Comparing Voting Systems by Hannu NurmiReview by: Gordon TullockPublic Choice, Vol. 59, No. 3 (1988), pp. 296-297Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30025153 .

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Comparing voting systems. Hannu Nurmi, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publish- ers, 1987. US $54.

In an earlier issue of this journal, I reviewed John Bonner's Introduction to the Theory of Social Choice, which I thought was an excellent introductory text for the subject although as the reader will know I have some doubts about the subject. Comparing Voting Systems would also be an excellent introduc- tory text although for a somewhat stiffer, more difficult course. Its coverage is complete and the organization, into a series of problems, I think is very good. Once again, my principal criticisms have to do with the subject matter. Further, it should be emphasized that solving the apparent paradox left to us by Arrow is a matter of great importance. But it seems to me that so far not a great deal of progress has been made.

Another similarity between this book and Bonner's is that it also does not discuss at all the American primary-election system. Granted the number of offices which are filled by election in the United States, it seems odd that this particular procedure should be largely ignored by Social Choice. Needless to say, this system is subject to much the same set of difficulties as the others, but it does seem to me it would be worth a formal analysis.

Social Choice and Public Choice are clearly drifting apart. For example, I looked myself up in the index of names in Nurmi and found one glancing refer- ence. On the other hand, I suppose I should consider myself lucky. Buchanan and Downs are not mentioned at all. Olson got two glancing references. The longest entry in the index of names was Borda, although this seems to be an error on the part of the indexer because Condorcet certainly plays a much larg- er role in the book.

Another area that is ignored is bargaining, or more specifically - log-rolling. Here again, the book is to a large extent characteristic of Social Choice. In- deed, Public Choice work has tended to downplay log-rolling in recent years. The Social Choice disinterest in bargaining can, perhaps, best be seen in Nur- mi's repetition without much comment of Sens parentian liberal 'paradox.' To take my own variant of this, suppose that a wealthy but prudish aunt offers to leave me a million dollars in her will if I agree not to read Lady Chatterley's Lover. Such agreement to this would violate the condition of minimal liberty. On the other hand, a law prohibiting me from accepting such a bargain appar- ently would not. I can assure you that under those circumstances - which un- fortunately are unlikely - I would regard Sen and Nurmi's preferences as med- dlesome, not those of my aunt.

Social Choice deals with a very, very important problem and a very, very difficult one. Because it is important, a lot of people have worked very hard, and because it is difficult, they have not gotten very far. We can only hope the continued work of so many first-rate minds wll eventually produce a suitable

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outcome. The situation is very much like that in cancer research. But in their present state, from the standpoint of outsiders like myself, both Social Choice and cancer research are rather depressing subjects. This does not, needless to say, imply that I think we should stop either one and Nurmi's book would be a good place for students to get a start.

Gordon Tullock Department of Economics

University of Arizona Tucson, AZ 85721

Homeward bound: Explaining changes in congressional be- havior. Glenn R. Parker,

Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986. 206 pages.

In his 1978 book Richard Fenno first coined the term home style to describe the ways in which incumbents cultivate their constituents. Parker's study of congressional attentiveness is a commendable, although often repetitive, ef- fort to expand upon Fenno's suggestion that House incumbents were paying more attention to their constituents than in the past. Parker addresses three questions: When did the adoption of attentive home styles occur? Why did members of Congress adopt attentive styles? And what institutional conse- quences have the widespread adoption of attentive home styles had?

Parker begins with a review of previous literature on home style, but his in- troductory chapter is really a summary of his conclusions about the nature and consequences of congressional attentiveness. His point of departure is that the adoption of a more attentive home style enables each member of Congress to have a freer rein in policy matters, that is, to follow the role of a trustee rather than a delegate. Although Parker regards this growing freedom from the pres- sures of constituency to be the focus of his study, most of his book is addressed to less theoretical concerns. In his analysis of data from both the House and Senate, Parker finds a 'period' effect; changes in time spent in the district or state are best explained by the conversion to higher levels of attention as a result of increase in the travel allowance given to each member of Congress. For members of the House, there is also a 'cohort' effect after 1974 as less attentive members are replaced by more attentive ones.

One of Parker's more significant findings arises from his analysis of the rela- tionship between home style and election competition in Chapter 5. He argues that changes in home style by House and Senate incumbents from atypical areas helped them to expand their voting coalitions and therefore expand their re-election margins. The aggregate result was increased electoral safety during the 60s and 70s. Thus Parker has provided an additional clue to the 'case of the disappearing marginals.'

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