G.R. No. 6878 September 13, 1913MARCELINA EDROSO,petitioner-appellant,vs.PABLO and BASILIO SABLAN,opponents-appellees.Francisco Dominguez for appellant.Crispin Oben for appellees.ARELLANO,C.J.:The subject matter of this appeal is the registration of certain property classified as required by law to be reserved. Marcelina Edroso applied for registration and issuance of title to two parcels of land situated in the municipality of Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna, one of 1 hectare 77 ares and 63 centares, and the other 1 hectare 6 ares and 26 centares. Two applications were filed, one for each parcel, but both were heard and decided in a single judgment.Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death on September 22, 1882. In this marriage they had a son named Pedro, who was born on August 1, 1881, and who at his father's death inherited the two said parcels. Pedro also died on July 15, 1902, unmarried and without issue and by this decease the two parcels of land passed through inheritance to his mother, Marcelina Edroso. Hence the hereditary title whereupon is based the application for registration of her ownership.Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan that is, two uncles german of Pedro Sablan appeared in the case to oppose the registration, claiming one of two things: Either that the registration be denied, "or that if granted to her the right reserved by law to the opponents be recorded in the registration of each parcel." (B. of E., 11, 12.)The Court of Land Registration denied the registration and the application appealed through a bill of exceptions.Registration was denied because the trial court held that the parcels of land in question partake of the nature of property required by law to be reserved and that in such a case application could only be presented jointly in the names of the mother and the said two uncles of Pedro Sablan.The appellant impugns as erroneous the first idea advanced (second assignment of error), and denies that the land which are the subject matter of the application are required by law to be reserved a contention we regard as indefensible.Facts: (1) The applicant acquired said lands from her descendant Pedro Sablan by inheritance; (2) Pedro Sablan had acquired them from his ascendant Victoriano Sablan, likewise by inheritance; (3) Victoriano Sablan had likewise acquired them by inheritance from his ascendants, Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, they having been adjudicated to him in the partition of hereditary property had between him and his brothers. These are admitted facts.A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary title is one without a valuable consideration [gratuitous title], and it is so characterized in article 968 of the Civil Code, for he who acquires by inheritance gives nothing in return for what he receives; and a very definite conclusion of law also is that the uncles german are within the third degree of blood relationship.The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the latter acquired without a valuable consideration from another ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is under obligation to reserve what he has acquired by operation of law for the relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line whence the property proceeded. (Civil Code, art. 811.)Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him these two parcels of land which he had acquired without a valuable consideration that is, by inheritance from another ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having acquired them by operation of law, she is obligated to relatives within the third degree and belong to the line of Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, whence the lands proceeded. The trial court's ruling that they partake of the nature property required by law to be reserved is therefore in accordance with the law.But the appellant contends that it is not proven that the two parcels of land in question have been acquired by operation of law, and that only property acquired without a valuable consideration, which is by operation of law, is required by law to reserved.The appellees justly argue that this defense was not alleged or discussed in first instance, but only herein. Certainly, the allegation in first instance was merely that "Pedro Sablan acquired the property in question in 1882, before the enforcement of the Civil Code, which establishes the alleged right required by law to be reserved, of which the opponents speak; hence, prescription of the right of action; and finally, opponents' renunciation of their right, admitting that it existed and that they had it" (p. 49).However that be, it is not superflous to say, although it may be unnecessary, that the applicant inherited the two parcels of land from her son Pedro, who died "unmarried and without issue." The trial court so held as a conclusion of fact, without any objection on the appellant's part. (B. of E., 17, 20.) When Pedro Sablan died without issue, his mother became his heir by virtue of her right to her son's legal portion under article 935 of the Civil Code:In the absence of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his ascendants shall from him, to the exclusion of collaterals.The contrary could only have occurred if the heiress had demonstrated that any of these lands had passed into her possession by free disposal in her son's will; but the case presents no testamentary provision that demonstrate any transfer of property from the son to the mother, not by operation of law, but by her son's wish. The legal presumption is that the transfer of the two parcels of land was abintestate or by operation of law, and not by will or the wish of the predecessor in interest. (Act No. 190, sec. 334, No. 26.) All the provision of article 811 of the Civil Code have therefore been fully complied with.If Pedro Sablan had instituted his mother in a will as the universal heiress of his property, all he left at death would not be required by law to be reserved, but only what he would have perforce left her as the legal portion of a legitimate ascendant.The legal portion of the parents or ascendants is constituted by one-half of the hereditary estate of the children and descendants. The latter may unrestrictedly dispose of the other half, with the exception of what is established in article 836. (Civil Code, art. 809.)In such case only the half constituting the legal portion would be required by law to be reserved, because it is what by operation of law could full to the mother from her son's inheritance; the other half at free disposal would not have to be reserved. This is all that article 811 of the Civil Code says.No error has been incurred in holding that the two parcels of land which are the subject matter of the application are required by law to be reserved, because the interested party has not proved that either of them became her inheritance through the free disposal of her son.Proof testate succession devolves upon the heir or heiress who alleges it. It must be admitted that a half of Pedro Sablan's inheritance was acquired by his mother by operation of law. The law provides that the other half is also presumed to be acquired by operation of law that is, by intestate succession. Otherwise, proof to offset this presumption must be presented by the interested party, that is, that the other half was acquired by the man's wish and not by operation of law.Nor is the third assignments of error admissible that the trial court failed to sustain the renunciation of the right required by law to be reserved, which the applicant attributes to the opponents. Such renunciation does not appear in the case. The appellant deduces it from the fact that the appellees did not contradict the following statement of hers at the trial:The day aftermy brother-in-law Pablo Sablandies and was buried, his brother came to my house and said that those rice lands were mine, because we had already talked about making delivery of them. (p. 91).The other brother alluded to is Basilio Sablan, as stated on page 92. From the fact that Basilio Sablan said that the lands belong to the appellant and must be delivered to her it cannot be deduced that he renounced the right required by law to be reserved in such lands by virtue of the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code, for they really belong to her and must be delivered to her.The fourth assignments of error set up the defense of prescription of the right of action. The appellant alleges prescription of the opponent's right of action for requiring fulfillment of the obligation they attribute to her recording in the property registry the right required by law to be reserved, in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law; and as such obligation is created by law, it prescribed in the time fixed in No. 2 of section 43 of Act No. 190. She adds: "Prescription of therightalleged to the reserved by force of law has not been invoked." (Eight allegation.)The appellant does not state in her brief what those provisions of the Mortgage Law are. Nor did she do so in first instance, where she says only the following, which is quoted from the record: "I do not refer to the prescription of the right required by law to be reserved in the property; I refer to the prescription of the right of action of those who are entitled to theguarantyof that right for seeking that guaranty, for those who are entitled to that right the Mortgage Law grants a period of time for recording it in the property registry, if I remember correctly, ninety days, for seeking entry in the registry; but as they have not exercised that right of action, such right of action for seeking here that it be recorded has prescribed.The right of action for requiring that the property be reservedhas not prescribed, but the right of action for guaranteeing in the property registry that this property is required by law to be reserved" (p. 69 of the record).The appellees reply: It is true that their right of action has prescribed for requiring the applicant to constitute the mortgage imposed by the Mortgage Law for guaranteeing the effectiveness of the required by law to be reserved; but because that right of action has prescribed, that property has not been divested of its character of property required by law to be reserved; that it has such character by virtue of article 8112 of the Civil Code, which went into effect in the Philippine in December, 1889, and not by virtue of the Mortgage Law, which only went into effect in the country by law of July 14, 1893; that from December, 1889, to July, 1893, property which under article 811 of the Civil Code acquired the character of property reserved by operation of law was such independently of the Mortgage Law, which did not yet form part of the positive legislation of the country; that although the Mortgage Law has been in effect in the country since July, 1893, still it has in no way altered the force of article 811 of the Civil Code, but has operated to reinforce the same merely by granting the right of action to the persons in whose favor the right is reserved by operation of law to require of the person holding the property a guaranty in the form of a mortgage to answer for the enforcement, in due time, of the right; that to lose the right of action to the guaranty is not to lose the right itself; that the right reserved is the principal obligation and the mortgage the accessory obligation, and loss of the accessory does not mean loss of the principal. (Fifth and sixth allegations.)The existence of the right required by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in question being indisputable, even though it be admitted that the right of action which the Mortgage Law grants as a guaranty of final enforcement of such right has prescribed, the only thing to be determined by this appeal is the question raised in the first assignment of error, that is, how said two parcels of land can and ought to be registered, not in the property registry newly established by the Mortgage Law, but in the registry newly organized by Act No. 496. But as the have slipped into the allegations quoted some rather inexact ideas that further obscure such an intricate subject as this of the rights required to be reserved in Spanish-Philippine law, a brief disgression on the most essential points may not be out of place here.The Mortgage Law of July 14, 1893, to which the appellees allude, is the amended one of the colonies, not the first enforced in the colonies and consequently in the Philippines. The preamble of said amended Mortgage Law states:The Mortgage Law in force in Spain for thirty years went into effect, with the modifications necessary for its adaptation, in the Antilles on May 1, 1880, and in the Philippines on December 1, 1889, thus commencing in those regions the renovation of the law on real property, and consequently of agrarian credit.The Civil Code went into effect in the Philippines in the same year, 1889, but on the eight day.Two kinds of property required by law to be reserved are distinguished in the Civil Code, as set forth in article 968 thereof, where it says:Besides the reservation imposed by article811, the widow or widower contracting a seconds marriage shall be obliged to set apart for the children and descendants of the first marriage the ownership of all the property he or she may have required from the deceased spouse by will, by intestate succession, by gift, or other transfer without a valuable consideration."The Mortgage Law of Spain and the first law that went into effect in the Philippines on December 1, 189, do not contain any provision that can be applied to the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil Code, for such right is a creation of the Civil Code. In those laws appear merely the provisions intended to guarantee the effectiveness of the right in favor of the children of the first marriage when their father or mother contracts a second marriage. Nevertheless, the holding of the supreme court of Spain, for the first time set forth in the decision on appeal of November 8, 1894, has been reiterated:That while the provisions of articles 977 and 978 of the Civil Code that tend to secure the right required to be reserved in the property refer especially to the spouses who contract second or later marriages, they do not thereby cease to be applicable to the right establishes in article 811, because, aside from the legal reason, which is the same in both cases, such must be the construction from the important and conclusive circumstance that said provisions are set forth in the chapter that deals with inheritances in common, either testate or intestate, and because article 968, which heads the section that deals in general with property required by law to be reserved, makes reference to the provisions in article 811; and it would consequently be contradictory to the principle of the law and of the common nature of said provisions not to hold them applicable to that right.Thus it was again stated in a decision on appeal, December 30, 1897, that: "As the supreme court has already declared, the guaranties that the Code fixes in article 977 and 978 for the rights required by law to the reserved to which said articles refer, are applicable to the special right dealt with in article 811, because the same principle exists and because of the general nature of the provisions of the chapter in which they are found."From this principle of jurisprudence it is inferred that if from December, 1889, to July, 1893, a case had occurred of a right required to be reserved by article 811, the persons entitled to such right would have been able to institute, against the ascendant who must make the reservation, proceedings for the assurance and guaranty that article 977 and 978 grant to the children of a first marriage against their father or mother who has married again. The proceedings for assurance, under article 977; are: Inventory of the property subject to the right reserved, annotation in the property registry of such right reserved in the real property and appraisal of the personal property; and the guaranty, under article 978, is the assurance by mortgage, in the case of realty, of the value of what is validly alienated.But since the amended Mortgage Law went into effect by law of July 14, 1893, in the Philippines this is not only a principle of jurisprudence which may be invoked for the applicability to the right reserved in article 811 of the remedies of assurance and guaranty provided for the right reserved in article 968, but there is a positive provision of said law, which is an advantage over the law of Spain, to wit, article 199, which read thus:The special mortgage for guaranteeing the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil Code can only be required by the relatives in whose favor the property is to be reserved, if they are of age; if minors, it will be require by the person who should legally represent them. In either case the right of the persons in whose favor the property must be reserved will be secured by thesamerequisites as set forth in the preceding article (relative to the right reserved by article 968 of the Civil Code), applying to the personobligatedto reserve the right the provisions with respect to thefather.In article 168 of the same law the new subsection 2 is added in connection with article 199 quoted, so that said article 168 reads as thus:Legal mortgage is established:1. . . .2. In favor of the relatives to whom article 811 of the Civil Code refers, for the property required to be reserved, upon the property of the person obliged to reserve it.This being admitted, and admitted also that both the litigating parties agree that the period of ninety days fixed for the right of action to the guaranty, that is, to require the mortgage that guarantees the effectiveness of the right required by law to be reserved, has prescribed, it is necessary to lay down a principle in this matter. Now it should by noted that such action has not prescribed, because the period of ninety days fixed by the Mortgage Law is not for the exercise of the right of action of the persons entitled to the right reserved, but for the fulfillment of the obligation of the person who must make the reservation.Article 191 of the reads thus: "If ninety days pass without the father's instituting in court the proceeding to which the foregoing article refers, the relatives themselves may demand fulfillment, etc., . . . applying, according to said article 199, to the person obligated to reserve the right the provisions with respect to the father."Article 203 of the regulation for the application of the Mortgage Law says: "In the case of article 199 of the law the proceedings to which article 190 thereof refers will be instituted within the ninety days succeeding the date of the date of the acceptation of the inheritance by the person obligated to reserve the property;after this period has elapsed, the interested parties may require the institution of such proceedings, if they are of age; and in any other case, their legal representatives."Thus it clearly appears that the lapse of the ninety days is not the expiration by prescription of the period for the right must be reserved, but really the commencement thereof, enables them to exercise it at any time, since no limits is set in the law. So, if the annotation of the right required by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in question must be made in the property registry of the Mortgage Law, the persons entitled to it may now institute proceedings to that end, and an allegation of prescription against the exercise of such right of action cannot be sustained.Since the applicant confesses that she does not allege prescription of the right of action forrequiring that the property be reserved, for she explicitly so stated at the trial, and as the case presents no necessity for the proceedings that should be instituted in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law, this prescription of the right of action cannot take place, because such right of action does not exist with reference to instituting proceedings for annotation in the registry of Act No. 496 of the right to the property required by law to be reserved. It is sufficient, as was done in the present case, to intervene in the registration proceedings with the claim set up by the two opponents for recording therein the right reserved in either parcel of land.Now comes the main point in the appeal. The trial court denied the registration because of this finding set forth in its decision:Absolute title to the two parcels of land undoubtedly belongs to the applicant and the two uncles of the deceased Pedro Sablan, and the application cannot be made except in the name of all of them in common. (B. of E., p. 20.)It must be remembered that absolute title consists of the rights to use, enjoy, dispose of, and recover. The person who has in himself all these rights has the absolute or complete ownership of the thing; otherwise, the person who has the right to use and enjoy will have the usufruct, and the person who has the rights of disposal and recovery the direct title. The person who by law, act, or contract is granted the right of usufruct has the first two rights or using an enjoying, and then he is said not to have the fee simple that is, the rights of disposal and recovery, which pertain to another who, after the usufruct expires, will come into full ownership.The question set up in the first assignment of error of the appellant's brief is this:What are the rights in the property of the person who holds it subject to the reservation of article 811 of the Civil Code?There are not lacking writers who say, only those of a usufructuary, the ultimate title belonging to the person in whose favor the reservation is made. If that were so, the person holding the property could not apply for registration of title, but the person in whose favor it must be reserved, with the former's consent. This opinion does not seem to be admissible, although it appears to be supported by decisions of the supreme court of Spain of May 21, 1861, and June 18, 1880, prior to the Civil Code, and of June 22, 1895, somewhat subsequent to the enforcement thereof.Another writer says: "This opinion only looks at two salient points the usufruct and the fee simple; the remaining features of the arrangement are not perceived, but become obscure in the presence of that deceptive emphasis which only brings out two things: that the person holding the property will enjoy it and that he must keep what he enjoys for other persons." (Manresa, VII, 189.)In another place he says: "We do not believe that the third opinion can now be maintained that is, that the surviving spouse (the person obliged by article 968 to make the reservation) can be regarded as a mere usufructuary and the descendants immediately as the owner; such theory has no serious foundation in the Code." (Ibid., 238.)The ascendants who inherits from a descendants, whether by the latter's wish or by operation of law, requires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes of the right of ownership belong to him exclusively use, enjoyment, disposal and recovery. This absolute ownership, which is inherent in the hereditary title, is not altered in the least, if there be no relatives within the third degree in the line whence the property proceeds or they die before the ascendant heir who is the possessor and absolute owner of the property. If there should be relatives within the third degree who belong to the line whence the property proceeded, then a limitation to that absolute ownership would arise. The nature and scope of this limitation must be determined with exactness in order not to vitiate rights that the law wishes to be effective. The opinion which makes this limitation consist in reducing the ascendant heir to the condition in of a mere usufructuary, depriving him of the right of disposal and recovery, does not seem to have any support in the law, as it does not have, according to the opinion that he has been expressed in speaking of the rights of the father or mother who has married again. There is a marked difference between the case where a man's wish institutes two persons as his heirs, one as usufructuary and the other as owner of his property, and the case of the ascendant in article 811 or of the father or mother in article 968. In the first case, there is not the slightest doubt that the title to the hereditary property resides in the hereditary owner and he can dispose of and recover it, while the usufructuary can in no way perform any act of disposal of the hereditary property (except that he may dispose of the right of usufruct in accordance with the provisions of article 480 of the Civil Code), or any act of recovery thereof except the limited one in the form prescribed in article 486 of the Code itself, because he totally lacks the fee simple. But the ascendants who holds the property required by article 811 to be reserved, and the father of mother required by article 986 to reserve the right, can dispose of the property they might itself, the former from his descendant and the latter from his of her child in first marriage, and recover it from anyone who may unjustly detain it, while the persons in whose favor the right is required to be reserved in either case cannot perform any act whatsoever of disposal or of recovery.Article 975 states explicitly that the father or mother required by article 9687 to reserve the right may dispose of the property itself:Alienation of the property required by law to be reserved which may be made by the surviving spouseaftercontracting a second marriage shall be valid only if at his or her death no legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage survive, without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage of Law.It thus appears that the alienation is valid, although not altogether effective, but under a condition subsequent, to wit: "If at his or her death no legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage survive."If the title did not reside in the person holding the property to be reserved, his alienation thereof would necessarily be null and void, as executed without a right to do so and without a right which he could transmit to the acquirer. The law says that the alienation subsists (to subject is to continue to exist) "without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage Law." Article 109 of this Law says:The possessor of property subject to conditions subsequentthat are still pendingmay mortgage or alienate it, provided always that he preserve the right of the parties interested in said conditions by expressly reserving that right in the registration.In such case, the child or legitimate descendants of the first marriage in whose favor the right is reserved cannot impugn the validity of the alienation so long as the condition subsequent is pending, that is, so long as the remarried spouse who must reserve the right is alive, because it might easily happen that the person who must reserve the right should outlive all the person in whose favor the right is reserved and then there would be no reason for the condition subsequent that they survive him, and, the object of the law having disappeared, the right required to be reserved would disappear, and the alienation would not only be valid but also in very way absolutely effective. Consequently, the alienation is valid when the right required by law to be reserved to the children is respected; while the effects of the alienation depend upon a condition, because it will or will not become definite, it will continue to exist or cease to exist, according to circumstances. This is what the law establishes with reference to the reservation of article 968, wherein the legislator expressly directs that the surviving spouse who contracts a second marriage shall reserve to the children or descendants of the first marriageownership. Article 811 says nothing more than that the ascendants must make the reservation.Manresa, with his recognized ability, summarizes the subject under the heading, "Rightsand obligations during the existence of the right required by law to be reserved," in these words:During the whole period between the constitution in legal form of the right required by law to be reserved and the extinction thereof, the relatives within the third degree, after the right thatin their turnmay pertain to them has beenassured, have only an expectation, and therefore they do not even have the capacity to transmit that expectation to their heirs.The ascendant is in the first place a usufructuary who should use and enjoy the things according to their nature, in the manner and form already set forth in commenting upon the article of the Code referring to use and usufruct.But since in addition to being the usufructuary he is, even though conditionally, the owner in fee simple of the property, he can dispose of it in the manner provided in article 974 and 976 of the same Code. Doubt arose also on this point, but theDireccion Generalof the registries, in an opinion of June 25, 1892, declared that articles 974 and 975, which are applicable by analogy, for they refer to property reserved by law, reveal in the clearest manner the attitude of the legislator on this subject, and the relatives with the third degree ought not to be more privileged in the right reserved in article 811 than the children in the right reserved by article 975, chiefly for the reason that the right required to be reserved carries with it a condition subsequent, and the property subject to those conditions can validly be alienated in accordance with article 109 of the Mortgage Law, such alienation to continue, pending fulfillment of the condition." (Civil Code, VI, 270.)Another commentator corroborates the foregoing in every way. He says:The ascendants acquires that property with a condition subsequent, to wit, whether or not there exists at the time of his death relatives within the third degree of the descendants from whom they inherit in the line whence the property proceeds. If such relatives exist, they acquire ownership of the property at the death of the ascendants. If they do not exist, the ascendants can freely dispose thereof. If this is true, since the possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent can alienate and encumber it, the ascendants may alienate the property required by law to be reserved, but he will alienate what he has and nothing more because no one can give what does not belong to him, and the acquirer will therefore receivea limited and revocable title. The relatives within the third degree will in their turn have an expectation to the property while the ascendant lives, an expectation that cannot be transmitted to their heirs, unless these are also within the third degree. After the person who is required by law to reserve the right has died, the relatives may rescind the alienation of the realty required by law to be reserved and they will complete ownership,in fee simple, because the condition and the usufruct have been terminated by the death of the usufructuary. (Morell, Estudios sobre bienes reservable, 304, 305.)The conclusion is that the person required by article 811 to reserve the right has, beyond any doubt at all, the rights of use and usufruct. He has, moreover, for the reasons set forth, the legal title and dominion, although under a condition subsequent. Clearly he has, under an express provision of the law, the right to dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of is to alienate, although under a condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one who possesses or should possess it and have title to it, although a limited and revocable one. In a word, the legal title and dominion, even though under a condition, reside in him while he lives. After the right required by law to be reserved has been assured, he can do anything that a genuine owner can do.On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor of the right is reserved cannot dispose of the property, first because it is no way, either actually, constructively or formally, in their possession; and, moreover, because they have no title of ownership or of the fee simple which they can transmit to another, on the hypothesis that only when the person who must reserve the right should die before them will they acquire it, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they take their place in the succession of the descendants of whom they are relatives within the third degree, that it to say, a second contingent place in said legitimate succession in the fashion of aspirants to a possible future legacy. If any of the persons in whose favor the right is reserved should, after their rights has been assured in the registry, dare to dispose of even nothing more than the fee simple of the property to be reserved his act would be null and void, for, as was definitely decided in the decision on appeal of December 30, 1897, it is impossible to determine the part "that might pertain therein to the relative at the time he exercised the right, because in view of the nature and scope of the right required by law to be reserved the extent of his right cannot be foreseen, for it may disappear by his dying before the person required to reserve it, just as may even become absolute should that person die."Careful consideration of the matter forces the conclusion that no act of disposalinter vivosof the person required by law to reserve the right can be impugned by him in whose favor it is reserved, because such person has all, absolutely all, the rights inherent in ownership, except that the legal title is burdened with a condition that the third party acquirer may ascertain from the registry in order to know that he is acquiring a title subject to a condition subsequent. In conclusion, it seems to us that only an act of disposalmortis causain favor of persons other than relatives within the third degree of the descendants from whom he got the property to be reserved must be prohibited to him, because this alone has been the object of the law: "To prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some special accident of life, property that would otherwise have remained therein." (Decision of December 30, 1897.)Practically, even in the opinion of those who reduce the person reserving the right to the condition of a mere usufructuary, the person in whose favor it must be reserved cannot attack the alienation that may be absolutely made of the property the law requires to be reserved, in the present case, that which the appellant has made of the two parcels of land in question to a third party, because the conditional alienation that is permitted her is equivalent to an alienation of the usufruct, which is authorized by article 480 of the Civil Code, and, practically, use and enjoyment of the property required by law to be reserved are all that the person who must reserve it has during his lifetime, and in alienating the usufruct all the usefulness of the thing would be transmitted in an incontrovertible manner. The question as to whether or not she transmits the fee simple is purely academic,sine re, for it is not real, actual positive, as is the case of the institution of two heirs, one a usufructuary and the other the owner, by the express wish of the predecessor in interest.If the person whom article 811 requires to reserve the right has all the rights inherent in ownership, he can use, enjoy, dispose of and recover it; and if, in addition to usufructuary, he is in fact and in law the real owner and can alienate it, although under a condition, the whole question is reduced to the following terms:Cannot the heir of the property required by law to reserved, merely because a condition subsequent is annexed to his right of disposal, himself alone register the ownership of the property he has inherited, when the persons in whose favor the reservation must be made degree thereto, provided that the right reserved to them in the two parcels of land be recorded, as the law provides?It is well known that the vendee underpacto de retractoacquires all the rights of the vendor:The vendee substitutes the vendor in all his rights and actions. (Civil Code, art. 1511.)If the vendor can register his title, the vendee can also register this same title after he has once acquired it. This title, however, in its attribute of being disposable, has a condition subsequent annexed that the alienation the purchaser may make will be terminated, if the vendor should exercise the right granted him by article 1507, which says:Conventional redemption shall take place when the vendor reserves to himself the right to recover the thing sold, with the obligation to comply with article 1518, and whatever more may have been agreed upon," that is, if he recovers the thing sold by repaying the vendee the price of the sale and other expenses. Notwithstanding this condition subsequent, it is a point not at all doubtful now that the vendee may register his title in the same way as the owner of a thing mortgaged that is to say, the latter with the consent of his creditor and the former with the consent of the vendor. He may alienate the thing bought when the acquirer knows by well from the title entered in the registry that he acquires a title revocable after a fixed period, a thing much more certain and to be expected than the purely contingent expectation of the person in whose favor is reserved a right to inherit some day what another has inherited. The purpose of the law would be defeated in not applying to the person who must make the reservation the provision therein relative to the vendee underpacto de retracto, since the argument in his favor is the more power and conclusive;ubi eadem ratio, eadem legis dispositivo.Therefore, we reverse the judgment appealed from, and in lieu thereof decide and declare that the applicant is entitled to register in her own name the two parcels of land which are the subject matter of the applicants, recording in the registration the right required by article 811 to be reserved to either or both of the opponents, Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, should they survive her; without special findings as to costs.Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Trent, JJ.,concur.

CASE DIGEST

Marcelina EDROSO vs.Pablo and Basilio SABLANG.R. No. 6878, September 13, 1913FACTS:Spouses Marcelina Edroso and Victoriano Sablan had a son named, Pedro who inherited two parcels of land upon the death of his father. Subsequently, Pedro died, unmarried and without issue, the two parcels of land passed through inheritance to his mother. Hence the hereditary title whereupon is based the application for registration of her ownership. The two uncles of Pedro, Pablo and Basilio Sablan(legitimate brothers of Victoriano) opposed the registration claiming that either the registration be denied or if granted to her, the right reserved by law to them be recorded in the registration of each parcel. The Court of Land Registration denied the registration holding that the land in question partake of the nature of property required by law to be reserved and that in such a case application could only be presented jointly in the names of the mother and the said two uncles. Hence, this appeal.ISSUES:1. Whether or not the property in question is in the nature of a reservable property.2. Whether or not Marcelina Edroso has the absolute title of the property to cause its registration.RULING:A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary title is one without a valuable consideration (gratuitous tile), and it is so characterized in Article 968 of the Civil Code, for he who acquires by inheritance gives nothing in return for what he receives; and a very definite conclusion of law also is that the uncles are within the third degree of blood relationship. Article 811. The ascendant, who inherits from his descendant property which the latter acquired without a valuable consideration from another descendant, or forma brother or sister, is under obligation to reserve what he has acquired by operation of law for the relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line where the property proceeded.Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him the two parcels of land which he had acquired without a valuable consideration that is, by inheritance from another ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having acquired them by operation of law, she is obligated to relatives within the third degree and belong to the line of Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez (parents of Victoriano), where the lands proceeded. The trial courts ruling that they partake of the nature property required by law to be reserved is therefore in accordance with the law.

G.R. No. L-12957 March 24, 1961CONSTANCIO SIENES, ET AL.,plaintiffs-appellants,vs.FIDEL ESPARCIA, ET AL.,defendants-appellees.Proceso R. Remollo for plaintiffs-appellants.Leonardo D. Mancao for defendants-appellees.DIZON,J.:Appellants commenced this action below to secure judgment (1) declaring null and void the sale executed by Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of appellees, the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes; (2) ordering the Esparcia spouses to reconvey to appellants Lot 3368 of the Cadastral Survey of Ayuquitan (now Amlan), Oriental Negros; and (3) ordering all the appellees to pay, jointly and severally, to appellants the sum of P500.00 as damages, plus the costs of suit. In their answer appellees disclaimed any knowledge or information regarding the sale allegedly made on April 20, 1951 by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellants and alleged that, if such sale was made, the same was void on the ground that Andrea Gutang had no right to dispose of the property subject matter thereof. They further alleged that said property had never been in possession of appellants, the truth being that appellees, as owners, had been in continuous possession thereof since the death of Francisco Yaeso. By way of affirmative defense and counterclaim, they further alleged that on July 30, 1951, Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso, as the only surviving heirs of Francisco Yaeso, executed a public instrument of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes, the said sale having been registered together with an affidavit of adjudication executed by Paulina and Cipriana on July 18, 1951, as sole surviving heirs of the aforesaid deceased; that since then the Esparcias had been in possession of the property as owners.After trial upon the issues thus joined, the lower court rendered judgment as follows:IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring (1) that the sale of Lot No. 3368 made by Andrea Gutang to the plaintiff spouses Constancio Sienes and Genoveva Silay is void, and the reconveyance prayed for by them is denied; (2) that the sale made by Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of defendants Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes involving the same lot is also void, and they have no valid title thereto; and (3) that the reservable property in question is part of and must be reverted to the estate of Cipriana Yaeso, the lone surviving relative and heir of Francisco Yaeso at the death of Andrea Gutang as of December 13, 1951. No pronouncement as to the costs.From the above decision the Sienes spouse interposed the present appeal, their principal contentions being, firstly, that the lower court erred in holding that Lot 3368 of the Cadastral Survey of Ayuquitan was a reservable property; secondly, in annulling the sale of said lot executed by Andrea Gutang in their favor; and lastly, in holding that Cipriana Yaeso, as reservee, was entitled to inherit said land.There is no dispute as to the following facts:Lot 3368 originally belonged to Saturnino Yaeso. With his first wife, Teresa Ruales, he had four children named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana, while with his second wife, Andrea Gutang, he had an only son named Francisco. According to the cadastral records of Ayuquitan, the properties left by Saturnino upon his death the date of which does not clearly appear of record were left to his children as follows: Lot 3366 to Cipriana, Lot 3367 to Fernando, Lot 3375 to Agaton, Lot 3377 (southern portion) to Paulina, and Lot 3368 (western portion) to Francisco. As a result of the cadastral proceedings, Original Certificate of Title No. 10275 covering Lot 3368 was issued in the name of Francisco. Because Francisco was a minor at the time, his mother administered the property for him, declared it in her name for taxation purposes (Exhs A & A-1), and paid the taxes due thereon (Exhs. B, C, C-1 & C-2). When Francisco died on May 29, 1932 at the age of 20, single and without any descendant, his mother, as his sole heir, executed the public instrument Exhibit F entitled EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND SALE whereby, among other things, for and in consideration of the sum of P800.00 she sold the property in question to appellants. When thereafter said vendees demanded from Paulina Yaeso and her husband Jose Esparcia, the surrender of Original Certificate of Title No. 10275 which was in their possession the latter refused, thus giving rise to the filing of the corresponding motion in the cadastral record No. 507. The same, however, was denied (Exhs. 8 & 9).Thereafter, or more specifically, on July 30, 1951, Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso, the surviving half-sisters of Francisco, and who as such had declared the property in their name, on January 1, 1951 executed a deed of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes (Exh. 2) who, in turn, declared it in their name for tax purposes and thereafter secured the issuance in their name of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2141 (Exhs. 5 & 5-A).As held by the trial court, it is clear upon the facts already stated, that the land in question was reservable property. Francisco Yaeso inherited it by operation of law from his father Saturnino, and upon Francisco's death, unmarried and without descendants, it was inherited, in turn, by his mother, Andrea Gutang. The latter was, therefore, under obligation to reserve it for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came, if any survived her. The record discloses in this connection that Andrea Gutang died on December 13, 1951, the lone reservee surviving her being Cipriana Yaeso who died only on January 13, 1952 (Exh. 10).In connection with reservable property, the weight of opinion is that the reserve creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which the property came (6 Manresa 268-269; 6 Sanchez Roman 1934). This Court has held in connection with this matter that the reservista has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to a resolutory condition; that he is like a life usufructuary of the reservable property; that he may alienate the same but subject to reservation, said alienation transmitting only the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservists, the rights acquired by the transferee being revoked or resolved by the survival of reservatarios at the time of the death of the reservista (Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; and Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 65 Phil. 279).The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore, subject to the condition that the vendees would definitely acquire ownership, by virtue of the alienation, only if the vendor died without being survived by any person entitled to the reservable property. Inasmuch much as when Andrea Gutang died, Cipriana Yaeso was still alive, the conclusion becomes inescapable that the previous sale made by the former in favor of appellants became of no legal effect and the reservable property subject matter thereof passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana.On the other hand, it is also clear that the sale executed by the sisters Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes was subject to a similar resolutory condition. The reserve instituted by law in favor of the heirs within the third degree belonging to the line from which the reservable property came, constitutes a real right which the reservee may alienate and dispose of, albeit conditionally, the condition being that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when the reservee survives the person obliged to reserve. In the present case, Cipriana Yaeso, one of the reservees, was still alive when Andrea Gutang, the person obliged to reserve, died. Thus the former became the absolute owner of the reservable property upon Andrea's death. While it may be true that the sale made by her and her sister prior to this event, became effective because of the occurrence of the resolutory condition, we are not now in a position to reverse the appealed decision, in so far as it orders the reversion of the property in question to the Estate of Cipriana Yaeso, because the vendees the Esparcia spouses did not appeal therefrom.WHEREFORE, the appealed decision as above modified is affirmed, with costs, and without prejudice to whatever action in equity the Esparcia spouses may have against the Estate of Cipriana Yaeso for the reconveyance of the property in question.

CASE DIGESTSIENES VS. ESPARCIAFACTS: The case involves Lot 3368 which originally belonged to Saturnino Yaeso. According to the cadastral records, upon Saturninos death, he left the aid land to Francisco, his only son with his second wife, Andrea Gutang. Because Francisco was a minor at the time, his mother administered the property for him, declared it in her name for taxation purposes and paid the taxes due thereon. When Francisco died on May 29, 1932 at the age of 20, single andwithout any descendant, his mother, as his sole heir, executed an extrajudicial settlement and sale whereby, among other things, she sold the property in question to the appellant, Constancio Sienes. Thereafter, Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso, the surviving half-sisters of Francisco, and who had declared the questioned property in their name, executed a deed of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes. The Trial court declared both sale as void and ordered that the property be reverted to the estate of Cipriana Yaeso, the lone surviving relative and heir of Francisco Yaeso at the death of Andrea Gutang.

ISSUE: WON the sale of the property by the ascendant who is obliged to reserve the property is valid although at the time of his death, there are still surviving relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which the property came.

RULING: The land in question was reservable property. Francisco Yaeso inherited it by operation of law from his father Saturnino, and upon Francisco's death, unmarried and without descendants; it was inherited, in turn, by his mother, Andrea Gutang. The latter was, therefore, under obligation to reserve it for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came, if any survived her. The record discloses that when Andrea Gutang died, the lone reservee surviving her is Cipriana Yaeso. The reserve creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which the property came. The reservista has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to a resolutory condition; that he is like a life usufructuary of the reservable property; that he may alienate the same but subject to reservation, said alienation transmitting only the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservists, the rights acquired by the transferee being revoked or resolved by the survival of reservatarios at the time of the death of the reservista. The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore, subject to the condition that the vendees would definitely acquire ownership, by virtue of the alienation, only if the vendor died without being survived by any person entitled to the reservable property. When Andrea Gutang died, Cipriana Yaeso was still alive; thus, the previous sale made by the former in favor of appellant became of no legal effect and the reservable property passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana.On the other hand, it is also clear that the sale executed by the sisters Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes was subject to a similar resolutory condition. The reserve instituted by law in favor of the heirs within the third degree belonging to the line from which the reservable property came, constitutes a real right which the reservee may alienate and dispose of, albeit conditionally, the condition being that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when the reservee survives the person obliged to reserve. In the present case, Cipriana Yaeso, one of the reservees, was still alive when Andrea Gutang, the person obliged to reserve, died. Thus the former became the absolute owner of the reservable property upon Andrea's death

G.R. No. L-27696 September 30, 1977MIGUEL FLORENTINO, ROSARIO ENCARNACION de FLORENTINO, MANUEL ARCE, JOSE FLORENTINO, VICTORINO FLORENTINO, ANTONIO FLORENTINO, REMEDION ENCARNACION and SEVERINA ENCARNACION,petitioners-appellants,vs.SALVADOR ENCARNACION, SR., SALVADOR ENCARNACION, JR., and ANGEL ENCARNACION,oppositors to encumbrance-petitioners-appelles.Jose F. Singson and Miguel Florentino for appellants.Pedro Singson for appellees.GUERRERO,J.:Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, acting as a land registration court, in Land Registration case No. N-310.On May 22, 1964, the petitioners-appellants Miguel Florentino, Remedios Encarnacion de Florentino, Manuel Arce, Jose Florentino, Victorino Florentino, Antonio Florentino, Remedior, Encarnacion and Severina Encamacion, and the Petitiners-appellees Salvador Encamacion, Sr., Salvador Encamacion, Jr. and Angel Encarnacion filed with the Court of First Instance of ilocos Sur an application for the registration under Act 496 of a parcel of agricultural land located at Barrio Lubong Dacquel Cabugao Ilocos Sur.The application alleged among other things that the applicants are the common and pro-indiviso owners in fee simple of the said land with the improvements existing thereon; that to the best of their knowledge and belief, there is no mortgage, lien or encumbrance of any kind whatever affecting said land, nor any other person having any estate or interest thereon, legal or equitable, remainder, reservation or in expectancy; that said applicants had acquired the aforesaid land thru and by inheritance from their predecessors in interest, lately from their aunt, Doa Encarnacion Florentino who died in Vigan, Ilocos Sur in 1941, and for which the said land was adjudicated to them by virtue of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated August 24, 1947; that applicants Salvador Encarnacion, Jr. and Angel Encarnacion acquired their respective shares of the land thru purchase from the original heirs, Jesus, Caridad, Lourdes and Dolores surnamed Singson one hand and from Asuncion Florentino on the other.After due notice and publication, the Court set the application for hearing. No Opposition whatsoever was filed except that of the Director of Lands which was later withdrawn, thereby leaving the option unopposed. Thereupon, an order of general default was withdrawn against the whole world. Upon application of the asets the Clerk Of court was commission will and to have the evidence of the agents and or to submit the for the Court's for resolution.The crucial point in controversy in this registration case is centered in the stipulation marked Exhibit O-1 embodied in the deed of extrajudicial partition (Exhibit O) dated August 24, 1947 which states:Los productos de esta parcela de terreno situada en el Barrio Lubong Dacquel Cabugao Ilocos Sur, se destination para costear los tos de procesio de la Tercera Caida celebration y sermon de Siete Palbras Seis Estaciones de Cuaresma, procesion del Nino Jesus, tilaracion y conservacion de los mismos, construction le union camarin en conde se depositan los carros mesas y otras cosas que seven para lot leiracion de Siete Palabras y otras cosas mas Lo que sobra de lihos productos despues de descontados todos los gastos se repartira nosotros los herederos.In his testimony during the trial, applicant Miguel Florentino asked the court to include the said stipulation (Exhibit O-1) as an encumbrance on the land sought to be registered, and cause the entry of the same on the face of the title that will finally be issued. Opposing its entry on the title as an encumbrance, petitionersappellee Salvador Encamacion, Sr., Salvador Encarnaciori, Jr. and Angel Encarriacion filed on October 3, 1966 a manifestation seeking to withdraw their application on their respective shares of the land sought to be registered. The withdrawal was opposed by the petitioners-appellants.The Court after hearing the motion for withdrawal and the opposition thereto issued on November 17, 1966 an order and for the purpose of ascertaining and implifying the issues therein stated that all the applicants admit the truth of the following;(1) That just after the death of Encarnacion FIorentino in 1941 up to last year and as had always been the case since time immomorial the products of the land made subiect matter of this land has been used in answering for the payment for the religious functions specified in the Deed Extrajudicial Partition belated August 24, 1947:(2) That this arrangement about the products answering for the comment of experisence for religions functions as mentioned above was not registered in the office of the Register of Deeds under Act No 3344, Act 496 or and, other system of registration;(3) That all the herein applicants know of the existence of his arrangement as specified in the Deed of Extra judicial Partition of A adjust 24, 1947;(4) That the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of August 24, 194-, not signed by Angel Encarnacion or Salvador Encarnacion, Jr,.The court denied the petitioners-appellee motion to withdraw for lack of merit, and rendered a decision under date of November 29, 1966 confirming the title of the property in favor of the f appoints with their respective shares as follows:Spouses Miguel Florentino and Rosario Encarnacion de Florentino, both of legal age, Filipinos, and residents of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, consisting of an undivided 31/297 and 8.25/297 portions, respectively;Manuel Arce, of legal age, Filipino, married to Remedios Pichay and resident of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, consisting of an undivided 66/297 portion;Salvador Encarnacion, Jr., of legal age, Filipino, married to Angelita Nagar and resident of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, consisting of an undivided 66/297; Jose Florentino, of legal age, Filipino, married to Salvacion Florendo and resident of 16 South Ninth Diliman, Quezon City, consisting of an undivided 33/297 portion;Angel Encarnacion, of legal age, Filipino, single and resident of 1514 Milagros St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, consisting of an undivided 33/297 portion;Victorino Florentino, of legal age, Filipino, married to Mercedes L. Encarnacion and resident of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, consisting of an undivided 17.5/297 portion;Antonio Florentino, of legal age, Filipino, single and resident of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, consisting of an undivided 17.5/297;Salvador Encarnacion, Sr., of legal age, Filipino, married to Dolores Singson, consisting of an undivided 8.25/297;Remedios Encarnacion, of legal age, Filipino, single and resident of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, consisting of an undivided 8.25/297 portion; andSeverina Encarnacion, of legal age, Filipino, single and resident of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, consisting of 8.25/297 undivided portion.The court, after ruling "that the contention of the proponents of encumbrance is without merit bemuse, taking the self-imposed arrangement in favor of the Church as a pure and simple donation, the same is void for the that the donee here has riot accepted the donation (Art. 745, Civil Code) and for the further that, in the case of Salvador Encarnacion, Jr. and Angel Encarnacion, they had made no oral or written grant at all (Art. 748) as in fact they are even opposed to it,"1held in the Positive portion, as follows:In view of all these, therefore, and insofar as the question of encumbrance is concerned, let the religious expenses as herein specified be made and entered on the undivided shares, interests and participations of all the applicants in this case, except that of Salvador Encarnacion, Sr., Salvador Encarnacion, Jr. and Angel Encarnacion.On January 3, 1967, petitioners-appellants filed their Reply to the Opposition reiterating their previous arguments, and also attacking the junction of the registration court to pass upon the validity or invalidity of the agreement Exhibit O-1, alleging that such is specified only in an ordinary action and not proper in a land registration proceeding.The Motion for Reconsideration and of New Trial was denied on January 14, 1967 for lack of merit, but the court modified its earlier decision of November 29, 1966, to wit:This Court believes, and so holds, that the contention of the movants (proponents of the encumbrance) is without merit because the arrangement, stipulation or grant as embodied in Exhibit O (Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial), by whatever name it may be (called, whether donation, usufruct or ellemosynary gift, can be revoked as in fact the oppositors Salvador Encarnacion, Sr., who is the only one of the three oppositors who is a party to said Exhibit O (the two others, Salvador Encarnacion, Jr. and Angel Encarnacion no parties to it) did revoke it as shown by acts accompanying his refusal to have the same appear as an encumbrance on the title to be issued. In fact, legally, the same can also be ignored or discararded by will the three oppositors. The reasons are: First, if the said stipulation is pour bodies in Exhibit O-1 is to be viewed as a stipulationpour autruithe same cannot now be enforced because the Church in whose favor it was made has not communicated its acceptance to the oppositors before the latter revoked it. Says the 2nd par. of Art. 1311 of the New Civil Code:"If a contract should contain some stipulation in favor of a third person he may demand its fulfillment provided he communicated his acceptance to the obligor before its revocation. A mere incidental benefit or interest of a person is not sufficient. The contracting parties must have clearly and deliberately conferred a favor upon a third person." No evide nee has ever been submitted by the Church to show its clear acceptance of the grant before its revocation by the oppositor Salvador Encarnacion, Sr. (or of the two other oppositors, Salvador Encarnacion, Jr. and Angel Encarnacion, who didn't even make any giant, in the first place), and so not even the movants who have officiously taken into themselves the right to enforce the grant cannot now maintain any action to compel compliance with it. (Bank of the P.I. v. Concepcion y Hijos, Inc., 53 Phil. 806).Second, the Church in whose favor the stipulation or grant had apparently been made ought to be the proper party to compel the herein three oppositors to abide with the stipulation. But it has not made any appearance nor registered its opposition to the application even before Oct. 18, 1965 when an order of general default was issued.Third, the movants are not, in the contemplation of Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the real party in interest to raise the present issue; and Fourth, the movants having once alleged in their application for registration that the land is without encumbrance (par. 3 thereof), cannot now be alloted by the rules of pleading to contradict said allegation of theirs. (McDaniel v. Apacible, 44 Phil. 248)SO ORDERED.2After Motions for Reconsideration were denied by the court, the petitioners- appellants appealed directly to this Court pursuant to Rule 4 1, Rules of Court, raising the following assign of error:I. The lower court erred in concluding that the stipulation embodied in Exhibit O on religious expenses is just an arrangement stipulation, or grant revocable at the unilateral option of the coowners.II. The lower court erred in finding and concluding that the encumbrance or religious expenses embodied in Exhibit O, the extrajudicial partition between the co-heirs, is binding only on the appoints Miguel Florentino, Rosario Encarnacion de Florentino, Manuel Arce, Jose Florentino, Antonio Florentino, Victorino Florentino, Remedios Encarnacion and Severina Encarnacion.III. The lower court as a registration court erred in passing upon the merits of the encumbrance (Exhibit O-1) as the sanie was never put to issue and as the question involved is an adjudication of rights of the parties.We find the first and second assignments of error impressed with merit and, therefore, tenable. The stipulation embodied in Exhibit O-1 on religious expenses is not revocable at the unilateral option of the co-owners and neither is it binding only on the petitioners-appellants Miguel Florentino, Rosario Encarnacion de Florentino Manuel Arce, Jose Florentino, Victorino Florentino Antonio Florentino, Remedios Encarnacion and Severina E It is also binding on the oppositors-appellees Angel Encarnacion,The stipulation (Exhibit 411) in pan of an extrajudicial partition (Exh. O) duly agreed and signed by the parties, hence the sanie must bind the contracting parties thereto and its validity or compliance cannot be left to the with of one of them (Art. 1308, N.C.C.). Under Art 1311 of the New Civil Code, this stipulation takes effect between the parties, their assign and heirs. The article provides:Art. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in cases where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property he received from the decedent.If a contract should contain a stipulation in favor of a third person, he may demand its fulfillment provided he communicated his acceptance to the obligor before its revocation. A mere incidental benefit or interest of a person is not sufficient. The contracting parties must have clearly and deliberately conferred a favor upon a third person.The second paragraph of Article 1311 above-quoted states the law on stipulationspour autrui.Consent the nature and purpose of the motion (Exh. O-1), We hold that said stipulation is a stationpour autrui. Astipulation pourautruiis a stipulation in favor of a third person conferring a clear and deliberate favor upon him, and which stipulation is merely a part of a contract entered into by the parties, neither of whom acted as agent of the third person, and such third person and demand its fulfillment provoked that he communicates his to the obligor before it is revoked.3The requisites are: (1) that the stipulation in favor of a third person should be a part, not the whole, of the contract; (2) that the favorable stipulation should not be conditioned or compensated by any kind of obligation whatever; and (3) neither of the contracting bears the legal represented or authorization of third person.To constitute a valid stipulation pour autrui it must be the purpose and intent of the stipulating parties to benefit the third and it is not sufficient that the third person may be incidentally benefited by the stipulation. The fairest test to determine whether the interest of third person in a contract is a stipulationpour autruior merely an incidental interest, is to rely upon the intention of the parties as disclosed by their contract. In applying this test, it meters not whether the stipulation is in the nature of a gift or whether there is an obligation owing from the promisee to the third person. That no such obsorption exists may in some degree assist in determining whether the parties intended to benefit a third person.4In the case at bar, the determining point is whether the co-owners intended to benefit the Church when in their extrajudicial partition of several parcels of land inherited by them from Doa Encarnacion Florendo they agreed that with respect to the land situated in Barrio Lubong Dacquel Cabugao Ilocos Sur, the fruits thereof shall serve to defray the religious expenses specified in Exhibit O-1. The evidence on record shows that the true intent of the parties is to confer a direct and material benefit upon the Church. The fruits of the aforesaid land were used thenceforth to defray the expenses of the Church in the preparation and celebration of the Holy Week, an annual Church function. Suffice it to say that were it not for Exhibit O-1, the Church would have necessarily expended for this religious occasion, the annual relisgious procession during the Holy Wock and also for the repair and preservation of all the statutes, for the celebration of the Seven Last Word.We find that the trial court erred in holding that the stipulation, arrangement or grant (Exhibit O-1) is revocable at the option of the co-owners. While a stipulation in favor of a third person has no binding effect in itself before its acceptance by the party favored, the law does not provide when the third person must make his acceptance. As a rule, there is no time at such third person has after the time until the stipulation is revoked. Here, We find that the Church accepted the stipulation in its favor before it is sought to be revoked by some of the co-owners, namely the petitioners-appellants herein. It is not disputed that from the time of the with of Doa Encarnacion Florentino in 1941, as had always been the case since time immemorial up to a year before the firing of their application in May 1964, the Church had been enjoying the benefits of the stipulation. The enjoyment of benefits flowing therefrom for almost seventeen years without question from any quarters can only be construed as an implied acceptance by the Church of the stipulationpour autruibefore its revocation.The acceptance does not have to be in any particular form, even when the stipulation is for the third person an act of liberality or generosity on the part of the promisor or promise.5It need not be made expressly and formally. Notification of acceptance, other than such as is involved in the making of demand, is unnecessary.6A trust constituted between two contracting parties for the benefit of a third person is not subject to the rules governing donation of real property. The beneficiary of a trust may demand performance of the obligation without having formally accepted the benefit of the this in a public document, upon mere acquiescence in the formation of the trust and acceptance under the second paragraph of Art. 1257 of the Civil Code.7Hence, the stipulation (Exhibit O-1) cannot now be revoked by any of the stipulators at their own option. This must be so because of Article 1257, Civil Code and the cardinal rule of contracts that it has the force of law between the parties.8Thus, this Court ruled inGarcia v. Rita Legarda, Inc.,9"Article 1309 is a virtual reproduction of Article 1256 of the Civil Code, so phrased to emphasize that the contract must bind both parties, based on the principles (1) that obligation arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties; and (2) that there must be mutuality between the parties based on their principle equality, to which is repugnant to have one party bound by the contract leaving the other free therefrom."Consequently, Salvador Encarnacion, Sr. must bear with Exhibit O-1, being a signatory to the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition embodying such beneficial stipualtion. Likewise, with regards to Salvador, Jr. and Angel Encarnacion, they too are bound to the agreement. Being subsequent purchasers, they are privies or successors in interest; it is axiomatic that contracts are enforceable against the parties and their privies.10Furthermore, they are shown to have given their conformity to such agreement when they kept their peace in 1962 and 1963, having already bought their respective shares of the subject land but did not question the enforcement of the agreement as against them. They are also shown to have knowledge of Exhibit O-1 as they had admitted in a Deed of Real Mortgage executed by them on March 8, 1962 involving their shares of the subject land that, "This parcel of land is encumbered as evidenced by the document No. 420, page 94, Book 1, series 1947, executed by the heirs of the late Encarnacion Florentino, on August 26, 1947, before M. Francisco Ante, Notwy Public of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, in its page 10 of the said document of partition, and also by other documents."The annotation of Exhibit O-1 on the face of the title to be issued in this case is merely a guarantee of the continued enforcement and fulfillment of the beneficial stipulation. It is error for the lower court to rule that the petitioners-appellants are not the real parties in interest, but the Church. That one of the parties to a contractpour autruiis entitled to bring an action for its enforcement or to prevent its breach is too clear to need any extensive discussion. Upon the other hand, that the contract involved contained a stipulation pour autrui amplifies this settled rule only in the sense that the third person for whose benefit the contract was entered into may also demand its fulfillment provoked he had communicated his acceptance thereof to the obligor before the stipulation in his favor is revoked.11Petitioners-appellants' third assignment of error is not well-taken. Firstly, the otherwise rigid rule that the jurisdiction of the Land Registration Court, being special and limited in character and proceedings thereon summary in nature, does not extend to cases involving issues properly litigable in other independent suits or ordinary civil actions, has time and again been relaxed in special and exceptional circumstances. (See Government of the Phil. Islands v. Serafica, 61 Phil. 93 (1934); Caoibes v. Sison, 102 Phil. 19 (1957); Luna v. Santos, 102 Phil. 588 (1957); Cruz v. Tan, 93 Phil. 348 (1953); Gurbax Singh Pabla & Co. v. Reyes, 92 Phil. 177 (1952). From these cases, it may be gleaned and gathered that the peculiarity of the exceptions is based not only on the fact that Land Registration Courts are likewise the same Courts of First Instance, but also the following premises (1) Mutual consent of the parties or their acquired in submitting the at aforesaid determination by the court in the registration; (2) Full opportunity given to the parties in the presentation of their respective skies of the issues and of the evidence in support thereto; (3) Consideration by the court that the evidence already of record is sufficient and adequate for rendering a decision upon these issues.12In the case at bar, the records clearly show that the second and third premism enumerated abow are fully mt. With regards to first premise, the petioners-appellants cannot claim that the issues anent Exhibit O-1 were not put in issue because this is contrary to their stand before the lower court where they took the initial step in praying for the court's determination of the merits of Exhibit O-1 as an encumbrance to be annotated on the title to be issued by such court. On the other hand, the petitioners-appellees who had the right to invoke the limited jurisdiction of the registration court failed to do so but met the issues head-on.Secondly, for this very special reason, We win uphold the actuation of the lower court in determining the conflicting interests of the parties in the registration proceedings before it. This case has been languishing in our courts for thirteen tong years. To require that it be remanded to the lower court for another proceeding under its general jurisdiction is not in consonance with our avowed policy of speedy justice. It would not be amiss to note that if this case be remanded to the lower court, and should appeal again be made, the name issues will once more be raised before us hence, Our decision to resolve at once the issues in the instant petition.IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur in Land Registration Case No. N-310 is affirmed but modified to allow the annotation of Exhibit O-1 as an encumbrance on the face of the title to be finally issued in favor of all the applications (herein appellants and herein appellees) in the registration proceedings below.No pronouncement as to cost.SO ORDERED.

CASE DIGESTFLORENTION VS. FLORENTINOFACTS In 1890, Apolonio II died leaving a notarial will. He was survived by his ten children and his widow as heirs. Apolonio III received in the partition of the subject property. When Apolonio III died, the said property were inherited byhis mother Severina, who later died, leaving a will instituting her only daughter as her universal heiress. Herein appellants demands from Mercedes to deliver their corresponding share in the reservable property but Mercedes refused. CFI dismissed the complaint of specific performance.

HELD:REVERSED. Even if Severina left in her will said property together with her own property to her only daughter, nevertheless, this property had not lost their reservable nature in as much as it originated from the common ancestor of herein appellants. The property was inherited by the son and was transmitted by operation of law to his mother. Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property while there are living within the 3rddegree relative of the latter, is nothing but a life usufructuary or a fiduciary of the reservable property received. But if afterwards, all of such relative die, the said pro perty become free property by operation of law, and is thereby converted into the legitime of theascendant heir who can transmit it at his death to his legal succession. There are seven reservatoris who are entitled to the reservable property left at the death of Apolonio III:(1)3 children of the 1st marriage;2)3 children who are represented by their own children (nephews/ nieces);(3)Mercedes All of the appellants are the relatives of the posthumous son within the third degree. Hence, they are entitled as reservatarios to the property which came from the common ancestors.

G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981BEATRIZ L. GONZALES,petitioner,vs.COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V), BENITO F. LEGARDA, ROSARIO L. VALDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA, TERESA LEGARDA, JOSE LEGARDA, BENITO LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, RAMON LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JAIME LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, CELSO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. TERESA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. ANTONIA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JOSE LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ROSARIO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, BENITO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, EDUARDO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, TRINIDAD F. LEGARDA, and the ESTATE OF DONA FILOMENA ROCES DE LEGARDA,respondents.AQUINO,J.:1wph1.tBeatriz Legarda Gonzales appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing her complaint for partition, accounting, reconveyance and damages and holding, as not subject toreserve troncal, the properties which her mother Filomena Races inherited in 1943 from Filomena Legarda (Civil Case No. 73335). The facts are as follows:Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died [Manila] on June 17, 1933. He was survived by his widow, Filomena Races, and their seven children: four daughters named Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and three sons named Benito, Alejandro and Jose.On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned in three equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda.Filomena Legarda y Races died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943. Her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda.Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially to herself the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena Legarda. The said properties consist of the following:1wph1.t(a) Savings deposit in the National City Bank of New York with a credit balance of P3,699.63.(b) 1,429 shares of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company and a 1/7 interest in certain shares of the San Miguel Brewery, Tuason & Legarda, Ltd., Philippine Guaranty Company, Insular Life Assurance Company and theManila Times.(c) 1/7 of the properties described in TCT Nos. 80226, 80237 to 80243 (7 titles), 80260, 80261 and 57512 of the Manila registry of deeds.1/21st of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 48164, 84714, 48201, 48202, 48205, 48203, 48206, 48160 and 48192 of the Manila registry of deeds;1/21st of the property described in TCT No. 4475 of the registry of deeds of Rizal, now Quezon City; 1/14th of the property described in TCT No. 966 of the registry of deeds of Baguio;1/7th of the lot and improvements at 127 Aviles described in TCT No. 41862 of the Manila registry of deeds; 1/7th of the lots and improvements at 181 San Rafael describe in TCT Nos. 50495 and 48161 of the Manila registry of deeds;1/7th of the property described in TCT No. 48163 of the Manila registry of deeds (Streets);l/21st of the properties described in TCT Nos. 48199 and 57551 of the Manila registry of deeds (Streets and Estero):2/21st of the property described in TCT No. 13458 of tile registry of deeds of T0ayabas.These are the properties in litigation in this case. As a result of the affidavit of adjudication, Filomena Races succeeded her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties heldproindivisoby her other six children.Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two handwritten Identical documents wherein she disposed of the properties, which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all). The document reads:1wph1.tA mis hijos :Dispongo que se reparta a todos mis nietos hijos de Ben, Mandu y Pepito, los bienes que he heredado de mi difunta hija Filomena y tambien los acciones de la Destileria La Rosario' recientemente comprada a los hermanos Values Legarda.De los bienes de mi hija Filomena se deducira un tote de terreno que yo he 0donada a las Hijas de Jesus, en GuipitLa case No. 181 San Rafael, la cede a mi hijo Mandu solo la casa; proque ella esta construida sobre terreno de los hermanos Legarda Races.1wph1.t(Sgd.) FILOMENA ROCES LEGARDA6 Marzo 1953During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving children partitioned the properties consisting of the one-third share in the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason which the children inherited in representation of their father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz.Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to probate as a holographic will in the order dated July 16, 1968 of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 70878, Testate Estate of Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda. The decree of probate was affirmed by the Court of Appeals inLegarda vs. Gonzales, CA-G.R. No. 43480-R, July 30,1976.In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the testatrix, filed on May 20, 1968 a motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said properties arereservableproperties which should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and not by the children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda. That motion was opposed by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda.Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzales filed on June 20, 1968 an ordinary civil action against her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother's estate for the purpose of securing a declaration that the said properties are reservable properties which Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath in her holographic will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of her three daughters and her three sons (See Paz vs. Madrigal, 100 Phil. 1085).As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action of Mrs. Gonzales. ln this appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 she contends in her six assignments of error that the lower court erred in not regarding the properties in question as reservable properties under article 891 of the Civil Code.On the other hand, defendants-appellees in their six counter-assignments of error contend that the lower court erred in not holding that Mrs. Legarda acquired the estate of her daughter Filomena] Legarda in exchange for her conjugal and hereditary shares in the estate of her husband Benito Legarda y De la Paz and in not holding that Mrs. Gonzales waived her right to the reservable properties and that her claim is barred by estoppel, laches and prescription.The preliminary issue raised by the private respondents as to the timeliness of Mrs. Gonzales' petition for review is a closed matter. This Court in its resolution of December 16, 1971 denied respondents' motion to dismiss and gave due course to the petition for review.In an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can be raised under undisputed facts. Since on the basis of the stipulated facts the lower court resolved only the issue of whether the properties in question are subject toreserva troncalthat is the only legal issue to be resolved in this appeal.The other issues raised by the defendants-appellees, particularly those involving factual matters, cannot be resolved in this appeal. As the trial court did not pass upon those issues, there is no ruling which can be reviewed by this Court.The question is whether the disputed properties are reservable properties under article 891 of the Civil Code, formerly article 811, and whether Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda could dispose of them in his will in favor of her grandchildren to the exclusion of her six children.Did Mrs. Legarda have the right to conveymortis causawhat she inherited from her daughter Filomena to the reservees within thethird degreeand to bypass the reservees in thesecond degreeor should that inheritance automatically go to the reservees in the second degree, the six children of Mrs. Legarda?As will hereinafter be shown that is not a novel issue or a question of first impression. lt was resolved inFlorentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480. Before discussing the applicability to this case of the doctrine in theFlorentinocase and other pertinent rulings, it may be useful to make a brief discourse on the nature ofreserve troncal,also calledlineal, familiar, extraordinaria o semi-troncal.Much time, effort and energy were spent by the parties in their five briefs in descanting on the nature ofreserve troncalwhich together with thereserva viudalandreversion legal,was abolished by the Code Commission to prevent the decedent's estate from being entailed, to eliminate the uncertainty in ownership caused by the reservation (which uncertainty impedes the improvement of the reservable property) and to discourage the confinement of property within a certain family for generations which situation allegedly leads to economic oligarchy, and is incompatible with the socialization of ownership.The Code Commission regarded thereservasas remnants of feudalism which fomented agrarian unrest. Moreover, thereserves,insofar as they penalize legitimate relationship, is considered unjust and inequitable.However, the lawmaking body, not agreeing entirely with the Code Commission, restored thereserve troncal,a legal institution which, according to Manresa and Castan Tobenas has provoked questions and doubts that are difficult to resolve.Reserva troncalis provided for in article 811 of the Spanish Civil Code, now article 891, which reads:1wph1.tART. 811. El ascendiente que heredare de su descendiente bienes que este hubiese adquirido por titulo lucrative de otro ascendiente, o de un hermano, se halla obligado a reservas los que hubiere adquirido por ministerio de la ley en favor de los parientes que eaten dentro del tercer grade y pertenezcan a la linea de donde los bienes procedenART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came.Inreserve troncal(1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property from an ascendant or from a brother or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another ascendant or is acquired by him by operation of law from the said descendant, and (3) the said ascendant should reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives