fo b4 commission meeting 3-30-04 fdr- tab 1- minutes of the march 2 2004 meeting 161

8/14/2019 FO B4 Commission Meeting 3-30-04 Fdr- Tab 1- Minutes of the March 2 2004 Meeting 161

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N A T I O N A L C O M M IS S IO N O NT E R R O R IS T A T T A C K S O N T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S

Minutes of the March 2, 2004 MeetingThe Chair called the Commission to order at 9:08 a.m. All Commissioners were inattendance.Minutes. Commissioner Roemer asked that he be allowed to append the Monheim andGonzales letters to the minutes. The Vice Chair stated that the practice of appendingitems to the minutes is generally not a useful one, but noted that he in fact had started thepractice, and so therefore could not object to Commissioner Roemer's desire to do so inthis case. Commissioner Roemer's submissions were agreed to. Commissioners Ben-Veniste, Gorelick, and Kerrey submitted additional amendments to the minutes. Theminutes of the February 10 and February 24 meetings were approved.Team 2 Presentation. Team Leader Kevin Scheid delivered a TS/SCI presentation onthe status of his team's investigative findings and policy recommendations. Teammembers Lorry Fenner, Gordon Lederman, and Lloyd Salvetti participated in thepresentation.Policy Discussion. The Executive Director introduced a staff strawman of major policyideas for the Commission's consideration. He emphasized that the purpose of thediscussion was not to arrive at policy recommendations, but to reach a consensus onwhich topics the Commission will try to shapeor reshapeon the national agenda.

Topics 1 & 2: Defining our National Strategy, Bringing Foreign Policy Back InOn Terrorism and the Muslim World. The Executive Director stated that theCommission can perform a service by accurately characterizing the threat, definingobjectives in the war on terror, and determining metrics for success. The Vice Chairnoted that the American people do not understand the phenomenon of terrorism. TheCommission must tackle the question of what kind of enemy we face: How do theyorganize? How are they financed? How do they recruit? Why do they hate us so much?Commissioner Lehman observed that it was the right approach to state the problem inplain language that the general public can understand. Commissioner Gorelick added thatthe Commission must address the dynamism of the enemy and the government's abilityto adapt to such change. She suggested that the Commission introduce the metric ofcatastrophic terrorism into the lexicon, adding that what the government would have todo to end all terrorism would result in the kind of world in which we would not want tolive.Commissioner Kerrey noted that the Commission should 1) not insult the very people inthe Islamic world we are trying to influence, and 2) tell the truth about the threat we face.Commissioner Gorton suggested that the Commission return to the definition of

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COMMISSION SENSITIVEterrorism. He added that terrorism is employed by many groups for many reasons; thereal problem Am erica faces is sympathy for al Qaeda in the Muslim world.Comm issioner Fielding stated that if the Comm ission can help people truly understandthe dynam ic of Islamic terrorism, it would be a powerful incentive to keep the nation onalert. Comm issioner Roem er added that this is a war of ideas; the United States oughtno t take on a war with a religion.On U.S. Foreign Policy. The Vice Chair noted that the Commission is mandated toexamine Am erican diplomacy. He suggested that the Commission m ake foreign policyrecommendations that flow from the 9/11 story. Commissioner Gorelick noted thatpeople in the M uslim world evaluate the United States based on their exposure toAmerican comm ercialism, movies, and the military. She added that the United States hasnot been a benign presence in these societies for the past two decades, and we need moretools than we currently have. The United States also needs a message, and she concludedby urging the Commission to explore when the "national interest" (such as the strongU.S. interest in oil from Saudi Arabia to the exclusion of other considerations) is not inthe "national interest." The Vice Chair added that the national interest is multi-faceted atany given time.On the Middle East Peace Process. Comm issioner Lehman asked if the Commissionshould take on this issue. Commissioner Gorton suggested the Comm ission stay out ofthis debate. Commissioner Kerrey noted that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been usedby Bin L adin and al Qaeda. The Vice Chair stated that U.S. foreign policy hasconsequences, and it is important for the American people to understand that. He didn't,for example, recall any opposition to placing U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, bu t thisapparently was a trigger for Bin Ladin.On Pakistan and Saud i Arabia. The Vice Chair cautioned that the C ommission needs tobe careful on the Saudi question, as the attitude toward Saudi Arabia has hardened. Fordecades, the heart of the deal had been oil versus protection of the monarchies. The dealis changing now, and the dialogue is beginning to deepen. He noted that the UnitedStates should never back off on its values. He went on to observe that the ultimatenightmare w ould be if a radical Islamic regime came to power in Pakistan and gainedcontrol of its nuclear arsenal. Commissioner Gorelick stated that the United States shouldhave issued to Pakistan in 1998 the ultimatum it did in 2001you are either w ith us oragainst us .Commissioner Lehman suggested that the Commission take the issue of Saudi Arabia andfinancing head-on. Com missioner Roemer added that the problem with madrassas shouldalso be addressed.On Leadership. Comm issioner Kerrey implored the C omm ission to consider whendiplomacy is no longer an option and when the nation's leaders need to take additionalsteps. Commissioner Gorelick stated that if Presidents Clinton or Bush had asked for adeclaration of war prior to 9/11, they wouldn't have gotten it. Commissioner Kerrey saidthat it is the job of the president to make the case. C ommissioner G orton noted that it will



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be highly controversial to make judgments about what should have been done, addingthat what the Commission can do effectively is provide recommendations for futurepresidents.

Topic 4: Protecting Security and Preserving LibertiesThe PA TRIOTAct . Commissioner Ben-Veniste stated that it was within theCommission's mandate to look at the PATRIOT Act. He suggested that the Commissionlook at the level of intelligence before the legislation and then examine whether thelegislation has enhanced information sharing. Commissioner Fielding suggested that theCommission outline the debate and make constructive recommendations. CommissionerGorelick stated that there were a lot of PATRIOT Act provisions that are helpful; theproblem is that they vest a lot of power in the government. She suggested that theCommission determine if there is adequate congressional oversight and mechanisms forensuring that these powers are properly used. Commissioners Ben-Veniste and Roemeralso expressed their concern regarding the need for proper checks and balances.On Data Mining, Privacy. Commissioner Gorton noted that the Markle Foundationhadmade a lot of progress in this area. He suggested that the Commission determine the areasin which it can add the most value. The Vice Chair agreed that the Commission does nothave a comparative advantage in this area and that it ought not be a central question forthe Commission.

Topic 5: National DefenseCommissioner Gorelick suggested that multilateral cooperation be added to this section.

Topic 6: Living in a World of RiskOn Homeland Defense. The Vice Chair stated that a key problem with homelandsecurity is that policymakers are unwilling to make judgments about priorities; to do so istoo hard and very risky. He added that policymakers must make such judgments preciselybecause they cannot protect everything or receive intelligence on every threat.Commissioner Fielding added that devising priority lists runs the risk of such lists beingexploited by terrorists.On Public-Private Partnerships. Commissioner Gorelick stated that the problem ofinfrastructure protection was missing from this section. She suggested that thegovernment's hands-off approach to infrastructure protection in the private sector wasmisguided; businesses don't sit down and share vulnerabilities. If the governmentinvested a little money, she added, it would pay off. The Chair reminded the Commissionof the excellent work that Team 8 member Emily Walker had been doing in this area.



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COMMISSION SENSITIVECommissioner Roemer noted that the basic premise of the legislation Randall Yimproposed at the Drew hearing was good.Topic 8: Treatment of Suspected TerroristsOn the Prosecution of Captured Terrorists. Commissioner Ben-Veniste stated that thisquestion pushes the bounds of the Commission's mandate, and that the Commissionwould probab ly need to wait for the Supreme Court ruling before ma king any judgments.The Chair and Comm issioner Roemer agreed that there would not be enough time todelve into this subject area. Th e Vice Chair and Comm issioner Gorelick stated that theCommission could not ignore the issue, although it should not go into much detail. TheVice Chair added that the C omm ission should recognize the dem ands of the war onterrorism. The United States has been condemned by much of the world because there isno legal process in place. Commissioner Kerrey suggested the Commission address thesituation in Guantanamo.O n the 9/11 Plotters. Th e Executive Director urged the Commission to specificallydiscuss the fate of the captured participants in the 9/11 plot. Com missioner Fielding saidthat the Commission should name the people and state what they did; he was not sure thatthe Commission needed to go further than that.Com missioner Ben-Veniste stated his concern regarding the limitations on what theCom mission could say in the final report because the Moussaoui trial. The GeneralCounsel mentioned that the Levin committee had met once and would consider this andother declassification issues.Extension. The Chair recounted recent developments w ith the extension: Last w eek, theWhite House spoke to the Speaker, and although he was not personally for an extension,they were optimistic th at he would go along with it. Over the weekend, the Speaker'sspokesman indicated a change o f heart, and then he declared th at the Senate bill would be"dead on arrival." Senators McCain and Lieberman attached the Commission's extensionto the highway extension, and after a number of phone conversations, the Speaker agreedto extend the reporting date but not the termination date.Th e Executive Director had received assurances from the Speaker's staff regarding anextension of the termination date. The decision could not wait because of the highwayextension was pending and the Senate was about to go out of session. The Chair and ViceChair had ten m inutes to ma ke a judgm ent, and they decided to proceed on the basis ofthese assurances from the Speaker's office.TheVice Chair stated that the letter from the Speaker was unsatisfactory because it doesnot allow for an adequate wind-up period. Com missioner Roem er stated tha t theCom mission should ha ve secured the extra 30 days before accepting the deal. TheExecutive Director explained that by the time the Speaker had agreed to the July 26deadline, there wa sn't enough time to walk him through the issue of a close-down phase.The Chair stated that the Vice Chair and Commissioner Thompson would join him for a



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COMMISSION SENSITIVEmeeting with the Speaker that afternoon to discuss these outstanding matters. The ViceChair thanked Comm issioner Thompson for his assistance with the Speaker. The ViceChair added that the Speaker had heard that the Comm ission was planning to slip past thestatutory deadline. At that afte rnoo n's meeting, they wo uld tell the Speaker that theCom mission intends to hono r the July 26 deadline.Commissioners Ben-Veniste Roem er stated that the Com mission should not acceptanything less than S.2136. The Vice Chair agreed. Com missioners Ben-Veniste,Gorelick, and Roem er expressed his concern about the declassification process.Commissioner Roemer added that the C om mission has not reached out to the Speakerenough. The Vice C hair agreed.Meeting with President and Vice President. The Chair reported that the W hite Househad not changed its conditions for meetings with the President and Vice President. H eadded that the Administration had suggested flexibility o n the issue of time, but itremained opposed to meetings with the full Commission.Comm issioner Thompson asked if the Adm inistration's rationale for these conditions w aslegal, as the meetings might give the appearance of testimony. The General Counselstated that this was the case. Comm issioner Roem er suggested that the C omm issionpostpone this decision, adding that the White House would not be able to sustain itsposition in the face of public pressure. The Chair and C omm issioner Fielding expressedtheir belief that the White House would not change its position. The C hair added that hehad tried repeatedly, and the Administration had not moved an inch.Commissioner Ben-Veniste observed that the interviews (with staff taking the lead andCommissioners folio wing-up) have gone well, adding that the staff had done anincredibly good job in this regard. He suggested tha t the C omm ission m aintain itsposition of a meeting with the full Com mission and continue its other interviews,particularly with President C linton and Vice President Gore. The Vice Chair agreed,noting that there was some time before the Commission would have to make a decision.Rice T estimony. Com missioner Kerrey stated that someone needs to testify publicly forthe Administration. Com missioner Ben-Veniste wondered if the Commission shouldconsider a subpoena. The General Counsel noted that the Commission does no t have anargument based on the need for information; the need is for public dissemination of thatinformation. The Chair stated that he w ould pressure that White House as much as hecould, but he wouldn't vote for a subpoena. Comm issioner Fielding said that he did notknow what purpose it would serve to subpoena someone the Commission knows willresist on a legal basis. He added that the Co mm ission cannot say that it needs D r. Rice'spublic testimony in order to conduct its work.Com missioner Ben-Veniste again suggested that the Com mission vote on a subpoena andhope that the White House reverses its position. Com missioner Kerrey stated that he wasnot prepared to vote for a subpoena; it is the Adm inistration's loss to prevent her publictestimony. Commissioners Gorelick and Roemer suggested that the Commission allow a



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COMMISSION SENSITIVElonger period of time for Dick Clarke's testimony. Commissioner Ben-Veniste withdrewhis suggestion to subpoena Dr. Rice, but he reiterated the need for a fair and balancedhearing.The Executive Director added that the staff did not yet perceive the need for anotherinterview.The Chair adjourned the meeting at 4:30 p.m.


fo b4 commission meeting 3-30-04 fdr- tab 1- minutes of the march 2 2004 meeting 161

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