succession 2 cases

7/30/2019 Succession 2 Cases

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Revilla v CA (G.R. No. 95329)

Facts: Don Cayetano Revilla, a bachelor, owned 2 pieces of land with buildings in Manila and6 parcels of land in his hometown in Bulacan. These properties are worth P30M. In 1978, heexecuted a 13-page last will and testament, bequeathing all his properties to his 9 nephewsand nieces including petitioner, Heracio Revilla. To each, he gave 1/10 of his estate reserving

the last tenth for masses to be said after his death and for the care of religious images hekept in a chapel in Bulacan.

During his lifetime, Don Cayetano sought the probate of his will to which the CFI Manilaadmitted. However, the City Hall of Manila was burned by fire where the records were alsoburned. A petition for reconstitution of the records was filed and it was granted.

After Don Cayetano died, Heracio Revilla filed another petition of a will wherein he institutedHeracio as sole heir of his uncles estate and executor of the will allegedly executed in 1982.The probate was opposed by Heracios 8 brothers and sisters on the grounds that:

- Since 1978 up to Cayetanos death, he never informed that he revoked the will executed

in 1978

- The 1982 will was not executed in accordance with law and the signature of Cayetanowas different from his usual and customary signature

- Cayetano was of unsound mind when he executed the will

- That the alleged will was executed with undue pressure and influence

- That the 1978 will is void for the reason that it was executed under duress or theinfluence of fear or threats

- Cayetano acted by mistake and the signatures in the alleged will were procured by fraudand he did not intend that the instrument be his will at the time of fixing his signature

The trial court disallowed the second will. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not the court erred in disallowing the second will.

Held: When Don Cayetano testified in the reconstitution proceedings, he was unaware of thesecond will which he supposedly made. He identified his first will and declared that it was histrue and only will. He could not have executed a second will because he was sick in the

hospital during that time (he stayed there for 2 months) and he could not sign any paperswhile he was confined in the hospital.

During the reconstitution proceedings, the will was produced. It was placed in a brownedenvelope stating Buksan ito pagkalibing ko to which Cayetano agreed to open. Herecognized the original will and acknowledged that he signed it. In the court records,Cayetano declared that he did not execute another last will and testament after the originalwill had been probated.

Significantly, although the petitioner opposed the reconstitution of Don Cayetano's first will, hedid not reveal the second will which Don Cayetano supposedly made only 2months before hetestified in the reconstitution proceeding. If the second will already existed on November 27,1982, it would have been Heracio's strongest argument against the reconstitution of theprobate of the first will.


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Since the execution of the second will could not have occurred on the alleged date(September 13, 1982) appearing therein (for Don Cayetano was admittedly sick in thehospital then) it must have been procured at the time when the testator was a virtual prisoner,held incommunicado, in his house. Judge Eduardo Bengson had to issue an ordercommanding the petitioner to allow his 8 brothers and sisters to visit Don Cayetano. Only thenwere they able to penetrate the iron curtain that Heracio had placed around their uncle. A

videotape, taken during their visit and shown in court, belied Heracio's allegation that DonCayetano was displeased with his said nephews and nieces, that was why he left them out ofhis second will.

Despite Judge Bengzon's order, Heracio did not cease his efforts to monopolize DonCayetano and his estate. To isolate Don Cayetano and make him inacessible to the privaterespondents, Heracio transferred him from his own house in Manila to Heracio's house inQuezon City.

The execution of the second will in an environment of secrecy and seclusion and thedisinheritance of his 8 other nephews and nieces, justified the trial court's and the Court ofAppeals' belief that undue influence was exercised by Horacio over Don Cayetano to makehim sign the second will (which Don Cayetano did not know to be such) in order to deprive hisbrothers and sisters of their rightful share in their uncle's estate.

There was fraud because Don Cayetano was not apprised that the document he was signingwith Co, Barredo and Lim ( as witnesses) was a second will revoking the dispositions ofproperty that he made in his first will. Had he been aware that it was a second will, and if itwere prepared at his own behest, he would not have denied that he made it. He wouldprobably have caused it to be probated while he was still alive, as he did with his first will. Butapparently, the instrument was foisted on him without his being aware of its true nature whichthe petitioner assiduously concealed, not only from the court and the private respondents, butfrom Don Cayetano himself.

That the dispositions in the second will were not made by Don Cayetano is proven by the

omission of Don Cayetano's reservation of one-tenth of his properties and the income thereofto pay for holy masses and to be spent for the maintenance of his family chapel. Thatprovision in his first will, for his personal benefit, would not have been deleted by DonCayetano if his only purpose in making a second will was to disinherit his nephews andnieces. But Heracio overdid himself. He wanted everything.

*Assuming for the sake of arguments that the second will was executed, the testimonies ofthe notary public, as well as those of the three (3) instrumental witnesses were not givencredit because of major contradictions in testimonies.Republic of the Philippines


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G.R. No. 95329 January 27, 1993

HERACIO R. REVILLA, petitioner, vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, FORTUNATO REVILLA, LUZ REVILLA DAVID, LORETOREVILLA GUTIERREZ, VENERANDA REVILLA MANIQUEZ, NICASIO REVILLA,PERFECTA REVILLA BALACANIA, JUSTINA REVILLA DEL ROSARIO and AGRIPINA

REVILLA CHACON, respondents.

This is a petition for review of the decision dated September 13, 1990 of the Court of Appealsin CA-G.R. CV No. 18190 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch39, in Special Proceeding No. 86-38444 which disallowed the second will supposedlyexecuted on September 13, 1982 by the late Don Cayetano Revilla whose first Will datedJanuary 28, 1978 had been probated on March 21, 1980 on his own petition in SpecialProceeding No. 128828 of the same court, while he was still alive.

In our resolution of November 19, 1990, we denied the petition for review for it raises onlyfactual issues. However, upon the petitioner's motion for reconsideration, we set aside thatresolution and gave due course to the petition so that the parties may argue their respective

positions with more depth and scope. After a more thorough consideration of thosearguments, we are persuaded that the decision of the Court of Appeals should not bechanged.

Don Cayetano Revilla y De la Fuente owned two valuable pieces of land with buildings onCalle Azcarraga (now C.M. Recto Street) in the City of Manila, and six (6) parcels of land inhis hometown of San Miguel, Bulacan. These properties, now worth some P30 million, areregistered in his name and more particularly described as follows:

a) TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 76620 (not TCT No. 170750-ind.) REGISTRY OF DEEDS FOR THE CITY OF MANILA

A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot. No. 22 of Block No. 2565 of theCadastral Survey of the City of Manila, Cadastral Case No.46, G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 229) with the buildingsand other improvements now found thereon, situated on theSW, line of Calle Azcarraga, District of Quiapo, . . .containing an area of ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDREDNINETY THREE SQUARE METERS AND SEVENTYSQUARE DECIMETERS (1,193.70), more or less, Assessedvalue P1,834,980.00.

b) TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 66173 (now TCT No. 170751-ind.) REGISTRY OF DEEDS FOR THE CITY OF MANILA

A PARCEL OF LAND ( Lot No. 24 of Block No. 2565 of theCadastral Survey of the City of Manila, Cadastral Case No.46, G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 229) with the buildingsand improvements now found thereon, situated on the SW.line of Calle Azcarraga; District of Quiapo. . . . containing anarea of SEVEN HUNDRED SQUARE METERS ANDSEVENTY SQUARE DECIMETERS (700.70), MORE ORLESS.

Assessed value P3,297,150.00

c) TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-192136 REGISTRY OFDEEDS FOR THE PROVINCE OF BULACAN


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A parcel of land (Lot 1245-A-6 of the subd. plan (LRC) Psd-177051, being a portion of Lot 1245-A, Psd-11366, LRC Cad.Rec. No. 700), situated in the Barrio of Salacot, Mun. of SanMiguel, Prov. of Bulacan, Island of Luzon. . . . containing anarea of TEN THOUSAND (10,000) SQUARE METERS, moreor less.

Assessed value P4.000.00

d) TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-192137 REGISTRY OFDEEDS FOR THE PROVINCE OF BULACAN

A parcel of land [Lot 1245-A-7 of the subd. plan (LRC) Psd-177051, being a portion of Lot 1245-A, Psd-11366, LRC Cad.Rec. No. 700], situated in the Barrio of Salacot, Mun. of SanMiguel, Prov. of Bulacan, Island of Luzon, . . . containing anarea of SEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED NINETY(7,890) SQUARE METERS, more or less.

Assessed value P3,790.00

e) TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-22049 REGISTRY OFDEEDS FOR THE PROVINCE OF BULACAN

A parcel of land (Lot 1245-A-9 of the subd. plan (LRC) Psd-177051, being a portion of Lot 1245-A, Psd-11366, LRC Cad.Rec. No. 700), situated in the Barrio of Salacot, Municipalityof San Miguel, Prov. of Bulacan, . . . containing an area ofONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FOURTEEN (1,514)SQUARE METERS, more or less.


f) TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 22263 REGISTRY OF DEEDSFOR THE PROVINCE OF BULACAN

A parcel of land (Lot No. 722 of the Cadastral Survey of SanMiguel), situated in the Municipality of San Miguel. . . .containing an area of SEVENTEEN THOUSAND ANDEIGHTY SIX (17,086) SQUARE METERS, more or less.


g) TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-242301 REGISTRY OFDEEDS FOR THE PROVINCE OF BULACAN

A parcel of land (Lot 108 of the Cad. Survey of San Miguel),situated in the Municipality of San Miguel. . . . containing anarea of FIVE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY THREE SQUAREMETERS more or less.


h) Cemetery lots with a mausoleum (Lots Nos. 66, 67, 68, 69, 70 and 71,Block No. 3) situated at the Sta. Rita Memorial Park, San Miguel, Bulacan (no

commercial value). (pp. 63-64, Rollo.)


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On January 28, 1978, Don Cayetano Revilla, a bachelor, without issue nor any survivingascendants, executed a last will and testament bequeathing all his properties to his nine (9)nephews and nieces, the parties herein, who are full blood brothers and sisters, including thepetitioner, Heracio Revilla. To each of them, he bequeathed an undivided one-tenth (1/10) ofhis estate reserving the last tenth for masses to be said after his death, and for the care of thereligious images which he kept in a chapel in San Miguel, Bulacan, where masses could be

held also (p. 126, Records).

During his lifetime, Don Cayetano had himself sought the probate of his will and on March 21,1980 the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, after due hearing in Special ProceedingNo. 128828, allowed and admitted said will to probate.

On November 19, 1981, however, the City Hall of Manila was destroyed by fire. The recordsof Special Proceeding No. 128828 also went up in flames. Shortly thereafter, a petition for thereconstitution of the records of Special Proceeding No. 128828 was filed, and after a properhearing wherein Don Cayetano testified again, the petition for reconstitution was granted.(Exh. "34"). (pp. 51-52, 179, Rollo.)

Don Cayetano died on November 11, 1986 at the age of 91.

On November 19, 1986, Heracio Revilla, the oldest nephew, filed a petition for probate ofanother will, allegedly executed by Don Cayetano on September 13, 1982 wherein he(Heracio) was instituted as sole heirof his uncle's estate and executor of the will.

The probate of the second will was opposed by Heracio's eight (8) brothers and sisters, theprivate respondents herein. As grounds for their opposition, they alleged:

. . . a) that on March 21, 1980 in Special Proceeding No. 128828, the thenCourt of First Instance of Manila, Branch 10, allowed and admitted to probatethe last will and testament of the deceased Cayetano Revilla and that sincethen and up to the time of his death, Cayetano Revilla never informed that herevoked the will dated January 28, 1978; (b) that the will sought to beprobated was not executed in accordance with law and that the signature ofCayetano Revilla was different from his usual and customary signature; (c)that when the will was allegedly executed the decedent was already ofunsound mind or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will or wasalready incompetent and could not, without outside aid, take care of himselfand manage his properties becoming thereby an easy prey of deceit andexploitation; d) that the alleged will was executed with undue and improperpressure and influence on the part of he beneficiaries thereon or some otherpersons for their benefit; e) that the will is void and ineffective for the reasonthat it was executed under duress or the influence of fear or of threats; and f)that the decedent acted by mistake and the signatures in the alleged willwere procured by fraud or trick, and he did not intend that the instrumentshould be his will at the time of fixing (sic) his signatures thereto (Oppositionto Probate of Alleged Will, pp. 7-8, Records).

The private respondents also opposed Heracio's petition for appointment as executor and/orspecial administrator of the estate on the ground that the alleged will is null and void, hencethe designation therein of Heracio as executor is likewise null and void, and that moreover, heis unfit for the trust (pp. 9-12. Records).

In an order dated May 7, 1987, the lower court held in abeyance the resolution of the issuewith regard to the propriety of Heracio's being appointed as executor (pp. 34-36, Records),but ordered the parties to present their evidence pro and con vis-a-vis the probate of thesecond will (Ibid).


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On December 1, 1987, the trial court rendered a decision disallowing the second will and,accordingly, dismissed the case with costs against the petitioner (Decision. pp. 144-184,Records; pp. 52-53. Rollo.)

On appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 18190, Sept. 19, 1990), the decision ofthe lower court was affirmed. This petition for review was filed by Heracio under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Court.

The lone issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals (and the trial court) erred indisallowing the alleged second will of Don Cayetano Revilla.

After a careful examination of the records, we share the appellate court's doubts regardingthe authenticity and due execution of the second will. Indeed, when Don Cayetano testified onNovember 27, 1982 in the reconstitution proceedings, he was unaware of the second willwhich he supposedly made only two months previous on September 13, 1982. He identifiedhis first will and declared that it was his true and only will. He denied having subsequentlymade another will. He could not have executed a second will on September 13, 1982because he was sick in the hospital at that time for two (2) months before October 21,

1982, or, in August to September 1982, and he did not, and could not, sign any papers whilehe was confined in the hospital.

ATTY. DAVID

May I request that this letter dated October 21, 1982, bemarked Exhibit "C" . . .

xxx xxx xxx

By the way Mr. Revilla, will you tell us whether you can stillread when you signed this letter?

A Yes, I can.

Q Did you read the contents of this letter?

A Yes, I did.

Q When you were sick, before you signed this letter onOctober 21, 1982, were you confined at the hospital?

A Yes.

Q How long were you confined at the hospital, was it forone month?

A More than one month, may be two months.

Q When you were in the hospital you cannot signbecause you were sick?

A No, I cannot sign.

xxx xxx xxx


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Q Will you tell us Don Cayetano if you ever executed alast will and testament after this one has been probated bythe Court?

A None, sir. (pp. 20-30, tsn, November 27, 1982.)

He recognized the original will and acknowledged that he signed it.

ATTY. DAVID

. . . we were granted by the Court permission to come here tofind out from you about your will approved by the Court whichwas burned which needs to be reconstituted which Atty.Dacanay undertook as your counsel and I was includedbecause your heirs requested me, . . . Since the documentswere burned, we have here a brown envelope which stateson its face "Buksan ito pagkalibing ko" then a signatureCayetano Revilla that one in the Court which was

approved by the Court we would like to request from you ifthis is the envelope which contains a copy of the will and ifthis is your signature?

xxx xxx xxx

Q And at the back of this envelope are four signatures,are these your signatures?

A (Looking over the four signatures at the back of theenvelope) Yes, these are all my signatures.

Q And your instructions were to open this envelope . . ."Buksan ito pagkalibing ko."

A Yes, that is right.

Q And since you are still alive you asked the Court thatyour last will and testament be approved and allowed andwhat is in the last will and testament is what will prevail?

A Yes, sir. (pp. 119-120, Rollo; Emphasis ours.)

He identified his first will and directed Atty. David to deliver it to the Court: "siyang ibigay sa

husgado" (p. 122.Rollo).

ATTY. DAVID

Now that I have told you in the presence of your grandson-in-law, Atty. Latosa, that the last will and testament which thecourt admitted and allowed to probate was burned, why Iasked you if this is the envelope and you remember this isthe envelope and you said you do, and that the fivesignatures appearing in this envelope are your signatures,now are you willing to have this envelope opened?

A Yes, kung anong nandiyan, siyang ibigay sa husgado.(p. 122, Rollo.)


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Although the envelope containing a copy of the first will was sealed, with instructions to openit after his funeral, Don Cayetano wanted "to open it now" (p. 123, Rollo).

ATTY. LATOSA Can you please read what is written in thatenvelope which you allowed to be opened.

A Yes, "buksan ito pagkalibing ko."

ATTY. DAVID Do you want to open this now?

A Yes.

Q Do you wish to open this envelope now?

A Yes, I want to open it now.(p. 23, Rollo.)

Don Cayetano declared that he understood that the document inside the envelope was hiswill ["naiintindihan ko po iyon" (p. 131, Rollo)].

Q This envelope which contained the last will andtestament which I took the contents in your presence and inthe presence of the other representation here including therepresentatives of the Court, the document contained thereinis entitled, "Unang Pahina, Huling Habilin Ni Don CayetanoRevilla," consisting of fourteen pages, the title means thatthis is your last will and testament?

A Yes, Naiintindihan ko po iyon.

Q And you executed this on the 28 of January as

appearing . . . 28th of January 1978, as appearing on the13th page of this last will and testament?

A Yes.

Q And all pages of this last will and testament were allsigned by you which reads Cayetano Revilla, will you go overthese fourteen pages and tell us if the signatures herereading Cayetano Revilla are your signatures?

A (After going over the document, page by page andlooking at the signature reading Cayetano Revilla in every

page) Yes, these are all my signatures, the ones readingCayetano Revilla. (p 131, Rollo; Emphasis supplied.)

He recognized himself and his lawyer, Attorney Benjamin Dacanay, in the pictures that weretaken during the signing of his first will.

Q Now, in this envelope there are pictures five pictures inall, will you go over these and tell us if you can rememberany of those persons appearing in the pictures?

A This one, (testator pointing to a person in the picture) isMr. Dacanay.

ATTY. DAVID


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May I request that this picture wherein Don Cayetano Revillaidentified Atty. Dacanay, be marked as Exhibit "D".

There is a person in this picture, the one second from theleft, will you go over it and see if you remember that person?

A I am that person.

Q Now in this second picture, do you recognize anybodyhere?

A Yes, I can recognize myself when I was signing the will.

Q Who else do you know is present in that picture?

A This one, he is Mr. Dacanay.

Q How about the other one?

A I don't know the others. (p. 133, Rollo; Emphasissupplied.)

Don Cayetano assured Attorney David that his original will was his "genuine will andtestament and not changed" (p. 134, Rollo).

ATTY. DAVIDxxx xxx xxx

We are doing this Mr. Revilla because in case there will bean opposition to this last will and testament we can provethat this is the genuine will and testament and not changed.

A Yes, that is true sir, that is the truth. (p. 134, Rollo.)

He declared that he did not execute another last will and testament after the original will hadbeen probated.

Q Will you tell us Don Cayetano if you ever executed alast will and testament after this one has been probated bythe Court?

A None, sir. (p. 135. Rollo.)

The petitioner's contention that Don Cayetano's denial constitutes "negative declaration"which has no "probative value under the rules of evidence" (p. 73, Rollo) is not correct. DonCayetano's assertion that he did not execute another will, was not negative evidence.Evidence is negative when the witness states that he did not see or know the occurrence of afact, and positive when the witness affirms that a fact did or did not occur (2 Moore an Facts,p 1338). Don Cayetano's declaration that he did not execute a second will, constitutespositive evidence of a fact personally known to himself: that he did not make a second will. Ascorrectly held by the Court of Appeals:

This categorical denial by the late Cayetano Revilla must be believed byeverybody. If he denied having executed another will, who are we to insistthat he made another or second will after the probate of his will dated

January 28, 1978? The testimonies of the alleged notary public as well as thethree instrumental witnesses of the alleged second will of the late Cayetano


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Revilla cannot outweigh the denial of the late Cayetano Revilla. . . . . (p.95, Rollo.)

Significantly, although the petitioner opposed the reconstitution of Don Cayetano's first will, hedid not reveal the second will which Don Cayetano supposedly made only two (2) monthsbefore he testified in the reconstitution proceeding. Why was the second will kept under

wraps? Did Heracio fear that if Don Cayetano were confronted with the document, he wouldhave disowned it? The explanation of the petitioner that an inquiry into the existence of thesecond will "was totally uncalled for, immaterial, and irrelevant" (p. 96, Rollo), is unconvincing.For if the second will already existed on November 27, 1982, it would have been Heracio'sstrongest argument against the reconstitution of the probate of the first will.

The petitioner's argument that Don Cayetano's testimony is inadmissible because petitioner'scounsel, Attorney Layosa, had no opportunity tocross-examine him (p. 146, Rollo), does not wash. The opportunity was there all the time.Attorney Layosa simply made no attempt to exercise his right tocross-examine Don Cayetano.

If Don Cayetano's testimony was "an honest mistake due to a misapprehension of fact" as thepetitioner insists (p. 35, Rollo), that mistake would have been rectified by inviting his attentionto the second will. It seems, however, that Attorney Layosa was under constraint not todisclose the second will to Don Cayetano.

Even the letter that Don Cayetano supposedly sent to the court disowning the petition forreconstitution of the records of the first probate proceeding, did not disclose that he hadalready made another will. As pointedly observed by the Court of Appeals, if Don Cayetanowere aware that he made a second will, he "could have easily told the Court that thereconstitution proceeding was useless" because he had already made a second will revokingthe first(pp. 54-55, Rollo).

The testimonies of the notary and attesting witnesses and even the photographs of whatpurported to be the signing of the second will were not given credit by the trial court and theCourt of Appeals. The court's observation that the photographs do not show the nature of thedocument that was being signed, nor the date of the transaction, is valid. The lower court'sdistrust for the testimonies of the attesting witnesses to the second will deserves our highestrespect (People vs. Sarol, 139 SCRA 125; Guita vs. CA., 139 SCRA 576; People vs. Cabanit,139 SCRA 94).

Since the execution of the second will could not have occurred on the date (September 13,1982) appearing therein (for Don Cayetano was admittedly sick in the hospital then) it musthave been procured at the time when the testator was a virtual prisoner, held incommunicado,in his house. The Honorable Judge (later Court of Appeals Justice) Eduardo Bengson had toissue an order commanding the petitioner to allow his eight (8) brothers and sisters to visitDon Cayetano. Only then were they able to penetrate the iron curtain that Heracio had placedaround their uncle. A videotape, taken during their pleasant visit with the old man and shownin court, belied Heracio's allegation that Don Cayetano was displeased with his said nephewsand nieces, that was why he left them out of his second will.

Despite Judge Bengzon's order, Heracio did not cease his efforts to monopolize DonCayetano and his estate. To isolate Don Cayetano and make him inacessible to the privaterespondents, Heracio transferred him from his own house on Claro M. Recto Avenue inManila to Heracio's house in Novaliches, Quezon City.

The execution of the second will in an environment of secrecy and seclusion and thedisinheritance of his eight (8) other nephews and nieces of whom he was equally fond,

justified the trial court's and the Court of Appeals' belief that undue influence was exercisedby Horacio over Don Cayetano to make him sign the second will (which Don Cayetano did not


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know to be such) in order to deprive his brothers and sisters of their rightful share in theiruncle's estate.

The employment of undue influence by Heracio was not "mutually repugnant" to fraud (p.172, Rollo) as the petitioner insists, for it was the means employed by Heracio to defraud hisbrothers and sisters of their share in Don Cayetano's estate.

There was fraud because Don Cayetano was not apprised that the document he was signingwith Co, Barredo and Lim was a second will revoking the dispositions of property that hemade in his first will. Had he been aware that it was a second will, and if it were prepared athis own behest, he would not have denied that he made it. He would probably have caused itto be probated while he was still alive, as he did with his first will.

But apparently, the instrument was foisted on him without his being aware of its true naturewhich the petitioner assiduously concealed, not only from the court and the privaterespondents, but from Don Cayetano himself.

That the dispositions in the second will were not made by Don Cayetano is proven by the

omission therefrom of Don Cayetano's reservation of one-tenth of his properties and theincome thereof to pay for holy masses for the repose of his soul and to be spent for themaintenance of his family chapel which houses the religious images he owned in San Miguel,Bulacan. That provision in his first will, for his personal benefit, would not have been deletedby Don Cayetano if his only purpose in making a second will was to disinherit his eightnephews and nieces. But Heracio overdid himself. He wanted everything.

The objection to the deposition of Don Cayetano for want of an oath before he testified, istardy. Objection to the lack of an oath should have been made at the taking of his deposition.Section 29(d), Rule 24 of the Rules of Court provides:

(d) As to oral examination and other particulars

Errors and irregularities occurring at the oral examination in the manner oftaking the deposition, in the form of the questions or answers, in the oath oraffirmation, or in the conduct of the parties anderrors of any kind which mightbe obviated, removed, or cured if promptly prosecuted, are waived unlessreasonable objection thereto is made at the taking of the deposition.(Emphasis ours.)

While the petitioner puts much stock in the supposed due execution of the will and thecompetence of the attesting witnesses Co, Barredo andLim the trial court, with whom the Court of Appeals agreed, gave them low marks forcredibility. The factual observations of the Court of Appeals on this point are quoted below:

Assuming for the sake of arguments that the second will was executed, thetestimonies of the notary public who prepared and before whom the will wasacknowledged, as well as those of the three (3) instrumental witnessesthereof were not given credit by the lower court, and so with this Court,because of major contradictions in testimonies.

As regards notary public Atty. Mendoza, the court a quo doubted hiscredibility as follows:

The prevarications on the testimonies of witnesses are notdifficult to find especially if we consider that in a secondmeeting only with Don Cayetano, Atty. Mendoza would

readily be entrusted with the delicate and confidentialpreparation of a second will, designed to disinherit his eightnephews and nieces in favor of Heracio, the operator of the


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bowling alley where witness Mendoza always play; . . . (p.36, Decision; p. 179, Records)

. . . Added to this is the statement of Atty. Mendoza that theold man could understood (sic) both English or Tagalog. Onthis score, this Court entertains doubt as to its truthfulness

because it was testified to by Barredo, prosecution witnessand corroborated by Ms. Bingel, principal witness for theoppositors, that the old man is versatile in Tagalog as he is aBulakeo but could not speak English except to say word,yes, sir. . . . . (p. 33, Decision, p. 176, Records).

With respect to witness Alfredo Barredo, the truthfulness of his testimonieswas doubted by the lower court in this wise:

. . . . Another point noticed by this Court is the testimony ofAlfredo Barredo that after talking with Atty. Mendoza at thephone he was asked by the old man to fetch the 2 witnesses

however when asked on direct examination, he stated thathe stayed all along with the old man and did not leave himeven after talking with Atty. Mendoza, which spells a whale ofdifference in time element and enormously distanced fromthe truth. So also, his exaggerated demonstration of theability of the old man in answering even small children yes,sir, is too good to be true. . . . . (pp. 33-34, Decision, pp. 176-177, Records).

Witness Dr. Co's testimony that he did not charge the late Cayetano Revillafor two services rendered by him and that he only charged when a thirdservice was made was also doubted by the lower court. Said the court a quo:

. . . witnesses Co, a practicing dentist was munificent enoughnot to charge Don Cayetano for two time services and onlycharged him the 3rd time.

It may be added here that the testimony of Dr. Co that the testator read hiswill in silence before they were asked to affix their signatures (tsn., Aug. 17,1987, pp. 30-31, 45) is completely different from the testimony of anotherwitness (Fernando Lim) who testified that the late Don Cayetano read his willaloud before he gave it to the witnesses for their signatures (tsn., Aug. 13,1987, pp. 47, 52).

The above citations of the inconsistencies and contradictions fatally made by

said witnesses are only some of the more important ones as discussed in thedecision of the lower court. But they are enough, to say the least, to convincethis Court that indeed said witnesses crossed the boundaries of theircredibilities. (pp. 56-57, Rollo.)

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals, the petitionfor review is DENIED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.


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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23079 February 27, 1970

RUBEN AUSTRIA, CONSUELO AUSTRIA-BENTA and LAURO AUSTRIAMOZO, petitioners,vs.HON. ANDRES REYES, Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, PERFECTO CRUZ,BENITA CRUZ-MENEZ ISAGANI CRUZ, ALBERTO CRUZ and LUZ CRUZ-SALONGA respondents.

Salonga, Ordoez, Yap, Sicat and Associates for petitioners.

Ruben Austria for himself and co-petitioners.

De los Santos, De los Santos and De los Santos for respondent Perfecto Cruz.

Villareal, Almacen, Navarra and Amores for other respondents.

CASTRO, J.:

On July 7, 1956 Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal(Special Proceedings 2457) a petition for probate, ante mortem, of her last will andtestament. The probate was opposed by the present petitioners Ruben Austria, ConsueloAustria-Benta and Lauro Austria Mozo, and still others who, like the petitioner, arenephews and nieces of Basilia. This opposition was, however, dismissed and the probateof the will allowed after due hearing.

The bulk of the estate of Basilia, admittedly, was destined under the will to pass on to therespondents Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz, and LuzCruz-Salonga, all of whom had been assumed and declared by Basilia as her own legallyadopted children.

On April 23, 1959, more than two years after her will was allowed to probate, Basilia died.The respondent Perfecto Cruz was appointed executor without bond by the same court inaccordance with the provisions of the decedent's will, notwithstanding the blockingattempt pursued by the petitioner Ruben Austria.

Finally, on November 5, 1959, the present petitioners filed in the same proceedings apetition in intervention for partition alleging in substance that they are the nearest of kin ofBasilia, and that the five respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., had not in fact been adoptedby the decedent in accordance with law, in effect rendering these respondents merestrangers to the decedent and without any right to succeed as heirs.

Notwithstanding opposition by the respondent Perfecto Cruz, as executor of the estate,the court a quo allowed the petitioners' intervention by its order of December 22, 1959,couched in broad terms, as follows: "The Petition in Intervention for Partition filed by the


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above-named oppositors [Ruben Austria, et al.,] dated November 5, 1959 is herebygranted."

In the meantime, the contending sides debated the matter of authenticity or lack of it ofthe several adoption papers produced and presented by the respondents. On motion ofthe petitioners Ruben Austria, et al., these documents were referred to the NationalBureau of Investigation for examination and advice. N.B.I. report seems to bear out thegenuineness of the documents, but the petitioners, evidently dissatisfied with the results,managed to obtain a preliminary opinion from a Constabulary questioned-documentexaminer whose views undermine the authenticity of the said documents. The petitionersRuben Austria, et al., thus moved the lower court to refer the adoption papers to thePhilippine Constabulary for further study. The petitioners likewise located formerpersonnel of the court which appeared to have granted the questioned adoption, andobtained written depositions from two of them denying any knowledge of the pertinentadoption proceedings.

On February 6, 1963, more than three years after they were allowed to intervene, thepetitioners Ruben Austria, let al., moved the lower court to set for hearing the matter of

the genuineness of the adoption of the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., by the lateBasilia. Before the date set by the court for hearing arrived, however, the respondentBenita Cruz-Meez who entered an appearance separately from that of her brotherPerfecto Cruz, filed on February 28, 1963 a motion asking the lower court, by way ofalternative relief, to confine the petitioners' intervention, should it be permitted, toproperties not disposed of in the will of the decedent.

On March 4, 1963, the lower court heard the respondent Benita's motion. Both sidessubsequently submitted their respective memoranda, and finally, the lower court issuedan order on June 4, 1963, delimiting the petitioners' intervention to the properties of thedeceased which were not disposed of in the will.

The petitioners moved the lower court to reconsider this latest order, eliciting thereby anopposition, from the respondents. On October 25, 1963 the same court denied thepetitioners' motion for reconsideration.

A second motion for reconsideration which set off a long exchange of memoranda fromboth sides, was summarily denied on April 21, 1964.

Hence this petition forcertiorari, praying this Court to annul the orders of June 4 andOctober 25, 1963 and the order of April 21, 1964, all restricting petitioners' intervention toproperties that were not included in the decedent's testamentary dispositions.

The uncontested premises are clear. Two interests are locked in dispute over the bulk ofthe estate of the deceased. Arrayed on one side are the petitioners Ruben Austria,Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Austria Mozo, three of a number of nephews andnieces who are concededly the nearest surviving blood relatives of the decedent. On theother side are the respondents brothers and sisters, Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meez,Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz and Luz Cruz-Salonga, all of whom heirs in the will of thedeceased Basilia, and all of whom claim kinship with the decedent by virtue of legaladoption. At the heart of the controversy is Basilia's last will immaculate in its extrinsicvalidity since it bears the imprimatur of duly conducted probate proceedings.

The complaint in intervention filed in the lower court assails the legality of the tie whichthe respondent Perfecto Cruz and his brothers and sisters claim to have with thedecedent. The lower court had, however, assumed, by its orders in question, that thevalidity or invalidity of the adoption is not material nor decisive on the efficacy of theinstitution of heirs; for, even if the adoption in question were spurious, the respondents


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Perfecto Cruz, et al., will nevertheless succeed not as compulsory heirs but astestamentary heirs instituted in Basilia's will. This ruling apparently finds support in article,842 of the Civil Code which reads:

One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose of by will all his estate orany part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.

One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided hedoes not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to thelegitime of said heirs.

The lower court must have assumed that since the petitioners nephews and niece are notcompulsory heirs, they do not possess that interest which can be prejudiced by a free-wheeling testamentary disposition. The petitioners' interest is confined to properties, ifany, that have not been disposed of in the will, for to that extent intestate succession cantake place and the question of the veracity of the adoption acquires relevance.

The petitioners nephews and niece, upon the other hand, insist that the entire estateshould descend to them by intestacy by reason of the intrinsic nullity of the institution ofheirs embodied in the decedent's will. They have thus raised squarely the issue ofwhether or not such institution of heirs would retain efficacy in the event there existsproof that the adoption of the same heirs by the decedent is false.

The petitioners cite, as the controlling rule, article 850 of the Civil Code which reads:

The statement of a false cause for the institution of an heir shall beconsidered as not written, unless it appears from the will that the testatorwould not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of suchcause.

Coming closer to the center of the controversy, the petitioners have called the attention ofthe lower court and this Court to the following pertinent portions of the will of thedeceased which recite:

III

Ang aking mga sapilitang tagapagmana (herederos forzosos) ay angaking itinuturing na mga anak na tunay (Hijos legalmente adoptados) nasina Perfecto, Alberto, Luz, Benita at Isagani, na pawang may apelyidongCruz.

xxx xxx xxx

Kung ako ay bawian ng Dios ng buhay, ay aking ipinamamana ang akingmga ari-ariang maiiwan, sa kaparaanang sumusunod:

A.Aking ipinamamana sa aking nabanggit na limang anak na sinaPerfecto, Alberto, Luz, Benita at Isagani, na pawang may apelyidongCruz, na parepareho ang kaparti ng bawa't isa at walang lamangan (enpartes iguales), bilang kanilang sapilitang mana (legiti[ma]), ang kalahati() ng aking kaparti sa lahat ng aming ari-ariang gananciales ng akingyumaong asawang Pedro Cruz na napapaloob sa Actuacion Especial No.640 ng Hukumang Unang Dulugan ng Rizal at itinutukoy sa No. 1 ng

parafo IV ng testamentong ito, ang kalahati () ng mga lagay na lupa atpalaisdaan na nasa Obando at Polo, Bulacan, na namana ko sa aking


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yumaong ama na si Calixto Austria, at ang kalahati () ng ilang lagay nalupa na nasa Tinejeros, Malabon, Rizal, na aking namana sa yumao kongkapatid na si Fausto Austria.

The tenor of the language used, the petitioners argue, gives rise to the inference that thelate Basilia was deceived into believing that she was legally bound to bequeath one-halfof her entire estate to the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. as the latter's legitime. Thepetitioners further contend that had the deceased known the adoption to be spurious, shewould not have instituted the respondents at all the basis of the institution being solelyher belief that they were compulsory heirs. Proof therefore of the falsity of the adoptionwould cause a nullity of the institution of heirs and the opening of the estate wide tointestacy. Did the lower court then abuse its discretion or act in violation of the rights ofthe parties in barring the petitioners nephews and niece from registering their claim evento properties adjudicated by the decedent in her will?

Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil Code, thefollowing requisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs must bestated in the will; second, the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear

from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he hadknown the falsity of the cause.

The petitioners would have us imply, from the use of the terms, "sapilitang tagapagmana"(compulsory heirs) and "sapilitang mana" (legitime), that the impelling reason or causefor the institution of the respondents was the testatrix's belief that under the law shecould not do otherwise. If this were indeed what prompted the testatrix in instituting therespondents, she did not make it known in her will. Surely if she was aware thatsuccession to the legitime takes place by operation of law, independent of her ownwishes, she would not have found it convenient to name her supposed compulsory heirsto their legitimes. Her express adoption of the rules on legitimes should very well indicateher complete agreement with that statutory scheme. But even this, like the petitioners'

own proposition, is highly speculative of what was in the mind of the testatrix when sheexecuted her will. One fact prevails, however, and it is that the decedent's will does notstate in a specific or unequivocal manner the cause for such institution of heirs. Wecannot annul the same on the basis of guesswork or uncertain implications.

And even if we should accept the petitioners' theory that the decedent instituted therespondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. solely because she believed that the law commandedher to do so, on the false assumption that her adoption of these respondents was valid,still such institution must stand.

Article 850 of the Civil Code, quoted above, is a positive injunction to ignore whateverfalse cause the testator may have written in his will for the institution of heirs. Such

institution may be annulled only when one is satisfied, after an examination of the will,that the testator clearly would not have made the institution if he had known the cause forit to be false. Now, would the late Basilia have caused the revocation of the institution ofheirs if she had known that she was mistaken in treating these heirs as her legallyadopted children? Or would she have instituted them nonetheless?

The decedent's will, which alone should provide the answer, is mute on this point or atbest is vague and uncertain. The phrases, "mga sapilitang tagapagmana"and "sapilitangmana,"were borrowed from the language of the law on succession and were used,respectively, to describe the class of heirs instituted and the abstract object of theinheritance. They offer no absolute indication that the decedent would have willed herestate other than the way she did if she had known that she was not bound by law to

make allowance for legitimes. Her disposition of the free portion of her estate (libredisposicion) which largely favored the respondent Perfecto Cruz, the latter's children, and


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the children of the respondent Benita Cruz, shows a perceptible inclination on her part togive to the respondents more than what she thought the law enjoined her to give to them.Compare this with the relatively small devise of land which the decedent had left for herblood relatives, including the petitioners Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Mozo and thechildren of the petitioner Ruben Austria. Were we to exclude the respondents PerfectoCruz, et al. from the inheritance, then the petitioners and the other nephews and nieces

would succeed to the bulk of the testate by intestacy a result which would subvert theclear wishes of the decedent.

Whatever doubts one entertains in his mind should be swept away by these explicitinjunctions in the Civil Code: "The words of a will are to receive an interpretation whichwill give to every expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of theexpressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferredwhich will prevent intestacy." 1

Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the will evincesan intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate, 2 as wasdone in this case. Moreover, so compelling is the principle that intestacy should be

avoided and the wishes of the testator allowed to prevail, that we could even vary thelanguage of the will for the purpose of giving it effect.3 A probate court has found, by finaljudgment, that the late Basilia Austria Vda. de Cruz was possessed of testamentarycapacity and her last will executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undueinfluence. In this situation, it becomes our duty to give full expression to her will.4

At all events, the legality of the adoption of the respondents by the testatrix can beassailed only in a separate action brought for that purpose, and cannot be the subject ofa collateral attack.5

To the petitioners' charge that the lower court had no power to reverse its order ofDecember 22, 1959, suffice it to state that, as borne by the records, the subsequent

orders complained of served merely to clarify the first an act which the court couldlegally do. Every court has the inherent power to amend and control its processes andorders so as to make them conformable to law and justices.6 That the court a quo haslimited the extent of the petitioners' intervention is also within its powers as articulated bythe Rules of Court.7

ACCORDINGLY, the present petition is denied, at petitioners cost.


Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 45425 March 27, 1992

CELSA L. VDA. DE KILAYKO, ENCARNACION L. VDA. DE PANLILIO andREMEDIOS L. VDA. DE GUINTO,petitioners,vs.HON. JUDGE ERNESTO TENGCO of the Court of First Instance of NegrosOccidental, Bacolod City, Branch IV and RODOLFO LIZARES and AMELO

LIZARES, as Judicial Administrators of the Estate of the late EUSTAQUIALIZARES, respondents.


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G.R. No. 45965 March 27, 1992

ROLDOFO LIZARES and AMELO LIZARES, as Judicial Administrators of theESTATE OF EUSTAQUIA LIZARES, petitioners,vs.HON. JUDGE ERNESTO TENGCO, CELSA L. VDA. DE KILAYKO, ENCARNACION L.VDA. DE PANLILIO and REMEDIOS VDA. DE GUINTO, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

These consolidated cases seek to annul the orders 1dated September 20, 1976, January7, 1977 and January 31, 1977 of the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental,Branch, IV respectively, cancelling the notice oflis pendens filed by Celsa L. Vda. deKilayko, et al. with the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental, denying the motion forreconsideration of the order dated September 20, 1976 filed by Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko,

et al., and holding in abeyance the resolution of defendants' motion to dismiss.

The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:

On November 20, 1962, the late Maria Lizares y Alunan executed a "Testamento" 2whichcontains among its provisions, the following:

DECIMA Asimismo, ordeno y dispongo que mi participacionconsistente en una tercera parte (1/3) de una catorce (1/14) avas partesproindivisas de la Hda. Minuluan, que he adquirido mediante permuta demi hermano Dr. Antonio A. Lizares, se adjudique, como por el presentese adjudica, a mi sobrina Eustaquia Lizares; ENTENDIENDOSE, sin

embargo, que en el caso de que mi citada sobrina Eustaquia Lizaresmuera soltera o sin descendientes legitimos, mi referida participacion enla Hda. Minuluan se adjudicara a mi hermano Antonio A. Lizares que mesobrevivan.

UNDECIMA Tambien ordeno y dispongo que el resto de todas mispropiendades, incluyendo mis participaciones, derechos e intereses (nodispuestos mas arriba) an las Haciendas "Minuluan" (Lotes Nos. 439,403, 1273, 1274, 1278, 1279 y 1280 del Catastro de Talisay, NegrosOccidental), y "Matab-ang" (Lotes Nos. 514, 550, 552, 553 y 1287-C delCatastrado de Talisay, Negros Occidental), situadas en el Municipio deTalisay, Provincia de Negros Occidental, I.F., el resto de mis acciones en

la Central Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. (unas 2,860 acciones) y de laFinancing Corporation of the Philippines (unas 53,636 acciones),registradas a mi nombre y no heredadas de mi difunta madre Da. EnricaA. Vda. de Lizares, mis acciones en la Central Bacolod-Murcia MillingCo., Inc., Negros Navigation Co. y otras Compaas Mineras, y todos losdemas bienes no mencionados en este testamento y que mepertenezcan en la fecha de mi muerte, se adjudiquen, como por elpresente adjudico, a mi sobrina Srta. Eusaquia Lizares, hija de mi difuntohermano Don Simplicio Lizares cuidados que mi citada sobrina me haprestado y signe prestandome hasta ahora. Ordeno, sin embargo, a mireferida sobrina, Srta. Eustaquia Lizares, que ella se haga cargo depagar todas las obligaciones que tengo y que gravan sobre laspropriedades adjudicadas a la misma. Asimismo ordeno a mi citadasobrina que ella mande celebrar una Misa Gregoriana cada ao ensufragio de mi alma, y misas ordinarias en sufragio de las almas de mi


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difunto Padre y de mi difunta Madre, el 6 de Marzo y 17 de Deciembre decada ao, respectivamente, y mande celebrar todos los aos la fiesta deSan Jose en Talisay como lo hago hasta ahora. En el caso de que micitada sobrina, Srta. Eustaquia Lizares, falleciere sin dejar descendienteslegitimos, ordeno y dispongo que mi participacion consistente en unasexta parte (1/6) de la Hda. Matab-ang, con su correspondiente cuota de

azucar y otros mejoras, se adjudique a mis hermanas y hermano antesmencionados y que me sobrevivan (Emphasis supplied)

On January 28, 1968, Maria Lizares y Alunan died without any issue leaving said"testamento" in the possession and custody of her niece, Eustquia Lizares. 3On February6, 1968, Eustaquia filed a petition for the settlement of the testate estate of Maria Lizaresy Alunan, before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch IV, docketedas Special Proceedings No. 8452. 4

The required publication of the notice of hearing of the petition having been made, in duecourse, the probate court issued an order declaring the will probated and appointingEustaquia as the executrix of the estate of Maria Lizares. 5

On July 10, 1968, Eustaquia filed a project of partition 6which was granted by the probatecourt in an order dated January 8, 1971. Simultaneously, said court declared the heirs,devisees, legatees and usufructuaries mentioned in the project of partition as the onlyheirs, devisees, legatees and usufructuaries of the estate; adjudicated to them theproperties repectively assigned to each and every one of them, and ordered the Registerof Deeds of Negros Occidental and Bacolod City to effect the corresponding transfer ofthe real properties to said heirs as well as the transfer of shares, stocks, and dividends indifferent corporations, companies and partnerships in the name of Maria Lizares to theheirs and legatees, and the closure of the testate proceedings of Maria Lizares. 7

Thereafter, Eustaquia filed an urgent motion to reopen the testate proceedings in order

that some properties of Maria Lizares which had been omitted in the partition beadjudicated to her. 8 The Court granted the motion and correspondingly reopened thetestate proceedings. It adjudicated to Eustaquia certain shares of stocks, a revolving fundcertificate, plantation credits and sugar quota allocations, and real or personal propertiesof Maria Lizares which were not given by her to any other person in her last will andtestament. 9

On November 28, 1972, the heirs of Maria Lizares, namely: Encarnacion L. Vda. dePanlilio, Remedios L. Vda. de Guinto, Felicidad Paredes Llopez, Rosario ParedesMendoza and Eustaquia Lizares executed an agreement of partition and subdivision,thereby terminating their co-ownership over Lots Nos. 550, 514, 553, 1287-C of planSWO-7446, and 552, all of the Cadastral Survey of Talisay covered by Transfer

Certificates of Title Nos. T-65004, T-65005; T-65006, T-65007, and T-65008. 10

A year later or on November 23, 1973, Eustquia Lizares died single without anydescendant. 11In due time, Rodolfo Lizares and Amelo Lizares were appointed jointadministrators of Eustquia's intestate estate.

On the strength of the testamentary provisions contained in paragraphs 10 and 11 of thewill of Maria Lizares, which were allegedly in the nature of a simple substitution, CelsaVda. de Kilayko, Encarnacion Vda. de Panlilio, and Remedios Vda. de Guinto(hereinafter collectively referred to as Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al.) filed a motion inSpecial Proceedings No. 8452 to reopen once again the testate estate proceedings ofMaria Lizares. They prayed among others that a substitute administrator be appointed;

that the order dated January 8, 1971 be reconsidered and amended by declaring them asheirs to 1/3 of 1/14 of Hda. Minuluan and to 1/6 of Hda. Matab-ang, both of which form an


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aggregate area of 33 hectares; that the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental, aftersuch amendment, be ordered to register at the back of their respective certificates of title,the order of probate and a "declaration" that movants are the heirs of said properties, andcorrespondingly issue new certificates of title in their names. 12

Two (2) sets of intestate heirs of the deceased Eustaquia Lizares namely: Socorro L.Vda. de Escario, Rodolfo Lizares, Mario Lizares, Lucrecia Gustilo, and Aurora LizaresWagner opposed the aforesaid motion. They alleged that the court had no morejurisdiction to reopen the testate estate proceedings of Maria Lizares as the order ofclosure had long become final and that the testamentary provisions sought to beenforced are null and void. 13

On April 6, 1974, the Court issued an order denying the motion to reopen the testateproceedings and holding that inasmuch as the settlement of an estate is a proceeding inrem, the judgment therein is binding against the whole world. It observed that inspite ofthe fact that the movants knew that the court had jurisdiction over them, they did not takepart in the proceedings nor did they appeal the order of January 8, 1971. Thus, the courtconcluded, even if the said order was erroneous, and since the error was not

jurisdictional, the same could have been corrected only by a regular appeal. The periodfor filing a motion for reconsideration having expired, the court opined that the movantscould have sought relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, butunfortunately for the movants, the period for filing such remedy had also elapsed. 14

Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. then filed a motion for reconsideration of said order. Itwas denied on June 17, 1974. 15Hence, on October 14, 1974, the said movants filed acomplaint for recovery of ownership and possession of real property against the joiningadministrators of the estate of Eustaquia Lizares, Rodolfo and Amelo Lizares. It wasdocketed as Civil Case No. 11639 with the then Court of First Instance of NegrosOccidental, Branch IV. 16On the same date, they availed of their rights under Rule 14,Section 24 of Rules of Court

by filing a notice oflis pendens with the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental. 17

As duly appointed judicial joint administrators of the estate of the late Eustaquia Lizares,Rodolfo Lizares and Amelo Lizares (the joint administrators for brevity), filed a motion todismiss alleging that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of thecase; the cause of action was barred by prior judgment, and the complaint stated nocause of action. 18This motion was opposed by the plaintiffs.

On January 23, 1975, the joint administrators filed a motion for the cancellation of thenotice oflis pendens on the contentions that there existed exceptional circumstanceswhich justified the cancellation of the notice oflis pendens and that no prejudice would becaused to the plaintiffs. 19The latter opposed said motion. The defendants having filed a

reply thereto, the plaintiffs filed a rejoinder reiterating their arguments in their oppositionto the motion for cancellation of notice oflis pendens. 20

On September 20, 1976, respondent judge issued an order granting the motion forcancellation of notice oflis pendens. 21The court simultaneously held in abeyance theresolution of the motion to dismiss the complaint.

The joint administrators filed the answer to the complaint in Civil Case No.11639. 22Thereafter, they filed a motion for preliminary hearing on affirmativedefenses. 23Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. vigorously opposed said motion. 24

On November 3, 1976, Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. filed a motion praying for thereconsideration of the order dated September 20, 1976. 25The joint administrators havingfiled an opposition thereto, 26on January 7, 1977 the lower court denied the aforesaid


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motion for reconsideration. 27It held that while a notice oflis pendens would serve asnotice to strangers that a particular property was under litigation, its annotation upon thecertificates of title to the properties involved was not necessary because such properties,being in custodia legis, could not just be alienated without the approval of the court.Moreover, the court added, a notice oflis pendens would prejudice any effort of theestate to secure crop loans which were necessary for the viable cultivation and

production of sugar to which the properties were planted.

Upon receipt of a copy of said order, Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. filed in this Court amotion for extension of time to file a petition for review on certiorari. Docketed as G.R No.L-45425, the petition contends that the grounds of lis pendens, namely, that theproperties are in custodia legis and the lending institutions would not grant crop loans tothe estate, are not the legal groundsprovidedfor under Sec. 24, Rule 14 of the Rules ofCourt for the cancellation of a notice oflis pendens.

Meanwhile, on January 31, 1977, the lower court issued an order stating that since onSeptember 21, 1976 it had held in abeyance the resolution of the motion to dismiss, itwas also proper to suspend the resolution of the affirmative defenses interposed by the

defendants until after trial on the merits of the case. Accordingly, the court set the date ofpre-trial for March 24, 1977. 28

On April 13, 1977, the joint administrators filed before this Court a petition forcertiorari,prohibition and/ormandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It wasdocketed as G.R. No. L-45965. Petitioners contend that the lower court had nojurisdiction over Civil Case No. 11639 as it involves the interpretation of the will of MariaLizares, its implementation and/or the adjudication of her properties. They assert that thematter had been settled in Special Proceedings No. become final and unappealable longbefore the complaint in Civil Case No. 8452 which had become final and unappealablelong before the complaint in Civil Case No. 11639 was filed, and therefore, the cause ofaction in the latter case was barred by the principle ofres judicata. They aver that the

claim of Celsa, Encarnacion and Remedios, sisters of Maria Lizares, over the propertiesleft by their niece Eustaquia and which the latter had inherited by will from Maria Lizares,was groundless because paragraphs 10 and 11 of Maria's will on which Celsa L. Vda. deKilayko, et al. base their claim, conceived of a fideicommissary substitution of heirs.Petitioners contend that said provisions of the will are not valid because under Article 863of the Civil code, they constitute an invalid fideicommissary substitution of heirs.

On April 26, 1977, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the lowercourt from further proceeding with the trial of Civil Case No. 11639. 29After both G.R.Nos. L-45425 and L-45965 had been given due course and submitted for decision, onJanuary 20, 1986, the two cases were consolidated.

The petition in G.R. No. L-45965 is impressed with merit.

In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the willhas been probated. 30The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it,because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right ofa person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. 31Theauthentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity ofthe testator and the compliance with those requirements or solemnities which the lawprescribes for the validity of a will. 32

Pertinent to the issue interposed by the petitioners in G.R. No. L-45965 is Section 1, Rule90 of the Rules of Court which reads:


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Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue made. When the debts,funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to thewidow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordancewith law, have been paid, the court, on application of the executor oradministrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearingupon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled

to the same, naming them and the proportions or parts, to which each isentitled, and such persons may demand and recover their respectiveshares from the executor or administrator, or any other person having thesame in his possession. If there is a controversy before the court as towho are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributiveshares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversyshall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.

No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligationsabove-mentioned has been made orprovidedfor, unless the distributees,or any of them give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditionedfor the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.

Applying this rule, in the cases ofDe Jesus v. Daza, 33and Torres v. Encarnacion, 34theCourt said:

. . . (T)he probate court, having the custody and control of the entireestate, is the most logical authority to effectuate this provision, within theestate proceeding, said proceeding being the most convenient one inwhich this power and function of the court can be exercised andperformed without the necessity of requiring the parties to undergo theincovenience and litigate an entirely different action.

Some decisions of the Court pertinent to the issue that the probate court has the

jurisdiction to settle the claims of an heir and the consequent adjudication of theproperties, are worth mentioning. In the cases ofArroyo v. Gerona,35and Benedicto v.Javellana, 36this Court said:

. . . any challenge to the validity of a will, any objection to theauthentication thereof, and everydemand or claim which any heir, legateeor party interested in a testate or intestate succession may make, mustbe acted upon and decided within the same special proceedings, not in aseparate action, and the same judge having jurisdiction in theadministration of the estate shall take cognizance of the question raised,inasmuch as when the day comes he will be called upon to makedistribution and adjudication of the property to the interested parties. . . .

(Emphasis supplied)

The probate court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to distribute the estate, has the powerto determine the proportion or parts to which each distributee is entitled . . .. 37A projectof partition is merely a proposal for the distribution of the heredity estate which the courtmay accept or reject. It is the court that makes that distribution of the estate anddetermines the persons entitled thereto. 38

In the instant case, the records will show that in the settlement of the testate estate ofMaria Lizares, the executrix, Eustaquia Lizares submitted on January 8, 1971, a projectof partition in which the parcels of land, subject matters of the complaint forreconveyance, were included as property of the estate and assigned exclusively to

Eustaquia as a devisee of Maria Lizares. In accordance with said project of partitionwhich was approved by the probate court, Encarnacion Lizares Vda. de Panlilio,


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Remedios Lizares Vda. de Guinto, Felicidad Paredes Llopez, Rosario Paredes Mendozaand Eustaquia Lizares executed an Agreement of Partition and Subdivision on November28, 1972, whereby they agreed to terminate their co-ownership over Lots Nos. 550, 514,553, 1287-C of SWO-7446 and 552 covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-65004, T-65005, T-65006, T-65007 and T-65008. These facts taken altogether show thatthe Lizares sisters recognized the decree of partition sanctioned by the probate court and

in fact reaped the fruits thereof.

Hence, they are now precluded from attacking the validity of the partition or any part of itin the guise of a complaint for reconveyance. A party cannot, in law and in goodconscience be allowed to reap the fruits of a partition, agreement or judgment andrepudiate what does not suit him. 39Thus, where a piece of land has been included in apartition and there is no allegation that the inclusion was affected through impropermeans or without petitioner's knowledge, the partition barred any further litigation on saidtitle and operated to bring the property under the control and jurisdiction of the court forits proper disposition according to the tenor of the partition. 40The question of privaterespondents title over the lots in question has been concluded by the partition andbecame a closed matter.

The admission made by Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. in their complaint, Civil Case No.11639, that Eustaquia had been in possession of the questioned lots since March 2,1971 up to the time of her death indicates that the distribution pursuant to the decree ofpartition has already been carried out. Moreover, it cannot be denied that when Celsa L.Vda. de Kilayko, et al. moved for the reopening of the testate estate proceedings of MariaLizares, the judicial decree of partition and order of closure of such proceedings wasalready final and executory, then reglementary period of thirty (30) days having elapsedfrom the time of its issuance, with no timely appeal having been filed by them. Therefore,they cannot now be permitted to question the adjudication of the properties left by will ofMaria Lizares, by filing an independent action for the reconveyance of the very sameproperties subject of such partition.

A final decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the landof the estate in the distributees. If the decree is erroneous, it should be corrected byopportune appeal, for once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any otherjudgment in rem, unless properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Where thecourt has validly issued a decree of distribution and the same has become final, thevalidity or invalidity of the project of partition becomes irrelevant. 41

It is a fundamental concept in the origin of every jural system, a principle of public policy,that at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at somedefinite time fixed by law, interest rei publicae ut finis sit litum. "The very object of whichthe courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies." 42The only instance

where a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside iswhen he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake orinadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better practice to secure reliefis the opening of the same by proper motion within the reglementary period, instead of anindependent action, the effect of which if successful, would be for another court or judgeto throw out a decision or order already final and executed and reshuffle properties longago distributed and disposed of. 43

The fundamental principle upon which the doctrine ofres judicata rests is that partiesought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once, that, when a right orfact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or anopportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains

unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law orestate. 44


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All the requisites for the existence ofres judicata are present. Thus, the order approvingthe distribution of the estate of Maria Lizares to the heirs instituted in said will hasbecome final and unappealable; the probate court that rendered judgment hadjurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties; the judgment or orders had beenrendered on the merits; the special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of MariaLizares was a proceedingin rem that was directed against the whole world including

Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al., so that it can be said that there is a similarity of parties inSpecial Proceedings No. 8452 and Civil Case No. 11639, the judicial administrators ofEustaquia being privy to Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al.; there is identity of subject matterinvolved in both actions, namely, the properties left by Maria Lizares; there is identity ofcauses of action because in the first action there was a declaration of the probate court inits order dated April 6, 1974 that although the testatrix intended a fideicommissarysubstitution in paragraphs 10 and 11 of her will, the substitution can have no effectbecause the requisites for it to be valid, had not been satisfied. 45

Granting that res judicata has not barred the institution of Civil Case No. 11639, thecontention of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. that they are conditional substitute heirs ofEustaquia in the testate estate of Maria Lizares 46is not meritorious. While the allegation

of the joint administrators that paragraphs 10 and 11 of Maria Lizares' last will andtestament conceives of a fideicommissary substitution under Article 863 of the Civil Codeis also baseless as said paragraphs do not impose upon Eustaquia a clear obligation topreserve the estate in favor of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al., neither may saidparagraphs be considered as providing for a vulgar or simple substitution.

It should be remembered that when a testator merely names an heir and provides that ifsuch heir should die a second heir also designated shall succeed, there is nofideicommissary substitution. The substitution should then be construed as a vulgar orsimple substitution under Art. 859 of the Civil Code but it shall be effective only if the firstheir dies before the testator. 47In this case, the instituted heir, Eustaquia, survived thetestatrix, Maria Lizares. Hence, there can be no substitution of heirs for, upon Maria

Lizares' death, the properties involved unconditionally devolved upon Eustaquia. Underthe circumstances, the sisters of Maria Lizares could only inherit the estate of Eustaquiaby operation of the law of intestacy.

With respect to the cancellation of the notice oflis pendens on the properties involved,there is no merit in the contention of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al., that the lower courtacted contrary to law and/or gravely abused its discretion in cancelling the notice oflispendens. The cancellation of such a precautionary notice, being a mere incident in anaction, may be ordered by the court having jurisdiction over it at any given time. 48UnderSec. 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, a notice oflis pendens may be cancelled "afterproper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that itis not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded." 49In this

case, the lower court ordered the cancellation of said notice on the principal reason thatthe administrators of the properties involved are subject to the supervision of the courtand the said properties are undercustodia legis. Therefore, such notice was notnecessary to protect the rights of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. More so in this casewhere it turned out that their claim to the properties left by Eustaquia is without any legalbasis.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorariin L-45425 is hereby DENIED but thepetition forcertiorariand prohibition and/ormandamus in L-45965 is GRANTED. Thetemporary restraining order of April 26, 1977 which was issued by the Court in L-45965 ismade PERMANENT. Costs against the petitioners in L-45425.

SO ORDERED.


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Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-17742 December 17, 1966

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DON VICENTE NOBLE. JUAN NOBLE, petitioner-appellee,vs.MARIA S. NOBLE, oppositor-appellant.

Jesus N. Maravilla and Nicolas Belmonte, for petitioner-appellee.Farrera, Belmi and Associates for oppositor-appellant.

BARRERA, J.:

This is an appeal by Maria S. Noble from an order of the Court of First Instance ofBatangas (in Sp. Proc. No. 343), dismissing her opposition to the probate of thepurported last will of the late Don Vicente Noble, who died on April 25, 1959.

The proceedings for the probate of the last will of the deceased was instituted by JuanNoble who was named executor therein and who had expressed willingness to assumethe trust. This was opposed by Maria S. Noble, who claimed to be an illegitimate(spurious) child of the deceased, born on July 22, 1923 out of an illicit relation betweenthe latter and Lucia Sinag. It was alleged that the will sought to be probated, datedAugust 25, 1957, was not the last will and testament of the late Don Vicente Noble; thatfrom all indications as shown by a perusal of the alleged last will of the deceased, the

same was not executed in accordance with the law, and that the said will was executedthrough undue influence, mistake and improper pressure on the part of one or some ofthe beneficiaries, and that petitioner Juan Noble, as then incumbent Assistant GeneralManager of the NAMARCO, a government corporation could not properly execute thetrust of his office in the estate of the deceased, which consists of real and personalproperties located in several provinces. Furthermore, oppositor contended that petitionerhas an adverse interest against those immediately interested in the estate, like her. Thus,she prayed that the purported last Will and Testament presented to the court bedisallowed; that she be declared the only surviving illegitimate daughter of the deceased;and in case the will sought to be probated be allowed, the institution of heirs madetherein be declared null and void; the devises and legacies be declared ineffective forbeing inofficious; and oppositor be declared entitled to one-half of the entire hereditaryestate of the deceased; that instead of petitioner, letters of administration be issued infavor of Mrs. Corazon Apacible de Caiza of Taal, Batangas. Simultaneously, she filed amotion asking for permission to present evidence of her alleged filiation with thedeceased. This motion was opposed by petitioner Juan Noble, on the ground that theclaim was in effect an action for compulsory recognition, and since it was brought afterthe death of the putative father and when claimant was already of majority age, the rightto bring the same has already prescribed pursuant to Article 285 of the new CivilCode.1 This motion was not immediately resolved. Instead, the court proceeded with thereception of the evidence for the petitioner, during which proceeding, the oppositor wasallowed to cross-examine the petitioner's witnesses.

Finding, on the basis of the evidence presented by the petitioner, that the document,Exhibit "D", and its copies, Exhibits "D-1" to "D-12", constitute the last will and testamentof the deceased Vicente Noble, and it was executed with all the formal requirements ofthe law, the aforesaid will was admitted to probate, and Juan Noble was appointed


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administrator of the estate upon a bond of P30,000.00. It was also ruled that the petitionof Maria S. Noble to present proof for the purpose of establishing her filiation, filed afterthe death of the presumed father, had been barred by prescription. Consequently, themotion to dismiss the petition of Maria S. Noble was granted. Oppositor appealed.

The main issue presented in this case requiring resolution by this Court is: what isnecessary to be established by an illegitimate not natural child in order that he may beentitled to successional rights under Article 887 of the new Civil Code, the fact of his barefiliation, or a filiation acknowledged by the putative parent?

While the Civil Code merely provides that "in all cases of illegitimate children, theirfiliation must be duly proved" (Art. 887), there are cogent reasons, both legal and moral,which require that such filiation must be acknowledged by the presumed parent. For, ifthe mere fact of the paternity of the supposed father is all that need be proved, thatconstruction of the law would pave the way to unscrupulous individuals taking advantageof the death of the presumed parent who would no longer be in a position to deny theallegations, to present even fictitious claims and expose the life of the deceased toinquiries affecting his character.

But more important than this, the law could not have demanded anything less than proofof an acknowledged filiation. Precisely, under Article 289 of the new Civil Code, theinvestigation of the paternity or maternity of children mentioned in the two precedingarticles (referring to illegitimate not natural children) is specifically permitted only in thecircumstances enumerated in Articles 283 and 284 of the same code. It must be notedthat these two articles refer to compulsory recognition or acknowledgment. Hence, sincethe proof of filiation required in Article 887, necessarily involves the investigationmentioned in Article 289, and this investigation in turn refers to recognition by theputative parent, it follows that the filiation to be proven must be one that is recognized.

In the present case, what is intended to be proved by appellant is simply the supposed

naked paternity of the deceased. This is evident from the pertinent allegations of heropposition to the probate of the will, which state:

2. That the oppositor is in continuous possession of status of a child of the lateDon Vicente Noble by the direct acts of the latter and/or his family; and, that theoppositor has in her favor evidence and/or proof that the late Don Vicente Nobleis her father.

It may be pointed out that the first sentence does not state that the supposed father hadrecognized or acknowledged the oppositor as his child. It is merely claimed that she wasin continuous possession of the status of a child, an allegation which is a ground forcompelling recognition under Article 283 of the new Civil Code and, therefore,

presupposes no previous recognition. The last sentence alleges that oppositor has in herfavor evidence and/or proof that the late Don Vicente Noble is her father. Again, there isno assertion that she has evidence that the deceased had recognized or acknowledgedher as such a child.

In a unanimous decision, in the case ofPaulino v. Paulino (G.R. No. L-15091, Dec. 28,1961), this Court held:

It is true that by their motion to dismiss the appellees are deemed to haveadmitted that the appellant is the illegitimate spurious, not natural, child of thedeceased Marcos Paulino. Such an admission, however, does not entitle her toinherit from her alleged putative father. It is necessary to allege that her putativefather had acknowledged and recognized her as such. Such acknowledgment isessential and is the basis of her right to inherit. There being no allegation of such


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acknowledgment the action becomes one to compel recognition which can not bebrought after the death of the putative father. (Emphasis supplied.)

This is authority to the declaration that acknowledgment is the basis of the right of aspurious child to enjoy the successional rights mentioned in Articles 287 and 887 of thenew Civil Code. There being no allegation of her recognition or acknowledgment by thealleged father in the petition to establish her filiation, the same, therefore, states no causeof action and the dismissal thereof by the lower court was proper.

Incidentally, the last sentence of the above-quoted portion of the decision inthe Paulino case constitutes a reversal of the ruling contained in the majority opinion inthe case ofZuzuarregui v. Zuzuarregui(G.R. No. L-10010, Oct. 31, 1957) relied upon bythe appellant.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant.So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar andCastro, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 "ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be broughtonly during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:

(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which

case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years fromthe attainment of his majority;

(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document shouldappear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or bothparents recognize the child.

In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from thefinding of the document.

succession 2 cases

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