n. m. karamzin, napoleon, and the notion of defensive war in russian history

Canadian Slavonic Papers

N. M. Karamzin, Napoleon, and the Notion of Defensive War in Russian HistoryAuthor(s): J. LAURENCE BLACKSource: Canadian Slavonic Papers / Revue Canadienne des Slavistes, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Spring,1970), pp. 30-46Published by: Canadian Association of SlavistsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40866272 .

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Ν. Μ. Karamzin, Napoleon, and the Notion

of Defensive War in Russian History

J. LAURENCE BLACK

After the breakdown of Tatar overlordship in fifteenth-century Russia, the chroniclers of Muscovy tended to rationalize any subsequent expansion of their principality on the grounds that territorial integrity, or the 'gathering of the Russian lands/ was prerequisite to the continued well-being of all inhabitants of those areas. Thenceforth, no matter how aggressive in appearance, wars were regarded as defensive enterprises and Muscovites were led to believe that their princes warred only to preserve national sovereignty. A feeling that they were an intrinsically peaceful people, but ever ready to fight when threatened by outside forces, became an integral part of conservative, nationalist ideologies upheld by many nineteenth-century Russians. Accepted in varying degrees by the mystically inclined Slavophiles, this presumptive attitude, mixed with a certain element of messianism, was also a major tenet of the openly aggressive Pan-Russianism formulated by Nicholas Danilevskii in his book, Rossiya i Evropa ( 1871 ) .

Most of the ancient chroniclers and a large number of later historians in Russia tended to look upon their fatherland as the bastion of Orthodoxy against Roman Christianity and Islam, and as a buffer state for a flourishing western civilization, of which Russia was a part, against a bellicose and barbaric eastern one.1 It is hardly sur- prising, then, that many nineteenth-century Russians were convinced that their country's role in international relations was a mediatory one and, when they did go to war, assumed that conflict was a last resort forced upon a reluctant tsar by the actions of those who wished to destroy Russia. Granted, policy-makers were more realistic about militarily desirable goals, but the feeling that all such activity was in the nature of what we now call preventative war permeated all

1 / This view became a major tenet of the Eurasian School of Russian historians. Before them, S. M. Solov'ev was undoubtedly the most important of nineteenth- century historians to hold this opinion. See his Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen, ι (Moscow 1962), 63. See also, xm, 7-10.

Canadian Slavonic Papers, xn, 1, 1970, Revue canadienne des Stovistes



KARAMZIN AND DEFENSIVE WAR 31

levels of society. However probable that tendency of thought may have been, for it was not unique to Russia, the facile way in which it seemed to be transmitted from the chronicles to books of later writers was due in large part to the almost universal acceptance of ideas about Russian history circulated by the literator-historian, N. M. Karamzin (1766-1826).

Karamzin, who had a claim to fame in more distinct categories of writing than any other Russian who lived through the French revolutionary and Napoleonic eras, drew a particularly eclectic picture of the role of warfare in his nation's growth. As the historian most widely read by his contemporaries, he helped inculcate many traditional ideals into lay matters and, in so doing, became one of the first exponents of the secular conservatism which came to replace Ortho- doxy as the dominant ideology of the Russian empire. In his periodicals, Moskovskii zhurndl (1791-2), Vestnik evropy (1802-3), and above all in his twelve volume Istoriya gosudarstva Rossiiskago ( 1818- 26), Karamzin conveyed to a countless number of readers his at once passive and aggressive interpretation of warfare and the national interest. The immense popularity of his writings made it inevitable that they would help shape the thinking of Russians about the place and future of their state in the concert of European nations.

Karamzin had been most anxious to go to the front on behalf of his fatherland when he was seventeen,2 but that militancy was ap- parently a product of youthful exuberance for, by the mid-eighties, he was swayed in the opposite direction by associates in a circle of freemasons in Moscow. The typical Russian mason abominated warfare, espoused cosmopolitanism, and spent his spare time meditating on spiritual, humanitarian things. Never totally committed to the pre- occupations of his colleagues, Karamzin did echo their feelings about the futility and waste of war in his poems, Κ D and Voennaya pesri.3 Both were written in 1788 and were follow-ups to a letter in which he had pleaded with his closest friend, I. I. Dmitriev, not to take part in a recently announced war with Sweden.4 Ridiculing Dmitriev's enthusiasm for the war, Karamzin suggested that his friend

2 / According to the foremost biographer of Karamzin, the future historian was not able to bribe a field secretary enough so that he could be sent where he wished to go. See M. P. Pogodin, N. M. Karamzin, po ego sochineniiam, pis'mam i otzyvam sovremennikov, ι (Moscow 1866), 22. 3/N. M. Karamzin, Polnoe Sobranie Stikhotvorenii (Moscow-Leningrad 1966), pp. 64-5, 67-8. 4/ tis ma iv. M. Raramzina κ l. i. umttrievu, ea. j. ^rot, v. rekarskii (St. Petersburg 1866), pp. 9-10.



32 REVUE CANADIENNE DES SLAVISTES

leave his wig behind because, as a symbol of scholarship, it was incompatible with military activities. At this early stage in his life, Karamzin was a convinced pacifist, and he remained one in the abstract sense throughout his lifetime. When confronted with Jacobin and then Napoleonic dynamism, however, he was to advocate defensive war in the manner of the early chroniclers.

All Europeans who lived during the last decade of the eighteenth century and the first quarter of the nineteenth must have resigned themselves to having war as part of their everyday fare. For Russians, wars now had far wider implications than those of the past. Conflicts with other nations no longer stemmed merely from border controversy, ambitions for seaports, or attempts to tame the eastern lands; they now involved the very survival and validity of the existing Russian civilization. For those of high birth, the impending hositilities meant a test of their right to privilege or a conflict between autocracy and

republicanism. Simultaneously, war raised the hopes of liberals and citizens of lower birth that their government might be forced into

making some positive societal changes in Russia. Moreover, with the

growing popularity of Herder's ideas, which gained considerable

following among Russian intellectuals, and the flowering of national consciousness in all countries, wars were now to have cultural, racial connotations that previously had been of little importance.

In 1792, not yet anxious over Russian security, Karamzin did not belabour the 'sad news' from revolutionary France on the pages of Moskovskii zhurnal, but he did direct a practical political lesson about war at his readers. By describing the consequences of Louis xiv's interference in the political affairs of England and implying that a ruler of one state must be very cautious about meddling in the business of another, he made out a case for isolationism in all matters that were of no concern to Russians.5

Karamzin's attitude towards war was determined by his admiration for autocracy and his objection to any radical political change in Russia. Frankly pragmatic in his writing after the turn of the century, he used Vestnik evropy to demonstrate the suitability of enlightened

5 / Karamzin suggested that Louis xrv's recognition of the Stuarts as legitimate claimants to the English throne had resulted in the popularization of William m' s 'revolutionary' government. See 'Poslednii chas Iakova n/ Moskovskii zhurnal, pt. 5 (Moscow 1802), t>. 372 (this was a reprint of the 1792 edition). In the following year, he turned to a more sentimental justification for Russian aloofness: 'thoughts of the destruction of towns and deaths of people everywhere, tighten my heart. Call me Don Quixote, but that famous cavalier could not have loved ... so passionately as I love - mankind/ Pis'ma ...kl. I. Dmitrievu, p. 42.




autocracy for his countrymen. Nothing could have convinced him of his rightness in this regard more than Napoleon's evacuation of Mos- cow in 1812. It was that event and the outwardly predominant role played by Alexander in the establishment of peace in Europe that made permanent Karamzin's devotion to the tsarist government. His faith derived not so much from a belief in the sacredness of Russian institutions as it was from their longevity and seeming resilience, past and present, in times of emergency. Indeed, all twelve volumes of the Istoriya were designed to prove this a truism.

After Napoleon left Moscow, Karamzin first praised God 'for saving Russia' from the 'new Mongols/6 then thanked the 'good, good people of Russia' a month later.7 By the spring of 1813, however, he was suggesting that, having defeated Napoleon, Russia might remain strong for a 'new 1000 years';8 and credited this revival to Russia's system of government. That Alexander's 'glory' as an autocrat became a passion for Karamzin was amply illustrated in a poem, Osvobozhdenie evropy i slava Aleksandra I (1814), where he equated victory over Napoleon with that of freedom over tyranny and of enlightenment over bar- barism. Later, perhaps feeling a little embarrassed over the emotional- ism of the poem, Karamzin admitted to Dmitriev that he wrote it at a time when he and most other Russians were in a state of grateful 'delirium' for their deliverance.9 The basis of the historian's great esteem for Alexander was much more than their mutual compatibility - rather it was the writer's conviction that the monarch was both enlightened enough and strong enough to maintain the power and security of the Russian empire.10

Karamzin was optimistic about peace on the accession of each of the three rulers who ascended the throne during his lifetime. In 1796 he enthused to his brother that Paul ι 'promises his subjects well- being; for example he moves away from war and observes neutrality in discussions between the warring states.'11 His hopes for Paul soon

6 / In a letter to his brother, V. M. Karamzin, dated 12 December 1812. See, Sochineniya Karamzina, ed. A. Smirdin, in (St. Petersburg 1848), 722. See also, Russkii arkhiv (1866), p. 234. 7 / Pis ma N. M. Karamzina k A. I. Turgenevu, Russkaia starina, 98 ( 1899 ) , 237. 8 / Pis ma ... k 1. 1. Dmitrievu, pp. 172-3. y / Ibid., p. 1Ö2. 10 / You know the sincerity of our love for the Tsar and feel our sadness ... the power of Russia did not decrease under him .../ 'Pis'ma N. M. Karamzina k kniazyu P. A. Viazemskomu,' Starina i novizna, Bk. i, pt. 2 (1897), p. 168. (Letter of 30 November 1825.) 11 / Sochineniya Karamzina, πι, 711.



34 CANADIAN SLAVONIC PAPERS

dashed, Karamzin expressed delight in August 1801 because Alex- ander was 'inclined to all virtues, and under him we will have a rest/12 He then acted to assure his own prophecy by directing political advice to the new ruler on almost every page of Vestnik evropy.13 The tenor of most of Karamzin's suggestions was represented well by an ode dedicated to Alexander in 1801, in which he said: 'Ruler! Enough laurels of glory, enough horrors of war! The reins of the Russian state are handed to you for our happiness/14 Karamzin's counsel notwithstanding, Russia warred until 1815 and then had only precarious peace during the last decade of Alexander's reign, but the historian took a hopeful position once again when Nicholas ι started his reign in 1825 by squelching the Decembrist Revolt. Seeing the origins of that affair in the French invasion15 and relieved that the 'new Tsar is firm and wise/16 Karamzin fully expected better, more peaceful times ahead.

Paul's erratic activities had disclosed to Karamzin the dangers of warfare when it stemmed solely from a ruler's personal whim; even victory was only valuable when it resulted in some permanent advantage for Russia. It is true that Karamzin cited A. Suvorov's successes during the Italian campaigns (1799-1800) against Napoleon as proof of Russian military prowess17 but he was nonetheless convinced that Russia would have been far better off if Paul had with- drawn from European conflicts altogether. After Paul's assassination, Karamzin was a leading proponent of compromise with Napoleon and, especially after Austerlitz (1805), was increasingly adamant in his insistence that Russia not be committed to war. Alexander's inconsistencies with regard to Napoleon were an equally worrisome

thing to Karamzin, who was most disgruntled by the Tsar's practice of carrying on somewhat desultory peace negotiations while con- tinuing to engage French armies on the battlefield. It appeared to Karamzin that Alexander was risking too much when victory could not benefit Russia to any great extent; subsequent losses at Jena and Friedland confirmed his apprehensions. The abrupt turn-about

12 / Fis ma ... k J. Í. Dmitrievu, p. 051. 13 / On Karamzin and the Vestnik evropy, see A. G. Cross's recent article, 'Ν. Μ. Karamzin's "Messenger of Europe" (Vestnik Yevropy), 1802-3/ Forum for Modern LanPuaze Studies, v, 1 (1969), 1-25. 14 / Polnoe Sobranie Stikhotvorenii, p. 263. 15 / 'God saved us from great harm on December 14th. This began with the French invasion ...,' Starina i novizna (1897), p. 169. (Letter of 31 December 1825.) 16 / Russkaia starina ( 1899), p. 233. (Letter to Turgenev, 18 December 1825.) 17 / 'The Italian war showed the world ...,' Sochineniya Karamzina, m, 589.




in policy, which arose from agreements forced on Alexander by Napoleon at Tilsit in 1807, served to intensify Karamzin's misgivings, not only about Russian safety, but also for her credibility with Euro- pean statesmen. One could hardly expect western leaders to have faith in Russian alliances when both Paul and Alexander had been so untrue to their commitments. In Karamzin's opinion, neutralism in matters that did not concern Russian borders was always preferable, for now Alexander was more likely to be in actual war as an ally of Napoleon than he had been as an enemy of France.

The historian's faith in neutrality as a positive force can be traced back to the first editions of his famous Tis ma russkago puteshestvennika, which were published in the Moskovskii zhurnal, 1791-2. In those years, Karamzin wrote of war in a romantic, sentimental way but still did not fail to place it in a practical perspective as far as rulers and nations were concerned. At the apex of his so-called sentimental period, Karamzin tended to regard war in a manner much like that of other romanticists - as a barbaric, but honourable pas- time for uncivilized man. He complained sadly of the Middle Ages, when 'the number of victories measured the merits of a man,'18 and he commended Prussia's Frederick William ι as the ideal monarch who, among other things, 'always kept out of wars.' Indeed, Karamzin suggested that, for this reason, Frederick William had more right to be called 'Great' than did his illustrious son.19 In the same series of letters, he made fun of Prussian military antics, yet praised men of any state who were prepared to defend their homeland. Karamzin's feelings in this regard were therefore exactly the same in 1791, at his sentimental peak, as they were in the Istoriya, at the height of his rational- ism. The first full edition of the Pis'ma did not appear until 1801 and it was then that he fully expressed his views on the place of warfare in Russian national policy. In complimenting the fifteenth century French monarch, Henry iv, he said: 'you did not conquer foreigners, but your own state, and only for the good of the conquered!'20 In this instance, Karamzin anticipated his rationalization for the elimination of Novgorodian freedoms by Moscow, which he made the theme of an historical tale in Vestnik evropy, and of the further Muscovite territorial aggrandizement described in the Istoriya.

Absorbed in writing the Istoriya between 1803 and 1810, to the exclusion of almost all other publishing activities, Karamzin was

18 / N. M. Karamzin, Izbrannye sochineniya, ι (Moscow-Leningrad 1964), 271. 19 /Ibid., pp. 113-14. 20 / Ibid., pp. 128, 154, 428.




jolted out of political somnolence by talk of imminent war with France. In 1811 he prepared the Zapiska ο drevnei i novoi Rossii, which he hoped would serve as a policy guide for Alexander i, and presented an ATbom of extracts from works by European thinkers to Alexander's sister, Catherine Pavlovna. Stimuli for both came from politically oriented meetings convened by Catherine at her husband's estate in Tver, which were attended by some of the more conservative members of the Russian elite and a small group of anti-Napoleon émigrés, among them Joseph de Maistre.21 Reading extracts from the early volumes of his still incomplete Istoriya, Karamzin's nationalist picture of ancient Russia was received with a good deal of enthusiasm.

For most participants, the immediate source of anxiety was constitutional reforms proposed by the Tsar's chief minister, Michael Speran- skii, for they could foresee the abrogation of their political and social privileges. Karamzin, too, contemplated Alexander's constitutional experimentation with some alarm, but the spectre behind his unease had little to do with personal position. He was concerned more with the threat posed to recently acquired Russian prestige by a Napoleonic army and, horror of horrors, its union with Polish legions from the Grand Duchy of Warsaw.

The parts of the Zapiska most relevant to Karamzin's attitude towards war and society were a brief introduction to Russian history and his critique of Alexander's foreign policy. Karamzin began his outline of Russian history with the hypothesis that his country's mon- archical system originated with a Slavic desire to live in peace. Thus, Scandinavians were quite cordially invited to act as sovereigns on the condition that they put a stop to constant civil strife among the Slavic tribes. Suggesting that the early 'quarrelling democratic states' had always been poverty stricken, he claimed that the Norsemen turned Slavic military skills into more positive channels, that is, a means to glory and booty, plus a united Slavdom. Yet conquest remained a positive force only so long as the state remained strong, centralized, and enlightened.22 Once warfare became a struggle for 21 / This is not to imply that Karamzin accepted the premises of de Maistre's conservatism. Though de Maistre once mentioned that he enjoyed listening to Karamzin read from the Istoriya at Tver, Karamzin claimed to have met him only in 1816. In 1821, when Europe was rife with revolution, Karamzin still complained that some of de Maistre's ideas were absurd. Tis ma ... k I. I. Dmitrievu, pp. 186, 311. See also Literaturnoe nasledstvo, no. 29/30 (Moscow 1937), pp. 577-626. 22 / Karamzin's Memoir on Ancient and Modern Russia, edited and with a fore- word by R. Pipes (Cambridge 1959), p. 105.




power between the princes, unity disappeared and the earliest 'Rus- sian' state collapsed.

It was mainly through the agency of cunning, peaceful diplomacy that Moscow was able to restore Russian prestige, the 'sword' only completing the task. In Karamzin's words, 'the Moscow princes ac- complished this great deed by utilizing a wise political system/ not by military heroics. In his opinion, the greatest merit of such a method of government, autocracy, was that its ablest practitioners 'were always ready for peace, they kept out of the affairs of Europe ... they dis- played no yearnings for false or perilous conquests, preferring to preserve rather than to acquire/23 In this sentiment, Karamzin was re- emphasizing what he had said in an earlier description of Boris Godu- nov, whom he had praised in 1802 for forcing Europeans 'to respect Russia more than before, without victories/24 The next year he had predicted Napoleon's downfall because there was no longer any logical motivation for the Frenchman's wars: 'It has always seemed to us [Karamzin] that revengefulness does not mix with rational politics/25

A distaste for 'useless' warfare remained the premise of Karamzin's preaching about foreign policy. In the Zapiska, he chastised Elizabeth for such wars26 but lauded Catherine π for triumphs that 'assured the external security of the realm' and for her policy of 'non-interference in wars which were of no concern to Russia/ The historian was remarkably consistent in this idea. Ten years before the Zapiska was written, he had hailed the expansionist ambitions of both Peter ι and Catherine because the *benefit of Russia' had been their only goal. Catherine's wars against the Turks and her ruthless actions against the Poles were condoned, indeed commended, because in Karamzin's opinion, those peoples had never ceased planning the destruction of Russia. But, he insisted, 'Europe knows that Catherine, ever ready for war, would never break the peace herself/27

Having eulogized Catherine for her martial successes, Karamzin used the advantage of hindsight to caution other monarchs against overconfidence: 'Russians began to think that nothing could overcome them - a delusion/28 He then blamed Paul for the aimlessness of Russia's policies after Catherine's death and charged him with turning 23 / Ibid. 24 / Vestnik evropu, no. 17 (Moscow 1802), 37. 25 / Ibid., no. 19 ( 1803), 235-6. 26 / JFipes, Karamzin s Memoir, p. lzy. 27 / Sochineniya Karamzina, i, 283-4. 28 / Pipes, Karamzin s Memoir, p. 132.




the manly 'spirit of war/ which had been characteristic of earlier Russian armies, into 'martinetism.' The uniquely bitter tone used by Karamzin when writing about Paul revealed the extent to which he felt obligated to advise the government, for that ill-fated Tsar was still taboo as a subject for conversation in Russian society.

Completing the survey of Russian history, in which he underscored the military policies of former princes, Karamzin went directly to the meat of his advice for Alexander in matters of foreign policy. He said, accordingly, that when France had returned to monarchy under Napoleon, 'Russian diplomacy should have aimed at general peace/ Instead, Alexander had committed his forces to assisting England and Austria 'without any particular advantage to herself/ Outlining a series of errors in Russian relations with Napoleon, Karamzin still did not condemn the war of 1806 for, by that time, 'we had no choice but to defend the security of our possessions, which Napoleon menaced by inciting Poland/ As late as 1811, when he was writing the Zapiska, he still felt that compromise might save the day for Russia, so he recommended that Alexander try to conclude peace, 'even at the cost of so-called honour - a luxury only strong states can afford/29

Not always so practical about war as he was in the Zapiska, Karam- zin's ATbom had as its keynote an extract from Bossuet to the effect that the rise and fall of states, victories, and losses, 'dépend des ordres secrets de la divine Providence/30 but it was the Zapiska that most clearly reflected his point of view. Supposedly secret, the contents of the Zapiska were not unknown to contemporaries. In any case, Prince P. A. Vyazemskii claimed that A. Ya. Bulgakov had conveyed Karamzin's feelings about the upcoming war with France to the governor-general of Moscow in 1812, F. V. Rostopchin. According to Vyazemskii: 'Karamzin did not support the war of 1812, either before or after its beginning. He suggested that we were not prepared for it ... He was of the opinion that some diplomatic concessions must be made ... his patriotism was not that of vehement journalists, rather his had the conservative character of an historian.'31 29 / Ibid., pp. 141, 145, 205. 30 / 'Al'bom N. M. Karamzina, ed. B. Lyshin, Letopisi russkoi liter atury i drev- nosti, i, pt. 2 (1859), 164. 31 / Russkii arkhiv (1869), p. 1437. Rostopchin was a leading francophobe and frequented the Pavlovna salon, but he did advise the Tsar not to send Russian armies after Napoleon into Europe. Karamzin stayed in Rostopchin's home while Moscow was being evacuated before Napoleon's arrival ( Sochineniya Karamzina, in, 721). In the 1850s D. N. Bludov suggested that if Karamzin had not been so anxious to make peace with Napoleon, Alexander might have made him secretary of state; Russkii arkhiv ( 1880), p. 239.




The essentials of Karamzin's scheme for Russian history were out- lined in the Zapiska but, since that study was not meant for general consumption, the public had no clear record of his thought from the last issue of Vestnik evropy while he was editor, until the first appearance of the Istoriya fifteen years later.32 A later historian, I. E. Zabelin, along with others, accused Karamzin of having written a history that was little more than 'an unchanging course of wars, innumerable weapons, storming of fortresses ../38 The superficialness of this charge notwithstanding, Karamzin did pay close attention to the role of warfare as one part of his fairly simple interpretation of Russian growth.34 Since he made no secret of his intention to write a history that would help determine the future policies of rulers and people alike, his judgments on the military actions of former princes divulged a great deal about his attitude towards the programme of his own Tsar.

Claiming that Russian monarchy was established 'with the general consent of the citizens' in contrast to those founded by the sword or by 'cruel, ambitious men* everywhere else, Karamzin based his entire scheme for Russian history on the notion that his people were peaceful.35 The abject futility of war for honour alone was highlighted in the Istoriya when the author returned to a theme first expounded in his historical tale, Mar ja Posadnitsa (1803). In the case of Novgorod's struggle for independence from Muscovy, which had been the subject of Marfa Posadnitsa, Karamzin said in Istoriya that the Tiorror of starvation and useless bloodletting' may well be glorious but hardly preferable to the peace that would ensue from Novgorodian acquies- cence.36 In the Istoriya Karamzin did not waste space explaining the rights of Novgorod citizens, rather he simply stated the needs of Muscovy as the raison d'état for the wars.

In an earlier volume, when describing the chaos of thirteenth- century Russia, Karamzin allowed that Tionour is valuable to a people 32 / Vestnik evropy lasted until 1830 with M. T. Kachenovskii, one of Karamzin's most consistent opponents, as its editor for most of that time. The first eight volumes of the Istoriya gosudarstva Rossiiskago appeared in 1818, the ninth in 1821, tenth and eleventh in 1824, the twelfth posthumously in 1826. 33 / Russkii arkhiv ( 1872), p. 2466. 34 / For a description and analysis ot Karamzin s scneme tor Kussian History, see J. L. Black, 'Nicholas Karamzin's Scheme for Russian History/ Eastern Europe: Historical Essays (Toronto 1969), pp. 26-33. 35 / Istoriya gosudarstva Rossitskago, ι (St. Petersburg 1818), 112. In another place, Karamzin again insisted that the 'Varangian princes did not conquer our fatherland, but were chosen by the Slavs to govern the state' (Karamzin's italics), ibid., π, 63. 36 / Ibid., vi, 79. See also, ν, 92.




that is flourishing: the oppressed wish only for relief/37 Moreover, he repeated in Istoriya what he had said in Vis ma almost twenty years before: 'boldness is justified only by success ... often the gratitude of the fatherland belongs to those who, without extremes, do not tempt danger and do not seek out the epithet, "Great"/38 Karamzin had once criticized the ancient chroniclers because they did not 'direct the ruler,39 but it was not likely that any such accusation would be made against him!

Having no tolerance for 'needless wars/ for which he bitterly condemned Ivan iv,40 Karamzin recognized the inevitability of conflict. Always as a last recourse, Russian princes still had to be prepared to give battle when it served the best interests of their state. In that vein, Karamzin harshly criticized Yaroslav of Tver, who became Great Prince in 1264, because lie did not wish to lead the troops/ and so could not be counted 'a friend of the Fatherland/ Yet, lost wars need not always be a waste. For example, though the military benefits of Donskoi's victory over the Tatars in 1388 were fleeting to say the least, Karamzin remarked: 'what victory in ancient or modern times is more glorious than that of Donskoi, where each Russian battled for the fatherland and for blessedness?'41 The larger war lost, this victory still had, in Karamzin's opinion, a positive, tangible consequence for Muscovites. It enabled them to regain 'self-respect/ which the writer

suggested had been tarnished by long-time obeisance to the khans. Effective as the traditional policy had been, and Karamzin lauded the

early princes for it, he could not bring himself to ignore a less bene- ficial, but infinitely more gratifying, military success against the over- lords.

During the first decades of the nineteenth century, the question of when to opt for war or peace was an acute one for all statesmen. To Russians, it probably posed more mental anguish than to leaders of other European states, because their policy-makers had not yet de- cided upon a consistent order of priorities in international relations. Karamzin, though not immune to inconsistencies, rarely wavered when it came to priorities; for him, Russian security and stability were all that mattered.

In volume five of the Istoriya, written in 1809, he commended Don- skoi for recognizing the time 'to unsheath the sword/42 a meaningful $7 /Ibid., iv (1892), 137-8. 38 / Ibid.. v. 134. This volume was written in 1809. 39 / Vestnik evropu, no. 18 ( 1803), pp. 143-5; no. β ( 1803), p. 128. 40 / Istoriya zosudarstva Rossiiskago, ix ( 1892), 197. 41 /Ifcid., ν (1818), 104-5. 42 / Ibid., 3.




comment since he had linked Alexander ι with Donskoi in his dedi- cation of the epic-making work. Similarly, Karamzin strongly pro- tested Russian involvement in wars against Napoleon in 1805, but then supported the cause with an uncharacteristically militant poem, Pesn voennov, in 1806.43 Later, in marked contrast to his correspon- dence of the 1870s with Dmitriev, Karamzin sent a letter to Vyazemskii congratulating him for participating in the Battle of Borodino which, he said, 'led Napoleon's armies to the grave/ He continued: 'for now the work of the sword, and afterwards the work of the mind/44 In spite of lip service to the creed of pacifism, the yardstick used by Karamzin to determine the relative necessity of wars was the degree of danger faced by the existing Russian state.

His self-avowed pacifism and, indeed, his liberal cosmopolitanism were hardly evident when Karamzin spoke of Poland. Like most Rus- sians of his generation, he felt that Poland represented the greatest long-term threat to Russian security and civilization, a feeling that was exacerbated when it appeared that Napoleon planned to exploit Polish nationalism as a stepping stone towards the destruction of the Russian empire. In Karamzin's mind, the partitioning of Poland in the eighteenth century had been Catherine's leading contribution to Rus- sian security and thence to general peace in Europe. In 1819 he made a personal appeal to Alexander to rescind constitutional concessions made to a people who, he was convinced, would then plot to subvert Russia. In that speech, Karamzin claimed that 'we took Poland by the sword; that was our right, to which the whole state owes its existence, for it all was created by conquest/45 This startling comment, which was most inconsistent with his usual assertions that Russia evolved by peaceful means, can only be understood in the light of Karamzin's fear that the 'epidemic'46 of constitutionalism might spread to his own country.

Karamzin always advocated preparedness for 'defensive' war and isolationism in matters not crucial to Russian security. Abhorring revolution of all kinds, he still hoped that Russian armies would not be sent to assist those European states which were beset by liberal or nationalist uprisings soon after the Congress of Vienna. He suggested to Vyazemskii in December 1820 that the 'constitutionalists' in Naples be left alone to destroy themselves and registered astonishment at the 43 / To arms! Let us cut down the enemies of our Fatherland!' Polnoe Sobranie StikhotvoreniL pp. 298-9. 44 / Russkii arkhiv ( 1866), p. 230. 45 / Neizdannyya sochineniya i perepiska Nikolai Mikhailovicha Karamzina, ed. K. S. Serbinovich (St. Petersburg 1862), p. 8. 46 / Starina i novizna (1897), p. 107. Letter to Vyazemskii, December 1820.




aggressiveness of Metternich who, Karamzin thought, could only be acting for personal gain or prestige.47 By the spring of 1821, when most of the revolutions were under control and the reactionary gov- ernments of Europe were restored, Karamzin expressed thanks that Russia had not been closely involved.48

Even after the Greeks began their struggle for independence from the Turks, Karamzin never wavered from this way of thinking. Most Russians, Karamzin among them, had a traditional liking for Greeks and detested the Ottoman empire, which they assumed to be Christian Orthodoxy's greatest enemy. Time and again Karamzin condemned the 'terrible Turkish barbarians' and praised men like Lord Byron for their romantic and real commitment to the popular Greek49 cause but, nevertheless, he wrote his brother that 'the policy of Russia is very wise, we keep out of war until the last possible moment/60

Earlier, Karamzin had underscored the futility of reaction when it came to the revolution in Europe of 1820, saying: Ί am not entirely unaware of European events ... Can armies give legality to the crown?*51 He was referring to the Spanish revolution in that instance and even implied that, if the people wished, they should be allowed to reinstitute a constitution granted them some years before; but it was not any liberal inclination that made him worry about the consequences of Russian intervention in Mediterranean affairs. He was convinced that any unilateral Russian action against the Turks would prompt a European combination against Russia. Although not alone in this conviction, Karamzin's political astuteness was remarkable for one who professed to be outside of politics. He was certainly close to the mark when he concluded that Europeans would never allow Russian armies to occupy the Black Sea parts of the Ottoman empire or the Straits. However, unlike M. P. Pogodin, General Fadayeev, Danilevskii, and other militants, who had the examples of the Crimean War and then the Congress of Berlin when it came to the so-called Eastern Question, Karamzin recommended conciliation rather than confrontation with Europe. Perhaps the main reason for the differences in conclusions drawn by Karamzin and later nationalists, even though 47 / Ibid. 48 / Fis ma ... k I. 1. Dmitrievu, p. 306. 49 / Ibid., p. 306; Starina i novizna ( 1897), pp. 113, 158. 50 / Atenei, no. 27 (1858), p. 61. Karamzin also said, in a letter to JJmitriev ot 2 August 1821: 'Here, as well as everywhere, most people are interested in the Greeks. The zealous wish to spill blood; but our policy must remain cautious. Europe, I think, would not take kindly to our success if we rush at Turkey,' Pis'ma ... k 1. I. DmitrieOti, p. 312. 51 / Ibid., p. 285.




their premises coincided, was that the former did not recognize or foresee that Russophobia could become intensified in Europe once Napoleonic France was defeated.

After Catherine's successful partitioning of Poland in the eighteenth century, the western frontiers had not posed the same problems to the Russian state as those with the Turks, because European nations were divided in their feelings about Polish-Russian relations. So Karamzin always insisted on direct, unequivocal action when Polish unrest threatened Russian stability. Similarly, expansion to the east, whether by military or economic means, was usually regarded by Karamzin as a normal policy designed either to strengthen Russian autocracy, or a matter of conveying Russian civilization to 'wild people/52 Territorial expansion had to be discouraged only when it seemed to be merely a product of a ruler's personality. As Karamzin cautioned in 1803, 'great Empires, based on conquest, must either be enlightened or conquer continually,'53 meaning that wars had to be motivated by need or their initiators would inevitably be caught up in an uncontrollable, self-destructive situation. In a like vein, he said of the Roman empire, 'the cause of its glory [conquest] finally became the cause of its fall,'54 and hinted, in 1814, that one important reason for Napoleon's military demise was that Tie ruled by the sword and so was executed by the [European] states.'55 Karamzin's entire point of view on such matters might best be summed up by his remark to Vyazemskii in 1821: 'where good or evil does not depend on me, there I try to be a calm spectator.'56 His studies in Russian history had brought him to the conclusion that such an attitude, placed in the framework of national policy, was the one most likely to assure Russia's continued well-being and ultimate leadership among European states.

Karamzin's belief that the wars of Muscovy were made necessary by outside pressures and had the continued security of his forefathers as their sole aim was not a unique one in Russian historiography. Nor, indeed, was the idea that wars were caused by those who, by dint of their natural aggresiveness, aimed to take advantage of 'peaceloving' Russians. In fact, by the nineteenth century, statesmen of all Euro- pean nations tended to rationalize their activities in international rela-

52 / 'They ' will see in Russians, neither plunderers nor tyrants ... but friends of mankind, ' Vestnik evrovv* no. 11 (1803), p. 166. 53 /Ibid., no. 9 (1803), p. 68. He was commenting on changes in the Ottoman state system and predicted that 'now their fall is inevitable.' 54 / So/ihineniua Karamzina. in. 373. 55 / Ibid., ι, 241. 56 / Starina i novizna ( 1897), p. 120,




tions by means of the encompassing phrase, 'national interest/ In Rus- sia, however, these concepts were so common in literature and historical writing that they became de jacto tenets of national ideology.

Karamzin's contribution to the evolution of this defensive attitude was a large one. In the 1860s, a number of Russians still regarded the Istoriya as a mirror of the 'contemporary patriotism' which had enabled earlier Russians to liberate and pacify Europe during the Napoleonic era.57 Unfortunately, their outwardly spectacular success in dealing with Napoleon had caused many Russians to draw distorted conclusions from Karamzin's interpretation of warfare in Russian history. They came to assume that only their nation could 'pacify* the west and, in so doing, sustain European civilization. Many of Russia's best known literati were weaned on Karamzin's stories and historical writing. The messianic writer, F. M. Dostoevskii, once boasted that he had read all of the Istoriya before he had reached the age of ten.58 A. S. Pushkin, K. Ryleev, Lermontov, Gogol', Tiutchev, I. S. Turgenev, N. A. Nekrasov, and innumerable lesser authors all used the Istoriya for background material and subject matter for their own writings,59 and the creator of War and Peace, Leo Tolstoi, once claimed that the Istoriya evoked in him a 'world of good feeling.'60

The Pis'ma Russkago puteshestvennika and tales from Karamzin's periodicals were often reprinted during the nineteenth century, but it was primarily from the Istoriya that the great writer's sentiments became part of Russian national consciousness. Indeed, it was for helping to intensify just such a feeling that Karamzin received applause from his admirers and critics alike. There can be little doubt that no other historical work has reached the Russian public in such a variety of ways. It became the official history text in Russian upper schools for the first half of the century and an outline of it was published in 1829 for use in lower schools.61 As late as 1850, P. Stroev published a book of extracts from the Istoriya that was recommended for children between the ages of seven and twelve by the minister of education and long-time admirer of Karamzin, S. S. Uvarov.62 Chapters on indi- vidual princes and events were published as separate studies, several

57 / Simbirskii yubilei Nikohi Mikhailovich Karamzina (Simbirsk 1867), p. 28. 58 / F. M. Dostoevskii, Dnevnik pisatelya za Iö73 i Io76 gody ( Moscow-Lenin- grad 1929). o. 139. 59 / See L. V. Cherepnin, Istoricheshie vzglyady klassikov russkoi literatury (Moscow 1968), and S. P. Petrov, Russkii istoricheskii Roman XIX veka (Moscow 1964). 60/ L. N. Tolstoi, Sobranie sochinenii, xix (Moscow 1965), 120. 61/?. Kalaidovich, S. P. Burg, Nachertanie Istorii Gosudarstva Rossiiskago (St. Petersburg 1829). 62 / Razskazy iz russkoi istorii, dlya detei pervago vozrasta (St. Petersburg 1850).




geographical works were based on it, and abridged versions were created for young foreign students of the Russian language.63

It was Karamzin's scheme for Russian history, not his eloquence, which made the notion of Russian passiveness a permanent part of historical writing in his country. Succeeding official historiographers, such as N. G. Ustryalov and Κ. Ν. Bestuzhev-Ryumin, maintained Karamzin's interpretations almost to the letter. Bestuzhev-Ryumin actually came to appreciate the militant and Darwinistic Danilevskii,64 who expressed most unequivocally a growing opinion that Russians had the moral duty to revitalize and reshape a dying Europe, by war if need be. Further, the influential University of Moscow professor of history, M. P. Pogodin, told his classes to 'study, study Karamzin.'65 Pogodin accepted and expanded upon the idea that the Russian state evolved by peaceful means in contrast to the violence which charac- terized the growth of states in western Europe, and tried to persuade the youth of his time that Karamzin was the purest 'source of Russian wisdom/66 In his capacity as editor of Moskvityanin, a leading organ of Nicholas is governing doctrine, Official Nationality, Pogodin fol- lowed Karamzin's lead in secularizing traditional beliefs and adopting them to the needs of his government. Moreover, it was Uvarov who first formulated Official Nationality and who used the powers of his office to keep the Istoriya an inviolable part of the school system and one of the mainstays of Nicholas' ideology. But keeping the Istoriya alive and vital was not a difficult task. The feeling that Russians had always to be on the defensive against an aggressive west had already been taken up by the Slavophiles, who took much of their inspiration, if not their ideals, from Karamzin. This was most true of K. S. Aksakov who made the Voluntary' invitation by Novgorodians to Varangians in the ninth century, and the 'unanimous* request for autocracy in 1612 the turning points of his own scheme for Russian history.67

Finally, the essential parts of Karamzin's scheme, above all the

63 / S. Ponomarev, Materialy dlya Bibliografii liter atury ο Ν. M. Karamzine (1783-1883) (St. Petersburg 1883), pp. 43-6. Ponomarev did not mention either of the books cited in the two previous footnotes. 64 / Istoriograpya Istorii SSSR, ed. V. Illentskii, I. A. Kudryavtsev (Moscow 1961), pp. 279-81. 65/ N. Barsukov, Zhizn i trudy M. P. Pogodinaf Bk. 6 (St. Petersburg 1892), p. 301. For an excellent, if brief, summary of the influence Karamzin had on Pogodin, see N. Ryazanovsky, Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825- 1855 ( Los Angeles 1957), pp. 178-80. 66/ Moskvityanin, no. 2 (1842), p. 7. See also Pogodin s, Vzglyad na russkuyu istoriyu' (1832), Istoriko-kriticheskie otryvki (Moscow 1846), pp. 1-18. 67 / Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, ι (Moscow 1889), 4, 8.




idea that the Russian state system was peacefully created in contrast to its European counterparts, were kept intact by the greatest of nineteenth-century scholarly historians, S. M. Solov'ev. No friend of either Pogodin or the Slavophiles, Solov'ev still insisted that conquest played a very minor role in the expansion of the Moscovite principality.68 Whether or not Solov'ev and others were consciously following the Istoriya, the immense popularity of Karamzin's sentimental and political writings and the predominant position of his history in school and society, assured the continuity of his ideas. This was, possibly, an unfortunate circumstance for those who recognized the need for change in Russian society. A formula for participation in European affairs which was derived from and applicable to the Napoleonic era, and which relied upon autocracy, only served to accentuate the tensions of Russian domestic life in later times.

68 /Sobranie sochinenii S. M. Sohveva (St. Petersburg 1901), pp. 790-1; see also, Istorii Rossii s drevneishikh vremen, ι (Moscow 1962), 127-30.



n. m. karamzin, napoleon, and the notion of defensive war in russian history

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