“barriers to protection: turkey's asylum regulations,” bill frelick, july 1996, us committee...

8/4/2019 Barriers to Protection: Turkey's Asylum Regulations, Bill Frelick, July 1996, US Committee for Refugees

1/27


2/27

BARRIERS TO PROTECTION:TURKEY'S ASYLUM

REGULATIONSby

Bill Frelick

Senior Policy Analyst, U.S. Committee for RefugeesJuly 1996

".,.:':

The author w ishes to thank the embassy of Turkey in W ashington, D .C . and the Turkish M inistry of Interior and theM inistry of F oreign A ffairs for their w illin gness to discuss the issues relatin g to refugees and asylum seekers in T urkey. Th eauthor also w ishes to thank the offices of the UN H igh Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in W ashington. Ankara. andG eneva for their assistance. Several nongovernm ental organizations w ere particularly helpful in providing assistance andinform ation. The author is especially grateful for the help of M aryam Namazie of the Com mittee for H umanitarian A ssis-tance to Iranian R efugees (C HA IR ), Farshad H usseini of the International Federation of Iranian R efugees and Im migrantsCouncils (IFIRIC)- Turkey branch. and other persons who preferred anonym ity, including members of the Iranian Refu-gees' A lliance. F inally, the author w ishes to thank the 16 1 rejected Iranian asylum seekers w ho, at the tim e of his visit. werestaging a sit-in at the offices of the United Socialist Party of Turkey to protest the rejection of their refugee claim s byUNH CR and to call for the cancellation of their deportation orders by the Turkish governm ent. They shared their hospital-ity . th eir sto ries. an d. m ost im po rtan tly , th eir co nfid en ce.

The U .S. Committee for Refugees receives no government funding. USCR is grateful for the important support itreceives from the F ord F oundation. the John D. a nd Ca the ri ne T. M acArthur Foundation. the John M erck Fund. the JoyceM ertz-G ilm ore Foundation, and the Pew Charitable Trusts. USeR is also grateful to m any individual contributors.

1996 Immigration and Refugee Services of Am ericaI SSN 0882- 92 82


3/27


4/27


5/27


6/27

Executive Summary

Turkey, whose accession to the 1951Refu-gee Convention includes a reservation thatexcludes non-Europeans from recognitionas refugees" promulgated regulations inNovember 1994 establishing a system fordetermining whether non-European refu-gee claimants would even be consideredas "asylum seekers" and be given theopportunity to present their claims to theUN High Commissioner for Refugees(UNHCR).

Among other provisions, the newregulations require non-Europeans tofiletheir asylum claims within five days ofentering the country, and, for thosearriving with improper documents, tofile their claims with the police at thelocation nearest where they enteredthe country.

In effect, this means that Iraniansarriving in major cities such as Ankara orIstanbul after traversing the war zone insoutheastern Turkey are required to returnto that dangerous area within a very short

time period to register their claims with localpolice officials.

Genuine refugees, persons with a wel1-founded fear of persecution, particularly Ira-nians and Iraqis, have been denied officialrecognition as "asylum seekers" by the Turk-ish authorities often for having failed tomeetarbitrary and restrictive filing requirementsunrelated to the merits of their claims. Insome cases, Turkey has forcibly repatriatedbona fide refugees to their countries of ori-gin, despite the intervention ofUNHCR andother humanitarian organizations, and invio-lation of the international legal norm ofnonrefoulement.Inrecommendations, beginning onpage

16, the U.S. Committee for Refugees callsupon the Turkish government, inter alia, todrop the time and geographical limits onfiling asylum claims, to treat non-Europeansthe same as Europeans in its refugee law andpractice, and to give greater deference toUNHCR with regard to persons for whomUNHCR expresses concern.

!1Turkey's Asylum Regula


7/27

BARRIERS TO ASYLUMIN TURKEYNon-European refugees and asylum seekers are inan increasingly hostile and precarious situation inTurkey because government authorities there forthe first time have begun to screen refugee claimsthemselves, rather than deferring that task to theUN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

In the past, Turkey allowed UNHCR tomake refugee determinations on behalf of non-European asylum seekers with the understandingthat UNHCR would take responsibility for find-ing resettlement places in third countries for thosepersons determined to be refugees. This arrange-ment was adopted because Turkey did not recog-nize non-Europeans as refugees-its accession tothe UN Refugee Convention has a geographicalreservation limiting its obligations to Europeanrefugees only.

Although Turkey has maintained its ba-sic stance of refusing to recognize non-Europeansas refugees, it nevertheless, on Novemb~r 30,1994, appropriated to itself the responsibility formaking first instance status determinations fornon-European refugee claimants. On that date, anew Turkish regulati-on, Decision Number 9416169, went into effect, requiring that asylum seek-ers in Turkey first present themselves to the po-lice, who are instructed to conduct interviewsrelating to their possible claims to refugee status.

More than a year after promulgation ofthe new regulations, many problems remain. Somerelate to implementation. Others, however. canbe traced to the letter of the regulations them-selves.

Local police conduct the asylum inter-views but do not themselves make a status deter-mination, according to the regulations (local non-governmental organizations say that the police doinclude written opinions, however). The inter-view documents are forwarded to the Ministry ofInterior, where, according to the regulations, offi-cials decide on the case after considering "theopinions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs andother relevant ministries and national agencies."It appears that the process takes anywhere fromone week to five months to complete, and there areindications that a backlog is developing.

Although the Turkish authorities havesolicited UNHCR opinions in some cases, itsopinions are not sought in all cases, nor do theregulations accord a specific role to UNHCR inthe status determination procedures (though theregulations specify that UNHCR should be coop-

~ Turkey's Asylum Regulations

Turkey makesprotection ofrefugees

contingent uponthe offer ofresettlement by athird country.

erated with "in principle ...primarily on aspectssuch asgiving food and shelter, transport, resettle-ment, passport and visa problems rezardinz athird country"). In 1995, UNHCR ;egiste;ed1.796 cases in Turkey, representing 3,778 per-sons. _Ofthe cases decided by UNHCR during theyear, Its recognition rate for all nationalities stoodat 68 percent.

In the first year of implementation of then~w procedure, 1,690 persons applied for asylumWith the Turkish police. During 1995, the Turkishgovernment recognized 195 claimants as "asylumseekers"and rejected 342. Ordinarily, this wouldbe considered as an "approval rate" of 36 percent.However, recognition of the claim by the Turkishauthorities does not carry with it a grant of asylum."Approval" is qualified.

Defining Refugees and Asylum SeekersBecause of Turkey's geographic reservation tothe 1951 UN Refugee Convention, excluding non-Europeans from its obligations on behalf of refu-gees, the new regulations take a somewhat convo-luted approach to defining the terms "refugee"~nd "as~lum seeker." Normally. an asylum seekerIS considered to be a person claiming to be arefugee whose status has not yet been determinedby an adjudicator. However, according to thenew Turkish regulations, the distinguishing fea-ture between a refugee and an asylum seeker iswhether or not the person in question is of Euro-pean origin.

According to the Turkish definition, anasylum seeker. no less than a refugee, has beenfound by the Turkish authorities to have a well-f~un?ed fear of persecution (the refugee defini-tion ITI the UN Refugee Convention). Therefore,the common usage of the term "asylum seeker"does not fit the new Turkish definition. Thisreport, therefore, will use the term "foreigner" or"claimant" to indicate a person who would nor-mally meet the definition of "asylum seeker" andreserve the term "asylum seeker" to conform to itstechnical meaning in the Turkish regulations.

Although the definitions look remark-ably close, the differences are far-reaching. Turk-ish authorities' recognition of a foreign~r as anas.ylum seeker essentially provides that personWith a temporary residence permit in order to seekthird-country resettlement. Failing that. Turkevaccepts no responsibility to protect persons it hasalready found to have well-founded fears of per-secution (i.e.. asylum seekers) against refoulement


8/27

(the forced return of a person to a place-where hislife or freedom would be threatened-a violationof Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention) ifUNHCR does not also recognize them as refugees(according to the same "well-founded fear" stan-dard Turkey applies in the case of asylum seekers)or if a resettlement offer is not forthcoming.

An official in the Ministry of ForeignAffairs told USCR, "We don't accept non-Euro-peans as 'refugees,' but we accept them as 'asy-lum seekers.' We leave it up to UNHCR todetermine if a person is a 'refugee' for resettle-ment. If UNHCR does not accept them as refu-gees, we accept its judgment."

The Resettlement RequisiteEven ifUNHCR does recognize the asylum seekeras a refugee, the offer of resettlement by a thirdcountry is critical. The regulations state that"permits given to foreigners who request resi-dence with the intention of seeking asylum froma third country may not be extended if after givenreasonable time the foreigners are still not able togo to a third country. The foreigners in suchsituations shall be invited to leave the country."(Article 28)

The head of the Foreigners Departmentwithin the Turkish Ministry ofInteriortold USCR,"We only accept refugees from neighboring coun-tries on the condition that they travel to a thirdcountry. When a refugee is not granted a visa totravel to a third country, this is the point where wefeel our problems. If resettlement is guaranteed,then asylum seekers present no problem."

Turkey, therefore, makes protection ofrefugees contingent upon the offer of resettlementby a third country. The fallacy in such an ap-proach, however, is that, notwithstanding the needof the international community to share the bur-den with countries of first asylum, nothing ininternational law compels them to do so. Refugeeresettlement is entirely- discretionary. Other fac-tors also playa part in refugee resettlement. First,UNHCR usually assesses whether other "durablesolutions" are available to a particular refugeegroup. The preferred solutions are voluntaryrepatriation or local integration in the country offirst asylum. For most of the world's refugees,one of these options can be seen on the horizon. Inthe case of non-ethnic-Turkish refugees in Tur-key, however, local integration is out of the ques-tion. Nor is voluntary repatriation an option forpersons with well-founded fears of persecution inIran and Iraq, given their respective human rights

records and the hostility of both regimes to oppo-sition groups.

Even though such refugees may have nooptions other than resettlement, outside govern-ments are not required to admit them. The rela-tively few governments that resettle refugees usu-ally take into consideration factors other thangreatest vulnerability in choosing who among theworld's refugees in need of resettlement theyought to admit. Under such circumstances, gov-ernments often weigh the prospects for successfulintegration--essentially immigration-like crite-ria-in determining whom to admit, employingcriteria such as the existence of family ties orprivate sponsors.

There is no guarantee that sufficient num-bers of third-country resettlement offers exist tomatch all the refugees who may enter a country offirst asylum and need resettlement as their onlyviable durable solution, but the process of determin-ing which refugees are of particular humanitarianconcern to a potential resettlement country gener-ally is slow and bureaucratic. A UNHCR resettle-ment officer in Ankara estimated that it nonnaIlytakes one year to process a refugee for resettlementwhen there are no complicating factors.

The impatience of the Turkish govern-ment, as expressed in Article 28, not only relatesto the willingness of third countries to resettlerefugees, but also to the time it takes to resettlethem. Turkey's judgment that a "reasonable time"has elapsed and that the refugee must leave doesnot relate to the legitimacy of the refugee's claimto asylum. Rather, through no fault of the refu-gees themselves, they could suffer the conse-quences of removal simply based on the unwill-ingness=-or even the slowness--of potential re-settlement states to admit them.

It may only be a coincidence, but a waveof deportations occurred from Turkey after onecircuit ride by a U.S. Immigration and Naturaliza-tion Service (INS) officer to determine eligiblecases for the U.S. resettlement program, raisingthe concern that the Turkish authorities are de-porting refugees who are not accepted for third-country resettlement.During 1995, UNHCR assisted 866 Ira-nians and 667 Iraqis to resettle in third countries;at year's end, another 384 Iranians and 267 Iraqishad been accepted for resettlement but had not yetdeparted Turkey. UNHCR's Assessment of Glo-bal Resettlement Needs for Refugees in 1996called for only 1,100 resettlement places for Iraqirefugees and 800 places for Iranians out of Turkeyin 1996, despite having had needs to resettle 1.250and 934 of these nationalities, respectively, in

i!urkey's Asylum Regulati

Even thoughsuch refugeesmay have nooptions otherthanresettlement,

outsidegovernments arenot required toadmit them.


9/27

1995. Accordingly, the U.S. State Department inits planning for FY 1995 refugee admissions re-ported to Congress that "about 500 Iraqis andIranians will be admitted from Turkey as PriorityOne UNHCR referrals."

A F iv e-D ay L im it o n F ilin g a n App lic atio nUnder the new regulations, many foreigners havenot been able to file asylum claims at all. Theregulations require refugee claimants to applywithin five days to local Governorates if theyentered the country legally, or, if they enteredillegally, 'to present themselves to the Governor-ates in the city where they entered the country,also within five days.

A Foreign Ministry official told USeR,"The police are instructed to implement this regu-lation in a very strict manner."

This means that Iranians and Iraqis whoenter illegally must apply for asylum in provincialcities in eastern Turkey, such as Van, Agri, andSirnak. However, the southeastern segment of thecountry is under martial law due to an ongoing,bloody conflict between Turkish governmentforces and the Kurdish guerrillas of the bannedWorkers Party of Kurdistan (PKK). Therefore, if an'Iranian who enters the land border between Turkeyand Iran succeeds in traversing what is essentially awar zone and zoes to Ankara to claim asylum, heoor she is told to tum around and return to thedanzers of southeastern Turkey in order to file anoasylum claim at a police station along the border.

Iraqis. and Iranians seeking asylum inTurkey are aware of a history ofsummary treatmentin the border regions where the principal concern ofTurkish military, police, and gendarmerie(Jandarma) forces is security, and where there islittle or no consciousness of the principles andrequirements of refugee protection.

Iranians and Iraqis of Kurdish ethnicity,in particular, fear that local police and securityforces situated in the midst of the conflict inKurdish southeastern Turkey cannot give them afair hearing. For example, an Iranian Kurd whobases his refugee claim on persecution arisingfrom his Kurdish separatist activities in Iran islikely not to expect a neutral hearing from aTurkish police or security official engaged insuppressing Kurdish separatism in Turkey. Hemay also fear a lack of confidentiality in theinterview, and worry that he may be deported toIran together with the information he has providedthe Tu;kish authorities about his political activi-ties there.

!!Turkey's Asylum Regulations

. This fear is also present among non-Kurdish Iranian political dissidents seeking asy-lum in Turkey. They fear agreements signedbetween the Turkish and Iranian governmentscommitting them to share information about po-litical activities of each other's exiles. They fearthat such agreements also pave the way for exchang-ing subversives between the two countries. AmongIranians inTurkey, there is a strongly held view thatsuch protocols relate to Turkey turning over mem-bers of Iranian opposition parties in exchange forIran turning over PKK members to Turkey.

USeR interviewed many Iranians in Tur-key who raised these concerns. A former Iranianarmy officer told USeR a detailed story of refus-ing to order his troops to fire on a group of IranianKurdish peshmargas (the guerrillas). However,after finishing his story, he said, "I went to theTurkish police, but I didn't tell them this story. Ijust said I escaped. I told them nothing political."

Another man told USeR that he himselfhad been a peshmarga in Iran. He pointed toinjuries he had sustained in his legs, and expressedfear that the Turkish authorities would hand himover to the Iranian government. He said that whenhe first crossed into Turkey, "the Turkish policedestroyed my documents." Within the first weekafter arriving, however, he went to the nearest citypolice station for an asylum interview. However,believing that "the Turkish police are anti-Kurd"and that "if I said I was a peshmarga, I would berejected," he said. "I didn't give them any specificinformation. Ijust told them there was no freedomor democracy in Iran." The man's refugee claimwas rejected and, at the time of the USeR visit, inOctober 1995, he was facing deportation.

These testimonies of Iranians who havehad interviews with the Turkish authorities shedlight on a written response the Turkish govern-ment made to a USeR inquiry about the inter-views. The government said:

In their asylum interviews with Turkishauthorities, Iranians almost invariablystate that they were not involved in anycrime or political associations in Iran,that they did not fear persecution if re-turned to Iran, and they just did notlike the Iranian regime and wished totravel abroad to Western countries.These statements for every single Ira-nian, who enjoys strict confidentiality, arekept in written form. signed and sworn bythe applicant himself and the authorizedinterpreter. No country would grant asy-lum on the basis of such statements.


10/27

Corum.

Eskisehir Ankara Yozgat

""0::"' ' '1E~ Area Under State of Emergency

Security Concerns OverridingTurkish government officials stated clearly inconversations with USCR that their overridingconcerns related to maintaining security; uncon-trolled movement of foreigners into the countrywas seen as a securi ty threat. An Interior Ministryofficial said, "Our first consideration is the secu-rity of the country. As Turkish citizens, we live inan uncomfortable area. We have to consider theinternal security of our country when implement-ing domestic law and regulations. All our regula-tions respond to the logic of stabilizing the secu-rity of our country." He remarked, "If there wereno terrorist incidents in Turkey, then there wouldnot be so much work to do. In such a situation,even the five-day period would not be necessary."

As it is, however, control of the move-ment of foreigners in and around the countryappears to be of paramount concern. In effect, theIranian- Turkish border is sealed at Van andHakkari, and the police are not accepting asylumapplications from foreigners there (although per-sons seeking asylum are still able to cross theborder north of Van and in Agri province).

This Interior Ministry official also toldUSCR that "the buses to Ankara [from the east]are controlled. It is usually not possible [for an

Nevsehir.

IRAQSYRIA

undocumented foreigner] to arrive toAnkara with-out being taken by the police."

He said, "When asylum seekers enterfrom the border, they don't have to travel a longway, because they have to apply to the securityauthorities where they first enter the country." Hesaid that it takes 15 hours to travel by bus fromVan to Istanbul. "Uncontrolled and uninspectedtravel causes trouble for our country with regardto security," he said. "When an asylum seekerapplies to a security officer before being seized bythe security officer, it shows his intention."

The official told USCR, "If I were aforeigner and came to Turkey, the five-day periodwould be enough for me to reach the authorities."

Iranians who have been interviewed bythe police have remarked that much of the ques-tioning in what are supposed to be refugee statusdetermination interviews relates to gathering infor-mation about smugglers and other Iranians in Tur-key. Some Iranian Kurds say that the Turkishauthorities who interviewed them for asylum statusinterrogated them about the PKK and directly andthreateningly accused them of links with the PKK.

According to the International Federa-tion ofIranian Refugees and Immigrants Councils(IFIRIC), based on a survey of 80 Iranians whounderwent the interview procedure at the policestation in Nevsehir, "Many of the questions which

~ Turkey's Asylum Regula


11/27

"6~.- . . . . ... _ " .were asked were irrelevant to their actual casesand aimed at obtaining information about Iranianpolitical refugee applicants who are currentlystaying in Turkey. It has even been reported thatpolice interrogators have jokingly passed the re-mark that 'Rafsanjani is expecting them."(Rafsanjani is the President of the Islamic Repub-lic of Iran).

The Five-Day Deadline and Internal OrbitCasesDisputes among local officials in interpreting theregulations have created "orbit cases." In thesecases, a foreigner seeks to apply for asylum in onelocation and is told to file at another location; hegoes to that location only to be told that he shouldhave filed at the location where he initially tried tofile his claim. Because of the five-day applicationdeadline, there is no margin for error, and officialshave ruled such persons ineligible to apply.In one case, an Iranian, ' who entered Turkey with aforged passport in March 1995 and directly ap-proached the Ankara police to apply for asylum,was told to apply at the city where he enteredbecause he had entered illegally. He then wentimmediately to Istanbul, where he had first en-tered the country. The police in Istanbul told himhe had to register for asylum in Ankara because hewas residing there. When he returned to Ankarato register, he was told that he had missed the five-day deadline, and he was deported to Iran.In another case, , anIranian who arrived in Turkey in December 1994,shortly after the new regulations came into effect.went to the UNHCR office in Ankara after expe-riencing a problem with the police at the border.UNHCR told him that he had to return to theborder area to register his asylum claim, and gavehim a police letter. He went to Corum, a "satellitecity" commonly used to house Iranian refugeestemporarily, pending resettlement. He tried toregister with the police in Corum, but was told thathe could not apply there, and that he had to go tothe border. He was fearful of returning to theborder police. And, by that time, the five-dayperiod for registering a claim had expired. Hestayed in Corum, apparently known to the Corumpolice, until he pushed his luck too far by askingfor a temporary residence permit. At that point. hewas arrested, and transferred to the police in Agri.a town in the border region. On October 14.during USCR's visit to Turkey. he was deportedto Iran. and was reportedly arrested upon arrival.

l!urkey's Asylum Regulations

Mostdeportationsappear to take

place insummary

fashion in theborder areaswhere there isvirtually nomonitoring.

In early 1996, he reportedly had succeeded in escaping Iran again, and was once morin Turkey seeking recognition by the Turkishauthorities.

Appeals of Negative DecisionsArticle 6 of the regulations, which sets forth thdecision-making procedure of the Interior Ministry, makes no reference to appeals or review onegative decisions. It states only that decisions"shall be communicated to the foreigner by thGovernorates" and that "foreigners whose requests are not accepted shall be deported by thGovernorates on instructions given by the Minis-try of Interior."

If a foreigner's claim is rejected, thMinistry ofInteriorsends him or her a written noteof rejection, saying that the claimant does nofulfill the criteria of being an asylum seeker. Iprovides no details regarding the reason for rejec-tion. The denied applicant is given 15 days toleave the country, after which. he or she is subjectto arrest and deportation.

A separate section, Article 29, deals withdeportation but seems to be limited to deporta-tions of persons who have already been recog-nized as refugees or asylum seekers, not to "for-eigners" whose asylum claims have been denied.That section gives refugees and asylum seekers 1days to file objections to deportation orders. Istates that "objections shall be taken into consid-eration and resolved by a higher authority than theone who ruled on the verdict," presumablyhigher level still within the Interior Ministry. Idoe.s not appear to involve any level of judicialreview.

UNHCR plays no official role in theinternal appeal procedure, and is not even pre-sented with a list of rejected claimants. When ibecomes aware of cases in which a negativedecision is appealed, and in which UNHCR assesses the claimant to be a refugee, UNHCR doessubmit letters to the authorities indicating why ibelieves the person has a valid refugee claim.It appears that some attempt was made inMay 1995 to remedy the ambiguity regardingwhether rejected claimants even have a right toappeal negative decisions, when the Ministry oInterior issued administrative instructions sayingthat rejected claimants also have 15 days to objectto deportation orders. However, they, like refu-gees and asylum seekers facing deportation underArticle 29, are not informed of the reasons fotheir rejections. and therefore can only guess a


12/27

........ is a widow whosehusband was executed by the Iranian

authorities in 1980 for his politicalactivities. ~spent one month

in solitary confinement, during whichtime she was tortured. Her son wasarrested as a political subversive in1991 and spent six months injail.Following the arrest of two of herpolitical associates in 1993, she fled

the country. Although her politicalaffiliations were with a Kurdish

organization, she told the Turkishauthorities that she had been a

supporter of the Shah. Both UNHCRand Turkey rejected her application.She said that she was worried that

Turkish security officials mightinform the Iranian authorities about

her, and that because of borderagreements between the twocountries, she feared deportation. "I

did not give all my informationbecause of fear," she said.Photo: USCR/B. Frelick

what information they might need to provide inorder toreassert their refugee claims. It is alsonotclear whether a foreigner can successfully assertan objection to a deportation order by challengingthe procedural grounds for denying access to theasylum procedure, namely, the five-day filingdeadline.

_Article 29 permits deportation of refu-gees and asylum seekers legally residing in Tur-key for reasons of national security or-publicorder. Given the martial law regime in the south-eastern part of the country, this provision couldconceivably be read in an overly broad mannerthat would exclude genuine refugees fromprotec-tion and subject them to refoulement.

Refoulement and the Denial of Access toAsylum ProceduresMost deportations appear to take place in sum-mary fashion in the border areas where there isvirtually no monitoring of the practice, as op-posed to the outcome of a due process with ad-equate oversight. A number of cases have beendocumented in which Iranians and Iraqis who hadsucceeded in reaching Ankara were told to return

to border areas to apply for asylum and weresubsequently apprehended by the Turkish policeand returned to Iran or Iraq without being given anopportunity to file asylum claims. -

In some cases, UNHCR had completedits assessment of the refugee claims prior to theclaimants' return to the border area. OnApril 24,1995, Turkish police arrested three such Iraniansrecognized as refugees by UNHCR, :::::.' ~ :: ' andias they were attempt-ing to travel back to Agri, near the Iranian border,to file their asylum claims. The Turkish policetook their documents, including referral lettersfrom UNHCR, and refouled them to Iran.

During 1995, UNHCR reported that 78persons (42 cases) whom UNHCR recognized asrefugees were subjected to refoulement by theTurkish authorities: 42 Iranians (33 cases), 31Iraqis (16 cases), and 5 of other nationalities (3cases).

UNHCR documented the forced repa-triations of another 47 persons (27 cases) whowere deported in 1995 without having had achance to file asylum claims despite having indi-cated a desire todo so: 20 Iranians (17cases) and27 Iraqis (10 cases).

IIurkey's Asylum Regulat


13/27

IRANIANS IN TURKEYIn 1995, 635 Iranians approached the Turkishauthorities seeking recognition as asylum seekers.A total of 137 were recognized and providedtemporary residence permits with the expectationthat they would seek refugee determination inter-views with UNHCR; another 31 were rejected andnotified to leave the country.UNHCR registered 486 refugee claims byIranians during the year (representing 908 per-sons). During that time, UNHCR recognized 524cases and rejected 264. 'Statistics provided byUNHCR did not distinguish among the variety ofcases that w'ould come under its consideration.

At least three different circumstancescould lead to a person having a UNHCR refugeestatus determination: 1) persons who had regis-tered claims before the new regulations came intoeffect could be considered; 2) persons who ap-proached UNHCR' s Ankara office directly beforepresenting their claims to the police (UNHCRwould normally interview them to determine theirrefugee status on the same day they registered withUNHCR, provide them with legal counseling, andinstruct them to go to the appropriate Turkishpolice stations to register their claims with thegovernment); and 3) persons who had approachedthe police first and been referred to UNHCR by theTurkish authorities after having been granted tem-porary asylum.

USCR believes that only a fraction ofIranians in Turkey fearing persecution if returnedto Iran have ever approached UNHCR or theTurkish authorities for recognition as refugees.Many Iranians carry valid passports, which allowthem to enter Turkey as tourists and stay for threemonths at a time. They often renew their permissionto stay as tourists by crossing back and forth fromBulgaria or Cyprus. Turkey fines, but generally doesnot expel, those who overstay their tourist period.

Many of the Iranians in refugee-like cir-cumstances are also undocumented and live insqualid conditions in urban slums. In the summerof 1994, the Turkish authorities passed a regula-tion that requires landlords who rent to aliens toinform the aliens that they must report to the localmunicipality. The effect has been to make it moredifficult for Iranians to find housing, and hasresulted in overcrowding in the apartments that arerented.

Estimates of the number of Iranians inTurkey who might have bonafide fears of persecu-tion if returned to Iran have varied greatly. USCR

estimates that more than 10,000 may be in suchcircumstances. This estimate is based on severalfactors:

1) The Turkish government itself, in a letter toUSCR, estimates that two million Iranians live inTurkey, although this figure appears to be inflated(the Intergovernmental Consultation on Asylum,Refugees, and Migration Policies in Europe andNorth America estimates 50,000).

2) A sustained and continuing pattern andpractice of intimidation and bias exist that discour-age Iranians from applying for asylum. A Turkishacademic wrote in 1994, even before the new regu-lations, that "Officials systematically discouragedIranians from formally seeking asylum." This situ-ation has grown worse under the new regulationsdescribed in this report.

3) A high level of persecution continues toexist in Iran, which led to a refugee recognition rateof 66 percent in 1995 for those who did manage to havea UNHCR interview in Ankara (comparable to the 60percent asylum approval rate for Iranian asylum seek-ers in the United States in 1995). Therefore,

4) If the government's estimate of the totalnumber of Iranians in Turkey is even close to accu-rate, then the percentage of Iranians who actuallyapproach the UNHCR office is infinitesimal. Evenif the government's estimate were divided by half, anestimate of 10,000 Iranian refugees in Turkey wouldamount to only one percent of the Iranian populationin the country.USCR maintains that it is likely that mostIranians fearing persecution intheir homeland wouldnot seek refugee recognition in Turkey. Some couldnot meet the five-day filing deadline. Others couldreasonably fear that they would be more likely to beforcibly returned to Iran for having registered a claimor that their lives or freedom could be endangered inTurkey for having gained the authorities' attention.

On a number of occasions during 1995,UNHCR intervened in cases of Iranians whom theoffice recognized as refugees, but whom the authori-ties were in the process of deporting to Iran. A totalof 42 UNHCR-recognized Iranian refugees wererefouled during the year. Additionally, Turkey ex-pelled at least 20 Iranians who were of concern toUNHCR but who had not yet undergone UNHCRrefugee status determinations.

In 1995, UNHCR assisted 866 Iranians to re-settle in third countries. Another 384 Iranians hadbeen accepted for resettlement. but had not yet de-parted at the end of the year.

& Turkey's Asylum Regulations


14/27

Because of the strictness of Turkey'spassport law, rejection offraudulently documentedasylum seekers at the border appears to be stan-dard practice by Turkish border police. Personscarrying false passports or forged Turkish identitydocuments are not accepted into the asylum pro-cedure and are deported immediately. In fact, inmany cases, they are arrested on the charge ofusing forged documents, hauled into court, anddeported.

Iraqi Refugee Claimants under theNew ProcedureIraqis have had particular difficulty gainingaccess to the new asylum procedure. At aboutthe same time that the Turkish Council of Min-isters promulgated the new asylum regulations,the Minister of Foreign Affairs announced a"one-time solution" for Iraqis who had fled toTurkey since the time of the 1991 Gulf Warexodus and who refused to repatriate voluntarily.The one-time solution would enable those Iraqiswhom UNHCR recognized to go to the Silopicamp near the Iraqi border before Christmas Day1994, where they would be allowed to stay untilUNHCR could find third-country resettlementopportunities for them.

A total of 334 Iraqis responded to theoffer to go to Silopi, most of whom were resettledin third countries. Others left the camp spontane-ously during the year, apparently seeking to crossinto other European countries on their own.

The government's one-time solution re-sulted in confusion about the status of newlyarrived Iraqis seeking asylum in Turkey under thenew asylum regulations. Although the regula-tions did not specify any particular nationalities,local police authorities seemed to operate on theassumption that they related only to Iranians. Inthe first six months of implementation of the newregulations, the Turkish authorities did not accepta single Iraqi asylum application in Sirnak prov-ince, the only entry point into Turkey from Iraq.During that same time, about 500 Iraqis sought topresent refugee claims to the UNHCR office inAnkara.

Finally, the police station in Sirnak, atown along the Iraqi border, began registeringsome Iraqi asylum requests. However, someIraqis have reported that the Sirnak police haverefused to register them, telling Iraqis that the newregulations do not apply to them. Iraqis seeking toapply after the five-day limit are summarily de-ported to Iraq.

In 1995, UNHCR reported that 31 Iraqis(16 cases) recognized by UNHCR as refugeeswere refouled to Iraq and that many others had notbeen permitted to apply for temporary asylum.

Historically, Turkey has not consideredIraqis to fit individualized refugee determinationprocedures. In 1988, when more than 60,000Iraqis fled to Turkey, and again in 1991, when thenumber of Iraqis seeking refuge in Turkey ex-ceeded 450,000, the sheer number ofIraqi asylumseekers precluded individualized refugee deter-minations.

Aside from the numbers, however, theTurkish authorities consistently resisted applyingthe refugee designation to Iraqis, insisting on itsgeographically restrictive interpretation of theterm, and not wanting to acknowledge the obliga-tions under international law that apply to personsrecognized as refugees, regardless of nationality.

The existence of the safe haven zone innorthern Iraq has also contributed to the Turkishauthorities' presumption that northern Iraq is safefor Iraqi Kurds and that they can be returned therewithout fear of persecution, despite the internecineturmoil among the Kurdish political factions there.Summary treatment of Iraqis in the border regioncould also be due to the widely held presumptionamong Turkish border authorities that Iraqis areeconomic migrants, and that the dire economicconditions in Iraq are the primary reason Iraqis areseeking to leave the country.

USCR asked an Iranian Kurd who hadlived in northern Iraq for two years before seekingasylum in Turkey why he and other foreign Kurdsin Turkey didn't go to the Kurdish zone in north-ern Iraq. He replied, "Many don't like the govern-ment in northern Iraq and escaped from it becauseof political differences. Some are communists,others belong to fundamentalist groups. Some areeconomic. They don't want to go back. Theyhave no prospects, no house, no money. But somefear persecution. The new Kurdish government inIraq persecutes Kurds."

By the end of 1995, under the new regu-lations, 1,014 Iraqis had approached the Turkishauthorities seeking recognition as asylum seek-ers. A total of 53 were recognized, and providedtemporary residence permits with the expectationthat they would seek refugee determination inter-views with UNHCR; 304 Iraqis were rejected andnotified to leave the country, a screening approvalrate of 17 percent. Most of the cases, 524, werestill in some stage of the screening process; 88cases had not been evaluated; and 45 had beenwithdrawn.

During 1995,2.720 Iraqis (1,203 cases)

!1Turkey's Asylum Regula


15/27

approached the UNHCR office seeking recogni-tion as refugees. UNHCR recognized 287 Iraqicases and rejected 895, for an approval rate of 24percent.

Disagreements between the Governmentand UNHCRIn a written response to a USCR inquiry about thenew regulations, the government stated that in allcases in which the UNHCR offrce intervenes toinform the government "that the applicant hadgiven a totally different statement to theUNHCR," indicating that his or her life wouldbe in danger if returned, the deportation ordersare not carried out, and Turkish authoritiesreevaluate the cases.

Government representatives in Ankararesponded more guardedly to the question aboutdisazreernents with UNHCR. The Ministry ofoInterior official told USCR, "The informationprovided to us and the UNHCR should be paral-lel," suggesting that if the asylum applicant toldthe Turkish police one thing and UNHCR some-thing different, the applicant's credibility must bequestioned. The Foreign Ministry official said,"We need to meet the interests of both parties,"and said that when disagreements occur betweenTurkey and UNHCR about whether a person hasa valid asylum claim, "We put these problemcases on the table."

It is noteworthy that the only instances inwhich the Turkish authorities accept UNHCRdecisions without reservation occur whenUNHCR rejects a claim after the Turkish policemade a positive finding that the person was an"asylum seeker." The Foreign Ministry officialsaid, "If they [UNHCR] do not accept the claim,we accept their judgment." Here the distinction inthe regulations between "asylum seeker" and "refu-gee" is cri tical. Ordinarily, itwould seem evidentthat if a government official determined a refugeeclaimant to have a well-founded fear of persecu-tion, such a person would be considered to be a"refugee" and protected from refoulement. How-ever, under the Turkish regulations, the determi-nation of a well-founded fear of persecution bythe Turkish government only qualifies the ap-plicant as an "asylum seeker," providing himwith a temporary resident permit and enablinghim to seek recognition as a refugee both byUNHCR and a third country willing to resettlehim. The Interior Ministry official explained,"When Turkey makes the determination that anillegal foreigner is an asylum seeker. we are not

it Turkey's Asylum Regulations

able to determine if the person is a genuine asylumseeker or not." Therefore, Turkey willingly ac-cepts UNHCR's determination that a person Tur-key has recognized as an asylum seeker is notgenuine.

However, the reverse does not hold. WhenUNHCR says "yes" and the government says"no" on the genuineness of a particular claim, thegovernment does not defer to UNHCR. Here.according to the Turkish authorities, the samecredibility issue is raised; if the assessments ofUNHCR and Turkey differ, the authorities sur-mise, they must be based on differing storiesgiven by the claimant to the government andUNHCR.

However, there are a significant numberof cases in which UNHCR has recognized as arefugee a foreigner who was not recognized byTurkey as an asylum seeker merely for havingfailed to meet the five-day filing deadline. In suchcases, the Turkish government never consideredthe merits of the claim, but nevertheless subjectedto refoulement persons whom UNHCR recog-nized as genuine refugees.

USCR intervened with the Turkish au-thorities on behalf of the following cases, com-piled by the Iranian Refugees' Alliance, duringUSCR's visit toTurkey in October 1995.2 Each ofthe Iranians had been recognized as a refugee byUNHCR and offered resettlement to a third coun-try; each nevertheless had been denied an inter-view by the Turkish police for having failed tomeet the five-day filing limit. In two cases,described below, the refugee claimants were de-nied an interview for having failed to apply withinthe five-day limit even though they had arrivedand registered their claims with UNHCR beforethe new regulations came into effect. Each personwas facing deportation. to Iran at the time ofUSCR's visit:

was registered with UNHCR onNovember 25, 1994, before the announcement ofthe new regulations. Because his arrival predatedthe new regulations, he was told to go to one of thesatellite cities, Eskishehir, and to return for hisUNHCR interview on December 13, 1994. Threedays prior to his scheduled UNHCR interview,the police told him to go to one of the bordertowns. UNHCR recommended that he stay untilthey could resolve his case. After two months,however, UNHCR also told him to go to theborder town of Agri, where he went and registeredwith the police. Forty days after registering withthe Agri police, he was issued a deportation orderbased on having failed to lodge an asylum appli-


16/27

"_ !.,!..i. ;:,.",r.i'Jk~,hilil':':1J .!,"=,_ 11W\J~1= '. \. I!.i. ( ' j ' , , , . " i \ \, i "W1i. . ~

aparticipant in the Ankara sit-in (see p. 13), holds aphotograph ofhimself that appeared on the front page of Cumhuriyet, a Turkish daily newspaper . practically blind in one eye from his imprisonment in Iran in 1990, says that twoother Iranians, and I 7 I who were involved in thesame political activities as himself, were recognized by UNHCR as refugees, but that hewas not. He does not know why he was rejected.

After his escape from Iran, wife, was arrested bythe Iranian authorities, beaten, and imprisoned for 48 hours. Subsequently she wasexpelled from her teaching job and her property was confiscated. She escaped fromIran with their two daughters. At the UNHCR interview, she was included as part ofher husband's case, and was not interviewed herself.

Of his interview with UNHCR, Isaid, "I am a Kurd and the interviewerwas a Turk ...which made the environment urgent and suspicious .... Because of anincompetent translator and the interviewer's repetitive and unrelated questioning, Ibecame worried. My wounded left eye as a result of arrest and torture wasuncontrollably twitching. The environment of my prison and torture chamber W1lSsimilar to the UN's small interrogation room and the small doorway and florescentlighting. "

Of his interview with the Turkish police, said, "1didn't tell them muchbecause I was afraid of them."

Because of the publicity generated by the sit-in, name is now knownby the Iranian authorities.

cation within the required five-day time limit. Hewas given 15 days to leave Turkey. UNHCRadvised him to come to Ankara, where he was putin a hotel while awaiting an exit permit, OnOctober 5, 1995, he was apprehended by theTurkish police. The Turkish police took him to.the Iranian embassy together with his identitypapers, including a card identifying him as amember of a banned, royalist political oppositionparty. Iranian embassy officials interrogatedhim, and issued papers with his photograph onthem indicating that he should be handed over

to the authorities in Iran together with his iden-tity papers.2)_ CenteredTurkeyinMarch 1995and registered with UNHCRonMarch 14, 1995. Hewas instructed to go toAgri, near the Iranian border.He arrived in Agri on March 20 and registered withthe police the following day. On March 22, thepolice apprehended him and returned him to Iranwithout obtaining a deportation order. He was toldthat his deportation was for having failed to registerhis asylum claim within the five-day limit.

!1 Turkey's Asylum Regula


17/27

He was imprisoned and tortured by theIranian authorities upon arrival. He managed toescape from the Revolutionary Court and fledagain to Turkey, where he again registered with,the police in Agri. The police took photographs ofthe torture marks on his body, and collected medi-cal reports attesting to his torture. After twoweeks, UNHCR advised him to go to Ankara toawait resettlement to Australia. He was put in ahotel in Ankara, but arrested by the Turkish policeon October 5, 1995. The police took him to theIranian embassy. Turkish police coerced him tosubmit his identity documents to the Iranian em-bassy. Iranian embassy officials interrogated himand then issued papers with his photograph indi-cating that he should be turned over to the authori-ties in Iran.3) registered with UNHCRon November 24, 1994, before the new regula-tions went into effect. He went to the satellitecity of Corum, where he reported to the policeon December 9, 1994. After four months there,the Interior Ministry ordered him to go to theborder town of Agri. He went to Agri on April24, 1995 and reported to the police there. Hewas ordered deported on June 5, 1995 becausehe had failed to lodge an asylum applicationwithin the five-day time limit. He was given 15days to leave Turkey. UNHCR advised him to goto Ankara and to obtain a visa to Norway. He wasapprehended by the Turkish police on October 5,1995. He was taken to the Iranian embassy,coerced by Turkish police to submit his identitydocuments, and was interrogated by Iranian em-bassy officials. The Iranian officials then issuedpapers with his photograph on them saying that heshould be handed over to the authorities in Iranwith his papers.4) arrived at Agri aroundMay 1, 1995, and registered with the Agri police6 or 7 days after his arrival. He was served witha deportation order on June 23, 1995 based on hisfailure to apply for asylum within five days ofarriving in Turkey. UNHCR advised him to go toAnkara. He obtained a visa to Australia and hada plane ticket to fly to Australia on October 15,1995. However, he was apprehended by thepolice on October 5, and was subsequently takento the Iranian embassy. Embassy officials interro-gated him and issued papers with his photographsaying that he should be handed over to the au-thorities in Iran.5~ _

!!Thrkey's Asylum Regulations was registered by

UNHCR on May 19, 1995, and approached thepolice in Agri on May 24, 1995. He was servedwith a deportation order for having failed to applyfor asylum within five days of arriving. UNHCRadvised him to go to Ankara. He obtained a visafor Canada shortly after and was waiting for anexit permit when he was apprehended on October5, 1995. Turkish officials took him to the Iranianembassy, where the Turkish police coerced him tosubmit his documents. Iranian embassy officialsinterrogated him. The embassy officials obtainedthe telephone number of his relatives in Iran andmade a phone call to them. He was then issuedpapers with his photograph on them indicatingthat he should be handed over to the authorities inIran with his papers.

All five of these Iranians, after beingapprehended on October 5, 1995 in Ankara, weretaken to the border town of Agri. Cases number 4and 5 were handed over to the Iranian authoritieswithin a few hours of arriving in Agri. The otherthree were taken to a hotel in Agri pending areview of their cases by the Interior Ministry. Thedelay in consideration of the first three cases,combined with the interventions of UNHCR andNGOs, including USCR, succeeded in preventingtheir refoulement. The three were allowed todepart for third countries in October and Novem-ber 1995.

Cases 4 and 5 were not so lucky, how-ever. They were both refouled to Iran on October7. Case S succeeded in escaping Iran again threeweeks later. With the assistance ofUNHCR, heapproached the Turkish authorities again, wasrecognized as an asylum seeker by Turkey andas a refugee by UNHCR, and allowed to departTurkey for third-country resettlement on No-vember 7.

These cases are remarkable in a numberof respects. One noteworthy feature is that all fivehad resettlement offers from third countries: twoto Canada; two to Australia; and one to Norway.Although four of the five were, eventually, al-lowed to resettle in third countries, the fact that allfive were threatened with deportation, despiteoffers of third-country resettlement, and that twowere, in fact, refouled, demonstrates that offers ofthird-country resettlement are not, in themselves,guarantees against refoulement.

The deportation orders resulted, rather.from the insistence on the strict applicability ofthe five-day filing deadline. even though two ofthe five had entered the country before the newregulations came into effect.

These cases also suggest that deference isnot given to UNHCR in cases where there is a


18/27

A DESPERATE LAST STANDOn August 2, 1995, a group of 161

Iranians staged a sit-in at the offices of the UnitedSocialist Party (BSP) inAnkara toprotest UNHCRrejection of their refugee claims and to seek areprieve from their deportation orders back to Iran(most of the sit-in participants had registered theirasylum claims before the new regulations went intoeffect). The first families gathering together at theBSP offices had initially done so in search ofsanctuary.' However, as more arrived, the groupdecided to band together in protest, managing togarner publicity in Turkish newspapers and ontelevision, and, in the process, made their identitiesknown to the Iranian authorities. Having rejectedtheir refugee claims based on earlier interviews,UNHCR faced a difficult decision: whether torecognize them as refugees s ur p la c e based on theirparticipation in a highly publicized sit-in, under-standing that such recognition could encourageother rejected claimants to take similar actions.

UNHCR held to its position of rejectingthe claims of the 161, saying that it had inter-viewed most of the applicants at least twice, andfound that they did not meet the refugee standard.UNHCR argued that its very rejection of theseclaimants would convey the message to the Ira-nian authorities that they had not, in fact, beenactive in opposition activities inside Iran, andthat UNHCR did not see any reason that theyshould fear return to Iran. UNHCR also offeredtomonitor theirreturn through its office inTehran.

During USCR's October visit to Tur-

key, USCR met with the Iranians at the site of thesit-in and interviewed most of them about theirexperiences. Based on their testimonies alone,USCR believed that many of the sit-in partici-pants presented credible claims, but recognizedthat UNHCR had more resources at its disposalfor a thorough assessment of the Iranians' claims.However, USCR was convinced that the sit-inwould be perceived as an overt political act bythe Iranian authorities, that the identities of thesit-in participants were known to the Iranian au-thorities, and that they did, consequently, have awell-founded fear of persecution upon return toIran, notnecessarily foracts committed while livingin Iran, but for their activities inTurkey.

USCR appealed toboth the Turkish gov-ernment and UNHCR to seek a humanitarianresolution of the sit-in.

On June 28, 1996, at about 1:00 am,Turkish security forces broke up the sit-in androunded upmore than 80of the remaining partici-pants, including a sub-group holding a hungerstrike since June 3 at the offices of the HumanRights Association. As this report was going topress, their situation was uncertain. The authori-ties divided up the protesters and sent them to"satellite cities" outside Ankara, where refugeeclaimants generally are told to wait pending theoutcome of their claims. However, it appearedthat the deportation orders against the partici-pants had not been canceled, and that they werein danger of being deported to Iran.

A child sleeps amid the belongings of the sit-in participants. USCRIR Frelick

!lurkeu's Asylum Regula


19/27

_.t' ,.'.~-~. \ . disagreement regarding refugee status. Unlikethe cases in which the disagreement between thegovernment and UNHCR relates to different in-terpretations of the merits of the refugee claim, inthese cases the Ministry ofInterior did not exam-ine the merits of the claim but rather denied thecases solely on the procedural ground of theclaimants having failed to register their claimswithin the required time period. That the govern-ment eventually relented in three of the five casesprior to refoulement provides a small glimmer ofhope that the authorities are willing to bend therules on occasion and that they can be amenable tooutside intervention. How much last-minute in-tervention is required, and whether it can bebrought to bear in time, remains the question.

A more recent case indicates that theproblem persists. Another Iranian, MehrdadKavoussi, a former long-term political prisoner,entered Turkey in August 1995, but failed to filean asylum claim within five days. He approachedUNHCR for assistance, and was accompanied bya UNHCR lawyer when he went to the Agri policestation to register his asylum claim on April 25,1996. However, he was immediately arrested anddeported to Iran the same day, despite protests byUNHCR and Amnesty International (which is-sued an Urgent Action alert on his behalf), amongothers.

C " ~ i 4 '. . . .

v, -

Cooperation between the Governmentsof Turkey and IranThe cases collected above also indicate that theTurkish police authorities have violated one of themost fundamental principles of refugee protec-tion by taking asylum seekers (in this case,UNHCR-recognized refugees) together with po-litically incriminating documents to the Iranianembassy, where Iranian officials interrogated them.

This shows an egregious disregard on thepart of the Turkish authorities for the safety ofIranians seeking asylum from persecution in Iran.It also indicates a close level of cooperation be-tween officials of the two governments with re-gard to nationals of each other's countries resid-ing in the territory of the other.

The Iranian and Turkish governmentshave signed several protocols in recent yearsaimed apparently at curbing the activities of therespective countries' opposition groups suspectedof operating in each other's territories. Althoughthe specific impact of protocols on extradition andborder control between Turkey and Iran on asy-lum seekers is not clear. Iranians seeking asylum

!!urkey's Asylum Regulations

in Turkey expressed to USCR their view that theirsafety in the country was endangered as a result ofsuch agreements.

A protocol signed in September 1992established a border committee with representa-tives from each government to meet every twomonths to discuss border security. Thecommittee's mandate included stopping unautho-rized border crossings between the two countries.

In December 1993, Iran and Turkeysigned a protocol on border security outliningsteps for "cooperation against terrorism by bothcountries." In late December of that year, Turkishpolice in Ankara reportedly rounded up and de-ported about 50 Iranians whose residence permi tshad expired. Included, according to NGO sourcesin Turkey, were at least four dissidents who wereseeking refugee recognition in Turkey.

In early January 1994, Amnesty Interna-tional reported that police took to the border andexpelled to Iran two Iranian asylum seekers whohad sought UNHCR protection in Turkey. In anapparent quid pro quo, in March, Iran reportedlyturned over four members of the PKK to Turkey.

An article in Iran's official newspaper,Keyhan Hawai, dated May 7, 1994, suggests thatsuch a quid pro quo exists involving not only thetrading of information but also of political exileactivists between Iran and Turkey. The articlesaid, "Following the meeting of MohammadHashemi, deputy foreign minister of our country,with the Turkish foreign minister, Ankara an-nounced that it has handed over a number ofIranian opposition members to Tehran."

In response to a USCRinquiry, the Turk-ish government wrote, "There exists no agree-ment between Turkey and Iran pertaining to thesharing of information about Iranians living inTurkey. Instead, the bilateral agreement to whichyou may be referring focuses on Turkish-Iranianjoint cooperation in combatting terrorism."

However, following the signing of a thirdprotocol on border security between Turkey andIran on June 14, 1994, the Turkish Minister ofInterior said, "No element acting against the Is-lamic Republic ofIran in Turkey will be allowedto remain on Turkish territory." In response, theIranian Interior Minister reportedly said, "Tehranis well aware of Turkey's problems and regardsTurkey's foes as its own."

An article in the Turkish paper, Evrensel,on April 21, 1996, suggested that an agreementbetween Iran and Turkey to exchange dissidentswas neither confirmed nor denied by the Turkishgovernment, but that Iranian officials were ac


20/27

knowledging it. The article quoted Dr. SaeedRejaie, a representative of the Assembly of theIslamic Republic who was part of a delegationtraveling with the Iranian Foreign Minister, assaying, "This exchange [of dissidents between thetwo countries] is a mutual agreement. If thegovernment of Turkey does not cause any prob-lems, it will become reality."

Regardless of the level of cooperationbetween Turkish and Iranian authorities, strongevidence exists that agents of the Iranian govern-ment have taken an active interest in Iraniansseeking asylum in Turkey.

The clearest case pointing directly toagents ofIran occurred in 1988 when a kidnappedIranian dissident was found bound and gagged inthe trunk of a car bearing Iranian diplomaticlicense plates at the crossing point from Turkeyinto Iran. The two Iranian diplomats caught red-handed were expelled.

A number of politically active Iranianexiles in Turkey have been assassinated in recentyears (and in other countries as well). In August1993, two Iranians-one, a recognized refugee,the other, an asylum seeker-were killed in Tur-key, reportedly by Iranian agents. More recently,on January 4,1994, Taha Kermanj, a member ofthe Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran, was shotand killed near his home in Corum, Turkey. Hehad been recognized as a refugee by UNHCRand was about to be resettled in Sweden at thetime of his death. He was believed to have fledto Turkey in 1993 from northern Iraq, where hehad reportedly recei ved death threats from Iranianagents.

On February 20, 1996, Zahra Rajabi, aParis-based official of the National Council ofResistance, an Iranian opposition group, was as-sassinated-shot five times at point blank range-in her apartment in Istanbul where she had been ona mission to assist Iranian refugees in Turkey. Thegroup accused Iranian agents of carrying out themurder.

Living Conditions for Asylum SeekersThe regulations state that persons who are recog-nized as asylum seekers shall be "hosted in a guesthouse." In practice, in most cases, it appearsthat registered refugees and asylum seekers arerequired (at their own expense, although UN-HCR provides some assistance) to move to andto live in one of about 20 "satellite cities"designated by police. where they are required tosign in daily.

So far, there is only one guest house,located in Yozgat, which is someti mes used forpeople who appear to be in some dangerin Turkeyand are in need of additional protection. It wasdescribed by one official as "very strict," but"secure."

USCR interviewed an Iranian who spentsix weeks in the Yozgat "guest house." Hiscircumstances were somewhat different fromthose of recognized asylum seekers, however.He had arrived in Turkey before the new regu-lations went into effect, and UNHCR had re-jected his refugee claim. With no prospects ofbeing recognized as a refugee in Turkey nor ofbeing resettled from Turkey through officialchannels, he tried to leave Turkey illegally withthe intention of seeking asylum in Sweden wherehe had a brother who was a recognized refugee.He was caught by the Turkish police, however,and spent 15 days in jail. During that time,members of his political party in Europe faxedthe government and UNHCR seeking recogni-tion for him and a cancellation of the deporta-tion order against him. He was transferred fromthe jail to Yozgat.

Perhaps due to the contrast with hisimmediately precedingjail experience, this mandescribed Yozgat in almost glowing terms. Hedescribed it as a house that had an entry gate, butno fence. He said that the residents were permit-ted to leave with a police escort.

At the time he was there, he said that itheld about 25 foreigners. He said that most, likehimself, were Kurds. He said that the residentsincluded two Russians, and who had been there for five years because Rus-sia refused to accept them, and a Sierra Leonean,

, who had been there for23 months (and in the Silopi camp on the Iraqiborder for 13 months before that). He said that15 of the persons in Yozgat were UNHCR-recognized refugees waiting for resettlement,most of whom were Iranians. Of the rest, hesaid that some, like himself, had been caughttrying to go to Europe, but that others hadpresented themselves to the police. Althoughhe was not aware of UNHCR representativesvisiting the guest house during the time he wasthere, the Iranian said that UNHCR sent moneyto support the camp residents, and that food,clothing, and medicine were all satisfactory.He said that the police were responsible for theguest house, and generally treated them well.During the time he was there, no one was de-ported from Yozgat. Fearing that he would bedeported. however, he escaped from Yozgat

~ Turkey's Asylum Regulati


21/27

and was residing w ithout proper docum ents inAnkara at the tim e of the U SCR interview .

Mass InfluxesAmon g th e m ost v ag ue, an d m ost tro ub lin g, o f th eprovisions in the new regulations is the sectiond ea lin g w ith m ass in flu xe s. T he s ec tio n is e ntitle d"T he Precautio ns to be taken against a possiblem ass influx .... " A rticle 8 states flatly that "it ise sse ntia l to s to p s uc h a mo veme nt a nd th e a dv an ceo f a sy l um se ek ers a t th e b ord ers." It ca lls u po n th ea uth oritie s to "tak e n ece ssary an d e ffectiv e m ea-sures to do so."

This is in m arked contrast to interna-tio nal law a nd p rac tice. T he E xec utiv e C omm it-tee of the UN H igh C ommissioner for R efugees,com prised of governm ents, meets formally toa do pt c on clu sio ns o n h ow s ta te s o ug ht to in te rp re tthe UN R efugee C on vention and P rotocol. C on-clusion Number 22 declares that "in cases oflarg e-sca le in flu x, asy lum se ek ers sh ou ld b e ad -m itte d to th e S ta te in w hich th ey first se ek refu geand if that State is unable to adm it them on ad urab le b asis, it sh ou ld a lw ay s admit th em a t le aston a temporary basis." Conclusion 22 furtherdeclares that "in all cases the fund am ental prin-ciple of non-refoulement-including non-rejec-tion at the frontier-m ust be scrupulously ob-served."

Turkey's new regulations codify thecountry's practice relating to m ass influx since1991 . W hen the first large-scale influ x of IraqiK urd refugees arri ved in 1988, Turkey openedits borders, co nsistent w ith UNHCR E xecutiveC om mittee conclusions on m ass influxes. Im -plicit in U NH CR's Executive C omm ittee con-clusions is the notion o f international burden-sharing, that countries fortunate enough not tob e o n th e fro ntlin e o f m ass in flu xe s w ou ld come tothe aid of countries such as Turkey w ho do findthem selves the im mediate neighbor of refugee

~ Thrkeys Asylum Regulations

p ro du cin g co un trie s. H ow ev er, in T urk ey , ten s o fth ou san ds o f Iraq i K urd s w aite d in d ism al refu ge ec am ps fo r re settle men t o ffe rs th at w ere n ot fo rth -cornmg.

In 1991, Turkey resolved not to repeatwhat it saw as its m istake in 1988. It did whatA rticle 8 now calls for: it stopped the m ass influxcold, on the border. A U.S. Senate staff reportw ritte n at th at tim e said :

If the refugees had been permitted tocross the border-even by half a mile-to entermore hospitable Turkish valleys and facilities,some of the tragic loss of life could have beenminimized during those desperate early days inApril.J

In a no th er d ep artu re from a cc ep te d in te r-na ti ona l p rac ti ce , Ar ti cl e IIs ta te s t ha t " re cep ti oncenters for the sheltering of the asylum seekersand those who take refuge in Turkey shall bee sta blis he d b y th e Gov ern ora te s at nearest pos-sible locations to theborders as d ete rm in ed b y th eM in is try o fIn te rio r in c oo rd in atio n w ith th e T urk -ish G en eral S taff' (e mp ha sis a dd ed ). G en erally ,host governm ents seek to rem ove refu gees fromborder areas w here they m ight becom e sub ject tocross-border attack or w here the governm ent ofth e refu ge e-p ro du cin g state c ou ld in terp re t th eirpresence as a provocation. T he U NH CR Execu-ti v e C ommittee issu ed a fo rm al C on clu sio n, N um -ber 48, saying that in order to protect refugeecamps, they should be located "wheneverp ossib le ... at a rea so nab le d istan ce from th e fro n-tie r o f th e co un try o f o rig in ."

A rticle 26 says that "at the conclusion ofa w ar, arm ed conflict or crisis the repatriation ofthe refugees ... shall be carried o ut...." A rticle 26does not say anything about the conditions forr ep atr ia ti on , t he vol un ta rin es s o f th e r ep atr ia tio n,or w hether international organizations w ith amandate to assist in voluntary repatriation ofrefugees, nam ely U NH CR , ought to be involvedin facilitatin g rep atria tio n in a w ay th at p romo testh e sa fety a nd d ig nity o f retu rn in g re fu gee s.


22/27

Conclusion and Recommendations

After more than a year of implementation, it isclear that Turkey has not yet succeeded in estab-lishing an asylum and refugee determination pro-cedure that instills confidence either among for-eigners seeking asylum in Turkey oron the part ofinternational observers.

Responsibility for handling refugeeclaimants has been assigned to a division of theInterior Ministry within the General Directorateof Security. The bias of government officialsinvolved with the asylum procedure appears over-whelmingly to be one of maintaining Turkey'ssecurity and of not harming relations with neigh-boring refugee-producing countries.

Notwithstanding the validity of securityconcerns and good foreign relations, refugee pro-tection is fundamentally a human rights concern,and, as difficult as it may be, governments need tocarve out a special place where fearful and trau-matized claimants can feel secure, have a fairhearing, and be given the opportunity to find saferefuge. It is in this spirit that USCR makes thefollowing recommendations.

1.The DoubleStandard inTreatment ofEuro-peans and Non-EuropeansThe distinction between "refugees" and "asylumseekers" in the Turkish regulations commits theTurkish government to a greater level of respon-sibility toward Europeans than toward non-Euro-peans faced with the same threats to their safety.It is ironic that Turkey ,a country that has, at times,felt excluded from membership in the European"club," would devise a double standard in its treat-ment of foreigners that would have the effect offavoring Europeans as the only persons eligible toberecognized as refugees by Turkey, and of discrimi-nating against non-Europeans. Therefore,

a) USCR calls upon the Turkish govern-ment to drop its geographical reservation to itsaccession to the UN Refugee Convention andProtocol.

b) USCR further recommends that the Turk-ish government amend its asylum procedures totreat all foreigners equally. regardless of nationalorigin. dropping the regulatory distinction between"asylum seeker" and "refugee" status based on thegeographical origin of the refugee claimant.

2. The Five-Day Deadline for Applying forAsylumThe five-day deadline for applying for asylum inTurkey creates an arbitrary procedural bar toasylum for persons who might be genuine refu-gees. As such, it violates the prohibition in theRefugee Convention on the return of refugees topersecution, an obligation acknowledged in theTurkish regulations. Therefore,

a) Any time limit on filing asylum claimsought to be abolished.

b) Although USCR objects, in principle, toilllY arbitrary time limits on filing asylum claims,if the above reform is not instituted, the Turkishauthorities could take certain steps to make thecurrent requirements less draconian, even if theystill would be insufficient to assure satisfactoryadherence to standards of refugee protection. Forexample, the time limit could be expanded to 90,120, or 180 days as a means of giving foreignersgreater opportunity to learn the filing require-ments and to locate and travel to the appropriateplace to file the claim.

c) If Turkey is unwilling to abolish or tolengthen the deadline on applying for asylum(which USCR believes to be a sine qua non oflegitimacy), there are other possible ways in whichthe time limit could be amended to make thisprovision somewhat less inflexible. Rather thanhaving the failure to meet the time limit precludea foreigner from applying for asylum, failure tomeet a time limit could be used not to bar accessto the asylum procedure but rather as a negativefactor that would be taken into consideration inevaluating the asylum claim. The regulationscould also be changed to allow for "good cause"exceptions for asylum seekers who did not applyin a timely fashion after arriving in the country,such as medical conditions or time spent seekinglegal counselor in traveling to "wrong" locations(see Recommendation number 4).3. Refugees Sur PlaceRefugees sur place are people who did not leavetheir country of origin owing to a well-foundedfear of persecution, but who became refugees at alater date either due to changed circumstances in

u s e Rrecommends

that the Turkishgovernmentamend itsasylum

procedures totreat all

foreignersequally,

regardless ofnational origin.

~ Turkey's Asylum Regulatio


23/27

, "

The five-daydeadline forapplying for .asylum in

Turkey createsan arbitrary

procedural bar toasylum forpersons whomight begenuinerefugees.

the home country or as a result of actions they tookin their country of residence. Applying an arbi-trary time limit to persons in such circumstanceswould deny them the protection they need at thetime when they actually became refugees. There-fore,

a) If a time limit is retained, an exceptionshould be made in the regulations to take intoaccount changed circumstances in the home coun-try or occurrences in Turkey that would lead aperson to have a well-founded fear of persecutionupon return to his or her country of origin.

b) The Turkish government should givetemporary residence permits to the Iranians whowere rounded up by Turkish security forces onJune 28 at the sit-in at the United Socialist Partyand Human Rights Association offices (see box,p. 13). They should be permitted to pursue theirasylum claims with the Turkish and UNHCRauthorities. Their claims should be adjudicated,on a case-by-case basis, in light of the new cir-cumstances arising from the sit-in itself. Recon-sideration of their claims should take into accountevidence that the identities and affiliations of thesit-in participants have come to the attention ofthe Iranian authorities.4. Geographic Filing RequirementsThe regulations require undocumented foreignersto file asylum claims in the nearest "Governor-ates" to the points at which they entered thecountry; foreigners entering with valid travel docu-ments are permitted to apply in the places wherethey are residing in Turkey. Because ten of theprovinces in the border region with Iraq and Iranare under a State of Emergency and cannot beconsidered to be safe, this requirement potentiallyplaces asylum seekers in danger. It also contrib-utes to confusion about which authorities areresponsible for conducting initial asylum inter-views. This has resulted in some applicants miss-ing the five-day filing deadline and being deniedaccess to the asylum procedure. Therefore,

a) The rule requiring undocumented for-eigners to file in the Governorate nearest the pointof entry should be lifted. and undocumented for-eigners should be permitted to apply for asylumwith the police station nearest where they areresiding in the country. The current regulationsallow foreigners with valid documents to apply inthis way: this change would allow undocumentedforeigners to do the same.

!!i Turkey's Asylum Regulations

b) Although USCR believes that there shouldnot be any geographic filing requirement, if theTurkish authorities insist on maintaining such arequirement, they could make it somewhat lessonerous and less confusing (i.e., unclear aboutwhat locality is responsible for accepting theasylum application with the result that "orbit"cases miss the filing deadline) by allowing theapplicant to file a notice of intent to apply forasylum at local Governorates, followed by a com-plete application at adesignatedin-land site wherethe full asylum interview would take place at alater date.

c) Although USCR believes that the geo-graphic filing requirement should be eliminatedentirely, if the above alternatives are not accept-able, USCR recommends that, atthe least, Turkeyshould provide exceptions for undocumented for-eigners who fear that they would be harmed in theprovince of first arrival in Turkey. Such claimsshould be considered credible if the province towhich (or through which) a foreigner is expectedto go is under martial law.

d) Another alternative worth exploringwould be to locate one or more centralized recep-tion centers in safe locations where foreignersseeking asylum could come, receive legal coun-seling, file their claims, be housed temporarily,and undergo refugee determination interviewsboth with the government authorities and withUNHCR.S. DeportationBecause Article 29 relates to deportation of recog-nized refugees and asylum seekers legally resid-ing in Turkey, it is not at all clear how it relates toforeigners whose asylum"claims are rejected. Ironi-cally, the regulation appears to authorize deporta-tions of persons whom Turkish authorities haverecognized as having credible fears of persecu-tion, but not to authorize deportations of personswhom have not been so recognized. In practice.however, deportation of non-recognized refugeesand asylum seekers appears to be common, al-though not well documented. The regulationsalso permit deportations for reasons of nationalsecurity or public order. Given the martial lawregime in the southeastern part of the country, thisprovision could conceivably be read in an overlybroad manner that would exclude genuine refu-gees from protection and subject them torefoulemeru, Therefore.


24/27

a) Any deportation on national securitygrounds of a recognized refugee or asylum seekerlegally residing in Turkey should be limited strictlyto the clearest cases based on specific evidencetying the individual refugee to specific securitythreats. In making the decision whether to deportsuch a refugee, the potential harm the refugeewould face must be weighed against the gravity ofthe security threat the refugee represents.

b) The regulations should clearly allowrejected asylum seekers to appeal their deporta-tion orders to ensure that they are carried outwithin the framework of the UN Refugee Conven-tion, namely, that no person can be returned orexpelled to the frontiers of territories where his orher life or freedom would be threatened on ac-count of race, religion, nationality, membershipof a particular social group, or political opinion.6. Disagreements between the Governmentand UNHCR on Refugee ClaimsGiven the tensions in the region and fears thatmany claimants in Turkey have about the confi-dentiality of the interviews and impartiality of thesecurity authorities charged with interviewingand determining refugee claims, it should not beunexpected that some might withhold importantinformation relevant to their claims from the Turk-ish authorities. That discrepancies may emerge inaccounts given by refugee claimants to the Turk-ish authorities and to UNHCR should not, initself, be grounds for dismissing the claim aslacking credibility. Therefore,

a) The Turkish government should defer toUNHCR when UNHCR determines that a personhas a bona fide refugee claim.

b) In cases where Turkey is unwilling todefer to UNHCR's recognition of a claimant'sstatus, it could. on the advice ofUNHCR and withthe cooperation of third countries willing to ac-cept them, order rejected claimants to be deportedto third countries rather than to the UNHCR-recognized refugee's country of origin. The gov-ernment would have to provide enough flexibilityin the timing of the deportation order to enableUNHCR to make what, in effect, would be anarrangement for third-country resettlement.7. Role of UNHCR and Local NGOsFor those refugee claimants who are fearful andsuspicious of the Turkish authorities or who have

failed to meet Turkey's stringent filing require-ments, effective advocacy by nongovernmentalorganizations and intervention by UNHCR repre-sent their last, and perhaps only hope. The Turk-ish authorities have at various times harassedgroups, such as the International Federation ofIranian Refugees and Immigrants Councils-Tur-key Branch (IFIRIC), raided their offices, ar-rested their members, and confiscated their files.Additional pressure is on UNHCR, as well, as thatagency, too, now must hurry to meet Turkishdeadlines. UNHCR's refugee status determina-tion -for recognized asylum seekers as well asunrecognized--can mean the difference betweenpermanent protection in a third country and forcedreturn to their country of origin. Because of thepressure to meet the time requirements of the newregulations, the chances for erroneous status de-terminations have increased. Therefore,

a) UNHCR should provide rejected c1aim-ants with the reasons for the rejection of theirrefugee claims and provide them with an opportu-nity to rebut negative findings.

b) Turkey should respect the role ofNGOsoperating within Turkey as guardians of the rightsand humanitarian needs of foreigners seekingasylum, and allow them to operate openly.8. Old CasesConsiderable confusion exists among asylum seek-ers as well as Turkish officials about the require-ments of the new regulations. The regulationsmake no provision indicating what proceduresought to be followed for foreigners who arrived inTurkey before the new regulations went into ef-fect. In fact, Turkish officials began adjudicatingasylum claims in July 1994, five months beforethe regulations were published. But the regula-tions themselves made no allowance for a transi-tion period. Therefore,

a) The Turkish government should clarifythat persons who had registered with UNHCRprior to November 30, 1994 and who, according tothe previous practice, had been recognized asrefugees by UNHCR (even if the status determi-nation occurred after the regulations went intoeffect), should be eligible for temporary residencepermits and allowed to pursue third-country re-settlement.

The Turkishgovernment

should defer toUNHCRwhenUNHCR

determines that aperson has a

bona fide refugeeclaim.

b) Foreigners who can establish that theyarrived in Turkey prior to November 30, 1994

!lurkey's Asylum Regulatio


25/27

20

Turkey shoulddecouple its

offer oftemporaryasylum tofor-

eigners fromthe need to have

an offer ofthird-countryresettlement.

should be allowed to register asylum claims withthe authorities in the Governorates in which theyreside without regard to time limits.

9. The Demand for ResettlementTurkey's asylum regulations are predicated on thenotion that no non-European refugees will beallowed to stay in Turkey other than temporarily,pending a resettlement offer from a third country.This requirement makes temporary protection inTurkey contingent on the willingness of thirdcountries to resettle refugees entering Turkey. Asunfair as it may seem in terms of the luck ofgeography, intemationallaw isclear on this point:the obligation not to return a refugee to persecu-tion-nonreJoulement-is a binding requirementon all countries whether or not they have ratifiedthe UN Refugee Convention or attached geo-graphical reservations to it. International lawdemands no such requirement from third coun-tries to resettle refugees. Resettlement is dis-cretionary, and those few countries that doresettle refugees exercise great latitude in de-termining which, and how many, they admit.Therefore,

a) Turkey should decouple its offer oftemporary asylum to foreigners it recognizes ashaving valid asylum claims from the need to havean offer of third-country resettlement.

b) Notwithstanding the desirability of pro-moting resettlement to third countries for thosepersons for whom third-country resettlementwould be the most appropriate durable solution,Turkey should also recognize that many asylumseekers from neighboring countries may havefamily links and cultural ties in Turkey, and thatTurkey itself might in some cases be the mostappropri ate venue for them to stay permanently oruntil they can voluntarily repatriate in safety anddignity.

c) UNHCR's annual assessment of resettle-ment needs for 1996, which seeks 1,900 refugeeadmissions for refugees out of Turkey (Ll 00Iraqis; 800 Iranians), is too minimalist in light ofthe uncertainty caused by the changed proce-dures. A higher number would afford UNHCRmore flexibility and give resettlement countriesbetter opportuni ty for advanced planning for con-tingencies that could result in greater vulnerabil-ity for refugees in Turkey and a higher imperativefor larger and quicker resettlement opportunities.

~ Turkey's Asylum Regulations

d) Other countries, including the UnitedStates, ought to respond generously and sympa-thetically to UNHCR requests to resettle non-European refugees out of Turkey. The need is notonly for the protection of these refugees per se, butalso for supporting Turkey as a country of firstasylum to encourage it to keep its doors open torefugees appearing at its borders.

e) The U.S. Department of State shouldadvise the U.S. embassy in Ankara that PriorityOne cases do not have to be UNHCR-referred.Priority One cases are those of "persons facingcompelling security concerns in countries of firstasylum," such as the threat of reJoulement, as wellas "persons for whom other durable solutions arenot feasible and whose status in the place ofasylum does not present a satisfactory long-termsolution." According to worldwide U.S. process-ing guidelines, Priority One cases may be"UNHCR-referred or U.S. embassy-identified"(emphasis added), yet the State Department'sguidance on refugee admissions from Turkeyrefers to admissions of Iranians and Iraqis inTurkey as limited to "Priority One UNHCR refer-rals," suggesting that cases cannot be referreddirectly by the embassy. Given the constraints onUNHCR in Turkey, the United States shouldallow itself the flexibil

“barriers to protection: turkey's asylum regulations,” bill frelick, july 1996, us committee...

Documents