pki services for the public sector of the eu member states dr. dimitrios lekkas dept. of products...

PKI Services PKI Services for the Public Sector for the Public Sector

of the EU Member Statesof the EU Member States

Dr. Dimitrios LekkasDr. Dimitrios Lekkas

Dept. of Products & Systems Design Engineering

University of the [email protected]

Rhodes, 9/6/2003

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University of the Aegean

Objectives of the study

To review the use of electronic signatures for e-government services.

To identify the technologies employed for the exploitation of e-signatures.

To discuss legal issues referring to the use of e-signatures.

To discuss digital certificates management in the public sector.

To provide a set of good-practices on the use of e-signatures in the public sector.

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University of the Aegean eeEurope-2005Europe-2005

The underlying strategic framework

Based on two groups of actionsgroups of actions: Services - Applications - Content Broadband Infrastructure - Security

Action Plan around inter-linked linesinter-linked lines: Policy Measures Good Practices Benchmarking Policies Coordination

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eGovernment ServicesGeneral key actions:General key actions: Broadband Connection Interoperability Interactive Public Services Public Procurement Public Internet Access Points Culture and Tourism

Key actions for securityKey actions for security: Cyber Security Task Force Security Culture Secure Communication between Public Services

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Our methodology at a glance

1. State-of-practiceReview of state-of-practice on e-signatures use.

2. Legal issuesReview of legal and regulatory issues on e-signatures use.

3. StandardsReview the standardization work on e-signatures.

4. Case studies Study lessons learnt from relevant situations.

5. SurveyIdentify and review relevant experiences from EU

…towards Good Practices

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University of the Aegean 1. State-of-practice on

Certification Services

Topics:

Qualified Certificates (QC)

Requirements for issuing QC

Additional requirements for Public Sector

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Qualified Certificates

Unique identification of CSP Unique identification of the physical entity Intended purpose Signature verification data corresponding to subject Period of validity Identity code of the certificate Electronic signature of the CSP Usage limitations Case-relevant extensions

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Requirements for issuing QS

Demonstrate the appropriate reliability Ensure appropriate directory/revocation services Verify physical entity’s identity Employ properly qualified personnel Use trustworthy systems Protect signature creation data Keep records relevant to qualified certificates Publish policies, practices, terms, and conditions Maintain sufficient operation financial resources Ensure physical security

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University of the Aegean Additional

requirements for the Public Sector

Risk Analysis/Assessment

ISO 9000 certification

Personal data protection

Insurance

Repositories for storing signature verification data for long time

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3. Standardization work

European initiatives and bodies:– ETSI: Europe's contribution to world-wide standardization – CEN/ISSS: Information Society Standardization System – ICTB/EESSI: European Electronic Signature

Standardisation Initiative

International initiatives and bodies:– ISO & ITU: World-wide de jure standards– IETF: Widely accepted de facto Internet standards– W3C: Recommendations for structuring web documents– PKCS: Public Key Cryptography Standards– ANSI: The American perspective

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Existing and emerging standards

CryptographyCryptographic algorithms, Hash functions, Random number generators

Secure HardwareSmart cards, Tokens, Secure devices

Digital CertificatesFormats, Distribution, Certificate Status Information (CSI)

Certification ServicesDigital signatures, Key management, Authorization, Time-stamping, Notary

General supportICT Security, Directory access, Database management, Repositories, Interoperability

ManagementIS management, Quality, Policy composition, Audit

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4. PKI in third countries

Canada– A ‘Policy Management Authority’ exists

– ‘External subscribers’ are allowed

– Key management resembles with the EU Directive

USA– Federal PKI is fully functional

– Federal Bridge CA assures interoperability

– Various ‘assurance levels’ for certificates

Australia– ‘Government Public Key Authority’ exists as accreditation body

– Various levels of certificates for individuals and non-individuals

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5. Survey

Means: Questionnaire on:

(a) Existing e-services

(b) Legal status of certificates

(c) Use of certificates in the public sector

(d) Requirements from CSP

(e) Use of certificates for G2G and G2C transactions

- Sent to the 15 Member States via CIRCA

- All recipients responded

- Results taken into account and refer to in the deliverable

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Survey findings

All Member States have adopted Directive 1999/93/EC.

In 14 Member States there is at least 1 CSP offering qualified certificates (except Ireland).

In 13 Member States there is one authority responsible for the accreditation of CSP (except France and Ireland).

In 13 Member States there is one authority responsible for regulating, monitoring and auditing the operation of CSP (except Ireland and UK).

In 9 Member States the two aforementioned procedures are performed by the same entity/authority.

In 5 Member States certificates of types other rather than qualified/unqualified are used.

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In 11 Member States CSP accreditation is voluntary for qualified certificates.

In 7 Member States certificates have been employed in G2G transactions (3 have plans for 2003 and 3 after 2003).

In all Member States the Public Sector obtains services from multiple CSP.

In 14 Member States there is no nation-wide RA, which registers civil servants (except of Belgium).

In 11 Member States each governmental organization may have or operate its own RA.

In 2 Member States (Finland and France) each sector or administration level has its own RA.

…survey findings

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8 Member States have in place specific provisions, in case a CSP ceases operation.

11 Member States have in place specific provisions, in case a CSP uses its key in a way incompatible with the existing legislation

10Appropriate skills of CSP staff

11Compliance with personal data regulations

4ISO 9000 certification

10Security of CSP equipment used for key generation

11Security of CSP premises

10Risk Analysis/Assessment

Member States

Special requirements a CSP should fulfill

…survey findings

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6All CSP should first apply for voluntary accreditation

5Compatibility of the CPS

4Interoperability of technology

Member States

Interoperability requirements when more than one CSP is involved

4Non-repudiation of receipt

4Notary

8Timestamping

Member States

Value Added Services the Public Sector receives from CSP

…survey findings

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In 6 Member States there exists (or is planned) a central repository, which provides each and every civil servant with a certificate.

In 5 Member States the role of the civil servant is associated with the certificate issuance.

In 4 of the above 5, when a civil servant is transferred to another post, its certificate is revoked or renewed.

In 10 Member States smart cards are used to keep signature-creation-data (e.g. a private key).

In 10 Member States audit records (logs) are kept.

In 9 of the above 10 CSP are responsible for keeping the audit logs.

…survey findings

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Good-practices

Working assumptions:– G2G and G2C transactions are included.– C2G transactions are not included.– Subject to additional sector-related requirements– Focus on authentication, non-repudiation, and

integrity.– Compliance with EU Directive 99/93.

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EU Directive 99/93: Article 3

Outline:– CSP operation

– Accreditation and supervision

– Certificate characteristics

– Signature Creation Devices

– Architectural issues

– Information dissemination

– Value-added Certification Services

– Certification Practice Statement (CPS)

– CSP cease of operation

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CSP Operation

CSP operator– The government is generally considered as the owner

of its Public Key Infrastructure.– The operator may be a governmental authority, or the

operation may be outsourced to the private sector. CSP’s cease of operation

– Handling differs in Member States– Subject to prior interoperability established, certificates

will be managed by another CSP, or– All issued certificates are revoked, or– Purely governmental-operated CSP (they never

cease...)

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Accreditation and Supervision Voluntary Accreditation

– Some Member States ask for compulsory accreditation – Generally desired for qualified certificates issuance– Accreditation is not a requirement for the issuance of

unqualified certificates Supervision

– Establishment of national supervisory bodies in most Member States

– Supervision, in most cases, is performed by Telecom Authorities

– Diversification of supervision and accreditation roles is desired

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Requirements for certificates

Certificate characteristics– Role-based certificates tend to have heavy administrative cost.– Both qualified and unqualified are needed, each for specific user

domain.– An identity certificate is needed for every civil servant. The

certificates can be either identity-based, only, or role-based. – Average certificate lifecycle: 1-3 years.

Public sector specific requirements– Signature lifetime is reported to be 30 years.– The signature lifetime should be (considerably) longer.– It is suggested that different keys are used for different functions

(e.g. signature, authentication, encryption).

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Signature creation issues

Key management– Key generation should be performed under the full

control of the end-user (for non-repudiation purposes)

– No key-recovery must be possible

Signature Creation Devices– Common agreement on the adoption of secure

hardware tokens (e.g. smart cards)– Conformance with international standards is

recommended.

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Architectural issues

Number of Certification Authorities– Support for multiple CA in each country should be ensured– Web of trust scalability is recommended

Trust architectures– Mixed schemes may exist– Combination of per-sector local hierarchies, local RA, Bridge CA

and Cross-certified CA should be ensured Registration Authorities

– Civil servants should be given a security token, according to a standard procedure

– Multiple RA per region or user domain should exist– If a central identity repository exists, then national-wide RA

should also exist

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Information dissemination

Key distribution– By personal correspondence (private) and by

publicly accessible repositories (public)

Specific provision for the self-signed CA certificates distribution– The maintenance of the Certification Trust Lists

(CTL) should be done on a per-sector basis

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Value-added Certification Services

Time-stamping

Confidentiality

Notary

Audit services

Non-repudiation of receipt

Long-lasting data repositories

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Certification Practice Statement

Conformance with IETF RFC-2527 is recommended. It should include, at least:

– CA and RA obligations– Subscriber and relying party obligations– Addressing community– Certificate classes, formats, and profiles– Procedures description– Liabilities– Value-added services description– Interoperability issues– Information dissemination procedures

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CSP should comply with data protection legislation

– Dissemination of personal PKI information– Regulation of lawful access to personal data available

to CSP– Data security measures specification

Data protection authorities should support public authorities to monitor the CSP privacy policies

EU Directive 99/93: Article 8

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Conclusion

The result of our study is…

an appropriately balanced good-practice guidance

for the exploitation of Public Key Infrastructure

by the Public Sector

pki services for the public sector of the eu member states dr. dimitrios lekkas dept. of products...

Documents

use of esignatures

public servicesuniversity

public sectoruniversity

exploitation of esignatures

use of electronic signatures

relevant experiences

relevant situations

legal issuesreview of