learning as conceptual change: factors mediating the development of preservice elementary...

SCIENCE TEACHER EDUCATION

Mark Windschitl, Section Editor

Learning as Conceptual Change:Factors Mediating theDevelopment of PreserviceElementary Teachers’ Viewsof Nature of Science

FOUAD ABD-EL-KHALICKCollege of Education, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Champaign,IL 61820, USA

VALARIE L. AKERSONSchool of Education, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405, USA

Received 15 January 2003; revised 25 November 2003; accepted 1 December 2003

DOI 10.1002/sce.10143Published online 30 June 2004 in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com).

ABSTRACT: This study assessed, and identified factors in participants’ learning ecolo-gies that mediated, the effectiveness of an explicit reflective instructional approach thatsatisfied conditions for learning as conceptual change on preservice elementary teachers’views of nature of science (NOS). Participants were 28 undergraduate students enrolled inan elementary science methods course. A purposively selected focus group of six partici-pants who showed differential growth in terms of their NOS views were closely followedthroughout the study. The Views of Nature of Science Questionnaire-Form B (VNOS–B) inconjunction with individual interviews was used to assess participants’ views prior to andat the conclusion of the study. Other data sources included weekly reflection papers, exitinterviews, and an instructor’s log. Initially, the greater majority of participants held naı̈veviews of NOS. Substantial and favorable changes in these views were evident as a resultof the intervention. An examination of the development of the focus group participants’

Correspondence to: Fouad Abd-El-Khalick; e-mail: [email protected] paper was edited by former Section Editor Deborah Trumbull.

C© 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

786 ABD-EL-KHALICK AND AKERSON

NOS views indicated that the effectiveness of the intervention was mediated by motiva-tional, cognitive, and worldview factors. These were related to internalizing the impor-tance and utility of teaching and learning about NOS, exhibiting a deep processing ap-proach to learning, and viewing science and religion as two distinct rather than opposingenterprises. C© 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Sci Ed 88:785–810, 2004

INTRODUCTION

Helping K-12 students develop informed views of NOS has been, and continues to be,a central goal for reform efforts in science education (American Association for the Ad-vancement of Science [AAAS], 1990; Millar & Osborne, 1998; National Research Council[NRC], 1996). Science teachers, however, do not seem to have developed the understandingsthat would enable them to achieve this valued goal. Research has consistently shown thatteachers’ views are not consistent with contemporary conceptions of NOS (e.g., Abd-El-Khalick, Bell, & Lederman, 1998; Gallagher, 1991; Lederman, 1992). Various approacheshave been undertaken to enhance teachers’ views of several NOS aspects with differinglevels of success (Abd-El-Khalick & Lederman, 2000a). In the case of elementary teachers,some evidence (Barufaldi, Bethel, & Lamb, 1977; Bianchini & Colburn, 2000; Shapiro,1996) suggests that engagement with scientific inquiry in the context of science methodscourses was successful, albeit to a limited extent, in impacting teachers’ views. In contrast,Akerson, Abd-El-Khalick, and Lederman (2000) (also see Abd-El-Khalick, 2001) foundthat an explicit reflective approach to NOS instruction undertaken in the same context waseffective in engendering substantial changes in elementary teachers’ NOS views. However,this latter approach was not equally successful in influencing all participants’ views of thetarget NOS aspects. We believe that an explicit reflective approach might be more effectiveif embedded within a “conceptual change” framework.

The orthodox conceptual change model (CCM) (cf. Hewson, 1981; Hewson & Hewson,1984; Posner, Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog, 1982; Strike & Posner, 1985) has come under in-creasing criticism in the past decade (e.g., Aikenhead & Jegede, 1999; Alsop & Watts, 1997;Cobern, 1996; Costa, 1995; Pintrich, Marx, & Boyle, 1993; Solomon, 1987). Nonetheless,two aspects remain central to learning as conceptual change: “concept status” and what willbe dubbed here as “learning ecology” (as compared to “conceptual ecology”). “Conceptualecology” is largely restricted to the cognitive domain. By comparison, “learning ecology” isexpanded to include elements from the cognitive, affective, motivational, contextual, social,and cultural domains (cf. Cobern, 1996; Costa, 1995; Driver, Asoko, Leach, Mortimer, &Scott, 1994; Pintrich et al., 1993; Shapiro, 1989; Solomon, 1987; Treagust, 1996). Whileit is easy to claim that elements from a variety of domains significantly impact learning asconceptual change, it remains crucial to elucidate the elements that gain special importancewhen learning about specific subject matter; in this case NOS.

This study assessed the effectiveness, and the factors mediating the effectiveness, ofan explicit reflective NOS instructional approach embedded within a conceptual changeframework on preservice elementary teachers’ views of certain aspects of NOS. The guidingresearch questions were: (1) What is the influence, if any, of using an explicit reflectiveteaching strategy that satisfied conditions for learning as conceptual change on preserviceelementary teachers’ views of certain aspects of NOS? (2) What factors of the participants’learning ecologies facilitate or hinder the development of their NOS views in the contextof the undertaken intervention?

Philosophers, historians, and sociologists of science, as well as science educators arequick to disagree on a specific definition for NOS. The use of the phrase “nature of sci-ence” instead of the more stylistically appropriate “the nature of science” throughout this

NATURE OF SCIENCE AND CONCEPTUAL CHANGE 787

manuscript is meant to convey our lack of belief in the existence of a single, agreed upondefinition for NOS (Abd-El-Khalick, 1998). However, many disagreements about NOS areirrelevant to K-12 instruction (the issue of the existence of one objective reality versusseveral phenomenal realties or mental constructions is a case in point). There is, we believe,a level of generality regarding NOS that is accessible and relevant to K-12 students and atwhich virtually no disagreement exists among experts (Abd-El-Khalick, Bell, & Lederman,1998). This study emphasized seven of the NOS aspects that fall under this level of gener-ality: That science is empirical, inferential, tentative, theory-laden, and creative; the lack ofa universal “Scientific Method”; and the functions of, and relationship between, scientifictheories and laws. These aspects, it should be noted, are also emphasized in current con-sensus science education reform documents (AAAS, 1990, 1993; Millar & Osborne, 1998;NRC, 1996). Next, we explore the current status of conceptual change theory.

CCM: BALANCING THE ACT BETWEEN THE RATIONAL,THE AFFECTIVE, THE SOCIAL, AND THE CULTURAL

The Orthodox Model

Much has been written about the orthodox CCM by its originators (e.g., Hewson, 1981;Posner et al., 1982; Strike & Posner, 1985) and other researchers (Scott, Asoko, & Driver,1992). Here we only highlight some of its key aspects that pertain to the present discussion.Conceptual change is the “process by which people’s central, organizing concepts changefrom one set of concepts to another set, incompatible with the first” (Posner et al., 1982, p.211). The model’s two basic elements are status and conceptual ecology. A set of conceptsis replaced with another if the latter has, from the learner’s viewpoint, higher status in termsof its intelligibility, plausibility, and fruitfulness (Hewson & Thorley, 1989). Judgmentsregarding status always take place against the learner’s current conceptual ecology, whichcomprises: epistemological commitments including explanatory ideals (i.e., what counts as asuccessful explanation) and general views about the character of knowledge (e.g., economy,parsimony), metaphysical beliefs about science (e.g., beliefs about the ultimate nature ofthe universe) that are immune to direct empirical refutation, and other knowledge includingknowledge in other fields and competing concepts (Posner et al., 1982).

In their most frequently cited paper, Posner et al. (1982) elucidated their basic assump-tions and anticipated possible criticisms: “Our central commitment . . . is that learning isa rational activity.” They continued, “It does not, of course, follow that motivational oraffective variables are unimportant to the learning process. The claim that learning is arational activity is meant to focus attention on what learning is, not what learning dependson” (p. 212). Thus, the CCM did not deny the role of motivational and affective variablesas mediators of learning. Nonetheless, learning itself was considered a strictly rationalactivity. The CCM also assumes that “ontogenetic change in an individual’s learning isanalogous to the nature of change in scientific paradigms that is proposed by philoso-phers of science” (Pintrich et al., 1993, p. 169). This latter assumption allowed Posneret al. to map rather traditional conceptions of scientific inquiry onto learning and build afunctional model of how such learning---essentially similar to (a rationalistic rendering of)Kuhn’s (1970) scientific revolutions, can be brought about. Such mapping explains whyconceptual conflict played a central role in the original model, and why the learner’s con-ceptual ecology was restricted to relevant knowledge, and epistemological and metaphys-ical elements, as these were thought to be central in making decisions regarding scientificclaims.


Criticisms and Extensions of the Orthodox Model

The orthodox model’s overly rationalistic view of learning soon came under attack (e.g.,Pines & West, 1986). Criticisms were fueled by widespread acceptance of constructivistviews, not only of learning but also of the very construction of knowledge (Driver et al.,1994; Solomon, 1994). Solomon (1987) argued that, despite supporting evidence, the modelignored the social dimension of learning. Nonetheless, she emphasized that a collaborativesocial perspective on learning should not rule at the expense of personal cognition andreflection, and insisted---and we agree, “that the social and personal elements in the con-struction of meaning, however different they may be, are indissolubly complementary”(p. 64). Solomon insightfully noted that invoking the social dimension of learning raises avery hard problem, namely, “How does the personal interact with the social?” (p. 64). Thislatter caveat, presented a challenge that, as will be argued below, is yet to be met.

Pintrich et al. (1993) added another dimension to these criticisms by taking the “construc-tivist position that the process of conceptual change is influenced by personal, motivational,social, and historical processes” (p. 170). They highlighted the theoretical difficulties of acold or “overly rational, model of conceptual change that focuses only on student cognitionwithout considering the . . . [influence of] students’ motivational beliefs about themselvesas learners and . . . individuals in a classroom learning community” (p. 167). The modelfails, for example, to explain why students with the needed prior conceptual knowledge donot activate this knowledge when engaged in school tasks. They suggested that conceptualchange is mediated by four general motivational constructs (goals, values, self-efficacy, andcontrol beliefs) and moderated by a host of classroom contextual factors (task, authority,and evaluation structures, teacher modeling and scaffolding, and classroom management).Pintrich et al. admitted, nonetheless, that little research or theory development was availableon linking motivation and cognition. And despite drawing on attribution, self-efficacy, goals,and intrinsic motivational theories, they fell short of putting forth a model that functionallylinks all the elements they invoked. Simply put, Pintrich et al. argued that the orthodoxconditions of conceptual change are moderated by motivational and classroom factors, butthey did not reconceptualize the CCM itself in terms of what learning is. They emphasized,though, that what learning depends on is too important to be dismissed when approachingconceptual change.

The aforementioned criticisms lead to a “revisionist theory of conceptual change” inwhich the originators of the CCM admitted that “the idea of a conceptual ecology . . . needsto be larger than the epistemological factors suggested by the history and philosophy ofscience,” and acknowledged the role of intuition, emotion, motives, and goals, and theirinstitutional and social sources in conceptual change (Strike & Posner, 1992, p. 162). Eventhough conceptual ecology was expanded, the model itself remained largely unchangedin its cognitive overtones (Alsop & Watts, 1997). Also, these revisions did not spare themodel from criticisms based on epistemological and metaphysical grounds. Cobern (1996)critiqued what he took to be the most problematic implicit assumption of the CCM, namely,“that scientific conceptions are superior to other conceptions for making sense of the world.”This assumed superiority, Cobern continued, “refers to the strategy in which the conceptualchange tactics are embedded [:] . . . in the science classroom all concepts regardless of theirorigin and source are evaluated by the standards of science. However, since few studentsshare this limited view of knowledge the assumption would seem problematic” (p. 582).

Cobern (1996) posed a significant challenge for the CCM. He argued that the modelexpected learners to break with long-held concepts steeped in personal meaning for newlyencountered (and even foreign) scientific concepts, and make decisions about such breaksfrom within (an equally alien) scientific framework of reference. Even though the CCM


advances that judgments of status are undertaken from the learners’ viewpoint, it stillassumes that learners ascribe to a “scientific” worldview and apply “scientific” modes ofreasoning when making such judgments. A scientific worldview is thus assumed to alreadybe in place or that it will naturally be adopted or take precedence simply because it is(assumed to be) superior to other worldviews. This assumption, Cobern argued, is wrong-headed and flawed because many learners ascribe to worldviews that, while not necessarilycompatible with a scientific worldview, provide them with meanings that have both scopeand force in helping them make sense of the world.

We believe that Cobern (1996) put forth a significant challenge to the CCM. His approach,nonetheless, was pessimistic and did not make way for an alternative functional model. Hedefined worldview as the “metaphysical levels antecedent [italics in original] to specificviews that a person holds about natural phenomena . . . the set of fundamental nonrationalpresuppositions on which . . . conceptions of reality are grounded” (p. 585). One should se-riously ask whether worldview in this sense is not equivalent with something like destiny!It seems that little can be done with worldview, which is impermeable to rational and/orempirical examination: Learners seem to be destined to continue to make sense of the worldfrom within their worldviews come what may. What is more, the implications derived fromCobern’s critique, such as giving students the “opportunity to work with scientific knowl-edge in conjunction with other ways of knowing such as the social sciences, philosophy,aesthetics, and religion” (p. 603), remained too general. While many would endorse suchrecommendations, it remains unclear how these could be achieved at the curricular, peda-gogical, and instructional levels. We do not believe that inviting “students to express anddiscuss important personal viewpoints as they pertain to the science curriculum” (Cobern,1996, p. 604) would go far in ameliorating Cobern’s concerns regarding conceptual change.

Criticisms of the CCM were also advanced on cultural grounds. Aikenhead and Jegede(1999) argued that students are “expected to construct scientific concepts meaningfullyeven when those concepts conflict with indigenous norms, values, beliefs, expectations,and conventional actions of students’ life-world . . . In response to such hazards, studentsunderstandably invent ways to avoid constructing scientific knowledge” (p. 270). Theyconceptualized science learning as a successful transition between a student’s life-worldand school science: a sort of cultural border crossing. Such crossing, however, is oftennot easy. Indeed, Costa (1995) studied students’ transitions between the cultures of theirfamily and school science and found that their success in making the transitions dependedon the extent to which the two cultures were congruent. The transitions were smooth ormanageable when the cultures of family and school science were similar or somewhatdifferent. But the transitions were hazardous or even impossible when the cultures weredissimilar or significantly discordant (see Phelan, Davidson, & Yu, 1991). Thus, Aikenheadand Jegede called for developing culturally sensitive curricula and teaching methods tominimize students’ alienation when their life-worlds cultures clash with that of Westernscience. Although inline with Cobern’s (1996) argument, Aikenhead and Jegede were moreoptimistic in indicating that students can move back and forth between the two cultures. Theiringredients for successful border crossing included playfulness, flexibility, and feelings ofease. While optimistic, such border crossings and the associated criteria are still far fromthe level of articulation that would inform model-driven instructional practices.

To be sure, in addition to criticizing the orthodox model, researchers were engaged inmodel building, at least, in the sense of extending the model. For example, Tyson, Venville,Harrison, & Treagust (1997) proposed a model built around three dimensions: epistemologi-cal (draws on the original notions of intelligibility, plausibility, and fruitfulness), ontological(relates to beliefs about the fundamental entities in the world; aspects already included in theorthodox model’s conceptual ecology), and affective/social (draws on Pintrich et al.’s (1993)


work). Alsop and Watts (1997) extended the CCM to include four dimensions: The cog-nitive dimension retained the basic elements of intelligibility, plausibility, fruitfulness, and(unlike Tyson et al.) dissatisfaction. The affective domain comprised three elements (salient,germane, and palatable) and focused on how students’ interest influenced their attention to,and effort and willingness to persist at, school tasks. The conative dimension also comprisedthree elements (control, action, and trust) and emphasized the extent to which knowledgecan be made practically applicable to students’ lives as compared to the intellectual benefitsemphasized in the CCM. Finally, the authors included learners’ self esteem with three com-ponents (image, confidence, and autonomy) because it strongly shapes learning in science.

An Inflamed Conceptual Ecology: The Needfor a Learning Ecology

Criticisms of the CCM highlighted and explicated the nature of a host of overlookedor downplayed dimensions and factors, which nonetheless figure prominently in sciencelearning. But the model’s criticisms and extensions did not go beyond Posner et al.’s (1982)original framework in terms of what learning is and what learning depends on: Learningremained largely a cognitive undertaking mediated and moderated by noncognitive factors.Pintrich et al. (1993) and Alsop and Watts (1997) kept referring to how the motivationalor conative “activated” or “blocked” the cognitive processes demanded by learning tasks,but did not explicate a genuinely different view of what learning is. This is not to say thatnon-cognitive factors are unimportant in reconceptualizing what learning is. As it turnedout, however, Solomon’s (1987) precaution that it would be gravely difficult to articulatethe nature of the interaction between the cognitive and the social, seems to apply to theinteractions between the cognitive and affective, motivational, contextual, and cultural.

The net effect of criticism was to expand the conceptual ecology against which (cog-nitive) learning takes place with little success in building an alternative model of learningas conceptual change. Pintrich et al. (1993) admitted that there was little theory availableto functionally link the affective, motivational, and contextual with the cognitive. Simi-larly, Alsop and Watts (1997) noted that the elements identified in their extended modelwere included to ensure “parallelism” rather than for any theoretical considerations: “Wehave attempted to parallel the elements in the cognitive components with three elementsin each of the others. There is no magic in the number three, but we have generated amodel that simply tries to give similar weighting to the affective, conative, and self-esteemas to the cognitive” (p. 641). They continued that the orthodox model “remains one ofthe most influential models of conceptual change learning in science education research”(p. 648).

However, strong theoretical arguments and some evidence show that science learning isaffected by factors that were not built into the CCM. In the absence of a functional alternative,one approach to working with conceptual change would be to replace “conceptual ecology”with a “learning ecology” that encompasses motivational, affective, contextual, social, andcultural factors in addition to cognitive ones. This approach ensures that science educatorswould be sensitive to the various dimensions when approaching, and designing instructionbased on a view of, learning as conceptual change. However, as Wilson (1981) pointedout, “it is easy to assert that, to be effective, teaching must take full account of the multi-dimensional cultural world of the learner, to apply this principle in a particular situation,and to express it in terms of curriculum materials and classroom methods, is a formidabletask” (p. 40). When designing and implementing instruction consistent with the CCM (withthe absence of an alternative modality), it seems that one literally needs to balance the actbetween all the aforementioned factors (hence the title of this section).


Additionally, adopting a “learning ecology” framework renders crucial the task of iden-tifying those factors that gain prominence when learning about specific subject matter. It isunlikely that all factors would be equally significant when learning all kinds of science con-tent: Such equivalence renders the design of effective instruction an insurmountable task.For example, worldview and cultural factors would be more prominent when learning aboutevolutionary theory as compared to orbital valence theory. Learning about NOS brings upother considerations: In science learning, content is usually in the fore and NOS beliefs arepushed to the background as part of conceptual ecology. The situation is reversed whenNOS is the subject matter and content serves as the backdrop against which NOS learningoccurs. The two scenarios may or may not be symmetrical. At any rate, dealing with learn-ers’ epistemic beliefs firsthand, as compared to trying to impact those beliefs when theyare one step removed from the learning situation (e.g., through content instruction), mightmake some factors in the learning ecology more significant than others in facilitating theinternalization of informed NOS views; hence, the present study’s concern with identifyingsuch factors.

TEACHING FOR CONCEPTUAL CHANGE

The latest revision of the CCM by Hewson, Beeth, and Thorley (1998) went some wayin addressing some of the above-mentioned concerns. The role of cognitive conflict wasdownplayed, and the overly rationalistic view of knowledge generation and the associatedview of what learning is, were somewhat modified. Hewson et al. (like Cob, 1994; Solomon,1987) adopted the position that knowledge is personally constructed but socially mediated.However, while giving the social more prominence, Hewson et al.’s revision was not asresponsive to culturally based criticisms (cf. Cobern, 1996). They acknowledged that theassumed superiority of Western science implied in their model had justifiably generated crit-icisms. Their response was, “We do not believe that satisfactory answers are either teachingindigenous science by itself, or teaching a menu list in which equal time is given to, forexample, evolutionary science and creation science” (p. 214). Hewson et al., we believe,did not want to undermine students’ cultural heritage. Rather, they were understandablyconcerned about the (possibly inescapable) curricular implications of an overzealous multi-cultural orientation to science education; an issue that we believe has no satisfactory answersas of yet.

Hewson et al. (1998) pointed out that teaching for conceptual change specifically refersto “teaching that explicitly aims to help students experience conceptual change learning, andmeets guidelines consistent with the conceptual change model [italics in original]” (p. 200).They put forth four general guidelines for conceptual change. First, students and teachers’ideas about the target topic should be made an explicit part of classroom discourse. Teachersshould provide learners with structured opportunities to state and explain the nature, discussthe strengths and limitations, and assess the consistency of their ideas. Second, discourseshould be made explicitly metacognitive. Learners need to make their ideas and think-ing an object of cognition. Hewson et al. distinguished being “metacognitive” from being“metaconceptual,” which refer to reflecting on cognitive processes and the very content ofconcepts respectively. Both activities are crucial for achieving conceptual change. Hewsonet al. identified the epistemology of science as a domain in which students can be meta-conceptual. Among the strategies they identified for actualizing this guideline is involvingstudents in “commenting on, comparing and contrasting . . . explanations, considering argu-ments to support or contradict one or another explanation, and choosing one of these possibleexplanations” (p. 205). Other strategies for encouraging metacognition include asking “stu-dents to consider their own recorded responses to some form of pretest . . . point out the


common features [and] . . . consider inconsistencies between different students’ answers”(p. 206). Third, the status of ideas and concepts in terms of intelligibility, plausibility, andfruitfulness should be explicitly discussed and negotiated. The authors noted that activitiesaimed at raising or lowering status are not different from those used in normal teaching.Raising the status of ideas or concepts could be achieved by presenting and developingthem; applying them in different situations; and suggesting different ways of thinking aboutthem or linking them to other ideas. To lower the status of ideas, instruction might “exploretheir unacceptable implications . . . consider experiences which they are unable to explain,or . . . find ways of thinking about them that point to their inadequacies” (p. 208).

Fourth, the justification for ideas and status decisions should be made an explicit com-ponent of the curriculum. While this guideline is extremely important, we believe thatits instructional implications were not adequately addressed. Hewson et al. (1998) seemto have adopted an implicit approach to this component (i.e., to making NOS an explicitcomponent of instruction!). They noted that “this guideline is implicit in the previous one”(p. 211). Also, like Cobern (1996), Hewson et al. seemed to assume that it is enough to“share” specific epistemological commitments with students. For instance, when providingan instructional example that satisfied this guideline, they noted that “the teacher had out-lined an epistemological commitment to the value of consistency between instance andexplanation and applied it to the [example in the lesson]” (p. 211). Simply sharing withstudents epistemological commitments or NOS ideas is hardly effective in helping theminternalize and apply such ideas. Applying the fourth guideline is seriously undermined inthis revision of the CCM. We have argued for years and provided evidence that NOS shouldbe treated as a cognitive domain and explicitly taught like other components of the sci-ence curriculum (Abd-El-Khalick, Bell, & Lederman, 1998; Abd-El-Khalick & Lederman,2000a). The present intervention satisfied the guidelines advanced by Hewson et al. Also, weintegrated our activity-based, explicit, reflective approach to teaching about NOS (Abd-El-Khalick, Bell, & Lederman, 1998) into the general framework of our teaching for concep-tual change. This integration does not conflict in any way with Hewson et al’s guidelines.It rather serves to actualize and strengthen the instructional implications of their fourthguideline.

Here, it is crucial to emphasize some points regarding our explicit, reflective approach toNOS instruction. The approach should not be confused with didactic teaching, and does notentail drilling students to reiterate certain ideas about NOS. The term “explicit” is not meantto refer to “explicit teaching,” which relates to prescribed generic teaching strategies thatare “most applicable in those areas where the objective is to master a body of knowledgeor learn a skill” (Rosenshine & Stevens, 1986, p. 377). Instead, the term is intended tohighlight our notion that NOS understandings are cognitive instructional outcomes, whichshould be intentionally targeted and planned for in the same manner abstract scientificconcepts and theories are. The fact that ideas associated with atomic or evolutionary theoryare translated into specific teaching objectives does not automatically entail that they will betaught didactically. Constructivist approaches could be used to teach about NOS in the sameway they are used to help students build their own conceptions of abstract scientific ideas.By comparison, the term “reflective” in the label “explicit-reflective” is meant to emphasizecertain instructional elements: They include providing students with opportunities to analyzetheir activities from within a NOS framework, map connections between these activitiesand those of scientists, and make conclusions about scientific epistemology. Simply put,an explicit-reflective approach emphasizes student awareness of certain NOS aspects inrelation to their learning activities, and student reflection on these activities from within aframework comprising these NOS aspects.


METHOD

This study was qualitative and exploratory in nature (LeCompte & Priessle, 1993). Itfocused on the meanings that participants ascribed to the target NOS aspects at the be-ginning and conclusion of an intervention undertaken in an elementary science methodscourse.

Participants

Participants were all 28 students, 25 female and 3 male, enrolled in an elementary sci-ence methods course in a mid-sized Western state university. Their ages ranged from 23to 44 years, with a median of 28 years. All participants were seeking a BA degree in ele-mentary education and lacked a strong science background, having completed an averageof 12 science credit hours. A focus group of six participants was purposively selected andclosely followed throughout the study (see the “Procedures” section for details regardingthe selection of participants in the focus group).

Context of the Study: An Elementary Science Methods Course

The second author taught the science methods course in which participants were enrolled.Classes were held weekly in three-hour blocks. The course aimed to help students developa theoretical framework for teaching science at the elementary level, a repertoire of scienceteaching methods, favorable attitudes toward science, and deeper understandings of somescience content area. Students were assigned weekly pedagogical readings. They werealso engaged in content-based explorations designed to help them experience a variety ofteaching methods and reinforce their understandings of key science concepts. The courseassignments included (a) an in-depth study of a science content area emphasized in theBenchmarks (AAAS, 1993), (b) interviews with elementary students to elicit their ideasabout the target science topic, (c) a paper illustrating the understandings acquired as a resultof studying the target content area, and contrasting those understandings with correspondingideas elucidated by the interviewed elementary students, (d) a series of three lesson plansemploying a conceptual change pedagogy to address interviewees’ alternative ideas, and(e) weekly reflection papers on the assigned readings and tasks.

Procedure

Several data sources were used to answer the two guiding research questions. To ensureclarity, we discuss data collection procedures related to each question separately.

Question I: Assessing the Impact of the Intervention. The VNOS-B (for detailssee Abd-El-Khalick et al., 2001; Lederman et al., 2002) was used to assess students’ viewsof the target NOS aspects. All 28 participants completed the questionnaire in class un-der the second author’s supervision prior to and at the conclusion of the study. Followingeach administration of the instrument, 10 students were randomly selected for individual,follow-up interviews. Seventeen students were interviewed since three were part of bothpre- and post-interview groups. Interviewees were provided their pre- or post-instructionVNOS–B and asked to explain and elaborate on their responses. The interviews aimed toclarify student responses and probe their views in depth, and to establish the validity of thequestionnaire (see data analysis below). Interviews, which were 30-min long on average,


were audiotaped and transcribed verbatim for analysis. Next, we explicate the interventionundertaken in the study.

The Conceptual Change Intervention. First, major themes in students’ views of thetarget NOS aspects were derived from an analysis of the pre-instruction VNOS–B and as-sociated interviews. Responses representing the various themes were selected and sharedwith participants, who were asked to comment on, explain, and identify similarities and dif-ferences between the responses. Discussions were summarized on overheads, which wererevisited several times during the study. Next, students were assigned two readings (Abd-El-Khalick, 1999; McComas, 1996) that presented alternative, more informed views of thetarget NOS aspects. The readings acquainted students with the researchers’ and science edu-cation community’s perspectives on NOS. This aspect of the intervention aimed to elucidateand make students’ and the instructor’s NOS ideas an explicit part of classroom discourse,thus meeting Hewson et al.’s (1998) first guideline. Second, during weeks 3–5 of class,students were engaged in 11 activities designed to help them examine their NOS views.The activities aimed to raise the status of some NOS notions and lower that of others, andprovide students with a NOS framework by introducing and, in a sense, sensitizing them tothe target NOS aspects. These aspects became themes that permeated all subsequent courseactivities. Detailed descriptions of these activities can be found elsewhere (Lederman &Abd-El-Khalick, 1998; Abd-El-Khalick, 2002). Small-group and whole-class discussionsfollowed each activity, with the aim of explicitly involving students in metaconceptual dis-course about the target NOS ideas. The activities embodied our explicit reflective approachto NOS instruction, which is consistent with Hewson et al.’s guidelines, but that specificallytargeted their fourth guideline.

Third, throughout the remainder of the course, students were provided unstructured andstructured opportunities to reflect, both orally and in writing, on various NOS aspects asthey arose during course readings or activities. These opportunities aimed to help studentsarticulate and elaborate their acquired NOS understandings, and apply them in variouscontexts. This component made Hewson et al’s (1998) guidelines pervasive themes inthe intervention. Starting with the fourth week of class, students were treated to weekly“NOS readings” (Abd-El-Khalick, 1999; Hoffman, 1993; Lederman, Abd-El-Khalick, &Bell, 2001; Lederman, Farber, Abd-El-Khalick, & Bell, 1998; McComas, 1996; Penrose,1994; Sagan, 1996), to which they responded by writing reflection papers. For each readingstudents answered the following questions: “Do the ideas in this reading fit our discussionsof NOS? If yes, how? If no, why? In your discussion try to focus on the elements oftentativeness, creativity, observation versus inference, subjectivity, and relationships oftheory and law.” The papers aimed to help students dissect their NOS ideas and exploremore informed views, and prepare them to engage in metaconceptual discourse. The majorthemes in each week’s set of papers were paraphrased and shared with the class. This wasfollowed by discussion and reflection prompted by the instructor.

Participants’ first reaction papers indicated a struggle with, and attempts to make senseof, ideas in light of their current understandings. Many papers ended with questions. For ex-ample, in reaction to Lederman et al. (1998), one student concluded her paper by noting, “Itseems like scientists are very certain about evolution. I didn’t think scientists were ever cer-tain about anything. I figured this was something that was up in the air. Can you really proveeither side of the debate?” Of course, this was not Lederman et al’s argument, but the studentinterpreted the language of the paper from within her own NOS framework. Her questionwas taken up the following class session, and participants decided that there was no wayto really “prove” anything with absolute certainty. Yet, the sophistication of the reflection


papers and embodied NOS understandings seemed to develop over the semester. Students’initial fragmented reflections turned into critical analyses of the readings as was evidentwith Carl Sagan’s “Most Precious Thing” reading. Participants were appropriately incensedabout particular statements made by Sagan. Such critical reflection revealed assimilation ofthe target NOS ideas, and the ability to apply them in novel settings (fruitfulness):

Mr. Buckley is obviously eager to discuss and learn about science, but all too often by thetime a person has gone through the school system and has been beaten over the head with thescientific method and other myths they are no longer even curious about what science hasto offer. Besides, how can Carl Sagan explain the nature of science to Mr. Buckley whenhe has misstepped himself. “Hippocrates is a man who introduces the scientific method(Sagan, p. 8).” If Carl Sagan can be bamboozled by the myths of science how can he expectMr. Buckley to manage?

In addition to reflection papers, whether students were exploring science content orpedagogy, or engaged in science-based activities or classroom discussions, the instructoroften promoted them to examine and reflect on how these activities relate to NOS. Theinstructor kept a detailed log of all such prompts and summaries of ensuing discussions. Forexample, following a discussion of theories, the instructor asked students to examine andcomment on the Benchmarks definition of evolutionary theory (AAAS, 1993, p. 122). Theensuing discussion focused on the explanatory function of evolutionary theory and its role ingenerating and guiding several fruitful biological research programs. This was particularlyinteresting given that many students initially believed that “creationism” should be taught asa “theory” alongside evolution. Another example illustrates how activities were debriefedto extend Hewson et al.’s (1998) fourth guideline related to explicating the justificationfor ideas in classroom discourse: Students had just completed an activity in which theyused a tube and strings to build a model that “behaved” in the same way as the instructor’stube:

Instructor: Now that we have seen which models work and which do not, what does thisactivity tell you about science? [Prompting metaconceptual discourse.]

Student 1: That models can approximate how something in nature works, or is, but we reallycan’t tell the whole truth.

Student 2: Yeah, even though there is evidence, we kind of have to fill in the blanks ourselvesto see how the evidence makes sense.

Instructor: That is the role of creativity you are carrying into the mix. How does the modelhelp you . . . make sense of the evidence?

Student 3: By letting you test your ideas, to see if your ideas make sense.Instructor: If the model didn’t work then what?Student 3: You would have to adapt the model until it [works] . . . then . . . you stop.Instructor: What might make you modify your model even if you “stopped?”Student 3: Seeing new evidence! Or seeing other people’s models. There were other models

that worked that were different from mine. We would have to test to see whichwas the best model.

This exchange also illustrates the importance of explicit prompts in getting students toclarify and reflect on different issues related to NOS. At the outset of the course, thesediscussions were almost exclusively dependent on the instructor’s explicit prompts. As theterm progressed, students began to recognize elements of NOS embedded in various courseactivities or readings, and initiate class discussions by posing questions. At this stage, theinstructor’s role shifted from prompting discussions to facilitating them, providing focus,and helping students come to some sort of closure.


Question II: Factors Mediating the Development of NOS Understandings. Giventhe lack of research on factors that mediate the development of preservice elementary teach-ers’ NOS views, the present study was, in this regard, exploratory in nature. Teasing out suchfactors entailed comparing students who showed differential growth in their NOS views overthe course of the study. To make the identification of an initial set of factors feasible, it wascrucial to limit the comparison to a select group of participants who (a) had nearly identicalpre-instruction NOS views, and (b) showed maximum variance in terms of growth in theirNOS views. At the end of the fifth week of class, purposive sampling (Lincoln & Guba,1985) was used to choose a focus group that satisfied both conditions. Choice was based onanalyzing all participants’ pre-instruction VNOS–B responses and their first two reactionpapers. Six students (five female) were thus chosen. They had nearly identical views of thetarget NOS aspects as evidenced in their VNOS–B responses. However, three participants(contrary to the other three) showed potential for developing deep understandings of NOSas evidenced by achieving significant progress during the first four weeks of class. Progress(or lack thereof for the other three students) was evident in these students’ first two reactionpapers.

The focus group participants were closely followed throughout the remainder of thecourse. All their reflection papers were collected for analysis. In her log, the instructorkept detailed notes on the contributions of these students to classroom discussions, andher informal exchanges with them. Additionally, the six students participated in individualpost-instruction exit interviews. During the interviews, the students discussed their NOSviews as evidenced in their post-instruction VNOS–B responses. They were also asked tocomment on whether and why their views of each of the target NOS aspects had changedas a result of the various course activities. Interviews, which were about an hour long, wereaudiotaped and transcribed verbatim for analysis.

Data Analysis

The first author analyzed the data. The second author conducted a round blind of analysis.Analyses were compared and differences were resolved by further consultations of the data.To ensure clarity, we discuss data analysis related to each research question separately.

Question I: Assessing the Impact of the Intervention. The pre- and post-VNOS–B responses and corresponding interview transcripts for students in the random sub-sampleswere used to establish the validity of the questionnaire. Starting with the pre-instruction data,each questionnaire was used to generate a summary of a respondent’s views of the: empiri-cal, inferential, tentative, theory-laden, and creative NOS; the diehard universal “ScientificMethod”; and the functions of, and relationship between, theories and laws. The summarieswere then searched for categories. These categories were checked against confirmatory orcontradictory evidence in the data and modified accordingly. Several rounds of categorygeneration, confirmation, and modification were conducted to reduce and organize the data.Categories were then employed to generate a profile of these students’ NOS views. The sameprocess was repeated with the corresponding interview transcripts resulting in a separateprofile of NOS views for the same group of participants. Next, the profiles generated fromthe separate analyses of the questionnaires and corresponding interviews were comparedand contrasted resulting in substantial agreement (95% or better). A similar agreementwas obtained when the whole process was repeated using the post-instruction VNOS–Bresponses and corresponding interviews of students in the second random sub-sample. Theresults indicated that the researchers’ interpretations of students’ responses to the VNOS–B


were faithful representations of their NOS views as articulated during individual interviews.Thus, the next phase of analysis was undertaken, during which a process similar to that de-scribed above was used to analyze all NOS questionnaires. This analysis generated pre-and postinstruction profiles of all participants’ NOS views. Finally, the two profiles weresystematically compared to assess the impact of the intervention. (For details on analyzingVNOS responses and coding them as ‘informed’ or ‘naı̈ve’ see Abd-El-Khalick et al. (2001)and Lederman et al. (2002).)

Question II: Factors Mediating the Development of NOS Understandings. Thefocus group data were used in this phase of the analysis. First, the post-instruction VNOS–Bresponses and interview transcripts were analyzed to ascertain the anticipated differencesbetween focus group students’ NOS views. Once differential growth in terms of NOS under-standings was ascertained, the analysis focused on comparing and contrasting the reactionpapers, interview transcripts, contributions to classroom discussions, and other course as-signments of the three focus group participants who demonstrated substantial growth intheir NOS views relative to the three who showed relatively minimal growth in this regard.It was assumed that themes or factors that were prominent in the case of all three par-ticipants in the former subgroup and simultaneously absent in the case of the latter threewere related to facilitating the internalization of informed NOS views. The reverse wasassumed for those themes or factors that hindered such development. It should be notedthat during the analysis, the data were approached with the various constituent lenses of alearning ecology in mind, including conceptual, affective, motivational, contextual, social,and cultural factors.

RESULTS

Impact of the Conceptual Change Intervention

Only a small minority of all 28 participants articulated informed views of the target NOSaspects at the outset of the study (see Table 1, column 2). Indeed, the larger majority ofparticipants held naı̈ve NOS views. For example, 86% of participants believed that scienceis characterized by the use of a single scientific method or a set of orderly and logical steps.About 90% believed that scientific laws are “proven true” and consequently not liable tochange, thus endorsing an absolutist view of scientific knowledge. Also, a majority ofparticipants (75–82%) did not demonstrate an understanding of the inferential, creative,and theory-laden NOS (pre-instruction views are illustrated in Table 2). As indicated inTable 1 (column 3), substantial changes were evident in the NOS views of the majority ofstudents at the conclusion of the study (though it should be noted that four students showedvirtually no change in their NOS views). Thus, an explicit reflective NOS teaching strategythat satisfied conditions for learning as conceptual change was notably effective in helpingparticipants develop informed views of the target NOS aspects.

Factors Mediating the Development of NOS Understandings

Three factors were found to mediate the development of the focus group students’ NOSviews. Assertions about these factors, it should be noted, only apply to the focus groupparticipants. These students were not different from others in the course: All six focusgroup students explicated naı̈ve views of almost all seven NOS aspects, and with minorexceptions, their pre-instruction views were virtually identical. Table 2 presents a summaryof the characteristic features along with illustrative quotes of the pre-instruction NOS views


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TABLE 2Focus Group Participants Pre-instruction Views of the Target NOS Aspects

NOS Aspect Major Features Representative Quotes

Empirical Science is the facts. It is “proven.”Failure to recognize that reference

to observations of the naturalworld is a major criterion thatsets science apart from otherdisciplines of inquiry. However,scientists always interpret theirobservations to draw inferencesand construct explanations,which are infused withassumptions and based ontheoretical considerations.

“Science is different because it isproven. Anyone can repeat thefacts of science . . . But in art thereis a lot of opinion, interpretation,personal views and thelike.” (Marj)

“Art is how artists view theirexperiences in the world. Scienceinvolves doing experiments andgetting the facts about theworld . . . The scientists onlyreport the facts.” (Sandra)

Tentative Once “proven,” scientificknowledge (e.g., facts and laws)is certain and set in stone.

Scientific theories do change, butonly to become laws, whichwould then achieve permanencein terms of their “truth.”

“A law has been proven byexperiments and gathering data.It is the truth.” (Marie)

“Theories are stepping-stones totruth, and they can become lawsand that is when they change.”(Sandra)

Inferential “Knowing is seeing”: Scientificconstructs, such as atomicstructure, are “discovered”through direct observations ofphenomena. Constructs(inferences) and the evidenceused to derive them(observations) are perceived asone and the same.

“Scientists viewed atoms throughhuge microscopes with a specialname that they use to see at theatomic level.” (Sam)

“Scientists are very sure of thestructure [of atoms]. Theydiscovered it by the use of amicroscope . . . This is how theyknow.” (Marla)

Creative Virtually no creativity is involved inanalyzing data or developingmodels and theories.

“Creativity in science” entailsmeanings other than buildingtheoretical constructs, models,etc.

Creativity threatens scientific“objectivity.”

“Scientists are very orderly and usespecific methods, and so cannotbe very creative in their work.”(Sandra)

“Scientists use creativity . . . to maketheir ideas and theoriesinteresting to the public.” (Marla)

“Scientists cannot be creative . . .because they would stop beingobjective.” (Sam)

Myth of the“ScientificMethod”

Science is characterized by aunique “right method.” Thismethod differentiates sciencefrom other disciplines of inquiry.

“Science is different from the artsbecause in the arts you do nothave a right way like the scientificmethod that tells you how to doyour work or the investigation.”(Marie)

“Science is different because itrequires you to follow astep-by-step format to getresults.” (Sandra)

Continued


TABLE 2Focus Group Participants Pre-instruction Views of the Target NOS Aspects(Continued)

NOS Aspect Major Features Representative Quotes

Theory-laden A scientific controversy could besolely attributed to the lack ofdata. Differences ininterpreting and drawingconclusions from the datawere not, at least partially,attributed to scientists’backgrounds, training,assumptions, disciplinary andtheoretical commitments,and/or beliefs.

“They disagree because they do nothave all the facts . . . Scientistscannot measure all the vastspace and then say: Here is theresult. The universe is expanding,like for example.” (Sandra)

“Scientists disagree because therehas not been enough conclusiveevidence to draw just oneconclusion . . . . Also they could beusing different parts of the data.”(Marla)

Theories andlaws

A theory represents a “weaker”type of knowledge than a law:It is a “guess” or “someone’sopinion” that had not beenproven. A law is the “truth”(scientific knowledge isabsolute).

There is a hierarchicalrelationship between theoriesand laws, whereby withsufficient “proof” theoriesdevelop into laws.

“A theory is a theory because thereis no way to conclusively prove it.”(Sharon)

“A law has been proven byexperiments and gathering data.It is the truth.” (Marie)

“A scientific law is a theory that hasbeen tested and proven with lotsof research. Once a theorybecomes a law it is set in stone.”(Marj)

of the focus group students. These participants were given pseudonyms chosen to facilitatefollowing the changes (or lack thereof) in their views described below. Marla, Marj, andMarie, though active participants in class discussions and activities, and faithful writers ofreflection papers, achieved virtually no changes in their views at the conclusion of the study(the letter “M” signifies “minimal” change in terms of NOS views). By comparison, Sandra,Sam, and Sharon achieved substantial changes and developed relatively more accurate NOSviews (the letter “S” signifies “substantial” development in their views).

Internalizing the importance of NOS. This factor is motivational and relates to thefocus group students’ perceptions of the “utility value” and/or “importance” (cf. Pintrichet al., 1993) of learning and teaching about NOS. In their first reflection paper, which wasin reaction to McComas’ (1996) “Ten Myths of Science,” all students voiced their “shock”about the myths and expressed disbelief that they held so many “erroneous” views. Theynoted that their own teachers explicitly taught them most of the myths. Thus, all studentsstarted at virtually the same point; their initial shock regarding the myths they ascribed torevealed the genesis of dissatisfaction with their ideas. For example, Sharon felt she was“guilty of believing most of the myths,” and Marla noted, “I was shocked when I read thesemyths. I feel I was betrayed into believing false information from my own teachers.”

Unlike Marla, Marj, and Marie, the focus group students who developed more informedviews by the end of the course showed an initial commitment to “learning” about more


TABLE 3Sandra’s Reaction to the McComas (1996) Reading: Sorting Out ‘‘Her’’Views Relative to the ‘‘Realities’’ of Science

Misconceptions of Science Realities of Science

Science is defined as knowledgegained by observation of the presentphysical world, using the five senses.

Science isn’t limited to that definition. Sciencealso involves manipulative experiments,reconstructing past events to understand thepresent, “extensions of the senses”(Instrumentation), as well as many otherdimensions used in understanding thephysical world.

There is one scientific method that isalways used by scientists.

Many “scientific methods” exist and there is noset way to investigate a problem. What countsis the evidence gathered.

A theory is simply “somebody’s idea” ofwhat has happened.

Scientific theories are well establishedexplanations of natural phenomena. Theyusually have tremendous amounts ofsupportive evidence.

Theories can be proved true. Theories can’t be proved true. Rather, scientiststest predictions derived from a theory andtheir results either refute the theory or simplystrengthen it.

Religion and science can be comparedusing scientific means.

Religion and science use different ways of“knowing.” Religion uses religious texts,prophets, and deity to find absolute truths.Faith, not physical evidence, is often stressed.Science is ever changing and is based onphysical evidence. They can’t be comparedusing scientific methods.

Evolutionary theory and religion areincompatible.

The compatibility depends on whether a religionhas a literal or nonliteral view of Genesis.

accurate views. Sam noted, “I understand that my views are erroneous, but I am confusedstill what I should understand. I need to understand this so I can teach it better to my ownstudents.” Sandra was so intent on improving her understandings before she went “out intothe field to teach young kids” that she developed a chart of myths of science, which shecontrasted with more accurate notions (see Table 3). She used this chart over the course ofthe semester to track her own views and reactions to new readings. Thus, although all sixstudents became initially dissatisfied with their ideas, those who achieved growth showed anearly commitment to changing their ideas. This commitment seems to have been associatedwith the belief that it was these participants’ responsibility to help their own studentsdevelop informed NOS views. Internalizing accurate views themselves was the first stepthese participants decided to take toward realizing this responsibility later on. As Sandranoted in her second reaction paper (in which she presented the aforementioned chart):

Clearing up confusion and misconceptions about science should be an important theme inour class because many of these myths are taught to people by educators. As teachers itwill be our job to teach all of the aspects of science to our students. Before we can do thiseffectively we must first clear up any confusion and misconceptions that we hold.


This finding, it should be noted, supports the contention (e.g., Scott, Asoko, & Driver,1992; Tyson et al., 1997) that generating dissatisfaction with naı̈ve ideas is not of itselfsufficient to create the incentive for learners to seriously explore and adopt alternative ideas.Indeed, as noted earlier, the present intervention did not target the generation of cognitivedissonance as a means to engender conceptual change (see Hewson et al., 1998). In thisstudy, internalizing (as it were here, early in the course of the intervention) the importanceof helping students develop more accurate NOS views and the associated concern regardingpreparedness to address NOS in their future classrooms played a major role in engenderingfavorable growth in participants’ views of the scientific endeavor.

Interaction of NOS instruction with global worldviews. Responses to reaction pa-pers and contributions to class discussions by Marla, Marj, and Marie indicated that theyascribed to a religiously compatible worldview and perceived that religion was in conflictwith science: They believed that scientific understandings were at odds with the faith-based understandings they grew up with (see Roth & Alexander, 1997). In response tothe Lederman et al. (1998) reading, which argued that science and religion were differ-ent systems for generating knowledge and thus could not be compared using a singleframework---be it that of science or religion, Marla was adamant to note that both scienceand religion should be put on equal footing. She noted that the topic on evolution and re-ligion “is like the topic on abortion. It’s always an issue but everyone has the right to theirown opinion. Neither theory can be proven, so each are equally valid.” It is noteworthythat this reading engendered such reaction from Marla even though the reading itself andensuing class discussions did not make value judgments regarding the issue of science ver-sus religion. Indeed, value judgments were consciously avoided and discussions focusedon the necessity of empirical evidence for supporting scientific claims and the lack of suchrequirement in the case of religion.

Marie and Marj also held faith-based views, which they explicated in class and in reactionpapers. Marie strongly believed in creationism. The course instructor often assured her thatreligious views were not being questioned in class. Rather, discussions aimed to highlight thedifferences between scientific and religious explanations without making value judgments.Marie’s beliefs interfered with her acquiring more valid views of scientific theories: Shejudged theories on their “truth” from a “right/wrong” dualistic perspective rather than ontheir empirical content, logical consistency, or explanatory power. In her reaction to theLederman et al. (1998) reading, she noted, “people can come up with enough argumentsfor both evolution and the theory that we were created by God. Both theories are valid.Without scientific proof rather than just speculation, I can believe either theory is valid.”Marie’s statements harbor misunderstandings of scientific theories and the tentative NOS.She believes that any kind of “theory” is scientific, and that science is absolute.

Even in her reaction to the Sagan (1996) reading toward the end of the term, Mariemaintained that science and religion are not different ways of knowing. She noted, “DespiteSagan’s attempt to give man credit for the discoveries we recognize as scientific, I stillfeel that God has given the man intelligence to do so.” Marie still perceived that attemptsto illuminate certain NOS aspects were meant to discredit her beliefs. For her, “science isintertwined by God giving us the knowledge and ability to create and therefore we are alwaysin debt. I will always have faith in the omniscience of my God.” By comparison, Sandra,Sam, and Sharon did not hold that religion and science were in opposition, even thoughSharon characterized herself as religious. These students viewed religion and science asdifferent enterprises, and believed in separating schooling and religion. In her response tothe Lederman et al. (1998) article, Sharon noted, “I consider myself religious, but I can seethat the school setting may very well be the wrong setting for creationism discussions.”


The interaction between students’ religious views and learning about NOS was not limitedto controversial and sensitive issues, such as evolutionary theory. The interaction seems tohave interfered in more subtle ways with learning about other aspects of NOS. Students’dualistic right/wrong religiously compatible worldview compromised their developing moreinformed views of the tentative NOS. Such a view created a tension between participantsendorsing the tentative NOS and their perception that the “credibility” of science (like thatof religion) is associated with the “truth” of its claims. Marla, for instance, noted early inthe term that she would believe scientific statements if they were proven, and not tentativeor under development. In her final reflection paper, Marla still expressed a similar view.She tried to integrate a tentative stance into her views, yet her statements indicated thatscience is tentative in as much as it is on its way to uncovering the “truth.” She wrote,“Even though the nature of science is tentative, often what we make as inference . . . basedon our observations, turns out to be true once we have all the evidence that we can have thenecessary proof.” Marie’s reaction to the Lederman et al. (2001) reading showed a similarview. For her, if science is not absolute, it is simply less credible. She noted, “Perhaps somemay feel that if we teach kids that science is never absolute they will think, ‘what is thepoint?”’ Marj also questioned the credibility of science given its tentativeness, and evenwent to question her own learning of the “facts” of science: “It seems that science is basedon what the observer saw or thinks. It is basically biased toward their opinion. This makesme question all the facts I learned about science.”

It should be emphasized that evolution was not among the science topics targeted inthe methods course: It was never our intention to mention or highlight the evolution-ary/creationist debates. Evolutionary theory was mentioned in one of the many NOS read-ings and only in the context of discussing the myth of “The Scientific Method.” Yet, thissingle mention invoked a host of student reactions, which coupled with our conscious de-cision to approach data analysis from a learning ecology perspective, made possible theidentification of this pattern in the development of students’ NOS views: As evidenced inthis study, religiously compatible worldviews interact with learning about NOS irrespectiveof whether controversial issues are brought into the mix as long as learners (a) view scienceand religion to be in opposition, and/or (b) attempt to apply criteria of credibility oftenassociated with religion to the realm of science. This finding, however, should not be takento mean that students with religiously compatible worldviews would not internalize moreaccurate NOS views. Sharon, who was religious, did (also see Roth & Alexander, 1997).The finding, on one hand, supports the argument that learners’ worldviews and culturalbeliefs, which might not be considered a part of their conceptual ecology, are significantfactors in learning as conceptual change (e.g., Cobern, 1996; Aikenhead & Jegede, 1999).On the other hand, this finding suggests that learners’ views of the discord (or lack thereof)between science and religion should be factored in when teaching about NOS. This crucialpoint will be explored further below.

Deep versus surface orientation to learning. The third factor was cognitive in nature:Relative to those who held fast to their naı̈ve NOS conceptions, Sandra, Sam, and Sharonshowed a deep processing orientation to learning (see Pintrich et al., 1993). Following initialdissatisfaction with their NOS views, they were actively seeking a consistent alternativeframework. They were eager to examine their NOS views and adopt ones that made senseto them and were congruent with those presented in the readings or explicated by the in-structor. Sandra, Sam, and Sharon talked about how they “felt all along” that what theyhad learned about science did not make much sense them. In class Sharon stated, “Finallyscience seems to make sense.” She continued, “It is amazing how quickly I am able tobelieve my previous ideas were a myth---probably this is because for the first time my


science class makes sense and doesn’t directly contradict what I know about the world.”Similarly, in his exit interview, Sam felt that sorting out and clarifying his and his students’ideas about NOS was important “because it will influence the rest of their lives and howthey view science as a working entity. Otherwise they will end up like me and everyoneelse in our class, all of a sudden completely confused and out of touch with what sciencereally is.”

Related to a deep approach to learning is the learner’s attempt to seek and clarify themeanings of relevant terms, and to use such meanings consistently across tasks or domains(Thomas & Bain, 1982). One difficulty with internalizing accurate NOS views stems fromthe vernacular meanings associated with relevant key terms such as “theory,” “proof,” and“creativity” (Abd-El-Khalick, 1998; Abd-El-Khalick & Lederman, 2000b). Learners whofail to develop accurate NOS views often conflate the meanings of key terms as used ineveryday life and in the context of discussing NOS. In this study, the variety of meaningsassociated with the use of such terms was often highlighted during class discussions. Yet,a surface approach to learning was evident in Marla, Marj, and Marie’s inconsistencyregarding the meanings they ascribed to key terms when discussing NOS. They neitherstrived to ensure such consistency, nor tried to integrate more accurate meanings into theirwritings. For example, in her reaction to the Penrose (1994) reading well into the term, Marlastill explicated inaccurate views of “creativity” and “tentativeness” because she continuedto attach vernacular meanings to these key words. This reading is a dialogue betweenyoung Jessica and her father, the scientist. Jessica goes with him into a cave to collectspecimens. She wonders what would happen if she, her father, and others got trapped insidethe cave. Eventually, she asks, “How could I know what the real world outside was like?”(Penrose, 1994, p. 2). The ensuing conversation focuses on how we know and how validour knowledge is, as Jessica’s father explains how much they could learn about the outsideworld just by observing whatever shadows might form on their cave walls. Marla noted, “Icould tell that Jessica was tentative. She was wary of being in the cave.” As such, Marlaequated “tentative” with “hesitant” rather than with “being amenable to change.” Similarly,Marla noted that Jessica was “very creative in the things she was coming up with. Likeliving off the plants if they got trapped in the cave.” Again, for Marla “creativity” wasassociated with “resourcefulness” rather than with “developing explanations”; a meaningthat is more commensurate with the connotations of “creativity in science” as discussed inthe course. It is noteworthy that this latter meaning of creativity was evident in Penrose’sstory, namely in the father’s attempt to provide explanations of the workings of the “outsideworld.”

Marj’s response to the Penrose (1994) reading reflected similar inconsistency in usingterms. She noted, “There is the element of inference with the daughter thinking that thelonger the boulder was there the more likely it would be to fall.” Marj assigned the term“inference” a meaning usually associated with the term “speculation,” rather than the mean-ing that was presented and discussed during the course (i.e., a conclusion based on, andconsistent with empirical observations.) Finally, Marie’s reaction to the Penrose readingconveys, not only similar naı̈ve NOS views, but also a lack of deep processing in terms ofcontrasting and comparing ideas across contexts and domains:

The elements of NOS I saw in the article: . . . creativity in that Jessica is imagining thesituation of the boulder falling down, Observation vs. inferences in explaining that the rockwon’t fall and Jessica thinking it has been there way passed its time. Subjectivity in that weoften believe what others say leading to misconceptions. Theory and Law in that shadowshave distorted shapes and the earth is in motion.


By comparison, Sandra, Sharon, and Sam better distinguished between everyday andmore accurate meanings of some key terms they used in their discussions of NOS. Forinstance, Sharon’s response to the Penrose (1994) reading revealed accurate understandingsof the inferential and creative NOS. She noted that creativity was evident in the father’sideas on “how to figure out what the real world outside is like if one had been born in acave.” Sharon also noted that Jessica’s story “seems to model . . . observation and inference,with Jessica’s father’s thoughts on figuring out what objects look like from observing theirshadows based on where the sun and objects are.” In his response to the same reading, Samshowed an elaborate understanding of the theory-laden NOS by noting that his approachingthe assigned readings with an intent to identify NOS aspects influenced his ability to extractthose aspects that were embedded in the text: “If I wasn’t looking for NOS then I wouldnever had noticed the elements. Isn’t that part of the NOS itself?”

Finally, Sandra, Sharon, and Sam were making concerted efforts to align the meaningsthey ascribed to the target NOS aspects across classroom activities and readings. Consistentwith a deep approach to learning, they continually tried to make connections across thetasks they were assigned and ideas that were brought up during classroom discussions.They often used metacognitive self-monitoring strategies. For example, as noted above,Sandra continually referred to the chart she developed early in the course (see Table 3)to help her clarify her NOS views. Sharon also sought connections. In her reaction to thelast NOS reading in the course (i.e., Hoffman, 1993), she referred to the first reading (i.e.,McComas, 1996):

STM [Scanning Tunneling Microscopy] is an extension of scientists’ sense. They are notreally seeing the atom, but an image related to the surface topography. This goes back toMyth 5 of Ten Myths of Science: Science and its Methods Provide Absolute Proof. “Seeing”the atom was not absolute proof. It was a reaffirmation, a support of what scientists alreadybelieved.

Sandra similarly referred to earlier readings when reflecting on Sagan’s (1996) article.She used ideas presented in Abd-El-Khalick’s (1999) article to support her critical views ofSagan’s ideas: “If you read the Nature of Science: an Overview, it says science is not lifeless,rational and orderly, but involves the invention of explanations that requires a great dealof creativity by scientists.” She continued, “But in ‘the Most Precious Thing’ we find thatscience is based on proven conclusions. There is a discrepancy here.” Moreover, to supporthis interpretation of Hoffman’s (1993) position, Sam referred to the “Rutherford’s Enlarged”activity (Abd-El-Khalick, 2002): “Like our activity last week. We made inferences based onobservations . . . When we drew what we believed was stopping the balls, we were acting asscientists do. Although none of us were exactly right, all of us were pretty close.” Attemptsto make such connections were not evident in the case of Marie, Marj, and Marla’s reactionpapers, contributions to classroom discussions, and exit interviews.

DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

Changes in participants’ NOS views represent a substantial improvement over our earlierefforts to enhance preservice elementary teachers’ views in the same context (see Table 1). InAkerson et al. (2000) an explicit reflective NOS intervention was undertaken with a similargroup of participants (undergraduate preservice elementary teachers) in the context of thesame science methods course, which was taught by the same instructor. Table 1 (columns4 and 7) indicates that, relative to the Akerson et al. study, a substantially larger percentageof students in this study achieved informed views of the target NOS aspects. However, the


present intervention differed genuinely in that explicit reflective NOS instruction was em-bedded in a framework that satisfied guidelines for learning as conceptual change (Hewsonet al., 1998). In particular, students and researchers’ NOS ideas were made an explicit part ofclassroom discourse. The discourse was made explicitly metacognitive through providingstudents with structured opportunities to assess their NOS ideas in relation to those of thescience education community. Also, the status of NOS ideas was explicitly discussed bymodeling, and engaging students in, the justification of ideas.

Our second research objective was to identify factors in the “learning ecology” thatfacilitated or impeded the development of informed NOS views. Through closely examiningthe development, or lack thereof, of the focus group participants’ NOS views, we tentativelyidentified three factors from the cognitive, motivational, and cultural domains that interactedin significant ways with these students’ internalization of more accurate NOS views. Thesefactors have significant implications for the design of effective NOS instruction and researchon NOS in science education. First, as with science content, focus group participants with adeep processing orientation achieved more accurate and elaborate NOS views. This findingsupports the claim by Abd-El-Khalick, Bell, and Lederman (1998) and Abd-El-Khalickand Lederman (2000a) that NOS instructional outcomes are cognitive rather than affectiveoutcomes. Deep learners who sought to clarify the meanings of key NOS terms and conceptsand use such meanings and concepts consistently across contexts, and who monitoredchanges in their NOS ideas, developed more informed views. By comparison, the otherthree focus group participants who showed little change in terms of their NOS views didlittle to compare and contrast the target NOS views across contexts, and often conflated themeanings of key NOS terms with their vernacular connotations. Cobern (1996) noted thatconfusing the meanings of scientific terms with everyday life meanings of the same termsinhibits conceptual change.

This finding indicates that learners should be provided structured opportunities to examinethe meanings they ascribe to key NOS terms in various contexts, and assess the consistencyof their ideas across these contexts with the hope of helping them reconcile these meaningsinto a coherent framework of ideas about NOS. Structured reflections and modeling throughclassroom dialogue were our means to achieve this end. Indeed, during exit interviews,focus group students indicated that writing reflection papers was the single most importantactivity that influenced their views. They noted that even though they did not always enjoywriting these papers, such writing “forced them” to think about and clarify their NOS ideas.These means, however, were not equally effective for students with a surface orientation tolearning. To be effective with a wider range of learners, NOS instruction might benefit frombeing coupled with targeted coaching in metacognitive strategies, including self-appraisaland self-management of cognition (Edwards & Green, 1997). For example, learners couldbe asked to use visual organizers (e.g., concept maps) to track the variety of meanings (e.g.,technical versus vernacular) that could be ascribed to key NOS terms and the contexts inwhich the use of such meanings might be considered accurate or not.

The second factor was motivational and related to students’ perceptions of the importanceand utility of learning and teaching about NOS. Participants who developed more informedNOS views internalized the importance of teaching and “dispelling myths about science”in their future classrooms, which served as a strong motivation for critically examiningand revising their views. Thus, effective NOS instruction should first aim to help teachersrealize the importance of NOS as a valued instructional outcome for K-12 students. This,however, should prove to be a difficult undertaking because even though current reforms(e.g., AAAS, 1990; NRC, 1996) assign NOS a prominent place among the instructionaloutcomes for K-12 science teaching, the culture of school science continues to be largelypreoccupied with a focus on science content and processes to the neglect of science as a


way of knowing. Several arguments support the significance of teaching and learning aboutNOS (Driver et al., 1996) that can, in principle, be used to “convince” teachers in this regard.These include the utilitarian, democratic, cultural, moral, and pedagogical arguments. Thelatter states that an understanding of NOS motivates students to learn science and facilitatestheir understanding of science content and is most directly relevant to teacher needs. Thesearguments, nonetheless, remain theoretical with little, if any, supporting evidence. This isan area of research that clearly needs serious work to enable science educators to presentteachers with an evidence-based case for the importance of teaching and learning aboutNOS.

Third, focus group participants’ religiously compatible worldview interacted with devel-oping more accurate NOS conceptions. Similar to results reported by Roth and Alexander(1997), students who viewed science and religion as two opposing enterprises rather thantwo different ways of knowing, did not show growth in their NOS views. These participantsseemed to approach the target NOS ideas and evaluate their implications from religious per-spectives and associated criteria of “credibility.” These included a dualistic “right/wrong”perspective and the criterion of “truth.” This approach resulted in tensions, such as thatbetween the acclaimed validity of scientific knowledge and its well-documented tentative-ness, which made students hesitant to adopt the NOS conceptions presented and discussedin the course. For example, Marla, Marj, and Marie noted that theories were not “provento be absolutely true” and consequently were not “credible.” Thus, ideas advanced in thesetheories were on equal footing with other ideas, even though the latter did not have equallysubstantial empirical contents. These participants were not able to think in terms of degreesof validity; a notion that is crucial to internalizing informed views of several importantNOS aspects. Conversely, the three students who did not view science and religion to be inopposition and were able to differentiate between religious and scientific ways of knowing,even though they did hold religious beliefs, were able to abandon their naı̈ve NOS viewsand adopt more informed ones.

Thus, effective NOS instruction should address the perceived discord between scienceand religion irrespective of whether such instruction draws on controversial (from a reli-gious and/or cultural perspectives) science-related topics, such as evolution, genetic engi-neering, or population growth. Science educators need to make a concerted effort to helplearners realize that science and religion are different ways of knowing. The values andassumptions of any one of these two ways cannot, and should not, be used to pass judg-ment on the validity of the other’s claims. This needs to be done, while emphasizing thatone way is not inherently “better” than the other. It should be noted, however, that help-ing learners internalize and apply such a distinction is by no means an easy undertaking.Here, we find that Aikenhead and Jegede’s (1999) notion of science learning as a sort ofsuccessful cultural border crossing to be extremely relevant. Efforts should be directedat helping students navigate smoothly between the cultures of science and religion. To-ward this end, we should note that the task of translating Aikenhead and Jegede’s criteriaof playfulness, flexibility, and feelings of ease that they deemed necessary for successfulborder crossings into curricular outcomes and instructional practices requires a great dealof theorizing and empirical research, which should nonetheless prove to be a worthwhilepursuit.

It should be noted that the above three factors were identified from examining the views ofthe six students in the focus group. Thus, these factors are necessarily tentative and furtherresearch is needed to substantiate their importance to the development of NOS views inother contexts and with different groups of learners. What is more, although we couldclaim, albeit tentatively, that the identified factor played a significant role in mediatingthe development of the focus group participants’ NOS views, very little could be said


about the ways in which these three factors interacted with one another in the contextof the implemented intervention. Particularly, it is not clear whether any of these factorshas primacy over, or is an antecedent to the others. For instance, Abd-El-Khalick, Bell, andLederman (1998) noted that internalizing the importance of teaching about NOS is essentialfor preservice teachers to address NOS instructionally. Thus, it should prove very useful forefforts undertaken to enhance science teachers’ NOS views and to facilitate the translationof such views into instructional practice if we were able to ascertain whether having a deepapproach to learning and/or viewing science and religion as two distinct ways of knowing arenecessary precursor(s) to internalizing the importance of teaching about NOS, or whetherthe relationship is reversed (if existent at all). Ascertaining the former possibility entailssignificant but tenable modifications for our approaches to promote science teachers’ NOSviews. Ascertaining the latter would leave us with the more difficult task of getting teachersto internalize the primacy of adding NOS objectives to their list of important instructionaloutcomes. We intend to pursue these questions using research designs designed to flesh outsuch relationships.

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