Lopez v. Orosa, Jr., and Plaza Theatre, Inc.

FACTS: Lopez was engaged in business under the name Lopez-Castelo Sawmill. Orosa approached Lopez and invited the latter to make an investment in the theatre business he was forming, the Plaza Theatre. Lopez expressed his unwillingness to invest. Nonetheless, Lopez agreed to supply the lumber for the construction of the theatre. Lopez further agreed that that the payment therefore would be on demand and not cash on delivery basis. Lopex delivered the lumber which was used for the construction of the Plaza Theatre. However, of the total cost of materials amounting to P62, 255.85, Lopez was paid only P 20, 848.50, thus leaving a balance of P 41, 771.35.

Due to Lopez demands, Orosa issued a deed of assignment over his shares of stock of the Plaza Theatre, Inc. As there was still an unpaid balance, Lopez filed a case against Orosa and Plaza Theatre. He asked that Orosa and Plaza theatre be held liable solidarily for the unpaid balance, and in case defendants failed to pay, the land and building should be sold in public auction with the proceeds to be applied to the balance, or that the shares of stock be sold in public auction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lien for the value of the materials used in the construction of the building attaches to said structure alone and does not extend to the land on which the building is adhered to.

HELD: No. While it is true that generally, real estate connotes the land and the building constructed thereon, it is obvious that the inclusion of the building, separate and distinct from the land, in the enumeration of what may constitute real properties could only mean one thingthat a building is by itself an immovable property. In view of the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, a building is an immovable property irrespective of whether or not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to belong to the same owner. The lien so created attaches merely to the immovable property for the construction or repair of which the obligation was incurred. Therefore, the lien in favor of appellant for the unpaid value of the lumber used in the construction of the building attaches only to said structure and to no other property of the obligors.

ASSOCIATED INSURANCE AND SURETY COMPANY V. IYA, ET. AL

FACTS: Spouses Valino were the owners of a house, payable on installments from Philippine Realty Corporation. To be able to purchase on credit rice from NARIC, they filed a surety bond subscribed by petitioner and therefor, they executed an alleged chattel mortgage on the house in favor of the surety company. The spouses didnt own yet the land on which the house was constructed on at the time of the undertaking. After being able to purchase the land, to be able to secure payment for indebtedness, the spouses executed a real estate mortgage in favor of Iya.

The spouses were not able to satisfy obligation with NARIC, petitioner was compelled to pay. The spouses werent able to pay the surety company despite demands and thus, the company foreclosed the chattel mortgage. It later learned of the real estate mortgage over the house and lot secured by the spouses. This prompted the company to file an action against the spouses. Also, Iya filed another civil action against the spouses, asserting that she has a better right over the property. The trial court heard the two cases jointly and it held that the surety company had a preferred right over the building as since when the chattel mortgage was secured, the land wasnt owned yet by the spouses making the building then a chattel and not a real property.

MULLER v. MULLER

CASE: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: This petition for review on certiorari assails the February 26, 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59321 affirming with modification the August 12, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 86 in Civil Case No. Q-94-21862, which terminated the regime of absolute community of property between petitioner and respondent, as well as the Resolution dated August 13, 2001 denying the motion for reconsideration.

FACTS: Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg, Germany on September 22, 1989. The couple resided in Germany at a house owned by respondents parents but decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By this time, respondent had inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and the construction of a house amounting to P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of petitioner under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 219438 5 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila.Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated. On September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition for separation of properties before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.On August 12, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision which terminated the regime of absolute community of property between the petitioner and respondent. It also decreed the separation of properties between them and ordered the equal partition of personal properties located within the country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo property, the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of the respondent. However, it ruled that respondent cannot recover his funds because the property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution.

Thus However, pursuant to Article 92 of the Family Code, properties acquired by gratuitous title by either spouse during the marriage shall be excluded from the community property. The real property, therefore, inherited by petitioner in Germany is excluded from the absolute community of property of the herein spouses. Necessarily, the proceeds of the sale of said real property as well as the personal properties purchased thereby, belong exclusively to the petitioner. However, the part of that inheritance used by the petitioner for acquiring the house and lot in this country cannot be recovered by the petitioner, its acquisition being a violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution which provides that "save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." The law will leave the parties in the situation where they are in without prejudice to a voluntary partition by the parties of the said real property.

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed decision modifying the trial courts Decision. It held that respondent merely prayed for reimbursement for the purchase of the Antipolo property, and not acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It also considered petitioners ownership over the property in trust for the respondent. As regards the house, the Court of Appeals ruled that there is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits respondent from acquiring the same.

ISSUE: Is respondent entitled to reimbursement of the amount used to purchase the land as well as the costs for the construction of the house?

HELD: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 26, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59321 ordering petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller to reimburse respondent Helmut Muller the amount of P528,000 for the acquisition of the land and the amount of P2,300,000 for the construction of the house in Antipolo City, and the Resolution dated August 13, 2001 denying reconsideration thereof, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The August 12, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 86 in Civil Case No. Q-94-21862 terminating the regime of absolute community between the petitioner and respondent, decreeing a separation of property between them and ordering the partition of the personal properties located in the Philippines equally, is REINSTATED.

DISCUSSION: Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:

Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands. The primary purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony.

In the case of Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 10 the Court held: Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated," and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result that section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it reads as follows:

"Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines."

This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may leak into aliens hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens.If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands not strictly agricultural, the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and that "they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses and purposes that are not, in appellants words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor Generals Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond question.

Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and expressly admitted his knowledge thereof to this Court. He declared that he had the Antipolo property titled in the name of petitioner because of the said prohibition. His attempt at subsequently asserting or claiming a right on the said property cannot be sustained.The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was created and resulted by operation of law in view of petitioners marriage to respondent. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession, respondents disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. To hold otherwise would allow circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.

Invoking the principle that a court is not only a court of law but also a court of equity, is likewise misplaced. It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition.Further, the distinction made between transfer of ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a futile exercise on respondents part. To allow reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property which he is not allowed to own.

ALFRED FRITZ FRENZEL vs. EDERLINA P. CATITO

FACTS:Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian citizen of German descent. He worked as a pilot with the New Guinea Airlines. He arrived in the Philippines in 1974, started engaging in business in the country two years thereafter, and married Teresita Santos, a Filipino citizen. In 1981, Alfred and Teresita separated from bed and board without obtaining a divorce.Sometime in February 1983, Alfred arrived in Sydney, Australia for a vacation. He went to King's Cross, a night spot in Sydney, for a massage where he met Ederlina Catito, a Filipina. Unknown to Alfred, she resided for a time in Germany and was married to Klaus Muller, a German national. She left Germany and tried her luck in Sydney, Australia, where she found employment as a masseuse in the King's Cross nightclub. Alfred was so enamored with Ederlina that he persuaded her to stop working at King's Cross, return to the Philippines, and engage in a wholesome business of her own. He also proposed that they meet in Manila, to which she assented. Within two weeks of Ederlina's arrival in Manila, Alfred joined her. Alfred reiterated his proposal for Ederlina to stay in the Philippines and engage in business, even offering to finance her business venture. Alfred told Ederlina that he was married but that he was eager to divorce his wife in Australia. Alfred proposed marriage to Ederlina, but she replied that they should wait a little bit longer.Alfred decided to stay in the Philippines for good and live with Ederlina. On different occasions, Alfred bought several properties in the Philippines for Ederlinas business and for the couples residence using his own funds but since Alfred knew that as an alien he was disqualified from owning lands in the Philippines, he agreed that only Ederlina's name would appear in the deed of sale as the buyer of the property, as well as in the title covering the same. Alfred also sold his properties in Australia and the proceeds of the sale were deposited in Alfred's account with the Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC), Kowloon Branch. When Ederlina opened her own account with HSBC Kowloon, Alfred transferred his with the said bank to this new account. Alfred received a Letter from Klaus Muller. Klaus informed Alfred that he and Ederlina had been married on October 16, 1978 and had a blissful married life until Alfred intruded therein. Klaus stated that he knew of Alfred and Ederlina's amorous relationship and begged Alfred to leave Ederlina alone and to return her to him. When Alfred confronted Ederlina, she admitted that she and Klaus were, indeed, married. But she assured Alfred that she would divorce Klaus. Alfred was appeased. He agreed to continue the amorous relationship and wait for the outcome of Ederlina's petition for divorce. Ederlina's petition for divorce was denied twice because Klaus opposed the same. Klaus wanted half of all the properties owned by Ederlina in the Philippines before he would agree to a divorce. Worse, Klaus threatened to file a bigamy case against Ederlina. Alfred and Ederlina's relationship started deteriorating. Ederlina had not been able to secure a divorce from Klaus. The latter could charge her for bigamy and could even involve Alfred, who himself was still married. To avoid complications, Alfred decided to live separately from Ederlina and cut off all contacts with her. Ederlina complained that he had ruined her life. Shortly thereafter, Alfred filed a Complaint against Ederlina, with the RTC of Quezon City for recovery of real and personal properties. In his complaint, Alfred alleged that Ederlina, without his knowledge and consent, managed to transfer funds from their joint account in HSBC Hong Kong, to her own account with the same bank. Using the said funds, Ederlina was able to purchase the properties subject of the complaints. Ederlina failed to file her answer and was declared in default. In the meantime, Alfred also filed a complaint against Ederlina with the RTC of Davao City for specific performance, declaration of ownership of real and personal properties, sum of money, and damages. He alleged that during the period of their common-law relationship, he acquired solely through his own efforts and resources real and personal properties in the Philippines valued more or less at P724,000.00The RTC of Quezon City ruled in favor of Alfred. However, after due proceedings in the RTC of Davao City, the trial court ruled in favor of Erlinda. The trial court ruled that based on documentary evidence, the purchaser of the three parcels of land subject of the complaint was Ederlina. The court further stated that even if Alfred was the buyer of the properties; he had no cause of action against Ederlina for the recovery of the same because as an alien, he was disqualified from acquiring and owning lands in the Philippines. The sale of the three parcels of land to the petitioner was null and void ab initio. Applying the pari delicto doctrine, the petitioner was precluded from recovering the properties from the respondent.The CA rendered a decision affirming in toto the decision of the RTC Hence, the petition at bar.

ISSUES: 1. Can petitioner is entitled to recover the property under Article 1416 of the Civil Code? 2. Whether petitioner is entitled to recovery under Article 22 of the Civil Code?

HELD:1. NO. Under Article 1416 of the Civil Code: When the agreement is not illegal per se but is merely prohibited, and the prohibition by the law is designed for the protection of the plaintiff, he may, if public policy is thereby enhanced, recover what he has paid or delivered. The provision applies only to those contracts which are merely prohibited, in order to benefit private interests. It does not apply to contracts void ab initio. The sale of three parcels of land in favor of the petitioner who is a foreigner is illegal per se. The transactions are void ab initio because they were entered into in violation of the Constitution. Thus, to allow the petitioner to recover the properties or the money used in the purchase of the parcels of land would be subversive of public policy.2. NO. Article 22 of the Civil Code provides: Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. The provision is expressed in the maxim: "MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST" (No person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another). An action for recovery of what has been paid without just cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso. This provision does not apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the application of the pari delicto doctrine. It may be unfair and unjust to bar the petitioner from filing an accion in rem verso over the subject properties, or from recovering the money he paid for the said properties, but, as Lord Mansfield stated in the early case of Holman vs. Johnson: "The objection that a contract is immoral or illegal as between the plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general principles of policy, which the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him and the plaintiff."

Failure of the parties to describe the subject property does not render the contract void; reformation is the remedy.

CELSO R. HALILI and ARTHUR R. HALILI vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

FACTSSimeon de Guzman, an American citizen, died sometime in 1968, leaving real properties in the Philippines. His forced heirs were his widow, defendant appellee Helen Meyers Guzman, and his son, defendant appellee David Rey Guzman, both of whom are also American citizens. On August 9, 1989, Helen executed a deed of quitclaim, assigning, transferring and conveying to David Rey all her rights, titles and interests in and over six parcels of land which the two of them inherited from Simeon. Among the said parcels of land is that now in litigation, . . . situated in Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, containing an area of 6,695 square meters. On February 5, 1991, David Rey Guzman sold said parcel of land to defendant-appellee Emiliano Cataniag.

ISSUESa. Whether or not the subjected land was ruralb. Whether or not the sale to Cataniag was valid.

HELDThe petition has no merit.a. Subject Land is Urban. The conclusion of the trial court -- that the subject property is urban land -- is based on clear and convincing evidence. Finding the subject land was urban, the petitioners have no ground to invoke the right of redemption, which presupposes that the land sought to be redeemed is rural. The provision is clearly worded and admits of no ambiguity in construction:ART. 1621. The owners of adjoining lands shall also have the right of redemption when a piece of rural land, the area of which does not exceed one hectare, is alienated, unless the grantee does not own any rural land . b. Sale to Cataniag valid Helen Guzmans quitclaim, which she assigned, transferred and conveyed to David Rey all her rights, titles and interests over the property, collided with the Constitution which states that only the qualified, can acquire lands of the public domain with the exception of hereditary succession. In the 1935 Constitution, aliens cannot acquire public as well as private lands. In fine, non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private lands or to lands of the public domain, except only by way of legal succession. Jurisprudence is consistent that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. Since the disputed land is now owned by Cataniag, a Filipino citizen, the prior invalid transfer can no longer be assailed.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MARIO B. LAPIA AND FLOR DE VEGA

FACTS:On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-D, as their residence with a total area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City, from one Cristeta Dazo Belen (Rollo, p. 41). At the time of the purchase, respondent spouses where then natural-born Filipino citizens.On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for registration of title of the two (2) parcels of land before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch XXXI. This time, however, they were no longer Filipino citizens and have opted to embrace Canadian citizenship through naturalization.An opposition was filed by the Republic and after the parties have presented their respective evidence, the court a quo rendered a decision confirming private respondents' title to the lots in question.On appeal, respondent court affirmed the decision of the trial court based on the following ratiocination: In the present case, it is undisputed that both applicants were still Filipino citizens when they bought the land in controversy from its former owner. For this reason, the prohibition against the acquisition of private lands by aliens could not apply. In justice and equity, they are the rightful owners of the subject realty considering also that they had paid for it quite a large sum of money. Issue: Whether or not a foreign national can apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141).Held: The Court disagreed on the petition to seek to defeat respondents' application for registration of title on the ground of foreign nationality. This Court, speaking through Justice Davide, Jr., stated: As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, the private respondents do not rely on fee simple ownership based on a Spanish grant or possessory information title under Section 19 of the Land Registration Act; the private respondents did not present any proof that they or their predecessors-in-interest derived title from an old Spanish grant such as (a) the "titulo real" or royal grant (b) the "concession especial" or especial grant; (c) the "composicion con el estado" title or adjustment title; (d) the "titulo de compra" or title by purchase; and (e) the "informacion posesoria" or possessory information title, which could become a "titulo gratuito" or a gratuitous title (Director of Forestry v. Muoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968]). The primary basis of their claim is possession, by themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, since time immemorial.Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into law, the relevant provision of which provides:Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship and who has the legal capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of one thousand square meters, in the case of urban land, or one hectare in the case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence. In the case of married couples, one of them may avail of the privilege herein granted; Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the total area acquired shall not exceed the maximum herein fixed.In case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands for residential purposes, he shall still be entitled to be a transferee of an additional urban or rural lands for residential purposes which, when added to those already owned by him, shall not exceed the maximum areas herein authorized.The Court is of the view that the requirements in Sec. 6 of BP 185 do not apply in the instant case since said requirements are primarily directed to the register of deeds before whom compliance therewith is to be submitted. Nowhere in the provision is it stated, much less implied, that the requirements must likewise be submitted before the land registration court prior to the approval of an application for registration of title. An application for registration of title before a land registration court should not be confused with the issuance of a certificate of title by the register of deeds. It is only when the judgment of the land registration court approving the application for registration has become final that a decree of registration is issued. And that is the time when the requirements of Sec. 6, BP 185, before the register of deeds should be complied with by the applicants. This decree of registration is the one that is submitted to the office of the register of deeds for issuance of the certificate of title in favor of the applicant. Prior to the issuance of the decree of registration, the register of deeds has no participation in the approval of the application for registration of title as the decree of registration is yet to be issued. The petition is DISMISSED and the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

Krivenko v. Register of Deeds Facts: Alexander Krivenko, an alien, bought a residential lot from Magdalena Estate Inc. in December 1941. The registration was interrupted by the war. In May 1945, he sought to accomplish the said registration but was denied by the Register of Deeds of Manila on the grounds that he is a foreigner and he cannot acquire a land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko brought the case to the CFI of Manila. The CFI ruled that he cannot own a land, being an alien. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not an alien may own private lands in the Philippines.

Held: No.

Ratio: Sec. 1, Art 13 of the Constitution talks about the conservation and utilization of natural resources. The said provision embraces all lands of any kind of the public domain. Its purpose is to establish a permanent and fundamental policy for the conservation and utilization of all natural resources of the nation. Although it mentions agricultural, timber, and mineral lands, the court held that in determining whether a parcel of land is agricultural, the test is not only whether it is actually agricultural, but also its susceptibility to cultivation for agricultural purposes. Hence, public agricultural land was construed as referring to those lands that were not timber or mineral. Therefore, it includes residential lands.

Director Of Lands V. IAC (1986)FACTS: Acme Plywood &VeneerCo., Inc., a corp.represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario,acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe 5parcels of land possession of the Infiels over the landdates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-ChristianTribeson land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain Acme Plywood &VeneerCo. Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth of improvements ownership and possession of the land sought to be registeredwas duly recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela. donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela IAC affirmed CFI: in favor ofISSUES:1. W/N the land is already a private land - YES2. W/N theconstitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations applies- NOHELD: IAC affirmedAcme Plywood &VeneerCo., Inc1. YES already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that acertificate of titleshould be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption The application forconfirmationis mereformality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law 2. NO If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares

TAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES

Facts: On June 14, 2001, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naic,Cavite, an application for land registration covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9972, Cad-459-D of Indang Cadastre, situated inBarangayBancod, Indang,Caviteand with an area of 6,920 square meters.[3]The petitioners alleged that they acquired the subject property from Gregonio Gatdula pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 25, 1996; and they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the subject property in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. RTC issued a decision granting petitioners application. CA ruled that the petitioners failed to prove that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject property for the requisite period of 30 years.

Issue: Whether the petitioners have proven themselves qualified to the benefits under the relevant laws on the confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.

Property; acquisition by prescription; confirmation of incomplete or imperfect titles; requirements. Held: There must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.For one to invoke the provisions of Section 14(2) and set up acquisitive prescription against the State, it is primordial that the status of the property as patrimonial be first established. Furthermore, the period of possession preceding the classification of the property as patrimonial cannot be considered in determining the completion of the prescriptive period.Adverse, continuous, open, public possession in the concept of an owner is a conclusion of law and the burden to prove it by clear, positive and convincing evidence is on the applicant. A claim of ownership will not proper on the basis of tax declarations if unaccompanied by proof of actual possession.The counting of the thirty (30)-year prescriptive period for purposes of acquiring ownership of a public land under Section 14(2) can only start from the issuance of DARCO Conversion Order. Before the property was declared patrimonial by virtue of such conversion order, it cannot be acquired by prescription.Jean Tan, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines;G.R. No. 193443, April 16, 2012.

REPUBLIC vs. RIZALVO

FACTS:On December 7, 2000, respondent Teodoro P. Rizalvo, Jr. filed before the MTC of Bauang, La Union, acting as a land registration court, an application for the registrationof a parcel of land,located in Bauang, La Union. Respondent alleged that he is the owner in fee simple of the subject parcel of land, that he obtained title over the land by virtue of a Deed of Transfer5dated December 31, 1962, and that he is currently in possession of the land. In support of his claim, he presented, among others, Tax Declaration for the year 1994 in his name, and Proof of Payment of real property taxes beginning in 1952 up to the time of filing of the application.On April 20, 2001, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed an Opposition. The MTC of Bauang, La Union, acting as a land registration court, rendered its Decision, approving respondents application. The Republic of the Philippines through the OSG filed a Notice of Appeal. However, the CA found no merit in the appeal and promulgated the assailed Decision, affirming the trial courts decision.ISSUE:Whether or not the respondent have shown indubitably that he has complied with all the requirements showing that the property, previously part of the public domain, has become private property by virtue of his acts of possession in the manner and length of time required by law.HELD:NO. Under Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish first, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is under abona fideclaim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.The first requirement was satisfied in this case. The certification and reportdated July 17, 2001 of the CENRO of San Fernando City, La Union, states that the entire land area in question is within the alienable and disposable zone, certified as such since January 21, 1987. Respondent has likewise met the second requirement as to ownership and possession. The MTC and the CA both agreed that respondent has presented sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence to show that he and his predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question.However, the third requirement, that respondent and his predecessors-in-interest be in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property since June 12, 1945 or earlier, has not been satisfied. Respondent only managed to present oral and documentary evidence of his and his mothers ownership and possession of the land since 1958 through a photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 8, 1958 between Eufrecina Navarro and Bibiana P. Rizalvo. He presented Tax Declarationfor the year 1948 in the name of Eufrecina Navarro and real property tax receipts beginning in 1952. Even assuming that the 1948 Tax Declaration in the name of Eufrecina Navarro and the tax payment receipts could be taken in this case as proof of a claim of ownership, still, respondent lacks proof of occupation and possession beginning June 12, 1945 or earlier. What is categorically required by law is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation under abona fideclaim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.Indeed, even assuming arguendo that the DENR-CENRO certification and report is enough to signify that the land is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth, respondent is still not entitled to registration because the land was certified as alienable and disposable in 1987, while the application for registration was filed on December 7, 2000, a mere thirteen (13) years after and far short of the required thirty (30) years under existing laws on prescription.

CRISOLOGO C. DOMINGO v. SEVERINO and RAYMUNDO LANDICHO, et al.

To prove that a land is alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, or administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator or a legislative act or statute.

FACTS:Crisologo Domingo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagaytay City, an applicationfor registration of certain parcels of land (the lots), which he supposedly purchased from oneGenoveva Manlapit in 1948, and has since been in continuous, open, public, adverse and uninterrupted possession thereof in the concept of an owner.

Severino and Raymundo Landicho, Julian Abello, Marta de Sagun and Editha G. Sarmiento subsequently filed an Answer/Opposition to Domingos application, claiming, among other things, that they have been the ones in open, continuous, adverse and actual possession and cultivation of the lots in the concept of owners and have even been paying real estate taxes thereon.The RTC approved Domingos application for registration. On appeal by Landicho, et al., the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the RTC Decision and dismissed Domingos application for registration of land title. Petitioner Domingo filed a motion for reconsideration with the Court of Appeals which was subsequently denied by said court.

ISSUE:Whether or not Domingo is entitled to the registration of the lots in question pursuant to Section 14, sub pars. (1) and (4) of P.D. 1529

HELD:Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529 provides that to be entitled of a land, the applicant must prove that:(a) the land applied for forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain and (b) he has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership arepresumed to belong to the State, and unless it has been shown that they have beenreclassified by the State as alienable or disposable to a private person, they remain part of the inalienable public domain.To prove that a land is alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of government, such as presidential proclamation or an executive order, or administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator or a legislative act or statute.

NEW REGENT SOURCES, INC. V. TANJUATCOFACTS:Petitioner New Regent Sources, Inc. (NRSI) filed a Complaintfor Rescission/Declaration of Nullity of Contract, Reconveyance and Damages against respondent Tanjuatco and the Register of Deeds of Calamba before the RTC of Calamba, Laguna.NRSI alleged that in 1994, it authorized Vicente P. Cuevas III, its Chairman and President, to apply on its behalf, for the acquisition of two parcels of land by virtue of its right of accretion.Cuevas purportedly applied for the lots in his name by payingP82,400.38 to the Bureau of Lands.On January 2, 1995, Cuevas and his wife executed a Voting Trust Agreementover their shares of stock in the corporation.Then, pending approval of the application with the Bureau of Lands, Cuevas assigned his right to Tanjuatco for the sum ofP85,000.OnMarch 12, 1996, the Director of Lands released an Order,which approved the transfer of rights from Cuevas to Tanjuatco.Transfer Certificates of Titlewere then issued in the name of Tanjuatco.In his Answer with Counterclaim,Tanjuatco advanced the affirmative defense that the complaint stated no cause of action against him.According to Tanjuatco, it was Cuevas who was alleged to have defrauded the corporation.He averred further that the complaint did not charge him with knowledge of the agreement between Cuevas and NRSI. RTC dismissed the complaint of petitioner on demurrer to evidence and held that Tanjuatco is an innocent purchaser for value.ISSUE: W/N NRSI was able to substantiate its claim of entitlement to ownership of the lands in Tanjuatcos nameHELD: No.NRSI anchors its claim over the lands subjects of this case on the right of accretion.It submitted in evidence, titlesto four parcels of land, which allegedly adjoin the lots in the name of Tanjuatco. But it must be stressed that accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457of the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.Thus, it is not enough to be a riparian owner in order to enjoy the benefits of accretion.One who claims the right of accretion must show by preponderant evidence that he has met all the conditions provided by law.Petitioner has notably failed in this regard as it did not offer any evidence to prove that it has satisfied the foregoing requisites.Further, it is undisputed that Tanjuatco derived his title to the lands from Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 245 registered in the name of the Republic of thePhilippines.Said parcels of land formed part of the Dried San Juan River Bed,which under Article 502 (1)of the Civil Code rightly pertains to the public dominion.The Certificationissued by Forester III Emiliano S. Leviste confirms that said lands were verified to be within the Alienable and Disposable, certified and declared as such onSeptember 28, 1981.Clearly, the Republic is the entity which had every right to transfer ownership thereof to respondent.Next, petitioner sought to establish fraudulent registration of the land in the name of Tanjuatco.NRSI presented before the trial court a copy of the Voting Trust Agreement which the spouses Cuevas executed in favor of Pauline Co.However, nothing in said agreement indicates that NRSI empowered Cuevas to apply for the registration of the subject lots on its behalf. Neither did petitioner adduce evidence to prove that Cuevas was its President and Chairman.Even assuming that Cuevas was the president of NRSI, his powers are confined only to those vested upon him by the board of directors or fixed in the by-laws.In truth, petitioner could have easily presented its by-laws or a corporate resolutionto show Cuevass authority to buy the lands on its behalf.But it did not.Petitioner filed a complaint for rescission/declaration of nullity of contract, reconveyance and damages against respondents.An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property, wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful and legal owner.In an action for reconveyance, the certificate of title is respected as incontrovertible.What is sought instead is the transfer of the property, specifically the title thereof, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another persons name, to its rightful and legal owner, or to one with a better right. To warrant a reconveyance of the land, the following requisites must concur: (1) the action must be brought in the name of a person claiming ownership or dominical right over the land registered in the name of the defendant; (2) the registration of the land in the name of the defendant was procured through fraudor other illegal means;(3) the property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value;and (4) the action is filed after the certificate of title had already become final and incontrovertiblebut within four years from the discovery of the fraud,or not later than 10 years in the case of an implied trust.Petitioner failed to show the presence of these requisites.

Agne v. Director of Lands Facts: The land subject matter of the case was originally covered by Free Patent 23263 issued on 17 April 1937 in the name of Herminigildo Agpoon. On 21 May 1937, pursuant to the said patent, the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan issued to said Herminigildo Agpoon OCT 2370. Presentacion Agpoon Gascon inherited the said parcel of land upon the death of her father, Herminigildo, and was issued TCT 32209 on 6 April 1960. Presentacion declared the said land for taxation purposes in her name under TD 11506 and taxes were paid thereon in her name. On 13 April 1971, spouses Joaquin and Presentacion Gascon filed Civil Case U-2286 in the then CFI Pangasinan for recovery of possession and damages against Marcelino C. Agne, Felix Oriane, Agaton Taganas (represented by Florentino C. Taganas), Hilario Escorpizo, Isabelo Mauricio, Heirs of Roman Damaso (Jorge Damaso and Alejandro Damaso), Heirs of Francisco Ramos (Encarnacion R. Leano and Dominga R. Medrano), Heirs of Sabina Gelacio Agapito (Serapio Agapito and Nicolasa Agapito), Feliza Diccion Agne, Estanislao Gorospe (represented by Elizabeth G. Badua), Librado Badua, Nicolas Villanieva, Heirs of Carlos Palado (Fortunata Palado and Isabelita Palado), Primitivo Taganas, Panfilo Soingco, Bernardo Palattao, Marcelino S. Santos and Paulino D. Agne Jr. (minor, represented by Feliza Diccion Agne). Their complaint states that they are the registered owners under TCT 32209 of the parcel of land situated in Barrio Bantog, Asingan, Pangasinan which is now in the possession of Agne, et.al.; that during the Japanese occupation, the latter, taking advantage of the abnormal conditions then obtaining, took possession of said land by means of fraud, stealth, strategy and intimidation; that Gascon repeatedly demanded the surrender of the physical possession of said property but the latter refused. Agne, et.al. alleged that the land in question was formerly a part of the river bed of the Agno-Chico River; that in the year 1920, a big flood occurred which caused the said river to change its course and abandon its original bed; that by virtue of the provisions of Article 370 of the Spanish Civil Code which was then the law in force, Agne, et.al., by operation of law, became the owners by accession or accretion of the respective aliquot parts of said river bed bordering their properties; that since 1920, they and their predecessors in interest occupied and exercised dominion openly and adversely over said portion of the abandoned river bed in question abutting their respective riparian lands continuously up to the present to the exclusion of all other persons, particularly Herminigildo Agpoon; that they have introduced improvements thereon by constructing irrigation canals and planting trees and agricultural crops thereon and converted the land into a productive area. On 6 March 1974, while the above case was still pending, Agne, et.al. filed a complaint against Director of Lands and spouses Agpoon with the former CFI Pangasinan for annulment of title, reconveyance of and/or action to clear title to a parcel of land, which action was docketed as Civil Case U-2649. Agne, et. al. alleged in their said complaint that the land in question, which was formerly a portion of the bed of Agno-Chico river which was abandoned as a result of the big flood in 1920, belongs to them pursuant to the provision of Article 370 of the old Civil Code; that it was only on 13 April 1971, when spouses filed a complaint against them, that they found out that the said land was granted by the Government to Herminigildo Agpoon under Free Patent 23263, pursuant to which OCT 2370 was issued in the latters name; and that the said patent and subsequent titles issued pursuant thereto are null and void since the said land, an abandoned river bed, is of private ownership and, therefore, cannot be the subject of a public land grant. On 21 June 1974, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case U-2286, ordering Agne, et.al. to surrender physical possession of land in question, to pay in soludum the produce of the land (P5,000 per year) from the date of the filing of the action at the rate of 6% interest per annum until fully paid; to pay in solidum the amount of P800 representing attorneys fees; and to pay the costs.

Agne, et.al. appealed to the appellate court. On 30 January 1985 the former IAC affirmed in toto in AC-GR CV 60388-R the decision of the trial court, and with the denial of Agne et.al.s motion for reconsideration, Agne, et.al. filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court (GR 72255). On 24 June 1974, the CFI Pangasinan, acting on the motion to dismiss filed by the Director of Lands and spouses Agpoon, issued an order dismissing Civil Case U-2649 for annulment of title by merely citing the statement in the case of Antonio, et al. vs. Barroga, et al. that an action to annul a free patent many years after it had become final and indefeasible states no cause of action. Agne, et.als motion for the reconsideration of the order was denied on 11 September 1974, hence the petition for review on certiorari (GR L-40399) The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the assailed decision of IAC in AC-GR CV 60388-R and the questioned order of dismissal of the trial court in its Civil Case 2649, and rendered judgment ordering the Gascon to reconvey the parcel of land to Agne, et.al.

1. Case of Antonio v. Barroga not controlling The lower court erred in ordering the dismissal of Civil Case U-2649, as the case of Antonio relied upon in the dismissal order is not controlling. In that case, the complaint was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action, not only because of the delay in the filing of the complaint but specifically since the ground relied upon by the plaintiff therein, i.e. that the land was previously covered by a titulo real, even if true, would not warrant the annulment of the free patent and the subsequent original certificate of title issued to defendant.

2. Cause of action; Facts alleged in complaint hypothetically admitted upon the filing of the motion to dismiss The facts alleged in the complaint, which are deemed hypothetically admitted upon the filing of the motion to dismiss, constitute a sufficient cause of action against private respondents.

3. Agne owns property; Riparian owners ipso facto owners of abandoned river bed (Old Civil Code) The old Civil Code, the law then in force, provides that the beds of rivers which remain abandoned because the course of the water has naturally changed belong to the owners of the riparian lands throughout their respective lengths. If the abandoned bed divided estates belonging to different owners, the new dividing line shall run at equal distance therefrom. Thus, once the river bed has been abandoned, the riparian owners become the owners of the abandoned bed to the extent provided by this article. The acquisition of ownership is automatic. There need be no act on the part of the riparian owners to subject the accession to their ownership, as it is subject thereto ipso jure from the moment the mode of acquisition becomes evident, without the need of any formal act of acquisition. Such abandoned river bed had fallen to the private ownership of the owner of the riparian land even without any formal act of his will and any unauthorized occupant thereof will be considered as a trespasser. The right in re to the principal is likewise a right in re to the accessory, as it is a mode of acquisition provided by law, as the result of the right of accretion. Since the accessory follows the nature of the principal, there need not be any tendency to the thing or manifestation of the purpose to subject it to our ownership, as it is subject thereto ipso jure from the moment the mode of acquisition becomes evident. The right of the owner of land to additions thereto by accretion has been said to rest in the law of nature, and to be analogous to the right of the owner of a tree to its fruits, and the owner of flocks and herds to their natural increase. In the present case, Agne, et.al. became owners of aliquot portions of said abandoned river bed as early as 1920, when the Agno River changed its course, without the necessity of any action or exercise of possession on their part, it being an admitted fact that the land in dispute, prior to its registration, was an abandoned bed of the Agno River and that Agne, et. al. are the riparian owners of the lands adjoining the said bed.

4. Ownership of accession governed by Civil Code, imprescriptibility of registered land governed by Land Registration Act; Imprescriptibility does not apply as title based on public grant The failure of Agne et.al. to register the accretion in their names and declare it for purposes of taxation did not divest it of its character as a private property. Although an accretion to registered land is not automatically registered and therefore not entitled or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under the Torrens system. The said rule is not applicable to the case since the title claimed by spouses Gascon is not based on acquisitive prescription but is anchored on a public grant from the Government, which presupposes that it was inceptively a public land. Ownership over the accession is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is a concern of the Land Registration Act.

5. Land of private ownership; Director of Lands does not have authority to grant free patent for said land Under the provisions of Act 2874 pursuant to which the title of Gascons predecessor in interest was issued, the President of the Philippines or his alter ego, the Director of Lands, has no authority to grant a free patent for land that has ceased to be a public land and has passed to private ownership, and a title so issued is null and void. The nullity arises, not from the fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the land is not under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands. The jurisdiction of the Director of Lands is limited only to public lands and does not cover lands privately owned. The purpose of the Legislature in adopting the former Public Land Act, Act 2874, was and is to limit its application to lands of the public domain, and lands held in private ownership are not included therein and are not affected in any manner whatsoever thereby. Land held in freehold or fee title, or of private ownership, constitute no part of the public domain and cannot possibly come within the purview of said Act 2874, inasmuch as the subject of such freehold or private land is not embraced in any manner in the title of the Act and the same are excluded from the provisions or text thereof. In the present case, the land in dispute since early 1920 was already under the private ownership of Agne et.al. and no longer a part of the lands of the public domain, the same could not have been the subject matter of a free patent. Free Patent 23263 issued to Herminigildo Agpoon is null and void and the subsequent titles issued pursuant thereto cannot become final and indefeasible.

6. No title acquired by applicant patentees if land already a private property of another As ruled in Director of Lands vs. Sisican, et al. that if at the time the free patents were issued in 1953 the land covered therein were already private property of another and, therefore, not part of the disposable land of the public domain, then applicants patentees acquired no right or title to the land.

7. Void patents produce no legal effects A certificate of title fraudulently secured is null and void ab initio if the fraud consisted in misrepresenting that the land is part of the public domain, although it is not. The nullity arises, not from the fraud or deceit but, from the fact that the land is not under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands. Being null and void, the free patent granted and the subsequent titles produce no legal effects whatsoever. Quod nullum est, nullum producit effectum.

8. Rule on incontrovertibility of certificate of title upon expiration of 1 year, does not apply in the present case The rule on the incontrovertibility of a certificate of title upon the expiration of one year, after the entry of the decree, pursuant to the provisions of the Land Registration Act, does not apply where an action for the cancellation of a patent and a certificate of title issued pursuant thereto is instituted on the ground that they are null and void because the Bureau of Lands had no jurisdiction to issue them at all, the land in question having been withdrawn from the public domain prior to the subsequent award of the patent and the grant of a certificate of title to another person. Such an action is different from a review of the decree of title on the ground of fraud.

9. Action to annul void title issued pursuant to a public grant does not prescribe Although a period of one year has already expired from the time a certificate of title was issued pursuant to a public grant, said title does not become incontrovertible but is null and void if the property covered thereby is originally of private ownership, and an action to annul the same does not prescribe.

10. Action to quite title imprescriptible since petitioners are in possession of land Since Agne, et.al. are in possession of the land in dispute, an action to quiet title is imprescriptible. Their action for reconveyance which, in effect, seeks to quiet title to property in ones possession is imprescriptible. Their undisturbed possession for a number of years gave them a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to determine the nature of the adverse claims of a third party and the effect on her title. As held in Caragay-Layno vs. Court of Appeals, et al., an adverse claimant of a registered land, undisturbed in his possession thereof for a period of more than 50 years and not knowing that the land he actually occupied had been registered in the name of another, is not precluded from filing an action for reconveyance which, in effect, seeks to quiet title to property as against the registered owner who was relying upon a Torrens title which could have been fraudulently acquired. To such adverse claimant, the remedy of an action to quiet title is imprescriptible. In actions for reconveyance of property predicated on the fact that the conveyance complained of was void ab initio, a claim of prescription of the action would be unavailing.

11. Land Registration Act and Cadastral Act does not give anybody better title than what he really or lawfully has A free patent which purports to convey land to which the Government did not have any title at the time of its issuance does not vest any title in the patentee as against the true owner. As stated in Gustillo v. Maravill (48 Phil 838), the Land Registration Act as well as the Cadastral Act protects only the holders of a title in good faith and does not permit its provisions to be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or that one should enrich himself at the expense of another. The Acts do not give anybody, who resorts to the provisions thereof, a better title than he really and lawfully has. If he happened to obtain it by mistake or to secure, to the prejudice of his neighbor, more land than he really owns, with or without bad faith on his part, the certificate of title, which may have been issued to him under the circumstances, may and should be cancelled or corrected (Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil., 590).

12. Agnes title superior over Gascons; Possession The title of Agne, et.al. over the land in dispute is superior to the title of the registered owner, Gascon, which is a total nullity. The long and continued possession of the former under a valid claim of title cannot be defeated by the claim of a registered owner whose title is defective from the beginning.

13. Conclusiveness of a Torrens title not available for use to perpetual fraud and chicanery; Land Registration Act; Registration is not a mode of acquiring property The quality of conclusiveness of a Torrens title is not available for use to perpetrate fraud and chicanery. To paraphrase from Angeles vs. Samia, the Land Registration Act does not create or vest title. It only confirms and records title already existing and vested. It does not protect a usurper from the true owner. It cannot be a shield for the commission of fraud. It does not permit one to enrich himself at the expense of another. The Torrens system was not established as a means for the acquisition of title to private land. It is intended merely to confirm and register the title which one may already have on the land. Where the applicant possesses no title or ownership over the parcel of land, he cannot acquire one under the Torrens system of registration. Resort to the provisions of the Land Registration Act does not give one a better title than he really and lawfully has. Registration does not vest title. It is not a mode of acquiring property. It is merely evidence of such title over a particular property. It does not give the holder any better title than what he actually has, especially if the registration was done in bad faith. The effect is that it is as if no registration was made at all.

14. Laches The failure of the spouses Gascon to assert their claim over the disputed property for almost 30 constitute laches and bars an action to recover the same. The registered owners right to recover possession of the property and title thereto from Agne, et. al. has, by long inaction or inexcusable neglect, been converted into a stale demand. 15. Authority of the Court to order the reconveyance of property Where the evidence show that the plaintiff is the true owner of the land subject of the free patent and title granted to another and that the defendant and his predecessor in interest were never in possession thereof, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction and without ordering the cancellation of said title issued upon the patent, may direct the defendant registered owner to reconvey the property to the plaintiff. Further, if the determinative facts are before the Court and it is in a position to finally resolve the dispute, the expeditious administration of justice will be subserved by such a resolution and thereby obviate the needless protracted proceedings consequent to the remand of the case of the trial court. On these considerations, as well as the fact that these cases have been pending for a long period of time, the Court, in the present case, see no need for remanding Civil Case 2649 for further proceedings, and hold that the facts and the ends of justice in this case require the reconveyance by the Gascons to Agne, et.al. of the disputed lot.

REPUBLIC VS. CAAlluvium must be the exclusive work of nature. It has 3 requirements: 1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; 2) through the current of the river; and 3) the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the river bank. Deposits made by human intervention are excluded.FACTS:The respondents (Tancincos) were registered owners of a parcel of land in Bulacan, bordering on the Maycauayan and Bocaue Rivers. They filed an application for the registration of three lots adjacent to their fishpond, but because of the recommendation of the Commissioner, they only pushed for the registration of two. The RTC and CA granted the petition despite the opposition of the Bureau of Lands.

The respondents based their claim on accretions to their fishponds. They presented a lone witness (their overseer). The Bureau of Lands argue that the lands in dispute are not accretions. They assert that what actually happened was that the respondents simply transferred their dikes simply further down the river bed of the Meycauayan River. Thus, if there was any accretion to speak of, it was man-made.

Respondents counter that the their evidence shows that accretion happened without human intervention and that the transfer of the dikes occurred only after.

ISSUE:Whether accretion took place

RULING: NoAlluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. There is not evidence that the addition to said property was made gradually through the effects of the currents of the two rivers. The lands in question total almost 4 hectares of land, which are highly doubtful to have been caused by accretion. The lone witness testified that she observed an increase in the area in 1939, but the lots in question were not included in the survey of their adjacent property conducted in 1940. They were also not included in the Cadastral Survey of the entire Municipality of Maycauayan between the years 1958-1960. If the overseer was indeed telling the truth, the accretion was sudden, not gradual. When the respondents transferred their dikes towards the river beds, the dikes were meant for reclamation purposes and not to protect their property from the destructive force of the waters of the river. The lots in question were portions of the bed of the Meycauayan River and are therefore classified as public property.

Registration denied, decisions appealed are reversed. Note: The lands sought were not even dry land. The entire area was under one to two meters of water.

Republic v. Munoz G.R No. 151910 October 15, 2007

FACTS: Respondent filed an application for registration of title of a parcel of land of 1,986 sq. Meters before RTC of Albay. The application for registration, respondent averred that no mortgage or encumberance of any kind affects the property that no other person has an interest, legal, on the subject lot. The property was acquired by donation inter vivos, executed by spouses Apolonio Muoz and Anastacia Vitero on Nov. 1956 and the spouses and predecessors-in-interest have been in possession thereof since time immemorial for more than 70 years.On Nov. 1996, petitioner through the OSG opposed the application. Alleging that 1) the applicant nor the predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto 2) the muniment/s of title and/or the tax payment/s receipts of application, if any, attached to or alleged in the application do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bonafide acquisition of the lands, 3)that the claim of ownership in gee simple on the basis of Spanish titleor grant can no loner be availed because it failed to file for a period of 6 mos. from Feb. 1976 as required by PD 892 4) the parcel applied for is part of public domain 4) filed beyond Dec. 31, 1987, which is filed out of time.Respondent Answer to opposition, the said lot was originally owned and possessed by Puvinar and Lozada. In April 1917, Pulvinar sold his share of the unregistered land to Sps. Muoz and Vitero to respondents parents. In June 1920, Lozada likewise sold his remaining part to the parents of respondent. Ownership and possession of the property were consolidated by the spouses and declared for taxation purposes in the name of Muoz in 1920.It was stated that during cadastral survey conducted in Lingao, Albay in 1928 the land was designated as Lot 2276 as per Survey Notification Card issued to Muoz dated Oct. 2, 1928. Finally, respondent contended that from 1920 up to 1996, the time of application, the land taxes for the property had been fully paid.During the trial, respondent, as sole witness, who was 81 years old,testified that he acquired the property in 1956 when his parents donated the same to him. He presented the tax declaration for payment of realty tax. A certification from the Office of the Municipal Treasurer was showed for payment of real estate taxes from 1956 up to 1997. Declared that the property is residential with improvements such as a house and fruit bearing trees. In 1957, he also constructed a concrete fence surrounding the entire property and narrated that his childhood days. Also non of his sibling were claiming interests over the property.The trial court noted the report of the Director of Lands, the land in question was covered by Free Patent application no. 10-2-664 of Anastacia Vitero. The RTC granted the application for registration.On appeal, the petitioner argued that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject lot: 1) the notice of initial hearing was not timely filed; 2) the applicant failed to present the original tracing cloth plan of the property sought to be registered during the trial; and 3) the applicant failed to present evidence that the land is alienable and disposable. The CA affirmed the decision of the court a quo, that there was conclusive proof that the jurisdictional requirement of due notice had been complied with under Sec. 24 PD 1529. Further the failure to present in evidence the tracing cloth plan of the subject property did not deprive the lower court of its jurisdiction to act on the application in question. Lastly CA ruled that respondent need not adduce document proof that the disputed property had been declared alienableand disposable for the simple reason that the lot had once been covered by free patent application; hence, this alone is conclusive evidence that the property was already declared by the government as open for public dominion.Hence this petition.

ISSUE: (a) Whether or not, failure to present the original tracing cloth plan is a fatal omission? NO.(b) Whether or not, that in proving the alienable and disposable nature of the property, there has to be a certification from the DENR and CENRO (Community Environment and Natural Resources Office)? YES

(a)The court has recognized instances of substantial compliance with this rule. It is true that the best evidence to identify a piece of land for registration purposes is the original tracing cloth plan from the Bureau of Lands, but blueprint copies and other evidence could also provide sufficient identification. In the present application for registration, respondent submitted the supporting documents: 1) blueprint copy of the survey plan approved by the Bureau of Lands 2) technical description duly verified and approved by the Director of Lands. In Recto v. Republic, the blueprint copy of the cloth plan together with the lots description duly certified as to their correctness by the Bureau of Lands are adequate to identify the land applied for registration.If the survey plan is approved by the Director of Lands and its correctness has not been overcome by clear, strong and convince evidence, the presentation of the tracing cloth plan may be dispensed with. All the evidence on record sufficiently identified the property as the one applied for by respondent and containing the corresponding metes and bounds as well as area. Original tracing cloth plan need not be presented in evidence.

(b)The CA said that the respondent need not to adduce documentary proof over the disputed property since it has been declared alienable and disposable because it is covered by Free Patent Application No. 10-2-664 in the name of respondents mother. It is proof enough that the property was declared by the government as open for public disposition, the court cannot sustain the argument of respondent that subject property was declared alienable and disposable land.The court also noted that neither the Director of Lands nor the LRA attested that the land subject of this proceeding is alienable or disposable.

Application for confirmation of imperfect title must be able to prove the following:

1) the land forms part of the alienable and disposable agricultural lands of public domain; 2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.The Public Land Act remains to this day the existing general law governing the classification and disposition of the public domain, other than timber and mineral lands.Under the Regalian Doctrine, embodied in the Constitution, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the alienable public domain.Under the jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government; and it is indispensable that the person claiming title to public land should show that his title was acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law. In the present case, respondent failed to submit a certification from proper government agency to prove that the land subject of registration is indeed alienable and disposable. A CENRO certificate, which respondent failed to secure, could have evidence the alienability of the land involved. Respondent failed to convince the court that the land applied for is alienable and disposable character. The Court cannot approve the application

HELD: The instant petition isgranted.Accordingly, thedecisiondatedAugust 29, 2001oftheCourt of Appeals inCA-G.R. CV No. 58170,as reiterated in itsresolution of January 29, 2002, isreversedandset aside, andthe application for registration filed by respondent Ludolfo V. Muozisdenied.

CAOIBES JR vs. CAOIBES-PANTOJAPetitioners Jose Caoibes, Jr., Melencio Caoibes and Loida Caoibes, as FIRST PARTY, and respondent Corazon Caoibes-Pantoja, as SECOND PARTY, forged on May 10, 1982 an agreement entitled RENUNCIATION AND TRANSFER OF CLAIMS, RIGHTS, AND INTERESTS (the agreement) covering a parcel of land, Lot 2 of plan Psd-162069 (Lot 2), situated in Calaca, Batangas containing an area of 54,665 sq. m., the pertinent portions of which agreement read:x x x xTHAT under and by virtue of a court approved document entitled Compromise Agreement entered into by the parties in Special Proceeding No. 857 and Civil Case No. 861 of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch VII, in particular Paragraph 4 (b) of aforesaid document, the FIRST PARTY are to receive, among others, in full ownershippro indiviso, and free from all liens and encumbrances, the following described real property, to wit:A parcel of land (Lot2of plan Psd-162069), situated in the sitio of Taklang-Anak, Barrio of Calantas,MunicipalityofCalaca,ProvinceofBatangas.Bounded on the NW., along line 1-2, by center of Creek and property of Felimon Las Herras (Lot 1 of plan Psu-101302); on the SE., along lines 2, 3, 4 and 5, by Lot 1 of plan Psu-162069; on the S., along lines 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, by Creek; on the NW., along lines 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 1, by center of Creek and property of Felimon Las Herras (Lot 1 of plan Psu-101302).x x x containing an area of FIFTY-FOUR THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY-FIVE (54,665) square meters.THAT issuance to the FIRST PARTY of the proper title to the aforesaid property is presently the subject of aland registration proceedingLRC No. N-411pending before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch VII, acting as aland registration court.THATfor and in consideration of the payment by the SECOND PARTY[-herein respondent Corazon Caoibes-Pantoja] of the loan secured by a real estate mortgageconstituted on the property described and delineated in Transfer Certificate of Title No.P-189of the Registry of Deeds of Batangas, said loan in the principal amount of NINETEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P19,000.00) exclusive of accrued interest being presently outstanding in the name of GUILLERMO C. JAVIER with the LEMERY SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, Balayan Branch, and the further undertaking of the SECOND PARTY to forthwith deliver upon release to the FIRST PARTY aforesaid TCT No. P-189 free from all liens and encumbrances, the FIRST PARTYhereby RENOUNCE, RELINQUISH and ABANDON whatever rights, interests, or claimssaid FIRST PARTY may haveover the real property in paragraph 1 hereofx x x [illegible]hereby TRANSFER, CEDE, and CONVEY said rightsx x x [illegible] andclaims, in a mannerabsoluteandirrevocable,unto andin favor of the SECOND PARTY, her heirs, successors and assigns;THAT by virtue of aforestated renunciation and transfer,theSECOND PARTY is hereby subrogated and/or substituted to whatever rights, interests or representationsthe FIRST PARTY may havein the prosecution of the proper land registration proceeding mentioned elsewhere in this instrument.[1]x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)As reflected in the abovequoted agreement of the parties, petitioners, as FIRST PARTY, renounced, relinquished, abandoned and transferred, ceded and conveyed whatever rights [they] may have over Lot 2 in favor of respondent, asSECOND PARTY, and on account of the renunciation and transfer, petitioners transferred whatever rights . . . [they] may have in the prosecution of the land registration proceeding, LRC No. N-411.About 14 years after the execution of the parties above-said agreement or in 1996, respondent filed a motion to intervene and be substituted as applicant in LRC Case No. N-411.The motion was opposed by petitioners who denied the authenticity and due execution of the agreement, they claiming that the same was without the consent and conformity of their mother, the usufructuary owner [sic] of the land.The land registration court, finding for petitioners, denied respondents motion by Order ofMarch 2, 1999.Respondent thus filed onMarch 16, 2000a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Balayan, Batangas, docketed as Civil Case No. 3705, for theenforcement of petitioners obligation under the agreement.To the complaint, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss anchored on prescription, laches and prematurity of action on account of respondents failure to refer the case to thebarangay luponfor conciliation.On their defense of prescription, petitioners argued:It was clearly alleged in the complaint that the purported RENUNCIATION AND TRANSFER OF CLAIMS, RIGHTS AND INTERESTS was . . . entered into on or aboutMay 10, 1982 a period of almost 18 LONG YEARS [BEFORE] THE PRESENT ACTION. Under Article 1144 (1) of the New Civil Code, it is required that an action founded upon a written contract must be broughtWITHIN TEN (10) YEARS FROM THE TIME THE RIGHT OF ACTION ACCRUES.[2](Underscoring supplied)Branch 9 of the Balayan RTC, by Resolution[3]datedJuly 12, 2000, granted petitioners motion in this wise:The Court is of the view thatimmediately after the executionof the RENUNCIATION contract, herein defendants weredeemed to have renounced and transferred their rightsor whatever claim they may have on the subject property and the lattershould have at once acted to make the renunciation effective by having herself substituted to petitioner in the land registration proceedings.Her failure to make immediately effective the terms of the said RENUNCIATION was constitutive of what is referred to as the requisite cause of action on the part of the plaintiff.A cause of action arises when that which should have been done is not done, or that which should not have been done is done, and in cases where there is no special provision for such computation, recourse must be had to the rule that the period must be counted from the day on which the corresponding action could have been instituted (Central Philippine University vs. CA, 246 SCRA 511).Thefact, that,from the day immediately following the execution of the RENUNCIATION contract up to the present, with the defendants still continuing the land registration proceedings without any substitution of plaintiff, could only be interpreted as a clear manifestation of defendants willful violation of the claimed RENUNCIATION contract.It is quite incorrect, therefore, to say that the violation happened only when the defendants objected that they be substituted by plaintiff in an intervention proceedings filed by the latter.The added fact that plaintiff did not raise this glaring violation earlier is something that eludes the comprehension of this Court. What separates the execution of the contract and the filing of this case is a period of almost EIGHTEEN (18) long years way beyond the prescriptive period set by law.[4](Underscoring supplied)On appeal by respondent, the Court of Appeals, by Decision[5]ofDecember 4, 2003subject of the present petition for review on certiorari, reversed the trial courts Resolution, it holding that prescription had not yet set in.The Court of Appeals reasoned:x x x It is not from the date of the instrument but from the date of the breach that the period of prescription of action starts.Since,it was only in 1996 when plaintiff-appellant moved to intervene and be substituted as the applicant in the land registration proceeding involving the subject property that defendants-appellees raised the issue of genuineness and due execution of the instrument, it is only from this date that the cause of action of plaintiff-appellant accrued.The period should not be made to retroact to the date of the execution of the instrument on May 10, 1982 as claimed by the defendants-appellees for at that time, there would be no way for the plaintiff-appellant to know of the violation of her rights.[6](Underscoring supplied)The appellate court thus ordered the remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings.Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the decision of the appellate court having been denied, the present petition for review on certiorari was filed, faulting said court to haveI.. . . ERRED IN REVERSING THE TRIAL COURT AND LABOR[ING] UNDER A GROSS MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS IN HOLDING THAT THE ACTION OF RESPONDENT HAS NOT YET PRESCRIBED.II.. . . ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENTS CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUED ONLY IN 1996 WHEN SHE MOVED TO INTERVENE AND BE SUBSTITUTED AS AN APPLICANT, IN LIEU OF PETITIONERS IN THE LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDING (LRC N-411) BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 11 OF BALAYAN, BATANGAS.III.. . . COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE PERIOD OF PRESCRIPTION SHOULD NOT BE MADE TO RETROACT TO THE DATE OF THE EXECUTION OF THE INSTRUMENT ONMAY 10, 1982.IV.. . .ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT JUST THE SAME BY NOT FINDING THAT LACHES HAD ALREADY SET IN.[7]By the earlier-quoted pertinent portions of the agreement, petitioners renounced and transferred whatever rights, interests, or claims they had overLot2 in favor of respondent for and in consideration of her payment of the therein mentioned loan in the principal amount ofP19,000 which wasoutstanding in the name of one Guillermo C. Javier.Articles 1458, 1498 and 1307 of the Civil Code which are pertinent to the resolution of the petition provide:Art. 1458.By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.xxxxArt. 1498.When thesale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall beequivalent to the delivery of the thingwhich is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred.x x x xArt. 1307.Innominate contracts shall be regulatedby the stipulations of the parties, by the provisions of Title I and II of this Book,by the rules governing the most analogous nominate contracts,and by the customs of the place.(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)The agreement of the parties is analogous to a deed of sale in favor of respondent, it having transferred ownership for and in consideration of her payment of the loan in the principal amount ofP19,000 outstanding in the name of one Guillermo C. Javier.The agreement having been made through a public instrument, the execution was equivalent to the delivery of the property to respondent.[8]In respondents complaint for specific performance, she seeks to enforce the agreement for her to be subrogated and/or substituted as applicant in the land registration proceeding overLot2.The agreement is of course in consonance with Sec. 22 of P.D. 1529 (Property Registration Decree which became effective on June 11, 1978) reading:SEC. 22.Dealings with land pending original registration. After the filing of the application and before the issuance of the decree of registration, the land therein described may still be the subject of dealings in whole or in part, in which casethe interested party shall present to the court the pertinent instrumentstogether with the subdivision plan approved by the Director of Lands in case of transfer of portions thereof, and the court, after notice to the parties, shall order such land registered subject to the conveyance or encumbrance created by said instruments, or order that the decree of registration beissued in the name of the person to whom the property has been conveyed by said instruments.(Underscoring supplied)InMendoza v. Court of Appeals,[9]this Court, passing on Sec. 29 of Art.No. 496, as amended (Land Registration Act), which is substantially incorporated in the immediately-quoted Sec. 22 of the Property Registration Decree, held:The law does not require that the application for registration be amendedby substituting the buyer or the person to whom the property has been conveyed for the applicant.Neither does it require that the buyer or the person to whom the property has been conveyed be a party to the case.He may thus be a total stranger to the land registration proceedings.The only requirements of the law are: (1) that the instrument be presented to the court by the interested party together with a motion that the same be considered in relation with the application; and (2) that prior notice be given to the parties to the case. x x x(Emphasis supplied)In light of the law and jurisprudence, the substitution by respondent of petitioners as applicant in the land registration case overLot2 is not even necessary.All respondent has to do is to comply with the requirements under the above-quoted Sec. 22 of the Property Registration Decree.Ergo,it was unnecessary for respondent to file the case for specific performance subject of the present petition against petitioners to honor their agreement allowing her to be substituted in their stead as applicant in the land registration proceeding.WHEREFORE,the assailed decision of the Court of AppealsisREVERSEDandSET ASIDE.The complaint of respondent, docketed by the Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas as Civil Case No. 3705, Corazon Caoibes-Pantoja is,in light of the foregoing ratiocination,DISMISSED.

REPUBLIC vs VDA DE NERI

Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of the Bureau of Lands, seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 50139 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City, which, in turn, dismissed the petitioners complaint for the annulment of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0662 and reversion. Likewise sought to be reversed and set aside is the appellate courts Resolution dated August 4, 1999, denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration.The antecedent facts are summarized as follows:Lot 2821, Plan (LRC) SWO-150, approved by the Land Registration Commission, is a parcel of land with an area of 105.568 hectares located along the Cagayan de Oro