and
Ethiopia. These countries are located on the upper White Nile centered on Lake Victoria. Though
most of them do not have hydro political interests, Waterbury argues that they are categorized as
one player with the same interests, options and preferences. These countries face acute water
shortages as a result of the 1959 Nile treaty that gives Egypt full control of the Nile.79
Madani et al articulate that this group of countries has three options: The First option that
upstream countries are likely to pursue is to construct an artificial river from Lake Victoria that
will serve their interests. This plan will exclude downstream countries and consequently improve
their water based development initiatives. The second option is to cooperate with the
downstream countries on the basis of the Comprehensive Framework Agreement (CFA) because
it will ensure cooperation of all countries with equal representation, and involvement of
78
Kagwanja P., Calming the Waters: The East African Community and Conflict over the Nile Resources, Vol.1
No.3, (Journal of Eastern African Studies, 2007), Pp321-337. 79
Waterbury J., The Nile Basin: National Determinants of Collective Action, Yale University Press, 2002.
36
international actors.80
The last option includes maintaining the status quo, that is, these countries
adhere to the 1959 Nile Treaty which does not recognize their rights.81
Conversely, the hydro-
political status quo has been slowly changing; this has made the situation in the region more
complex. Upstream countries continue to insist on equitable utilization of Nile waters rather than
historical user rights.82
3.5.1.2. Ethiopia
Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the region yet it gives eighty five of its water to the
Nile. El Fadel et al argue that Ethiopia has great potential for agriculture yet only 0.2 percent of
its arable land has been cultivated. Ethiopia imports most of its food from Egypt and therefore
Egypt is not willing to reduce that dependence. If Ethiopia were allowed a stake in the Nile
waters, it would reduce droughts and incidences of food insecurity.83
The Nile Basin Initiative states that Ethiopia can pursue four options: The first option is
cooperation. As one of the founder members of the Nile Basin Initiative, Ethiopia may choose to
cooperate with other Nile riparian states -both downstream and upstream- countries to attain its
interests. The second option is that Ethiopia may also sign an agreement with Sudan that is
independent of Egypt‟s action and independent of the Nile Basin Initiative.
That last option for Ethiopia is that it will let the 1959 treaty prevail. Under this
arrangement, the Nile will continue to be dominated by Egypt and Sudan. In this case, Ethiopia
will refrain from water related development and continue to rely on imported food because of the
80
ICE, The Nile river Dispute: The Inventory for Conflict Environment, 1997.
http//:www.american.edu/ted/ice/BlueNile.htm (Accessed October 21, 2013) 81
Madani K., Rheinheimer D., Elimam L. and Connel-Buck C., A Game Theory Approach to Understanding the
Nile basin conflict, 2012, pp 102-116. 82
Zeitoun M., and Warner J., Hydro-Hegemony- A Framework for Analysis for Trans-boundary Water Conflicts (
(Water Policy, vol.8, No. 5, 2006) 83
El Fadel M., El Sayegh Y., El Fadel K., Khorbotly D., The Nile Basin: A Case Study in Surface Water Conflict
Resolution, (National Resources, Life Science Education (32), 2003), pp 107-117.
37
pressure from Egypt.84
Lastly, Ethiopia may ally with the upstream nations to pursue unilateral
projects as in the case of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.
3.5.1.3. Sudan (North)
Both South Sudan and the Sudan according to the 1959 treaty are entitled to a third of what
Egypt gets. Sudan (North) has good relations with both Egypt and Ethiopia. The first option is to
maintain the status quo. With this option, it will continue to receive its annual allocation. This
option is complicated because besides the need to have good relations with Egypt, Sudan (North)
needs to maintain good relations with Ethiopia as well as seen in the joint development projects
undertaken by Ethiopia and Sudan (North). Ethiopia can no longer be ignored in the region.
The second option is that Sudan (North) may also cooperate with the NBI Countries and
this will ensure equity in the sharing and distribution of the Nile waters. If Sudan (North) does
not cooperate with other upstream countries, it will not be able to achieve sustainable quantity
and quality waters.85
The third option is for Sudan (North) to develop its independent water
resources. Sudan (North) has developed several projects on the Nile river; for example, the
Sennar dam, the Rossaries and Kashim on the Blue Nile and the Girhba dam on the Atbara. In
this option, Sudan (North) will be able to develop its water resources more vigorously with less
regard for Egypt which relates to its development projects so long as they do not encroach on its
own water supply.86
84
Madani K., Rheinheimer D., Elimam L., and Connel-Buck C., A Game Theory Approach to Understanding the
Nile basin conflict, 2012, pp 102-116. 85
The Reporter, Ethiopia: Challenges of the Unilateral Approach towards shared Nile Water Resources, (The
Reporter: African News, All Africa, 2006), pp1-3. 86
Madani K., Rheinheimer D., Elimam L., and Connel-Buck C., A Game Theory Approach to Understanding the
Nile basin conflict, 2012, pp 102-116.
38
3.5.1.4. Egypt
This is the most downstream country of the players. With its political and military might, Egypt
has more flexible options. It has constructed a number of dam projects in the region, such as the
Aswan High dam, N. Sinai Agricultural Development Program, Artificial lakes and other
massive projects.
First, Egypt would do anything to maintain the status quo. Under the 1959 Agreement,
the Nile is almost fully controlled by Egypt. This is the best option for Egypt because it
guarantees that it gets its annual quota and fully utilizes the Nile during the dry seasons. Allan
argues that Egypt is likely to pursue this option for a long period of time.87
The second option for Egypt is to invoke military or economic retaliation. It is politically,
economically and militarily strong in the region and the African Union. If any country pursues an
independent water development project, using force is another way out for Egypt to achieve its
interests.
Its last option is to cooperate with other riparian states under the Nile Basin Framework.
This will ensure equitable and effective distribution of water. This option would be motivated by
the fact that Egypt seeks not only to maintain a good image in the international system but also
create good relations with other Nile riparian states.
3.5.2. South Sudan
As a middle stream riparian state, South Sudan is bound to take the following options: the first
option is to maintain the status quo. South Sudan still benefits from the1959 treaty agreement in
that it is entitled to its annual flow of the Nile as per the agreement. Additionally, it is unclear
87
Allan J., The Nile Basin Evolving Approaches to the Nile Management Program; Environmental Challenges of
the Next Millennium, (Israel Society for Ecology and Environmental Quality Science; Jerusalem., 1999).
39
under the 2005 CPA what share of water both South Sudan and the Sudan entitled to as they
signed the treaty as one country in 1959.
South Sudan‟s second option is to cooperate under the Nile Basin Initiative. Under this
framework, all riparian states will benefit from equitable water distribution. It will also cement
good relations. Its last option is to pursue independent development projects. South Sudan is one
of the least developed countries in the region; it is just getting on its feet. It has poor
infrastructure, it has not developed major water resources and still experiences issues with
sanitation. This option is detrimental to South Sudan because it still depends on Sudan on many
things. Besides, if the country sets up such projects they will take a very long time to be
established.
3.5.2.1 Preferences
The players‟ preferences of the outcome of the game in game theory vary according to their
political or economic hierarchy in the region. The options available to them and other players
depend on their water resources potential vis-à-vis the current developmental levels; and their
physical allocation in the Nile river basin. The following table shows the preferences of the Nile
basin riparian states.
40
Table 3: A Summary of the Preferences of Players in the Nile Bain Hydro-Politics
UPSTREAM
COUNTRIES
EGYPT SUDAN ETHIOPIA SOUTH
SUDAN
Defined by the
desire to
challenge the
status quo
Defined by the
desire to maintain
the status quo
Benefits from
the status quo
Seeks to
change the
status quo
Cooperates
with Sudan
for mutual
Benefit
Do not prefer
military nor
economic
retaliation
Will use military
and economic
retaliation if the
course of the Nile
is diverted
Do not prefer
military nor
economic
retaliation
Will use
military force
if Egypt uses
force
Does not
prefer military
nor economic
retaliation
The 1959
agreement
should be done
away with to
pave way for an
all-inclusive
agreement
Upholds the 1959
agreement and
does not support a
new all- inclusive
agreement
Upholds the
1959 agreement
but is open to
negotiating
support of a new
all- inclusive
agreement
The 1959
agreement
should be
done away
with to pave
way for an
all-inclusive
agreement
Benefits from
the 1959
agreement but
is open to
negotiating
support of a
new all-
inclusive
agreement
It is highly likely that Egypt will use force (economic and military) in the future to
retaliate if other states‟ preferences involve independent development. For decades, the use of
force by Egypt has been effective. If Ethiopia decides to use force too to protect its own interests,
41
there is bound to be a water war between Egypt and Ethiopia. This means that history has a
critical role to play in the Nile basin hydro-politics.
If states choose to cooperate, they are likely to resolve their differences in the use and
distribution of water and come up with an all inclusive long lasting solution. From the table
above, most countries favor non aggression. Therefore, Egypt will have to change its preferences
for peace to reign in the region.
3.6. The role of South Sudan in the Nile diplomatic game
The Nile has always played a major role in the geopolitics of North-East Africa. Through it,
alliances, hostilities, coalitions are formed and politics of the regions shaped. Weis observes that
the region has for decades been locked in proxy conflicts.88
In the long run, Sudan‟s share of the
1959 treaty will have to be renegotiated between Sudan and South Sudan and its quota quickly
be reached. The question whether or not South Sudan will join the NBI, thereby allying with the
upstream states is also pending.89
Egypt has had a near monopoly over the use of the Nile but has since been challenged by
upstream countries.90
Ethiopia‟s persistence on building the renaissance dam has shown signs of
changing balance of power in the Nile region.91
Egypt has been bullying other countries through
the threat of war. Egypt cannot by itself subdue all states that have a stake in the Nile. Egypt‟s
former president, Mohammed Morsy threatened war against Ethiopia as a reaction to the
establishment of the Grand Renaissance Dam which could divert the flow of Nile to Egypt.
88
Weis T., Sudan After Separation: New Approaches to a New Region, Publication Series on Democracy, vol. 28,
(Henrich Boll Stiftung, 2012), pp 104-106. 89
Sudan Tribune, South Sudan tells Egypt it will respect existing Nile water treaties, March 28th 2011
http//www.sudantribune.com/SouthSudan tells Egypt- it- will 38423 accessed 20th
December, 2013. 90
Backlander C., The Balance of Power Upset in the Battle for the Nile Nordic African Institute. July 14, 2013. 91
See more on balance of power in Kegley C., and Wittkopff E., World Politics: Trends and Transformation (10th
ed), 2005, p.503
42
According to Morsy, “Egypt is a gift to the Nile and the Nile is a gift to Egypt and if it
diminishes by one drop then our blood is the alternative.”92
Upstream countries have often acted as one bloc trying to balance the dominant
downstream countries that have always acted as a bloc. The entry of South Sudan as a middle-
stream country is bound to change the balance of power in the Nile hydro-politics significantly.
Since its independence, South Sudan was expected to sign the CFA but it has not; this is because
it still benefits from the 1959 Nile Agreement. Similarly, DRC Congo remains neutral while
Eritrea remains an observer state since it is not located along the Nile or its tributaries, so not
eligible to sign.
If the 6th
country signs the CFA, then power is likely to shift from downstream to
upstream countries. With the CFA in place, the Nile riparian states may come together to
establish another treaty that would ensure equitable use and distribution of the Nile waters and
resources. If the CFA doesn‟t go through, downstream countries will continue to have monopoly
over the Nile. Therefore, South Sudan remains a key determinant in the shift of power in the Nile
hydro-politics. The alliances that South Sudan is likely to form will most definitely border on its
national interests. 93
Additionally, the Jonglei Canal in the Sudd region is a swampy region where the Nile
disperses itself on 600 kilometers and loses more than fifty percent of its water by evaporation.
The canal was constructed by Egypt and Sudan in 1980 to channel the water before it gets lost
and would increase Egypt‟s Nile flow by ten percent. The project as planned would simply
perpetuate poverty and underdevelopment of the inhabitants of the area hence was stopped in
92
See footnote No.15 93
Ayebare A., Issue Brief: A Political Storm over the Nile, International Peace Institute, New-York, 2010.
43
1984 after SPLM/A attacks. In case of water sharing renegotiation, the Jonglei Canal will
certainly be used as a political move by South Sudan in its favor toward Sudan and Egypt.94
The Nile offers enormous development opportunities not only for South Sudan but also
for the other Nile Basin countries. Actually, future prospects for the people living in the region
fully depend on the river. This current process of this diplomatic game can be a win-win
situation if every country manages to make compromises. If so, those African countries will
enjoy the enormous asset that is the Nile river. 95
3.7. Cooperation in the Nile Basin Region: The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) and the
Comprehensive Framework Agreement (CFA)
3.7.1 The NBI and the CFA
Riparian cooperation in the Nile basin has a very short past, dating back to the 1950s, and has
been a non-issue for quite a long time. Anchored in a Shared Vision „to achieve sustainable
socio-economic development through the equitable utilization of, and benefits from, the common
Nile basin water resources‟, the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) has provided a convenient forum for
the negotiation of a Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) to set up a permanent, inclusive
legal and institutional framework.96
The Comprehensive Framework Agreement, ratified May 14, 2011 had the main
objective of setting up a new, independent body to authorize all Nile projects. Six of the eleven
states bordering the Nile have signed the agreement; this, in theory, is enough to bring it into
force – although in practice not having Egypt, Sudan, and South Sudan on board would of course
94
Teshome W., Trans-boundary Water Cooperation in Africa: The Case of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI)
Alternatives, (Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol. 7(4), 2008). 95
Natsios A., and Abramowitz M., Sudan’s Secession Crisis: Can the South Part from the North without War?, 90
Foreign Affairs, January, 2011 96
Mekonnen D., The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement Negotiations and the Adoption of a ‘Water
Security’ Paradigm: Flight into Obscurity or a Logical Cul- de Sac? (European Journal of International Law, 2010),
pp 421-440.
44
prove difficult. Carson argues that the CFA presents the best opportunity to set up an
independent decision-making body.97
According to Article 42 of the Nile Basin Comprehensive Framework Agreement, the
CFA shall enter into force on the sixtieth day following the date of the deposit of the sixth
instrument of ratification or accession with the African Union. Till today, six nations-Ethiopia,
Rwanda, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi have signed it and DRC will follow in the
unprecedented future.
Upon the ratification of the treaty, according to Article 15, the CFA will establish the
Nile Basin Commission. To this day, signatories are all, therefore, upstream states; no
downstream state has signed yet.98
The CFA serves as the only formalized alternative to the 1959
Nile Waters Agreement. It enshrines the doctrine of equitable and reasonable utilization, granting
every member the right to use water from the Nile.99
Studies carried out by Cascao reveal that
four scenarios are likely to emerge on the question of cooperation or lack of it thereof in the Nile
basin conflict through the Comprehensive Framework Agreement (CFA) and the Nile river basin
Commission (NRBC)100
:
Scenario one: Where all the Nile riparian states will ratify the CFA and the NRBC and
that the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) is replaced by new institutions. This is the best solution as
this kind of cooperation will attract financial support from international donors. There is a
guarantee that there will be peace in the Nile basin region. 97
Carson B., Hydro politics of the Nile: Reassurance or Realignment? Think Africa Press, 16th
May, 2011
http://thinkafricapress.com/blogs/ben-carson 98
Zerihun A., The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI): Current Status, Challenges and Prospects,2012 99
Agreement on the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework, art. 42, opened for signature May 14, 2010,
available at
http://internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/regionaldocs/Nile_River_Basin_Cooperative_Framework_2010.pdf. 100
Cascao A., Institutional Analysis of the Nile Basin Initiative: What Worked, What Did Not Work and What are
The Emerging Options? Report Submitted to International Water Management Institute as a part of the Nile Basin
Focal Project, International Water Management Institute, 2009.
45
Scenario two: Downstream riparian states fail to ratify the NBRC and the CFA
immediately but have an opportunity to join the NBRC that will be formed by two thirds
majority. In this case, there are bound to be tensions between the upstream and downstream
states. Additionally, financial support will be a problem as financial institutions such as the
World Bank favor an all inclusive basin-wide organization with a shared vision.
If downstream states fail to recognize the NBRC and the CFA, it will be hard to
implement projects especially if they insist on the 1959 treaty. Egypt might use its hegemonic
position to influence international financial institutions and western development partners to
withdraw their support for the Nile river basin projects. In this case, upstream countries may opt
to implement their projects independently through bilateral cooperation with support from China.
Scenario three: Where the CFA is not ratified in the short term and that the NRBC is not
established, it will be hard to provide for international financial institutions to support projects in
the Nile. Consequently, bilateral agreements and unilateral decisions are likely to be the order of
the day.
Scenario four: Where the CFA is not ratified and that the NRBC is not established at all,
an approach inclusive of cooperation will be impossible. Therefore, unilateral movements and
bilateral agreements are likely to occur. Additionally, the Nile basin atmosphere will be that of
increased tensions due to the lack of mutual trust and cooperation among the riparian states.101
Therefore, a cooperative approach is the most appropriate in the end as cooperation
within the NRBC will be sustainable rather than relying on unilateral or bilateral agreements.
101
Cascao A., Institutional Analysis of the Nile Basin Initiative: What worked, what did not work and what are the
Emerging Options? Report Submitted to International Water Management Institute as a part of the Nile Basin Focal
Project, International Water Management Institute, 2009.
46
States that take unilateral action risk being isolated in the region, thereby losing their hegemonic
power in the process. Cooperation thus brings about a win-win situation.
3.7.2. South Sudan’s Legal Rights under the CFA
Unlike the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement, state succession does not play a role in the analysis of
South Sudan‟s right to accede to the CFA. Sudan is a member of the NBI, but South Sudan is
currently not, though it is seeking membership. The CFA is not an agreement exclusively meant
for NBI members i.e. Nile hydrology, not political affiliation or national identity, acts as the
determinant for party eligibility.102
South Sudan can ratify and accede to the CFA because of the White Nile‟s flow through
its sovereign territory under Article 41 of the CFA. Though the CFA has not entered into force,
South Sudan‟s ratification or accession is eligible to count as one of the required six state
ratifications or accessions necessary for the CFA to enter into force.103
3.8. National Strategies towards Water Resources in the Nile Basin Region
The flow of the Nile as a naturally endowed commodity has benefited North Eastern Africa
countries‟ economic activities through the agriculture and tourism sectors. About 90 percent of
Egypt‟s land mark is desert and therefore, many populations have concentrated along the Nile
river basin, due the economic opportunities available along the Nile river basin.104
The complete dependence of water resources over the centuries have caused the Nile
river basin to deplete, especially of essential material resources causing high rate of
102
Malingha D., Burundi Government Signs Accord on Use of Nile river Water, Bloomberg, Feb. 28, 2011,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-28/burundi-signs-accordon- water-usage-from-nile-that-may-strip-egypt-
of-veto.html. Accessed 29th December, 2013. 103
Sudan and South Sudan: The Mother of All Divorces, The Economist, Feb. 11, 2012
http://www.economist.com/node/21547300 Accessed on 29th December, 2013 104
Mageed R., The Geopolitics of Water in the Nile river Basin ,Global Research Center on Research on
Globalization, 2013.
47
unemployment, diseases and hunger in the countries depending on the water resources. Global
warming due to climatic conditions and green house emission effect according to Conway et al,
is one of the contributing factors for the recent water resource decline in the Nile river basin.105
As a result, development along the Nile river has led to water resource pollutions by many
riparian countries.106
The benefit sharing debate has dominated many scholarly discourses on the Nile issue.
Porter argues that the problem in benefit sharing cooperative agreement is the fact that many
riparian countries come from different political and socio-cultural backgrounds and are therefore
prone to series of political and civil upheavals that will endanger any attempt by riparian
countries to cooperate for mutual benefit sharing. The most significant one is the Ethiopia-Eritrea
conflict that has rocked the region for several years. Others include the Somalia civil conflicts,
the Rwanda Burundi and many others in Sudan that have worked to prevent many cooperative
agreements to realize their potential. Although mutual benefit is essential, its implementation to a
full potential is unattainable.107
The CFA and the GERD have taken the hydro politics of the Nile river into a new level.
These two projects are fertile grounds for fierce diplomatic confrontation for they disrupt the
prevailing structure in the basin. Therefore, Ethiopia‟s reactive foreign policy orientation must
give way to the more proactive and active foreign policy orientation as evidenced in the two
developments-CFA and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.108
105
Conway D., and Schipper E., "Adaptation to climate change in Africa: Challenges and opportunities identified
from Ethiopia." Global Environmental Change 21, no. 1 (2011): 227-237. 106
Porter S., The Republic of South Sudan and Africa’s Thirst for the Nile, Africa Faith & Justice Network, 2011 107
Ibid 108
Zerihun A., Egypt’s Strategy on the Nile: Active securitization towards Active Delusion, 2012
48
3.9. Conclusion
In water-scarce regions like the Nile river Basin, South Sudan‟s emergence means additional
demands on either static or dwindling water resources, making it somewhat surprising that South
Sudan and Sudan did not come to an agreement on use of the Nile prior to South Sudanese
independence. Dellapenna argues that the CFA provides South Sudan with greater flexibility for
its current and future water needs, stronger ties with socio-cultural regional peers, and greater
domestic sovereignty. 109
If South Sudan allies itself with powerful downstream states; it will still be entitled to
some amount of water from the Nile according to the 1959 Nile Treaty. Egypt can very well
contribute to significant changes in the regional hydro political relations. Conversely, if the
country cooperates with upstream countries, it will benefit a lot. The EAC links South Sudan
with its main economic and trade partners, aiming to deepen the relationship, with plans such as
building a future oil pipeline from South Sudan to the port of Lamu in Kenya.
On the basis of the above discussions, it can be concluded that with the nature of tensions
in North Eastern Africa, the Nile riparian countries are on the brink of an armed conflict over the
control and use of Nile water resources. Since water is a vital part of the economic resources of
Africa, the water resources just as any other economic resources has a full potential of tension
and conflict; therefore, there is a likelihood of an armed conflict over the Nile river waters by its
riparian states.
109
Dellapenna J., Treaties as Instruments for Managing Internationally-Shared Water Resources: Restricted
Sovereignty v. Community of Property, (26 CASES: W. RES. J. INT‟L L, 1994), pp27-35.
49
CHAPTER FOUR
AN ANALYSIS OF THE HYDROPOLITICS OF THE NILE RIVER
4.1. Introduction
Water scarcity has become a social, security and economic issue in the Nile basin region and
downstream states are the most distressed.110
Chapter three examined the information from the
Nile river basin states to review the role of South Sudan in the Nile basin conflict. It reviewed
data from unpublished documents to examine how states in the Nile basin region have dealt with
the issue of water sharing. In the process, chapter three captured the role of non state actors in the
Nile basin conflict.
This chapter will use the data from chapter one, chapter two and chapter three to critically
analyze the role of South Sudan in the Nile basin hydro-politics. It will look at the complexity of
the Nile basin conflict, South Sudan, agriculture, water scarcity and Egypt-Ethiopian conflict as
emerging issues in the Nile basin region.
4.2. Emerging Issues
4.2.1. Complexity of the Nile Basin Hydro politics
Conflicts of interest are bound to arise when resources are shared amongst many countries.
Misunderstandings often crop up with regards to the issue of allocation and sharing of these
resources; these usually are a cause of instability within and amongst these states. In the case of
the Nile, water is the shared resource. Kasimbazi argues that internationally shared water bodies
create political, social and economic tensions concerning the allotment, use and management of
110
Caponera D., Principles of Water Law and administration: National and International,2012
50
water.111
It is on this premise that Gleick argues that individual states that are armed with
sovereign rights to territorial resources have often used water as a shared resource to serve their
political, economic and social goals.112
The Nile basin region is prone to conflicts of different nature and magnitude. Therefore,
the Nile hydro politics have to a large extent been shaped by conflict. Threats also arise from
politically unstable neighbors for instance Somalia in the Great Lakes region. The Arab spring
politically weakened the downstream countries. Unresolved issues between Sudan and South
Sudan have caused conflicts between both countries. Additionally, tensions between Ethiopia
and Eritrea remain since the end of the 2000 Ethiopia-Eritrean war. Other riparian states not only
continue to experience internal disputes but also the violence that results from general elections
after every five years.113
When these conflicts are internationalized by agents of internationalization such as
refugees, the media and the actors and issues involved, the hydro-politics of the Nile become
intricate. The Nile has the most riparian states than any other international river basin in the
world. All Nile riparian states have been experiencing population and economic growth, thereby
increasing their demand for water.114
According to Ulman, the threat of water scarcity defines the
relationship between the environment and political interests of the Nile riparian states.115
Each of the 11 riparian states has different plans for the Nile basin; for instance, while
Egypt uses the river for cotton farming, Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda amongst other riparian states 111
Kasimbazi E., Complexities of Developing a Transboundary Water Resources Management Agreement: The
Experiences from the Nile Basin, School of Law: Makerere University, 2010. 112
Gleick P., Coping With the Global Fresh Water Dilemma: The State and Global Governance in the Global
Environment in the 21st Century, Prospects for International Cooperation on Market Forces, 2009.
113 Aboul –Enein Y., Nile basin conflict: Perspectives on Water Sharing, Food Shortages, Civil Wars and
Terrorism, Small Waters Journal, 2008. 114
Ibid 115
Ulman R., Redefining Security, International Security, Vol 8(1), 1983, p133
51
utilize it for hydropower. Therefore water scarcity and degradation not only complicate the Nile
basin conflict but also pose a threat to local, state, regional and even global stability.116
The Nile basin hydro-politics are further complicated by the core question of historic
versus sovereign water rights. This is further complicated by the technical question of where the
river ought to best be controlled-upstream or downstream. Egypt argues that without an
alternative source of water, the country will likely experience water shortages by 2017 if the
riparian countries initiate major irrigation and hydroelectric power projects. The 1959 treaty
states that there should be consultations with Egypt and Sudan before any project is initiated.117
4.2.2. Egypt-Ethiopia Conflict
Egypt has been the Nile hydro-hegemon for a long time. Gleick argues that Egypt considers the
access and supply of the Nile's water as its undisputed right.118
Backlander argues that its
position has since been challenged by upstream countries. For instance, the proposed
hydroelectric projects by Uganda and Rwanda and most of all the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance
Dam (GERD) have not only posed a threat to Egypt‟s position on the Nile but also its national
security and interests.119
On one hand, Egypt is ready to go to war to protect its position on the Nile. On the other
hand, Ethiopia is ready to go to war to defend its interests since both countries have economic
and geographic leverage respectively over the Nile. Critics argue that there is no evidence to
116
Climate Change- Independent Evaluation Group. http://www.ieg.worldbankgroup.org./topic/climate-
change?gclid=c12p9, Accessed 24th
January, 2014. 117
Dudin M., and Frentzen C., Egypt-Ethiopia over Nile Waters Flares, 2013.
http://www.rappler.com/world/31553-egypt-ethiopia-conflict-over-nile-waters-flares (accessed October 18th 2013) 118
Gleick P., Coping With the Global Fresh Water Dilemma: The State and Global Governance in the Global
Environment in the 21st Century, 2009.
119 Backlander C., The Balance of Power Upset in the Battle for the Nile Nordic African Institute, July 14, 2013.
52
show that countries have gone to war over water. Wars over water according to Kagwanja are
neither strategically rational nor economically viable.120
Therefore, hydro-politics of the Nile
depend upon the desire of Sudan and Egypt to maintain a strong hold on the Nile waters amidst
growing resistance by the upstream riparian states.
4.2.2.1. Control Strategies: The destabilization policy
Conflicts tend to destabilize world peace. Rayner defines destabilization as an attempt to
brainwash, disorient or abuse or disarm a victim. It can also be applied among states.
121
Therefore, the policy of destabilization can be defined as an attempt by states to undermine other
states‟ economic, military or political power; usually through persistent attempts to demoralize
other countries. This policy is used by states that seek to replace regional governments deemed
hostile towards it. It is directed against independent regional African states.122
On one hand, during his reign, former president Anwar Sadat (1970-1981) declared that
threats to Egypt‟s water security would constitute an act of war. The recently deposed President
Mohammed Morsy, who served as Egypt‟s fifth president (30 June 2012 -3 July 2013), too
adopted similarly confrontational rhetoric in defense of the resource, declaring, “If our share of
Nile water decreases, our blood will be the alternative”.123
Egypt‟s policy of covert destabilization is not only aimed at preventing any concerted
challenge against its control of the Nile Basin but also weakening the potential of target states all
120
Kagwanja P., Calming the Waters: The East African Community and Conflict over the Nile Resources ,(Journal
of East African Studies,Vol1 no.3, 2007), p330 121
Rayner C., Hoel H., and Cooper C.L, Workplace bullying: What we know, who is to blame? What can we do?
2001. 122
Hasu P., South Africa’s Destabilization Policy, The Round Table: The Commonwealth, (Journal of International
Affairs, vol. 76 , 1987), pp303. 123
Verhoeven H., Disorder on the Nile as Power Shifts Towards Ethiopia, International Political Forum, 2013.See
also Naluyaga, R., Saving the Nile by a Drop of Blood: Egyptian President’s Only Option, Daily Nation Reporter,
28.06.2013.
53
in a bid to prevent them from undertaking any development projects with any significant impact
on the Nile basin conflict. This policy also includes active blocking of financial assistance from
international and regional donors for instance when Ethiopia began the Tana Beles project in
1988, Egypt blocked a loan from the African Development Bank.124
The current general instability amongst the upstream nations can be attributed to this
policy. Egypt cannot control Ethiopia in the same way as Sudan or Somalia. Ethiopia is therefore
the biggest threat to Egyptian hegemony over the Horn; in turn, Egypt's strategy is not to control,
but to subvert. The conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea gave Egypt a golden opportunity to
sabotage Ethiopia‟s ambitions. Eritrea's role gave Egypt new leverage over Ethiopia thus
Ethiopia was not able to play a leadership role in the region. 125
Additionally, Somalia‟s former president, Siad Barre received extensive and loyal
support from Egypt, including weapons, military training and economic assistance. The aim was
simple: to maintain leverage on Ethiopia, and prevent Ethiopia from achieving stability. Egypt's
main goal in Somalia has been-publicly-to promote peace; but a closer look reveals that every
single one of its actions had been aimed at undermining any peace process supported by the
Ethiopian government.126
Today, Egypt‟s role in the Horn of Africa has become weak; at the same time, Ethiopia‟s
role in this region has become stronger. Dudin and Frentzen argue that Egypt no longer has a role
to play in Somalia; it has not been party to any key negotiations about Sudan and South Sudan. It
is preoccupied with both national and international matters and therefore lacks the ability to
124
Kagwanja P., Calming the Waters: The East African Community and Conflict over the Nile Resources, Journal of
East African Studies, vol.1 (3), 2007. 125
Addis tribune, Egypt and the Horn of Africa, Chamber World Network International Limited, 1998. 126
Ibid
54
confront regional issues and international players like China which have favored other
considerations that have disregarded Egyptian rights thereby giving more power to its rival,
Ethiopia.127
On the other hand, Mountain argues that Ethiopia has played a big role in the conflict
within South Sudan. First, it has 10,000 peacekeepers between Sudan and South Sudan borders.
Secondly, it hosts Reik Machar, the leader of the current rebellion in South Sudan. Additionally,
Machar‟s coup cronies were released and flown to Ethiopia. Peace talks were also held in Addis
Ababa.128
From the above cases, it can be concluded that the current conflict in South Sudan is
attributable to both Countries. Egypt because of South Sudan„s position on the Grand
Renaissance Dam Project and also because of its weak position over the Nile and Ethiopia.
Ethiopia has its own interests in South Sudan especially oil; it will gain a lot from the oil sector
when government institutions are weak.
4.2.2.2. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)
The importance of the Nile‟s waters and Egypt‟s loss of hydrological veto power is heightened
by the increase in demand for water in the region. The population of the Nile basin region is
expected to double in the next forty years. According to Aboul-Enein, an increase in population
means an increase in the demand for water. Lack of access to water and energy will most
definitely limit growth for upstream countries.129
127
Dudin M., and C. Frentzen, Egypt-Ethiopia over Nile Waters Flares, 2013.
http://www.rappler.com/world/31553-egypt-ethiopia-conflict-over-nile-waters-flares (accessed October 18th 2013) 128
Mountain T., Ethiopia’s Hand in South Sudan, Foreign Policy Journal, 2014 129
Aboul –Enein Y., Nile basin conflict: Perspectives on Water Sharing, Food Shortages, Civil Wars and
Terrorism, Small Wars Journal, 2011.
55
Loveluck notes that the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) will become Africa‟s largest
hydropower plant generating 6,000 megawatts of electricity.130
This means that GERD is highly
likely to reduce the flow of the Nile and this does not augur well with the Egyptian government
and population.131
Access to the Nile waters is at the core of Egypt‟s national interests. Ashok argues that
the construction of the GERD on the Blue Nile has brought about tensions between Egypt, Sudan
and Ethiopia. There are tensions in Cairo over water sharing since downstream countries believe
that the construction of the GERD puts the control of the Nile waters in Ethiopia‟s hands.132
Therefore, it can be concluded that GERD will be able to mitigate inequalities of water sharing
and thereby helping other states to access the Nile.
Other than the threats posed by GERD to downstream countries, Egypt is set to benefit
from the dam in two main ways: According to Lewis, the dam will trap sediments that would
otherwise flow downstream, prolonging lives of major reservoirs. Being the largest
hydroelectricity facility, surplus electricity that is harnessed from the dam can be sold to Egypt
but also spare some electricity for future.133
4.2.3. Significance of South Sudan as a new actor in the Nile Hydro-politics
Before South Sudan‟s independence, all Nile and other rivers crossing the border between Sudan
and South Sudan belonged to the Sudan. Whittington and Waterbury argue that about ninety
130
Loveluck L., Egypt and Ethiopia try to roll back threats over war, Aljazeera, 2013. 131
Pham P., Crisis, Conflict, and Opportunity in the Nile Basin: Strategic Interests, World Defense Review
columnist PhD, 2014. 132
Swain A., Ethiopia’s Dam Project Reflects Shifting Balance of Power in the Nile Basin, World Politics Review,
2013 133
Lewis M., Egyptian Protests, Ethiopian Dams and the Hydro politics of the Nile Basin, 2013
.http//www.geocurrents.ilr/environmental-geographical/Egyptian-protests-ethiopian-dams and- the- hydro-politics-
of –the nile-basin#ixzz2nk33916v.Accessed on the 24th
Jan, 2014.
56
percent of South Sudan falls in the Nile basin, while about twenty percent of the Nile basin falls
in South Sudan. Southern Sudan is the land where the equatorial and Ethiopian sources of the
White Nile meet, and where the White Nile loses and later re-establishes itself.134
The state of South Sudan has been born at a time of tense relations amongst the ten Nile
riparian countries, exacerbated by the acute differences over some basic principles and
provisions of the CFA. Conca et al argue that South Sudan faces the issue of its relationship with
the other Nile riparian states and how to deal with the Nile Basin CFA. 135
According to Adar,
the six countries that have thus far signed the CFA will do their best to woo, perhaps even
pressure, southern Sudan to become a party to the CFA so as to provide the desperately needed
downstream state for the CFA to enter into force and effect. On the other hand, Egypt and Sudan,
who vehemently oppose the CFA, will do their best to court South Sudan to their side, or at least
keep it neutral on this issue.136
Close to fifty percent of the waters of the White Nile are lost to evaporation and seepage
in the three large swamps of southern Sudan, namely the Sudd of Bahr el Jebel and Bahr el
Zaraf, the Bahr el Ghazal swamps, and the Sobat/Machar swamps. If the Jonglei Canal is
completed, it will be able to conserve the waters of the swamps of southern Sudan that
evaporates. Consequently, the stakes of South Sudan can be classified as very high, almost at par
with Egypt, Ethiopia and the Sudan.137
134
Waterbury J., and Whittington J., Playing Chicken on the Nile? The Implications of Micro-dam Development in
the Ethiopian Highlands and Egypt's New Valley Project, 1998. 135
Conca K., A. Ehrlich and P. Gleick, Conflict over Resources, Draft Background for Working Group 5: Resources
and Environmental Degradation as Sources of Conflict, 50th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs,
Eliminating the Causes of War, Queens College, Cambridge, UK, 2000. 136
Adar K., The Interface between National Interest and Regional Stability: The Nile river and the Riparian States,
African Sociological Review, 2007 137
Kameri-Mbote P., “Water, Conflict and Cooperation: Lessons from the Nile River Basin,” Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, Navigating Peace no. 4. 2007
57
South Sudan‟s independence from Sudan has reduced the demographics of downstream
states, thereby weakening their position in the horn of Africa region. According to Briney, the
crisis in Darfur, disputes between South Sudan and Sudan and the international isolation of
Sudan‟s president has made it difficult for Khartoum to maneuver the Nile and has further
weakened the alliance of downstream states. As a result, the balance of power has shifted to
Ethiopia.138
Therefore, the hydro-politics of the Nile are to a greater extent determined by South
Sudan.
4.2.4. The Nile Basin Initiative and the Comprehensive Framework Agreement: Lessons
Learnt
Foulds argues that the lack of a legal agreement among riparian states that share an international
water body continues to increase the possibility of water induced conflicts. The Nile basin
conflict brings about a general atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. The fact that the Nile
riparian states‟ interests are threatened, there‟s a great potential for an armed conflict to emerge
between downstream and upstream countries.139
In 1999 and 2009, the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) and the Comprehensive Framework
Agreement (CFA), respectively, were set up. These agreements were established to resolve the
legal uncertainty in the Nile basin region. To date, these agreements have not achieved unanimity
because Sudan and Egypt won‟t sign because of the words used in the provision dealing with
water and security.140
The Nile basin region lacks a comprehensive agreement on the use of the
138
Briney A., “Geography of Sudan - Learn the Geography of the African Nation of Sudan." Geography at
About.com., 2011 Retrieved from: http://geography.about.com/od/sudanmaps/a/sudan-geography.htm accessed 23rd
January,2014 139
Foulds K., The Nile Basin Initiative: Challenges to Implementation from Managing Shared Waters: Lessons
Learned, 2012. 140
Goffard C., South Sudan: New Nation of South Sudan Declares Independence, Los Angeles Times, 2011
Retrieved from: http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-south-sudan-independence-
20110710,0,2964065.story accessed 23rd January,2014
58
Nile river water that binds all Nile riparian states. As a result, there is total absence of
cooperation and coordinated development planning among the riparian states.141
The Nile riparian states can learn a lesson from many other water agreements that have
been successful elsewhere. For instance, the Mekong River Commission (MRC) in South East
Asia was signed after a short period of time because of the long-term relationship and familiarity
of the key players-Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam. Kasimbazi argues that this
cooperation has given these countries an opportunity for the management of water utilization
programs for instance dams construction, ecological protection and a dynamic process of water
allocation. Additionally, the Zambezi Water Agreement has succeeded because Southern Africa
Development Community (SADC) has provided a political climate suitable for developing the
agreement.142
4.2.5. Water Security in the Nile
The concept of „water security‟ was a belated inclusion in the CFA made by the Negotiating
Committee the Nile-COM established at its Cairo meeting held in February 2002 with a mandate
to negotiate the draft. Mageed contends that „water security‟ will pave the way for a compromise
as it, allegedly, „has the advantage of relegating existing treaties to the background in favor of
the more dynamic and progressive principles of international water law‟.143
141
Mason S., From Conflict to Cooperation in the Nile Basin, Dissertation, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology,
Zurich, 2004. 142
Kasimbazi E., Complexities of Developing a Transboundary Water Resources Management Agreement: The
Experiences from the Nile Basin, School of Law: Makerere University, 2010. 143
Mageed M., The Nile Basin: Lessons from the Past, in A.K. Biswas (ed.), International Waters of the Middle
East: From Euphrates – Tigris to Nile ,1994
59
4.2.6. Agriculture
The Nile sub-regions encompass a variety of climatic, land and socio-economic conditions.
Agriculture continues to underpin socio-economic development in the Nile basin region.
Agriculture is the chief livelihood, sustaining millions of people; it provides occupation for more
than seventy percent of the total labor force and contributes more than a third of the region‟s
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Agriculture is therefore vital to the maintenance of food
security; it anchors rural livelihood for the rapidly growing population.144
Farming systems in the Nile region vary in size, distribution and characteristics. The most
prevailing is pastoralism, crop-livestock and agro-pastoral systems covering forty five percent,
thirty six percent and nineteen percent of land area respectively. Productivity in irrigated
agriculture in the Nile delta and Nile valley is highest while it is low in the rest of the Nile basin
region that depends on rain-fed agriculture.145
One of the major constraints that agricultural development faces is that of water scarcity.
Agriculture is the largest water-consuming sector; it consumes about seventy eight percent of the
peak flow of the Nile at Aswan. Approximately 5.6 million hectares of land is either under
irrigation; 97 percent of it is located in Egypt and Sudan with the remaining 3 percent distributed
amongst upper Nile riparian states. 146
144
Bo A., Wulf K., and Undala A., Water and Agriculture in the Nile Basin, Nile Basin Initiative Report to ICCON,
Background Paper Prepared by FAO, Rome, 2000. 145
Poolard K., Molden D., Notenbaert A., and Peden D., Nile Basin Farming Systems and Productivity, 146
Azza N., Mbuliro M., Hilhorst B., and King J., State of the Nile Basin, (Nile Basin Initiative Secretariat Report,
2012), p122.
60
In arid and semi arid areas, the agriculture sector competes for water with domestic and
industrial sectors.147
The potential for the agricultural sector is great but it is held back by
constraints in both the natural resource base and policy, institutional and economic environment.
Therefore, enhancing agriculture will lead to the alleviation of poverty in the region. 148
4.2.7. Security Threats in Africa: The Horn of Africa and the Middle East Regions
The proliferation of conflicts in these regions has generated another problem, that of the
proliferation of light weapons. Moreover, the influx of refugees and the uncontrolled movement
of people from one country to another have also made the trafficking of illegal arms much easier,
thus increasing security vulnerability within and between communities. Today, one of the major
security concerns is that it is the individual rather than the state, which has become a soft target
for attackers.149
Conflicts have negative effects on the socio-political and economic development of a
state. Hence, there is a direct correlation between a war situation and the prevalence of poverty.
Poverty in itself is a security concern. Poor people with no basic needs, living in a state of near
or pure anarchy, will pose a threat to the security of the state and its neighbors. This is typical of
Uganda in the 1950s, and Somalia and Kenya in the 1990s.150
Another security issue in these two regions is ethnic conflicts. Ethnic conflicts in Africa,
especially in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa led to the disintegration and collapse
147
Ahmed MD., Islam A., Masih I., Muthuwatta L., Karimi P., and Turral H., Mapping Basin Level Water
Productivity using Remote Sensing and Secondary Data in the Karkheh River Basin, Iran, (Water International, 34
(1), 2009), pp119-133. 148 IPRID Secretariat, Rapid Assessment Study towards Integrated Planning of Irrigation and Drainage in Egypt
Final Report 2005. 149 Ofuho C., Security Concerns in the Horn of Africa in African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization Eds.
By Makumi Mwagiru, (Henrich Boll Foundation,2004 ), pp11-14 150
Berman J., Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State (1998) p. 309
61
of Somalia as a state. These ethnic conflicts often degenerate into civil wars. The Horn of Africa
has been orchestrated by civil wars, caused mainly by military coups and counter–coups,
struggle for power, and ethnic nationalism. This, in some instances, led to the formation of
military regimes that further institutionalize the militarization of politics in the region. 151
Additionally, the tension between the Arab World and the west, associated mainly with
the war in the Middle East has also affected the Horn of Africa, thus adding to contemporary
security concerns in the region. The post Gulf war period ushered the world into international
politics. The humiliation of Iraq and the subsequent economic sanctions by the UN and the west
in general, tension has led to the building up of tension between the west and the Arab world.
Such tensions have led to the rise of extreme military and fundamentalist politics. Suicide
bombings in Israel and parts of the west have been employed to fulfill the mission of Islamists.
This is what has been notably termed global terror.152
The Lord‟s Resistance Army (LRA) rebel movement in Uganda is another security risk in
the region. There have been reports of massive killings, massacres, abductions and ambushes of
civilians in the northern region of Uganda and some parts of Southern Sudan. Not only is the
accusation by Uganda that the Khartoum government is a major donor to the LRA correct, but
the U.S. government has long listed Sudan as a terrorist country. Hence, this has often fuelled a
degree of tension between the two neighboring Horn of Africa countries.153
151
Nyongo AP., “The Implications of Crisis and Conflict in the Upper Nile Valley” in Conflict Resolution in Africa,
edited by Deng FM.,and Zartman W., (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1991), p.95–114 152
Networking with a view to Promoting 'Peace' Towards a Sustainable Peace Civil Society Dialogue Forum for the
Horn of 'Africa (Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2000) 153 Rupesinghe K., ed., Conflict Resolution in Uganda, (Anthany Ohio University Press, 1989)
62
Cross-border banditry and cattle rustling is another security issue. Active banditry and
cattle rustling have become prolific along the Kenya–Uganda, Kenya–Somali, Kenya–Ethiopia,
Kenya–Sudan and Sudan–Uganda borders and vice versa. Even though such practices have been
linked to indigenous cultural practices, the introduction of modern weapons has made them
become costly both in terms of human life and resources. The instability in the region coupled
with weak administration in the region, cattle rustling has emerged as one of bigger security
problems affairs in the Horn of Africa.
Numerous Small and Light Weapons (SALWs) arms are in the wrong hands and this in
itself is a security risk within and among countries in the Horn of Africa region.154
The high rate
of the generation of refugees in Africa has added a new dimension to conflict over the use of
shared resources among communities. Armed conflict within IGAD member states, especially
the civil wars in Ethiopia, Uganda, Somalia and Sudan has created a large number of refugees
and internally displaced persons.
In either case, the sudden movement of large populations of people exerts pressure on the
host communities and countries and produce demand-driven conflicts over local resources.
Conflicts between locals and refugees have become a new threat to security within the sub–
region. Furthermore, the proliferation of small arms within the IGAD sub–region and the
consequent increase in the rate of crime can be attributed to the influx of refugees, in an
unregulated cross–border migration.155
154
Ofuho C., Security Concerns in the Horn of Africa, in Mwagiru M; eds African Regional Security in the Age of
Globalization, (Henrich Boll Foundation, 2005), p5. 155
Chweya L., Emerging Dimensions of Security in the IGAD Region in African Regional Security in the Age of
Globalization Eds. By Makumi Mwagiru, (Henrich Boll Foundation,2004 )
63
4.2.8. Other Issues
Apart from the conflict regarding the distribution and use of the Nile waters, there are many
other issues that plague the Nile Basin region. Some of these issues include: Climate change, the
role of non state actors in the Nile basin conflict and the role of development partners in the Nile
basin conflict.
4.2.8.1. Effects of Climate Change on the Nile Basin Hydro politics
Water is not only a necessity for life but also a critical component of each and every economic
activity such as farming, industry and energy production. A number of countries in the Sahel
have been experiencing water-stress due to insufficient and unreliable rainfall, droughts and
famine, water scarcity, insufficient and unreliable energy and flooding; all of these natural
disasters are caused by climate change.156
The Nile river basin can be considered a climate security hot spot, as it is expected that
this region will be severely affected by climate change. Rising temperatures and changing
precipitation patterns exacerbate already existing problems of desertification, water scarcity, and
food production, posing a challenge for the stability of the entire region. The fact that the Nile
river has the most riparian states than any other international river basin in the world means that
river Nile water is at the risk of depletion and therefore needs to be managed well by its riparian
states.
Climate change has emerged as a new challenge, adding to the existent political and
demographic ones. Tadesse argues that climate change often exacerbates water problems. It can
also have multiplier effects on other factors affecting resources. For Instance, where climate
156
World Bank, World Development Report – Development and the Environment, Washington D.C,1992
64
change has caused desertification in the Sahel, overgrazing usually follows then later these areas
suffer rapid run off and flooding. 157
Environmental scarcity has generated intermediate social effects like poverty and
migration that are interpreted as a conflict‟s immediate cause. The intermediate social effects,
including constrained economic productivity, population movements, social segmentation, and
the weakening of states, can cause ethnic conflicts, insurgencies, and consequently coups
d‟état.158
Pointek argues that of all the Nile riparian states, Egypt is the most vulnerable; effects
of climate change are bound to trigger internal conflict within Egypt and internationally with
other riparian states or cause states to cooperate within the region. 159
Agriculture is the backbone of the Nile political economy; it is the main source of
livelihoods and employment as most countries depend on food aid and agricultural exports.160
All the Nile riparian states depend on a small percentage of the Nile for agriculture but Egypt
depends on the Nile for ninety percent of its water use. Pressure on land and water resources that
is caused by climate change has reduced the availability of water making agriculture less viable.
Climate change not only increases challenges for downstream states but also generates
potential benefits resulting from cooperation with other Nile riparian states. Sudan is vulnerable
to floods that originate from the Ethiopian highlands; in this case, if it cooperates with Ethiopia,
Ethiopia will help it control flooding that has often adversely affected Sudan. In the case of
157
Tadesse D., Hydro-politics of the Nile: Climate Change, Water and Food Security in Ethiopia, Working Paper
No.46, (International Institute of Politics, 2012). 158
Cascao A., Institutional Analysis of the Nile Basin Initiative: What worked, what did not work and what are the
Emerging Options? Report Submitted to International Water Management Institute as a part of the Nile Basin Focal
Project, International Water Management Institute, 2009. 159
Pointek F., Scheffran J., and Link M., Impacts of climate change on the River Nile Conflict: The Case of Egypt,
2008. 160
Cascao A., Climate Change and Hydro-politics: Trans-boundary Water Governance in the Nile Basin, Danish
Institute of International Studies, Copenhagen, Denmark,2012.
65
Egypt, if it does not cooperate with downstream countries it risks being isolated within the
region. If Egypt is isolated in this region then its position in the Nile basin region will be
weakened. 161
4.2.8.2. Pollution of the Nile River
While most of the Nile river‟s water quality is within acceptable levels, there are several hot
spots mostly found in the irrigation canals and drainages. Sources of pollutants are from
agricultural, industrial, and household waste. There are 36 industries that discharge their
pollution sources directly into the Nile, and 41 into irrigation canals. These types of industries
are: chemical, electrical, engineering, fertilizers, food, metal, mining, oil and soap, pulp and
paper, refractory, textile and wood.162
The water exceeds the European Union‟s standards of fecal contamination and there is a
high saline intrusion in the delta. This happens when there‟s a buildup of salts in the soil. The
soil cannot retain water which prevents anything from growing. Saline intrusion is when the
ground is saturated with saltwater. The northeast Nile Delta region has a high incident rate of
pancreatic cancer that is believed to be from high levels of heavy metals and organ chlorine
pesticides found in the soil and water.163
161
Helmy E., Samia M., Marsafary, and Ouda S., Assessing the Economic Impacts of Climate Change on
Agriculture: A Ricardian Approach, CEEPA Discussion Paper no.16, 2006. 162
.Nile Basin Initiative: Nile Basin National Water Quality Monitoring Baseline Study Report for Egypt, 2005 163
Soliman A., et al. Environmental Contamination and Toxicology: Geographical Clustering of Pancreatic
Cancers in the Northeast Nile Delta Region of Egypt, 2005
66
4.3. Conclusion
Shared water can either be a source of conflict or cooperation.164
The lack of cooperation in the
Nile basin region has made it difficult for downstream countries to maintain their share of the
Nile. Although there is little evidence to support the fact that water sharing has led to
international armed conflicts, there is a possibility that an armed conflict could occur if the
upstream and the downstream countries do not make concessions. All Nile basin riparian states
should therefore accede to the CFA and incorporate changes that will accommodate downstream
riparian states. Alternatively, these countries could establish an all inclusive agreement that will
incorporate all Nile riparian states.
164
Allan J., Political Economy of Power and Water: Opening Remarks at the Third International Workshop on
Hydro-Hegemony, 2007
67
CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMENDATIONS
5.1. Summary of Chapters One to Four
When water sources traverse boundaries that is, are shared by many countries, it takes a long
time for these riparian states to produce a common policy agenda that truly incorporates issues
that directly affect the environment and resources into approaches that will reduce the risk of
regional and national conflicts.165
The entry of new issues and actors such as climate change, non
riparian states, financial institutions and development partners into the Nile basin conflict have
not only complicated but also internationalized it.
Downstream countries dominate the use of the Nile at the detriment of the upstream
states. On one hand, Egypt views the Nile from a security prism; reducing the amount of water
entering the country is tantamount to a national security threat. Egypt threatens to go to war with
any Nile riparian state that changes the course of or reduces the amount of water it is entitled to
according to the 1959 treaty. On the other hand, Ethiopia, which is the major source of the Nile;
up till now, it and other Nile riparian states hardly benefit from the Nile river water.
Consequently, tensions continue to exist amongst the Nile riparian states.166
The Nile riparian states depend on an agriculture economy which heavily relies on water
for irrigation for regions that are susceptible to famine and droughts. The upstream Nile riparian
states have asked for their share of the Nile through the Comprehensive Framework Agreement
(CFA); if their rights are granted, the amount of water allocated to the downstream countries will
165
Allan J., The Nile Basin Evolving Approaches to the Nile Management Program; Environmental Challenges of
the Next Millennium, 2007. 166
Cascao A., Climate Change and Hydro-politics: Trans-boundary Water Governance in the Nile Basin, Danish Institute of International Studies, Copenhagen, Denmark, 2012
68
reduce significantly. There continues to be a clash between Ethiopia‟s interests and Egypt‟s legal
and historical rights over the Nile.167
It is evident from the research that South Sudan‟s entry into the Nile basin conflict has
not only complicated the conflict itself but also the decision making processes. The new country
plays a big role in the balance of power between downstream and upstream countries of the Nile
river basin; it will determine the direction in which power will shift within the region. On one
hand, the upstream nations have tried to woo South Sudan through trade relations and have
offered the new country membership within the East African Community. On the other hand,
Egypt has used the policy of „seduction‟ to woo South Sudan mainly through economic aid,
cooperation and political recognition.168
The existence of multiple agreements and institutions for the management of trans-
boundary water resources is a promising signal of the capacity for cooperation in the Nile basin
region. If South Sudan realigns with the upstream countries, it may contest the 1959 treaty; this
will weaken the downstream front. Sudan and Egypt will be a weak front and will not be able to
defend their position using the 1959 treaty.
Sudan also has its interests; it may support the GERD since it stands to benefit from it. It
is highly likely that in the near future, Sudan will switch positions so that it can achieve its
interests.169
Therefore, cooperation is the only way for Nile riparian states to address
167
Ayeb H., Ethiopia and Sudan Demand their water back: Egypt No longer owns the Nile, Le Monde
Diplomatique, 2013. 168
Defining the Geopolitics of a Thirsty World: South Sudan and the Hydro-Politics of the Nile Basin, 2011
http://www.waterpolitics.com/2011/05/07/south-sudan-and-the-hydro-politics-of-the-nile-basin/ Accessed 31st
January, 2014. 169
Nile: Sudan’s support for the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project, Horn Affairs, 2012.
http://hornaffairs.com/en/2012/04/16/nile-sudans-support-for-the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-project/
Accessed 31st January, 2014.
69
environmental issues, facilitate better access to financial resources and safeguard long term water
resources for the Nile riparian states.
5.2. Key Findings
Four key findings can be deduced from this research. First, all upstream Nile riparian states do
not recognize the 1959 Nile treaty; they prefer a new form of cooperation under the CFA. All
downstream riparian states do not recognize the suggested revisions to the Nile treaty proposed
by the upstream countries. All downstream countries prefer the status quo; they recognize the
1959 Nile treaty.
Secondly, Egypt as a hydro hegemon has dominated the decision making process with
regards to the use and distribution of the Nile waters. The new state of South Sudan has become
a principal determinant in the balance of power of the Nile basin hydro politics. It will not only
determine power shift between Nile riparian states but also whether there will be a new form of
cooperation in the Nile basin region. Therefore, the future of the Nile hydro-politics is uncertain;
it depends on South Sudan‟s decisions.
Thirdly, positions are no longer important within the Nile hydro-politics; interests have
become much more important since the establishment of the GERD. Alliances are built and
destroyed depending on whatever interests a country is set to achieve. Water as a sole source of
violence is exceedingly rare in general. There has not been a water war amongst the Nile riparian
states over the Nile although there has been a spate of non violent exchanges in the region
especially between Egypt and Ethiopia.
70
Both Egypt and Ethiopia have some power over the Nile; while Egypt is economically
advantaged, Ethiopia is geographically advantaged. Given the extent of their power, both states
may decide to take unilateral decisions and thereafter start a water war to achieve their interests
if they fail to concede with regards to their positions.
Lastly, China has played a significant role in the economics and politics of many African
countries. Through the use of soft power -financial support, infrastructure and dam building-
China has immensely contributed to the shift in positions of power in the Nile. China‟s
involvement in building of the GERD has shifted power towards Ethiopia, thereby having an
effect on the Nile basin hydro-politics.
5.3. Recommendations
This research therefore recommends that: First, the upstream Nile riparian states claim that they
did not participate in the decision making process that established the 1959 treaty that is now in
place. Therefore, all the Nile riparian countries need to sign UN water conventions which will
serve as a basis for negotiations of distribution of the Nile waters.
Secondly, the research found out that Egypt has been dominating negotiations in the Nile
basin region and this has been to the detriment of the upstream Nile riparian states. Therefore,
third parties should be included in the decision and policy making procedures in the region.
Inclusion of third parties in the decision making process according to the multi-track conflict
71
management theory will guarantee a range of management options that have a greater chance
that these options are likely to be accepted.170
Thirdly, the research also found out that interests are much more important than positions
unlike in the past. According to Harvard‟s program on negotiations, focus on positions creates a
win-lose position but focus on interests creates a win-win situation.171
Therefore, relationships
that are characterized by the right mix of power, rules and negotiations avert conflicts.
Additionally, opponents can be won over. The theory of peaceful non cooperation argues that
unwilling opponents can be brought to the table. Goodwill towards opponents and respect of law
also brings opponents to negotiate accept each others‟ existence. 172
The Interactive Conflict Resolution theory states that when countries interact, perceptions
change and ideas are created in a safe environment so that they can come up with creative and
more applicable options.173
For CFA to be ratified, its proponents should therefore raise
consciousness about benefits of cooperating through the CFA using technical experts.
Alternatively, both states should negotiate an agreement that will address each of the Nile
riparian states‟ concerns.174
This study lays out a foundation for several future studies. Several thematic areas arose
under chapter four and they could be used as a basis for future qualitative and quantitative
170
McDonald J., Multi-Track Diplomacy: Beyond Intractability (Eds) Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess, Conflict
Information Consortium: University of Colorado, Boulder, September 2003.
http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/multi-track-diplomacy 171
Fisher R., Ury W., and B. Patton, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In, New York: Penguin
Books, 1991. 172
Gandhi M., Young India,. Quoted in Iyer R. (ed.), Moral and Political Writings of Mahatma Gandhi, (Oxford
University Press: New York, 1986), p47. 173
Fisher R., Interactive conflict resolution, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1997. 174
Kelman HC., International Conflict and Conflict Resolution, Research Papers 1993
72
studies. From the research, it is clear that decision making processes within the Nile are usually
dominated by Egypt and Sudan. Therefore, further research should be carried out on how to
establish an agenda that is not dominated by the interests of powerful groups in trans-boundary
waters.
The Nile riparian states- both upstream and downstream- often experience internal
conflicts. Further research should be carried out on the impact of the recent conflict within South
Sudan on the Nile basin hydro-politics. According to this research, it is evident that non riparian
states have influenced the Nile basin conflict in numerous diverse ways. China is a new actor
that has played roles such as dam building, funding of projects and many other roles. Therefore,
further research should be carried out to determine how China‟s soft power-dam building- as a
non riparian state has helped shift positions and aided countries achieve interests in the Nile
basin hydro-politics.
73
Appendix 1: Nile Basin Countries
Source: Nile River Basin Map- Retrieved From
http//www. worldbank.org/INTAFRNILEBASINI/About Us/21082459/Nile_River_Basin.htm
Accessed on 10th
February, 2014.
74
Appendix 2: The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
Source: The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project in the Nile Basin Region,
Retrieved From
http://www. criticxxtreme.files.wordpress.com/2013/08/map-the-nile-river.jpg .Accessed 10th
February, 2014
75
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