succession 3 cases

7/29/2019 Succession 3 Cases

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 118680 March 5, 2001

MARIA ELENA RODRIGUEZ PEDROSA, petitioner, vs.

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE, CARMEN, MERCEDES & RAMON, allsurnamed RODRIGUEZ, ROSALINA RODRIGUEZ, CHAN LUNG FAI, MATEO

TAN TE, TE ENG SUY, LORETA TE, VICTORIO S. DETALIA, JEROMEDEIPARINE, PETRONILO S. DETALIA, HUBERT CHIU YULO, PATERIO N.LAO, LORENSITA M. PADILLA, IMMACULATE CONCEPCION COLLEGE ANDLILIAN EXPRESS, INC. and TIO TUAN, respondents.

QUISUMBING,J.:

This petition assails the decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 23, 1994

which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, of OzamizCity in Civil Case No. OZ-1397.

The facts of this case are as follows:

On April 8, 1946, the spouses Miguel Rodriguez and Rosalina J. de Rodriguezinitiated proceedings before the CFI of Ozamiz City for the legal adoption ofherein petitioner, Maria Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa. On August 1, 1946, the CFI

granted the petition and declared petitioner Pedrosa the adopted child of Migueland Rosalina.

On April 29, 1972, Miguel died intestate. Thereafter, petitioner and Rosalinaentered into an extrajudicial settlement of Miguel's estate, adjudicating betweenthemselves in equal proportion the estate of Miguel.

On November 21, 1972, private respondents filed an action to annul the adoptionof petitioner before the CFI of Ozamiz City, with petitioner and herein respondentRosalina as defendants docketed as OZ 349.

On August 28, 1974, the CFI denied the petition and upheld the validity of theadoption. Thereafter, the private respondents appealed said decision to the Court

of Appeals.

On March 11, 1983, while said appeal was pending, the Rodriguezes entered intoan extrajudicial settlement with respondent Rosalina for the partition of the estateof Miguel and of another sister, Pilar. Rosalina acted as the representative of theheirs of Miguel Rodriguez. Pilar had no heirs except his brothers and sisters.

The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition covered fourteen parcels of

land covering a total area of 224,883 square meters. These properties weredivided among Jose, Carmen, Mercedes, Ramon and the heirs of Miguel,

represented solely by Rosalina. The heirs of Miguel were given 226 square metersof parcel 2, and 9,567 square meters and 24,457 square meters of parcels 7 and9, respectively.1 The total land area allocated to the heirs of Miguel was 34,250

square meters.


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Armed with the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition, respondentsRodriguezes were able to secure new Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) andwere able to transfer some parcels to the other respondents herein.2

Lots 504-A-6, 504-B-3 and 504-C-4, portions of Parcel 3, designated as Lot 504,were transferred to respondents Chuan Lung Fai,3 but not included in the Deed ofSettlement and Partition, were transferred to respondent Lilian Express, Inc. and

are now registered under TCT No. T-11337. Parcel 6, Lot 560, was subdividedamong Ramon, Jose, Carmen and Mercedes and was designated as Lots 560-A,

560-B, 560-C, 560-D and 560-E. Lot 560-A covering 500 square meters wastransferred to respondent Victorino Detall4 and was subsequently transferred to

Jerome Deiparine who registered it under his name under TCT No. T-10706. Lot560-B with 500 square meters was transferred to respondent PetroniloDetalla5 and was later transferred to respondent Hubert Chiu Yulo who registeredit under his name under TCT No. T-11305. Lot 560-C was transferred andregistered under the name of respondent Paterio Lao with TCT No. T-10206. Lot560-D was sold to and subsequently registered in the name of Lorensita M.Padilla under TCT No. T-10207. The remaining portion, Lot 560-E consisting of

43,608 square meters was bought by respondent Immaculate Concepcion Collegeand was registered in its name under TCT No. T-10208.6

On June 19, 1986, the parties in the appeal which sought to annul the adoption ofpetitioner Pedrosa filed a joint Motion to Dismiss. On June 25, 1986, the Court ofAppeals dismissed the appeal but upheld the validity of the adoption of petitioner.

Thereafter, petitioner sent her daughter, Loreto Jocelyn, to claim their share ofthe properties from the Rodriguezes. The latter refused saying that Maria Elenaand Loreto were not heirs since they were not their blood relatives.

Petitioner, then, filed a complaint to annul the 1983 partition. The said complaint

was filed on January 28, 1987. Said complaint was later amended on March 25,1987 to include the allegation "that earnest efforts toward a compromise weremade between the plaintiffs and the defendants, but the same failed."7

The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed thedecision of the trial court. Its ruling was premised on the following grounds:8

1) that the participation of Rosalina has already estopped her fromquestioning the validity of the partition, and since she is already estopped,

it naturally follows that Maria Elena, her successor-in-interest, is likewiseestopped, applying Article 1439 of the Civil Code;

2) that the appeal of Maria Elena and her claim that the partition is nulland void is weakened by her inconsistent claim that the partition wouldhave been alright had she been given a more equitable share;

3) the action is essentially an action for rescission and had been filed late

considering that it was filed beyond the 4 year period provided for inArticle 1100 of the Civil Code;9

4) that fraud and/or bad faith was never established.


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Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Court ofAppeals in a Resolution dated December 20, 1994.10

Hence, this petition wherein the petitioner asserts that the following errors wereallegedly committed by the Court of Appeals in -

I. FINDING THAT THE EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND PARTITION ENTEREDINTO BY DEFENDANT JUREDINI AND DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS RODRIGUEZES

WAS VALID AND BINDING UPON THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT WHO DID NOTPARTICIPATE IN SAID TRANSACTION

II. CONCLUDING THAT THE CLAIM OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAVE ALREADYPRESCRIBED TWO (2) YEARS AFTER PUBLICATION OF THE EXTRAJUDICIALSETTLEMENT AND PARTITION IN THE NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION

III. ...CONCLUDING THAT THE CLAIM OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT IS BARRED ORESTOPPED IN FILING THIS CASE (sic) IN VIEW OF THE DISMISSAL OF THE

APPEAL IN CIVIL CASE NO. OZ 349 INTERPOSED BY HEREIN DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES WHO WERE THEN PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS IN AC [C]-G.R. NO. SP-00208

IV. SUSTAINING THE DEFENDANT-APPELLEES' CLAIM THAT AS THEY HAVENOT AS YET RECOGNIZED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AS AN ADOPTED DAUGHTER OFMIGUEL RODRIGUEZ IT WAS NOT NECESSARY FOR THEM TO HAVE HERPARTICIPATE IN THE EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT, EXHIBITS "S" AND "I"

V. CONCLUDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAD NOT CONCLUSIVELYSHOWN THAT MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ WAS A CO-OWNER OF THE LANDS SOLD AND

HENCE IT FOLLOWS THAT SHE HAS NO RIGHT OF REDEMPTION OF THOSE

LANDS

VI. FINDING THAT PORTION OF LOTS NOS. 504 AND 560 SOLD TO THEOTHER DEFENDANTSAPPELLEES WERE CLEAN AND FREE FROM ENCUMBRANCESOR ANY FLAWS HENCE WERE VALID

VII. FINDING THAT THE PLANTIFFAPPELLANT NEVER APPEARED IN COURTTO TESTIFY OR REBUT THE ASSERTIONS OF THE DEFENDANTSAPPELLANTSTHAT THERE WAS A VALID PARTITION

VIII. AWARDING PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DAMAGES FOR THE INCOME OF HERSHARE IN THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION11

In sum, the issues to be resolved in our view are (1) whether or not thecomplaint for annulment of the "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition"had already prescribed; (2) whether or not said deed is valid; and (3) whether ornot the petitioner is entitled to recover the lots which had already beentransferred to the respondent buyers.

Petitioner argues that the complaint for annulment of the extrajudicial partition

has not yet prescribed since the prescriptive period which should be applied isfour years following the case ofBeltran vs. Ayson, 4 SCRA 69 (1962). She alsoavers that Sec. 4, Rule 74 which provides for a two-year prescriptive periodneeds two requirements. One, the party assailing the partition must have been

given notice, and two, the party assailing the partition must have participatedtherein. Petitioner insists these requirements are not present in her case,12 since


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she did not participate in the "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition." Shecites Villaluz vs. Neme, 7 SCRA 27, 30 (1963), where we held that a deed ofextrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had noknowledge and consent to the same, is fraudulent. She asserts that she is anadoptive daughter and thus an heir of Miguel.13

Petitioner also contends that the respondent buyers were buyers in bad faith

since they failed to exercise the necessary due diligence required beforepurchasing the lots in question.14 In the alternative, petitioner wants to redeem

the said lots as a co-owner of respondent Rodriguezes under the provisions ofArticle 1620 of the New Civil Code.15

Lastly, petitioner asserts that she will suffer lesion if the partition would beallowed. She asks for the rescission of the said partitioning under Articles 165-175 of the Civil Code.16

Respondents, in response, claim that the action of petitioner had already

prescribed. In addition, they argue that petitioner, Maria Elena, and Rosalinaalready have their shares in the estate of Miguel Rodriguez reflected in the

compromise agreement they entered into with the respondent Rodriguezes in AC-G.R. SP 00208. Finally, respondents aver that the non-participation of Maria Elena

in the extrajudicial partition was understandable since her status as an adoptedchild was then under litigation. In any case, they assert that the shares ofMiguel's heirs were adequately protected in the said partition.17

Section 4, Rule 7418 provides for a two year prescriptive period (1) to personswho have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition,and in addition (2) when the provisions of Section 119 of Rule 74 have been

strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent havetaken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves orthrough guardians.20

Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not participate in the extrajudicial partition.Patently then, the two-year prescriptive period is not applicable in her case.

The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4) years as provided in Gerona vs.De Guzman, 11 SCRA 153 (1964), which held that:

[The action to annul] a deed of "extrajudicial settlement" upon the ground

of fraud...may be filed within four years from the discovery of the fraud.Such discovery is deemed to have taken place when said instrument was

filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued inthe name of respondents exclusively.21

Considering that the complaint of the petitioner was filed on January 28, 1987, orthree years and ten months after the questioned extrajudicial settlement datedMarch 11, 1983, was executed, we hold that her action against the respondentson the basis of fraud has not yet prescribed.

Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the applicable rule on publication ofextrajudicial settlement. It states:

The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published

in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next


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succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding uponany person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.22

Under said provision, without the participation of all persons involved in theproceedings, the extrajudicial settlement cannot be binding on said persons. Therule contemplates a notice which must be sent out or issuedbefore the Deed ofSettlement and/or Partition is agreed upon, i.e., a notice calling all interestedparties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition,not after, which was when publication was done in the instant case. FollowingRule 74 and the ruling in Beltran vs. Ayson, since Maria Elena did not participatein the said partition, the settlement is not binding on her.

The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply when the deed ofextrajudicial partition is sought to be annulled on the ground of fraud. A deed ofextrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had noknowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious.23 Maria Elena isan heir of Miguel together with her adopting mother, Rosalina. Being the lonedescendant of Miguel, she excludes the collateral relatives of Miguel from

participating in his estate, following the provisions of Article 1003 of the CivilCode.24 The private respondent Rodriguezes cannot claim that they were not

aware of Maria Elena's adoption since they even filed an action to annul thedecree of adoption. Neither can they claim that their actions were valid since theadoption of Maria Elena was still being questioned at the time they executed thedeed of partition. The complaint seeking to annul the adoption was filed onlytwenty six (26) years after the decree of adoption, patently a much delayedresponse to prevent Maria Elena from inheriting from her adoptive parents. Thedecree of adoption was valid and existing. With this factual setting, it is patentthat private respondents executed the deed of partition in bad faith with intent to

defraud Maria Elena.

In the case ofSegura vs. Segura, the Court held:

This section [referring to section 4, Rule 74] provides in gist that a personwho has been deprived of his lawful participation in the estate of thedecedent, whether as heir or as creditor, must assert his claim within twoyears after the extrajudicial or summary settlement of such estate underSections 1 and 2 respectively of the same Rule 74. Thereafter, he will beprecluded from doing so as the right will have prescribed.

It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition inquestion which was null and void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned.

The rule covers only valid partitions. The partition in the present case was

invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equalshares in the partitioned property. Under the rule, "no extrajudicialsettlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participatedtherein or had no notice thereof." As the partition was a total nullity anddid not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court tohold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after twoyears from its execution in 1941.25

To say that Maria Elena was represented by Rosalina in the partitioning isimprecise. Maria Elena, the adopted child, was no longer a minor at the time

Miguel died. Rosalina, only represented her own interests and not those of MariaElena. Since Miguel predeceased Pilar, a sister, his estate automatically vested to

his child and widow, in equal shares. Respondent Rodriguezes' interests did notinclude Miguel's estate but only Pilar's estate.


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Could petitioner still redeem the properties from buyers? Given the circumstancesin this case, we are constrained to hold that this is not the proper forum to decidethis issue. The properties sought to be recovered by the petitioner are now allregistered under the name of third parties. Well settled is the doctrine that aTorrens Title cannot be collaterally attacked. The validity of the title can only beraised in an action expressly instituted for such purpose.26

Petitioner asks for the award of damages. No receipts, agreements or any otherdocumentary evidence was presented to justify such claim for damages. Actual

damages, to be recoverable, must be proved with a reasonable degree ofcertainty. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in

determining the fact and amount of damages.27 The same is true for moraldamages. These cannot be awarded in the absence of any factual basis.28 Theunsubstantiated testimony of Loreto Jocelyn Pedrosa is hearsay and has noprobative value. It is settled in jurisprudence that damages may not be awardedon the basis of hearsay evidence.29 Nonetheless, the failure of the petitioner tosubstantiate her claims for damages does not mean that she will be totallydeprived of any damages. Under the law, nominal damages are awarded, so that

a plaintiff's right, which has been invaded or violated by defendants may bevindicated and recognized.30

Considering that (1) technically, petitioner sustained injury but which,unfortunately, was not adequately and properly proved, (2) petitioner wasunlawfully deprived of her legal participation in the partition of the estate ofMiguel, her adoptive father, (3) respondents had transferred portions of theproperties involved to third parties, and (4) this case has dragged on for morethan a decade, we find it reasonable to grant in petitioner's favor nominaldamages in recognition of the existence of a technical injury.31 The amount to be

awarded as such damages should at least commensurate to the injury sustainedby the petitioner considering the concept and purpose of said damages.32 Such

award is given in view of the peculiar circumstances cited and the special reasonsextant in this case.33 Thus, the grant of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND

(P100,000.00) PESOS to petitioner as damages is proper in view of the technicalinjury she has suffered.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court ofAppeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The "Deed of ExtrajudicialSettlement and Partition" executed by private respondents on March 11, 1983 isdeclared invalid. The amount of P100,000.00 is hereby awarded to petitioner as

damages to be paid by private respondents, who are also ordered to pay thecosts.

SO ORDERED.


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EN BANC

G.R. No. L-19382 August 31, 1965

IN RE SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF MELODIA FERRARIS.

FILOMENA ABELLANA DE BACAYO, petitioner-appellant, vs.GAUDENCIA FERRARIS DE BORROMEO, CATALINA FERARIS DE

VILLEGAS, JUANITO FERRARIS and CONCHITA FERRARIS, oppositors-appellees.

This is a pauper's appeal, directly brought to this Court on points of law, from aresolution, dated September 20, 1961, excluding petitioner-appellant herein,Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, as heir in the summary settlement of the estate ofMelodia Ferraris, Special Proceeding No. 2177-R of the Court of First Instance ofCebu, Third Branch, as well as from the order, dated October 16, 1961, denying a

motion to reconsider said resolution.

The facts of this case are not disputed by the parties.

Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she transferred toIntramuros, Manila. She was known to have resided there continuously until1944. Thereafter, up to the filing on December 22, 1960 of the petition for thesummary settlement of her estate, she has not been heard of and herwhereabouts are still unknown. More than ten (10) years having elapsed sincethe last time she was known to be alive, she was declared presumptively dead forpurposes of opening her succession and distributing her estate among her heirs.

Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City, consisting of one-third (1/3) share inthe estate of her aunt, Rosa Ferraris, valued at P6,000.00, more or less, and

which was adjudicated to her in Special Proceeding No. 13-V of the same court.

The deceased Melodia Ferraris left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant, orspouse, but was survived only by collateral relatives, namely, Filomena Abellanade Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of decedent's father, Anacleto Ferraris; and byGaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all surnamed Ferraris, her nieces andnephew, who were the children of Melodia's only brother of full blood, Arturo

Ferraris, who pre-deceased her (the decedent). These two classes of heirs claimto be the nearest intestate heirs and seek to participate in the estate of said

Melodia Ferraris.

The following diagram will help illustrate the degree of relationship of thecontending parties to said Melodia Ferraris:

Note: Picture The sole issue to be resolved in this case is: Who should inheritthe intestate estate of a deceased person when he or she is survived only bycollateral relatives, to wit an aunt and the children of a brother who predeceased

him or her? Otherwise, will the aunt concur with the children of the decedent'sbrother in the inheritance or will the former be excluded by the latter?

The trial court ruled that the oppositors-appellees, as children of the onlypredeceased brother of the decedent, exclude the aunt (petitioner-appellant) of

the same decedent reasoning out that the former are nearer in degree (twodegrees) than the latter since nieces and nephews succeed by right of


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representation, while petitioner-appellant is three degrees distant from thedecedent, and that other collateral relatives are excluded by brothers or sisters orchildren of brothers or sisters of the decedent in accordance with article 1009 ofthe New Civil Code.

Against the above ruling, petitioner-appellant contends in the present appeal thatshe is of the same or equal degree of relationship as the oppositors appellees,

three degrees removed from the decedent; and that under article 975 of the NewCivil Code no right of representation could take place when the nieces and

nephew of the decedent do not concur with an uncle or aunt, as in the case atbar, but rather the former succeed in their own right.

We agree with appellants that as an aunt of the deceased she is as far distant asthe nephews from the decedent (three degrees) since in the collateral line towhich both kinds of relatives belong degrees are counted by first ascending to thecommon ancestor and then descending to the heir (Civil Code, Art. 966).Appellant is likewise right in her contention that nephews and nieces alone do notinherit by right of representation (i.e., per stripes) unless concurring with

brothers or sisters of the deceased, as provided expressly by Article 975:

ART. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the

deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, ifthey survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, theyshall inherit in equal portions.

Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy,nephews and nieces of the de cujusexclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles,first cousins, etc.) from the succession. This is readily apparent from articles

1001, 1004, 1005, and 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that provided asfollows:

ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with thewidow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritanceand the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.

ART. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the fullblood, they shall inherit in equal shares.

ART. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and

nieces, who are the children of the decedent's brothers and sisters of thefull blood, the former shall inherit per capita, and the latter per stripes.

ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sister nor children ofbrothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to theestate.

The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among

them by reason of relationship by the whole blood.

Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and

nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins,etc.) being called to the succession. This was also and more clearly the caseunder the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that immediately preceded the Civil Code

now in force (R.A. 386). Thus, Articles 952 and 954 of the Code of 1889prescribed as follows:


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ART. 952. In the absence of brother, or sisters and of nephews or nieces,children of the former, whether of the whole blood or not, the survivingspouse, if not separated by a final decree of divorce, shall succeed to theentire estate of the deceased.

ART. 954. Should there be neither brothers or sisters, nor children ofbrothers or sisters, nor a surviving spouse, the other collateral relatives

shall succeed to the estate of deceased.

The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among

them by reason of the whole blood.

It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and sisters andnephews and nieces inherited ab intestato aheadof the surviving spouse, whileother collaterals succeeded only afterthe widower or widow. The present CivilCode of the Philippines merely placed the spouse on a par with the nephews andnieces and brothers and sisters of the deceased, but without altering the

preferred position of the latter vis-a-vis the other collaterals.

Appellants quote paragraph 2 of Tolentino's commentaries to Article 1009 of the

present Civil Code as declaring that Article 1009 does not establish a rule ofpreference. Which is true as to "other collaterals," since preference among themis according to their proximity to the decedent, as established by Article 962,paragraph 1.

ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes themore distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly

takes place.

But Tolentino does not state that nephews and nieces concur with othercollaterals of equal degree. On the contrary, in the first paragraph of hiscommentaries to Article 1009 (Vol II, p. 439) (which counsel for appellants hadunethically omitted to quote), Tolentino expressly states:

Other collaterals. The last of the relatives of the decedent to succeed inintestate succession are the collaterals other than brothers or sisters orchildren of brothers or sisters. They are, however, limited to relativeswithin the fifth degree. Beyond this, we can safely say there is hardly anyaffection to merit the succession of collaterals. Under the law, therefore,

relatives beyond the fifth degree are no longer considered as relatives, forsuccessional purposes.

Article 1009 does not state any order of preference. However, this articleshould be understood in connection with the general rule that the nearestrelatives exclude the farther. Collaterals of the same degree inherit inequal parts, there being no right of representation. They succeed withoutdistinction of lines or preference among them on account of the wholeblood relationship. (Emphasis supplied)

We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a decedent'suncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces ofthe decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed.

The decision appealed from, in so far as it conforms to this rule, is herebyaffirmed. No costs.


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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 155733 January 27, 2006

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA

DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LAROSA and other HEIRS OF LUIS DELGADO, namely, HEIRS OF CONCHA

VDA. DE AREVALO, HEIRS OF LUISA DELGADO VDA. DE DANAO, ANGELADELGADO ARESPACOCHAGA, TERESA DELGADO PERLAS, CAROLINADELGADO-ARESPACOCHAGA, RODOLFO DELGADO, BENJAMIN DELGADO,GLICERIA DELGADO and CLEOFAS DELGADO; and HEIRS OF GORGONIODELGADO, namely, RAMON DELGADO CAMPO, CARLOS DELGADO CAMPO,CLARITA DELGADO CAMPO-REIZA, YOLANDA DELGADO ENCINAS, FELISA

DELGADO CAMPO-ENCINAS and MELINDA DELGADO CAMPO-MADARANG, Petitioners,

vs.HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, namely, GUILLERMO R.

DAMIAN and JOSE R. DAMIAN; HEIRS OF HORTENCIA RUSTIA CRUZ,namely, TERESITA CRUZ-SISON, HORACIO R. CRUZ, JOSEFINA CRUZ-RODIL, AMELIA CRUZ-ENRIQUEZ and FIDEL R. CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS OFROMAN RUSTIA, SR., namely, JOSEFINA RUSTIA ALBANO, VIRGINIARUSTIA PARAISO, ROMAN RUSTIA, JR., SERGIO RUSTIA, FRANCISCORUSTIA, LETICIA RUSTIA-MIRANDA; and GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, asOppositors;1and GUILLERMA RUSTIA, as Intervenor,2 Respondents.3

D E C I S I O N

CORONA,J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to reinstate the May 11,1990 decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 55,4 in SP CaseNo. 97668, which was reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals in itsdecision5 dated October 24, 2002.

FACTS OF THE CASE

This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and

Josefa Delgado.6

The main issue in this case is relatively simple:who, betweenpetitioners and respondents, are the lawful heirs of the decedents. However, it isattended by several collateral issues that complicate its resolution.

The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may bedivided into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her

half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews andgrandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his

sisters,7 his nephews and nieces,8 his illegitimate child,9 and the de facto adoptedchild10 (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.

The alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado
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The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa11 Delgado by one LucioCampo. Aside from Josefa, five other children were born to the couple, namely,Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. FelisaDelgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-bloodsiblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado.

However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgados life.

Before him was Ramon Osorio12with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado. But,unlike her relationship with Lucio Campo which was admittedly one without the

benefit of marriage, the legal status of Ramon Osorios and Felisa Delgados unionis in dispute.

The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married iscrucial to the claimants because the answer will determine whether theirsuccessional rights fall within the ambit of the rule against reciprocal intestatesuccession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives.13 If Ramon Osorio andFelisa Delgado had been validly married, then their only child Luis Delgado was alegitimate half-blood brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore excluded from the

latters intestate estate. He and his heirs would be barred by the principle ofabsolute separation between the legitimate and illegitimate families. Conversely,

if the couple were never married, Luis Delgado and his heirs would be entitled toinherit from Josefa Delgados intestate estate, as they would all be within theillegitimate line.

Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were never married. Insupport thereof, they assert that no evidence was ever presented to establish it,not even so much as an allegation of the date or place of the alleged marriage.What is clear, however, is that Felisa retained the surname Delgado. So did Luis,her son with Ramon Osorio. Later on, when Luis got married, his Partida deCasamiento14stated that he was "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado"(the natural

child of Felisa Delgado),15 significantly omitting any mention of the name andother circumstances of his father.16 Nevertheless, oppositors (now respondents)insist that the absence of a record of the alleged marriage did not necessarilymean that no marriage ever took place.

Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was survived byGuillermo Rustia and some collateral relatives, the petitioners herein. Severalmonths later, on June 15, 1973, Guillermo Rustia executed an affidavit of self-

adjudication of the remaining properties comprising her estate.

The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado

Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado17 butwhether a marriage in fact took place is disputed. According to petitioners, thetwo eventually lived together as husband and wife but were never married. Toprove their assertion, petitioners point out that no record of the contestedmarriage existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate namingJosefa Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her as "Seorita"or unmarriedwoman.

The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that the absence of

a marriage certificate did not of necessity mean that no marriage transpired.

They maintain that Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado were married on June 3,1919 and from then on lived together as husband and wife until the death ofJosefa on September 8, 1972. During this period spanning more than half a
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century, they were known among their relatives and friends to have in fact beenmarried. To support their proposition, oppositors presented the following pieces ofevidence:

1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated [December 1, 1944] issued toMrs. Guillermo J. Rustia by Carlos P. Romulo, then Resident Commissionerto the United States of the Commonwealth of the Philippines;

2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25,1947;

3. Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for DisabilityResulting from Service in the Active Military or Naval Forces of the UnitedStates- Claim No. C-4, 004, 503 (VA Form 526) filed with the VeteransAdministration of the United States of America by Dr. Guillermo J. Rustiawherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia himself [swore] to his marriage to JosefaDelgado in Manila on 3 June 1919;18

4. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated thathe was married to Josefa Delgado.

The alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With no children oftheir own, they took into their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia andNanie Rustia. These children, never legally adopted by the couple, were what wasknown in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan.

During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an

illegitimate child,19

the intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one AmparoSagarbarria. According to Guillerma, Guillermo Rustia treated her as his

daughter, his own flesh and blood, and she enjoyed open and continuouspossession of that status from her birth in 1920 until her fathers demise. In fact,Josefa Delgados obituary which was prepared by Guillermo Rustia, named theintervenor-respondent as one of their children. Also, her report card from theUniversity of Santo Tomas identified Guillermo Rustia as her parent/guardian.20

Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that Guillerma Rustia has no

interest in the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia as she was never dulyacknowledged as an illegitimate child. They contend that her right to compulsory

acknowledgement prescribed when Guillermo died in 1974 and that she cannot

claim voluntary acknowledgement since the documents she presented were notthe authentic writings prescribed by the new Civil Code.21

On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of Josefa Delgado,Guillermo Rustia filed a petition for the adoption22 of their ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia. He stated under oath "[t]hat he ha[d] no legitimate,legitimated, acknowledged natural children or natural children by legalfiction."23 The petition was overtaken by his death on February 28, 1974.

Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was survived by hissisters Marciana Rustia vda. deDamian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, and by thechildren of his predeceased brother Roman Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina Rustia

Albano, Virginia Rustia Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia, Francisco Rustiaand Leticia Rustia Miranda.24
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ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS

On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis Delgado,filed the original petition for letters of administration of the intestate estates ofthe "spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia" with the RTC of Manila,Branch 55.25 This petition was opposed by the following: (1) the sisters ofGuillermo Rustia, namely, Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz;26 (2) the heirs of Guillermo Rustias late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and (3)the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia. The opposition was grounded onthe theory that Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao and the other claimants were barredunder the law from inheriting from their illegitimate half-blood relative Josefa

Delgado.

In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in theproceedings, claiming she was the only surviving descendant in the direct line ofGuillermo Rustia. Despite the objections of the oppositors (respondents herein),the motion was granted.

On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of administration was amended

to state that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia were nevermarried but hadmerely lived together as husband and wife.

On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed a motion to dismissthe petition in the RTC insofar as the estate of Guillermo Rustia was concerned.The motion was denied on the ground that the interests of the petitioners and theother claimants remained in issue and should be properly threshed out uponsubmission of evidence.

On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa substituted for her sister,

Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, who had died on May 18, 1987.

On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa asadministratrix of both estates.27 The dispositive portion of the decision read:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioner and her co-claimants to theestate of the late Josefa Delgado listed in the Petitions, and enumeratedelsewhere in this Decision, are hereby declared as the only legal heirs of the said

Josefa Delgado who died intestate in the City of Manila on September 8, 1972,and entitled to partition the same among themselves in accordance with the

proportions referred to in this Decision.

Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is hereby declared as the sole andonly surviving heir of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled to theentire estate of the said decedent, to the exclusion of the oppositors and theother parties hereto.

The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of Josefa Delgado executed by the

late Guillermo J. Rustia on June 15, 1973 is hereby SET ASIDE and declared of noforce and effect.

As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as yet been settled, and theirsettlement [is] considered consolidated in this proceeding in accordance with law,a single administrator therefor is both proper and necessary, and, as the

petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa has established her right to theappointment as administratrix of the estates, the Court hereby APPOINTS her as
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the ADMINISTRATRIX of the intestate estate of the decedent JOSEFA DELGADO inrelation to the estate of DR. GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.

Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION issue to thepetitioner CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her filing of therequisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).

Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA is hereby ordered to cease and

desist from her acts of administration of the subject estates, and is likewiseordered to turn over to the appointed administratix all her collections of the

rentals and income due on the assets of the estates in question, including alldocuments, papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates to the petitionerand appointed administratix CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA,immediately upon receipt of this Decision. The same oppositor is hereby requiredto render an accounting of her actual administration of the estates in controversywithin a period of sixty (60) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.28

On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was denied on the ground that

the record on appeal was not filed on time.29 They then filed a petition forcertiorari and mandamus30 which was dismissed bythe Court ofAppeals.31 However, on motion for reconsideration and after hearing the partiesoral arguments, the Court of Appeals reversed itself and gave due course tooppositors appeal in the interest of substantial justice.32

In a petition for review to this Court, petitioners assailed the resolution of the

Court of Appeals, on the ground that oppositors failure to file the record onappeal within the reglementary period was a jurisdictional defect which nullified

the appeal. On October 10, 1997, this Court allowed the continuance of theappeal. The pertinent portion of our decision33 read:

As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be followed. However, underexceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused ongrounds of substantial justice.

xxx xxx xxx

The respondent court likewise pointed out the trial courts pronouncements as tocertain matters of substance, relating to the determination of the heirs of the

decedents and the party entitled to the administration of their estate, which were

to be raised in the appeal, but were barred absolutely by the denial of the recordon appeal upon too technical ground of late filing.

xxx xxx xxx

In this instance, private respondents intention to raise valid issues in the appealis apparent and should not have been construed as an attempt to delay or

prolong the administration proceedings.

xxx xxx xxx

A review of the trial courts decision is needed.

xxx xxx xxx
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WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Courthereby AFFIRMS the Resolution dated November 27, 1991 of the Court ofAppeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23415, for the APPROVAL of the private respondentsRecord on Appeal and the CONTINUANCE of the appeal from the Manila, BranchLV Regional Trial Courts May 11, 1990 decision.

SO ORDERED.

Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals34 partially set aside the trial courtsdecision. Upon motion for reconsideration,35 the Court of Appeals amended its

earlier decision.36 The dispositive portion of the amended decision read:

With the further modification, our assailed decisionis RECONSIDERED and VACATED. Consequently, the decision of the trial courtis REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby RENDERED declaring: 1.)Dr. Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado Rustia to have been legally married; 2.)the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the

children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) entitled to partition among themselves theintestate estate of Josefa D. Rustia in accordance with the proportion referred to

in this decision; 3.) the oppositors-appellants as the legal heirs of the late Dr.Guillermo Rustia and thereby entitled to partition his estate in accordance with

the proportion referred to herein; and 4.) the intervenor-appellee Guillerma S.Rustia as ineligible to inherit from the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia; thus revoking herappointment as administratrix of his estate.

The letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia inrelation to the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado shall issue to the nominee of theoppositors-appellants upon his or her qualification and filing of the requisite bond

in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).

Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is hereby ordered to cease and

desist from her acts of administration of the subject estates and to turn over tothe appointed administrator all her collections of the rentals and incomes due onthe assets of the estates in question, including all documents, papers, recordsand titles pertaining to such estates to the appointed administrator, immediatelyupon notice of his qualification and posting of the requisite bond, and to renderan accounting of her (Guillermina Rustia Rustia) actual administration of theestates in controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from notice of theadministrators qualification and posting of the bond.

The issue of the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Dr.Guillermo Rustia on June 15, 1973 isREMANDED to the trial court for further

proceedings to determine the extent of the shares of Jacoba Delgado-Encinas andthe children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) affected by the said adjudication.

Hence, this recourse.

The issues for our resolution are:

1. whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia andJosefa Delgado;

2. who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and Josefa

Delgado are;


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3. who should be issued letters of administration.

The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado

A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact whichcourts are permitted to draw from proof of other facts. Presumptions areclassified into presumptions of law and presumptions of fact. Presumptions of laware, in turn, either conclusive or disputable.37

Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory ifuncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:

xxx xxx xxx

(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have

entered into a lawful contract of marriage;

xxx xxx xxx

In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a validmarriage existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Theircohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted. Their family and friendsknew them to be married. Their reputed status as husband and wife was suchthat even the original petition for letters of administration filed by LuisaDelgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred to them as "spouses."

Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had simply

lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They makemuch of the absence of a record of the contested marriage, the testimony of awitness38 attesting that they were not married, and a baptismal certificate whichreferred to Josefa Delgado as "Seorita"or unmarried woman.39

We are not persuaded.

First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage,its absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took place.40 Once thepresumption of marriage arises, other evidence may be presented in support

thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or directly establish the marriage butmust at least be enough to strengthen the presumption of marriage. Here, the

certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia,41 thepassport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia,42 the declaration under oath of no lessthan Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa Delgado43 and the titles tothe properties in the name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado," morethan adequately support the presumption of marriage. These are publicdocuments which areprima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.44 No clearand convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth ofthe recitals therein was presented by petitioners.

Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners own witness whose testimony theyprimarily relied upon to support their position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustiahad proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado and that eventually, the two had "lived

together as husband and wife." This again could not but strengthen thepresumption of marriage.
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Third, the baptismal certificate45 was conclusive proof only of the baptismadministered by the priest who baptized the child. It was no proof of the veracityof the declarations and statements contained therein,46 such as the alleged singleor unmarried ("Seorita") civil status of Josefa Delgado who had no hand in itspreparation.

Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and

Josefa Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans towardlegitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are

presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual order of things in society and, ifthe parties are not what they hold themselves out to be, they would be living in

constant violation of the common rules of law and propriety.Semper praesumiturpro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.47

The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa Delgado

To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned status of

the cohabitation of her mother Felisa Delgado with Ramon Osorio must first beaddressed.

As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable.Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the law makes so peremptory thatno contrary proof, no matter how strong, may overturn them.48On the otherhand, disputable presumptions, one of which is the presumption of marriage, canbe relied on only in the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary.

Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and

Ramon Osorio. The oppositors (now respondents) chose merely to rely on thedisputable presumption of marriage even in the face of such countervailing

evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa and Luis (her son with Ramon Osorio)of the surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgados and Caridad Concepcions Partidade Casamiento49identifyingLuis as "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado"(the naturalchild of Felisa Delgado).50

All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame therebuttable presumption of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio werenever married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa Delgado out of her relationswith Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings

Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamedDelgado,51 were her natural children.52

Pertinent to this matter is the following observation:

Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y with another woman, C; then Xand Y would be natural brothers and sisters, but of half-blood relationship. Canthey succeed each other reciprocally?

The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children andlegitimate children of the same parent, even though there is unquestionably a tie

of blood between them. It seems that to allow an illegitimate child to succeed abintestato (from) another illegitimate child begotten with a parent different fromthat of the former, would be allowing the illegitimate child greater rights than alegitimate child. Notwithstanding this, however, we submit that
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succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters areonly of the half-blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocalsuccessions between legitimate and illegitimate families does not apply to thecase under consideration. That prohibition has for its basis the difference incategory between illegitimate and legitimate relatives. There is no such differencewhen all the children are illegitimate children of the same parent, even if

begotten with different persons. They all stand on the same footing before thelaw, just like legitimate children of half-blood relation. We submit, therefore, that

the rules regarding succession of legitimate brothers and sisters should beapplicable to them. Full blood illegitimate brothers and sisters should receive

double the portion of half-blood brothers and sisters; and if all are either of thefull blood or of the half-blood, they shall share equally.53

Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood, except Luis Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were allillegitimate, they may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of them areentitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.

We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews,nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of

the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes placeonly in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces).Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews andgrandnieces.54 Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who areentitled to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and sisters, or theirchildren who were still alive at the time of her deathon September 8, 1972. Theyhave a vested right to participate in the inheritance.55 The records not being clearon this matter, it is now for the trial court to determine who were the surviving

brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of her death.Together with Guillermo Rustia,56 they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado

in accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code:57

Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow orwidower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and thebrothers and sisters or their children to the other one-half.

Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could nothave validly adjudicated Josefas estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the

Rules of Court is clear. Adjudication by an heir of the decedents entire estate tohimself by means of an affidavit is allowed only if he is the sole heir to the

estate:

SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. If thedecedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors arerepresented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for thepurpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide theestate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed inthe office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so inan ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate

to himself the estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of theregister of deeds. x x x (emphasis supplied)

The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia

Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child58 ofGuillermo Rustia. As such, she may be entitled to successional rights only upon
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proof of an admission or recognition of paternity.59 She, however, claimed thestatus of an acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia only after thedeath of the latter on February 28, 1974 at which time it was already the newCivil Code that was in effect.

Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950), illegitimatechildren absolutely had no hereditary rights. This draconian edict was, however,

later relaxed in the new Civil Code which granted certain successional rights toillegitimate children but only on condition that they were first recognized or

acknowledged by the parent.

Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary.60 Recognition iscompulsory in any of the following cases:

(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of theoffense coincides more or less with that of the conception;

(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of thealleged father (or mother)61 by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;

(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother

cohabited with the supposed father;

(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that thedefendant is his father. 62

On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of birth, a

will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing.63

Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsoryrecognition through the open and continuous possession of the status of anillegitimate child and second, voluntary recognition through authentic writing.

There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimatechild from her birth until the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia.However, this did not constitute acknowledgment but a mere groundby whichshe could have compelled acknowledgment through the courts.64 Furthermore,any (judicial) action for compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation: thelifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative parent.65On the death of

either, the action for compulsory recognition can no longer be filed.66 In this case,intervenor Guillermas right to claim compulsory acknowledgment prescribed

upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on February 28, 1974.

The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillermas second ground) must likewise fail.An authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood as agenuine or indubitable writing of the parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia). Thisincludes a public instrument or a private writing admitted by the father to behis.67 Did intervenors report card from the University of Santo Tomas and Josefa

Delgados obituary prepared by Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic writingsunder the new Civil Code? Unfortunately not. The report card of intervenor

Guillerma did not bear the signature of Guillermo Rustia. The fact that his nameappears there as intervenors parent/guardian holds no weight since he had noparticipation in its preparation. Similarly, while witnesses testified that it was

Guillermo Rustia himself who drafted the notice of death of Josefa Delgado whichwas published in the Sunday Times on September 10, 1972, that published
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obituary was not the authentic writing contemplated by the law. What could havebeen admitted as an authentic writing was the original manuscript of the notice,in the handwriting of Guillermo Rustia himself and signed by him, not thenewspaper clipping of the obituary. The failure to present the original signedmanuscript was fatal to intervenors claim.

The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia, whowas never adopted in accordance with law. Although a petition for her adoptionwas filed by Guillermo Rustia, it never came to fruition and was dismissed upon

the latters death. We affirm the ruling of both the trial court and the Court ofAppeals holding her a legal stranger to the deceased spouses and therefore not

entitled to inherit from them ab intestato. We quote:

Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which [created] between twopersons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity andfiliation. Only an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with theprocedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this

jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To

establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out,otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never

presumed, but must be affirmatively [proven] by the person claiming itsexistence.68

Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of GuillermoRustia, namely, intervenor Guillerma Rustia and the ampun-ampunan GuillerminaRustia Rustia, are not lawful heirs of the decedent. Under Article 1002 of the newCivil Code, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, orsurviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of thedeceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining

claimants, consisting of his sisters,69 nieces and nephews.70

Entitlement To Letters Of Administration

An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestateestate of the decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes anorder of preference in the appointment of an administrator:

Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor isnamed in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust,or fail to give a bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin,or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such survivinghusband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competentand willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin,or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the

husband or widow or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after thedeath of the person to apply for administration or to request that the

administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to oneor more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may begranted to such other person as the court may select.


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In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interestin the estate of the one to be appointed.71 The order of preference does not ruleout the appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where

justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in themanagement of the estates,72 a situation which obtains here.

It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of

Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces ofGuillermo Rustia. They are the next of kin of the deceased spouses Josefa

Delgado and Guillermo Rustia, respectively.

WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision ofthe RTC Manila, Branch 55) is hereby DENIED. The assailed October 24, 2002decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the following modifications:

1. Guillermo Rustias June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-adjudication is

hereby ANNULLED.

2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestateestate of Josefa Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full

and half-siblings of Josefa Delgado who survived her and (b) the childrenof any of Josefa Delgados full- or half-siblings who may have predeceasedher, also surviving at the time of her death. Josefa Delgadosgrandnephews and grandnieces are excluded from her estate. In thisconnection, the trial court is hereby ordered to determine the identities ofthe relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to share in her estate.

3. Guillermo Rustias estate (including its one-half share of Josefa

Delgados estate) shall be inherited by Marciana Rustia vda. de Damianand Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares shall bepercapita)and the children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived GuillermoRustia and whose respective shares shall beper stirpes). Considering thatMarciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are nowdeceased, their respective shares shall pertain to their estates.

4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado shall issue to Carlota Delgado vda.de de la Rosa and to a nominee from among the heirs of Guillermo Rustia,as joint administrators, upon their qualification and filing of the requisitebond in such amount as may be determined by the trial court.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONAAssociate Justice
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G.R. No. L-26306 April 27, 1988

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE GREGORIO VENTURA MARIAVENTURA, executrix- appellant, MIGUEL VENTURA and JUANACARDONA, heirs-appellants,vs.GREGORIA VENTURA and HER HUSBAND, EXEQUIEL VICTORIO,

MERCEDES VENTURA and HER HUSBAND, PEDRO D. CORPUZ, oppositors-appellees.

PARAS,J.:

This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija,Guimba, Branch V in Special Proceedings No. 812, Testate of the late GregorioVenture, dated October 5, 1965, removing the appellant Maria Ventura as

executrix and administratrix of the estate of the late Gregorio Ventura, and in herplace appointing the appellees Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura as jointadministratrices of the estate. (Record on Appeal, pp. 120-131.)

Appellant Maria Ventura is the illegitimate daughter of the deceased GregorioVentura while Miguel Ventura and Juana Cardona are his son and saving spousewho are also the brother and mother of Maria Ventura. On the other hand,appellees Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the deceased's legitimate childrenwith his former wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano (Record on Appeal, p. 122) butthe paternity of appellees was denied by the deceased in his will (Record on

Appeal, p. 4).

On December 14,1953, Gregorio Ventura filed a petition for the probate of his willwhich did not include the appellees and the petition was docketed as SpecialProceedings No. 812 (Record on Appeal, pp. 1-3). In the said will, the appellantMaria Ventura, although an illegitimate child, was named and appointed by thetestator to be the executrix of his will and the administratrix of his estate (Recordon Appeal, p. 7).

In due course, said will was admitted to probate on January 14,1954 (Record on

Appeal, pp. 8-10). Gregorio Ventura died on September 26,1955. On October 10,1955, the appellant Maria Ventura filed a motion for her appointment as executrix

and for the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor (Record on Appeal, pp.10-11). On October 17, 1955, Maria Ventura was appointed executrix and the

corresponding letters testamentary was issued in her favor (Record on Appeal,pp. 11-12).

On or about July 26, 1956, Maria Ventura submitted an inventory of the estate ofGregorio Ventura (Record on Appeal, pp. 12-20).

On June 17,1960, she filed her accounts of administration for the years 1955 to1960, inclusive. (Record on Appeal, pp. 20-27). Said account of administration

was opposed by the spouses Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuz on July 25,1960 (Record on Appeal, pp. 27-33) and by Exequiel Victorio and Gregoria

Ventura on August 5,1963 (Record on Appeal, pp. 46-50). Both oppositionsassailed the veracity of the report as not reflecting the true income of the estate

and the expenses which allegedly are not administration expenses. But onJanuary 25, 1961, Maria Ventura filed a motion to hold in abeyance the approvalof the accounts of administration or to have their approval without the opposition


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of the spouses Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuz and Gregoria Ventura andExequiel Victorio on the ground that the question of the paternity of MercedesVentura and Gregoria Ventura is still pending final determination before theSupreme Court and that should they be adjudged the adulterous children oftestator, as claimed, they are not entitled to inherit nor to oppose the approval ofthe counts of administration (Record on Appeals, pp. 33-36). Spouses Mercedes

Ventura and Pedro Corpuz filed on February 2, 1961 their opposition to themotion to hold in abeyance the approval of the accounts of administration on the

ground that Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura had already been declared by theCourt of First Instance in Civil Cases No. 1064 and 1476, which cases are

supposed to be pending before the Supreme Court, as the legitimate children ofGregorio Ventura, hence, they have reason to protect their interest (Record onAppeal, pp. 36-39). On February 9,1961, the motion to hold in abeyance theapproval of the accounts was denied (Record on Appeal, pp. 39-40).

It appears that on July 12, 1963, the Court set the case for pre-trial on August 7,1963 in connection with the accounts of the executrix Maria Ventura dated June17, 1960 and the Motion to Annul Provision of Will dated July 14,1962 of

Mercedes Ventura (Record on Appeal, p. 45).

On October 22, 1963, four motions were filed by Mercedes Ventura and GregoriaVentura, namely: (1) motion to remove the executrix Maria Ventura which wassupplemented on April 27, 1965; (2) motion to require her to deposit the harvestof palay of the property under administration in a bonded warehouse; (3) motionto render an accounting of the proceeds and expenses of Administration; and (4)motion to require her to include in the inventory of the estate certain excludedproperties (Record on Appeal, pp. 50-53; 71). An opposition to said motions wasfiled by the heirs Juana Cardona and Miguel Ventura and by the executrix Maria

Ventura herself (Record on Appeal, pp. 56-61; 61-70 and 71).

On motion of counsel for Exequiel Victorio and Gregoria Ventura the joint motionsto require an Up-to-date Accounting and to Require Executrix Ventura to IncludeExcluded Properties in Her Inventory were ordered withdrawn (Order datedFebruary 2, 1965, Record on Appeal, p. 73). The other two motions werehowever set for hearing.

The grounds of aforesaid joint motions to remove the executrix Maria Venturaare: (1) that she is grossly incompetent; (2) that she has maliciously and

purposely concealed certain properties of the estate in the inventory; (3) that sheis merely an illegitimate daughter who can have no harmonious relations with the

appellees; (4) that the executrix has neglected to render her accounts and failedto comply with the Order of the Court of December 12, 1963, requiring her to file

her accounts of administration for the years 1961 to 1963 (Record on Appeal, pp.70 and 75-76) and the Order of June 11, 1964, reiterating aforesaid Order ofDecember 12, 1963 (Record on Appeal, p. 76); and (5) that she is withpermanent physical defect hindering her from efficiently performing her duties asan executrix (Record on Appeal, pp. 50-53 and 74-79).

On May 17, 1965, the executrix Maria Ventura finally submitted her accounts of

administration covering the period 1961 to 1965 (Record on Appeal, pp. 79-84)which were again opposed by the spouses Exequiel Victorio and Gregoria Ventura

on September 21, 1965 and by the spouses Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuzon September 29, 1965 (Record on Appeal, pp. 106-120). On June 2, 1965, theexecutrix filed her supplemental opposition to the aforesaid four motions, and

prayed that the joint supplemental motion to remove the executrix be denied orheld in abeyance until after the status of Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as heirs


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of the testator is finally decided (Record on Appeal, pp. 85-1 01). On June 3,1965, the Court, finding that the estate taxes have not been paid, ordered theadministratrix to pay the same within thirty (30) days. On September 13, 1965,the lower court denied the suspension of the proceedings and deferred theresolution of the joint motion to remove executrix Maria Ventura until after theexamination of the physical fitness of said executrix to undertake her duties as

such. Also, it ordered the deposit of all palay to be harvested in the nextagricultural year and subsequent years to be deposited in a bonded warehouse to

be selected by the Court and the palay so deposited shall not be withdrawnwithout the express permission of the Court (Record on Appeal, pp. 103-105). On

September 21, 1965, spouses Exequiel Victorio and Gregoria Ventura filed theiropposition to the accounts of administration of Maria Ventura dated May 17,1965, while that of spouses Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuz was filed onSeptember 29, 1965, both oppositions alleging among others that said accountsdo not reflect the true and actual income of the estate and that the expensesreported thereunder are fake, exhorbitant and speculative (Record on Appeal, pp.106-120).

On October 5, 1965, the court a quo, finding that the executrix Maria Ventura hassquandered the funds of the estate, was inefficient and incompetent, has failed tocomply with the orders of the Court in the matter of presenting up-to-date

statements of accounts and neglected to pay the real estate taxes of the estate,rendered the questioned decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, Maria Ventura is hereby removed as executrix andadministratrix of the estate and in her place Mercedes Ventura andGregoria Ventura are hereby appointed joint a tratrices of theestate upon filing by each of them of a bond of P 7,000.00. Let

letters of administration be issued to Mercedes Ventura andGregoria Ventura upon their qualification.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

(Record on Appeal pp. 120-131).

Hence, this appeal.

In their brief, appellants Maria Ventura and spouses Juana Cardona and Miguel

Ventura assign the following errors allegedly committed by the probate court:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

I

The lower court erred in ordering the removal of Maria Ventura asexecutrix and administratrix of the will and estate of the deceasedGregorio Ventura without giving her full opportunity to be heard

and to present all her evidence.

II

The lower court erred in finding that the executrix Maria Venturahad squandered and dissipated the funds of the estate under her

administration.


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III

The lower court erred in finding that the executrix Maria Venturawas inefficient and incompetent.

IV

That, considering the circumtances surrounding the case, the lowercourt erred in finding that the failure of Maria Ventura to submit

her periodical account had justified her removal as executrix.

V

The lower court erred in considering as an established fact that theappellees Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura are thelegitimate daughters of the deceased Gregorio Ventura.

VI

The lower court erred in finding that the devises and bequests infavor of Maria Ventura and Miguel Ventura as specified inparagraph 8 of the last Will and Testament of the late GregorioVentura have ipso facto been annulled.

VII

The lower court erred in allowing the appellees Mercedes Ventura

and Gregoria Ventura to intervene in the hearing of the accounts ofadministration submitted by the executrix Maria Ventura and/or in

not suspending the hearing of the said accounts until the saidappellees have finally established their status as legitimate childrenof the deceased Gregorio Ventura.

VIII

The lower court erred in appointing (even without a proper petitionfor appointment and much less a hearing on the appointment of)

the appellees Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura who have anadverse interest as joint administratrices of the estate of the

deceased Gregorio Ventura.

IX

The lower court erred in not appointing the surviving widow, JuanaCardona, or Miguel Ventura, as administratrix of the estate ofGregorio Ventura in case the removal of Maria Ventura as executrixand administratrix thereof is legally justified.

X

Considering that there are in fact two (2) factions representingopposite interests in the estate, the lower court erred in not

appointing Juana Cardona, or Miguel Ventura, as one of the two (2)administratrices.' (Joint Brief for the Appellants, pp. 1-4)


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On July 19,1967, Atty. Arturo Tolentino (representing appellees Mercedes Venturaand Pedro Corpuz) and Atty. Jose J. Francisco (representing Gregoria andExequiel Victoria), having failed to submit their respective briefs within the periodfor the purpose, which expired on July 2 and May 29,1967, respectively, theSupreme Court Resolved to consider this case submitted for decision WITHOUTSAID APPELLEES' BRIEF (Rollo, p. 152).

The crucial issue in this case is whether or not the removal of Maria Ventura asexecutrix is legally justified. This issue has, however, become moot and academic

in view of the decision of this Court in related cases.

At the outset, it is worthy to note that aside from the instant special proceedings,there are two other civil cases involving the estate of the deceased GregoriaVentura, namely, Civil Cases Nos. 1064 and 1476. Civil Case No. 1064 was filedon December 2, 1952 by herein appellee Gregoria Ventura in the Court of FirstInstance of Nueva Ecija, Branch I, against the other appellees herein MercedesVentura and their father, Gregorio Ventu

succession 3 cases

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