Arigo v Swift (2014)The Court's Ruling

As a preliminary matter, there is no dispute on the legal standing of petitioners to file the present petition. SIaHTD

Locus standi is "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." 10 Specifically, it is "a party's personal and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result" of the act being challenged, and "calls for more than just a generalized grievance." 11 However, the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest. 12

In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., 13 we recognized the "public right" of citizens to "a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law." We declared that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. 14

On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their own and future generations. Thus: SaHcAC

Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come. 15 (Emphasis supplied.)

The liberalization of standing first enunciated in Oposa, insofar as it refers to minors and generations yet unborn, is now enshrined in the Rules which allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases. The provision on citizen suits in the Rules "collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature." 16

Leonen (concurring)

The pleadings presented the following issues: a) whether petitioners have legal standing to file a petition for writ of kalikasan with prayer for temporary environmental protection order (TEPO), and b) whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity applies to foreign respondents.

Petitioners argued that they have locus standi. 20 Having categorized the petition as a citizen's suit, they alleged that they are representing "others, including minors and generations yet unborn" in asserting their constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology. 21 Petitioners cited this court's ruling in Oposa v. Factoran that Article II, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution was immediately enforceable. The pronouncement was anchored on the premise that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology belonged "to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation." 22 HATICc

The parties do not have legal standing

Petitioners brought this case as a citizen's suit under the Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park Act of 2009, in conjunction with the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. 37

Section 37 of the Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park Act of 2009 allows any citizen to file a civil, criminal, or administrative case against:

(a)Any person who violates or fails to comply with the provisions of this Act its implementing rules and regulations; or

(b)Those mandated to implement and enforce the provisions of this Act with respect to orders, rules and regulations issued inconsistent with this Act; and/or

(c)Any public officer who wilfully or grossly neglects the performance of an act, specifically enjoined as a duty by this Act or its implementing rules and regulations; or abuses his authority in the performance of his duty; or, in any manner improperly performs his duties under this act or its implementing rules and regulations: Provided, however, That, no suit can be filed until after a thirty (30)-day notice has been given to the public officer and the alleged violator concerned and no appropriate action has been taken thereon. The court shall exempt such action from the payment of filing fees, upon prima facie showing of the non-enforcement or violations complained of and exempt the plaintiff from the filing of an injunction bond for the issuance of preliminary injunction. In the event that the citizen should prevail, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees, moral damages and litigation costs as appropriate.

While the Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park Act enumerates causes of action available against duty-bearers, it does not specifically describe the parties who may file a case. TcCDIS

The "environmental" nature of this petition, based upon the alleged violation of the Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park Act, by itself does not and should not automatically render the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases applicable. At best, it must be reconciled with rules on parties as contained in the Rules of Court. This is to preclude a situation where the interpretation of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases results in a ruling inconsistent or contrary to established legal concepts. It is my position that unless the remedy sought will serve the purpose of preventing an environmental catastrophe, the traditional procedural route should be taken. This means that even in environmental cases, Rule 3, Section 2, 3, or 12 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure should still also apply.

Real party in interest

Rule 3, Section 2 pertains to real party in interest:

SEC. 2.Parties in interest. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. (2a) 38

A real party in interest is a litigant whose right or interest stands to benefit or get injured by the judgment of the case. 39 The interest referred to must be material interest, founded upon a legal right sought to be enforced. 40 They bring a suit because the act or omission of another has caused them to directly suffer its consequences. 41 Simply put, a real party in interest has a cause of action based upon an existing legal right-duty correlative.

Representatives as parties

Section 3 of Rule 3, on the other hand, discusses parties acting in representation of the real party in interest: ACTESI

SEC. 3.Representatives as parties. Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal. (3a) 42

A "representative" is not the party who will actually benefit or suffer from the judgment of the case. The rule requires that the beneficiary be identified as he or she is deemed the real party in interest. 43 This means that acting in a representative capacity does not turn into a real party in interest someone who is otherwise an outsider to the cause of action.

This rule enumerates who may act as representatives, including those acting in a fiduciary capacity. While not an exhaustive list, it does set a limit by allowing only those who are "authorized by law or these Rules." 44 In environmental cases, this section may be used to bring a suit, provided that two elements concur: a) the suit is brought on behalf of an identified party whose right has been violated, resulting in some form of damage, and b) the representative authorized by law or the Rules of Court to represent the victim.

The citizen's suit under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases is a representative suit. A citizen's suit is defined: HCTEDa

SEC. 5.Citizen suit. Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of said order.

In my view, this rule needs to be reviewed. A citizen's suit that seeks to enforce environmental rights and obligations may be brought by any Filipino who is acting as a representative of others, including minors or generations yet unborn. 45 As representatives, it is not necessary for petitioners to establish that they directly suffered from the grounding of the USS Guardian and the subsequent salvage operations. However, it is imperative for them to indicate with certainty the injured parties on whose behalf they bring the suit. Furthermore, the interest of those they represent must be based upon concrete legal rights. It is not sufficient to draw out a perceived interest from a general, nebulous idea of a potential "injury."

This is particularly important when the parties sought to be represented are "minors and generations yet unborn."

"Minors and generations yet unborn" is a category of real party in interest that was first established in Oposa v. Factoran. In Oposa v. Factoran, this court ruled that the representatives derived their personality to file a suit on behalf of succeeding generations from "intergenerational responsibility." 46 The case mirrored through jurisprudence the general moral duty of the present generation to ensure the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology by the succeeding generations. 47 IDEScC

Since environmental cases necessarily involve the balancing of different types and degrees of interests, allowing anyone from the present generation to represent others who are yet unborn poses three possible dangers.

First, they run the risk of foreclosing arguments of others who are unable to take part in the suit, putting into question its representativeness. Second, varying interests may potentially result in arguments that are bordering on political issues, the resolutions of which do not fall upon this court. Third, automatically allowing a class or citizen's suit on behalf of "minors and generations yet unborn" may result in the oversimplification of what may be a complex issue, especially in light of the impossibility of determining future generation's true interests on the matter.

Decisions of this court will bind future generations. The unbridled and misguided use of this remedy by supposed representatives may not only weaken the minors' and unborn's ability to decide for themselves but may have unforeseen and unintended detrimental effects on their interests.

The last point is especially crucial in light of res judicata. A long-established doctrine on litigation, res judicata:

. . . is an old axiom of law, dictated by wisdom and sanctified by age, and founded on the broad principle that it is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by the same parties over a subject once fully and fairly adjudicated. It has been appropriately said that the doctrine is a rule pervading every well-regulated system of jurisprudence, and is put upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law: one, public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium; the other, the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for one and the same cause nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa. A contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquillity and happiness. 48 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

The elements of res judicata are: TDCcAE

. . . (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) the former judgment must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (3) the former judgment must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and subsequent actions (i) identity of parties or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; (ii) identity of subject matter, or of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and, (iii) identity of causes of action in both actions such that any judgment that may be rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. 49 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

An absolute identity of the parties is not required for res judicata to apply, for as long as there exists an identity or community of interest. 50

Res judicata renders conclusive between the parties and their privies a ruling on their rights, not just for the present action, but in all subsequent suits. This pertains to all points and matters judicially tried by a competent court. The doctrine bars parties to litigate an issue more than once, and this is strictly applied because "the maintenance of public order, the repose of society . . . require that what has been definitely determined by competent tribunals shall be accepted as irrefragable legal truth." 51

Considering the effect of res judicata, the ruling in Oposa v. Factoran has opened a dangerous practice of binding parties who are yet incapable of making choices for themselves, either due to minority or the sheer fact that they do not yet exist. Once res judicata sets in, the impleaded minors and generations yet unborn will be unable to bring a suit to relitigate their interest.

Perhaps it is time to revisit the ruling in Oposa v. Factoran. cDIaAS

That case was significant in that, at that time, there was need to call attention to environmental concerns in light of emerging international legal principles. While "intergenerational responsibility" is a noble principle, it should not be used to obtain judgments that would preclude future generations from making their own assessment based on their actual concerns. The present generation must restrain itself from assuming that it can speak best for those who will exist at a different time, under a different set of circumstances. In essence, the unbridled resort to representative suit will inevitably result in preventing future generations from protecting their own rights and pursuing their own interests and decisions. It reduces the autonomy of our children and our children's children. Even before they are born, we again restricted their ability to make their own arguments.

It is my opinion that, at best, the use of the Oposa doctrine in environmental cases should be allowed only when a) there is a clear legal basis for the representative suit; b) there are actual concerns based squarely upon an existing legal right; c) there is no possibility of any countervailing interests existing within the population represented or those that are yet to be born; and d) there is an absolute necessity for such standing because there is a threat of catastrophe so imminent that an immediate protective measure is necessary. Better still, in the light of its costs and risks, we abandon the precedent all together.

Class suit

The same concern regarding res judicata also applies to a class suit.

Rule 3, Section 12 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 12.Class suit. When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the court finds to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect the interests of all concerned may sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to intervene to protect his individual interest. (12a) HECaTD

In Mathay et al. v. The Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, 52 this court held that a class suit must essentially contain the following elements:

The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are accordingly (1) that the subject matter of the controversy be one of common or general interest to many persons, and (2) that such persons be so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all to the court. An action does not become a class suit merely because it is designated as such in the pleadings. Whether the suit is or is not a class suit depends upon the attending facts, and the complaint, or other pleading initiating the class action should allege the existence of the necessary facts, to wit, the existence of a subject matter of common interest, and the existence of a class and the number of persons in the alleged class, in order that the court might be enabled to determine whether the members of the class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, to contrast the number appearing on the record with the number in the class and to determine whether claimants on record adequately represent the class and the subject matter of general or common interest.

The complaint in the instant case explicitly declared that the plaintiffs-appellants instituted the "present class suit under Section 12, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court in behalf of CMI subscribing stockholders" but did not state the number of said CMI subscribing stockholders so that the trial court could not infer, much less make sure as explicitly required by the statutory provision, that the parties actually before it were sufficiently numerous and representative in order that all interests concerned might be fully protected, and that it was impracticable to bring such a large number of parties before the court. ScAHTI

The statute also requires, as a prerequisite to a class suit, that the subject-matter of the controversy be of common or general interest to numerous persons. Although it has been remarked that the "innocent 'common or general interest' requirement is not very helpful in determining whether or not the suit is proper," the decided cases in our jurisdiction have more incisively certified the matter when there is such common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy. By the phrase "subject matter of the action" is meant "the physical facts, the things real or personal, the money, lands, chattels, and the like, in relation to which the suit is prosecuted, and not the delict or wrong committed by the defendant." 53 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

The same case referred to the United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. After having been raised by Mathay et al. as legal basis for its class suit, this court held:

. . . We have no conflict with the authorities cited; those were rulings under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pursuant to Rule 23 of which, there were three types of class suits, namely: the true, the hybrid, and the spurious, and these three had only one feature in common, that is, in each the persons constituting the class must be so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court. The authorities cited by plaintiffs-appellants refer to the spurious class action Rule 23 (a) (3) which involves a right sought to be enforced, which is several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and a common relief is sought. The spurious class action is merely a permissive joinder device; between the members of the class there is no jural relationship, and the right or liability of each is distinct, the class being formed solely by the presence of a common question of law or fact. This permissive joinder is provided in Section 6 of Rule 3, of our Rules of Court. Such joinder is not and cannot be regarded as a class suit, which this action purported and was intended to be as per averment of the complaint.

It may be granted that the claims of all the appellants involved the same question of law. But this alone, as said above, did not constitute the common interest over the subject matter indispensable in a class suit. 54 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) ACTISD

In a class suit, petitioners necessarily bring the suit in two capacities: first, as persons directly injured by the act or omission complained of; and second, as representatives of an entire class who have suffered the same injury. In order to fully protect all those concerned, petitioners must show that they belong in the same universe as those they seek to represent. More importantly, they must establish that, in that universe, they can intervene on behalf of the rest.

These requirements equally apply in environmental cases.

Petitioners who bring the suit both for themselves and those they seek to represent must share a common legal interest that is, the subject of the suit over which there exists a cause of action is common to all persons who belong to the group. 55 As a result, the right sought to be enforced is enjoyed collectively, and not separately or individually. 56 The substantial injury must have been suffered by both the parties bringing the suit and the represented class.

However, it is recognized that any damage to the environment affects people differently, rendering it impossible for the injury suffered to be of the same nature and degree for each and every person. For instance, second-hand smoke from one who lights up a cigarette may cause lung and other health complications of a much graver degree to exposed commuters, compared to those who are kept insulated by well-maintained and well-ventilated buildings. The same may be said for dumpsites along the shores of a bay. The gravity of injury they cause to those whose source of livelihood is purely fishing in the affected area would be entirely different from that suffered by an office worker.

The differences in effects, ranging from miniscule to grave, increase the possibility of "free-riders" in a case. This results in a negative externality: an environmental management concept that delves into the effect of an individual's or firm's action on others. 57 In this case, the effect on others is a disadvantage or an injury. HSTCcD

In most instances where this free-rider or negative externality exists, a suit is not filed because the cost of maintaining and litigating outweighs the actual damage suffered due to the act or omission of another. The theory is that bringing a class suit allows those who are not as affected as petitioners, though they may share the same interest, to latch their claim on someone else without any personal expense. There must be some assurances, however, that the interests are the same and the arguments that should have been brought by others who do not have the resources to bring the suit are properly represented. This is why the rules allow courts to be liberal in assessing "common interest."

Another essential element of a class suit is that petitioners must be sufficiently numerous and representative so as to fully protect the interest of all concerned. One of the dangers of bringing a class suit is that while the parties' environmental interest shares a common legal basis, the extent and nature of that interest differ depending on circumstances.

In the case of Re: Request of the Plaintiffs, Heirs of the Passengers of the Doa Paz, 58 which quoted Moore's Federal Practice we noted:

A "true class action" distinguished from the so-called hybrid and the spurious class action in U.S. Federal Practice "involves principles of compulsory joinder, since . . . (were it not) for the numerosity of the class members all should . . . (be) before the court. Included within the true class suit . . . (are) the shareholders' derivative suit and a class action by or against an unincorporated association. . . . A judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is binding under res judicata principles upon all the members of the class, whether or not they were before the court. It is the non-divisible nature of the right sued on which determines both the membership of the class and the res judicata effect of the final determination of the right." 59 (Emphasis supplied)

Those who bring class suits do so, carrying a heavy burden of representation. All the parties represented may not have consented to the agency imposed on them. EIaDHS

Courts, therefore, must ensure that the parties that bring the suit are sufficiently numerous to ensure that all possible interests and arguments have been considered. The community, class, group, or identity that is represented must be sufficiently defined so that the court will be able to properly assess that the parties bringing the suit are properly representative.

In view of the technical nature of some environmental cases, not only should the parties be representative in terms of the interests and arguments that they bring, they must likewise show that they have the capability to bring reasonably cogent, rational, scientific, well-founded arguments. This is so because if they purportedly represent a community, class, group, or identity, we should assume that all those represented would have wanted to argue in the best possible manner.

The cogency and representativeness of the arguments can readily be seen in the initiatory pleading. In the special civil actions invoked in this case, this court has the discretion to scrutinize the initiatory pleading to determine whether it should grant due course prior or after the filing of a comment. In my view, this pleading falls short of the requirement of representativeness.

For instance, it is clear in some of the reliefs that were requested that the arguments may not be what all those they purport to represent really want. As an illustration, the petition requests:

3)for respondents to stop all port calls and war games under the Balikatan;

The facts in this case and the writ of kalikasan certainly have no bearing on why this court should issue an injunction against all port calls in any part of the country made by all kinds of ships even if this is related to the Balikatan exercises. "War games" even undertaken solely on land has no bearing on the subject matter of this case. Also, in the facts as alleged in the pleading, it is not clear how all those affected by the ecological mishap that may have occurred in the Tubbataha Reefs would also be interested in stopping "war games under the Balikatan." The pleading asserts that it represents all generations yet unborn. Thus, it includes the sons and daughters of all government officials who are now involved in the Balikatan exercises. It also includes the military commanders who are now administering such exercise. The broad relief requested belies the representativeness of the suit. HcISTE

Of similar nature are the following prayers for relief in the petition:

4)for respondents to assume responsibility for prior and future environmental damage in general and under the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA);

5)for the temporary definition of allowable activities near or around the Tubbataha Reefs [Natural] Park, but away from the damaged site and the additional buffer zone;

6)for respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs to negotiate with the United States representatives for an agreement on environmental guidelines and accountability pursuant to the VFA;

xxx xxx xxx

8)for the declaration of exclusive criminal jurisdiction of Philippine authorities over erring USS Guardian personnel;

xxx xxx xxx

14)for the convention of a multisectoral technical working group that will provide scientific and technical support to the Tubbataha Protected Area Management Board (TPAMBI);

15)for respondents Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of National Defense, and the Department of Environmental and Natural Resources to review the VFA and the Mutual Defense Treaty in light of the right to a balanced and healthful ecology, and any violation related thereto;

16)for the declaration of the grant of immunity under Articles V and VI of the VFA as being violative of equal protection and/or the peremptory norm of nondiscrimination; cIHDaE

17)for permission to resort to continuing discovery measures

Not all environmental cases need to be brought as class suits. There is no procedural requirement that majority of those affected must file a suit in order that an injunctive writ or a writ of kalikasan can be issued. It is sufficient that the party has suffered its own direct and substantial interest, its legal basis is cogent, and it has the capability to move forward to present the facts and, if necessary, the scientific basis for its analysis for some of these cases to be given due course.

Parenthetically, the humility of bringing suits only in the name of petitioners will protect them from the charge that more than the legal arguments they want to bring, they also want to impose their own political views as views which are universally accepted.

In all environmental cases, it is also not necessary that generations yet unborn be represented. It is not also necessary that minors bring the suit. In my view, pleading their interests have no value added to the case except for its emotive effect at the risk of encouraging a paternal attitude toward our children and for those belonging to generations yet unborn. Certainly, it was not necessary with respect to the putative cause of action relating to the grounding of the USS Guardian.

With the class suit improperly brought, the parties who filed this petition have no legal standing. To protect the individuals, families, and communities who are improperly represented, this case should be dismissed.

GMA Network v COMELEC 2014

GMA then claims that it has legal standing to bring the present suit because:

. . . First, it has personally suffered a threatened injury in the form of risk of criminal liability because of the alleged unconstitutional and unlawful conduct of respondent COMELEC in expanding what was provided for in R.A. No. 9006. Second, the injury is traceable to the challenged action of respondent COMELEC, that is, the issuance of the assailed Resolutions. Third, the injury is likely to be redressed by the remedy sought in petitioner GMA's Petition, among others, for the Honorable Court to nullify the challenged pertinent provisions of the assailed Resolutions. 15 EaSCAH

Locus Standi

Every time a constitutional issue is brought before the Court, the issue of locus standi is raised to question the personality of the parties invoking the Court's jurisdiction. The Court has routinely made reference to a liberalized stance when it comes to petitions raising issues of transcendental importance to the country. Invariably, after some discussions, the Court would eventually grant standing. 28

In this particular case, respondent also questions the standing of the petitioners. We rule for the petitioners. For petitioner-intervenor Senator Cayetano, he undoubtedly has standing since he is a candidate whose ability to reach out to the electorate is impacted by the assailed Resolutions.

For the broadcast companies, they similarly have the standing in view of the direct injury they may suffer relative to their ability to carry out their tasks of disseminating information because of the burdens imposed on them. Nevertheless, even in regard to the broadcast companies invoking the injury that may be caused to their customers or the public those who buy advertisements and the people who rely on their broadcasts what the Court said in White Light Corporation v. City of Manila 29 may dispose of the question. In that case, there was an issue as to whether owners of establishments offering "wash-up" rates may have the requisite standing on behalf of their patrons' equal protection claims relative to an ordinance of the City of Manila which prohibited "short-time" or "wash-up" accommodation in motels and similar establishments. The Court essentially condensed the issue in this manner: "[T]he crux of the matter is whether or not these establishments have the requisite standing to plead for protection of their patrons' equal protection rights." 30 The Court then went on to hold: TIESCA

Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to support that party's participation in the case. More importantly, the doctrine of standing is built on the principle of separation of powers, sparing as it does unnecessary interference or invalidation by the judicial branch of the actions rendered by its co-equal branches of government.

The requirement of standing is a core component of the judicial system derived directly from the Constitution. The constitutional component of standing doctrine incorporates concepts which concededly are not susceptible of precise definition. In this jurisdiction, the extancy of "a direct and personal interest" presents the most obvious cause, as well as the standard test for a petitioner's standing. In a similar vein, the United States Supreme Court reviewed and elaborated on the meaning of the three constitutional standing requirements of injury, causation, and redressability in Allen v. Wright.

Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as the overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, third party standing and, especially in the Philippines, the doctrine of transcendental importance.

For this particular set of facts, the concept of third party standing as an exception and the overbreadth doctrine are appropriate. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

American jurisprudence is replete with examples where parties-in-interest were allowed standing to advocate or invoke the fundamental due process or equal protection claims of other persons or classes of persons injured by state action. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Assuming arguendo that petitioners do not have a relationship with their patrons for the former to assert the rights of the latter, the overbreadth doctrine comes into play. In overbreadth analysis, challengers to government action are in effect permitted to raise the rights of third parties. Generally applied to statutes infringing on the freedom of speech, the overbreadth doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally guaranteed rights. In this case, the petitioners claim that the Ordinance makes a sweeping intrusion into the right to liberty of their clients. We can see that based on the allegations in the petition, the Ordinance suffers from overbreadth. IHTaCE

We thus recognize that the petitioners have a right to assert the constitutional rights of their clients to patronize their establishments for a "wash-rate" time frame. 31

If in regard to commercial undertakings, the owners may have the right to assert a constitutional right of their clients, with more reason should establishments which publish and broadcast have the standing to assert the constitutional freedom of speech of candidates and of the right to information of the public, not to speak of their own freedom of the press. So, we uphold the standing of petitioners on that basis.

Association of Flood Victims v COMELEC

Since petitioner Association of Flood Victims has no legal capacity to sue, petitioner Hernandez, who is filing this petition as a representative of the Association of Flood Victims, is likewise devoid of legal personality to bring an action in court. Neither can petitioner Hernandez sue as a taxpayer because he failed to show that there was illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation 10 or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. 11

Besides, petitioners have no locus standi or legal standing. Locus standi or legal standing is defined as: cHDAIS

. . . a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain a direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. 12

In this case, petitioners failed to allege personal or substantial interest in the questioned governmental act which is the issuance of COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 12-0859, which confirmed the re-computation of the allocation of seats of the Party-List System of Representation in the House of Representatives in the 10 May 2010 Automated National and Local Elections. Petitioner Association of Flood Victims is not even a party-list candidate in the 10 May 2010 elections, and thus, could not have been directly affected by COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 12-0859.

In view of our holding that petitioners do not have legal capacity to sue and have no standing to file the present petition, we shall no longer discuss the issues raised in this petition.

Araullo v Aquino III

Legal standing, as a requisite for the exercise of judicial review, refers to "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." 43 The concept of legal standing, or locus standi, was particularly discussed in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, 44 where the Court said:

In public or constitutional litigations, the Court is often burdened with the determination of the locus standi of the petitioners due to the ever-present need to regulate the invocation of the intervention of the Court to correct any official action or policy in order to avoid obstructing the efficient functioning of public officials and offices involved in public service. It is required, therefore, that the petitioner must have a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, for, as indicated in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.: EATCcI

The question on legal standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Accordingly, it has been held that the interest of a person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.

It is true that as early as in 1937, in People v. Vera, the Court adopted the direct injury test for determining whether a petitioner in a public action had locus standi. There, the Court held that the person who would assail the validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result." Vera was followed in Custodio v. President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers' Association v. De la Fuente, Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix, and Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works. HCEaDI

Yet, the Court has also held that the requirement of locus standi, being a mere procedural technicality, can be waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion. For instance, in 1949, in Araneta v. Dinglasan, the Court liberalized the approach when the cases had "transcendental importance." Some notable controversies whose petitioners did not pass the direct injury test were allowed to be treated in the same way as in Araneta v. Dinglasan.

In the 1975 decision in Aquino v. Commission on Elections, this Court decided to resolve the issues raised by the petition due to their "far-reaching implications," even if the petitioner had no personality to file the suit. The liberal approach of Aquino v. Commission on Elections has been adopted in several notable cases, permitting ordinary citizens, legislators, and civic organizations to bring their suits involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations, and rulings. cSIHCA

However, the assertion of a public right as a predicate for challenging a supposedly illegal or unconstitutional executive or legislative action rests on the theory that the petitioner represents the public in general. Although such petitioner may not be as adversely affected by the action complained against as are others, it is enough that he sufficiently demonstrates in his petition that he is entitled to protection or relief from the Court in the vindication of a public right.

Quite often, as here, the petitioner in a public action sues as a citizen or taxpayer to gain locus standi. That is not surprising, for even if the issue may appear to concern only the public in general, such capacities nonetheless equip the petitioner with adequate interest to sue. In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court aptly explains why: HISAET

Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer" standing in public actions. The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayer's suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizen's suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins: "In matter of mere public right, however . . . the people are the real parties . . . It is at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be remedied." With respect to taxpayer's suits, Terr v. Jordan held that "the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied." 45

The Court has cogently observed in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. 46 that "[s]tanding is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest." ICTcDA

Except for PHILCONSA, a petitioner in G.R. No. 209164, the petitioners have invoked their capacities as taxpayers who, by averring that the issuance and implementation of the DAP and its relevant issuances involved the illegal disbursements of public funds, have an interest in preventing the further dissipation of public funds. The petitioners in G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo) and G.R. No. 209442 (Belgica) also assert their right as citizens to sue for the enforcement and observance of the constitutional limitations on the political branches of the Government. 47 On its part, PHILCONSA simply reminds that the Court has long recognized its legal standing to bring cases upon constitutional issues. 48 Luna, the petitioner in G.R. No. 209136, cites his additional capacity as a lawyer. The IBP, the petitioner in G.R. No. 209260, stands by "its avowed duty to work for the rule of law and of paramount importance of the question in this action, not to mention its civic duty as the official association of all lawyers in this country." 49

Under their respective circumstances, each of the petitioners has established sufficient interest in the outcome of the controversy as to confer locus standi on each of them. CTEDSI

In addition, considering that the issues center on the extent of the power of the Chief Executive to disburse and allocate public funds, whether appropriated by Congress or not, these cases pose issues that are of transcendental importance to the entire Nation, the petitioners included. As such, the determination of such important issues call for the Court's exercise of its broad and wise discretion "to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised." 50

Carpio (Separate)

Petitioners have standing to sue. The well-settled rule is that taxpayers, like petitioners here, have the standing to assail the illegal or unconstitutional disbursement of public funds. 2 Citizens, like petitioners here, also have standing to sue on matters of transcendental importance to the public which must be decided early, 3 like the transfer of appropriations from one branch of government to another or to the constitutional bodies, since such transfer may impair the finely crafted system of checks-and-balances enshrined in the Constitution. SACHcDThese opposing positions opportunely provide me the chance to reiterate the fresh approach I first developed in my Separate Opinion in Imbong v. Executive Secretary 35 to clarify the Court's approaches in giving due course to and reviewing constitutional cases.

As I explained in Imbong, the Court under the 1987 Constitution possesses three powers:

(1)the traditional justiciable cases involving actual disputes and controversies based purely on demandable and enforceable rights;

(2)the traditional justiciable cases as understood in (1), but additionally involving jurisdictional and constitutional issues;

(3)pure constitutional disputes attended by grave abuse of discretion in the process involved or in their result/s.

The present petitions allege that grave abuse of discretion and violations of the Constitution attended the DAP, from the perspectives of both its creation and terms, and its sourcing and use of funds. In these lights, the exercise of our expanded power of judicial review falls within the third kind above, i.e., the duty to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion on the part of any governmental body (in this case, by the Executive) to ensure that the boundaries drawn by the Constitution have been and are respected and maintained.

That Rule 65 of the Rules of Court has been expressly cited, to my mind, is not a hindrance to our present review as the allegations of the petitions and the remedies sought, not their titles, determine our jurisdiction in the exercise of the power of judicial review. EHSADa

1.The Court's expanded power of

judicial review

In contrast with previous constitutions, the 1987 Constitution substantially fleshed out the meaning of "judicial power," not only by confirming the meaning of the term as understood by jurisprudence up to that time, but by going beyond the accepted jurisprudential meaning of the term.

Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:

Section 1.The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, AND to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (italics, emphases and underscore supplied)

Under these terms, the present Constitution not only integrates the traditional definition of judicial power, but introduces as well a completely new power and duty to the Judiciary under the last phrase "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."

This addition was apparently in response to the Judiciary's past experience of invoking the political question doctrine to avoid cases that had political dimensions but were otherwise justiciable. The addition responded as well to the societal disquiet that resulted from these past judicial rulings.

Under the expanded judicial power, justiciability expressly and textually depends only on the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion, as distinguished from a situation where the issue of constitutional validity is raised within a "traditionally" justiciable case which demands that the requirement of actual controversy based on specific legal rights must exist. Notably, even if the requirements under the traditional definition of judicial power are applied, these requisites are complied with once grave abuse of discretion is prima facie shown to have taken place. The presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion is the justiciable issue to be resolved.

Necessarily, a matter is ripe for adjudication under the expanded judicial power if the assailed law or rule is already in effect. If something had already been accomplished or performed by the Legislative and/or the Executive, and the petitioner sufficiently alleges the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action, then the controversy cannot but already be ripe for adjudication. 36

In the expanded judicial power, any citizen of the Philippines to whom the assailed law or rule is shown to apply necessarily has locus standi since a constitutional violation constitutes an affront or injury to the affected citizens of the country. If at all, a less stringent requirement of locus standi only needs to be shown to differentiate a justiciable case of this type from the pure or mere opinion that courts cannot render.

The traditional rules on hierarchy of courts and transcendental importance, far from being grounds for the dismissal of the petition raising the question of unconstitutionality, are necessarily reduced to rules relating to the level of court that should handle the controversy, as directed by the Supreme Court. HcACST

Thus, all courts have the power of expanded judicial review, but only when a petition involves a matter of transcendental importance should it be directly filed before this Court. Otherwise, the Court may either dismiss the petition or remand it to the appropriate lower court, based on its consideration of the urgency, importance, or the evidentiary requirements of the case.

In other words, petitions in order to successfully invoke the Court's power of expanded judicial review must satisfy two essential requisites: first, they must demonstrate a prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the governmental body's actions; and second, they must prove that they relate to matters of transcendental importance to the nation.

The first requirement establishes the need for the Court's exercise of expanded judicial review powers; the second requirement justifies direct recourse to the Court and a relaxation of standing requirements.

The present petitions clearly satisfy these requisites as explained below.

2.Prima facie showing of grave abuse

of discretion

The respondents posit that the petitioners' allegations miserably failed to make a case of grave abuse of discretion considering the "insufficiency and uncertainty of the facts" alleged as they are mostly based on newspaper clippings and media reports. 37 Given the innumerable allotments and disbursements, they argue that the petitioners are required to establish with sufficient clarity the kinds of allotments and disbursements complained of in the petitions. On this basis, the respondents question the presence of an actual case or controversy in the petitions.

I cannot agree with the respondents' positions.

I note that aside from newspaper clippings showing the antecedents surrounding the DAP, the petitions are filled with quotations from the respondents themselves, either through press releases to the general public or as published in government websites. 38 In fact, the petitions quoting the press release published in the respondents' website enumerated disbursements released through the DAP; 39 it also included admissions from no less than Secretary Abad regarding the use of funds from the DAP to fund projects identified by legislators on top of their regular PDAF allocations. 40

Additionally, the respondents, in the course of the oral arguments, submitted details of the programs funded by the DAP, 41 and admitted in Court that the funding of Congress' e-library and certain projects in the COA came from the DAP. 42 They likewise stated in their submitted memorandum that the President "made available" to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) the "savings" of his department upon request for funds. 43

The mechanics by which funds were pooled together to create and fund the DAP are also evident from the statements published in the DBM website, 44 as well as in national budget circulars and approved memoranda implementing the DAP. The respondents also submitted a memo showing the President's approval of the DAP's creation.

All of these cumulatively and sufficiently lead to a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion by the Executive in the handling of public funds. In other words, these admitted pieces of evidence, taken together, support the petitioners' allegations and establish sufficient basic premises for the Court's action on the merits. While the Court, unlike the trial courts, does not conduct proceedings to receive evidence, it must recognize as established the facts admitted or undisputedly represented by the parties themselves.

First, the existence of the DAP itself, the justification for its creation, the respondent's legal characterization of the source of DAP funds (i.e., unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations for slow moving projects) and the various purposes for which the DAP funds would be used (i.e., for PDAF augmentation and for "aiding" other branches of government and other constitutional bodies) are clearly and indisputably shown. DCSTAH

Second, the respondents' undisputed realignment of funds from one point to another inevitably raised questions that, as discussed above, are ripe for constitutional scrutiny. 45

The established prima facie case means that without considering any contradicting evidence, the allegations, admissions, official statements and documentary evidence before the Court sufficiently show the existence of grave abuse of discretion. This situation, to my mind, is patent from the allegations in the petitions, read with the cited admissions and those obtained through the oral arguments, particularly (1) on how savings had been generated and their uses; and (2) on the transfer of funds budgeted for the Executive to the Legislative, the COA, and the COMELEC.

a.The lack of audit findings does not

negate grave abuse of discretion

The respondents additionally deny the existence of an actual case because the COA has yet to render its audit findings to determine whether the DAP-funded projects identified in the petitions are lawful or not, thus showing that the petitions may be premature.

I do not find this contention persuasive.

The issue of criminal, civil or administrative liability, determined on the basis, among others, of the COA's findings, does not and cannot preempt the issue of constitutionality. In fact, the Court's finding of unconstitutionality inevitably leads to the determination of the possibility of the commission of infractions that can give rise to different liabilities. The Court's findings too should be material in the appropriate proceedings where the liabilities arising from grave constitutional violations are properly determined.

The prima facie case, as established and shown in these proceedings, is sufficient to resolve the issue of whether the Executive committed grave abuse of discretion in creating and implementing the DAP. In other words, the absence of any COA finding on the validity of the disbursements under the DAP cannot render the present petitions premature.

To avoid any confusion, let me restate and clarify my view that while the COA can rule on the legality or regularity of an item of expense, it cannot rule on the constitutionality of the measure that made the expenditure possible. This issue remains for the courts, not for the COA, to decide upon.

On the same reasoning, the invocation of the presumption of constitutionality of legislative and executive acts immediately loses its appeal when it is considered that the presumption is never meant to shield government officials from challenges against their official actions (or from liability) where the violation of the Constitution is otherwise clear and unequivocal.

3.Transcendental importance of the

issues presented by the petitions

The petitions likewise establish the second requirement of transcendental importance. DHcEAa

While the concept of transcendental importance has no doctrinal definition, former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano came up with the following determinants whose degree of presence or absence can guide the courts in determining whether a case is one of transcendental importance: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised. 46

I submit that these determinants are all present in the cases before us.

For one, the Executive's undisputed creation and implementation of the DAP, which involves billions of taxpayers' money (and which potentially involves billions more unless halted), satisfy the first determinant. To point out a present obvious reality, the Executive is even now engaged in a "shame" campaign to prod people to pay their taxes. If taxes will continue to be faithfully paid, now and in the future, it is of transcendental importance for the people to know how their tax money is spent or misspent, and to be informed as well that they have this right.

For another, the petitioners' serious allegations of constitutional violation by the Executive in transferring appropriations despite the non-existence of savings and the respondents' commission of grave abuse of discretion in disregarding the limitations of allowable transfer of appropriations under Section 25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution as admitted by the respondents themselves satisfy the second determinant. Based on the admissions made alone, the incidents of constitutional violations are clear, patent and of utmost gravity; they affect the very nature of our republican system of government.

Lastly, given the intrinsic nature of the petitions as taxpayers' suits (to prevent wastage and misapplication of funds by an unconstitutional executive act), there can really be no other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the issue of constitutionality than the petitioners, suing as taxpayers and invoking a public right.

Over and above these determinants, the transcendental importance of these present cases lies in the complementary relation of their presented issues with those raised in the PDAF which the Court squarely ruled upon in the recent case of Belgica v. Executive Secretary. 47

In Belgica, the Court declared the statutorily-created pork barrel system to be unconstitutional for violating the core doctrine of separation of powers. The Court ruled that the legislator's post-enactment participation in the areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment or role in the implementation or enforcement of the GAAs are beyond Congress' oversight function, and are therefore unconstitutional. The Court pertinently ruled:

Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment. 48

In this light, the statement of the COA Chairperson during the oral arguments is particularly illuminating:

Justice Bersamin:

Alright, the next question Chairperson is this, do you remember if your office has in [sic] pass an audit any activity or any transfer of funds under the DAP? SDATEc

Chairperson Pulido Tan:

Under this particular administration, if I may say, Sir. . .

Justice Bersamin:

DAP only, its existence came only in the last quarter of 2011, 541 was released only in the middle of 2012, so it is as recent as that, I do not talk about the previous administration.

Chairperson Pulido Tan:

Your Honor, if I may, because from the way we have looked at it so far, it is really nothing new. It's only called DAP now but in the past, the past administration has been doing this kind of using funds and appropriated appropriations. In the past, we would account for them under what we call, what was called then "Reserved Controlled Account" ang tawag po dun, after a while and then eventually it became a very generic Pooled Savings Programs. In 2011 that was when it was called the "DAP" but the mechanism, Your Honor, is essentially the same, the items of funds or appropriations being put together practically the same and. . . we saw that happening even as far back as 2006. There were other releases because that was how it was [sic] been even in the past, Your Honor, and its [sic] only been called DAP now in 2011. . . it has been happening in the past, yes, we passed them on audit, as in the same way that we also disallowed some in audit. And that is what is going to be the course of event also in the present, Your Honor. 49

The Court should find it significant that it was the COA Chairperson herself who spoke in this quoted transcript of the proceedings. Her statement lends credence to the respondents' claim that NBC No. 541 is not really the "face of the DAP." NBC No. 541 only formalized what the Executive had been doing even prior to its issuance.

To point out the obvious, if a "practice" similar to the mechanism under the DAP already existed and was being observed by the Executive in the execution of the enacted budget in the same manner that the PDAF was also a "practice" during the execution stage of a GAA and which was simply embodied in the GAA provisions then there is every reason for the Court to squarely rule on the constitutionality of the Executive's action in light of the seriousness of the allegations of constitutional violations in the petitions.

In fact, the nature and amounts of the public funds involved are more than enough to sound alarm bells to this Court if we are to maintain fealty to our role as the guardian of the Constitution.

Secretary Abad's official, public and unrefuted statement that part of the releases of DAP funds in 2012 was "based entirely on letters of request submitted to us by the Senators" should neither escape the Court's attention nor should the Court gloss over it. From the very start, his statement cast a much darker cloud on the validity of the DAP in light of our pronouncement in Belgica that

certain features embedded in some forms of Congressional Pork Barrel, among others the 2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on congressional oversight. The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested observers when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, it must be pointed out that this very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation a matter before another office of government renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office. 50 ESCTaA

This ruling effectively emphasizes that the transcendental importance of these cases alone renders it obligatory for this Court to allow the direct invocation of its expanded judicial review powers and the relaxation of the strict application of procedural requirements.

4.Justiciability and Political Questions

Justiciability refers to the fitness or propriety of undertaking the judicial review of particular matters or cases; it describes the character of issues that are inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law. 51

In contradistinction, political questions refer to those that, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government; it is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, and not the legality of a particular measure. 52 Where the issues so posed are political, the Court normally cannot assume jurisdiction under the doctrine of separation of powers except where the court finds that there are constitutionally-imposed limits on the exercise of the powers conferred on a political branch of the government. 53

In these cases, the petitioners have strongly shown the textual limits to the Executive's power over the implementation of the GAA, particularly in the handling and management of funds. Far from bordering on political questions, the challenges raised in the present petitions against the constitutionality of the DAP are actually anchored on specific constitutional and statutory provisions governing the realignment or transfer of funds.

The increase of government expenditures is a macroeconomic tool that is at the disposal of the country's policy-makers to stimulate the country's economy and improve economic growth. From this perspective, constitutional provisions touching on economic matters are understandably broadly worded to accommodate competing needs and to give policy-makers (and even the Court) the necessary flexibility to decide policy questions or disputes on a case-to-case basis.

A broad formulation and interpretation of this guiding principle, however, cannot be used to override plain and clear provisions of the Constitution (and relevant laws) that are in place under the wide umbrella of the rule of law. While the three goals of the economy under Section 1, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution as a legal translation of the Executive's economic justification for the DAP are addressed to the political branches of the government, sole reliance on these objectives would ignore the constitutional limitations applicable to the means for achieving them. These legal limitations are precisely at the core of the issues presented to us in these challenges to the constitutionality of the DAP's creation and implementation; the issues before us are legal ones, not economic or political.

For this reason, I have brushed aside as beyond our authority to consider and rule upon the views in other Opinions justifying the issuance of the DAP for largely economic practicality reasons.

5.The Court's boundary-keeping role

in times of political upheaval

As a final note on the procedural aspects, I believe that the present case provides us with an excellent opportunity to revisit our role as boundary-keeper, a role assigned to us to ensure that the limits set by the Constitution between and among the different branches of government are observed. aECSHI

As early as Angara v. Electoral Commission, 54 this Court has identified itself as the mediator in demarcating the constitutional limits in the exercise of power by each branch of government. We then observed that these constitutional boundaries tend to be forgotten or marred in times of societal disquiet or political excitement, and it is the Court's role to clarify and reinforce the proper allocation of powers so that the different branches of government would not act outside their respective spheres of influence. We clarified that although we may, in effect, nullify governmental actions abhorrent to the Constitution, we do not undertake this role because of "judicial supremacy" but because this duty has been assigned to us by the Constitution.

Time and again, we have looked back to our Angara ruling when cases of national interest reach the Court, and have used its guiding principles to determine whether or not to act on the cases before us.

Since Angara, things have changed because of developments in our political history. Since then, the Court has been granted expanded jurisdiction to determine not only the traditional justiciable controversies that led to Angara, but also the existence of grave abuse of discretion by any agency or instrumentality of the government. Thus, our jurisdiction has been expanded to the extent of the new grant, in the process affecting the traditional justiciability requirements developed since Angara.

The principles in Angara, to be sure, still carry a lot of truth and relevance, but these principles now have to be adjusted to make way for the expanded jurisdiction that this landmark ruling did not contemplate.

We still are the mediators between competing claims for authority but the 1987 Constitution has taken it one step further: we now also determine the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government agency or instrumentality, regardless of the presence of political questions that may have come with the controversy. This expansion necessarily gives rise to a host of questions: does our constitutional duty end with the determination of the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion and the decision on the constitutional status of a challenged governmental action? To what extent can we, acting within our judicial power and the power of judicial review, clarify the consequences of our decision?

Recent jurisprudence shows that we have been providing guidance to the bench and the bar, to clarify the application of the law and of our decisions to future situations not squarely covered by the presented facts and issues, but which may possibly arise again because of the complexity and character of the issues involved. We have set guidelines, for instance, on how to apply our ruling in Atong Paglaum v. Comelec 55 on the requirements to qualify as a partylist under the partylist system. As well, we provided guidelines in Republic v. CA and Molina 56 on how to interpret and apply Article 36 of the Family Code.

It is in these lights that I favorably view the Court's resolve to clarify the application of the operative fact doctrine to the issue of the DAP's constitutionality and the potential consequences under a ruling of unconstitutionality. It is in this spirit that I discuss these topics below. HCDAac

Crisologo v JEWMUnder normal circumstances, JEWM would be correct in their averment that the lack of legal standing on the part of Spouses Crisologo in the case before RTC-Br. 14 prevents the latter's recourse via Rule 65.

This case, however, is an exception. In many instances, the Court has ruled that technical rules of procedures should be used to promote, not frustrate the cause of justice. Rules of procedure are tools designed not to thwart but to facilitate the attainment of justice; thus, their strict and rigid application may, for good and deserving reasons, have to give way to, and be subordinated by, the need to aptly dispense substantial justice in the normal cause. 28

Be it noted that the effect of their non-participation as indispensable parties is to preclude the judgment, orders and the proceedings from attaining finality. Time and again, the Court has ruled that the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even to those present. Consequently, the proceedings before RTC-Br. 14 were null and void including the assailed orders, which may be "ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head." 29

To turn a blind eye to the said nullity and, in turn, rule as improper the recourse to Rule 65 by the lack of legal standing is to prolong the denial of due process to the persons whose interests are indispensable to the final disposition of the case. It will only result in a protracted litigation as Spouses Crisologo will be forced to rely on a petition for the annulment of judgment before the CA (as the last remaining remedy), which may again reach this Court. To prevent multiplicity of suits and to expedite the swift administration of justice, the CA should have applied liberality by striking down the assailed orders despite the lack of legal standing on the part of Spouses Crisologo to file the Rule 65 petition before it. Besides, this lacking requirement, of which Spouses Crisologo were not even at fault, is precisely the reason why this controversy arose.

FUNA v MECO

Standing of Petitioner

The second preliminary issue is concerned with the standing of the petitioner to file the instant mandamus petition. The COA claims that petitioner has none, for the latter was not able to concretely establish that he had been aggrieved or prejudiced by its failure to audit the accounts of the MECO. 71

Related to the issue of lack of standing is the MECO's contention that petitioner has no cause of action to file the instant mandamus petition. The MECO faults petitioner for not making any demand for it to submit to an audit by the COA or for the COA to perform such an audit, prior to filing the instant petition. 72

We sustain petitioner's standing, as a concerned citizen, to file the instant petition.

The rules regarding legal standing in bringing public suits, or locus standi, are already well-defined in our case law. Again, We cite David, which summarizes jurisprudence on this point: 73 CScTDE

By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met:

(1)the cases involve constitutional issues;

(2)for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;

(3)for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question;

(4)for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and TECcHA

(5)for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.

We rule that the instant petition raises issues of transcendental importance, involved as they are with the performance of a constitutional duty, allegedly neglected, by the COA. Hence, We hold that the petitioner, as a concerned citizen, has the requisite legal standing to file the instant mandamus petition. SaIACT

To be sure, petitioner does not need to make any prior demand on the MECO or the COA in order to maintain the instant petition. The duty of the COA sought to be compelled by mandamus, emanates from the Constitution and law, which explicitly require, or "demand," that it perform the said duty. To the mind of this Court, petitioner already established his cause of action against the COA when he alleged that the COA had neglected its duty in violation of the Constitution and the law.

Principle of Hierarchy of Courts

The last preliminary issue is concerned with the petition's non-observance of the principle of hierarchy of courts. The COA assails the filing of the instant mandamus petition directly with this Court, when such petition could have very well been presented, at the first instance, before the Court of Appeals or any Regional Trial Court. 74 The COA claims that the petitioner was not able to provide compelling reasons to justify a direct resort to the Supreme Court. 75 Cdpr

In view of the transcendental importance of the issues raised in the mandamus petition, as earlier mentioned, this Court waives this last procedural issue in favor of a resolution on the merits. 76

Sps Imbong v OchoaDISCUSSION

Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it behooves the Court to resolve some procedural impediments.

I.PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy. HESAIT

The Power of Judicial Review

In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts that it should submit to the legislative and political wisdom of Congress and respect the compromises made in the crafting of the RH Law, it being "a product of a majoritarian democratic process" 75 and "characterized by an inordinate amount of transparency." 76 The OSG posits that the authority of the Court to review social legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since the Constitution vests the discretion to implement the constitutional policies and positive norms with the political departments, in particular, with Congress. 77 It further asserts that in view of the Court's ruling in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 78 the remedies of certiorari and prohibition utilized by the petitioners are improper to assail the validity of the acts of the legislature. 79

Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper considering that the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied to the petitioners, and that the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. It claims that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech-regulating measure. 80 TADCSE

In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the Executive and the Legislature, it is often sought that the Court temper its exercise of judicial power and accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis of the principle of separation of powers. To be clear, the separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government, which obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. 81 Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines; 82 (b) the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines; 83 and (c) the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. 84 The Constitution has truly blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, the allotment of powers among the three branches of government. 85 TADCSE

In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation of powers which imposes upon the courts proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their respect for the other branches of government, in striking down the acts of the Executive or the Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a harmonious blend of courtesy and caution. 86 CITaSA

It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political instability, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. 87 In order to address this, the Constitution impresses upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch done within its sphere of competence and authority, but at the same time, allows it to cross the line of separation but only at a very limited and specific point to determine whether the acts of the executive and the legislative branches are null because they were undertaken with grave abuse of discretion. 88 Thus, while the Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results. 89 The Court must demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect those cherished rights and principles embodied in the Constitution. THIASE

In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may be limited, the Constitution makes no distinction as to the kind of legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social legislation or otherwise. The reason is simple and goes back to the earlier point. The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the executive branches, since its duty is not to review their collective wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have acted in consonance with their respective authorities and rights as mandated of them by the Constitution. If after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under review. 90 This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which expressly provides:

Section 1.The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. [Emphases supplied] AEDCHc

As far back as Taada v. Angara, 91 the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials, as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. This ruling was later on applied in Macalintal v. COMELEC, 92 Aldaba v. COMELEC, 93 Magallona v. Ermita, 94 and countless others. In Taada, the Court wrote: SEcAIC

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld." Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide. [Emphasis supplied]

In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them. To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation or instrument of intervention of the judiciary in that balancing operation." 95

Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just any and every claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz.: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case. 96 IcDHaT

Actual Case or Controversy

Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subject petitions do not present any actual case or controversy because the RH Law has yet to be implemented. 97 They claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one has been charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by its operation. 98 In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH Law is premature.

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. 99 The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising