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FORMAL INSTITUTIONS IN INFORMAL POLITICS:
THE EFFECT OF CLIENTELIST POLITICS ON
PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALIZATION
By
Helen Hyun-Young Lee
A DISSERTATION
Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Political Science - Doctor of Philosophy
2014
ABSTRACT
FORMAL INSTITUTIONS IN INFORMAL POLITICS:
THE EFFECT OF CLIENTELIST POLITICS ON
PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALIZATION
By
Helen Hyun-Young Lee
This dissertation consists of three essays that seek to improve upon theoretical and
empirical accounts of the three dimensions of party system institutionalization: (i) emergence of
new parties; (ii) party nationalization; and (iii) ideological congruence between parties and voters.
In explaining these aspects of the party system, my approach highlights the role of the informal
mechanisms of clientelism. My dissertation argues that clientelism exerts centrifugal forces on the
relationships among key actors, which in turn has negative effects on institutionalization.
The first essay investigates why new parties emerge in an environment where clientelism
is widespread, if clientelist practice empowers the ruling parties as conventional wisdom suggests.
To answer this question, I highlight the structural aspect of clientelism. Drawing upon bargaining
theory, I contend that when extensive clientelist practice is coupled with a decentralized resource
structure, abundant resources actually reduce political actors’ incentives to pledge allegiance to
the incumbent party, as in this situation their resource needs can be easily met by alternative
resource channels. I demonstrate that the combination of clientelist resources and decentralized
clientelist structure creates an incubator for the birth of new parties.
In the second essay, I ask why some parties are competitive throughout the country, while
others appeal to only a few specific regions. In this study, I examine if and how much informal
mechanisms of clientelism mediate the impact of formal party structure on party nationalization,
i.e. the patterns of territorial vote distribution of parties. To this end, I explore the relationship
among three variables: party structure, effectiveness of clientelism, and party nationalization. I
hypothesize that extensive party structure enhances the effectiveness of parties’ clientelist efforts,
which in turn decreases party nationalization. Where clientelist efforts are effectively translated
into electoral gains, elites and voters are more likely to establish relationships beyond party
organizations. Therefore, I argue that effective clientelism undermines a party’s organization as a
collective entity. As existing studies suggest, parties with extensive organization tend to have
higher levels of party nationalization. However, I find that this positive impact is suppressed to the
extent that these organizational attributes improve the effectiveness of clientelism.
Finally, the third essay examines the impact of clientelism on the level of congruence.
Conceptualizing clientelism as a tool of persuasion employed by political parties, I maintain that
elites distribute clientelist rewards in order to alter the preferences and behaviors of voters who
would otherwise hold different or no views about parties’ policies. In response to the rewards, I
argue, some voters will develop an affinity to a patron party, and subsequently vote for that party
despite it being located further than other parties from their ideal points. Consequently, clientelism
systematically widens the gap between voters’ preferences and their vote choices, thereby
undermining congruence. I suggest that voters’ utility is a function of both issue position and
material inducement. I find that clientelism serves as a crucial predictor of congruence.
This dissertation contributes to the understanding of party system institutionalization by
emphasizing the under-explored role of informal institutions. By demonstrating how informal rules
constrain and modify the way formal institutions function, this dissertation also offers important
insights into the literature on the relationship between formal and informal institutions. Thus, this
dissertation provides an opportunity to advance our understanding of to what extent formal
institutions explain or predict political outcomes.
iv
To my parents for their constant love and support
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
In every aspect, my experience in graduate school has been the best years of my life so far.
I have grown intellectually and personally and I found something that I am truly passionate about.
For my intellectual and personal growth, I owe thanks to many people. First and foremost, I thank
my dissertation chair, Eric Chang, from the bottom of my heart. He is the best adviser and mentor
anyone could ever wish for. I first met him in one of my first classes at graduate school. Since then,
he has been a profound influence on my intellectual growth. The conversations with him have
always been intellectually inspiring and amusing. He genuinely cared about my intellectual growth
and personal well-being. Throughout the years, he has never lost faith in me even when I didn’t
seem to be quite on the right track, and he patiently motivated me to live up to my true potential.
Without his tremendous support and guidance, I cannot imagine anything I have achieved so far
in graduate school.
My sincere appreciation also goes to my dissertation committee members, Michael Bratton,
Jeffrey Conroy-Krutz, and Ani Sarkissian. Throughout my graduate training and dissertation
writing, they have been a source of advice, encouragement and inspiration. Michael Bratton helped
me to find my strength in quantitative methods. His comments and suggestions on my works have
been one of the most important source of my inspirations for my research. Jeffrey Conroy-Krutz
contributed enormous time and energy on offering me feedback on the drafts of my dissertation.
Thanks to his invaluable comments and suggestions, I was able to hone my scholarly writing skills.
Ani Sarkissian also offers me invaluable suggestions and comments on my earlier drafts of
dissertation.
vi
I owe particular thanks to Karen Battin, Melinda Hall, Steve Kautz, and Charles Ostrom
for their help in every administrative need. I am also grateful for the financial support from the
Department of Political Science and Graduate School at MSU, and the Afrobarometer Project. I
am also thankful for Carolyn Logan for her guidance. While I was working with her at the
Afrobarometer, I develop various skills in data management. Furthermore, my appreciation also
goes to my mentor at Dongguk University, Youngjoong Lee, who encouraged and supported me
throughout the entire graduate school years. I also would like to thank Valentina Bali, Cristina
Bodea, Matt Grossmann, William Jacoby, Joongi Kim, Saundra Schneider, Corwin Smidt, for their
intellectual advice and guidance.
I would also like to express special thanks to my cohorts and friends, Danielle Carter, Fang-
Yu Chen, Seo-Yeon Choi, Nicholas Kerr, Sung-Min Han, Masaaki Higashijima, Shih-Hao Huang,
Hsin-Hsin Pan, Chunho Park, Johann Park, Wen-Chin Wu, and Fangjin Ye. Through the
dissertation writing support group, the Economist discussion group, and informal gatherings, they
contributed their time and energy to provide me with great feedback on the drafts of my dissertation
and with lots of encouragement. They made my years in graduate school brighter and more colorful.
Last but not least, I am deeply thankful for my family who have always believed in me and
provided me with love and support. Without them, I would never have completed this dissertation.
My mother, Myung-Ok Lee, always reminded me of the virtue of positive thinking and grit.
Throughout my graduate school years, I only had a chance to see her once. But, her positive and
pleasant vibe have been strong enough to make me happy and laugh over the phone conversation.
She has been the major source of my energy and peace. My father, Seung-Ki Lee, has been my
role model since I was a little kid. As a professor in biochemistry, he has always been open to
interesting questions and new perspectives. His passion for research motivates me to follow in his
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footsteps. My sisters, Jin-Young and Sun-Young, are my best friends and the biggest supporters.
While facing similar challenges, we shared our concerns and moments. Finally, I thank my
husband, Youngmin, and my parents-in-law for their patience, understanding, and support. I am
truly lucky and blessed to have these wonderful people in my life.
viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................................... x
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................... xi
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 1 1.1 The Motivations ............................................................................................................... 1 1.2 Theoretical and Empirical Solutions ................................................................................ 5
1.2.1 Informal Institutions.................................................................................................. 5
1.2.2 Party System Institutionalization .............................................................................. 8
1.2.3 Clientelism .............................................................................................................. 10
1.2.4 Conceptualization of Clientelism ............................................................................ 13 1.3 Contribution ................................................................................................................... 14 1.4 Chapter Overview .......................................................................................................... 15
CHAPTER 2 CLIENTELIST POLITICS AND NEW PARTY FORMATION .......................... 20
2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 20 2.2 Theoretical Framework .................................................................................................. 22
2.3 Empirical Analysis ......................................................................................................... 28 2.3.1 A Cross-National Investigation............................................................................... 28 2.3.2 A Cross-Party Investigation .................................................................................... 34
2.3.3 Individual-level Investigation ................................................................................. 36
2.3.4 Robustness Check ................................................................................................... 39 2.4 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 42
APPENDIX ................................................................................................................................ 44
CHAPTER 3 PARTY EXTENSIVENESS, CLIENTELISM, AND PARTY
NATIONALIZATION: THE MEDIATING EFFECT OF CLIENTELISM .............................. 48
3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 48 3.2 Literature Review ........................................................................................................... 52
3.3 Theory: the mediating role of clientelism ...................................................................... 56 3.3.1 Party Structure and Effectiveness of Clientelism ................................................... 56 3.3.2 Clientelism and Party Cohesion .............................................................................. 58
3.4 Data and Measures ......................................................................................................... 61 3.4.1 Dependent Variable: Party Nationalization ............................................................ 61
3.4.2 Independent Variables: Extensiveness of a Party Organization ............................. 63 3.4.3 Mediating Variable: Effectiveness of Clientelism .................................................. 64
3.4.4 Control variables ..................................................................................................... 65 3.5 Empirical Analysis ......................................................................................................... 66
3.5.1 Analytic Strategy .................................................................................................... 66 3.5.2 Results ..................................................................................................................... 68
3.6 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 75 APPENDIX ................................................................................................................................ 77
ix
CHAPTER 4 CLIENTELISM AS AN INFORMAL DETERMINANT OF CONGRUENCE ... 81
4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 81 4.2 Defining and Measuring Congruence ............................................................................ 83 4.3 Literature on Electoral Systems and Congruence .......................................................... 86
4.4 Theory ............................................................................................................................ 88 4.5 Data and Measures ......................................................................................................... 94
4.5.1 Dependent Variable: Congruence ........................................................................... 94 4.5.2 Independent Variable: Level of clientelism ............................................................ 98 4.5.3 Control Variables .................................................................................................... 98
4.6 Empirical Analysis ......................................................................................................... 99 4.6.1 Descriptive Analysis ............................................................................................... 99 4.6.2 Analysis................................................................................................................. 101 4.6.3 Robustness Check ................................................................................................. 103
4.7 Discussion and Conclusion .......................................................................................... 105 4.7.1 Implications for Core-Swing Voter Argument ..................................................... 106
4.7.2 Endogenous Preference Formation and Implication for Congruence ................... 108 APPENDIX .............................................................................................................................. 111
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION..................................................................................................... 116
BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................... 120
x
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1.1 Organization of the Dissertation ................................................................................... 19
Table 2.1 Cross-National Determinants of the New Party Emergence ........................................ 33
Table 2.2 Summary of the Measurements of Variables ................................................................ 42
Table 2.3. Effect of Clientelist Level and Structure on Effectiveness of Clientelism .................. 45
Table 2.4. Effect of Clientelist Level and Structure on Voters' Supports for Ruling Parties ....... 45
Table 2.5. Robustness Checks for the Cross-National Determinants of New Party Emergence .. 46
Table 2.6 Cases Included .............................................................................................................. 47
Table 3.1. Mediation Analysis ...................................................................................................... 69
Table 3.2. Sobel Test for Mediating Effects ................................................................................. 72
Table 3.3. Bootstrap Results for Mediating Effects ...................................................................... 73
Table 3.4. Descriptive Statistics.................................................................................................... 78
Table 3.5. Case Selection by Region ............................................................................................ 78
Table 3.6. Case Selection by Country ........................................................................................... 78
Table 3.7. DALP Questionnaire.................................................................................................... 79
Table 4.1. Cross-tabulation of ‘Having a party representing respondents’ views’ and ‘Having a
part respondents feel close to’ ...................................................................................... 90
Table 4.2. Bivariate Regression: Relationship between the Level of Clientelism and Having a
Non-Ideological Affinity to a Party ............................................................................. 91
Table 4.3. Survey Questions and Dataset ..................................................................................... 97
Table 4.4. Multivariate Analysis of Congruence ........................................................................ 101
Table 4.5. First Difference: Changes in the Expected Value of Congruence by the Changes in the
Level of Clientelism under PR and SMD .................................................................. 102
Table 4.6. First Difference: Changes in the Expected Value of Congruence with the Changes
from SMD to PR ........................................................................................................ 103
Table 4.7. Countries Categorized by the Level of Clientelism in 2008-2009 ............................ 115
xi
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1.1. Level of Clientelism across the World ....................................................................... 12
Figure 2.1. Predicted Number of New Parties across Different Levels of Clientelism under Two
Alternative Clientelist Structures ................................................................................. 34
Figure 2.2. Estimated Effects of Clientelist Level on Effectiveness of Clientelism under
Alternative Clientelist Structure ................................................................................... 36
Figure 2.3. First Difference Measuring the Effect of Clientelist Level across Varying Clientelist
Structure ....................................................................................................................... 38
Figure 2.4. Predicted number of new parties across different levels of clientelism under two
alternative clientelist structures .................................................................................... 47
Figure 3.1 Calculation of Party Nationalization Score ................................................................. 62
Figure 3.2. Distribution of Party Nationalization Score ............................................................... 68
Figure 3.3. Pathway of a Mediation Process for a Relationship between Party Structure and Party
Nationalization ............................................................................................................. 70
Figure 4.1. Conventional Measure of Congruence the absolute ideological distance between the
median citizen and the governing parties ..................................................................... 83
Figure 4.2. Many-to-Many Measure of Congruence the overlap of the distribution of citizens and
governing parties .......................................................................................................... 84
Figure 4.3. Three Hypothetical Scenario of Many-to-Many Congruence .................................... 85
Figure 4.4. Proportion of Respondents Having a Party Representing their Views....................... 90
Figure 4.5. Degree of an Affinity to a Party ................................................................................. 92
Figure 4.6. Congruence Patterns by the Level of Clientelism ...................................................... 99
Figure 4.7. Clientelism (measure: DALP expert survey) and Level of Distortion ..................... 112
Figure 4.8. Clientelism (measure: personal vote system) and Level of Distortion..................... 112
Figure 4.9. Clientelism (measure: corruption perception index) and Level of Distortion .......... 113
Figure 4.10. Clientelism (measures from World Economic Forum) and Level of Distortion .... 114
..
1
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
This dissertation examines the relationship between formal and informal institutions.
Specifically, I focus on how the nature of clientelistic politics affects the levels of party system
institutionalization in light of three main questions: (i) How do clientelist practices by established
parties affect the electoral fortunes of new parties? Do they create an unlevel playing field in favor
of the established parties, or do they open up an opportunity for new parties to enter into the
electoral game? (ii) Why are some parties competitive throughout the country, while others appeal
to only a few specific regions? In other words, how do we account for the varying degrees in
nationalization across party systems? (iii) Do parties’ clientelist practices lead to differentiation or
convergence in what citizens want and what their representatives try to achieve? If so, what are
the underlying mechanisms of differentiation or convergence? Answering these questions is
crucial to improving our understanding of party system institutionalization and democratic
representation processes. It also contributes to our understanding of how informal politics interacts
with formal institutions.
1.1 The Motivations
This dissertation is motivated by the lack of research on informal political institutions in
contemporary institutional analyses. In particular, the new institutionalism brought the institutions
back into the studies of politics. Rational choice theorists argue that institutions affect individuals'
choices and behaviors by setting parameters to further choice (e.g. North 1990). According to the
historical institutional approach, institutions shape the individual preferences and behaviors, while
political outcomes are the product of the interactions among diverse interests and institutional
structures (e.g. Steinmo et al. 1992). Since the emergence of the new institutionalism in the social
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sciences, scholars have emphasized formal institutions more than informal ones. Conventionally,
it is assumed that formal rules mainly shape individuals’ incentives and expectations. Institutions
are often defined in terms of formal rules and officially recognized political structures.
These assumptions require further scrutiny. As Sheingate (2003) maintains, out of rigid
rules, unexpected patterns of interaction often emerge. Even in a tightly specified rule, uncertainty
occurs due to the gaps between the written rules and their implementations (Mahoney and Thelen
2010). Thus, formal institutions neither exactly reflect collective interests nor operate in practice
as initially devised.
Importantly, formal political institutions are initially formulated for Western democracies.
For many new democracies, therefore, formal institutions may present even greater gaps between
the written stipulations and the reality. How formal institutions are implemented in practice may
differ considerably according to the rules of the game, norms, and routines already embedded in a
society.
Surprisingly little is known about how informal rules affect political life or how extensive
their effects are, although they serve a crucial role in shaping the political landscape (for exceptions
see Stokes 2006; Bratton 2007; Helmke and Levitsky 2004). Informal institutions are often treated
as residual variables or noise whenever formal institutions can no longer account for the variation
in outcomes. When existing literature does focus on informal institutions, it often depicts them in
an overly simplistic way; e.g. as the byproduct of low levels of political or economic development.
This imbalance is unfortunate, as the term “institution” is conceptualized in a much broader
way than just formal institutions. As North suggests, institutions refer to “any form of constraint
that human beings devise to shape human interaction” (North 1990: 4). Within his theoretical
formulation, individuals are assumed to have incomplete information and limited cognitive
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capacity. To reduce risk and transaction costs, North argues, humans design institutions. In his
definition, institutions include both formal and informal rules. Together they shape the preferences
and strategies of the actors involved. Since the seminal work of North, the literature on new
institutionalism has become increasingly interested in a broader institutional framework that
incorporates informal norms and rules (Williamson 2000). More recently, Helmke and Levitsky
point out that “formal institutions do not operate in a vacuum” (Helmke and Levitsky 2006: 280).
Formal institutions are effective because of informally shared norms and expectations. For
example, Stokes (2006) argues that in Argentina elections serve as mechanism of vertical
accountability to the extent that a shared norm motivates voters to follow retrospective decision
rules.
Moreover, despite the extensive research on formal institutions, the debate on to what
extent formal institutions explain or predict political behaviors and outcomes remains anything but
settled in the comparative study of political institutions. For example, studies on the forms of
government offer contradictory predictions about their effects on the quality of democracy and
democratic representation. Some scholars claim the superiority of parliamentarism (Lijphart 1999;
Linz 1990; Stepan and Skach 1993). They find that presidentialism inhibits accountability and
increases the potential for conflicts, while undermining fair representation of interests by
encouraging winner-takes-all outcomes. In contrast, others argue that parliamentarism may result
in regime instability due to the difficulty of forming a stable majority government, whereas
presidentialism is characterized by identifiable accountability (Shugart and Mainwaring 1998;
Hellwig and Samuels 2007). Neither body of research adequately explains the contradictory
outcomes. Likewise, the literature on federalism has not reached consensus on the effect of federal
systems on political and economic outcomes. Some argue that in federal systems, the public sector
4
will be more efficient and the quality of government is higher. According to this argument, this
system encourages competition among governments and promotes greater responsiveness to
diverse local preferences (Rodden and Wibbels 2002). Others contend that federalism complicates
policy-making and coordination by empowering regional politicians (Treisman 2002).
Debates on the effect of institutional design implicitly assume that formal institutions will
be implemented and generate expected consequences. Thus, as a good predictor of political
behaviors and outcomes, this body of literature focuses on formal institutions such as constitutions,
electoral systems, party systems, etc. As Knight and Sened (1995) point out, however,
effectiveness of institutions varies. In spite of overwhelming emphasis on formal institutions,
empirical evidence suggests that in reality many formal institutions are widely challenged and
violated. We observe that the similarly designed institutions of Western democracies produce
different consequences in political and economic performance in new democracies. The workings
of the presidency in Chile during the 1990s are another example. The Chilean presidency was
designed to be strong, but in practice the presidents systematically underutilized their legislative
and agenda-setting powers during this time (Helmke and Levitsky 2004). The weak presidency in
Chile is attributable to an informal institution, Concertaciones, which encouraged power sharing
(Helmke and Levitsky 2004). As the anecdote implies, informal institutions have implications for
the way enforcement of formal institutions occurs, the norms of behavior, and the expectations of
the actors involved. Thus, informal institutions affect the outcomes of formal institutions
(Grzymala-Busse 2004). Many rules and procedures that have significant influence on political
life are created and enforced beyond formal channels (Helmke and Levitsky 2004). Where formal
institutions are perceived to be ineffective or unfavorable, actors create or turn to informal rules to
achieve their goals (Grzymala-Busse 2006).
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Variations in the effectiveness of formal institutions is particularly salient where formal
institutions have not been fully established. In the less institutionalized settings, formal institutions
are subject to manipulation by key actors (Schedler 2002). As Tsebelis puts it, “the game in the
principal arena is nested inside a bigger game where the rules of the game themselves are variable”
(Tsebelis 1990: 8). Thus, consequences of institutions are expected to vary according to their
capacity to enforce the rules and induce compliance in practice.
This dissertation does not intend to solve all of these problems at one time. Instead, the
purpose of this dissertation is to take a modest step toward redressing our insufficient
understanding of informal institutions. To this end, I focus on a specific example of informal
institutions, clientelism, and examine how it modify or constrain the workings of formal
democratic institutions. Going beyond the simplistic perspective on informal institutions as a
byproduct of underdevelopment, my dissertation demonstrates that informal mechanisms of
clientelism have a wide spectrum of relationships with formal institutions.
1.2 Theoretical and Empirical Solutions
1.2.1 Informal Institutions
Helmke and Levitsky define informal institutions as “socially shared rules, usually
unwritten, that are created, communicated and enforced outside officially sanctioned channels”
(Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 727). As an important source of constraints devised by people to
regulate their interactions, an increasing body of literature considers informal institutions such as
sanctions, customs, traditions, or codes of conduct (North 1990).
In many polities, informal rules are deeply entrenched in political life. They constrain and
change formal institutions and political behavior (Brinks 2003). Therefore, although unwritten and
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unofficial, informal institutions often have meaningful influence on individuals’ expectations and
behavioral patterns. As Bratton points out, in reality it is social and power relations revolving
around informal rules that determine “who gets what, when, and how” (Bratton 2007: 96).
Importantly, formal and informal institutions are closely intertwined. Helmke and Levitsky
(2004) identify the four types of relationships. First, formal and informal institutions can be
complementary. In this case, informal institutions make the formal institutions more effective by
facilitating the pursuit of individual goals within the formal institutional framework (Helmke and
Levtisky 2004). For example, Grzymala-Busse (2004) maintains that informal financing and
mobilization techniques used in electoral campaigns strengthen the role of elections as the means
of elite competition. These informal techniques reduce the transaction costs of elections by
providing information for strategic decisions (Grzymala-Busse 2004). Second, informal
institutions may be substitutive to formal institutions. Substitutive informal institutions achieve
what formal institutions fail to do. According to Taylor-Robinson (2006), for instance, informal
institutions of clientelism fill the representation gap in Costa Rica, where the formal electoral rules
do not provide an incentive for elected officials to represent local needs. Third, formal and informal
institutions may have a competing relationship. Competing informal institutions provide
incentives incompatible with the formal rules. Cases in point include corruption, tax loopholes, or
subcontracting, which take advantage of the gaps in formal rules (Grzymala-Busse 2004). Finally,
formal and informal institutions can have an accommodating relationship. Accommodating
informal institutions reduce conflicts, while finding solutions within existing settings (Helmke and
Levitsky 2006: 15). For example, Langston (2006) argues that in Mexico the informal rule of
executive succession, called Dedazo, enables the outgoing executive to appoint the next president,
thereby keeping intra-regime conflict to a minimum.
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My dissertation moves beyond a simplistic perspective on informal institutions as a
byproduct of underdevelopment. Thereby, I demonstrate a more nuanced relationship between
formal and informal institutions than previously explored within the literature on party system
institutionalization. For the purpose of my dissertation, I focus on one example of informal
institutions, clientelism, which influences crucial aspects of institutional order, power relations,
and allocation of resources in many polities.
Specifically, Chapter 2 demonstrates that clientelism shapes inter-party relationship in new
democracies where formal electoral rules and procedures are not yet fully established. According
to the classification of Helmke and Levitsky (2004), this type of informal institutions have
substitutive relationship with formal institutions. In this chapter, I argue that, in new democracies,
the way clientelist exchange occurs significantly affects the rate of new party emergence, which is
mainly considered as the product of formal electoral rules and social constructs in advanced
democracies. In Chapter 3, I argue that informal institutions of clientelism have competing
relationship with formal institutions. Clientelism creates incentives for elites to behave in ways
that are incompatible with the formal institutions. To follow informal rules of clientelism, elites
choose particularistic interests over programmatic and public-oriented goals. Through clientelist
practices, individual elites gain at the expense of the party organization’s shared purpose. Chapter
4 illustrates accommodating nature of informal institutions. Parties and elites participate in
electoral competition without directly violating formal rules of electoral competitions. However,
by distributing clientelist rewards, patron parties and elites seek to alter the preferences and
behaviors of voters in favor of them. Thereby, clientelist practices enable the patron parties to
assume competitive advantage over other parties. In other words, the parties and elites abide by
8
the formal rules, while modifying their substantive effects through informal mechanisms of
clientelist practices.
1.2.2 Party System Institutionalization
A large body of literature has investigated party and party system institutionalization.1
These studies argue that institutionalized parties and party systems are crucial to democratic
functioning and consolidation because they effectively channel social demands (Hicken and
Kuhonta 2011). Specifically, they demonstrate that institutionalized parties tend to have more
accountability, greater stability of interests, and more broadly targeted policy programs. According
to Huntington (1968), organizations gain value and stability through institutionalization.
Mainwaring and Scully (1995) conceptualize four dimensions of party system institutionalization.
In institutionalized systems, (i) the pattern of party competition is stable and regular, (ii) parties
have strong roots in society, (iii) political actors see parties as a legitimate and necessary part of
the democratic process, and (iv) party organizations are not the instrument of only a few ambitious
elites.
In this dissertation, I utilize three approaches to the study of party system
institutionalization common in the literature on party competition and voting behaviors: 2 (i)
1 For example, see Huntington 1968; Kuenzi and Lambright 2001; Mainwaring and Scully 1995;
Mainwaring and Torcal 2006
2 Other approaches include the spatial model of voting behavior (Downs 1957; Cox 1990; Hinich and
Munger 1996; Budge 1994), social cleavage theories on party systems (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), and
theories on party realignments (Inglehart 1990).
9
electoral volatility3 and new party formation,4 (ii) party nationalization,5 and (iii) congruence.6
First, the studies of new party formation enhance our understanding of party system
institutionalization by examining the stability and regularity of party competition. The rise and fall
of new entrants to electoral competitions prevent voters from developing party loyalties, thereby
hindering system institutionalization (Tavits 2008). Second, party nationalization captures the
institutionalization of individual parties, which in turn play an important role in party system
institutionalization (Lupu 2008). Cohesive party organizations with nation-wide appeal enhance
the stability and regularity of interparty competition. Finally, the literature on congruence also
provides important insights into party system institutionalization by examining how parties
develop roots in society and how voters develop attachments to parties (Mainwaring and Torcal
2005).
The existing explanations for new party formation, nationalization, and congruence are
unsatisfactory in that they mainly rely on formal institutions as key explanatory factors. Informal
institutions are prevalent in how political parties actually function, such as in recruiting activists,
selecting candidates, managing party finance, maintaining societal linkages, and delivering votes.
For instance, a politician’s career path may be determined by which patron-client networks she is
involved in. Also, organizational boundaries of a party may be ambiguous due to informal
networks which constitute a crucial part of party organizations. Freidenberg and Levitsky (2006)
argue that if decision-making, resource allocations, or career paths are determined by informal
3 Przeworski 1975; Pedersen 1983; Coppedge 1998; Roberts and Wibbel 1999; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007
4 Cox 1997; Hug 2001; Tavits 2008
5 Cox and McCubbins 1993; Stokes 1967; Jones and Mainwaring 2003; Chhibber and Kollman 2004; Cox
1997; Kasuya and Moenius 2008; Bochsler 2010; Schattschneider 1960
6 Powell 1994; McDonald, Mendes, and Budge 2004; Golder and Stramski 2010
10
institutions, analyses that focus only on formal structures will produce a misleading understanding
of how a party works. The extent to which formal institutions affect party systems might be
spurious because of alternative incentives generated by informal institutions. Thus, party
competition and voting behavior may not be merely motivated by ideological or programmatic
rationales as existing literature assumes. Likewise, if informal institutions are the main sources
that citizens rely on to get things done and to process political information, analysis of their
behaviors and attitudes should consider the effects of informal institutions. Bratton (2007) echoes
this proposition and argues that where the performance of formal institutions does not meet popular
expectations, people seek to make up for perceived institutional deficiencies by counting on the
informal ties of clientelism. For example, he contends that informal rules of clientelism continue
to affect Africans' political behaviors and attitudes (Bratton 2007).
1.2.3 Clientelism
Clientelism is an informal mechanism through which patrons and clients engage in
strategic alliances for mutual benefit. These relationships are established based on exchanges.
Using their power and resources, patrons offer selective benefits to clients. In return, clients
provide support and assistance to patrons (Scott 1972; Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984; Hopkin 2006;
Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Stokes 2007).
Recent studies argue that clientelism is a ubiquitous and enduring feature of contemporary
political parties.7 In many polities, clientelism is deeply embedded in key political functions by
creating behavioral patterns “to which all political actors are acutely attuned” (Bratton 2007: 98).
As van de Walle (2007) maintains, clientelism can be found in all polities, although its forms,
7 Katz and Mair 1995; Kitschelt 2000; Piattoni 2001; van Biezen 2000
11
extent, or political consequences vary. As Figure 1.1 illustrates, clientelism prevails throughout
the world, including economically and politically advanced polities such as Greece, Spain,
Belgium, Italy, and Japan.
Scholars maintain that contemporary clientelism needs to be distinguished from traditional
clientelism in that the former is characterized by less personalized, more equal, and more
instrumental relationships than the latter (Hopkin 2001; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Piattoni
2001). Considerable variation exists across countries and parties in terms of the extent and the
patterns of clientelist practices. However, little attention has been paid to different patterns of
clientelist practices and their political consequences. My dissertation examines the implications of
the extent and patterns of clientelist exchanges for elite fragmentations and ultimately for party
system arrangements.
12
Figure 1.1. Level of Clientelism across the World
Note: I have created the map based on DALP dataset (2008) using GunnMap. The level of clientelism is presented in color in which yellow presents the lowest level and red indicates the highest level of clientelism. The gray color indicates the missing data.
13
1.2.4 Conceptualization of Clientelism
I argue that clientelism plays a crucial role in shaping the nature of relationships among
political parties, politicians, and voters. To explain variations in political parties and party systems,
each of the three chapters in this dissertation explores how clientelism influences different aspects
of the following relationships: inter-party relationships, intra-party relationships, and party-voter
relationships. Specifically, in order to explain the dynamics of inter-party relationships, Chapter 2
conceptualizes the patron-client exchange as a form of a bargaining. I argue that decentralized
clientelist structures shift the bargaining power away from existing parties, while motivating
ambitious challengers to establish new political parties. In Chapter 3, I focus on the mediating
effects of clientelism on intra-party coordination. Based on party-level analysis, I argue that
clientelism provides incentives for individual politicians to gain at the expense of the party
organization they are involved in. As an obstacle to intra-party coordination, clientelism facilitates
unequal vote distributions across districts, thus lower party nationalization. Finally, with regard to
the outcome of party-voter relationships, Chapter 4 describes clientelism as a tool of persuasion
employed by political elites and parties. I maintain that political elites use clientelistic rewards to
alter the preferences and behavior of voters who would otherwise hold different or no views about
parties’ policies. Therefore, clientelism persuades voters to vote further away from their own ideal
points on the policy spectrum, which in turn undermines congruence at the aggregate level. Taken
together, my dissertation examines both vertical and horizontal accountability. Chapter 2 and
Chapter 3 discuss horizontal accountability, which considers the degree to which elites are
responsible to other agencies and institutions. Chapter 4 enhances our understanding of the
determinants of vertical accountability, which refers to the degree to which citizens hold officials
14
accountable (Stokes 2001). Taken together, I argue that clientelism increases electoral volatility
and undermines levels of party and party system institutionalization.
1.3 Contribution
The three essays in this dissertation examine the destabilizing and fragmentary effect of
clientelism on party system institutionalization in terms of intra-party, inter-party, and party-voter
relationships. Specifically, I examine how clientelism reinforces centrifugal tendencies within
party organizations and party systems. Centrifugal forces disperse and divide elites and voters in
pursuit of divergent objectives. The literature on clientelist politics often relies on the assumption
that parties have an incentive to restrain competition for the sake of effective coordination in
resource allocation, and presumes that political elites will remain committed to the clientelist
arrangement.
In this context, clientelism serves as a means to control intra-elite relationships, allowing
the leaders to punish potential challengers and reward loyal supporters. Accordingly, existing
studies tend to focus on the role of clientelism in attracting supporters and in enforcing patrons’
positions. For example, Huntington argues that clientelist rewards distributed by parties promotes
the coordination of office seekers and, thereby, the formation of stable majorities. In turn, it
contributes to effective and enduring political parties (Huntington 1968). Likewise, Arriola (2009)
argues that leaders facilitate intra-elite accommodation and discourage oppositional challenges by
recruiting more elites into their clientelist coalitions. By doing so, they achieve stability for their
political regimes. Finally, Katz and Mair (1995) propose that major parties will develop cartel-like
behavior over time. With a common interest in preserving their privileged positions, major parties
restrain competition based on collusion and increase intra-party cooperation. Consequently, Katz
15
and Mair (1995) argue that parties will eventually come to adopt each other’s positions and
strategies and begin to resemble one another.
This conventional argument raises the questions of how patrons manage to keep clients
from defecting and how patrons maintain a reliable cooperative arrangement in the absence of
enforcement mechanisms. The ideal case of trouble-free agreement without a tedious bargaining
process is exceptional rather than commonplace (Laver 1999). The literature seldom considers the
destabilizing and fragmentary effects of clientelism because it focuses exclusively on the
relationship between those who benefit from and are involved in clientelist relationships. By going
beyond the narrow relationship between patron and client, this dissertation demonstrates that
clientelism may have centrifugal effects on party organizations and party systems as a whole.
This dissertation contributes to the understanding of party system institutionalization by
emphasizing the under-explored role of informal institutions. By demonstrating how informal rules
constrain and modify the way formal institutions function, this dissertation also offers important
insights into the literature on the relationship between formal and informal institutions. Thus, this
dissertation provides an opportunity to advance our understanding of an important question: to
what extent do formal institutions explain or predict political outcomes?
1.4 Chapter Overview
This dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, the first essay, Clientelist Politics
and New Party Formation in New Democracies, addresses the question of why new parties emerge
in an environment where clientelism is widespread if clientelism empowers the ruling parties as
conventional wisdom suggests. To answer this question, I present and test a theory explaining the
varying extent to which clientelism helps or hinders ruling parties to dominate party systems and
16
its consequences for the formation of new parties. To explain this variation, I highlight the under-
explored structural aspect of clientelism. Specifically, I argue that the effect of clientelist practices
on new party formation critically depends on the way clientelist exchange takes place. Drawing
upon bargaining theory, I posit that when extensive clientelist practice is coupled with a
decentralized resource structure, these abundant resources actually reduce political actors’
incentives to pledge allegiance to the incumbent party, as their resource needs can then be easily
met through alternative resource channels. Under such circumstances, the combination of
clientelist resources and decentralized clientelist structure creates an incubator for the birth of new
parties. The analysis of new party formation is conducted at three levels. First, I examine new party
formation from a cross-national perspective using an aggregate measure of clientelist level and
structure created from the expert survey dataset. Second, I evaluate the implications of my theory
at the party level. I show that parties’ clientelist efforts are less effective in producing actual votes
if clientelist structure is decentralized. Finally, I conduct an individual-level analysis drawn from
cross-national mass survey data in order to examine whether clientelist level and structure affect
citizens’ votes for new parties.
In Chapter 3, the second essay, Party Extensiveness, Clientelism, and Party
Nationalization: The Mediating Effect of Clientelism, asks why some parties are competitive
throughout the country, while others appeal to only a few specific regions. This study examines if
and how much informal mechanisms of clientelism mediate the impact of formal party structure
on party nationalization (i.e. the patterns of territorial vote distribution of parties). To this end, I
explore the relationship among three variables: party structure, effectiveness of clientelism, and
party nationalization. I hypothesize that extensive party structure enhances the effectiveness of
parties’ clientelist efforts, which in turn decreases party nationalization. Where clientelist efforts
17
are effectively translated into electoral gains, elites and voters are more likely to establish
relationships beyond party organizations. Therefore, I argue that effective clientelism undermines
a party’s organization as a collective entity with a common goal. As existing studies suggest,
parties with extensive organizations tend to have higher levels of party nationalization. However,
this positive impact will be suppressed to the extent that these organizational attributes improve
effectiveness of clientelism. This chapter takes the party as the unit of analysis. To evaluate my
hypotheses, I conduct mediation analysis.
Finally, my third essay in Chapter 4, Clientelism as an Informal Determinant of
Congruence, examines the impact of clientelism on the level of congruence. Conceptualizing
clientelism as a tool of persuasion employed by political parties, I contend that elites distribute
clientelistic rewards in order to alter the preferences and behaviors of voters who would otherwise
hold different or no views about parties’ policies. In response to the rewards, I argue, some voters
will develop an affinity to a patron party and vote for that party despite its being located further
than other parties from their ideal points. Consequently, clientelism systematically widens the gap
between voters’ preferences and their vote choices, thereby undermining congruence. I challenge
the conventional assumptions that individual voters have one-dimensional and single-peaked
political preferences. Instead, I suggest that voters’ utility is a function of both issue position and
material inducement.
In sum, my dissertation examines the varying patterns of party system institutionalization
in light of informal mechanism of clientelism. Table 1.1 presents the organization of this
dissertation. Each chapter investigates different aspects of relationships among key actors, which
have important implications for party system institutionalization. In explaining the frequency of
new party emergence, Chapter 2 conceptualizes the exchange between patron and client as a form
18
of bargaining. Empirically, my model illustrates that there is an interaction effect between the
structure and the level of clientelism. In my analyses at the country, party, and individual levels, I
find that formal electoral rules and informal mechanism of clientelism have substitutive effect. In
new democracies where formal electoral rules are weak, clientelist logic plays a crucial role in the
dynamics of electoral competition. Chapter 3 describes clientelism as an obstacle to intra-party
coordination. My analysis focuses on the mediating effect of clientelism on the relationship
between party structure and party nationalization outcomes. My findings on party nationalization
demonstrates the cases in which informal rules of clientelism are incompatible with formal rules
in that elites' clientelist practices undermine formal electoral rules and party organizations. Finally,
in Chapter 4, the analysis of congruence theorizes that clientelism serves as a persuasion tools
employed by parties and elites. The cross-national analysis illustrates that informal logic of
clientelism has accommodating relationships with formal democratic rules. In electoral
competition, parties and elites abide by the formal rules of the game, while being managed to stay
ahead of the game by means of clientelist rewards. Taken together, my findings demonstrate that
the diverse relationship between formal and informal institutions together shapes the political
landscapes.
19
Table 1.1 Organization of the Dissertation
Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4
Outcomes New party emergence Party nationalization Ideological congruence
Relationship of
Interest
Inter-Party Relationship Intra-Party Relationship Party-Voter Relationship
Theoretical Role of
Clientelism
Patron-client exchange
as a form of bargaining
Clientelism as an obstacle
to intra-party
coordination
Clientelist rewards as a
tool of persuasion
Empirical Role of
Clientelism
Interaction between the
structure and level of
clientelism
The mediating effect of
clientelism on the
relationship between
party extensiveness and
party nationalization
Level of clientelism
Relationship with
formal institutions
substitutive competing accommodating
Unit of Analysis country; party;
individual
party country
Methodology Regression analysis
(Poisson, linear, logit)
Mediation analysis;
simultaneous equation
model
Multivariate analysis
20
CHAPTER 2 CLIENTELIST POLITICS AND NEW PARTY FORMATION
2.1 Introduction
As the wave of democratization continues to spread throughout North Africa and the
Middle East, the emergence of new political parties in nascent democracies has recently regained
scholarly attention. Research on new party formation originates from Duverger’s study, and it has
subsequently branched into two parallel literatures. The first sociological approach emphasizes the
role of socioeconomic conditions and values orientation of a society (Lago and Martinez 2010,
Clark and Inglehart 1998). According to this perspective, new parties are more likely to form when
established parties fail to address new social cleavages. The institutional approach, on the other
hand, attributes new party formation to the cost of entry and the benefits of office induced by
institutional rules (Cox 1997; Hug 2001; Tavits 2008).
Nevertheless, neither the sociological nor the institutional approach adequately accounts
for new party formation in young democracies. In new democracies social cleavages rarely change
as often and fast as party systems. Meanwhile, formal institutions are less institutionalized and
often subject to manipulation by ruling elites. More bluntly, the relationship between formal
institutions and new party formation might be spurious, as political institutions themselves are
nested inside the strategic consideration of political actors. Lust (2009) echoes my proposition,
arguing that elections as formal institutions matter much less than informal institutions like
clientelism in shaping the interaction between voters and politicians in developing democracies.
Towards a fuller understanding of how new parties emerge in new democracies, this paper
moves beyond the current literature and presents a theory that highlights the importance of
informal rules of clientelist politics. I emphasize the distinction between two intertwined yet
different concepts of clientelist practice: one of level of clientelism and one of structure of
21
clientelism. The former is referred to as the amount of discretionary public resources available to
the incumbent (such as public jobs, contracts, and services), whereas the latter is defined as the
extent to which decision-making power over public resource distribution is centralized and
monopolized by the incumbent. Importantly, I argue that the effect of clientelist resources on new
party formation depends on the way clientelist exchange takes place. Specifically, drawing upon
bargaining theory, I argue that when state resources are monopolized by the incumbent, an increase
in the size of clientelist resource will reinforce the dominance of the incumbent party and hinder
new party formation. However, when extensive clientelist practice is coupled with decentralized
resource distribution, abundant state resources actually reduce political actors’ incentives to pledge
allegiance to the incumbent party as their resource needs can be easily met by alternative resource
channels. Under such circumstances, the combination of clientelist resources and decentralized
clientelist structure creates an incubator for new parties.
My analysis is conducted at three levels: First, I employ a cross-national analysis to directly
examine whether new party formation depends on clientelist levels and structures. Second, I assess
the implications of my theory at the party level, and I show that parties’ clientelist efforts are less
effective in producing actual votes when clientelist structure is decentralized. Finally, I conduct an
individual-level analysis to investigate whether clientelist levels and structures affect citizens’
electoral support for new parties. I find supportive evidence consistent across different levels of
analyses. My results also survive a series of robustness checks.
Before proceeding, it is useful to briefly use the case in Peru to illustrate my theory. Peru
has a long history of clientelist politics, however, new parties constantly emerge to replace existing
parties during elections. For instance, the major parties in the 1980s, such as C-90, FREDEMO,
and APRA, degenerated into the minor parties with less than 2 percent of the vote in 2000
22
(Levitsky and Cameron 2003). Recently in the 2011 general election, 8 out of 10 candidates came
from new parties and alliances (Lupu 2012). In Peru, clientelist exchange occurs in an atomized
and temporary way among national politicians, mediators, and local citizens. During elections
politicians “improvise” political parties to establish privileged links with local powers. In turn,
autonomous local organizations continuously change their affiliations to new political parties
(Munoz Chirinos 2013: 2). According to Levitsky and Cameron (2003), this interesting dynamics
between new party formation and clientelist politics in Peru can be attributed to the growth of
informal urban economy in the late 1980s that make resources for clientelism available from
multiple channels. In other words, alternative resources from the informal sectors created a
decentralized clientelist structure, which consequently contributed to the growth of new political
parties in Peru.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the existing
literature and highlights the gap in the theory about new party formation in new democracies. In
addition, it provides a theoretical framework of the interaction effect between size and structure of
clientelism on the emergence of new parties, and it derives a set of hypotheses. Section 3
empirically tests my hypotheses at three different levels. Finally, Section 4 concludes with a
discussion regarding the interaction between informal and formal institutions.
2.2 Theoretical Framework
Conventional wisdom holds that clientelist resources provide an unfair playing field for
ruling elites to dominate party systems. This branch of scholarship particularly emphasizes the
patron’s ability to induce the clients’ compliance by punishing potential challengers and rewarding
loyal supporters (Stokes 2005; Hicken 2011). For instance, in his study on how traditional patrons
23
pressured villagers in central India, Krishna argues that the patron’s authority is “inherited and
unquestioned, met with fear and subservience on the part of ordinary villagers” (Krishna 2007:
146). Yet, if the conventional wisdom is true, then how do we explain the frequent emergence of
new parties in new democracies where clientelist politics is the norm rather than the exception? If
the cost is high for new entrants to enter the electoral arena, then how are new parties ever
established in developing democracies?
To solve this puzzle, I suggest that in countries with pervasive clientelist practices, the real
challenges for the incumbent often come from their own parties. Indeed, defection of elite members
from the incumbent party to form new parties has characterized the political landscape of many
new democracies. In India, a country notorious for prevalent clientelist practice, elite defection has
become a common phenomenon since the general election in 1967.8 The extensive clientelist
practice also fails to prevent the continuous elite defections and the eventual breakdown of ruling
parties in Senegal,9 Lesotho,10 Nigeria,11 Mexico,12 just to name a few.
8. Between 1967 and 1970, 148 party members defected; between 1976 and 1977, one of every five
members of the legislature was a defector, and 15 of these defectors became chief ministers. See
International Referred Research Journal, April, 2011. pp.15-16.
9. In 1998, an extensive defection within the ruling Socialist Party of Senegal was initiated by Djibo Ka,
who later established a new party, Union for Democratic Renewal. Later in the 2000 election, another wave
of massive defection from the Socialist Party contributed to the historic victory of the opposition party led
by Abdoulaye Wade.
10. Before general election in 2007, Lesotho’s parties faced extensive intra-party splits in the Parliament.
In 1997, a faction leader of the ruling Basotho Congress Party (BCP), Mokhehle, broke with the party and
established the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD). In 2001, in turn, the leading LCD members left
the party to form the Lesotho People’s Congress. Meanwhile, the Basutoland African Congress was formed
following a split within the BCP in 2001.
11. Many Nigerian politicians had defected from the ruling People’s Democratic Party to form the new
parties since 1999: e.g. Comrade Chukwuemerijie to the Progressive People Alliance, Chief Sergeant
Awuse to Democratic People’s Party, Chief Kalu to the Progressives People’s Alliance, a senator Osakwe
to Accord Party.
12. The elite defections also occurred in the long dominant Mexican party, PRI. For example, the prominent
members of the PRI faction, Corriente Democra´tico (CD), left the PRI and joined the National Democratic
Front (FDN) in early 1988.
24
Contrary to what the existing literature suggests, from these illustrative cases we can see
that the emergence of new parties in many new democracies is not a manifestation of new issues
or demands from the civil society. Rather, it is often the result of internal power struggle within
the ruling parties. Levitsky and Way (2010) support my observations, showing that the major
opposition movements draw most of their support from former ruling elites who defected from
governing coalitions in their case studies of Georgia, Kenya, Malawi, Senegal, Ukraine, and
Zambia. The next logical question is under what conditions political elites are more likely to defect
from the dominant ruling parties, especially in countries with abundant state resources? In other
words, what drives elite politicians and voters away from the incumbent patrons with state
recourses to form and support new parties?
To answer these questions, I highlight the structure of clientelism in which resources are
mobilized and exchanged and distinguish the concept of clientelist structure from the traditional
focus on clientelist size in the literature. Drawing from Worsnop (2013), I define the structure of
resources in terms of directness and exclusiveness in resource provision. Directness refers to the
distance between the national leadership and the local citizens with regard to resource provision.
In other words, this concept captures the degree to which responsibilities of resource provision are
delegated, or the vertical dispersion of power over resource distribution. On the other hand,
exclusiveness examines if patrons are the sole providers of these resources. Put differently,
exclusiveness refers to the number of dispensing resources, or horizontal distribution of authority
over resource provision.
Following Worsnop's insight, I argue that the structure of resource provision can be
decentralized in two ways. First, decentralization of clientelist practices occurs when multiple
patrons compete for the same group of clients. For example, Cornelius (1977) shows that clients
25
in Mexican urban slum enjoy greater autonomy than their counterparts in rural regions because
urban clients had a wider choice of patrons. Second, decentralization of clientelism takes place
when a single patron delegates the task of clientelist management to multiple intermediaries such
as local elites. In such extended clientelist networks, ordinary citizens have little direct contact
with their patron from the summits of national politics and only are linked to their patron through
a chain of mediating relationships (Muno 2010). 13 Meanwhile, local mediators often play a
bridging role connecting national politicians at the top and ordinary voters at the bottom.14 In sum,
the first scenario captures the horizontal fragmentation of authority over resources, while the
second scenario represents the vertical fragmentation. Both cases represent the proliferation of the
alternative resource providers in clientelist exchange.
The extent to which clientelist structure is decentralized has substantial implications on the
power balance between the client and the patron. At one end of the continuum where the clientelist
structure is highly centralized, patron-client relationship becomes highly repressive. Weingrod
(1977) presented an unequal relationship between a community leader and the residents in
Sardinian villages. He shows that because it was hard for the villagers to build any other
relationships outside the village, they had to put up with unreasonable treatment by their patron
otherwise they would lose resources. At the other end of the continuum where clientelist structure
is decentralized, individuals are in a better position to make demands with greater freedom to leave
the network on their own terms. Krishna (2007) describes the highly flexible patron-client
13. Given the complex reality of the relationship among patrons, clients, and mediators, the dyadic depiction
of clientelism has limitations in explaining the cause and consequences of clientelist practice. For the
discussions on the extended structure of clientelism, see Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007), and Stokes (2007).
14. For example, Hilgers (2011) shows how the leaders of Francisco Villa Popular Front party from Mexico
City exchange political support for help in accessing social housing credits with the urban poor and use
their followers as leverage in negotiations for public sector jobs, political candidacies, and public resources
with the Federal District government.
26
relationship between multiple political entrepreneurs (known as naya netas) and the individual
villagers in central Indian village. Unlike patron-client relationship in Sardinian villages, the
villagers are not locked into an unequal relationship with a single patron. They enter patron-client
network with one naya netas who offer them “most resources to finance development works in
their village, and they switch allegiance easily from one set of politicians to another” (Krishna
2007: 148).
Upon a closer look at the contrasting cases of the Sardinian and the Indian villages, I see
that the presence of alternative resource providers contributes to the greater equality between
patrons and citizens. From the perspective of bargaining theory, the availability of alternative
patrons in the Indian villages provides citizens with more exit options, which in turn allows them
to strike a better deal with their patrons. In addition, players with exit options are more likely to
leave the bargaining game since they are less tolerant of unfavorable terms and have no incentive
to settle for smaller rewards than they can get elsewhere. Therefore the presence of exit options
reduces a range of mutually acceptable agreements (Kato 1998).
If we conceptualize a patron-client relationship as a bargaining game, we can easily see
that decentralized clientelist structures provide multiple exit options by allowing greater numbers
of resource suppliers. Importantly, when the patron is not the only supplier, he can no longer dictate
the terms of clientelist deals or exercise unilateral coercion to induce compliance of the client. To
the contrary, the clientele groups can shop around for the patron who offers them the best deal.
Meanwhile, a decentralized clientelist structure can encourage ambitious politicians to create their
own support base without entirely relying on ruling parties. With greater resource autonomy, the
mediators and the local patrons can easily “break with or withhold support from national
27
politicians” to promote their own interests and those of their clients (Beck 2008: 16).15 Hence,
contrary to the conventional expectations, clientelism may not always encourage compliance to
dominant parties if the resource channel is decentralized. On the contrary, I expect that
decentralized clientelist structure will encourage defection from ruling party and new party
formation.
Note that a decentralized clientelist structure can also reduce the durability of the existing
patron-client relationship because of the accompanying information asymmetry. In a bargaining
game when one party has more information about the key parameters pertinent to the negotiation,
it can exercise greater bargaining power by exploiting her informational advantage. In
decentralized clientelist settings, the national patron rarely has enough knowledge about the actual
value of the exit options to the clients or the level of loyalty towards the current patron as opposed
to alternative patrons. Given the difficulty for the national party leaders to get private information
that may be relevant for the bargaining outcome, the patrons are in a disadvantageous position
against the clientele group. Weinstein (2005) echoes this proposition and argues that, conditional
on resource endowment, clientelist practices result in a separating equilibrium with low-committed
individuals being more likely to assemble in a new selected group of patronage. Hence, as
clientelist structures become increasingly decentralized, they inadvertently undermine the
cohesion of party organization and result in party splits.
In sum, drawing on these theoretical frameworks, I hypothesize that the effect of
clientelism on new party formation depends on the way clientelist practices are managed and
15. According to Nash (1950), the bargaining problem can be defined as any contractual interaction between
two parties “who have the opportunity to collaborate for mutual benefits” (Nash 1950: 155). The bargaining
theory assumes that the two parties are rational in calculating their payoffs and that no party will enter into
a contract unless they expect it to be beneficial (Rubinstein 1982: 97). In other words, bargaining represents
the situation where rational actors have common interest in reaching an agreement on exchange terms,
while they also have conflicting interests.
28
distributed. While in a highly centralized setting, clientelism will undermine the formation of new
parties as the conventional wisdom suggests, I argue that if the clientelist structure is decentralized
then this negative effect of clientelism on the new party formation decreases.
2.3 Empirical Analysis
Given the causal complexity and the difficulty in measuring clientelist structures, I test my
hypotheses using three different units of analysis. First, I conduct a cross-national analysis to
examine if the number of new parties is a function of the aggregated measures of clientelist level
and structure. Second, I examine the implications of my theory at the party level and see if parties’
clientelist efforts are less effective in yielding votes where clientelist structure is decentralized.
Finally, at the individual level, I analyze whether clientelist politics induce citizens’ electoral
support using public survey data. My research design is guided by the notion of triangulation
(Denzin 1970). By drawing evidence from multiple measures and data sources at three different
levels of analysis, I hope to increase the credibility of my findings and reduce potential biases and
deficiencies from using only a single method of inquiry. As Webb et al. (1966: 3) persuasively
argue, “…once a proposition has been confirmed by two or more independent measurement
processes, the uncertainty of its interpretation is greatly reduced.”
2.3.1 A Cross-National Investigation
I start my cross-national analysis by building on Tavits (2008)’ data on new party entry to
parliamentary elections in East European countries, and I expand the data to cover 45 third wave
29
democracies around the world.16 Following Tavits, I only include countries that score at least 4 on
both Freedom House scales to control the level of democratic development. To measure the
formation of new parties, I count the number of new parties that have appeared in a given election
for the first time and received a vote share of at least 0.3%.
Note that literature disagrees on the definition of a new party. Some studies show that a
significant portion of new parties are derived from a split from an existing party and hence consider
the splits and mergers as new. They argue that in new democracies where individual politicians
frequently reshuffle along the party lines, the difference between the splinters and the new parties
is quite slim (Mair 1999; Lago and Martinez 2010). On the other hand, others limit the new party
to the genuinely new organization (Bakke and Sitter 2005). Following Tavits, I consider a party
new either if it splits from an existing party or is genuinely new.17
To measure the level of clientelism, I use a recent dataset on clientelism from the
Democratic Accountability and Linkage Project (DALP) (Kitschelt et al. 2009).18 The DALP asks
the respondents to evaluate how much effort parties make in their country to their electoral target
constituencies. To facilitate the comparative study across parties and countries, the DALP
introduces the five most commonly used “currencies” of clientelistic exchange, including gifts of
consumer goods, preferential access to social policy entitlements, public sector employment,
government contracts or procurement opportunities for business, and client influence over
regulatory procedures. For each item, parties’ clientelist efforts are evaluated based on four grading
16. To compile the data, I referred to the following online sources: http://africanelections.tripod.com;
http://psephos.adam-carr.net; http://www.eisa.org.za; http://electionguide.org; www.electionresources.org
17. I exclude the electoral alliances formed mainly by existing parties.
18. The expert survey has been conducted in 89 countries between 2008 and 2009. The respondents were
asked to evaluate political parties in their countries regarding the ways in which parties attempt to connect
with voters, ranging from programmatic to clientelistic efforts. For more details, see Kitschelt and Freeze
(2011)
30
schemes from “a negligible effort or none at all” to “a major effort.” As Kitschelt (2011) posits,
by framing the questions about clientelist practices based on concrete actions, the survey avoids
the politically charged notion of clientelism. Operationally, I follow Kitschelt (2011) and create a
composite index at the country level based on the five average measures of clientelist efforts of
individual parties (weighted by their vote share in the most recent national legislative election)
within a country.
In addition, the DALP also provides useful information on the structure of clientelism by
gauging the extent to which political authority is decentralized. Specifically, the DALP asks its
respondents to describe the candidate nomination process for a given party and see whether
national legislative candidates are chosen by national party leaders, a bargaining process between
the different levels of party organization, regional/state-level organizations, or local/municipal
level actors. The literature suggests that candidate nomination has substantial implications for
power balance within a party organization and control over resources. Schattschneider (1942: 64)
forcefully argues that “…the nature of nominating procedure determines the nature of the party;
he who can make the nomination is the owner of the party.” Other studies report similar findings,
showing that when nominations are centrally controlled, candidates are more likely to remain loyal
to the party on whom the trajectory of their political careers depends (Rahat and Hazan 2001).
Importantly, the literature considers the nomination structure as a crucial determinant of the way
resources are distributed across the different organizational levels of the party. For example,
Kemahlioglu (2005) compares the degree of controls over resources by local party organizations
in Argentina and Turkey in light of the candidate selection structure. She argues that in Argentina
the local organs of the parties hold greater control over resources than its Turkish counterparts
because the sub-units of the Argentine party are engaged in the candidate selection process. Hence,
31
I expect that clientelist resources will be more centrally managed and distributed when a national
party tightly controls the candidate nomination process and most decentralized when candidate
selection process is more open and participatory.
Finally, I follow the literature and take into account several institutional and structural
factors that would affect the cost of entry, the benefits of office, and the potential of electoral
support when elites decide whether to form a new party (Cox 1997; Hug 2001; Tavits 2008). First,
my model controls for the costs of entry. The entry cost is expected to increase with the number
of signatures required to put a new party name on the ballot. I measure it using the variable Petition
available from the Institutions and Elections Project, which equals 1 if petition signatures are
required and 0 otherwise. Secondly, the availability of public financing for new parties alleviates
the entry cost for new parties, thus promoting their emergence. This variable is coded as 1 if public
funding is provided and 0 otherwise.19 In addition, district magnitude accounts for how permissive
the institutions are to the new challengers; for example, Cox (1997) shows that larger district
magnitude encourages new party formation.20 Lastly, following Tavits (2008), I also control for
the type of electoral system.21 The intuition is straightforward: the more proportional the system,
the more likely new parties emerge as the cost of winning a seat is lowered. Next, the model
controls the benefits of office. Studies have shown that when the elected position allow
considerable power over policy making and the spoils of office, new parties have greater incentives
to take on challenges to enter (Tavits 2008). To measure the decision making powers of chief
executives, I consider the variable executive constraints available from Polity IV. This variable
19. The cross-national data on these variables are available for the year 2008 from the International Institute
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA).
20. I use the data on district magnitude from Database of Political Institutions (2009).
21. I use the measure of electoral systems from the Democratic Electoral Systems around the World
compiled by Bormann and Golder (2013).
32
refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief
executives. I also take into account the length of democracy. The notion is that electoral history
determines the level of uncertainty about electoral performance, thereby influencing the entry
decision by the elites. Lastly, the literature suggests that disappointing economic performance
works in favor of new entrants. Thus, I include inflation, unemployment rate, and GDP growth
from the World Development Indicators.
To reiterate, I argue that the effect of clientelism on new party formation is contingent on
its structure. In a highly centralized setting, higher level of clientelism is negatively associated
with the number of new parties. However, I expect that this negative effect declines as the
clientelist structure decentralizes. To evaluate the hypothesis, I estimate the following interaction
model at the country level:
Number of New Parties
= β0 + β1𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 + β2𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒
+ β3(𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 ∗ 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒) + 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀
Since the dependent variable is a nonnegative count variable, I use a Poisson regression
with robust standard errors to model the data generating process.22 Table 2.1 shows the estimation
results. The coefficients on the key explanatory variables are statistically significant with the
expected signs, corroborating my argument that the effect of clientelist level on the formation of
new parties is contingent upon the clientelist structure. Given the non-linearity nature of my model,
I illustrate the conditional effect of clientelist politics in Figure 2.1. As we can see, as clientelist
level increases, the predicted numbers of new party decrease. However, the downward slope for
22. My dependent variable does not have an excessive number of zeros. Nor does the variance of our
dependent variable is greater than that of a true Poisson.
33
the decentralized clientelist structure is flatter than the one for the centralized clientelist structure,
indicating that the negative effect of clientelist level on new party formation is smaller under
decentralized clientelist structures. In addition, we can also see that at a higher level of clientelism,
the predicted numbers of new parties are actually greater under decentralized clientelist structures.
Together, these results highlight the importance of clientelist structure in shaping the dynamics of
new party formation in new democracies.
Table 2.1 Cross-National Determinants of the New Party Emergence
DV: Number of New Parties
Model 1
Clientelist Level -0.8067***
(0.1967)
Clientelist Structure -1.3241**
(0.4739)
Interaction 0.5857**
(0.2101)
Petition -0.0981
(0.2438)
Public financing -0.3608
(0.2737)
District Magnitude 0.2458***
(0.0672)
Electoral System 0.2474
(0.1806)
Executive Constraints -0.1037
(0.0751)
Inflation -0.0423*
(0.0196)
GDP growth 0.0269
(0.0200)
Unemployment 0.0757***
(0.0102)
_cons -0.0102
(0.6966)
N 45
ll -110.7366
34
Table 2.1 (cont’d)
chi2 97.5882
Note: Poisson regression model; each country’s exposure to democracy is considered in the model using the number of consecutive years of democracy. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
Figure 2.1. Predicted Number of New Parties across Different Levels of Clientelism under
Two Alternative Clientelist Structures
Note: The figure is generated using Model 1 of Table 2.1.
2.3.2 A Cross-Party Investigation
The cross-national evidence presented so far provides top-down support of my theory that
intense clientelist efforts may be associated with increasing number of new parties under
decentralized clientelist structure. In essence, I interpret this finding as evidence that decentralized
clientelist structure reduces the credibility of threat to withhold clientelist resources and
consequently undermines the durability of the existing patron-client relationship. Under such
circumstances, efforts to provide clientelistic benefits may not necessarily translate to greater
compliance and loyalty from the clients. In other words, I argue that parties’ clientelist efforts to
010
20
30
Pre
dic
ted
Num
ber
of N
ew
Pa
rtie
s
.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8Patronage Level
Centralized
Decentralized
Predictive Margins of Patronage Structure
35
mobilize voters and sustain the cohesion of party organization would be less effective under
decentralized clientelist environments.
To further corroborate my argument, I test the implications of my theory at the party level
using the DALP data. The DALP taps directly to the effectiveness of parties’ clientelist efforts by
asking respondents to evaluate how effective parties are in their efforts to mobilize voters by
targeted benefits. Operationally, I aggregate the score of perceived effectiveness from respondents
at the party level, and regress the variable of clientelist effectiveness on the variables of clientelist
size, clientelist structure, and their interaction term. Again, if my theory holds, clientelist efforts
should be most effective when clientelist structure is centralized. As the clientelist structure
decentralizes, clientelist practices become ineffective in inducing compliance and support from
voters.
This is indeed what I have found. As Figure 2.2 clearly demonstrates, clientelist efforts are
indeed useful in inducing electoral support as the conventional wisdom suggests. More importantly,
the upward slope for the decentralized clientelist structure is less steeper than the one for the
centralized clientelist structure, indicating that the clientelist effort is less effective in mobilizing
voters under decentralized clientelist environment. 23 The difference between centralized and
decentralized clientelist environment is statistically significant, as evident in the non-overlapping
95% confidence interval. In sum, the results show that the effectiveness of clientelist efforts in
securing electoral support critically depends on the clientelist structure.
23. The numerical results are shown in Appendix, Table 2.2.
36
Figure 2.2. Estimated Effects of Clientelist Level on Effectiveness of Clientelism under
Alternative Clientelist Structure
Note: The figure is generated using Model 2 of Table 2.3 in Appendix. The vertical lines present 95% confidence interval.
2.3.3 Individual-level Investigation
Finally, I test the implications of my theory on voters’ electoral behavior using the most
recent Afrobarometer survey data. Following my theory, I argue that decentralized clientelist
structure provides the clients alternative providers of state resources, which in turn makes it less
likely for them to stay in the existing clientelist network. Hence, by implications, I expect that
voters will be less likely to support the ruling party when they perceive more diversified channels
of resource management and distribution.
The dependent variable in this individual-level analysis is voters’ support for ruling parties.
This binary variable is coded from the survey question “If a presidential election were held
tomorrow, which party’s candidate would you vote for?” I identified a full list of ruling parties at
the time of the survey for each country included in dataset, and I coded as 1 if respondents would
vote for the ruling party and 0 otherwise. To measure the level of clientelism at the individual level,
12
34
5
Lin
ea
r P
redic
tion
on
Eff
ectiven
ess o
f T
arg
etin
g
5 10 15 20
Patronage Level
Centralized Decentralized
Effectiveness of Targeting
Effe
ctiv
enes
s o
f C
lien
telis
t Ef
fort
s
37
I follow Young (2009) and utilize a question on whether and why respondents contacted formal or
informal leaders. The choices are “did not contact any”, “community problem”, “personal
problem”, which I recode into 0, 1, 2, where 2 indicate the highest level of clientelism. According
to Young (2009), these questions on the Afrobarometer survey best serves as “a test for an effect
of personal, clientelistic networks on voting behavior”. Although a contact with leaders in and of
itself is not necessarily equivalent to clientelism, direct and interpersonal interaction has been
considered the most fundamental characteristic of clientelistic exchange. Hicken (2011: 291)
correctly notes that “…as long and complex as this broker network may become, most scholars
stress that at the core are personal, dyadic relationships between individuals.” Thus, to trace
clientelism, the literature has increasingly used survey questions on whether individuals have
contacted elected officials for help (Kitschelt 2011). As to the measure of clientelist structures, I
capture the decentralization of discretionary power over clientelist resources by examining how
many different sources of authorities the respondents rely on to meet their needs. Specifically, this
measure taps into the perception of respondents regarding who they believe has the power and
resources to help them. If the respondents contacted more diverse authorities, I expect that they
consider the authorities and resources are more decentralized. Hence, I created the composite
index based on whom respondents contact about important problems. The choices include “local
government councilor”, “a member of parliament”, “official of a government agency”, “religious
leader”, “traditional ruler”, and “other influential persons”. I recoded each variable as 0 if the
respondent chose “Never” and 1 if they contacted more than once. Then, I created the index by
summing up the six questions. Consequently, the variable ranges from 0 to 6, where 6 represent
highest level of (perceived) decentralization. Lastly, I control the respondents’ perception on the
previous and future economic condition. Building upon the insights from the economic voting
38
literature, I expect voters to base their vote on whether incumbents are responsible for economic
outcomes. I also control for the level of education of the respondents.
The finding from the logistic regression provides strong empirical support to my theory.24
As we can see in Figure 2.3, the relationship between clientelist level and voters' support for ruling
parties is highly contingent on clientelist structure. When clientelist structure is highly centralized,
an increase of clientelism from the median level to the 75% level would lead to voters’ incumbent
support by 10%. However, as voters recognize greater dispersion of the authority over resources,
the effect of increasing in clientelist level on voters’ incumbent support starts to reduce
substantially. This result supports my hypothesis that clientelist efforts do not have uniform effects
on voters' support for ruling parties; instead, incumbents' clientelist efforts pay off electorally only
when the clientelist structure is centralized.
Figure 2.3. First Difference Measuring the Effect of Clientelist Level across Varying
Clientelist Structure
Note: Pr(Vote for Ruling Party=1 | Clientelism= 75 percentile) - Pr(Vote for Ruling Party=1 | Clientelism= 50 percentile). This figure is generated using CLARIFY based on Model 3 of Table 2.4 in Appendix.
24. Again, the numerical results are shown in Appendix, Table 2.4.
-.0
2-.
01
0
.01
.02
Fir
st
Diffe
rence
: E
ffect
of
Patr
ona
ge
Leve
l
on
the
Su
pp
ort
for
Ru
ling
Part
ies
020
40
60
% o
f o
bse
rvatio
n
0 2 4 6
Patronage Structure
Low High
39
2.3.4 Robustness Check
To buttress my empirical analysis further, I now undertake a series of robustness checks to
ensure the validity of my previous results. To begin with, I employ a variety of alternative
indicators for my key variables, i.e. the level and the structure of clientelism, to ensure that my
results are not driven by arbitrary choice of measurements.
First, in terms of the level of clientelism, I use a different question from the DALP survey
to measure the level of clientelism. This alternative question asks country experts to evaluate the
extent to which parties mobilize electoral support by delivering targeted material benefits. The
responses are scaled on a 1-4 metric, where 1 indicates “not at all” and 4 “a great extent.” In a
nutshell, the question captures whether parties establish relationship between politician and voters
through a programmatic or through a clientelistic linkage. Unlike the previous measurement, this
question is not based on parties’ performance in actually targeting clientelist resources, but on “an
explicit or implicit statement of intent” (Kitschelt and Freeze 2011: 23). Note that empirically these
two measurements correlate only modestly (77%). In additions, one might question the subjective
nature of these two measurements since both of them are drawn from survey data and hence might
capture only the perception of the clientelist politics rather than the reality of it. To alleviate this
concern, I cross-check my results by employing a commonly used, objectively-based measurement
on the clientelist spending: the government expenditure on wages and employer contributions as
the percentage of total government expenditure. In the absence of a direct measurement, the
existing literature considers the spending on personnel as the most widespread manifestation of
clientelist practice (Grzymala-Busse 2008). As Chubb (1982) puts it, “…politics revolves around
the job or position and a job signifies a vote and vice versa.”
40
Second, regarding the structure of clientelism, the DALP also provides valuable
information regarding the extent to which clientelism is decentralized by examining whether the
patron delegates the task of clientelist management to intermediaries. In particular, it ask whether
the parties “…have local intermediaries (e.g. neighborhood leaders, local notables, religious
leaders) who operate in local constituencies on the parties’ behalf, and perform a variety of
important tasks such as maintaining contact with large groups of voters, organizing electoral
support and voter turnout, and distributing party resources to voters and supporters?” The
responses fall into three categories, ranging from “they have local representatives in most
constituencies,” “they have local representatives in some constituencies,” to “they have almost no
local representatives.” Using this information, I create an alternative indicator of clientelist
structure based on the presence of intermediaries. I argue that while parties may benefit from strong
informal network of intermediaries to reach out to local voters, the capacity of a national party to
control the clientelist network will inevitably diminish as network grows. Moreover, I use
Vanhanen’s (2003) indicators of power resource distribution to capture the structure of clientelism
in a more objective manner. The Vanhanen indicator ranges from 0 to 100, where 100 represents
high relative distribution of power resources. This measure is calculated by taking into account the
diversification of occupation, the education level of the population, and the level of
decentralization in non-agricultural economic resources. Many studies have used this indicator to
measure the various dimension of inequality (Amendola et al. 2013), and I argue that this indicator
can serve as an indirect yet useful measurement for the power distribution within the clientelist
network.
Model 4 and Model 5 in Table 2.5 (shown in Appendix) reports the results from using these
alternative subjective and objective measurements respectively. For both models, the coefficients
41
of clientelist level and structure as well as the interaction term are statistically significant with the
expected signs. These results corroborate that my previous findings that increases in clientelism
can lead to more new party formation when the clientelist structure is decentralized.
Finally, recall from my individual-level analysis that voters are more likely to withdraw
their support for the incumbent in decentralized clientelist environments. To ensure the validity
of this finding, I further collect data on the vote share of the new parties and examine whether they
depend on the interaction between clientelist level and the clientelist structure. As expected, I find
that as clientelist structure decentralizes, higher level of clientelism is associated with higher level
of vote share for new parties. The result is in line with my micro-level evidence. Jointly, these
results represent the micro-foundation for the electoral outcome of new parties.
In sum, all the analyses presented so far underscore my theory: the effect of clientelist
level on new party formation depends on the way clientelism is structured. The finding that
clientelist resources have a conditional effect on new party formation is shown to be remarkably
resilient, surviving rigorous robustness tests. As Table 2.2 summarizes, my results hold across
three different units of analysis and various alternative measurements.
42
Table 2.2 Summary of the Measurements of Variables
Unit of
Analysis
Dependent
Variable
Independent Variable:
Clientelist Level
Independent Variable:
Clientelist Structure
Country-
level
Number of New
Parties
1: Clientelist efforts with five specific
goods and services
2: Intensity of parties’ clientelist
efforts
3: Government expenditure on wages
and employer contributions
1: Nomination structure
2: Presence of intermediaries
3: Vanhanen’s indicators of power
resource distribution
Party-level Effectiveness of
Clientelist
Efforts
Clientelist efforts with five specific
goods and services
Nomination structure
Individual-
level
Voters' Support
for Ruling
Parties
Whether respondents contacted
formal or informal leaders
Number of authorities respondents
rely on
2.4 Conclusion
As a fundamental means of building political support, I concur with the literature that
clientelism plays a crucial role in shaping the party system. As Medina and Stokes (2007: 69) puts
it, “…no democracy on earth has found its way to preventing all forms of patronage”. However,
I disagree with conventional wisdom on how clientelism shapes the party system, and I emphasize
the importance of structural aspect of clientelist resources. I conceptualize the clientelist exchange
as a form of a bargaining, and I argue that increasing clientelism accompanied with a decentralized
resource control leads to greater numbers of alternative suppliers. This, in turn, creates a
competitive environment empowering voters with greater freedom to leave the clientelist network
and join new parties. In addition, decentralized supply channels also increase information
asymmetry between patrons and clients. Taken together, they shift the bargaining power away
from the existing parties and undermine their organizational integrity, while facilitating
challengers to form new political parties.
43
Some might wonder why party leaders decentralize the clientelist structure in the first place
if it encourages new challengers. Although a comprehensive investigation of the origin of
decentralization is beyond the scope of this paper, I expect that the decision of decentralization is
partially driven by the trade-off between holding control over resources and extending support
base. As Slater (2004) shows, even Suharto, one of the most powerful authoritarian rulers, had to
put a lot of efforts to constantly create and nurture supports for the regime. However, given its
inherently non-universalistic nature, the extent to which clientelist practices can induce the support
is bound to be limited. Therefore, politicians have incentives to delegate their redistributive
authority to those who can attract more supports on behalf of them. At the same time, this process
inevitably leads to the surrender of power to intermediary authorities. As Baldwin (2011) suggests,
African politicians often give up power over the allocation of critical resources to local leaders to
receive more electoral support beyond their core ethnic group.
I note that there are other types of clientelism aside from public resources. Arriola (2012)
argues that private sources such as support from business sectors can also facilitate the formation
of opposition coalitions. Due to the data constraints, my empirical analyses mainly focus on the
structure of control over public resources. However, conceptually I expect that the existence of
private sources would strengthen my theoretical prediction as they further decentralize the
clientelist structure and hence facilitate new party formation.
Finally, this paper contributes to the growing literature on the relationship between formal
and informal institutions. As Helmke and Levitsky (2004) show, the formal and informal
institutions can be mutually reinforcing, supplementary, conflicting, and accommodating. By
showing how clientelist politics shapes party systems in new democracies, this paper demonstrates
how the informal rules constrain and modify the way formal rules evolve.
44
APPENDIX
45
Table 2.3. Effect of Clientelist Level and Structure on Effectiveness of Clientelism
DV: Effectiveness of Clientelism
Model 2
Clientelist Level (b15) 0.1606***
(0.0232)
Clientelist Structure (a5n) 0.3045*
(0.1315)
Interaction (b15Xa5n) -0.0285*
(0.0122)
_cons 0.7241*
(0.2794)
N 506
r2 0.4372
F 49.4247
Clusters 88
ll -330.9603
Note: Linear regression model. Robust standard errors clustering at country level in parenthesis; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 2.4. Effect of Clientelist Level and Structure on Voters' Supports for Ruling Parties
DV: Support for Ruling Parties
Model 3
Clientelist Level 0.0475*
(0.0208)
Clientelist Structure 0.1964***
(0.0362)
Interaction -0.0369*
(0.0156)
Education -0.1393***
(0.0099)
Retrospective Voting 0.1202***
(0.0172)
Prospective Voting 0.3052***
(0.0159)
_cons -0.5317***
(0.1064)
N 16796
ll -9322.7891
chi2 3767.7168
46
Table 2.4 (cont’d)
Note: Logistic regression model. Country dummies are not reported on the table. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1.
Table 2.5. Robustness Checks for the Cross-National Determinants of New Party
Emergence
DV: Number of New Parties
Model 4 Model 5
Clientelist Level -0.2808*** -0.0227*
(0.0762) (0.0105)
Clientelist Structure -4.7512*** -0.0564***
(1.2071) (0.0171)
Interaction 0.1092*** 0.0015*
(0.0311) (0.0007)
Petition -0.6476* 0.9149*
(0.2936) (0.4271)
Public financing -0.6275* 0.3859
(0.3143) (0.2906)
District Magnitude 0.0041*** -0.0036
(0.0009) (0.0045)
Mixed (Electoral System) 0.4186 0.2262
(0.2224) (0.1338)
Presidency -0.0246 -0.0622
(0.1203) (0.1094)
Executive Constraints -0.0801 -0.1334*
(0.0882) (0.0555)
Log(Length of Democracy) -0.2474 0.1645
(0.2917) (0.1394)
Inflation -0.0929*** 0.0002*
(0.0193) (0.0001)
GDP growth 0.0013 -0.0335
(0.0200) (0.0228)
Unemployment -0.0604* -0.0081
(0.0255) (0.0111)
lnalpha -1.6371***
_cons (0.4139)
_cons 14.9899*** 1.8448**
(3.3172) (0.7117)
N 32 101
N cluster 35
ll -62.3588 -236.0991
chi2 101.5963 136.2759
47
Table 2.5 (cont’d)
Note: Model 4 is produced based on the subjective measures from DALP dataset. Model 5 is estimated based on the objective measure from World Development Indicators and Vanhanen index, which is used to create the proxy for clientelist level and clientelist structure, respectively.
Table 2.6 Cases Included
Albania Egypt Macedonia Romania
Argentina El Salvador Mali Russia
Bangladesh Estonia Mauritius Slovakia
Benin Georgia Moldova Slovenia
Bolivia Ghana Mozambique Tanzania
Brazil Guatemala Nicaragua Turkey
Bulgaria Honduras Niger Ukraine
Chile Hungary Nigeria Uruguay
Colombia Jamaica Panama Zambia
Croatia Kenya Paraguay
Czech Rep. Latvia Peru
Ecuador Lithuania Poland
17 countries in Eastern Europe and post Soviet Union
14 countries in Latin America
2 countries in North Africa & the Middle East
10 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa
1 countries in South Asia, 1 countries in The Caribbean
Figure 2.4. Predicted number of new parties across different levels of clientelism under two
alternative clientelist structures
Note: The figure is generated using Model 5 of Table 2.5. The vertical lines present 95% confidence interval.
05
10
15
Pre
dic
ted N
um
be
r o
f N
ew
Part
ies
4 14 24 34 44 54
Patronage Level
Centralized Decentralized
Predictive Margins with 95% CIs
48
CHAPTER 3 PARTY EXTENSIVENESS, CLIENTELISM, AND PARTY
NATIONALIZATION:
THE MEDIATING EFFECT OF CLIENTELISM
3.1 Introduction
Why are some parties competitive throughout the country, while others appeal to only a
few specific regions? Recent years have seen an increasing interest in understanding the pattern of
territorial vote distribution of parties, which is called party nationalization.25 From the supply side
perspective, party nationalization captures the number of districts in which parties and candidates
are competing in a given country (Kasuya and Moenius 2008) and the degree to which co-
partisans coordinate to run under a common party label (Cox 1997).26 From the demand side, it
presents voters’ electoral behaviors across districts in terms of the degree to which they offer
similar levels of support to the parties throughout districts (Morgenstern et al. 2009). Highly
nationalized parties would be equally strong in every district. In contrast, marginally nationalized
parties gain most of their votes in a few specific districts (Bochsler 2010).
To achieve a consistent level of support across districts, i.e. high party nationalization, the
literature recognizes the importance of efficient coordination among elites and voters on a
common party label. As a crucial determinant of elites' incentives and capacities to coordinate,
prominent explanations for the level of party nationalization have focused on how political
25 Note that party nationalization is different from another commonly used term, nationalization, which is
defined as the process of taking a private assets into public ownership by a national government.
26 Literature defines nationalization in terms of several different aspects (Schattschneider 1960;
Morgenstern et al. 2009, Schakel 2013): First, static (or distributional) nationalization (Morgenstern et al.
2009) refers to the degree of homogeneity in the geographic distribution of a party’s vote or the consistency
of a party’s support across a country; Second, dynamic nationalization is about the degree to which a party’s
vote in the various districts changes uniformly over time (Stokes 1967; Brady 1985; Bawn et al. 1999).
Third, multilevel nationalization takes into consideration the multilevel dimension of party systems
(Schakel 2013). Finally, party linkage nationalization focuses on the extent to which party candidates come
together under common party labels (Chhibber and Kollman 2004; Cox 1997). This study focuses on the
static nationalization and the party linkage nationalization.
49
authority is distributed, which is manifested by organizational structures. For example, parties
with territorially comprehensive structures are associated with a greater institutionalization
(Mainwaring 1999), greater party cohesion (van Biezen 2000), and greater capacity to effectively
perform and shape political processes (Szcerbiak 2001). At the party system level, likewise, as
national governments exert more control over local areas, the literature demonstrates that voters
and candidates are likely to have greater incentives to coordinate on common party labels
(Chhibber and Kollman 1998) and achieve higher nationalization (Harbers 2010).
While prior scholarship on party nationalization predicts exclusively positive effects from
extensive political authority, the studies on intra-party politics suggest that a potentially
contradictory mechanism might be at work. For example, Boucek (2012) argues that the extended
dominance of a party can threaten a party organization by generating intra-party differences.
Having a lack of external challenges, she argues, politicians are less concerned about obtaining
votes for the party and more devoted to pursuing individual or factional ambitions. In a similar
vein, Warner (1997) maintains that a monopoly leads politicians to drop their ‘competitive guard’
and channel their efforts into clientelism. In this situation, individual politicians gain at the expense
of the party organization’s common purpose.
I argue that the key to understanding the contradictory effects of extensive party structure
lies in the informal mechanism of clientelism. This is an informal contractual relationship in which
patrons distribute resources to supporters in order to strengthen their political positions (Piattoni
2001).27 Literature on clientelism argues that clientelist practices are more effective for parties that
27 Clientelist resources include a wide variety of monetary and non-monetary rewards such as jobs, goods,
licenses, and other public decisions. These benefits can be distributed by a variety of agents such as local
notables, government or party bureaucracies, and party activists; whoever has access to the resources
(Warner 1997).
50
have extensive organizations because these organizational attributes expand parties’ monitoring
and distributing capacities (Kitschelt and Kselman 2010). In turn, another strand of literature on
the consequences of clientelism proposes that this practice tends to undermine institutionalization
of parties and party systems and cultivates more particularistic linkages with voters and politicians
(Warner 1997; Kitschelt 2000; Hicken 2011). The findings from these two bodies of literature on
clientelism imply that extensive political structure might have negative effects on party
nationalization: extensive organizational structure facilitates the effectiveness of clientelism,
which in turn undermines parties’ abilities to coordinate on the common party label. In spite of its
potential implications, the role of informal mechanisms of clientelism has largely been overlooked
in the party nationalization literature.
The goal of this study is to examine if and how much informal mechanisms of clientelism
mediate the impact of formal party structure on party nationalization. To this end, I explore the
relationship among three variables: party structure, effectiveness of clientelism, and party
nationalization. Effectiveness of clientelism is defined as the extent to which parties turn their
clientelistic efforts into electoral success (Kitschelt and Kselman 2010). In terms of party structure,
I focus on extensiveness, which is commonly seen as crucial determinants of party performance.
Drawing on Harmel and Janda (1982), extensiveness of a party is defined in terms of its structural
capacity to reach voters across a country. The concept is manifested by parties’ geographic reach
or territorial presence through local offices, affiliated organizations, and established relationships
with local notables (Kitschelt and Kselman 2010; Tavits 2012).
I posit that extensive party control structure enhances the effectiveness of parties’
clientelist efforts, which in turn decreases party nationalization. This implies that party
nationalization partially depends on the informal mechanism of clientelism. As existing studies
51
suggest, I admit that extensive political authority does have a positive effect on party
nationalization. However, I insist that this positive impact will be suppressed to the extent that
these organizational attributes improve effectiveness of clientelism. Where clientelist efforts are
effectively translated into electoral gains, elites and voters are more likely to establish the
relationships beyond party organizations. Therefore, I maintain that effective clientelism threatens
a party's existence as a collective entity with a shared goal.
My study takes a party as the unit of analysis.28 In my analysis, 256 political parties from
49 countries are included.29 To obtain the party-level data on party nationalization, I use the
Constituency-Level Elections Archive (CLEA) datasets which contain the measure of party
nationalization for a particular party in a given country-year dyad. In addition, I obtain the data on
effectiveness of clientelism and extensiveness of party structure from the Democratic
Accountability and Linkages Project (DALP).
My hypotheses suggest a causal chain of relations where an independent variable (i.e.
extensiveness of party) affects a mediating variable (i.e. effectiveness of clientelism), which then
affects an outcome variable (i.e. party nationalization).30 To empirically evaluate my hypotheses,
28 Party system nationalization is a weighted sum of party nationalization of all parties in a given country.
My analysis focuses on party nationalization of individual parties.
29 In my case selection, I focus on the established parties with more than 5% of vote share. I follow the
criteria of case selection of DALP dataset outlined by Kitschelt (2013). Political parties included are from
the countries with at least two million inhabitants with at least two recent rounds of national elections under
at least semi-democratic conditions with the Freedom House Index of at least 4.0. Regionally, my cases are
distributed as follows: 51 parties in Eastern Europe and post Soviet Union, 46 parties in Latin America, 5
parties in North Africa and Middle East, 20 parties in Sub-Saharan Africa, 90 parties in Western Europe
and North America, 45 parties in Asia (East, South-East, South).
30 The term ‘causal’ is used because the path diagram represents a prediction about possible causal
influence. However, given that my data come from non-experimental designs, I can only test whether a
hypothesized causal model is plausible and consistent with the data.
52
I conduct mediation analysis based on three sets of linear regressions.31 In addition, I conduct two
additional significance tests on the mediating effects of clientelism: i.e. the Sobel test and
nonparametric bootstrap sampling analysis. The results from these different methods provide
consistent support for my hypothesis that clientelism mediates the effect of party structure on party
nationalization. My study contributes to research on party nationalization by situating this
underexplored informal mechanism within the context of current theory on the determinants of
party nationalization.
3.2 Literature Review
Building on earlier studies of party system development and institutionalization, recent
scholars have investigated the causes and consequences of party nationalization, as well as
methods of measurement (Chhibber and Kollman 1998; Jones and Mainwaring 2003; Brancati
2008; Lago and Montero 2009; Morgenstern et al. 2009; Bochsler 2010).32 The literature maintains
that party nationalization has important implications for key aspects of political outcomes. First,
where a party draws most of its support from a few specific districts, i.e. low party nationalization,
31 Hypotheses regarding mediated effects are common in political science research. For example, Nelson
et al. (1997) maintain that the effect of news frames on tolerance for the Ku Klux Klan is mediated by the
perceived importance of public order values. In the study of political behavior in post-communist countries,
Powers and Cox (1997) argue that understandings of the past mediate the relationship between personal
circumstances and satisfaction with economic reforms. Using mediation analysis, Brader et al. (2008)
present that anxiety mediate the effect of racialized news coverage on public opinion about immigration.
Arceneaux (2012) proposes that the effect of political argument on public opinion is mediated by anxiety.
Johnson et al. (2012) claim that campaign receipts mediate the effect that race has on the decision of a
House member to seek a Senate nomination. Newman et al. (2013) demonstrate that an acculturating
context exerts a mediating effect on the preferred amount of immigration through its impact on cultural
threat.
32 The concept of institutionalization captures the collective stability of inter-party competition and parties’
relationships with society at the party system level (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). However, within the
party system, individual parties may vary in terms of the level of institutionalization. The patterns of party
nationalization capture this underexplored aspect of intra-party dynamics. Specifically, a low level of party
nationalization represents a weak shared identity of a party’s members and constituents.
53
it may favor its stronghold over other areas in policymaking decisions (Jones and Mainwaring
2003). In Ethiopia, for example, 80% of the parties in the House of People’s Representatives have
regional bases. As Chege (2007) finds, their policy agendas are largely limited to region-specific
issues. Second, studies argue that a more nationalized party cultivate highly coordinated settings
which facilitate executives’ efforts to build legislative coalitions based on national issues (Jones
and Mainwaring 2003). Thus, scholars propose that nationalized parties and party systems tend to
generate more responsive government (Lupu 2008). Finally, the literature contends that the
nationalization of politics makes elections meaningful by making power alternation more likely
(Schattschneider 1960). In new democracies, the foundations of opposition parties are often
limited to ethnic and regional constituencies. In the absence of an established nationwide
membership, representation remains local and they are less likely to become a viable alternative
to incumbents.
According to the party nationalization literature, the degree of vote dispersion of a party is
crucially determined by coordination of candidates and voters across districts (Cox 1999). When
electoral competitors refrain from entering the race independently and converge on a common
nation-wide party platform, similar patterns of electoral competitions emerge across districts
(Chhibber and Kollman 1998). Conversely, when elites fail to ally with other groups or candidates,
competitors and parties are likely to proliferate at the regional level (Hicken 2009). In this setting,
electoral competitions occur among different sets of parties across districts and the electoral
behavior of voters and candidates is likely to diverge from district to district. Thus, vote shares
obtained by candidates from the same party vary considerably across districts.
To explain variations in party nationalization, therefore, the literature has investigated
institutional determinants that might affect incentives for elites and voters to coordinate. Among
54
others, institutions defining the structure of political authority and control have been considered as
one of the most important determinants of party nationalization (Brancati 2008). Prominent studies
on party nationalization share the view that the distribution of political authority is a crucial factor
determining incentives to coordinate (Hicken 2002; Chhibber and Kollman 1998). At the party
system level, for example, Chhibber and Kollman (1998) contend that as governments centralize
power and their policies affect local areas, candidates tend to engage in national-level
organizations and voters support nationally competitive parties over regionally-based ones. As
national governments exert more political or economic control over local areas, the distribution of
votes becomes more similar across districts because candidates and voters coordinate on the
national level to influence policy outcomes (Harbers 2010).
Likewise, at the party level, the internal distribution of authority is expected to affect
parties’ capacities to develop more coherent electoral strategies, broaden their support bases and
induce politicians and voters to coordinate under common party labels (Szcerbiak 2001; Scott
2004). Specifically, Mainwaring (1999) associates territorially comprehensive parties with greater
system institutionalization. In a similar vein, Tavits (2012) defines organizational strength and
success in terms of the extensive structure of political parties. She argues that these parties are
electorally advantageous because they can effectively address environmental challenges and
formulate policy. Perceived as reliable and capable, a party with extensive structure is capable of
inducing elites and voters to coordinate. The discussion from existing studies leads to the following
hypothesis about the internal distribution of authority at the party level:
H1: As party organization becomes more extensive by exerting greater political control over local
areas, the level of party nationalization increases.
55
Although existing studies on party nationalization found that formal institutions play a
significant role in shaping party nationalization, their explanations are unsatisfactory in that they
have rarely considered the challenges of coordination derived from informal institutions. The
extant literature assumes that political elites and voters are motivated to coordinate across districts
by programmatic or ideological causes. In particular, the goal to influence policy is considered as
the key motivation to coordinate on parties at the national level (Chhibber and Kollman 2004). As
Mainwaring (1999) points out, however, party competition rarely occurs solely over policy-
oriented issues. In a setting where programmatic issues play a limited role, informal rules and
particularistic relationships matter more than formal party structure to the patterns of party
competition. In particular, clientelist practices create intra-party groupings which add another
dimension to elite competition within a party (Levitsky 2003). Therefore, clientelist practices carry
implications for elites’ incentives to coordinate, which have been overlooked in existing party
nationalization literature. More importantly, the literature on clientelism suggests positive effects
deriving from extensive party structure, which is conventionally considered to strengthen national
party organizations. However, my study argues that there are negative effects as well. Extensive
party structure not only strengthens national parties, but it also offers a favorable environment for
effective clientelist practices by enhancing monitoring and distributing capacities. In the latter case,
a decrease of party nationalization is expected because clientelist practices primarily serve
individual or factional purposes rather than party goals.
Given the potential effects of clientelism, the end results of party nationalization may not
be solely a product of formal institutions as identified in the extant literature. In spite of its potential
implication for party nationalization, existing party nationalization literature has rarely looked into
the role of informal mechanisms of clientelism. To fill these gaps in the existing literature, the next
56
section provides theoretical explanations that account for variations in party nationalization in light
of the mediating role of clientelism.
3.3 Theory: the mediating role of clientelism
The primary interest of my study is to examine the extent to which effectiveness of
clientelism mediates the impact of party structures on party nationalization. There are a lack of
theoretical studies explicitly focusing on the relationship among the three variables within a
common framework. Thus, I build upon two related bodies of literature to guide my expectations:
specifically, they include previous works on (a) party structure and effectiveness of clientelism
and (b) clientelism and party cohesion.
3.3.1 Party Structure and Effectiveness of Clientelism
To account for the mediating effect of clientelism, I first investigate the relationship
between party extensiveness and clientelism. Clientelist practices pose challenges to parties and
political elites in distributing resources and monitoring clients’ behaviors. As Okun points out, the
loss of efficiency is inherent in the distribution process, which he called a ‘leaky bucket problem’
(Okun 1975: 91). He argues that some of the resources will inevitably disappear in transit, so the
recipients of interest will not receive all the resources as patrons initially intended. In addition to
addressing inefficiency in distribution, parties also need to ensure that recipients of targeted
benefits honor their promises to cast their vote for the party. However, due to the secret ballot and
the informal rules dictating clientelist exchange, enforcement of clientelist terms is difficult
(Helmke and Levitsky 2004).
57
In the face of these challenges, literature on clientelism argues, parties’ organizational
structures has important implications for the effectiveness of clientelism. Stokes (2005) argues that
successful clientelist parties have extensive organizations deeply involved in voters’ social
networks. Extensive organizations translate to broad formal membership and networks of local
branches, informal associations with external networks, and affiliations with civil society
organizations (Kitschelt and Kselman 2010). Examples of this type of extensive party
organizations include Peru’s Peruvian Aprista Party, Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary Party,
and Argentina’s Peronists Party. Based on extensive organizational networks, these parties
maintain intimate relationships between elites and citizens. With these relationships, they are in a
better position to extract valuable information about voters’ preferences and behaviors (Kitschelt
and Kselman 2010; Stokes 2005). In turn, these parties and elites can exercise firmer control over
clientelist transactions by denying noncompliant clients further access to clientelist benefits.
By reducing inefficiencies inherent in clientelist transactions, extensive organizations are
conducive to effective distribution of targeted benefits and controlling opportunism. A party’s
marginal return from its clientelist effort increases with greater organizational extensiveness. In
other words, increases in organizational extensiveness are more likely to turn parties’ clientelistic
efforts into tangible electoral gains (Kitschelt and Kselman 2010). As a result, parties and elites
have greater incentives to divert their efforts and resources to the distribution of targeted benefits
as opposed to programmatic policy campaign (Kitschelt and Kselman 2010). This leads to the
following proposition:
H2: As party organization becomes more extensive, it is more likely to be effectively clientelist.
58
3.3.2 Clientelism and Party Cohesion
In addition, I explore the relationship between clientelism and party nationalization. While
earlier studies considered parties to be homogeneous entities, more recent works have recognized
that there are varying levels of diversity in party members’ preferences (Boucek 2009). A coherent
party platform and electoral strategy are not always easily acquired. Rather, in order to achieve
coordination across districts and form a nationalized party, a party needs to be able to mediate
intra-party conflict and to encourage various intra-party cliques to compromise on policy priorities
(Hicken 2009).
I argue that intra-party coordination gets more difficult and costly with increasing
clientelism. While clientelism attracts political elites and voters to the provider party, it also offers
resources and opportunities for elites to cultivate their own support groups within and beyond a
party organization, which are largely temporary and informal. It can be seen as ironic that
increasing resources will undermine parties’ governability. As Panebianco (1988) insightfully
points out, however, the nature of power is reciprocal, if asymmetrical, which opens up the
possibility of the balance of power being shaken up:
One can exercise power over others only by satisfying their needs and expectations. One thereby
submits oneself to their power. In organizations, every organizational actor controls at least a
small zone of uncertainty, i.e. possesses resources which can be capitalized on in power games
(Panebianco 1988: 22).
By nature, clientelism strengthens distinctive relationships between patrons and clients,
where each relationship serves particularistic interests. Thus, clientelism is likely to encourage
independent chains of command to develop within and apart from the national party organization
(Bridges 1984). Specifically, clientelism promotes proliferation of factions and blurs party lines
by developing alliances with opponents. By widening the gap between the de facto power structure
59
and the formal structure of a party, clientelism creates an unfavorable environment for a party to
sustain as a cohesive organization.
Where clientelism is prevalent and effective, I insist that centrifugal forces are at work
which draw supporters and participants away from the party in which they were initially involved.
In terms of intra-party relationships, clientelism promotes intra-party rivalry, thereby making
horizontal coordination costly. Within a party, politicians often strive to cultivate allies and support
groups consisting of influential political actors including fellow politicians, party members, and
activists (Kemahlioglu 2011). It is important for them to obtain sufficient support to secure
nominations or control policy making processes. Patron-client networks provide the support
necessary to achieve these goals.33 Importantly, the membership of patron-client networks is not
confined to the boundary of a national party organization. The zero-sum nature of the clientelism
increases the level of intra-party competition to the extent that factional leaders enter into alliances
with the party’s external opponents to undermine intra-party rivals (Weiner 1967).
In addition, a patron-client relationship starting within a party is often extended vertically
down to local followings. Beyond their immediate followings, politicians build vertical alliances
with local patrons (Scott 1972).34 Upon receipt of clientelist benefits from higher levels of the
party’s hierarchy, in turn, local patrons promise to draw support from their own local followings
(Sandbrook 1972). Because these relationships are established based on the reputations of the
individual politicians, electoral competition is likely to revolve around the individual elites rather
than around the party. To the extent that the vertical alliance constitutes an independent unit, it can
33 Within the network, things such as campaign funds, favorable list placement, internal party posts, and
jobs can be exchanged (Benton 2001).
34 The patron serves his clients as "a short cut through the maze of authority" in their dealings with regional
or national officials (Kenny 1960: 19). The local patrons, i.e. mediators, are of significant interest because
of his role in linking the local community to the nation (Wolf 1965).
60
enjoy the flexibility to provide or withdraw support for the national party. For example, Warner
(1997) shows that among politicians in Brazil who maintain their own political machines and
alliances there is a broad tendency to break away from their parties.
The existence of multiple power centers within and beyond a party organization introduces
conflicting party goals, campaign strategies, and member preferences over policy platforms
because each group can serve as a veto player. Conflicting goals and preferences within a party
increase the cost of cross-district coordination (Hicken and Stoll 2011).
In sum, clientelism facilitates emergence of intra-party groupings, which restrain parties’
abilities to develop coherent party strategies or to coordinate across districts in electoral
competitions. Consequently, candidates and voters are less likely to converge on a few coherent
national-level party brands. Taken together, I hypothesize the following:
H3: Effective clientelism is negatively associated with the level of party nationalization due to
increasing cost for the party to coordinate across districts.
To summarize, the theoretical discussions from the three bodies of literature yield the following
predictions:
Party extensiveness increases party nationalization. In addition, party extensiveness
enhances effectiveness of clientelism, which in turn undermines party nationalization. Thus, the
positive impact of party extensiveness on party nationalization will be suppressed to the extent that
party extensiveness improves effectiveness of clientelism.
61
3.4 Data and Measures
3.4.1 Dependent Variable: Party Nationalization
The unit of analysis in my study is a political party. To measure the party nationalization,
I draw on the Party Nationalization Score (PNS) proposed by Jones and Mainwaring (2003), which
builds on the Gini coefficient of inequality in the vote shares across districts. Gini coefficient has
been widely employed to calculate heterogeneity in the distribution of income (Deininger and
Squire 1996) and electoral outcomes (Taagepera and Shugart 1989). According to the Bochsler’s
review on the existing measures of party nationalization, the Gini coefficient-based measure is one
of the most ideal alternatives among the existing measures because it has the least methodological
problems (Bochsler 2010: 2-6).
Figure 3.1 illustrates the calculation of the Gini coefficient. The x-axis represents the
electoral districts, placed in the order of their vote shares for the party Pi. The y-axis displays the
cumulative function of votes across regions. In the first district, a party Pi obtains the lowest vote
share. The vote shares from the first district are added up to the ones from the second district. This
way, a district i carries the information about the sum of all previous vote shares up to the district
i. Thus, the last district presents the total number of votes a party Pi received across the whole
district (Jones and Mainwaring 2003; Bochsler 2010). Finally, the Gini coefficient is calculated by
the area between the graph and the 45-degree perfect homogeneity line, which ranges from 0 to 1.
With heterogeneous vote distribution (i.e. low party nationalization), this area becomes close to 1.
To have the higher value represent higher party nationalization, Jones and Mainwaring (2003)
subtract this value from 1.
62
Figure 3.1 Calculation of Party Nationalization Score
Note: (Bochsler 2010: 161)
In my analysis, I use the revised version of Party Nationalization Score (PNS) with two
modifications suggested by Bochsler (2010). First, the revised measure accounts for the variations
in the number of electoral districts across countries. Statistically, a country with smaller number
of districts presents less variation in party nationalization because extreme values disappear by
aggregation. To allow comparison across countries with different number of districts, the revised
measure standardized the Gini-coefficients. Second, the measure also adjusts for the unequal sizes
of districts within a country (Bochsler 2010: 161-164). In order to correct for the fact that electoral
behaviors of smaller districts are overly represented in the nationalization outcome, the revised
measure weight the importance of districts by their population size. Taken together, the formula
of the revised Party Nationalization Score (PNS) is as follows:
𝑃𝑁𝑆𝑠𝑤 = (𝑃𝑁𝑆𝑤)1
log (𝐸) , where 𝑃𝑁𝑆𝑤 = 2 ∗∑ (𝑣𝑖∗(∑ 𝑃𝑗
𝑖1 −
𝑃𝑖2
))𝑑1
∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑑1 ∗∑ 𝑃𝑖
𝑑1
and the variable E is a constant calculated at the national level as follows:
𝐸 =(∑ 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑐𝑠𝑡
𝑑1 )
2
∑ 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑐𝑠𝑡𝑑1
, where 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑐𝑠𝑡 is the number of votes cast in constituency i.
63
I use the Constituency-Level Elections Archive (CLEA) datasets which contain the
measure of party nationalization. At the party level, the measure indicates the level of
nationalization for a particular party in a given country-year dyad. The measure is calculated based
on the electoral outcome at the lower house legislative elections. To minimize the possibility of
reverse causality, I construct my cross-sectional data on the dependent variable that is measured
temporally after the independent variable and the mediating variable, which is the year 2008.
3.4.2 Independent Variables: Extensiveness of a Party Organization
To obtain the data on party structure, I use the Democratic Accountability and Linkages
Project (DALP), which asks countries’ experts to evaluate major parties in a given country
(Kitschelt 2013). The data is collected in 2008 and 2009 on parties’ organizational structures and
policies.35 I use the dataset aggregated at the party level. Building on Kitschelt and Kselman (2010),
party extensiveness is measured by a battery of items which are designed to represent a diverse
“transmission belts through which political parties may reach voters” (3). Specifically, to tap into
the extensiveness of a party organization, I create a composite index based on three variables on
party structure: (i) the formal extensiveness of a party organization; (ii) the informal extensiveness
of a party organization; and (iii) the extensiveness of linkages with civil society organization.
First, the formal extensiveness is captured by the experts’ evaluation on the portion of
districts where a party has a physical presence such as local branch office. The answer consists of
four-level scale ranging from 1 (no local offices) to 4 (permanent local offices in most districts).36
In addition, the informal extensiveness measures the parties’ capacity to reach voters through
35 See Appendix for the list of countries and the number of parties included in the analysis.
36 I recoded these variables so that higher scores indicate greater extensiveness.
64
informal ties such as local intermediaries. The variable ranges from 1 (no local representatives) to
3 (local representatives in most constituencies). Finally, the extensiveness of linkages with civil
society organization is assessed by using the following survey question: “Do the following parties
have strong linkages to one or more of the following civil society organizations?” I create an index
on the number of organizations that a party maintains explicit linkages. If there is no linkage to
any groups, 0 is assigned. If there is any linkage, I count the number of organizations that a party
maintains relationship with from the following lists: unions; business and professional associations,
religious organizations; ethno-linguistic organizations; urban or rural associations; and women’s
organizations.
Using these three variables, I create the index by summing up the three variables. Larger
value represents greater extensiveness of a party organization. I weight the measure of party
extensiveness by party size. Existing studies point out that small parties are statistically more
nationalized than larger ones because of little variance in their vote shares. For the measure of
party size, I use an average of a party’s vote shares in the most recent two national legislative
elections before 2009 available from the DALP dataset.
3.4.3 Mediating Variable: Effectiveness of Clientelism
To measure effectiveness of clientelism, I draw on the survey questions from DALP, where
the experts are asked to estimate how successful parties are in translating clientelistic effort into
actual vote gains. Level of effectiveness is assessed based on four grading schemes from “not at
all” to “to a great extent.”
65
3.4.4 Control variables
My analysis also includes other covariates that the existing literature found relevant to party
nationalization. First, existing studies suggest that federalism can undermine party nationalization
by reducing party cohesion (Chhibber and Kollman 2004; Desposato 2004; Brancati 2008). With
independent decision making authority at the subnational level, politicians have incentive to serve
local preferences deviating from their party. The measure of federalism is coded as 1 if a country
has a federal political structure and 0 otherwise. Second, the literature maintains that single
member district (SMD) system tends to generate lower party nationalization (Hicken 2009). Due
to the majority rule to win a seat, parties only invest in the districts where they have a chance to
win. This results in unequal vote distributions across districts. Using the classification scheme by
Norris (2009), majoritarian systems are coded as 0, mixed systems as 0.5 and proportional systems
as 1. Third, parliamentary systems are expected to present higher level of party nationalization
than its presidential counterparts (Schattschneider 1960; Morgenstern and Swindle 2005). In a
parliamentary system, it is less costly to achieve intra-party coordination due to interdependent
relationship between executive and legislative candidates. Based on the Database of Political
Institutions, presidential system is coded as 0, strong president elected by assembly as 0.5, and
parliamentary system as 1. Finally, I control for ethnic fractionalization with the expectation that
it undermines party nationalization because diverse ethnic settings pose greater challenges to
aggregate the interests (Linz and Stepan 1996; Cox 1997; Brancati 2003; Caramani 2004). The
measure of ethnic fractionalization ranges from 0 to 1, where higher values indicate greater
heterogeneity (Alesina et al. 2003).
66
3.5 Empirical Analysis
3.5.1 Analytic Strategy
To test my hypotheses, I conduct a mediation analysis. This analysis seeks to explain the
mechanism through which an independent variable influences an outcome variable by means of a
mediating variable (Mackinnon, Fairchild, and Fritz 2007). In examining a mediational proposition,
the relationship among variables is decomposed into two causal paths. One of these paths carries
the direct effect of the party extensiveness (i.e. independent variable) on party nationalization (i.e.
dependent variable) while controlling for effectiveness of clientelism (i.e. the mediator). The other
path links these variables through a mediator, called the mediating (or indirect) effect. The total
effect is the sum of the direct and mediating effects: Total effect (c) = Direct effect (c’) + Indirect
effect (ab)
The path coefficients (a, b, c′) estimate the strength of hypothesized associations. When a
path includes other variables, the strength of the relationship for this path is estimated by
multiplying the coefficients for each leg of the path. Thus, the strength of the mediated relationship
is estimated by the product of a × b coefficients. Mediation occurs if the effect of an explanatory
variable on the outcome variable is partly or entirely transmitted by the mediating variable
(Holland 1988; Sobel 1990).37
The most common way to obtain coefficient estimates for these paths is to run the following
series of regression analyses, i.e. the causal steps approach.38 First, regressing the dependent
variable on the independent variable; second, regressing the mediator on the independent variable;
37 A mediation effect differs from an interaction effect in that no causal sequence is implied by an
interaction effect.
38 Another way to estimate the path coefficients is the structural equation model.
67
and third, regressing the dependent variable on the mediator (Hayes 2013; Zhao et al. 2010).39 My
mediation model for the ith party is given by
Effectiveness of Clientelismi = β0 + βxz*Party Extensivenessi + εzi,
ln (Party Nationalizationi
1−Party Nationalizationi )= γ0 + γzy*Effectiveness of Clientelismi + γxy*Party Extensivenessi + εyi
Note that my measure of party nationalization draws on a Gini coefficient which is bounded
between 0 and 1.40 As Figure 3.2 demonstrates, this violates the assumptions of normality and
linearity, which makes linear regression inappropriate. In addition, the assumption of
homoscedastic errors is violated because the variance tends to decrease when the mean gets closer
to 0 or 1.41 To handle this data, I take a logit transformation of my dependent variable as I conduct
the regression analyses.
39 These steps are similar to causal step approach to establish a mediation effect, recommended by Baron
and Kenny (1986). Although widely used, it is not the most recommended procedure because mediation
may occur even when the conditions are not met such as in competitive mediation (MacKinnon et al. 2007;
MacKinnon, 2008; Zhao et al. 2010). Given its limitations, I use it only to estimate the path coefficients.
To evaluate the statistical significance of the mediating effects, I employ two additional methods.
40 Party nationalization literature indicates there is an increasing heterogeneity of the vote with increasing
number of districts, but with a decreasing marginal effect of the number of districts (Morgenstern et al.
2014). Alternative solutions to the violation of heteroskedasticity, normality, and linearity include modeling
the distribution of the dependent variable with a beta distribution or fitting a generalized linear model with
binomial distributions and the logit link function.
41 Strictly, logit p cannot be determined for the extreme values of 0 and 1. Since my data does not have
any 0 and 1, this practice will not cause any problem.
68
Figure 3.2. Distribution of Party Nationalization Score
In addition to the causal steps mediation analysis, I corroborate the estimation results using
the structural equation models. Then, to evaluate the significance of the mediating effects, I
conduct the Sobel test and the non-parametric bootstrap analysis.
3.5.2 Results
Table 3.1 displays results for the causal steps mediation analysis. Model 1, 2, and 3 are
estimated without control variables, while Model 4, 5, and 6 control for the variables. In what
follows, I focus on the interpretation of the latter three models, but both cases present consistent
results for the relationship among party extensiveness (X), effectiveness of clientelism (M), and
party nationalization (Y). Figure 3.3 shows the corresponding path diagram with the path
coefficients estimated from this mediation analysis. Standardized coefficient estimates are reported
in the brackets.
05
10
15
20
25
Pe
rcen
t
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1Party Nationalization
69
Table 3.1. Mediation Analysis
DV: Party Nationalization (Y)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
X Y X M X+M Y X Y X M X+M Y
Party Extensiveness (X) 0.677*** 0.204*** 0.868*** 0.668*** 0.204*** 0.831***
(0.405) (0.035) (0.069) (0.068) (0.035) (0.067)
Effectiveness of Clientelism (M)
-0.934*** -0.768***
(0.115) (0.115)
Ethnic fractionalization -1.107** -0.683*
(0.333) (0.313)
Federalism -0.286 -0.226
(0.168) (0.156)
Parliamentary System 0.104 0.079
(0.163) (0.151)
Majoritarian System -0.652*** -0.570***
(0.168) (0.156)
_cons 0.405*** 2.435*** 2.678*** 1.004*** 2.435*** 2.700***
(0.102) (0.049) (0.295) (0.213) (0.049) (0.321)
N 256 256 256 256 256 256
F F(1, 254)=85.81 F(1, 254)=33.27 F(2, 253)=86.18 F(5, 250)=30.42 F(1, 254)=33.27 F(6, 249)=37.25
Prob > F p<0.0001 p<0.0001 p<0.0001 p<0.0001 p<0.0001 p<0.0001
R2 (adjusted) 0.25 0.11 0.41 0.37 0.11 0.46
Fit Statistics for the Structural Equation Model
chi2_bs(3)=164.52, p > chi2=0.000, RMSEA=0.000, CFI=1.000, TLI=1.000, SRMR=0.000, CD=0.453
chi2_bs(3)=217.89, p > chi2=0.000, RMSEA=0.134, CFI=0.911, TLI=0.756, SRMR=0.060, CD=0.503
Note: 1. X: Party Extensiveness, M: Effectiveness of Clientelism, Y: Party Nationalization; 2. Coefficients are ordinary least squares regression estimates. Standard errors are in parentheses;* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; 3. Fit Statistics: RMSEA (Root Mean Squared Error of Approximation); CFI (Comparative Fit Index); TLI (Tucker-Lewis index); SRMR (Standardized Root Mean Squared Residual); CD (Coefficient of Determination). Generally, CFI ≥0.9, TLI ≥0.9, SRMR ≤ .08, and RMSEA ≤0.06, and larger CD represent a good fitting model.
70
As shown in Model 4 in Table 3.1, first regression predicts the level of party nationalization
from party structure, while controlling for the mediating variable. The coefficient from this
regression corresponds to path c in Figure 3.3: the total effect. The estimation results show that the
total effect of party extensiveness on party nationalization is c = 0.668. This effect is statistically
different from zero, t(df=250)=9.79, p=.000, with a 95% confidence interval from 0.534 to 0.803.
The party with greater organizational extensiveness tends to achieve a higher level of party
nationalization. Since I perform a logit transformation of my dependent variable (i.e. party
nationalization), the results can be interpreted as the percentage change in the ratio of
nationalization: [exp(0.668)-1]*100≈95. One unit increase in party extensiveness is associated
with a 95% increase in the proportion of votes obtained by this party across districts, i.e. increase
in the level of party nationalization.
Figure 3.3. Pathway of a Mediation Process for a Relationship between Party Structure
and Party Nationalization
b= - 0.768***/[-0.342***] (0.115) a= 0.204***/[0.340***]
(0.035)
Effectiveness of Clientelism (M)
Party Extensiveness (X) Party Nationalization (Y)
c’=0.831***/[0.616***] (0.067)
Mediating Effects: a x b = -0.157
Note: Standardized coefficients are reported in brackets and standard errors are in parentheses. Proportion of total effect that is mediated by Effectiveness of Clientelism:
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡=
−0.157
0.831 + (−0.157)≈ −0.243
71
Next, a second regression predicts the mediating variable, effectiveness of clientelism,
from the independent variable, party extensiveness. Model 5 in Table 3.1 demonstrates that the
coefficient of path a is 0.204, with t(df=254) = 5.77, p = .000. For a party with greater structural
extensiveness by one unit, I predict a 0.204 unit increase in effectiveness of their clientelist efforts
turning into electoral gains. This implies that more extensive parties tend to enjoy greater
effectiveness in their clientelistic practices than their less extensive counterparts.
Finally, as Model 6 in Table 3.1 shows, a regression is performed to predict party
nationalization from both party extensiveness and effectiveness of clientelism. This regression
provides coefficient estimates for path b and path c’ in Figure 3.3. The coefficient c′ estimates the
strength of the direct effect of party extensiveness on party nationalization that is not mediated by
clientelism. The estimated direct effect of party extensiveness on party nationalization, controlling
for clientelism, is c′ = 0.831, t(df=249) = 12.31, p = .000. I expect about a 129.6% increase in party
nationalization for each additional unit of party extensiveness.42 The coefficient on the effect of
clientelism on party nationalization is b = -0.768. This effect is statistically different from zero
t(df=249)= -6.69, p=.000, with a 95% confidence interval from -0.994 to -0.542. For each unit
increase in effectiveness of clientelism, I predict a 53.6% decrease in party nationalization.43 Party
nationalization is predicted reasonably well by party extensiveness and effectiveness of clientelism,
with adjusted R2 = 0.46 and this is statistically significant, F (6,249) = 37.25, p < .0001.
Based on the coefficient estimates of these paths, I find that the magnitude of mediating
effect is 0.204 × (-0.768) = -0.157. The percentage change in the ratio of party nationalization can
be obtained by [exp(-0.157)-1]*100 ≈ -14.5. Thus, for each one unit increase in a party’s
42 [exp(0.831)-1]*100≈129.6
43 [exp(-0.768)-1]*100≈53.6
72
extensiveness, the proportion of votes obtained by this party decreases by 14.5% across districts.
This decrease in party nationalization is explained by the effects of party extensiveness on
clientelism. This result demonstrates that more effective clientelism is likely to decrease party
nationalization. Overall, the estimation results presented in Figure 3.3 and Table 3.1 indicate that
the effectiveness of clientelism mediates 24.3% of the total effect of party extensiveness on party
nationalization, while about 75.7% of the total effect is direct.44
To evaluate the significance of mediating effect of clientelism, I use the two most widely-
used methods. First, I conduct the Sobel test (Sobel 1982). The null hypothesis of interest is H0:
ab = 0, which evaluate if the mediating path is significantly different from zero.45 The Sobel test
statistics in Table 3.2, z = -4.341, p = 0.000, suggest that the mediating effect of clientelism is
significantly different from zero. Thus, the effectiveness of clientelism significantly mediates the
effect that party structure has on party nationalization.
Table 3.2. Sobel Test for Mediating Effects
Mediating Effect Test statistics (z) Std. Error P-Value
Effectiveness of Clientelism (M) -0.157*** -4.341 0.036 0.000
Note: H0: a x b = 0; *** p<0.001
Secondly, I conduct a non-parametric bootstrap sampling analysis. This process provides
an empirical sampling distribution that can be used to derive a confidence interval, a p value, and
44 The proportion of total effect that is mediated by effectiveness of clientelism is computed by dividing
the indirect effect by the total effect (MacKinnon 2008).
45 The Sobel test provides an approximate estimate of the standard error of ab as follows:
𝑆𝐸𝑎𝑏 = √𝑏2𝑠𝑎2 + 𝑎2𝑠𝑏
2
where a and b are the unstandardized regression coefficients that represent the effect of the independent
variable on the mediating variable and the effect of the mediating variable on the dependent variable,
respectively. The test of the indirect effect is given by z = ab/𝑆𝐸𝑎𝑏
73
a standard error for the estimates of the coefficients for indirect effect, axb (Imai et al. 2010). In
general, bootstrap confidence intervals are preferred over the Sobel test because they do not rely
on a priori assumptions about distributions (Preacher and Hayes 2008; Zhao et al. 2010).46 As
Table 3.3 presents, the bootstrap estimated mediating effect is -0.157 (p = 0.000) with a standard
error of 0.032. The 95 % bootstrap confidence interval for the value of the indirect effect ab is
from -0.231 to -0.102, and because zero is not in the confidence interval, it is concluded that the
indirect effect is statistically different from zero. The results of the nonparametric bootstrap
sampling mediation analysis are consistent with the findings of the causal step analysis and the
Sobel test: the mediator significantly predicts party nationalization.
Table 3.3. Bootstrap Results for Mediating Effects
Mediating Effect Std. Error 95% CI
Effectiveness of Clientelism (M) -0.157*** 0.032 -0.231 -0.102
Note: Non-parametric bootstrapping was performed with 5000 samples. I use the SPSS script for the PROCESS procedure (Preacher and Hayes 2008). A bias-corrected and accelerated confidence interval (CI) was created for the coefficient of mediating effect. Statistical significance of mediating effect is determined by whether a confidence interval include zero or not (Fritz and MacKinnon 2007). *** p<0.001
Taken together, these results provide consistent evidence to support for my hypothesis that
clientelism mediate the effect of party extensiveness on party nationalization. In addition, the direct
path from party extensiveness to party nationalization is also statistically significant. Therefore,
the total effect of party extensiveness is partially mediated by clientelist practices. Importantly,
although the direct effect of party extensiveness is to increase party nationalization, the
mediational path has the opposite effect: party extensiveness increases effectiveness of clientelism,
46 The z tests used for the Sobel test assume that values of this ab product are normally distributed across
samples from the same population. Studies have demonstrated that the sampling distribution of ab is highly
skewed and the normality assumption is likely to be violated (Fritz and MacKinnon 2007).
74
which in turn decreases party nationalization. When the direct and mediated effects have opposite
signs, the mediator acts as a suppressor variable which produces a small or non-significant total
effect (MacKinnon et al. 2000). Such models are known as competitive (or inconsistent) mediation
models (MacKinnon et al. 2007).47
To corroborate the results, I use the structural equation model (SEM) to estimate the
mediating effect. The mediation analysis literatures argue that the SEM approach is statistically
superior to the conventional causal step approach because it estimates the series of regressions
simultaneously instead of assuming that each equation is independent (Zhao et al. 2010). In general,
it is argued that fitting a single SEM model offers more efficient and consistent estimation than
the three regression pieces (Iacobucci et al. 2008). The path coefficients are identical to the ones
from the causal step analysis because the correlation matrix translates to path coefficients
(Iacobucci et al. 2008). The last row in Table 3.1 shows that the SEM model presents reasonably
good model fit as indicated by the selected overall goodness-of-fit statistics: SRMR = .06;
χ2(df=249) = 217.89, p≤0.001; RMSEA=0.042; CFI=0.911; TLI=0.756.48
47 Drawing on the example of MacKinnon et al. (2000), competitive mediation effects can be found in the
interrelationships among workers’ intelligence, level of boredom, and the number of errors made. All else
being equal, the more intelligent workers would make fewer errors. However, they would also exhibit
higher levels of boredom and boredom can increase the number of errors. Thus the direct effect of
intelligence on errors would be negative, while the indirect effect mediated by boredom would be positive.
Combined, these two hypothetical effects may cancel each other out, resulting in a small total effect of
intelligence (MacKinnon et al. 2000).
48 Higher values of CFI (Comparative Fit Index) demonstrate greater improvement over the baseline model
in fit. In contrast, lower values of SRMR (Standardized Root Mean Square Residual) and RMSEA (Root
Mean Squared Error of Approximation) indicate better model-data fit. SRMR and RMSEA measure the
extent to which the model reproduces the sample covariance matrix. Similar to an R2, CD (Coefficient of
Determination) shows how well the data fits a model. Rule of thumb guidelines are that CFI ≥0.9, TLI ≥0.9,
SRMR ≤ .08, RMSEA ≤0.06, and larger CD represents a well-fitting model.
75
3.6 Conclusion
This study asks why political parties have varying patterns of vote distributions across
districts. To answer this question, I examine the underexplored informal mechanism of clientelist
practices. I propose that clientelism act as a mediator in the relationship between party structure
and party nationalization. An extensive party structure enhances the chance that parties’ clientelist
efforts turn into electoral gains. In turn, effective clientelism prohibits the emergence of a
nationalized party by increasing incentive for politicians to cultivate their own support base within
and beyond party organizations. Given that a nationalized party is mainly a product of efficient
coordination among candidates across districts, proliferation of factions increases the cost of
coordination.
Using the party-level datasets, I conduct the mediation analysis. In line with my hypotheses,
the empirical results suggest that party extensiveness increases effectiveness of clientelism, which
in turn undermines party nationalization. In addition, the direct effect of party extensiveness on
party nationalization is positive and statistically significant. Overall, clientelism exerts a
suppression effect on the relationship between party extensiveness and party nationalization,
which would otherwise present stronger positive associations.
In this study, a focus on the party level allows me to find the dynamics of intra-party
groupings. Specifically, I demonstrate that clientelist practices provide incentives for the co-
partisan to employ divergent electoral strategies deviating from their national party platforms.
Thus, my findings imply that with respect to intra-party relationships, clientelism can be a source
of competition and conflict rather than of solidarity.
My study opens the way for additional research. By nature, mediation analysis takes a
confirmatory approach to the investigation of the causal relations among key variables. Thus, the
76
results can verify whether a hypothesized theoretical model is consistent with the data. To
determine whether any alternative causal relations can be ruled out, evidence from micro-level
case studies or experimental works can be supplemented. In addition, this study focuses on cross-
sectional analysis due to the limited availability of the data on informal mechanisms of clientelism.
However, increasing body of party nationalization literature point out the importance of
understanding how a party’s vote distribution pattern changes over time. Likewise, the clientelism
literature suggest that over an increasing time span clientelist transactions may provide different
incentives to the relevant actors. If it is a repeated practice, it is important for participants to build
reputations and credibility. Consequently, informal rules can be institutionalized, while their
centrifugal effects on relevant actors might be attenuated. Further study is called for to analyze the
incentive structures of actors engaging in coordination efforts to form nationalized parties and
party system over a longer time span.
77
APPENDIX
78
Table 3.4. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Party Nationalization 256 0.71 0.237 0.005 0.975
Effectiveness of Clientelism 256 2.64 0.593 1 3.857
Organizational Extensiveness of a Party
Formal extensiveness (local offices and paid staff)
256 3.12 0.654 1 4
Informal extensiveness (local intermediaries)
256 2.21 0.458 1 3
Centralization of electoral strategy
256 2.37 0.353 1 2.8
Linkage with civil society 256 0.33 0.170 0.023 0.795
Ethnic Fractionalization 256 0.34 0.234 0.002 0.850
Federalism 256 0.22 0.419 0 1
Majoritarian System 256 0.33 0.837 0 1
Party Size 256 0.16 0.143 0 0.678
Parliamentary System 256 0.22 0.414 0 1
Table 3.5. Case Selection by Region
Region Frequency
Eastern Europe and post Soviet Union 51
Latin America 45
North Africa & the Middle East 5
Sub-Saharan Africa 20
Western Europe and North America 89
East Asia 6
South-East Asia 12
South Asia 27
The Caribbean 1
Total 256
Table 3.6. Case Selection by Country
Country # of parties Country
# of parties
Albania 4 Jamaica 1
Argentina 5 Japan 4
Austria 5 Korea 2
Bangladesh 4 Latvia 8
79
Table 3.6 (cont’d)
Bolivia 4 Mauritius 3
Botswana 3 Mexico 5
Brazil 11 Netherlands 8
Canada 5 New Zealand 7
Colombia 7 Nigeria 3
Costa Rica 4 Norway 7
Croatia 10 Pakistan 6
Czech Republic 5 Peru 4
Denmark 8 Philippines 6
Dominican Republic 3 Poland 6
Estonia 3 Portugal 5
Finland 8 Romania 5
France 6 Russian Federation 6
Germany 6 South Africa 3
Ghana 3 Spain 3
Greece 4 Sweden 7
Honduras 2 Turkey 5
Hungary 4 UK 3
India 17 US 2
Indonesia 6 Zambia 5
Ireland 5 Total 256
Table 3.7. DALP Questionnaire
Mediating Variable
Effectiveness of Clientelism
Please assess how effective political parties are in their efforts to mobilize voters by targeted benefits.
[1] Not at all, [2] To a small extent, [3] To a moderate extent, [4] To a great extent
Independent Variable
Formal Extensiveness
Do the following parties or their individual candidates maintain offices and paid staff at the local or municipal-level? If yes, are these offices and staff permanent or only during national elections?
[1] No, the party does not maintain local offices
[2] Yes, the party maintains local offices, but only during national elections
[3] Yes, the party maintains permanent local offices in SOME districts
[4] Yes, the party maintains permanent local offices in MOST districts
Informal Extensiveness
80
Do the following parties have local intermediaries (e.g. neighborhood leaders, local notables, religious leaders) who operate in local constituencies on the parties’ behalf, and perform a variety of important tasks such as maintaining contact with large groups of voters, organizing electoral support and voter turnout, and distributing party resources to voters and supporters?
[1] No, they have almost no local representatives
[2] Yes, they have local representatives in SOME constituencies
[3] Yes, they have local representatives in MOST constituencies
Linkage with Civil Organization
Political parties often have more or less routine and explicit linkages to civil society organizations such as unions, business or professional organizations, and cultural organizations based on religion, language, or ethnicity. The linkages might include leadership and membership overlap, mutual financial support, reserved positions for representatives of these organizations at National Conventions, etc. Do the following parties have strong linkages to one or more of the following civil society organizations?
o No linkages to all the groups
o Unions
o Business associations and professional associations
o Religious Organizations
o Ethnic/ linguistic organizations
o Urban neighborhood or rural associations/movements
o Women’s organizations
Table 3.7 (cont’d)
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CHAPTER 4 CLIENTELISM AS AN INFORMAL DETERMINANT OF CONGRUENCE
4.1 Introduction
Representative democracy requires heterogeneous public preferences to be embodied by a
small group of representatives. A large body of literature has studied whether and how diverse
individual preferences can be aggregated into a coherent choice. Mandate theory sees
representatives as delegates who act on behalf of their constituency rather than as those who act
on their own independent judgment (McDonald, Mendes, and Budge 2004). Following the
mandate theory, democratic representation means that the actions of representatives are expected
to be responsive to what the people wish. Accordingly, the quality of representation is assessed by
the degree of a match between what citizens want and what the representatives try to achieve
(Powell 2013).
Starting with the seminal study of Miller and Stokes (1963), a growing body of literature
has investigated the mechanisms that connect citizens and their elected representatives based on
the notion of congruence. Congruence is an election-based linkage between citizens and their
representatives (Powell 2004). Through voters’ choice of parties and candidates in elections, voters’
preferences are linked to preferences and behavior of representatives. Literature emphasizes that a
simple correspondence of interests and policy is not enough in that a benevolent dictatorship is not
a representative democracy even though it serves citizens’ interests just as well as a democracy
(Pitkin 1967: 232–234). What makes democracy different from autocracy is an institutional
mechanism that ensures regular opportunity for citizens to express their interests (McDonald,
Mendes, and Budge 2004: 3). For this reason, studies on representation predominantly focus on
the effect of electoral institution that will reliably connect citizens to representatives.
82
The fact that literature mainly examined electoral rules as a determinant of congruence
indicates that it sees citizens’ votes as an accurate guide to underlying preferences. However, few
studies have asked what happens to congruence if citizens’ preferences are not expressed at the
ballot box. If voters do not vote according to their sincere preferences, congruence can still be
undermined in spite of the functioning electoral rules.
As a serious impediment to congruence, this paper examines the underexplored effect of
clientelism on congruence. Clientelism is an informal mechanism through which parties obtain
political support in exchange for selective benefits to voters or groups (Hopkin 2006).49 In this
paper, I conceptualize clientelism in terms of a tool of persuasion employed by political elites and
parties. By means of clientelistic rewards, elites try to alter the preferences and behavior of voters
who would otherwise hold different or no views about parties’ policies. In response to the rewards,
I expect that voters vote further from their ideal points, although the degree of responsiveness
varies by their strength of partisanship, information, or needs.
In spite of its ability to shape the party-voter relationship, clientelism has rarely taken
center stage in the study of opinion congruence, which predominantly focuses on advanced
democracies. Conventional wisdom says that programmatic commitment will replace clientelistic
practices with political and economic development. Although previous studies have broadly
49 Hopkin (2001) argues that there is significant differences between the old and the new clientelism. The
new clientelism is characterized by more equal and less personalized relationship between patron and
clients. Piattoni (2001) also maintains that "democracy strengthens the clients' bargaining leverage vis-a-
vis brokers and patrons". Literature increasingly observes that modern clientelism takes the form of a more
"complex pyramidal exchange network of exchange" (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007:8).
The examples of rewards offered in clientelistic exchange include tangible goods such as food, clothing,
medicine, mattresses, construction materials, and utility bill payments (Schaffer 2007: 1–2) and services
such as transporting voters to polling places, haircuts, teeth cleaning and vasectomies (Nichter 2014). In a
longer term, clientelistic transaction also involves public sector jobs and promotions or preferential,
discretionary access to subsidized goods such as land, public housing, education, utilities, or social
insurance benefits, and specific procurement contracts to private enterprises (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007).
83
assumed that clientelism has a negative impact on policy representation (Stokes 2006), few studies
have offered empirical evidence on this assumption in the context of opinion congruence. To fill
this gap, this paper examines whether and how clientelism is systematically associated with the
level of congruence between political parties and their voters. Specifically, I argue that countries
with higher levels of clientelism show higher levels of incongruence in policy preferences between
the public and the governing parties.
4.2 Defining and Measuring Congruence
The influential work by Huber and Powell (1994) initiated the study on congruence based
on the comparison of the position of the median voters with that of the governing parties. Since
then, the median position in public opinion serves as a common yardstick of representation.
Congruence is considered to be enhanced when the parties’ position move closer to the median
position. Scholars have considered that representation of the median citizen produces the most
favorable outcome of representation. Assuming that citizens always favor the position closer to
them, the median position is the optimal location which minimizes the average distance between
voters’ ideal positions and the government’s policy (Cox 1997), thereby decreasing dissatisfaction
with collective choice (Dalton et al. 2011). As Figure 4.1 illustrates, empirical studies have
predominantly conceptualized and measured congruence in terms of the absolute ideological
distance between the median citizen and the governing parties or government.
Figure 4.1. Conventional Measure of Congruence
the absolute ideological distance between the median citizen and the governing parties
Note: Golder and Stramski (2010)
84
Recent studies point out the limitations of this approach to congruence in that it invalidly
assumes constituencies to be homogenous and it ignores the ideological configuration of the
collective body of representatives. The theorists of democratic representation emphasizes that what
makes it representation is not a single action by one participant, but the overall structure and
functioning of the system, which is shaped by the compound behaviors of people involved (Pitkin
1972: 221). As demonstrated in Figure 4.2, this vision of representation has been conceptualized
in an alternative measure, labeled ‘many-to-many congruence’, which is proposed by Golder and
Stramski (2010). Instead of the absolute distance between the median citizen and the party, they
take into consideration the distribution of both preferences. The level of congruence is assessed by
the degree of similarity in both the shape and location of citizen and representative preferences.
Congruence is maximized when the two distributions are identical (Golder and Stramski 2010).
Given that the many-to-many measure of congruence considers both shape and location of
preferences, it is a better way to understand the pattern of congruence in a country where voters
are heterogeneous and are not strongly linked to a party.50
Figure 4.2. Many-to-Many Measure of Congruence the overlap of the distribution of citizens and governing parties
Note: Golder and Stramski (2010)
50 For the studies employing many to many measure of congruence, see Golder and Stramski 2010;
Eerd 2011; Espana Najera and Martınez-Roson 2012; Bengtsson and Wass 2012; Boas and Smith 2014;
Ruth 2011; Andeweg 2011; Corral 2013
85
To explain the concept of many-to-many congruence, I introduce the Figure from Golder
and Stramski (2010). As Figure 4.3 illustrates, it offers three hypothetical countries, A, B, and C.
The top row presents the probability distributions on a left-right issue dimension for the citizens
and representatives in each country, whereas the bottom row demonstrates their cumulative
distributions. The measure of many-to-many congruence is captured by the shaded area between
the cumulative distributions. The larger shaded area indicates greater dissimilarity between the
preferences, thus lower congruence. In countries A and B, the shapes of probability distributions
for the citizens and representatives are identical, while the position of the representatives in country
B is located further away from that of the citizens, in comparison to country A. The larger shaded
area in country B indicates lower level of congruence than in country A. In country C, the shapes
of the two probability distributions differ, whereas the location of the distribution is similar.
Figure 4.3. Three Hypothetical Scenario of Many-to-Many Congruence
Note: Figure from Golder and Stramski (2010)
86
4.3 Literature on Electoral Systems and Congruence
Powell (2004) sees democratic responsiveness as a series of intertwined linkages. The first
linkage connects the preferences of citizens to their behavior in elections. The second linkage
indicates the process in which citizens’ voting behavior influences election outcomes and
government formation. Finally, the third linkage concerns the relationship between the policy
makers and the policy outcomes that get implemented.51 The quality of democracy is determined
by institutional arrangements that support each linkage of responsiveness. As the mandate theory
claims, elections are the key mechanism through which popular preferences are translated into
policy (McDonald, Mendes, and Budge 2004).
For this reason, congruence literature has closely examined the effect of electoral rules on
the level of congruence.52 However, empirical studies have produced mixed findings so far. Some
suggests that proportional representation electoral rules (hereafter PR) promotes greater
congruence (Huber and Powell 1994; Wessels 1999; McDonald and Budge 2005; Powell 2000).
Studies also maintain that high district magnitude and a large number of political parties also
contribute to better congruence (Thomassen 1999). At elections, they argue that PR offers a wider
range of party choices so that voters have more options closer to their preferences (Powell 2000).
At the government formation stage, PR further promotes congruence by pulling the government
toward the center of the policy spectrum. That is because PR systems generally require a coalition
government, and the median parties play a key role in this process (Huber and Powell 1994). In
51 In this article, I focus on the congruence achieved at the election because clientelistic practice is more
relevant to mobilization of citizens during election. In contrast, government formation entails bargaining
and coordination among the political elites.
52 Some of the representative studies include Huber and Powell (1994), Powell (2000, 2006, 2009, 2013),
Powell and Vanberg (2000), Kim and Fording (2006), Kim et al. (2010), McDonald, Mendes, and Budge
(2004), McDonald and Budge (2005), Blais and Bodet (2006), Golder and Stramski (2007).
87
contrast, other scholars found that PR tend to produce less centrist parties, thereby decreasing the
level of congruence. When more parties are competing, each of them wants to distinguish itself
from the others (Cox 1997). Thus, the distance between parties and voters increases (Blais and
Bodet 2006; Wessels 1999). Moreover, proportionality of vote-to-seat conversion is associated
with multi-member districts and low electoral thresholds, which creates diverse outcomes within
proportional systems (Sirinic 2014). Also, these studies found it questionable that the median
parties pull the government toward the center in coalition government formation because their
inclusion depends on elites’ decision, which may prefer alternative parties located further from the
median voter position (Ferree et al. 2013).
As to the majoritarian electoral system (hereafter SMD), its effect on congruence is not
straightforward. SMD promotes congruence by producing identifiable governments because a
single party often wins the majority of the seats in the parliament. When elections create single
party majority government, the majority support the party and, therefore, the majority’s
preferences will approximate the party’s policy position. On the other hand, majoritarian systems
offer incentives for strategic voting because minor parties are less likely to pass electoral
thresholds. In this setting, voters may choose the party that is not necessarily closest to their
preference in order to not waste their votes.
Yet others find no consistent advantage of either PR systems or SMD systems in enhancing
congruence between governing parties and voters (Blais and Bodet, 2006; Golder and Stramski
2010; Golder and Lloyd 2014). The contradictory results suggest that the electoral systems may
not be sufficient to explain congruence level as a main determinant, which motivates this study to
explore beyond the formal institutional determinants. To help explain the lack of a conclusive
answer, I turn to an alternative linkage mode called clientelism.
88
Recent research expands the basis of comparison to include new democracies (Blais and
Bodet 2006; Golder and Stramski 2010). However, little empirical research considers clientelism
as the crucial determinant of congruence even though the role of clientelism is expected to be more
prominent in new democracies where volatile party system offers an ideal incubator of
clientelism.53
4.4 Theory
Congruence literature argues that functioning electoral institutions ensure the right
representatives to be selected and voters’ preference to be reproduced by them. This argument
assumes that citizens’ voting behaviors reflect their genuine policy preferences.
I challenge this assumption by asking: what if voters’ electoral behaviors do not express
their genuine preferences? Clientelistic practices are essentially a persuasion strategy employed
by parties that seek to broaden their base of supporters. By means of material benefits, parties and
individual elites attempt to influence voters’ preferences and behaviors (Kitcshelt 2000; Stokes
2005).54 For example, in Argentina the Peronist party distributes clientelist rewards to weakly
opposed voters to induce them to switch their vote choices (Stokes 2005).55 In contrast to existing
work on congruence, thus, I argue that political elites do not only replicate existing voter
preference, but they also proactively influence voters’ choice. Consequently, I expect that
clientelism undermines congruence by nudging voters in favor of the clientelist parties, which
53 Some of the exceptions include Luna and Zechmeister (2005); Kitschelt et al. (2010); Mainwaring,
Bejarano, and Pizarro (2006).
54 The effectiveness of clientelism to change the voting behavior depends on the monitoring and
enforcement mechanism on the part of the clientelist parties.
55 The effectiveness of effort depends on enforcement mechanism. Stokes argues that the Peronist party
uses its “deep insertion in voters’ social networks” to violate the secret ballot, and is therefore able to
enforce compliance when buying citizens’ vote.
89
often requires voters to choose options further away from their preferred positions. If a party’s
clientelist efforts induce individual voters to vote for the party that do not closely represent their
views, then even institutionalized electoral arrangements cannot reliably create close connections
between voters’ preferences and policy outcomes. In this case, citizens’ voting behaviors may be
endogenously determined by their clientelist relationship with parties and elites.
In reality, we often observe that parties’ clientelistic efforts generate positive attitudes and
political support among recipients. The case in point is Bolsa Familia, a large scale social welfare
program of the Brazilian government. It offers financial aid to poor families, through which 26%
of the Brazilian population were covered. The Washington Post reports the political effect of Bolsa
Familia as follows:
the poor strongly associates the program with Lula, … , and surveys indicate that the
two-thirds of the population that lives on less than $500 per month provide overwhelming
support for Lula. Lula is expected to gain 63 percent of total valid votes versus 36.8 percent
for the opponent Alckmin, according to a poll (Washington Post 2006).56
As the electoral consequence of the welfare program illustrates, some recipients base their
preferences on experiences of clientelistic exchange. Voters develop an affinity with a party
regardless of whether or not the party represents their views.
Table 4.1 shows that about 9.7% of the respondents feel close to a party even if they do not
think any party represent their views. Figure 4.4 illustrates the cross-national distribution of this
phenomenon. The figure demonstrates the differences between the percentage of respondents
feeling close to a party and the percentage of respondents feeling that their views are represented
by a party. The countries with positive values indicate that there are respondents who feel close to
56 Reel, M. (2006, October 29). Cash Aid Program Bolsters Lula's Reelection Prospects. Washington Post.
Retrieved May 30, 2014, from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/10/28/AR2006102800823.html?nav=rss_world/southamerica
90
the party even if there is lack of representation. In other words, the gap between voters’ affinity to
a party and the representativeness of the parties suggests that voters’ partisan affinity is not solely
a function of issue positions as congruence literature assumes.
Table 4.1. Cross-tabulation of ‘Having a party representing respondents’ views’ and
‘Having a part respondents feel close to’
Are you close to any political party?
Is there a party that represents
your views?
Yes No Don't know Total
Yes 41.14 18.15 0.6 59.89
No 8.77 26.24 0.51 35.52
Don't know 1.13 2.97 0.49 4.59
Total 51.04 47.36 1.6 100
Note: Data from CSES Module 3. The number represents the cell percentages. Total number of cases are 60,328. The number is the percentage.
Figure 4.4. Proportion of Respondents Having a Party Representing their Views
Note: Data from CSES Module 3
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
Au
stra
liaA
ust
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Bel
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sB
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Den
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Fran
ceG
erm
any
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ece
Ho
ng
Ko
ng
Icel
and
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and
Isra
el
Jap
anK
ore
a, S
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exic
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eth
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and
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Ze
alan
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eru
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ilip
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lan
dP
ort
uga
lR
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Slo
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ain
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itze
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Thai
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Have an Affinity to a Party (%) - Having a Party to Represent (%)
91
What motivates some people to feel close to a party even if a party does not represent their
views? In Table 4.2, I examine if parties’ clientelist efforts are associated with this case. I report
the coefficients on the measure of clientelism from a bivariate logit regression where ideological
congruence is the dependent variable. I employ robust standard errors clustered by country to take
account of potential heteroskedasticity. The results indicate that the level of clientelism is
positively and significantly associated with the case in which voters have an affinity to a party
without being represented by the party.
Table 4.2. Bivariate Regression: Relationship between the Level of Clientelism and Having
a Non-Ideological Affinity to a Party
Model 1
Clientelism 0.1234***
(0.0320)
_cons -3.7064***
(0.4117)
N 63854
N cluster 38
chi2 14.8358
Note: DV: the percentage of respondents who do not have a party representing their views, but at the same time have an affinity to a party. This case is summarized in Table 4.1 highlighted in gray color. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; substantively similar results are obtained if I do not employ robust or clustered standard errors; *** p<0.001
The next question is then how voters’ affinity to a clientelist party lead to an actual vote
choice. Recall that a negative effect of clientelism on congruence should occur only when voters
actually vote for the party that is further from their ideal preferences. Literature emphasizes the
importance of monitoring to actually get voters to vote for clientelist parties. However, as the
Brazilian Bolsa Familia case illustrates, sometimes voters voluntarily respond to the material
benefits by offering support even without explicit monitoring. Studies of preference formation
argue that people often base judgments on the considerations that are immediately salient or most
accessible to them at the time of expression (Zaller 1992). Due to memory limitations, it is costly
92
for people to examine exhaustive information whenever they form a preference (Druckman and
Lupia 2000). Following from this argument, clientelism may influence voters’ choice at the ballot
box in that it is a tangible action that increases awareness about the patron party. If an individual
has recently engaged in clientelistic exchange, then a party or a candidate may come to the top of
the individual’s head. As a result, an individual not only develops an affinity to the party that
previously would not exist, but she may also choose them at the election.
Figure 4.5. Degree of an Affinity to a Party
Note: Data from CSES Module 3; Total sample size: 43,232
My argument relies on the assumption contradictory to the conventional description of
voters’ incentive structure. Drawing on the classic Downsian spatial model of political competition,
existing studies of congruence presumes that voters can place all election options along a single
dimensional political spectrum in light of their own ideological preferences. Among these options,
voters are expected to find and select a single optimal choice of a party closest to their own
ideological position according to their single-peaked preference structure. In reality, however,
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Yes
No
Don't Know
Are
yo
u C
lose
to
An
y P
arty
?
Degree of Closeness
Very Close Somewhat Close Not very Close Don't Know
93
voters’ incentive structure seems much more complicated. As Figure 4.5 shows, even among those
who have a preferred party, the degree of attachment to the party varies. Specifically, only 23% of
them felt “very close” to the party, 41% of them responded “somewhat close”, and 13% of them
said “not very close.” Although the literature treats the party identifier as a homogeneous group,
it is likely that the voting behavior of those who feel very close to the party is likely to be different
than those who do not feel very close. Specifically, I expect that their behavioral differences
become most salient when they face alternative incentives such as material benefits from other
parties.57
In sum, I conceptualize clientelism in terms of a tool of persuasion that political parties and
elites employ to broaden and consolidate their support bases. As a result of clientelist rewards,
individual voters develop an affinity to patron parties and vote for the parties that do not necessarily
represent their policy preferences. Thus, I argue that clientelism systematically increases the gap
between voters’ preferences and their vote choices, which in turn decreases the level of congruence.
Taken together, my theoretical discussion leads to the following hypothesis about the relationship
between clientelism and congruence:
H: Countries with higher levels of clientelism show higher levels of incongruence in policy
preferences between citizens and governing parties.
57 The reasons why voters respond to non-programmatic redistributive benefits vary, ranging from low
partisanship to lack of political information (Dixit and Londregan 1996; Grossman and Helpman 2001).
94
4.5 Data and Measures
4.5.1 Dependent Variable: Congruence
My dependent variable evaluates the degree of congruence between the policy positions of
the governing parties and the substantive preferences of the citizens. I use the many-to-many
measure of congruence by Golder and Stramski (2010), which compares the similarity of the
distributions of citizen and representative preferences on the left-right issue dimension.
Specifically, the measure is calculated by the following formula:
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 = ∑ 𝐹𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟(𝑥) − 𝐹𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦(𝑥)
𝑥
, where 𝐹𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟(𝑥) and 𝐹𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦(𝑥)are the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) for the citizen and
party preferences. This measure calculates the area between the CDFs for the citizens and parties.
As the discrepancies between the parties’ position and the citizens’ position increase, so thus the
area between the CDFs. The larger value of the measure indicates lower congruence (Golder and
Stramski 2010).58
In calculating my measure, I modified one thing from the many-to-many measure of
congruence suggested by Golder and Stramski (2010). Instead of averaging them out, I take into
consideration the full range of party position scores assigned by individual experts on a given party.
By using an average score, Golder and Stramski assumes that a party is a unitary actor sharing the
ideological position and policy preferences (2010: 97). In reality, this is rather a stringent
assumption to meet. Political parties are often volatile alliances of politicians with heterogeneous
interests and views rather than behaving as unitary actors (Kitschelt and Freeze 2011). If experts’
evaluation on a given party presents greater variations, it indicates that the party fails to provide
58 Note that my measure of congruence compares the policy preferences of parties from that of citizens in
a single point in time and it does not take into consideration the actual policy output.
95
coherent and unambiguous position. In addition, it also implies that individual representatives vary
from one another within a party or their mobilization efforts cut across the party line. 59 The
variation can provide an important information about coherency of party’s position, thus I will
take advantage of this variation in calculating my congruence measure. Since the measure of many-
to-many congruence intend to captures the preferences of the collective representative body as a
whole, I believe my modification of measure also suits the purpose of the original measure.
To construct the measure of congruence, I need data on both the distribution of citizen
preferences and the distribution of parties’ preferences. Following the conventional approach, I
obtain data on the distribution of citizen preferences from the public opinion survey, while the
distribution of parties’ preferences from the expert surveys on democratic accountability
mechanisms.60 Specifically, to evaluate the distribution of parties’ preferences I use the expert
survey dataset from the Democratic Accountability and Linkage Project (DALP) compiled by
Kitschelt (2013). The expert survey has been conducted in 89 countries between 2008 and 2009.
The respondents were asked to evaluate political parties in their countries regarding the ways in
which parties attempt to connect with voters, ranging from programmatic to clientelistic efforts
(Kitschelt and Freeze 2011). The advantage of using this data is that the data also includes the
measure of my key independent variable, i.e. the level of clientelism. To evaluate voters’ positions
I use the World Value Survey (WVS) wave 5. When the same questions are available, I use two
59 To further illustrate my point, let me provide a brief hypothetical example. Let’s say 10 experts are asked
to place the two parties A and B of their country on the same left-right scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means
the left. The score of party A’s position ranges from 2 to 8 with standard deviation of 2 and mean 4.5, while
the score of party B ranges from 4 to 6 with standard deviation of 0.5 and mean 4.5. Although their mean
positions are the same, experts’ perceived position of party A present greater variations than that of party
B.
60 Some of the studies using the combination of public opinion data and expert survey data includes the
following: Espana (2010); Powell (2006); Eerd (2011); Boas and Smith (2014); Luna and Zechmeister
(2005); Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2007).
96
additional public opinion survey to fill in the missing data: Latin American Public Opinion Project
(LAPOP) (2008) and AsiaBarometer (2005).
Although it is a widespread practice to compare the positions of the voters and the party
from the different survey sources, some may consider this practice problematic due to the
differences in the scale in some cases. Since my measures compare overall distribution patterns
between citizens and parties rather than exact positions on the issues, this problem is less of a
concern. To avoid potential limitations, I further corroborate my result using an alternative
congruence measure on the overall left-right placement, which is created from a single dataset, i.e.
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) project.61
Based on these datasets, I create the two different measures of congruence as follows. Table
4.3 presents the complete wording and associated dataset.
(1) Congruence on the Overall Left-Right Placement
I construct the measure of congruence on left-right placement because it is the most
common aspect of congruence which existing studies have examined. I do not insist that most
voters perceive political competition in terms of sophisticated ideological concepts, such as
socialism or liberalism. However, it has been used as a scale that represents the major conflicts in
the political system (Inglehart 1990: 273).
(2) Congruence on the Issues regarding the Redistribution
In addition to comparing the left-right position, I also examine congruence in an additional
substantive issue area, which is the common proxy for governmental policy output in the literature
61 This approach has its own limitation in that the public opinion surveys may capture citizens’ perception
on the positions of both citizens and parties. However, the accuracy of public perceptions of parties’
positions is not a critical problem because voters will choose parties at the elections based on these
perceptions (Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister 2011). Since my study mainly concerns with the extent to
which voters feel they are represented, the measure based on citizens’ perceptions of the parties serves the
purpose.
97
(Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008). Because left-right does not summarize all the issues and
cleavages that define political competition in many polities, congruence on other substantive issues
offer more complete picture of congruence patterns. I create the measure of congruence on
redistribution issues. It compares the preferences of the parties and voters on whether they
advocates extensive social spending and redistributing income to benefit the less well-off in society.
Table 4.3. Survey Questions and Dataset
[Congruence] Overall Left-Right Placement 1: Expert survey + Mass survey
Parties' position
DALP [1] Party is best located at the “left” of the national political spectrum based upon its overall policy positions and ideological framework. [10] Party is best located at the “right” of the national political spectrum based upon its overall policy positions and ideological framework.
Voters' position
WVS In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking? (Code one number): Left 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Right
LAPOP On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left to right. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those on the left and those on the right. In other words, some people sympathize more with the left and others with the right. According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale? Indicate the box that comes closest to your own position: Left 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Right
[Congruence] Social spending on the disadvantaged: Expert survey + Mass survey
Parties' position
DALP [1] Party advocates extensive social spending redistributing income to benefit the less well-off in society. [10] Party opposes extensive social spending redistributing income to benefit the less well-off in society.
Voters' position
WVS How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right: Incomes should be made more equal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort
LAPOP Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements: The (Country) government should implement firm policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?
AsiaB Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement: It is desirable that the people are equal, even if the economy is stagnant, rather than unequal but developing fast (AsiaBarometer 2005)
98
4.5.2 Independent Variable: Level of clientelism
To measure the level of clientelism, I use the same expert survey dataset from the
Democratic Accountability and Linkage Project (DALP) that is used to obtain the distribution of
parties’ preferences. The survey asks the respondents to evaluate how much effort parties make in
their country to their electoral target constituencies. Specifically, the question asks about the five
most commonly used “currencies” of clientelistic exchange, including gifts of consumer goods,
preferential access to social policy entitlements, public sector employment, government contracts
or procurement opportunities for business, and client influence over regulatory procedures. For
each item, parties’ clientelistic efforts are evaluated based on four grading schemes from “a
negligible effort or none at all” to “a major effort.” Operationally, I follow Kitschelt (2011) and
create a composite index at the country level based on the five average measures of clientelistic
efforts of individual parties weighted by their vote share in the most recent national legislative
election within a country.
4.5.3 Control Variables
I take into account the institutional and socio-economic factors that might affect the level
of congruence. On the one hand, my model controls for the electoral system. Some literature argues
that PR promotes a better fit between voters and parties in their positions (Powell 2009), while
others find no effect of electoral institutions on congruence level. In addition, I incorporate GDP
growth to control for the level of economic development. Literature expects that socio-economic
development is positively associated with the level of congruence (Kitschelt 2000).
99
4.6 Empirical Analysis
4.6.1 Descriptive Analysis
In light of the many-to-many congruence measure, I present the patterns of congruence in
some countries categorized by the level of clientelism.62 Figure 4.6 shows that the distributions of
citizens and parties are more similar in countries with lower level of clientelism. With increasing
level of clientelism, the figures present greater discrepancies between the distributions both in
terms of location and shape.63
Figure 4.6. Congruence Patterns by the Level of Clientelism
A. Lowest Level of Clientelism: 25th percentile
62 To produce the figures, I used the questions on the left-right placement available from CSES wave 3.
The level of clientelism has been obtained from the expert survey dataset, DALP.
63 See Table 4.7 in Appendix for the complete list of countries in my analysis categorized by the level of
clientelism.
0
10
20
30
40
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SLOVENIA
voter_cses3 party_cses3
100
Figure 4.6 (cont’d)
B. Lower Level of Clientelism: 50th percentile
C. Higher Level of Clientelism: 75th percentile
D. Highest Level of Clientelism: 100th percentile
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
CHILE
party_cses3 voter_cses3
0
5
10
15
20
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
ROMANIA
voter_cses3 party_cses3
0
5
10
15
20
25
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
MEXICO
voter_cses3 party_cses3
101
4.6.2 Analysis
To test the hypothesis on the relationship between clientelism and congruence, I use the
two measures of congruence as the dependent variables. In the analysis, I am interested in how the
level of clientelism is related to the two measures of congruence. Instead of using separate
regression analyses for each outcome variable, therefore, I estimate the multivariate linear
regression model. Multivariate results allow for testing of coefficients across equations. Table 4.4
presents the estimation result of the multivariate analysis. As expected, the level of clientelism is
strongly related to both the congruence on left-right placement and the congruence on
redistribution issues. The sign is consistently positive, which means that increasing clientelism is
associated with an increasing gap between parties’ preferences and voters’ preferences.64 None of
the control variables are significant. In particular, the variable on proportional representation does
not reach statistical significance, although it presents a negative sign as conventional studies expect.
On the whole, this analysis provide support for my hypothesis that clientelism is negatively
associated with congruence.
Table 4.4. Multivariate Analysis of Congruence
Model 2 Model 3
DV: Position on Left-Right Placement DV: Position on Redistribution
Clientelism 0.1793** 0.2066***
(0.0564) (0.0566)
PR -0.1389 -0.1614
(0.0968) (0.0972)
Polarization 0.0694 0.0515
(0.0430) (0.0432)
GDP Growth -0.0063 -0.0050
(0.0088) (0.0088)
64 Recall that my measure of congruence captures the area between the Cumulative Distribution Functions
of parties’ and that of voters’. The greater the area, the larger the discrepancies between parties’ preferences
and voters’ preferences. In other words, the larger value of the measure indicate lower congruence.
102
Table 4.4 (cont’d)
_cons 0.4843** 0.2880
(0.1756) (0.1764)
N 47 47
F 2.613 3.606
r2 0.199 0.256
To better understand how much clientelism is associated with congruence under various
scenarios, Table 4.5 reports the predictions from several simulations for each congruence measure.
These simulations predict the changes in the expected value of congruence level caused by changes
in the level of clientelism by 20th percentile increments, which indicates the strength of the effects
of clientelism. The probabilities are predicted by the separate linear regression model with the
robust standard errors. All control variables are held at the mean, except the electoral institutions
measure, which is held at 0 (SMD) and 1 (PR), respectively. The results show that, in all cases,
the first differences are positive with the increase in the level of clientelism, which indicates that
clientelism increases the value of congruence measure. In other words, clientelism decreases the
level of congruence.
Table 4.5. First Difference: Changes in the Expected Value of Congruence by the Changes
in the Level of Clientelism under PR and SMD
Level of Clientelism Congruence
First difference Left-Right Placement Redistribution
PR min-p20 0.165 ( 0.078 0.248 ) 0.157 ( 0.067 0.247 )
p20-p40 0.076 ( 0.036 0.114 ) 0.100 ( 0.043 0.157 )
p40-p60 0.090 ( 0.042 0.136 ) 0.080 ( 0.034 0.126 )
p60-p80 0.062 ( 0.029 0.093 ) 0.046 ( 0.020 0.073 )
p80- max 0.059 ( 0.028 0.088 ) 0.060 ( 0.026 0.094 )
SMD min-p20 0.169 ( 0.085 0.259 ) 0.154 ( 0.067 0.245 )
p20-p40 0.078 ( 0.039 0.119 ) 0.098 ( 0.043 0.156 )
p40-p60 0.092 ( 0.047 0.142 ) 0.079 ( 0.034 0.125 )
103
Table 4.5 (cont’d)
p60-p80 0.063 ( 0.032 0.097 ) 0.046 ( 0.020 0.072 )
p80- max 0.060 ( 0.030 0.092 ) 0.059 ( 0.026 0.093 )
Note: This simulation result is produced using the CLARIFY statistical software package (Tomz et al. 2003). Entries are First Differences for each measure of congruence. I report the change in the expected value of congruence level caused by increasing the level of clientelism by 20 percentile increment: e.g. from minimum to 20th percentile, from 20th percentile to 40th percentile, from 40th percentile to 60th percentile, from 60th percentile to 80th percentile, and finally from 80th percentile to maximum value. 95% confidence interval in parentheses. Probabilities are based on linear regression estimates with robust standard errors. Control variables are held at mean except for the electoral institutions.
In turn, Table 4.6 presents the changes in the expected value of congruence with changes
in the electoral institutions from SMD to PR. As the 95% interval value indicates, this change does
not have any statistically significant impact on the level of congruence. In sum, the simulation also
provides the supportive evidence in favor of my hypothesis that clientelism is associated with a
lower level of congruence.
Table 4.6. First Difference: Changes in the Expected Value of Congruence with the
Changes from SMD to PR
Electoral System Congruence
First difference Left-Right Placement Redistribution
SMD ->PR -0.108 ( -0.289 0.077 ) -0.087 ( -0.260 0.097 )
Note: This simulation result is produced using the CLARIFY. Entries are First Differences for each measure of congruence. I report the change in the expected value of congruence level caused by changing electoral system from SMD to PR. 95% confidence interval in parentheses. Probabilities are based on linear regression estimates with robust standard errors. Control variables are held at mean.
4.6.3 Robustness Check
To ensure that my finding is not contingent on the choice of measurements, I estimate the
model using a conventional measure of congruence, i.e. the absolute ideological distance between
the median citizen and the governing parties. Based on the dataset compiled by Kim, Powell, and
Fording (2010), I create the measure of congruence capturing the distance between the position of
104
the median voter and the median parties, which is labelled as distortion.65 Parties’ positions are
estimated based on a cross-national left-right scale constructed from the mentions of a number of
topics compiled by Comparative Manifesto Project. The position of the median voter is estimated
based on the distribution of party votes (Kim and Fording 2003).
As a measure of my key independent variable, i.e. clientelism, I first use my original
measure derived from DALP expert survey data. In addition, I estimate the models based on
proxies for clientelism. First, I use the measure of the personal vote system as a measure of level
of clientelism using the dataset by Johnson and Wallack (2006). This variable ranks countries in
increasing order of incentives to cultivate a personal vote. The variable ranges from 1 to 13, which
takes into account four dimensions of the electoral system: ballot, vote, pool, and district
magnitude (Carey and Shugart 1995). In personal vote system, where a party label helps little in
electoral competition, individual politicians are more likely to be engaged in clientelistic practice
to distinguish them from other candidates. Second, I use the measure of the corruption level from
the dataset by Transparency International (2012). 66 Corruption Perception Index is another
commonly used proxy for clientelism. The CPI focuses on corruption in the public sector and
defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain. The CPI Score ranges from 0 to
1, where 0 represents highest level of corruption. Finally, I use 4 measures from the Global
Competitive Index constructed by the World Economic Forum, which include (i) diversion of
public funds, (ii) favoritism in decisions of government officials, (iii) irregular payments and
bribes, and (iv) wastefulness of government spending. These measures range from 1 to 7, where 1
represents a higher level of clientelism.
65 Distortion is the opposite concept of congruence.
66 These measures of clientelism are coded such that lower scores represent higher level of clientelism.
105
Figure 4.7-4.10 in Appendix present the estimation results of the linear regression. The
coefficient of clientelism is statistically significant and positively associated with the distortion,
thus negatively correlated with congruence. As presented in the figures, this result is corroborated
across alternative measures of clientelism. In sum, the results are in line with my main findings
that a higher level of clientelism is associated with higher distortion and lower congruence.
4.7 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper presents that clientelism is negatively associated with the level of congruence.
Drawing on the conceptualization of clientelism as a tool of persuasion employed by political
parties, I argue that elites distribute clientelistic rewards in order to alter the preferences and
behavior of voters who would otherwise hold different or no views about parties’ policies. In
response to the rewards, I expect that some voters develop an affinity to and vote for a party located
further from their ideal points. Consequently, clientelism systematically widens the gap between
voters’ preferences and their vote choices, thereby undermining the congruence. The empirical
result supports my expectation that countries with higher levels of clientelism present higher levels
of incongruence in policy preferences between the public and the governing parties. To advance
an argument, I challenge the conventional assumptions that individual voters have one dimensional
and single peaked political preferences. Instead, I suggest that voters’ utility is a function of both
issue position and material inducement. In response, parties also employ both programmatic and
clientelistic linkage strategies to maintain sustainable electoral support. Regarding the relationship
between the two mechanisms, Robinson and Verdier (2013) describes it as “two faces of the same
political game.”
My finding contributes to the literature on congruence by demonstrating the overlooked
effect of an informal determinant on congruence level. In existing works of congruence, the debate
106
on the determinant of congruence has predominantly revolved around formal electoral mechanism.
I concur that the formal electoral rules is at the core of democratic system. However, in order to
fully understand how congruence is achieved, I maintain that we need to consider an informal
realm in which parties and voters interact. Clientelistic rules are informal and unwritten institutions,
but they may not necessarily be of trivial value. As Stokes (2006) point out, it may have an
important impact on how democracy works when large number of citizens use it.
4.7.1 Implications for Core-Swing Voter Argument
My findings suggest that clientelism is negatively associated with the level of congruence.
This result has implications for the debate over the type of voters which parties channel their
material resources into. Specifically, it provides a potential evidence in favor of the swing voter
argument.
Given the limited resources, parties have to determine how to allocate the resources to
make the most out of them. To explain how parties behave in the face of conflicting incentives,
the swing voter model predicts that parties distribute selective goods to the swing voter (Lindbeck
and Weibull 1987). In this scenario, parties seek to create a heterogeneous but broader support
base. The main purpose of resource allocation is to persuade the voters to switch their vote
choices away from their initial preferences. On the other hand, the core voter theory argues that
parties allocate their resources to core supporters (Cox and McCubbins 1986; Cox 2005). Parties
target narrower but coherent groups of voters. By definition, the core voters are already
predisposed in favor of a party. Thus, what parties try to achieve through resource allocation is
mainly coordination and mobilization rather than persuasion.67
67 Shaw (2008) defines core voters as those who have voted the same party in three consecutive elections.
107
Following this logic, core voters experience less tension between their preferences and
their vote choice in response to clientelistic benefit, than their swing counterparts. Regarding the
outcome of congruence, the swing voter hypothesis is strengthened if parties use clientelism as
persuasion strategy which induce the beneficiary of clientelistic benefit to change their vote
choices further from their ideal points. The negative association between clientelism and
congruence suggests that clientelism undermine congruence by inducing voters to choose the
option further from their original preferences. On the other hand, the core-voter hypothesis is
supported if parties use clientelism as a mobilization strategy which affects core supporters to vote
but not demand any changes in vote choices further from their ideal points. In this scenario, the
relationship between clientelism and congruence should be either positive or null.
The fact that clientelism undermine congruence implies that parties are more likely to direct
their efforts to the swing voters to persuade away from their ideal position.68 Swing voters are
generally political moderates who are located near the political center of the electorate (Dixit and
Londregan 1996: 1144). They are more likely to compromise their party affinities or ideological
position in response to particularistic benefits (Dixit and Londregan 1996), and, therefore, they
are susceptible to the persuasion effect of clientelism that creates a gap between voters’ original
preferences and their vote choices.
68 Studies show that information also affects the stability of preferences. Specifically, the best-informed
and worst-informed voters have highest stability. Whereas the best-informed voters are knowledgeable
enough to limit the extent to which new information influence them, the worst-informed persons have little
feedback and stimulation for preference change (Druckman and Lupia 2000).
108
4.7.2 Endogenous Preference Formation and Implication for Congruence
This paper argues that voters’ informal relationship with parties and candidates shapes
voters’ voting behavior. This raises a fundamental question about whether parties’ clientelistic
efforts only influence voters’ behavior in short term or whether they will eventually influence and
shape voters’ preferences. My study cannot answer this question because most of the public
opinion datasets have short time span. With limited time points in the dataset, it is difficult to track
how clientelism affect the changes in ideological and policy preferences of voters over time. For
the sake of future research, however, the answer to this question has important normative
implications for the study of congruence. If voters’ preference is not necessarily exogenous and
fixed as congruence literature assumes and if it is susceptible to the influence from political elites,
can the match between voters’ preference and elites’ preference still serve as a valid yardstick to
evaluate the quality of democracy? Is it enough to look into the formal electoral rules that translate
voters’ preference into policy?
Two increasing body of literature speaks to these questions. On the one hand, research
shows that individual citizens’ relationship with parties affect how they process political
information (Zaller 1992). Specifically, insider and outsider of clientelist network develop
systematically different attitudes and preferences in all aspects of political life, be it vote choice,
ideological self-placement, or attitudes toward the government policy (Anderson and Tverdova
2001). The beneficiaries of either formal or informal systems interpret the workings of the political
system in a more positive way.
109
On the other hand, the cognitive dissonance theory demonstrates that an action can change
preferences, not the other way around. 69 The theory states that individuals try to maintain
consistency in their behavior, beliefs, and attitudes, as being inconsistent generates psychological
discomfort (Festinger 1957). Thus, when they have behaved in a way contradictory to their beliefs
or preferences, the individual unconsciously alters his beliefs in line with their behaviors so as to
alleviate the discomfort of having inconsistent attitudes and actions (Mullainathan and Washington
2009). For example, Mullainathan and Washington (2009) find that the mere act of voting for a
specific candidate boosts a more positive attitude toward the candidate.70 The individual voters
adjust their partisan attitudes toward a party to alleviate the internal discomfort, which arises from
having voted for a candidate whom they used to have a poor opinion of. Contrary to the common
assumption in the voting behavior literature, the dissonance theory implies that voting behaviors
may shape preferences and beliefs, not the other way around (Denny and Doyle 2007).71 After all,
it is easier to change preferences and attitudes than to go back and undo the behavior that has
already occurred (Dinas 2013; Festinger 1957).
The idea of the two theories point to the possibility that voters’ preference may be
compromised to the interest of parties and political elites who have power and resources to exercise
influence. My findings present that clientelism influence citizens’ voting behaviors. As the
cognitive dissonance theory suggest, if the vote choice itself can create a sense of commitment and
get the voters increasingly attached to their choice, i.e. the patron party, clientelist efforts by parties
69 Elster, 1983. Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality; Festinger, 1957. A Theory of
Cognitive Dissonance.
70 The studies on the impact of voting behavior on party identification dates back to several decades ago
(Dobson and St. Angelo 1975; Howell 1980; Jennings and Markus 1984; Knoke 1976; Markus and
Converse 1979). However, these studies are mainly framed in the context of short-term partisan volatility
(Dinas 2013). More recent studies, also see Beasley and Joslyn (2001)
71 Also, see Bandura (1989).
110
and elites can manufacture the citizen preference to their favors. In this scenario, the conventional
studies on congruence that merely comparing voters’ preferences and parties’ preferences may
only reflect preferences of parties and elites. It may not be the kind of representative democracy
that normative theorists envisioned.
111
APPENDIX
112
Figure 4.7. Clientelism (measure: DALP expert survey) and Level of Distortion
Note: The figure plots the estimation results of linear regression model. Congruence dataset from Kim, Powell, and Fording (2010); Clientelism Dataset from Kitschelt (2013) Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project.
Figure 4.8. Clientelism (measure: personal vote system) and Level of Distortion
Note: The figure plots the estimation results of linear regression with panel-corrected standard errors; Congruence dataset from Kim, Powell, and Fording (2010); Clientelism Dataset from Johnson and Wallack (2006: Electoral Systems and the Personal Vote).
Level of Clientelism
Proportional Representation
Polarization
GDP Growth (%)
-10 -5 0 5Average Marginal Effects
Personalistic Tier
Electoral System
Polarization
GDP Growth (%)
-6 -4 -2 0 2Average Marginal Effects
N: 22 F: 2.8508 Log-likelihood: -45.3081 R2: 0.4015
N: 149 # of clusters: 21 R2: 0.2091
113
Figure 4.9. Clientelism (measure: corruption perception index) and Level of Distortion
Note: The figure plots the estimation results of linear regression model with robust standard error clustered at the country level. Congruence Dataset from Kim, Powell, and Fording (2010). Corruption Perception Index is commonly used as a proxy for clientelism. The CPI focuses on corruption in the public sector and defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain. The CPI Score ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt)
Corruption Perceptions Index
Electoral System
Polarization
GDP Growth (%)
-6 -4 -2 0 2 4Average Marginal Effects
N: 51 R2: 0.2074
114
Note: The figure plots the estimation results of linear regression model. Congruence Dataset from Kim, Powell, and Fording (2010); Clientelism Dataset from (Schwab 2012); Each model is estimated using 4 alternative measures of clientelism. The measure of clientelism ranges from 1 to 7, where 1 represents higher level of clientelism. Years 2011–12 weighted average. 1. Diversion of Public Funds: "In your country, how common is diversion of public funds to companies,
individuals, or groups due to corruption?" [1 = very common; 7 = never occurs]. N: 24, F: 3.8686, Log-likelihood: -68.0186, R2: 0.4489
2. Irregular Payments and Bribes: Average score across the five components of the following Executive Opinion Survey question: "In your country, how common is it for firms to make undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with (a) imports and exports; (b) public utilities; (c) annual tax payments; (d) awarding of public contracts and licenses; (e) obtaining favorable judicial decisions." In each case, the answer ranges from 1 (very common) to 7 (never occurs). N: 24, F: 3.8686, Log-
likelihood: -68.0186, R2: 0.4489 3. Favoritism in Decisions of Government Officials: "To what extent do government officials in your
country show favoritism to well-connected firms and individuals when deciding upon policies and contracts?" [1 = always show favoritism; 7 = never show favoritism]. N: 24, F: 3.8686, Log-likelihood: -68.0186, R2: 0.4489
4. Wastefulness of Government Spending: "How would you rate the composition of public spending in your country?" [1 = extremely wasteful; 7 = highly efficient in providing necessary goods and services]. N: 24, F: 3.8686, Log-likelihood: -68.0186, R2: 0.4489
Lack of Clientelism
Electoral System
Polarization
GDP Growth (%)
-15 -10 -5 0 5Diversion of public funds
Lack of Clientelism
Electoral System
Polarization
GDP Growth (%)
-10 -5 0 5Favoritism in decisions of government officials
Lack of Clientelism
Electoral System
Polarization
GDP Growth (%)
-10 -5 0 5Irregular payments and bribes
Lack of Clientelism
Electoral System
Polarization
GDP Growth (%)
-15 -10 -5 0 5Wastefulness of government spending
Figure 4.10. Clientelism (measures from World Economic Forum) and Level of Distortion
115
Table 4.7. Countries Categorized by the Level of Clientelism in 2008-2009
Very low Low High Very High
Australia Chile Bangladesh Argentina
Austria Costa Rica Bolivia Bulgaria
Canada Greece Brazil Colombia
Czech Republic Israel Croatia Dominican Republic
Denmark Italy Georgia Ecuador
Estonia Japan Hungary Egypt
Finland South Korea Indonesia El Salvador
France Malaysia Moldova Ghana
Germany Poland Morocco Guatemala
Ireland Portugal Pakistan Honduras
Latvia Russia Peru India
Netherlands South Africa Romania Jamaica
New Zealand Thailand Serbia and Montenegro Mali
Norway Uruguay Taiwan Mexico
Slovakia Ukraine Mongolia
Slovenia Zambia Nicaragua
Spain Panama
Sweden Paraguay
Switzerland Philippines
United Kingdom Turkey
United States Venezuela
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION
This dissertation examines patterns of party system institutionalization in terms of informal
rules of clientelism. Motivated by the lack of focus on informal institutions in the literature on
party system institutionalization, my dissertation focuses on how clientelist practices affect three
types of relationships that are crucial to understanding this process: (i) inter-party relationships,
(ii) intra-party relationships, and (iii) party-voter relationships. This dissertation argues that
clientelist practices shape the incentives motivating individual actors and thereby have significant
impacts on the party organizations and party systems in which they are involved. Specifically, my
dissertation argues that clientelism exerts centrifugal forces on the relationships among relevant
actors, which in turn has negative effects on party system institutionalization.
With regard to inter-party relationships, Chapter 2 examines the mechanism of new party
formation by focusing on the structures in which clientelist exchanges occur. I review the
conventional argument that clientelism empowers the ruling parties, and I suggest that the effect
of clientelism is contingent on the specific clientelist structure. Conceptualizing clientelist
exchange as a bargaining process, I argue that clientelist practice under a decentralized structure
facilitates new party formation. Three levels of empirical analysis offer consistent evidence
supporting my hypothesis. From the cross-national analysis, I find that the effect of clientelism on
emergence of new parties depends upon the details of the clientelist structure. In centralized
settings, the number of new parties decrease with increasing levels of clientelism. However, this
negative effect of clientelism is alleviated under decentralized structures. Under decentralized
structures, the number of new parties increase with increasing clientelism. In the party-level
analysis, I show that parties’ clientelist efforts are less effective in producing actual votes if the
clientelist structure is decentralized. This result corroborates my theoretical prediction that
117
decentralized clientelist structures reduce the credibility of threats to withhold clientelist resources,
and consequently undermines the durability of the existing patron-client relationship. Finally, the
results from the individual-level analysis demonstrate that clientelist levels and structures affect
citizens’ votes for new parties. Specifically, I find that as voters recognize greater dispersion of a
party’s authority over resources, the effects of increasing clientelist levels on voters’ support of
incumbents decreases substantially. These results suggest the significance of clientelist structure
in determining the frequency of new party formation in new democracies.
With special emphasis on intra-party relationships, Chapter 3 investigates the determinants
of varying patterns of territorial vote distribution of parties, i.e. party nationalization. Based on a
mediation analysis using the party-level datasets, I find that clientelism mediates the effect of party
extensiveness on party nationalization. Although the direct effect of party extensiveness is to
increase party nationalization, the mediational path has the opposite effect: party extensiveness
increases the effectiveness of clientelism, which in turn undermines party nationalization.
Therefore, clientelism exerts a suppression effect on the relationship between party extensiveness
and party nationalization, which would otherwise present stronger positive associations.
Finally, Chapter 4 focuses on the dynamics of party-voter relationships. I posit that
clientelism systematically widens the gap between voters’ preferences and their vote choices,
thereby undermining congruence. Using a multivariate linear regression analysis based on the
many-to-many congruence measure, I find that the level of clientelism is negatively associated
with congruence on left-right placement and congruence on redistribution issues.
This finding has implications for understanding parties’ and voters’ behaviors. On the one
hand, in terms of voters’ behaviors, it suggests that voters respond to both issues and material
inducement. This raises a question about the validity of existing arguments in the congruence
118
literature. Specifically, my study asks whether a match between voters’ preferences and elites’
preferences is a valid yardstick to evaluate the quality of a democracy, if voters’ preference is
susceptible to influence from political elites. Given that voters’ preferences may be compromised
to the interest of parties and political elites who have the power and resources to exercise influence,
I conclude that it is not sufficient to focus on formal electoral rules as a determinant of congruence.
On the other hand, in terms of parties’ behavior, the result that clientelism undermines congruence
implies that parties are more likely to direct their efforts to persuading swing voters away from
their ideal positions. Swing voters are more likely to compromise their ideological position in
response to particularistic benefits. Therefore, they are more susceptible to the persuasion effect
of clientelism that creates a gap between voters’ original preferences and their vote choices.
My findings suggest some possible extensions for future research. First, researchers may
improve upon the method for conceptualizing and measuring patron-clientelism. This dissertation
draws on expert surveys and proxy data to capture key dimensions of clientelist practices. More
direct and objective measures of clientelism can enhance our understanding of the relationship
between clientelism and party system institutionalization.
Importantly, given the significance of temporal elements in party system
institutionalization, collecting data on changes in the patterns of clientelism over time is desirable.
The traditional perspective on clientelism assumed its eventual disappearance in the course of
democratization. However, recent phenomena show the resilience of clientelism, which has
adapted to changing environments. Still, we know little about how the forms, extents, and
functions of clientelistic practices change over time, because existing literature conceptualizes it
as largely static and there is few data available that captures these temporal dynamics. The ever-
119
changing political landscape constantly rearranges the balance of power and creates new political
spaces. Thus, the scope and nature of clientelism is expected to vary over time.
In addition, research can be further extended to different types of clientelism. For example,
private sources of clientelist benefits, such as various business sectors, can also facilitate the
formation of patron-client relationships. With enhanced data availability, many questions about
the dimensions of clientelist practices can be addressed, such as: How are clientelistic network
organized across different levels of government? And how much autonomy do key actors (e.g.
patron, clients, and brokers) have in a given patron-client network?
Finally, the enforcement of the informal rules of clientelism is another issue which needs
to be examined. Potential questions regarding this topic include: Why have patron-client relations
remained intact in some cases, while they have been repeatedly challenged in others? What
explains variation in the strength and level of stability in patron-client relations? When and how
do the key actors manage to institutionalize clientelistic flows of resources? And how do the
patrons or the brokers induce compliance from clients?
This dissertation ultimately aims to motivate the study of the political functions of diverse
informal institutions. By demonstrating the significant role of informal mechanisms in shaping
political outcomes, my study suggests that any future research in comparative political institutions
needs to consider the interactions of informal and formal institutions.
120
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