CASES SA SUCCESSION

EXTRINSIC VALIDITYGarcia v. La Cuesta, et.al., L-4607, November 29, 1961Yap Tua v. Yap KaKuan, 27 Phil. 579 (1914)Abangan v. Abangan, 40 Phil. 476 (1919)Lopez v. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429 (1948)Garcia v. Lacuesta v. 90 Phil. 489 (1951)Taboada v. Rosal, G.R. No. L-36033, November 5, 1982Nera v. Rimando, 18 Phil. 450 (1911)SUBSTANTIVE OR INTRINSIC VALIDITYLlorente v. CA, G.R. No. L-124371, November 23, 2000Bellis v. Bellis, 20 SCRA 358Cayetano v. Leonidas, 129 SCRA 522JOINT WILLSAlsua-Betta v. CA, G.R. No.L-4643031, July 30, 1979

WITNESSES TO WILLSGonzales v. CA, No.L-37453, May 25, 1979

REVOCATION OF WILLS AND TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONSTestate Estate of Adriana Maloto v. CA, G.R. No. 76464, February 29, 1988Gan v. Yap G.R. L-12190, August 30, 1958Rodelas v. Aranza, G.R. No.L-58509, December 7, 1982Gago v. Mamuyac, 49 Phil. 902 (1927)

ALLOWANCE AND DISALLOWANCE OF WILLSLopez v. Gonzaga, et.al., L-18788, January 31, 1964Caniza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.110427, February 24, 1997Sps. Pascual v. CA, G.R. No.115925, August 15, 2003Pastor v. Court of appeals, G.R. No.56340, June 24, 1983Re-Testate of Suntay, L-3080, November 5, 1964Ngo the Hua v. Chung Kiat Kung, L-17091, September 30, 1963Heirs of Lasam v. Umengan, G.R. No.168156, December 6, 2006Seangio v. Reyes, G.R. Nos. 1403371-72, November 27, 2006Guevarra v. Guevarra, 74 Phil. 479Maloles II. V. Philips, G.R. Nos. 129-505 & 133359, January 31, 2000

GROUNDS FOR DISALLOWANCE OF WILLSSps. Ajero v. CA, G.R. No.106720, September 15, 1994

INSTITUTION OF HEIRAustria v. Reyes, G.R. No. L-23079, February 27, 1970JLT Agro, Inc. v. Balansang, G.R. No. 141882, March 11, 2005Nuguid v. Nuguid, G.R. No. 23445, June 23, 1966

SECOND DIVISION[G.R. No. 129505. January 31, 2000]OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II,petitioner, vs. PACITA DE LOS REYES PHILLIPS,respondent.[G.R. No. 133359. January 31, 2000]OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II,petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FERNANDO V. GOROSPE, JR., in his Official Capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC-Makati, Branch 61, and PACITA PHILLIPS as the alleged executrix of the alleged will of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos,respondents.D E C I S I O NMENDOZA,J.:These are petitions for review oncertiorariof the decisions of the Thirteenth and the Special Eighth Divisions of the Court of Appeals which ruled that petitioner has no right to intervene in the settlement of the estate of Dr. Arturo de Santos. The cases were consolidated considering that they involve the same parties and some of the issues raised are the same.

The facts which gave rise to these two petitions are as follows:

On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati City, filed a petition for probate of his will[1]in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-4223. In his petition, Dr. De Santos alleged that he had no compulsory heirs; that he had named in his will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that he disposed by his will his properties with an approximate value of not less than P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will were in the custody of the named executrix, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips. A copy of the will[2]was annexed to the petition for probate.

On February 16, 1996, Judge Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of RTC-Makati, Branch 61 issued an order granting the petition and allowing the will. The order reads:

On 03 August 1995, the Court issued an Order setting the hearing of the petition on 12 September 1995, at 8:30 oclock in the morning, copies of which were served to Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc. and Ms. Pacita de los Reyes Phillips (Officers Return, dated 04 September 1995 attached to the records). When the case was called for hearing on the date set, no oppositor appeared nor any written opposition was ever filed and on motion of petitioner, he was allowed to adduce his evidence in support of the petition.

Petitioner personally appeared before this Court and was placed on the witness stand and was directly examined by the Court through "free wheeling" questions and answers to give this Court a basis to determine the state of mind of the petitioner when he executed the subject will. After the examination, the Court is convinced that petitioner is of sound and disposing mind and not acting on duress, menace and undue influence or fraud, and that petitioner signed his Last Will and Testament on his own free and voluntary will and that he was neither forced nor influenced by any other person in signing it.Furthermore, it appears from the petition and the evidence adduced that petitioner in his lifetime, executed his Last Will and Testament (Exhs. "A", "A-1", "A-2", "A-4", "A-5") at his residence situated at 9 Bauhinia corner Intsia Streets, Forbes Park, Makati City; said Last Will and Testament was signed in the presence of his three (3) witnesses, namely, to wit: Dr. Elpidio Valencia (Exhs. "A-6", "A-7", "A-8", "A-16", "A-16-A"), Atty. Edward J. Berenguer (Exhs. "A-3", "A-3-A", "A-9", "A-10", & "A-11"), and Atty. Victoria C. delos Reyes (Exhs. "A-12", "A-13", "A-14", "A-17", & "A-18"), who in turn, in the presence of the testator and in the presence of each and all of the witnesses signed the said Last Will and Testament and duly notarized before Notary Public Anna Melissa L. Rosario (Exh. "A-15"); on the actual execution of the Last Will and Testament, pictures were taken (Exhs. "B" to "B-3").

Petitioner has no compulsory heirs and Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc., with address at No. 9 Bauhinia corner Intsia Streets, Forbes Park, Makati City has been named as sole legatee and devisee of petitioners properties, real and personal, approximately valued at not less than P2 million, Ms. Pacita de los Reyes Phillips was designated as executor and to serve as such without a bond.

From the foregoing facts, the Court finds that the petitioner has substantially established the material allegations contained in his petition. The Last Will and Testament having been executed and attested as required by law; that testator at the time of the execution of the will was of sane mind and/or not mentally incapable to make a Will; nor was it executed under duress or under the influence of fear or threats; that it was in writing and executed in the language known and understood by the testator duly subscribed thereof and attested and subscribed by three (3) credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of another; that the testator and all the attesting witnesses signed the Last Will and Testament freely and voluntarily and that the testator has intended that the instrument should be his Will at the time of affixing his signature thereto.

WHEREFORE, as prayed for by the petitioner (testator himself) the petition for the allowance of the Last Will and Testament of Arturo de Santos is hereby APPROVED and ALLOWED.

Shortly after the probate of his will, Dr. De Santos died on February 26, 1996.

On April 3, 1996, petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for intervention claiming that, as the only child of Alicia de Santos (testators sister) and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos. He likewise alleged that he was a creditor of the testator. Petitioner thus prayed for the reconsideration of the order allowing the will and the issuance of letters of administration in his name.On the other hand, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips, the designated executrix of the will, filed a motion for the issuance of letters testamentary with Branch 61. Later, however, private respondent moved to withdraw her motion. This was granted, while petitioner was required to file a memorandum of authorities in support of his claim that said court (Branch 61) still had jurisdiction to allow his intervention.[3]Petitioner filed his memorandum of authorities on May 13, 1996. On the other hand, private respondent, who earlier withdrew her motion for the issuance of letters testamentary in Branch 61, refiled a petition for the same purpose with the Regional Trial Court, Makati, which was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 and assigned to Branch 65.

Upon private respondents motion, Judge Salvador Abad Santos of Branch 65 issued an order, dated June 28, 1996, appointing her as special administrator of Dr. De Santoss estate.

On July 29, 1996, petitioner sought to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 and to set aside the appointment of private respondent as special administrator. He reiterated that he was the sole and full blooded nephew and nearest of kin of the testator; that he came to know of the existence of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 only by accident; that the probate proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. M-4223 before Branch 61 of the same court was still pending; that private respondent misdeclared the true worth of the testators estate; that private respondent was not fit to be the special administrator of the estate; and that petitioner should be given letters of administration for the estate of Dr. De Santos.

On August 28, 1996, Judge Abad Santos ordered the transfer of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 to Branch 61, on the ground that "[it] is related to the case before Judge Gorospe of RTC Branch 61 . . ."

It appears, however, that in Sp. Proc. No. M-4223, Judge Gorospe had denied on August 26, 1996 petitioners motion for intervention. Petitioner brought this matter to the Court of Appeals which, in a decision[4]promulgated on February 13, 1998, upheld the denial of petitioners motion for intervention.

Meanwhile, Judge Gorospe issued an order, dated September 4, 1996, returning the records of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 to Branch 65 on the ground that there was a pending case involving the Estate of Decedent Arturo de Santos pending before said court. The order reads:Acting on the ORDER dated 28 August 1996 of Branch 65, this Court, transferring this case to this Branch 61 on the ground that this case is related with a case before this Court, let this case be returned to Branch 65 with the information that there is no related case involving the ESTATE OF DECEDENT ARTURO DE SANTOS pending before this Branch.

There is, however, a case filed by ARTURO DE SANTOS, as petitioner under Rule 76 of the Rules of Court for the Allowance of his will during his lifetime docketed as SP. PROC. NO. M-4223 which was already decided on 16 February 1996 and has become final.

It is noted on records of Case No. M-4223 that after it became final, herein Petitioner Pacita de los Reyes Phillips filed a MOTION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY, which was subsequently withdrawn after this Court, during the hearing, already ruled that the motion could not be admitted as the subject matter involves a separate case under Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, and movant withdrew her motion and filed this case (No. 4343).

Octavio de Santos Maloles [II] filed a MOTION FOR INTERVENTION before Case No. M-4223 and this motion was already DENIED in the order (Branch 61) of 26 August 1996 likewise for the same grounds that the matter is for a separate case to be filed under Rule 78 of the Rules of Court and cannot be included in this case filed under Rule 76 of the Rules of Court.

It is further noted that it is a matter of policy that consolidation of cases must be approved by the Presiding Judges of the affected Branches.

Initially, in his decision dated September 23, 1996,[5]Judge Abad Santos appeared firm in his position that " . . . it would be improper for (Branch 65) to hear and resolve the petition (Sp. Proc. No. M-4343)," considering that the probate proceedings were commenced with Branch 61. He thus ordered the transfer of the records back to the latter branch. However, he later recalled his decision and took cognizance of the case "to expedite the proceedings." Thus, in his Order, dated October 21, 1996, he stated:

Considering the refusal of the Hon. Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of Branch 61 to continue hearing this case notwithstanding the fact that said branch began the probate proceedings of the estate of the deceased and must therefore continue to exercise its jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others, until the entire estate of the testator had been partitioned and distributed as per Order dated 23 September 1996, this branch (Regional Trial Court Branch 65) shall take cognizance of the petition if only to expedite the proceedings, and under the concept that the Regional Trial Court of Makati City is but one court.Furnish a copy of this order to the Office of the Chief justice and the Office of the Court Administrator, of the Supreme Court; the Hon. Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr.; Pacita De Los Reyes Phillips, Petitioner; and Octavio de Santos Maloles, Intervenor.

On November 4, 1996, Judge Abad Santos granted petitioners motion for intervention. Private respondent moved for a reconsideration but her motion was denied by the trial court. She then filed a petition forcertiorariin the Court of Appeals which, on February 26, 1997, rendered a decision[6]setting aside the trial courts order on the ground that petitioner had not shown any right or interest to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. M-4343.

Hence, these petitions which raise the following issues:

1.Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court - Makati, Branch 61 has lost jurisdiction to proceed with the probate proceedings upon its issuance of an order allowing the will of Dr. Arturo de Santos

2.Whether or not the Honorable (Regional Trial Court - Makati, Branch 65) acquired jurisdiction over the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by (private) respondent.

3.Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos, has a right to intervene and oppose the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by the respondent.

4.Whether or not (private) respondent is guilty of forum shopping in filing her petition for issuance of letters testamentary with the Regional Trial Court - Makati, Branch 65 knowing fully well that the probate proceedings involving the same testate estate of the decedent is still pending with the Regional Trial Court - Makati, Branch 61.First.Petitioner contends that the probate proceedings in Branch 61 of RTC-Makati did not terminate upon the issuance of the order allowing the will of Dr. De Santos. Citing the cases ofSantiesteban v. Santiesteban[7]andTagle v. Manalo,[8]he argues that the proceedings must continue until the estate is fully distributed to the lawful heirs, devisees, and legatees of the testator, pursuant to Rule 73, 1 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, petitioner contends that Branch 65 could not lawfully act upon private respondents petition for issuance of letters testamentary.

The contention has no merit.

In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of the court is limited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will,i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.[9]Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the death of the testator, so much so that, after approving and allowing the will, the court proceeds to issue letters testamentary and settle the estate of the testator. The cases cited by petitioner are of such nature. In fact, in most jurisdictions, courts cannot entertain a petition for probate of the will of a living testator under the principle of ambulatory nature of wills.[10]However, Art. 838 of the Civil Code authorizes the filing of a petition for probate of the will filed by the testator himself. It provides:

Civil Code, Art. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.

The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court having jurisdiction for the allowance of his will. In such case, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court for the allowance of wills after the testators death shall govern.The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules of Court as may be necessary for the allowance of wills on petition of the testator.

Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during the lifetime of the testator or after his death, shall be conclusive as to its due execution.

Rule 76, 1 likewise provides:

Sec. 1Who may petition for the allowance of will. - Any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.

The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition in the court for the allowance of his will.

The rationale for allowing the probate of wills during the lifetime of testator has been explained by the Code Commission thus:

Most of the cases that reach the courts involve either the testamentary capacity of the testator or the formalities adopted in the execution of wills. There are relatively few cases concerning the intrinsic validity of testamentary dispositions. It is far easier for the courts to determine the mental condition of a testator during his lifetime than after his death. Fraud, intimidation and undue influence are minimized. Furthermore, if a will does not comply with the requirements prescribed by law, the same may be corrected at once. The probate during the testators life, therefore, will lessen the number of contest upon wills. Once a will is probated during the lifetime of the testator, the only questions that may remain for the courts to decide after the testators death will refer to the intrinsic validity of the testamentary dispositions. It is possible, of course, that even when the testator himself asks for the allowance of the will, he may be acting under duress or undue influence, but these are rare cases.

After a will has been probated during the lifetime of the testator, it does not necessarily mean that he cannot alter or revoke the same before his death. Should he make a new will, it would also be allowable on his petition, and if he should die before he has had a chance to present such petition, the ordinary probate proceeding after the testators death would be in order.[11]Thus, after the allowance of the will of Dr. De Santos on February 16, 1996, there was nothing else for Branch 61 to do except to issue a certificate of allowance of the will pursuant to Rule 73, 12 of the Rules of Court. There is, therefore, no basis for the ruling of Judge Abad Santos of Branch 65 of RTC-Makati that -Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati having begun the probate proceedings of the estate of the deceased, it continues and shall continue to exercise said jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others. It should be noted that probate proceedings do not cease upon the allowance or disallowance of a will but continues up to such time that the entire estate of the testator had been partitioned and distributed.

The fact that the will was allowed during the lifetime of the testator meant merely that the partition and distribution of the estate was to be suspended until the latters death. In other words, the petitioner, instead of filing a new petition for the issuance of letters testamentary, should have simply filed a manifestation for the same purpose in the probate court.[12]Petitioner, who defends the order of Branch 65 allowing him to intervene, cites Rule 73, 1 which states:

Where estate of deceased persons settled.- If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.

The above rule, however, actually provides for the venue of actions for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons. InGarcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, it was held:[13]The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the state," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes." It could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing, jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The power or authority of the court over the subject matter "existed was fixed before procedure in a given cause began." That power or authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the manner in which the power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are cases though that if the power is not exercised conformably with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the parties.Indeed, the jurisdiction over probate proceedings and settlement of estates with approximate value of over P100,000.00 (outside Metro Manila) or P200,000.00 (in Metro Manila) belongs to the regional trial courts under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. The different branches comprising each court in one judicial region do not possess jurisdictions independent of and incompatible with each other.[14]It is noteworthy that, although Rule 73, 1 applies insofar as the venue of the petition for probate of the will of Dr. De Santos is concerned, it does not bar other branches of the same court from taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the testator after his death. As held in the leading case ofBacalso v. Ramolote:[15]The various branches of the Court of First Instance of Cebu under the Fourteenth Judicial District, are a coordinate and co-equal courts, and the totality of which is only one Court of First Instance. The jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the judges. And when a case is filed in one branch, jurisdiction over the case does not attach to the branch or judge alone, to the exclusion of the other branches. Trial may be held or proceedings continue by and before another branch or judge. It is for this reason that Section 57 of the Judiciary Act expressly grants to the Secretary of Justice, the administrative right or power to apportion the cases among the different branches, both for the convenience of the parties and for the coordination of the work by the different branches of the same court. The apportionment and distribution of cases does not involve a grant or limitation of jurisdiction, the jurisdiction attaches and continues to be vested in the Court of First Instance of the province, and the trials may be held by any branch or judge of the court.

Necessarily, therefore, Branch 65 of the RTC of Makati City has jurisdiction over Sp. Proc. No. M-4343.

Second. Petitioner claims the right to intervene in and oppose the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by private respondent. He argues that, as the nearest next of kin and creditor of the testator, his interest in the matter is material and direct. In ruling that petitioner has no right to intervene in the proceedings before Branch 65 of RTC-Makati City, the Court of Appeals held:

The private respondent herein is not an heir or legatee under the will of the decedent Arturo de Santos. Neither is he a compulsory heir of the latter. As the only and nearest collateral relative of the decedent, he can inherit from the latter only in case of intestacy. Since the decedent has left a will which has already been probated and disposes of all his properties the private respondent can inherit only if the said will is annulled. His interest in the decedents estate is, therefore, not direct or immediate.His claim to being a creditor of the estate is a belated one, having been raised for the first time only in his reply to the opposition to his motion to intervene, and, as far as the records show, not supported by evidence.

. . . . [T]he opposition must come from one with a direct interest in the estate or the will, and the private respondent has none. Moreover, the ground cited in the private respondents opposition, that the petitioner has deliberately misdeclared the truth worth and value of the estate, is not relevant to the question of her competency to act as executor. Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court requires only an allegation of the probable value and character of the property of the estate. The true value can be determined later on in the course of the settlement of the estate.[16]Rule 79, 1 provides:

Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary. Simultaneous petition for administration. - Any person interested in a will may state in writing the grounds why letters testamentary should not issue to the persons named therein as executors, or any of them, and the court, after hearing upon notice, shall pass upon the sufficiency of such grounds. A petition may, at the same time, be filed for letters of administration with the will annexed.

Under this provision, it has been held that an "interested person" is one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor, and whose interest is material and direct, not merely incidental or contingent.[17]Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be considered an "heir" of the testator. It is a fundamental rule of testamentary succession that one who has no compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his entire estate by will. Thus, Art. 842 of the Civil Code provides:

One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitimate of said heirs.

Compulsory heirs are limited to the testators -

(1)Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;

(2)In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and descendants;

(3)The widow or widower;

(4)Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.[18]Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have been preterited in the testators will.

Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement proceedings based on his allegation that he is a creditor of the deceased. Since the testator instituted or named an executor in his will, it is incumbent upon the Court to respect the desires of the testator. As we stated inOzaeta v. Pecson:[19]The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary concomitant of his right to dispose of his property in the manner he wishes. It is natural that the testator should desire to appoint one of his confidence, one who can be trusted to carry out his wishes in the disposal of his estate. The curtailment of this right may be considered a curtailment of the right to dispose.

Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to give bond may the court appoint other persons to administer the estate.[20]None of these circumstances is present in this case.

Third.Petitioner contends that private respondent is guilty of forum shopping when she filed the petition for issuance of letters testamentary (Sp. Proc. No. M-4343) while the probate proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. M-4223) were still pending. According to petitioner, there is identity of parties, rights asserted, and reliefs prayed for in the two actions which are founded on the same facts, and a judgment in either will result inres judicatain the other.

This contention has no merit. As stated earlier, the petition for probate was filed by Dr. De Santos, the testator, solely for the purpose of authenticating his will. Upon the allowance of his will, the proceedings were terminated.On the other hand, the petition for issuance of letters testamentary was filed by private respondent, as executor of the estate of Dr. De Santos, for the purpose of securing authority from the Court to administer the estate and put into effect the will of the testator. The estate settlement proceedings commenced by the filing of the petition terminates upon the distribution and delivery of the legacies and devises to the persons named in the will. Clearly, there is no identity between the two petitions, nor was the latter filed during the pendency of the former. There was, consequently, no forum shopping.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decisions of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena,andDe Leon, Jr., JJ.,concur.

[1]G.R. No. 129505,Rollo, pp. 107-109.

[2]Id., at 110-111.

[3]RTC order, dated April 26, 1996. G.R. No. 133359,Rollo, pp. 54-55.

[4]Per Justice Rodrigo V.Cosico and concurred in by Justices Delilah Vidalon-Magtolis (Acting Chairman) and Artemio G. Tuquero. This is the subject of G.R. No. 133359.

[5]G.R No. 129505,Rollo, p. 83.

[6]Per Justice Hector L. Hofilea and concurred in by Justices Jainal D. Rasul (Chairman) and Artemio G. Tuquero. This is the subject of G.R. No. 129505.

[7]68 Phil. 367 (1939).

[8]105 Phil. 1123 (1959).

[9]Pastor, Jr.v.Court of Appeals, 207 Phil. 758 (1983); Montaanov.Suesa, 14 Phil. 676 (1909).

[10]79 Am Jur 2d, Wills, 851: It seems clear that in the absence of statute expressly conferring such jurisdiction, a court does not have the power to entertain a suit for the establishment or annulment of the will of a living testator. The ambulatory nature of a will, and the absence of parties in interest, which results from the rule that a living person has neither heirs nor legatees, render impossible the assumption that a court has inherent power to determine the validity of a will prior to the death of the maker. It has been held that a statute providing for the probate of a will before the death of the testator, leaving him at liberty to alter or revoke it, or to escape the effect of any action under it by removal from the jurisdiction, is alleged and void on the ground that such a proceeding is not within the judicial power.

[11]Report of The Code Commission, pp. 53-54, quoted in 3 A. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines 149 (1992).

[12]G.R. No. 129505,Rollo, p. 83.

[13]74 SCRA 189, 198 (1976).

[14]Ellav.Salonga, 146 Phil. 91 (1970).

[15]128 Phil. 559, 564-565 (1967).

[16]G.R. No. 129505,Rollo, pp. 38-39.

[17]Teoticov.Del Val Chan, 121 Phil. 392 (1965).

[18]Civil Code, Art. 887.

[19]93 Phil. 416, 420 (1953).

[20]Rules of Court, Rule 78, 6.

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994

SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO,petitioners,vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND,respondents.

Miguel D. Larida for petitioners.

Montilla Law Office for private respondent.

PUNO,J.:This is an appeal bycertiorarifrom the Decision of the Court ofAppeals1in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads;PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision of November 19, 1988 of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the petition for probate is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.

The earlier Decision was rendered by the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 94,2in Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, and the instrument submitted for probate is the holographic will of the late Annie Sand, who died on November 25, 1982.In the will, decedent named as devisees, the following: petitioners Roberto and Thelma Ajero, private respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam S. Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa S. Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr., and their children.

On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, for allowance of decedent's holographic will. They alleged that at the time of its execution, she was of sound and disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence, and was in every respect capacitated to dispose of her estate by will.

Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue influence. The petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the disposition in the will of a house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner.

Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court admitted the decedent's holographic will to probate. It found,inter alia:

Considering then that the probate proceedings herein must decide only the question of identity of the will, its due execution and the testamentary capacity of the testatrix, this probate court finds no reason at all for the disallowance of the will for its failure to comply with the formalities prescribed by law nor for lack of testamentary capacity of the testatrix.

For one, no evidence was presented to show that the will in question is different from the will actually executed by the testatrix. The only objections raised by the oppositors . . . are that the will was not written in the handwriting of the testatrix which properly refers to the question of its due execution, and not to the question of identity of will. No other will was alleged to have been executed by the testatrix other than the will herein presented. Hence, in the light of the evidence adduced, the identity of the will presented for probate must be accepted,i.e., the will submitted in Court must be deemed to be the will actually executed by the testatrix.

xxx xxx xxx

While the fact that it was entirely written, dated and signed in the handwriting of the testatrix has been disputed, the petitioners, however, have satisfactorily shown in Court that the holographic will in question was indeed written entirely, dated and signed in the handwriting of the testatrix. Three (3) witnesses who have convincingly shown knowledge of the handwriting of the testatrix have been presented and have explicitly and categorically identified the handwriting with which the holographic will in question was written to be the genuine handwriting and signature of the testatrix. Given then the aforesaid evidence, the requirement of the law that the holographic will be entirely written, dated and signed in the handwriting of the testatrix has been complied with.

xxx xxx xxx

As to the question of the testamentary capacity of the testratix, (private respondent) Clemente Sand himself has testified in Court that the testatrix was completely in her sound mind when he visited her during her birthday celebration in 1981, at or around which time the holographic will in question was executed by the testatrix. To be of sound mind, it is sufficient that the testatrix, at the time of making the will, knew thevalueof the estate to be disposed of, the properobjectof her bounty, and thecharacterof the testamentary act . . . The will itself shows that the testatrix even had detailed knowledge of the nature of her estate. She even identified the lot number and square meters of the lots she had conveyed by will. The objects of her bounty were likewise identified explicitly. And considering that she had even written a nursing book which contained the law and jurisprudence on will and succession, there is more than sufficient showing that she knows the character of the testamentary act.

In this wise, the question of identity of the will, its due execution and the testamentary capacity of the testatrix has to be resolved in favor of the allowance of probate of the will submitted herein.

Likewise, no evidence was presented to show sufficient reason for the disallowance of herein holographic will. While it was alleged that the said will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary or of some other person, the evidence adduced have not shown any instance where improper pressure or influence was exerted on the testatrix. (Private respondent) Clemente Sand has testified that the testatrix was still alert at the time of the execution of the will,i.e., at or around the time of her birth anniversary celebration in 1981. It was also established that she is a very intelligent person and has a mind of her own. Her independence of character and to some extent, her sense of superiority, which has been testified to in Court, all show the unlikelihood of her being unduly influenced or improperly pressured to make the aforesaid will. It must be noted that the undue influence or improper pressure in question herein only refer to the making of a will and not as to the specific testamentary provisions therein which is the proper subject of another proceeding. Hence, under the circumstances, this Court cannot find convincing reason for the disallowance of the will herein.

Considering then that it is a well-established doctrine in the law on succession that in case of doubt, testate succession should be preferred over intestate succession, and the fact that no convincing grounds were presented and proven for the disallowance of the holographic will of the late Annie Sand, the aforesaid will submitted herein must be admitted to probate.3(Citations omitted.)On appeal, said Decision was reversed, and the petition for probate of decedent's will was dismissed. The Court of Appeals found that, "the holographic will fails to meet the requirements for its validity."4It held that the decedent did not comply with Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code, which read, as follows:Art. 813: When a number of dispositions appearing in a holographic will are signed without being dated, and the last disposition has a signature and date, such date validates the dispositions preceding it, whatever be the time of prior dispositions.

Art. 814: In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will, the testator must authenticate the same by his full signature.

It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and undated, or signed but not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made thereon had not been authenticated by decedent.

Thus, this appeal which is impressed with merit.

Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:

(a) If not executed and attested as required by law;

(b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will, at the time of its execution;

(c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;

(d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary, or of some other person for his benefit;

(e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not intend that the instrument should be his will at the time of fixing his signature thereto.

In the same vein, Article 839 of the New Civil Code reads:

Art. 839: The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases;

(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;

(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the time of its execution;

(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;

(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary or of some other person;

(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;

(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto.

These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will.5Thus, in a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's last will and testament; (2) whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent.6In the case at bench, respondent court held that the holographic will of Anne Sand was not executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. It held that Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code,ante, were not complied with, hence, it disallowed the probate of said will. This is erroneous.

We reiterate what we held inAbangan vs.Abangan, 40 Phil. 476, 479 (1919),that:

The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded.

For purposes of probating non-holographic wills, these formal solemnities include the subscription, attestation, and acknowledgment requirements under Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code.

In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself,7as provided under Article 810 of the New Civil Code, thus:A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself.It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed. (Emphasis supplied.)

Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator.

A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositionscannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.

Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814. In the case ofKalaw vs.Relova132 SCRA 237 242(1984), this Court held:

Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will have not been noted under his signature, . . . the Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined. Manresa gave an identical commentary when he said "la omission de la salvedad no anula el testamento, segun la regla de jurisprudencia establecida en la sentencia de 4 de Abril de 1985."8(Citations omitted.)Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on testator's signature,9their presence does not invalidate the will itself.10The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes.It is also proper to note that the requirements of authentication of changes and signing and dating of dispositions appear in provisions (Articles 813 and 814) separate from that which provides for the necessary conditions for the validity of the holographic will (Article 810). The distinction can be traced to Articles 678 and 688 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which the present provisions covering holographic wills are taken. They read as follows:

Art. 678: A will is called holographic when the testator writes it himself in the form and with the requisites required in Article 688.

Art. 688: Holographic wills may be executed only by persons of full age.

In order that the will be valid it must be drawn on stamped paper corresponding to the year of its execution, written in its entirety by the testator and signed by him, and must contain a statement of the year, month and day of its execution.

If it should contain any erased, corrected, or interlined words, the testator must identify them over his signature.

Foreigners may execute holographic wills in their own language.

This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that only the requirements of Article 810 of the New Civil Code and not those found in Articles 813 and 814 of the same Code are essential to the probate of a holographic will.

The Court of Appeals further held that decedent Annie Sand could not validly dispose of the house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, in its entirety. This is correct and must be affirmed.

As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. However, in exceptional instances, courts are not powerless to do what the situation constrains them to do, and pass upon certain provisions of the will.11In the case at bench, decedent herself indubitably stated in her holographic will that the Cabadbaran property is in the name of her late father, John H. Sand (which led oppositor Dr. Jose Ajero to question her conveyance of the same in its entirety). Thus, as correctly held by respondent court, she cannot validly dispose of the whole property, which she shares with her father's other heirs.IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, except with respect to the invalidity of the disposition of the entire house and lot in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94 in Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, dated November 19, 1988, admitting to probate the holographic will of decedent Annie Sand, is hereby REINSTATED, with the above qualification as regards the Cabadbaran property. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

#Footnotes

1 Sixteenth Division, composed of Associate Justices Luis L. Victor(ponente), Ricardo J. Francisco (chairman), and Pacita Caizares-Nye.

2 Presided by Judge Filemon H. Mendoza.

3 Rollo, pp. 37-39.

4 Impugned Decision, p. 5;Rollo, p. 46.

5 Pecson vs. Coronel, 45 Phil. 216 (1923);See3 EDGARDO L. PARAS, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated (1989), pp. 145-146.

6 SeeMontanao vs. Suesa, 14 Phil. 676 (1909).

7 SeeFernando vs. Villalon, 3 Phil. 386 (1904).

8 SeeVelasco vs. Lopez, 1 Phil. 720, 725 (1903),citinga Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, dated April 4, 1895;See also, 3 MANRESA, Commentarios al Codigo Espaol (Quinta ed.), p. 483;See further, 3 ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, Commentaries & Jurisprudence on the Civil Code (1973), p. 107,citingCastan 341, 5 Valverde 82; 3 AMBROSIO PADILLA, Civil Code Annotated (1987),pp. 157-158; 2 RAMON C. AQUINO and CAROLINA C. GRIO-AQUINO (1990), p. 42.

9 3 PARAS,op.cit.

10 It must be noted, however, that inKalaw, this Court laid down an exception to the general rule, when it invalidated the entire will because of an unauthenticated erasure made by the testator. In that case, the will had only one substantial provision. This was altered by substituting the original heir with another , with such alteration being unauthenticated. This was altered by substituting the original heir with another, with such alteration being unauthenticated. This Court held that the whole will was void "for the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will after (the provision is invalidated) which could remain valid. To state that the Will as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But, that change of mind can neither be given effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full signature."

11 Nepomuceno vs. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 206 (1985);SeeNuguid vs. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449 (1966);See alsoCayetano vs. Leonidas, 129 SCRA 522 (1984).

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23079 February 27, 1970

RUBEN AUSTRIA, CONSUELO AUSTRIA-BENTA and LAURO AUSTRIA MOZO,petitioners,vs.HON. ANDRES REYES, Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, PERFECTO CRUZ, BENITA CRUZ-MENEZ ISAGANI CRUZ, ALBERTO CRUZ and LUZ CRUZ-SALONGArespondents.

Salonga, Ordoez, Yap, Sicat and Associates for petitioners.

Ruben Austria for himself and co-petitioners.

De los Santos, De los Santos and De los Santos for respondent Perfecto Cruz.

Villareal, Almacen, Navarra and Amores for other respondents.

CASTRO,J.:On July 7, 1956 Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Special Proceedings 2457) a petition for probate,ante mortem, of her last will and testament. The probate was opposed by the present petitioners Ruben Austria, Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Austria Mozo, and still others who, like the petitioner, are nephews and nieces of Basilia. This opposition was, however, dismissed and the probate of the will allowed after due hearing.

The bulk of the estate of Basilia, admittedly, was destined under the will to pass on to the respondents Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz, and Luz Cruz-Salonga, all of whom had been assumed and declared by Basilia as her own legally adopted children.

On April 23, 1959, more than two years after her will was allowed to probate, Basilia died. The respondent Perfecto Cruz was appointed executor without bond by the same court in accordance with the provisions of the decedent's will, notwithstanding the blocking attempt pursued by the petitioner Ruben Austria.

Finally, on November 5, 1959, the present petitioners filed in the same proceedings a petition in intervention for partition alleging in substance that they are the nearest of kin of Basilia, and that the five respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., had not in fact been adopted by the decedent in accordance with law, in effect rendering these respondents mere strangers to the decedent and without any right to succeed as heirs.

Notwithstanding opposition by the respondent Perfecto Cruz, as executor of the estate, the courta quoallowed the petitioners' intervention by its order of December 22, 1959, couched in broad terms, as follows: "The Petition in Intervention for Partition filed by the above-named oppositors [Ruben Austria, et al.,] dated November 5, 1959 is hereby granted."

In the meantime, the contending sides debated the matter of authenticity or lack of it of the several adoption papers produced and presented by the respondents. On motion of the petitioners Ruben Austria, et al., these documents were referred to the National Bureau of Investigation for examination and advice. N.B.I. report seems to bear out the genuineness of the documents, but the petitioners, evidently dissatisfied with the results, managed to obtain a preliminary opinion from a Constabulary questioned-document examiner whose views undermine the authenticity of the said documents. The petitioners Ruben Austria, et al., thus moved the lower court to refer the adoption papers to the Philippine Constabulary for further study. The petitioners likewise located former personnel of the court which appeared to have granted the questioned adoption, and obtained written depositions from two of them denying any knowledge of the pertinent adoption proceedings.

On February 6, 1963, more than three years after they were allowed to intervene, the petitioners Ruben Austria, let al., moved the lower court to set for hearing the matter of the genuineness of the adoption of the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., by the late Basilia. Before the date set by the court for hearing arrived, however, the respondent Benita Cruz-Meez who entered an appearance separately from that of her brother Perfecto Cruz, filed on February 28, 1963 a motion asking the lower court, by way of alternative relief, to confine the petitioners' intervention, should it be permitted, to properties not disposed of in the will of the decedent.

On March 4, 1963, the lower court heard the respondent Benita's motion. Both sides subsequently submitted their respective memoranda, and finally, the lower court issued an order on June 4, 1963, delimiting the petitioners' intervention to the properties of the deceased which were not disposed of in the will.

The petitioners moved the lower court to reconsider this latest order, eliciting thereby an opposition, from the respondents. On October 25, 1963 the same court denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

A second motion for reconsideration which set off a long exchange of memoranda from both sides, was summarily denied on April 21, 1964.

Hence this petition forcertiorari, praying this Court to annul the orders of June 4 and October 25, 1963 and the order of April 21, 1964, all restricting petitioners' intervention to properties that were not included in the decedent's testamentary dispositions.

The uncontested premises are clear. Two interests are locked in dispute over the bulk of the estate of the deceased. Arrayed on one side are the petitioners Ruben Austria, Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Austria Mozo, three of a number of nephews and nieces who are concededly the nearest surviving blood relatives of the decedent. On the other side are the respondents brothers and sisters, Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz and Luz Cruz-Salonga, all of whom heirs in the will of the deceased Basilia, and all of whom claim kinship with the decedent by virtue of legal adoption. At the heart of the controversy is Basilia's last will immaculate in its extrinsic validity since it bears the imprimatur of duly conducted probate proceedings.

The complaint in intervention filed in the lower court assails the legality of the tie which the respondent Perfecto Cruz and his brothers and sisters claim to have with the decedent. The lower court had, however, assumed, by its orders in question, that the validity or invalidity of the adoption is not material nor decisive on the efficacy of the institution of heirs; for, even if the adoption in question were spurious, the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., will nevertheless succeed not as compulsory heirs but as testamentary heirs instituted in Basilia's will. This ruling apparently finds support in article, 842 of the Civil Code which reads:

One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose of by will all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.

One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs.

The lower court must have assumed that since the petitioners nephews and niece are not compulsory heirs, they do not possess that interest which can be prejudiced by a free-wheeling testamentary disposition. The petitioners' interest is confined to properties, if any, that have not been disposed of in the will, for to that extent intestate succession can take place and the question of the veracity of the adoption acquires relevance.

The petitioners nephews and niece, upon the other hand, insist that the entire estate should descend to them by intestacy by reason of the intrinsic nullity of the institution of heirs embodied in the decedent's will. They have thus raised squarely the issue of whether or not such institution of heirs would retain efficacy in the event there exists proof that the adoption of the same heirs by the decedent is false.

The petitioners cite, as the controlling rule, article 850 of the Civil Code which reads:

The statement of a false cause for the institution of an heir shall be considered as not written, unless it appears from the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of such cause.

Coming closer to the center of the controversy, the petitioners have called the attention of the lower court and this Court to the following pertinent portions of the will of the deceased which recite:

III

Ang aking mga sapilitang tagapagmana (herederos forzosos) ay ang aking itinuturing na mga anak na tunay (Hijos legalmente adoptados) na sina Perfecto, Alberto, Luz, Benita at Isagani, na pawang may apelyidong Cruz.

xxx xxx xxx

Kung ako ay bawian ng Dios ng buhay, ay aking ipinamamana ang aking mga ari-ariang maiiwan, sa kaparaanang sumusunod:

A.Aking ipinamamana sa aking nabanggit na limang anak na sina Perfecto, Alberto, Luz, Benita at Isagani, na pawang may apelyidong Cruz, na parepareho ang kaparti ng bawa't isa at walang lamangan (en partes iguales), bilang kanilang sapilitang mana (legiti[ma]), ang kalahati () ng aking kaparti sa lahat ng aming ari-ariang gananciales ng aking yumaong asawang Pedro Cruz na napapaloob sa Actuacion Especial No. 640 ng Hukumang Unang Dulugan ng Rizal at itinutukoy sa No. 1 ng parafo IV ng testamentong ito, ang kalahati () ng mga lagay na lupa at palaisdaan na nasa Obando at Polo, Bulacan, na namana ko sa aking yumaong ama na si Calixto Austria, at ang kalahati () ng ilang lagay na lupa na nasa Tinejeros, Malabon, Rizal, na aking namana sa yumao kong kapatid na si Fausto Austria.

The tenor of the language used, the petitioners argue, gives rise to the inference that the late Basilia was deceived into believing that she was legally bound to bequeath one-half of her entire estate to the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. as the latter's legitime. The petitioners further contend that had the deceased known the adoption to be spurious, she would not have instituted the respondents at all the basis of the institution being solely her belief that they were compulsory heirs. Proof therefore of the falsity of the adoption would cause a nullity of the institution of heirs and the opening of the estate wide to intestacy. Did the lower court then abuse its discretion or act in violation of the rights of the parties in barring the petitioners nephews and niece from registering their claim even to properties adjudicated by the decedent in her will?

Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil Code, the following requisites must concur:First, the cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the will;second, the cause must be shown to be false; andthird, it must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause.

The petitioners would have us imply, from the use of the terms, "sapilitang tagapagmana" (compulsory heirs) and "sapilitang mana" (legitime), that the impelling reason or cause for the institution of the respondents was the testatrix's belief that under the law she could not do otherwise. If this were indeed what prompted the testatrix in instituting the respondents, she did not make it known in her will. Surely if she was aware that succession to the legitime takes place by operation of law, independent of her own wishes, she would not have found it convenient to name her supposed compulsory heirs to their legitimes. Her express adoption of the rules on legitimes should very well indicate her complete agreement with that statutory scheme. But even this, like the petitioners' own proposition, is highly speculative of what was in the mind of the testatrix when she executed her will. One fact prevails, however, and it is that the decedent's will does not state in a specific or unequivocal manner the cause for such institution of heirs. We cannot annul the same on the basis of guesswork or uncertain implications.

And even if we should accept the petitioners' theory that the decedent instituted the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. solely because she believed that the law commanded her to do so, on the false assumption that her adoption of these respondents was valid, still such institution must stand.

Article 850 of the Civil Code, quoted above, is a positive injunction to ignore whatever false cause the testator may have written in his will for the institution of heirs. Such institution may be annulled only when one is satisfied, after an examination of the will, that the testator clearly would not have made the institution if he had known the cause for it to be false. Now, would the late Basilia have caused the revocation of the institution of heirs if she had known that she was mistaken in treating these heirs as her legally adopted children? Or would she have instituted them nonetheless?

The decedent's will, which alone should provide the answer, is mute on this point or at best is vague and uncertain. The phrases,"mga sapilitang tagapagmana"and"sapilitang mana,"were borrowed from the language of the law on succession and were used, respectively, to describe the class of heirs instituted and the abstract object of the inheritance. They offer no absolute indication that the decedent would have willed her estate other than the way she did if she had known that she was not bound by law to make allowance for legitimes. Her disposition of the free portion of her estate (libre disposicion) which largely favored the respondent Perfecto Cruz, the latter's children, and the children of the respondent Benita Cruz, shows a perceptible inclination on her part to give to the respondents more than what she thought the law enjoined her to give to them. Compare this with the relatively small devise of land which the decedent had left for her blood relatives, including the petitioners Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Mozo and the children of the petitioner Ruben Austria. Were we to exclude the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. from the inheritance, then the petitioners and the other nephews and nieces would succeed to the bulk of the testate by intestacy a result which would subvert the clear wishes of the decedent.

Whatever doubts one entertains in his mind should be swept away by these explicit injunctions in the Civil Code: "The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy."1Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate,2as was done in this case. Moreover, so compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the testator allowed to prevail, that we could even vary the language of the will for the purpose of giving it effect.3A probate court has found, by final judgment, that the late Basilia Austria Vda. de Cruz was possessed of testamentary capacity and her last will executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence. In this situation, it becomes our duty to give full expression to her will.4At all events, the legality of the adoption of the respondents by the testatrix can be assailed only in a separate action brought for that purpose, and cannot be the subject of a collateral attack.5To the petitioners' charge that the lower court had no power to reverse its order of December 22, 1959, suffice it to state that, as borne by the records, the subsequent orders complained of served merely to clarify the first an act which the court could legally do. Every court has the inherent power to amend and control its processes and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justices.6That the courta quohas limited the extent of the petitioners' intervention is also within its powers as articulated by the Rules of Court.7ACCORDINGLY, the present petition is denied, at petitioners cost.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Article 791.

2 53 Cal. Jur. 2d 678.

3 Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, L-28734, March 24, 1969, 27 SCRA 546, 552; Solla v. Ascueta, 49 Phil. 333, 347-348.

4 Ibid, citing Barrera v. Tampoco, 94 Phil. 346, 353.

5 See Gomez v. Concepcion, 47 Phil. 717; Ramos v. Maalac, 89 Phil. 270; Santos v. Aranzaso, L-23828, Feb. 28, 1966 16 SCRA 352.

6 Sec. 5, par. (g), Rules of Court.

7 Sec. 2, par. (b),Ibid; Seva, et al. v. Rivera, etc., 73 Phil. 477, 479-480, cited in Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 edition, Vol. I, pp. 354-355.

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SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 141882. March 11, 2005]

J.L.T. AGRO, INC., represented by its Manager, JULIAN L. TEVES,petitioner, vs.ANTONIO BALANSAG and HILARIA CADAYDAY,respondents.

D E C I S I O N

TINGA, J.:

Once again, the Court is faced with the perennial conflict of property claims between two sets of heirs, a conflict ironically made grievous by the fact that the decedent in this case had resorted to great lengths to allocate which properties should go to which set of heirs.

This is a Rule 45 petition assailing theDecision[1]dated 30 September 1999 of the Court of Appeals which reversed theDecision[2]dated 7 May 1993 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 45, of Bais City, Negros Oriental.

The factual antecedents follow.

Don Julian L. Teves (Don Julian) contracted two marriages, first with Antonia Baena (Antonia), and after her death, with Milagros Donio Teves (Milagros Donio). Don Julian had two children with Antonia, namely: Josefa Teves Escao (Josefa) and Emilio Teves (Emilio). He had also four (4) children with Milagros Donio, namely: Maria Evelyn Donio Teves (Maria Evelyn), Jose Catalino Donio Teves (Jose Catalino), Milagros Reyes Teves (Milagros Reyes) and Pedro Reyes Teves (Pedro).[3]The present controversy involves a parcel of land covering nine hundred and fifty-four (954) square meters, known as Lot No. 63 of the Bais Cadastre, which was originally registered in the name of the conjugal partnership of Don Julian and Antonia under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 5203 of the Registry of Deeds of Bais City. When Antonia died, the land was among the properties involved in an action for partition and damages docketed as Civil Case No. 3443 entitledJosefa Teves Escao v. Julian Teves, Emilio B. Teves, et al.[4]Milagros Donio, the second wife of Don Julian, participated as an intervenor. Thereafter, the parties to the case entered into aCompromise Agreement[5]which embodied the partition of all the properties of Don Julian.

On the basis of the compromise agreement and approving the same, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros Oriental, 12thJudicial District, rendered aDecision[6]dated 31 January 1964. The CFI decision declared a tract of land known as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa as property owned in common by Don Julian and his two (2) children of the first marriage. The property was to remain undivided during the lifetime of Don Julian.[7]Josefa and Emilio likewise were given other properties at Bais, including the electric plant, the movie property, the commercial areas, and the house where Don Julian was living. The remainder of the properties was retained by Don Julian, including Lot No. 63.

Paragraph 13 of theCompromise Agreement, at the heart of the present dispute, lays down the effect of the eventual death of Don Julianvis--vishis heirs:

13. That in the event of death of Julian L. Teves, the properties hereinafter adjudicated to Josefa Teves Escao and Emilio B. Teves, (excluding the properties comprised as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa together with all its accessories and accessions) shall be understood as including not only their one-half share which they inherited from their mother but also the legitimes and other successional rights which would correspond to them of the other half belonging to their father, Julian L. Teves. In other words,the properties now selected and adjudicated to Julian L. Teves (not including his share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa) shall exclusively be adjudicatedto the wife in second marriage of Julian L. Teves and his four minor children, namely, Milagros Donio Teves, his two acknowledged natural children Milagros Reyes Teves and Pedro Reyes Teves and his two legitimated children Maria Evelyn Donio Teves and Jose Catalino Donio Teves. (Emphasis supplied)

On 16 November 1972, Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed aDeed of Assignment of Assets with Assumption of Liabilities[8]in favor of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. (petitioner). Less than a year later, Don Julian, Josefa and Emilio also executed an instrument entitledSupplemental to the Deed of Assignment of Assets with the Assumption of Liabilities (Supplemental Deed)[9]dated 31 July 1973. This instrument which constitutes a supplement to the earlier deed of assignment transferred ownership over Lot No. 63, among other properties, in favor of petitioner.[10]On 14 April 1974, Don Julian died intestate.

On the strength of theSupplementalDeedin its favor, petitioner sought the registration of the subject lot in its name. A court, so it appeared, issued an order[11]cancelling OCT No. 5203 in the name of spouses Don Julian and Antonia on 12 November 1979, and on the same date TCT No. T-375 was issued in the name of petitioner.[12]Since then, petitioner has been paying taxes assessed on the subject lot.[13]Meanwhile, Milagros Donio and her children had immediately taken possession over the subject lot after the execution of theCompromise Agreement. In 1974, they entered into a yearly lease agreement with spouses Antonio Balansag and Hilaria Cadayday, respondents herein.[14]On Lot No. 63, respondents temporarily established their home and constructed a lumber yard. Subsequently, Milagros Donio and her children executed aDeed of Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate[15]dated 18 March 1980. In the deed of partition, Lot No. 63 was allotted to Milagros Donio and her two (2) children, Maria Evelyn and Jose Catalino. Unaware that the subject lot was already registered in the name of petitioner in 1979, respondents bought Lot No. 63 from Milagros Donio as evidenced by theDeed of Absolute Sale of Real Estate[16]dated 9 November 1983.

At the Register of Deeds while trying to register the deed of absolute sale, respondents discovered that the lot was already titled in the name of petitioner. Thus, they failed to register the deed.[17]Respondents, as vendees of Lot No. 63, filed a complaint before the RTC Branch 45 of Bais City, seeking the declaration of nullity and cancellation of TCT No. T-375 in the name of petitioner and the transfer of the title to Lot No. 63 in their names, plus damages.[18]After hearing, the trial court dismissed the complaint filed by respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, by preponderance of evidence, this Court finds judgment in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, and thus hereby orders:

(1) That complaint be dismissed;

(2) That plaintiffs vacate the subject land, particularly identified as Lot No. 63 registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-375;

(3) That plaintiffs pay costs.

Finding no basis on the counterclaim by defendant, the same is hereby ordered dismissed.[19]The trial court ruled that the resolution of the case specifically hinged on the interpretation of paragraph 13 of theCompromise Agreement.[20]It added that the direct adjudication of the properties listed in theCompromise Agreementwas only in favor of Don Julian and his two children by the first marriage, Josefa and Emilio.[21]Paragraph 13 served only as an amplification of the terms of the adjudication in favor of Don Julian and his two children by the first marriage.

According to the trial court, the properties adjudicated in favor of Josefa and Emilio comprised their shares in the estate of their deceased mother Antonia, as well as their potential share in the estate of Don Julian upon the latters death. Thus, upon Don Julians death, Josefa and Emilio could not claim any share in his estate, except their proper share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa which was adjudicated in favor of Don Julian in theCompromise Agreement. As such, the properties adjudicated in favor of Don Julian, except Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa, were free from the forced legitimary rights of Josefa and Emilio, and Don Julian was under no impediment to allocate the subject lot, among his other properties, to Milagros Donio and her four (4) children.[22]The trial court further stressed that with the use of the words shall be, the adjudication in favor of Milagros Donio and her four (4) children was not final and operative, as the lot was still subject to future disposition by Don Julian during his lifetime.[23]It cited paragraph 14[24]of theCompromise Agreementin support of his conclusion.[25]With Lot No. 63 being the conjugal property of Don Julian and Antonia, the trial court also declared that Milagros Donio and her children had no hereditary rights thereto except as to the conjugal share of Don Julian, which they could claim only upon the death of the latter.[26]The trial court ruled that at the time of Don Julians death on 14 April 1974, Lot No. 63 was no longer a part of his estate since he had earlier assigned it to petitioner on 31 July 1973. Consequently, the lot could not be a proper subject of extrajudicial partition by Milagros Donio and her children, and not being the owners they could not have sold it. Had respondents exercised prudence before buying the subject lot by investigating the registration of the same with the Registry of Deeds, they would have discovered that five (5) years earlier, OCT No. 5203 had already been cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-375 in the name of petitioner, the trial court added.[27]The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial courts decision. The decretal part of the appellate decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered declaring the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-375 registered in the name of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. as null and void.

With costs against defendant J.L.T. Agro, Inc. represented by its Manager, Julian L. Teves.

SO ORDERED.[28]Per the appellate court, theCompromise Agreementincorporated in CFI decision dated 31 January 1964, particularly paragraph 13 thereof, determined, adjudicated and reserved to Don Julians two sets of heirs their future legitimes in his estate except as regards his (Don Julians) share in Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa.[29]The two sets of heirs acquired full ownership and possession of the properties respectively adjudicated to them in the CFI decision and Don Julian himself could no longer dispose of the same, including Lot No. 63. The disposition in the CFI decision constitutesres judicata.[30]Don Julian could have disposed of only his conjugal share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa.[31]The appellate court likewise emphasized that nobody in his right judgment would preterit his legal heirs by simply executing a document like theSupplemental Deedwhich practically covers all properties which Don Julian had reserved in favor of his heirs from the second marriage. It also found out that the blanks reserved for the Book No. and Page No. at the upper right corner of TCT No. T-375, to identify the exact location where the said title was registered or transferred, were not filled up, thereby indicating that the TCT is spurious and of dubious origin.[32]Aggrieved by the appellate courts decision, petitioner elevated it to this Court via a petition for review oncertiorari, raising pure questions of law.

Before this Court, petitioner assigns as errors the following rulings of the appellate court, to wit: (a) that future legitime can be determined, adjudicated and reserved prior to the death of Don Julian; (b) that Don Julian had no right to dispose of or assign Lot No. 63 to petitioner because he reserved the same for his heirs from the second marriage pursuant to theCompromise Agreement; (c) that theSupplemental Deedwas tantamount to a preterition of his heirs from the second marriage; and (d) that TCT No. T-375 in the name of petitioner is spurious for not containing entries on the Book No. and Page No.[33]While most of petitioners legal arguments have merit, the application of the appropriate provisions of law to the facts borne out by the evidence on record nonetheless warrants the affirmance of the result reached by the Court of Appeals in favor of respondents.

Being the key adjudicative provision, paragraph 13 of theCompromise Agreementhas to be quoted again:

13. That in the event of death of Julian L. Teves, the properties herein adjudicated to Josefa Teves Escao and Emilio B. Teves, (excluding the properties comprised as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa together with all its accessories and accessions) shall be understood as including not only their one-half share which they inherited from their mother but also the legitimes and other successional rights which would correspond to them of the other half belonging to their father, Julian L.Teves. In other words, the properties now selected and adjudicated to Julian L. Teves (not including his share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa)shall exclusively be adjudicatedto the wife in second marriage of Julian L. Teves and his four minor children, namely, Milagros Donio Teves, his two acknowledged natural children Milagros Reyes Teves and Pedro Reyes Teves and his two legitimated children Maria Evelyn Donio Teves and Jose Catalino Donio Teves.(Emphasis supplied)

With the quoted paragraph as basis, the Court of Appeals ruled that the adjudication in favor of the heirs of Don Julian from the second marriage became automatically operative upon the approval of theCompromise Agreement, thereby vesting on them the right to validly dispose of Lot No. 63 in favor of respondents.

Petitioner argues that the appellate court erred in holding that future legitime can be determined, adjudicated and reserved prior to the death of Don Julian. The Court agrees. Our declaration inBlas v. Santos[34]is relevant, where we defined future inheritance as any property or rightnot in existence or capable of determination at the time of the contract,that a person may in the future acquire by succession. Article 1347 of the New Civil Code explicitly provides:

ART. 1347. All things which are not outside the commerce of men, including future things, may be the object of a contract. All rights which are not intransmissible may also be the object of contracts.

No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law.All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy may likewise be the object of a contract.

Well-entrenched is the rule that all things, even future ones, which are not outside the commerce of man may be the object of a contract. The exception is that no contract may be entered into with respect to future inheritance, and the exception to the exception is the partitioninter vivosreferred to in Article 1080.[35]For the inheritance to be considered future, the succession must not have been opened at the time of the contract.[36]A contract may be classified as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under the second paragraph of Article 1347, where the following requisites concur:

(1) That the succession has not yet been opened;

(2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and

(3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature.[37]The first paragraph of Article 1080, which provides the exception to the exception and therefore aligns with the general rule on future things, reads:

ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an actinter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.

. . . .

In interpreting this provision, Justice Edgardo Paras advanced the opinion that if the partition is made by an actinter vivos, no formalities are prescribed by the Article.[38]The partition will of course be effective only after death.It does not necessarily require the formalities of a will for after all it is not the partition that is the mode of acquiring ownership. Neither will the formalities of a donation be required since donation will not be the mode of acquiring the ownership here after death; since no will has been made it follows that the mode will be succession (intestate succession). Besides, the partition here is merely the physical determination of the part to be given to each heir.[39]The historical antecedent of Article 1080 of the New Civil Code is Article 1056[40]of the old Civil Code. The only change in the provision is that Article 1080 now permits anyperson(not a testator, as under the old law) to partition his estate by actinter vivos. This was intended to abrogate the then prevailing doctrine that for a testator to partition his estate by an actinter vivos, he must first make a will with all the formalities provided by law.[41]Article 1056 of the old Civil Code (now Article 1080) authorizes a testator to partitioninter vivoshis property, and distribute them among his heirs, and this partition is neither a donation nor a testament, but aninstrument of a special character, sui generis,which is revocable at any time by thecausanteduring his lifetime, and does not operate as a conveyance of title until his death. It derives its binding force on the heirs from the respect due to the will of the owner of the property, limited only by his creditors and the intangibility of the legitime of the forced heirs.[42]The partitioninter vivosof the properties of Don Julian is undoubtedly valid pursuant to Article 1347. However, considering that it would become legally operative only upon the death of Don Julian, the right of his heirs from the second marriage to the properties adjudicated to him under the compromise agreement was but a mere expectancy. It was a bare hope of succession to the property of their father. Being the prospect of a future acquisition, the interest by its nature was inchoate. It had no attribute of property, and the interest to which it related was at the time nonexistent and might never exist.[43]Evidently, at the time of the execution of the deed of assignment covering Lot No. 63 in favor of petitioner, Don Julian remained the owner of the property since ownership over the subject lot would only pass to his heirs from the second marriage at the time of his death. Thus, as the owner of the subject lot, Don Julian retained the absolute right to dispose of it during his lifetime. His right cannot be challenged by Milagros Donio and her children on the ground that it had already been adjudicated to them by virtue of the compromise agreement.

Emerging as the crucial question in this case is whether Don Julian had validly transferred ownership of the subject lot during his lifetime. The lower court ruled that he had done so through theSupplemental Deed. The appellate court disagreed, holding that theSupplemental Deedis not valid, containing as it does a prohibited preterition of Don Julians heirs from the second marriage. Petitioner contends that the ruling of the Court of Appeals is erroneous. The contention is well-founded.

Article 854 provides that the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. Manresadefines preterition as the omission of the heir in thewill, either by not naming him at all or, while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not instituting him as heir without disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him some part of the properties.[44]It is the total omission of a compulsory heir in the direct line from inheritance.[45]It consists in the silence of the testator with regard to a compulsory heir, omitting him in thetestament, either by not mentioning him at all, or by not giving him anything in the hereditary property but without expressly disinheriting him, even if he is mentioned in the will in the latter case.[46]But there is no preterition where the testator allotted to a descendant a share less than the legitime, since there was no total omission of a forced heir.[47]In the case at bar, Don Julian did not execute a will since what he resorted to was a partitioninter vivosof his properties, as evidenced by the court approvedCompromise Agreement. Thus, it is premature if not irrelevant to speak of preterition prior to the death of Don Julian in the absence of a will depriving a legal heir of his legitime. Besides, there are other properties which the heirs from the second marriage could inherit from Don Julian upon his death. A couple of provisions in theCompromise Agreementare indicative of Don Julians desire along this line.[48]Hence, the total omission from inheritance of Don Julians heirs from the second marriage, a requirement for preterition to exist, is hardly imaginable as it is unfounded.

Despite the debunking of respondents argument on preterition, still the petition would ultimately rise or fall on whether there was a valid transfer effected by Don Julian to petitioner. Notably, Don Julian was also the president and director of petitioner, and his daughter from the first marriage, Josefa, was the treasurer thereof. There is of course no legal prohibition against such a transfer to a family corporation. Yet close scrutiny is in order, especially considering that such transfer would remove Lot No. 63 from the estate from which Milagros and her children could inherit. Both the alleged transfer deed and the title which necessarily must have emanated from it have to be subjected to incisive and detailed examination.

Well-settled, of course, is the rule that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein.[49]A certificate of title accumulates in one document a precise and correct statement of