revisiting the myth of jones. sellars and behaviorism - 2011

7/30/2019 Revisiting the Myth of Jones. Sellars and Behaviorism - 2011

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Historyof PHilosoPHyQuarterly

Vlme 28, Nmber 1, Janar 2011

85

Revisiting the Myth of Jones:

sellaRs and BehavioRisM

Paolo Tripodi

The mth Jnes, the thght experiment that Wilrid Sellars nar-rates in the last part Empiricism and the Philsph Mind(hencerth EPM), can be rermlated as an argment having thellwing rm. I peple belnging t cmmnit A, eqipped withepistemic and cnceptal resrces B, learned a ther C and weretrained in manner D, then the wld acqire the cncept E. Let meillstrate. Cmmnit A is cmpsed ctitis hman ancestrs whthink, act, have a langage, and cmmnicate bt lack an cncept amental event (as an inner episde), inclding r cncept a thght.

The resrces B the are eqipped with are the resrces semanticdiscrse (r example, the are able t make semantic assertins the rm . . . in L means -) and the resrces theretical discrse(namel, the are able t pstlate theretical entities in rder t ex-plain bservatinal phenmena). Ther C is invented b a genis inthe cmmnitcall him Jneswh nds it msteris that pepleact intelligentl nt nl while speaking bt even when silent. Jnesexplains the mster b pstlating nbservable entities, call themthghts, cnceived n the mdel verbal episdes (r example,

bth them have semantic prperties) and capable casing intel-ligent behavir (bth verbal and silent). Jnes teaches his cmpatritsthe ther, s that the learn t interpret ther peples and their wnbehavir in terms the theretical cncept thght. Nw (pint D),r ancestrs are trained reliabl t reprt the ccrrences theirwn thghts, witht rther need t bserve vert behavir. Theeventall acqire the cncept E, namel, the same cncept thghtas we (actal peple) pssess.

The standard interpretatin (r example, Rsenberg 2009) regardsthe mth Jnes as attempting t shw (verss Cartesianism) thatne can avid the Mth the Given while still claiming (verss be-havirism) that mental events (sch as thghts1) are inner episdes


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86 HISToRy o PHILoSoPHy QuARTERLy

that are knwable nninerentiall. M task in this paper is t investi-gate rther the relatin between behavirism and the mth Jnesb taking int accnt bth EPM and ther relevant parts Sellarssphilsphical sstem, especiall papers written in the same perid. In therst sectin, I shall evalate the standard exegesis, accrding t whichSellarss mth can be interpreted as a pineer piece antibehavirismin the philsph mind. I regard sch an interpretatin as incmpleterather than straightrwardl alse. In the secnd sectin, I shall csn the philsph langage that is invlved in stages A and B themth Jnes and claim that (nt in principle bt as a matter act)the mth depends n a behaviristic accnt langage acqisitin.Sch an accnt is explanatril inadeqate, bt, as I will shw in the

third sectin, Sellarss argment can be resced rm the inadeqac.In the rth sectin, I will shw that stage D the mth depends n abehaviristic accnt nninerential knwledge nes thghts. Inthe th sectin, I shall arge that sch a rther behaviristic assmp-tin invalidates the mth Jnes. In the sixth sectin, I shall makesme remarks n the epistemlg nninerential knwledge. In thelast sectin, I will brief cnnect the mth Jnes with the braderisse Sellarss argment against the Mth the Given.

1. antibeHaviorismintHe mytHof Jones

Cartesians claim that nes nninerential knwledge nes wnmental states (particlarl nes wn thghts) is, and mst be,epistemicall independent ther knwledge. on the cntrar, Sellarssmth shws that, initiall, ne can appl the cncept a thght jstas a theretical cncept (that is, inerentiall) and jst n the basis a web epistemic abilities (sch as r ancestrs alread had at theinitial stages the str), whereas ne can have nninerential knwl-

edge nes thghts nl later n, n the basis cmplex epistemicprcedres and in virte being part a sphisticated scilingisticcmmnit (as with r ancestrs at the end the str).

The antibehaviristic imprt the mth Jnes is smewhat lesseas t discern. Let me distingish betweenPhilosophical Behaviorism(PB) andScientifc Behaviorism (SB). The rmer is a cnceptal dc-trine, accrding t which r rdinar mental cncepts are analzablein terms cncepts pertaining t vert behavir. At the time EPM,

Gilbert Rles The Concept o Mind was the best-arged rm PB. Thelatter is a nrmative and methdlgical dctrine that sggests hw tg abt bilding a science pschlg (EPM 54). SB is character-ized b the cnjnctin tw claims:


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Methodological Behaviorism (MB): scientifc psychologists areallowed to accept only one kind oevidence, namely, evidentialdata consisting o or derived rom overt behavior (EPM 53).

& Concept Formation Behaviorism (CB): whether ordinary men-

tal concepts are analyzable in terms o overt behavior (that is,whether PB is true), scientifc psychological concepts shouldbe introduced in terms o an austere behavioristic vocabulary,where every concept is defnable in terms o publicly accessiblebehavior (EPM 54).

At the time EPM, the mst infential versin SB was perhaps

red Skinners operatinal Behavirism (EPM 59), thgh Sellarswas als acqainted, via Gstav Bergmann, with Kenneth Spencesbehaviristic ther learning (Sellars 1975).

The mth Jnes rejects bth PB and SB. Accrding t Sellars, PBcrrectl describes r ancestrs mental cncepts and abilities at stage

A the str. That is wh Sellars calls r ancestrs Ryleans. Thethink as we d bt lack our cncept a thght as an inner episde:their prcesses speaking, perceptin, and thght are the same asrs in ever dimensinexcept one: the lack the apprpriate ntlg thghts as thght-episdes and the capacit t nninerentiallrecgnize them as sch episdes. Accrding t them, thinking simplamnts t having sme behavir r certain dispsitins t behave.Sellars rejects PB, r he denies that Rleans are mch similar, let alneidentical, t s. o crse, the have t be scientl like s t be pla-sible as r cnceptal reathers. Hwever, we knw hw t explain rintelligent behavir, etpace Rle (1949)sch explanatins canntbe given in terms hpthetical and mngrel hpthetical-categrical

acts abt behavir (EPM 46). In act, whenever we tr t explainwhat we mean b calling a piece nonhabitual behavir intelligent, weseem t nd it necessar t d s in terms thinking (EPM 46). InRles view, that a nnhabital behavir is intelligent means that theagent acts in virte a dispsitin t behave. Accrding t Rle (1949,46), sch a dispsitin is nt a single track dispsitin, like a refex ra habit. Rather, sch dispsitins are intelligent capacities, that is,capacities that are bilt p b training, rather than b drill (r cn-ditining) (Rle 1949, 42). The acqisitin sch capacities invlves

the stimlatin b criticism and example the ppils wn jdgment,s that he learns hw t d things thinking what he is ding; everperatin perrmed is itsel a new lessn t him hw t perrm bet-ter (Rle 1949, 4243). In Sellarss ees, Rle resrts (r, rather, must

SELLARS AND BEHAVIoRISM 87


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resrt) t the cncepts thinking and jdgment i he is t accnt rthe cncept a dispsitin t intelligent behavir. Hwever, since thermer cncept shld explicate the latter, the explicatin ends p beingcirclar (EPM 4647).

rthermre, in the mth Jnes Sellars rejects SB as well (eventhgh he apprves MB and thinks that a science pschlg ispssible). r in rder t acqire r cncept a thght, (a) the Rleansneed t acqire the resrces semantic and theretical discrse; (b)the genis Jnes mst explit sch resrces in bilding the ther thghts as inner episdes; (c) Jnes mst teach them sch a ther,s thatater sme trainingthe learn t knw their wn thghtsdirectl. Hence, Rleans can becme like s nl i CB (a ortiori, SB)

is alse, r tw main reasns. irst, the nctins that are picked t bthe semantic vcablar are raght with ght, whereas n behavir-istic accnt can explain the rle-gverned cnnectins in the netwrk langage. Secndl, Sellars allws the prt-pschlgist Jnes tintrdce ntins that d nt redce t a vcablar in which everterm is dened in terms bservable behavir (EPM 53)namel,Jnes intrdces the cncept a thght as a theoretical cncept (thatcannt be dened in an independent and prir bservatin vcablar).

B the rejectin CB, Sellars, as a rernner bth cgnitive scienceand the s-called ther-ther in the philsph mind, cntribtedt the all SB in the ver same ears dring which Chmsk (1959)demlished Skinner (1957).

2. beHaviorismin sellarss PHilosoPHyof language

The previs sectin has shwn that the view is partl tre accrdingt which the mth Jnes is a pineer piece antibehavirism (in

the philsph mind). In this sectin, I will claim that sch a view isals partl alse, r in the mth Jnes, Sellars presppses a Skin-nerian accnt langage acqisitin. In this sectin, I shall prsetw gals: recnstrcting Sellarss mltiaceted view langage, rle,sand behavir, n the ne hand; and shwing t what extent it dependsn behaviristic grnds, n the ther hand.

What des Sellars mean when he sas that ne (r example, aRlean) is eqipped with a langage? Sellars (1963a, 321, rst pb-lished in 1954) answers that being a cmpetent speaker invlves being

able t se langage accrding t rles. Hwever, Sellars has smemisgivings abt this answer, as it ma sggest that rle-gvernedlingistic behavir reqires awareness rles. Accrding t him, scha view shld be set aside, r it leads t an innite regress, as shwnb the llwing argment.


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(1) Learning to use (correctly) an expression E in a language L islearning to obey certain rules o L.

(2) Such rules can be linguistic or nonlinguistic. A linguistic rule

governing E is a sentence that contains a metalinguistic ex-pression reerring to what one has to do in order (correctly) touse E in L, while a nonlinguistic rule governing E is a mentalor a Platonistic rule that establishes what one has to do inorder (correctly) to use E in L.

(3) Consequently, learning to obey a rule governing E in L presup-poses either the ability to use a metalanguage ML in which therules governing E are ormulated or the awareness o certainmental or Platonistic rules.

(4) The frst disjunct leads to a regress, or one can know ML onlyi one has already learned it. I, by analogy with (1), learningML is learning to obey rules governing ML, then such learningpresupposes having learned MML; and by the same token, thispresupposes having learned MMML, and so orth.

(5) The second disjunct also leads to a regress, or awareness(such as thinking, reasoning, and so orth) is a sort o game,that is, a rule-governed activity. Being able to think, reason,be aware, and so on presupposes having learned such games.Thus, learning a nonlinguistic rule governing E presupposeshaving learned to be aware o certain (mental or Platonistic)rules (meta-awareness), which, in turn, presupposes havingacquired meta-meta-awareness, and so orth.

In light crrent philsph and cgnitive science, (4) and (5)(particlarl the idea that knwing a rle langage r a rle thght presppses having learned it) clearl bear the mark the

times. r example, at least since the pblicatin Jerr drs TheLanguage o Thought (1975), man have ceased t believe that beingable t think necessaril reqires having learned hw t think; n thecntrar, rles gverning thght are ten cnceived as innate. rthe mment, let me leave this rst smptm Sellarss behavirismaside, and keep llwing his line thght. Accrding t Sellars, therigin the regress is the claim that being able t learn a langagepresppses sme kind awareness rles. Ths, there is a simpleand straightrward wa aviding the regress, namel, b cnsider-ing rle-gverned lingistic behavir as behavir merely conormingto rules, as with habits (Sellars 1963a, 322); r nes behavir cancnrm t a rle even i the idea sch a rle has never ccrred tne. Sellars rejects this sltin, hwever, r he is cnvinced that apiece behavir is geninel rle-gverned nl i ding these things



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is making mves in virtue oa sstem rles; bt behavir merelcnrming t a rle cannt be s described.

Ths, Sellars is cnrnted with a dilemma: n the ne hand, in r-

der t avid the regress, ne has t d witht the idea that lingisticbehavir reqires the speaker intentinall t llw a rle; n thether hand, i the speaker des nt rmlate his tterance in virte the rles he is llwing, then it seems t be a mere accident that hisbehavir cnrms t the rles gverning it. Accrding t Sellars, thisis a alse dilemma, r there is a third, intermediate ntin, brrwedrm a Skinnerian ther learning: the ntin pattern-governedbehavior, which is neither accidental (like a mere habit) nr intentinal(like rle-llwing prper). Sellars claims that mst lingistic behav-

ir is pattern-gverned behavir. At the beginning, a ver small childC behaves in a certain wa; r example, he tters the snd orangein rnt an range bject. Sellars calls sch a reaction a langageentr move, even thgh C is nt llwing a rle intentinall. Then,an adlt, cmpetent speaker A, rewards C r his reactin (r example,he applads Cs behavir). Ater sme time and training, Cs behavirevlves int cnrming t a rle (which nl A knws): C has acqiredthe dispsitin t respnd in a certain wa (b implementing a certain

behaviral pattern, namel, b tteringorange in presence rangebjects). Sellars (1963a, 327) emphasizes that here the wrd respondshld be interpreted as an S-R cnnectin in the sense a Skinnerianther learning (which, in trn, might in principle be explained innerphsilgical terms). Then, in virte sch cnditining, Cs be-havir becmes a rm pattern-gverned behavir. r neither is Caware the rle he is llwing (nl A knws it), nr is Cs behavirmerel accidental (since C implements sch a behaviral patternthatis, the behavir a cmpetent speaker would have i he were intentinall

llwing that sstem lingistic rlesbecause he is gided b A andther cmpetent speakers). Therere, the dilemma vanishes.

Here it trns t, hwever, that a behaviristic view the mentalrepresents a dwnright arrire pense in Sellarss philsph langage,as it is shwn b the astere behaviristic vcablar that Sellarsempls, a vcablar entirel cnsisting expressins sch as S-Rcnnectin, reinrcement, reward, behaviral pattern, respnse,dispsitin, and s n. unrtnatel, accrding t crrent theries, the

real prcess lexical acqisitin is cmpletel dierent rm the nedepicted b Sellars. r example,Blm (2000, 61) has pinted t thatthe acqisitin the meanings wrds b rteen-mnth-ld childrenis nt the simple prcess that man philsphers, pschlgists, andparents ten described. Invking assciatin and imitatin, let alnecnditining, is nt engh t explain sch a prcess. Even learning a


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simple wrd reqires the child alread t have cmmand a cmplexweb cnceptal, scial, and lingistic abilities, which smetimes arecalled a ther mind.

3. Howto rescuetHe mytHof Jonesfrom beHaviorism

intHe PHilosoPHyof language

As I shall shw in this sectin, as ar as the mth Jnes is cncerned,ne can rgive Sellarss Skinnerian explanatin langage-acqisi-tin, r r main reasns: ne histrical, ne bradl exegetical, nenarrwl exegetical, and ne philsphical.

irst, Chmsks epchal attack n SB (especiall n CB)nt nl

in the celebrated review Skinners Verbal Behavior (Chmsk 1959)bt even in the less-knwn review Sellarss Sme Refectins nLangage Games (Chmsk 1957)appeared ater the pblicatin EPM in 1956.

Secnd, in the 1950s (when bth Skinner and Sellars were aliatedwith the Minnesta Center r the Philsph Science), Skinnerianbehavirism was abt the nl shw in twn. Sellars did nt see mchalternative t behavirism as the rm scientic pschlg, and when

he refected n langage-acqisitin mechanisms, he cld nt help mv-ing within a Skinnerian ramewrk. Accrdingl, as I have pinted tabve, he sed a Skinnerian terminlg. ones speaking like a scienticbehavirist, hwever, des nt entail nes being a scientic behavirist. rexample, ne can think that Skinnerian behavirism is an interesting btltimatel inadeqate model that will be sperseded bt the vcablar which can in the meantime be sed t make certain metacnceptalpints. There is sme evidence that, in EPM, Sellars held that ver belie(r example, EPM 55). Mrever, as I have shwn in sectin 1, nlike

Skinner and ther behavirists, Sellars rejected CB.

Third, in EPM Sellars has the Rleans eqipped with a langage,witht an explicit explanatin the rigin their lingistic abilities,let alne a behaviristic explanatin. The same can be said the resrc-es semantic discrse. That ne (r example, a Rlean ancestr) hasthe resrces semantic discrse means that ne can make semanticassertins the rm . . . in L means (EPM 49)2, where . . . isan expressin a langage L, while belngs t a metalangage

ML (which ne alread knws). Ths, having thse resrces amntst being able t d tw kinds things: giving the meaning . . . in Lb sing in ML as a sample, in rder t exhibit (witht describingit) the meaning in ML (which ML speakers alread knw); andsggesting that . . . has, r L speakers, the same meaning rML speakers. In ther wrds, Rleans can make assertins the rm



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. . . in L is a (in ML), that is, the knw hw t se the dot-quotingdevice t achieve tw reslts: pinting t the lingistic rle that has r ML speakers witht having t describe it (as ML speak-ers are alread amiliar with it); and claiming that the rle exhibitedb is the same as . . . has r L speakers (Sellars 1953, 1969,1974). I, r example, . . . were the Italian wrd arancione, L were Ital-ian, were the English wrd range, and ML were English, then wld be a set lingistic behavirs made p language entrytransitions (sch as seeing smething range in rnt ne and tter-ing range), intralinguistic moves (sch as explaining that range islighter than red bt darker that ellw), and language exit transitions(sch as ttering I shall catch an range thing and stretching nes

arm t tward an range pencil) (Sellars 1974, 42324). one mightcnsider Sellarss apparats t heav. Bt in principle (at least at thislevel detail), the apparats des nt impl behavirism.

rth and perhaps mre imprtantl, the mth Jnes des ntcllapse becase Sellarss Skinnerian explanatin langage ac-qisitin. Even thgh sch an explanatin is cmpletel inadeqate,nnetheless attribting a ther mind (r an inner grammar) tthe child (r the Rlean) des nt jepardize the validity Sellarss

argmentnt i ne regards the mth Jnes as a thght experimentthat des nt need t be scienticall plasible, bt rather lgicall ps-sible.3 r the childs (r the Rleans r even man actal cmpetentspeakers) knwledge a ther mind (r a grammar) is tacit knwl-edge. I ne likes, ne ma sa that, in the pre-Jnesean scenari thatcharacterizes the beginning the mth, Rleans tacitly know havingthghts, since the have them, thgh the are nt aware havingthem; ater all, ne ma sa, the exhibit their tacit knwledge, r theact intelligentl. Hwever, this wld be jst a verbal pint that wld

leave sbstantial acts nmdied, r pre-Jnesean Rleans wldstill lack our cncept a thght as an inner episde, which reqiresawareness (nt jst tacit knwledge) nes wn thghts.4

4. beHaviorismin sellarss PHilosoPHyof mind

I shall nw switch again t the philsph mind. M task in this sectinwill be t pint t that Sellarss psitive attitde tward behavirism isnt cnned t the philsph langage. Sellars (1975) recalls when,

as a pressr at the universit Iwa (between the 1930s and the1940s), he began t take behavirism serisl:

The idea that smething like S-R-reinrcement learning ther cldprvide a bridge between white rat behavir and characteristicallhman behavir was a tempting ne, bt I cld see n wa cash-


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ing it t in the philsph mind. In particlar, I cld nt see hwt relate it t the intentinalit which I cntined t think as theessential trait the mental.

A ew ears later, the mth Jnes dispels all dbts cncerningintentinalit b ptting rward a thesis that Sellars misleadinglcalls Verbal Behaviorism (VB) (Sellars 1974, 418): lingistic assertinsare intentinal in a primar sense, while the (theretical) cncept thghtbilt p n the mdel verbal episdesis intentinal in aderivative sense. Thanks t VB, Sellars can whleheartedl se behav-irism (especiall the paradigmatic explanatin rat behavir) in thephilsph mind, as at the end the pst-Jnesean scenari, thes-called dnouement the mth Jnes (EPM 59):

once r ctitis ancestr, Jnes, has develped the ther that vertverbal behavir is the expressin thghts, and taght his cmpa-trits t make se the ther in interpreting each thers behavir,it is bt a shrt step t the se this langage in sel-descriptin.Ths, when Tm, watching Dick, has behaviral evidence which war-rants the se the sentence (in the langage the ther) . . . Dickis thinkingthat p, Dick, sing the same behaviral evidence, can sa,in the langage the ther, . . . I am thinkingthat p. And it nwtrns tneed it have?that Dick can be trained t give reasnablreliable sel-descriptins, sing the langage the ther, withthaving t bserve his vert behavir. Jnes brings this abt, rghlb applading tterances b Dick I am thinkingthat p when thebehaviral evidence strngl spprts the theretical statement Dickis thinkingthat p; and b rwning n tterances I am thinkingthat p, when the evidence des nt spprt this theretical state-ment. or ancestrs begin t speak the privileged access each s has t his wn thghts. What began as a language with a purelytheoretical use has gained a reporting role.

once again, Sellars seems t be a ll-blded behavirist. Mrever,Sellars (196162)5 explicates EPM 59 b claiming that the core Dicks learning t reprt what he is thinking is a matter his acqir-ing a tendenc (ceteris paribus) t respnd t his thght that p bsaing I am thinkingthat p, where everthing hinges n the rce the wrd respnd in this cnnectin.It is being used as a technicalterm borrowed rom learning theory. Which ther? A Skinnerian ne, crse: thanks t Jness applading (a psitive reinrcement) and

rwning (a negative reinrcement) at his tterances, the Rlean Dickis cnditined in a certain wa. Ths, ne might think that Sellars isempling a vcablar cnrming t CB instrctins.

Hwever, things are mre cmplicated. Strictl speaking, Sellarssview in the dnouement is nt cmpatible with CB. r Sellars em-



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pls a Skinnerian vcablar plus the theretical ntin thght(intrdced b Jnes). The relata the cnditining relatin Sellars istalking abt are Dicks behaviral respnse (namel, the tterance Iam thinkingthat p), n the ne hand, and a theretical entit (namel,Dicks thght that p), n the ther hand. This prmpts Sellars (196162) t make a terminlgical claricatin. The expressin cnditinedrespnse is . . . mst reqentl sed (b American pschlgists in theSkinnerian traditin) in sch a wa that the vert is cnditined t thevert. This is bnd p with the relctance man pschlgists tspeak in terms establishing cnnectins between pstlated centralprcesses; and in general, with an anti-theretical bias. Ths, he writesthat i the expressin cnditined respnse (pace Pavlv) is t mean

b denitin a cnnectin between bservables, then, crse, I cantse the term in making m pints [that is, in talking a cnditiningrelatin between thght and behavir]. I shall, therere, sbstitte themre netral term assciative cnnectin, which reers t a similarlcntingent and nnratinal relatin. I ne likes, ne can braden theSkinnerian jargn and call the rmer relatum sch assciative cn-nectin (that is, Dicks tterance) a respnse and the latter relatum(that is, Dicks thght) a stimls: hwever, sch a stimls is still(contra CB) a theretical entit pstlated b Jnes n theretical

grnds.

Prima acie, accrding t Sellars (196162), ater training, Dickbecmes able t nninerentiall knw his wn thght that p ithellwing tw cnditins are llled:

(a) Dick has become conditioned to respond to the occurrenceo the thought that p by uttering I am thinkingthat p

&

() the conditioning is itsel caught up in a conceptual rame-work.

on the ne hand, claim (a) is clearl alse, r it sggests that we (actalspeakers and thinkers) are like ne sch as Dick, wh is cnditined ttter Im thinkingthat p whenever he has the thght that p. Thatswh Sellars mdies the scenari depicted in the dnouement b claimingthat, strictl speaking, the latter relatum the cnditining relatin isnt the utterance I am thinkingthat p, bt rather the metathought I

am thinkingthat p (Sellars 196162, 1965). Dick alread had thghtseven at the beginning the str, when he was a mere Rlean. Bt nlater having learned the ther thghts and having been trained bJnes des he acqire the tendenc t respnd t the ccrrence thethght that p in his mind b having the metathght I am thinking


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that p, which he sometimes expresses b ttering I am thinkingthatp. Ths, (a) shld be sbstitted with (a)*:

(a)* Dick is cnditined t respnd t the ccrrence the thght

that p b having the metathght I am thinkingthat p.

on the ther hand, claim () needs npacking. The expressin cn-ceptal ramewrk ccrring in () reers t the cnceptal (inerential)resrces Dick is eqipped with and thanks t which he is able t jstihis metathght I am thinkingthat p. Accrding t Sellars (196162,1965) Dicks epistemic attitdes tward his metathght are the llw-ing:

()* Dicks recgnizes that his metathght I am thinkingthat p

asserts the ccrrence his thght that p can be vertl expressedb the tterance I am thinkingthat p and is a reliable smptm the ccrrence the thght that p.

Sellars regards (a)* and ()* as the scient cnditins r Dicksnninerential knwledge his thght that p. The rmer, (a)*, accntsr the directness Dicks knwledge, while the latter, ()*, accnts rtheepistemic natre Dicks respnse.

In the next sectin, I will shw that sch a behaviristic accnt

nninerential knwledge nes wn thghts leads t the ailre themth Jnes. Nw let me brief cnsider MB. Sellars describes Jnesas an nsng rernner the mvement in pschlg, nce revl-tinar, nw cmmnplace, knwn as Behavirism, cnceived as themethdlgical thesis MB, accrding t which scientic pschlgistsare allwed t accept nl evidence derived rm vert behavir (EPM 53). Apparentl, MB expresses a reasnable and harmless cnstraint.Hwever, here things are nt less tangled than in the case CB. In

the sixth sectin, I shall pint t that impsing sch a methdlgicalcnstraint t Jnes prtpschlgical activit has seris cnseqencesr the mth Jnes.

5. tHe failureoftHe mytHof Jones

The mth Jnes has been criticized in several was, r example, asa lgicall incherent thght experiment (Marras 1973a, 1973b, 1977)and as an empiricall implasible scenari (Triplett and deVries 2006).

In what llws, I shall pt rward a dierent criticism. I shall argethat, nlike the behaviristic assmptins in the philsph langage(see sectins 2 and 3 abve), Sellarss behavirism in the philsph mind makes the mth Jnes an invalid argment; r, given thepremises, it is alse that at the end the str the rmer Rlean Dick



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has reall becme very much similar, let alone identical, to us, as ar asthe abilit directl t knw nes thghts is cncerned. Let me pint ttw nt easil redcible dierences between Dick (even ater trainingand cnditining) and rselves.

M rst bjectin rns as llws. Sppse r the argments sakethat Dick is cnditined (b Jnes) t respnd t the ccrrence the thght that p (r example, p: the sn is rising) b having themetathght I am thinkingthat p; sppse rther that, in virte sch cnditining and the cnceptal resrces he is eqipped with, Dickcan jsti his metathght, s that he can be said directly to know histhght that p. Nnetheless, even in this case, Dick wld nt be likes. r the cnditining cnnectin between the thght that p and the

metathght I am thinkingthat p has n infence n the relatin be-tween the thght that q (r example, q: this carpet is green) and themetathght I am thinkingthat q (rp and q are nt semanticallrelated). Ths, in rder t have direct knwledge his thght that qDick needsurther cnditining, as having learned directl t knw theccrrence his thght that p is nt engh.

Therere, pst-Jnesian cnditined Rleans are nt (scientl)like us, r ne s directl knws nt nl the ccrrence nes

thght that p bt als the ccrrence nes thght that q and, inact, the ccrrence any thght ne happens t have, witht havingt be trained and cnditined each time and r each single thght. rexample,when ne ( s) has the thght that r (r example, r: Tmis tall) r thefrst time, then ne knws that ne has sch a thghtwitht bserving nes wn behavir, witht making an inerence andwitht being cnditined. Therere, the mth Jnes ails becase,at the end the mth, the rmer Rleans have nt acqired the sameabilit as we have t knw directl any r thghts whatsoever.

M secnd bjectin is the llwing. The Jnesean ther thghtsis allible, r it des nt prvide s with a methd r relating behav-ir and thghts witht making mistakes. Based n sme behaviralevidence, Jnes smetimes believes that Dick is thinkingthat p, whilein act Dick is thinkingthat q r even that non-p. I this happens (as itma), then hw can Jnes train Dick reliabl t respnd when and onlywhen Dick is thinkingthat p? It seems that he cannt. once again, Dickhas nt acqired the same kind direct sel-knwledge as we have.

I d nt knw i and hw Sellars cld repl t the rmer bjectin:perhaps b invking a radical (and, as ar as I can see, implasible)rm semantic hlism. Hwever, I gess he wld repl t the latterbjectin b making tw claims. irst, a Jnesean ther thght pr-


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vides ne with a rbst cnnectin between behavir and thghts. rexample, i smene sas, I shld g t New yrk, then enters a travelagenc and bs a ticket t New yrk, her behavir strngl spprtsr belie that she is thinking smething like in rder t g t New yrkI shld b a plane ticket. B analg, smene wh cries and shtsand has tpical stmach-ache behavir gives s strng grnds t inerthat he is having a stmach ache. Secnd, n knwledge is inallible,neither the ctitis knwledge the Jnesean ther thghts nrthe actal direct sel-knwledge nes thghts. In act, accrding tRrt (1970) ceasing t cnsider incrrigibilit as the mark the men-tal is ne the mst virts cnseqences the nvel nn-Cartesianpictre that Sellars draws in EPM.

Let me repl t these mves. irst, I have said that Jnes cannttrain Dick reliabl t respnd when and only when Dick is thinkingthatp, bt I am nt cmmitted t the view accrding t which ne knwsnes wn thghts with tter and abslte Cartesian certaint. Clearl,the when and nl when is an ideal that ne can nl apprximate.Hwever, the mistakes ne wld make in cnnecting behavir andthghts based n a Jnesean ther thghts are prbabl morerequent than and, mre imprtantl, dierent rom thse based n

actal sel-knwledge. In act, as I shall arge, the rmer mistakescrrespnd t dierentgrounds.

In what llws, I will nt be cncerned with the qestin Whdes Dick metathght ccr? whse answer is Becase he has beentrained t respnd t his thghts with metathghts t the eect thathe has them. In itsel, the cnditining has nthing epistemic: beingcnditined t have the metathght I am thinkingthat p is nt a case knwledge, let alne sel-knwledge (becase knwledge reqires

jsticatin).

Rather, I will cs n theepistemology nninerential knwledge nes wn thghts, and I will address the qestin What are Dicksgrounds r the ccrrence his metathght? Mre precisel, Whatright des Dick have t have his metathght? In sch a case, the answerreqires a ver dierent str that will inclde reerence t the reliabilit the cnditined respnse t thghts with metathghts, as well ast the jsticatin the invlved ther mind, that is, the Jneseanther thghts. on the ne hand, Dick knws that his metathght

is a reliable smptm the ccrrence the thght that p and, mreprecisel, thatgiven the ccrrence the thght that phe has beencnditined t have the metathght (that is, he cannt help having it).on the ther hand, he knws that his wn intelligent behavir (nt nl



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verbal bt even silent) shld be explained in Jnesean terms, that is,b attribting certain thghts t himsel.

Ths, Dicks jsticatin r his metathght ltimatel relies n be-

havioral evidence. r bth the ther cnditining and the Jneseanther thghts that Dicks jsticatin his metathght dependsn are explicitl bilt in accrd with MB. Accrdingl, bth theries aremerel spprted b the bservatin ther peples and nes wnvert behavir. Therere, Dicks sel-knwledge ltimatel has thesame kind grnds as Skinners ther cnditining and as Jnessprtpschlgical ther thghts, namel, evidential data cnsist-ing r derived rm vert behavir. That is wh, even at the end the str, Dick has nt acqired the same kind direct sel-knwledge

as we have: r reasn t believe that we are thinkingthat p is nt rbehavir bt rather r thght that p.

6. noninferential grounds

Brrwing a distinctin rm McDwell (2010), let s sa that a piece knwledge can be either epistemologically r psychologically nn-inerential. The rmer is a piece knwledge whse justifcation isnninerential. The latter is a piece knwledge ne has arrived at b

a directprocess, that is, witht intermediar steps. It is wrth ntingthatSellars himsel regards the inerential/nninerential divide as anepistemlgical distinctin. r example, accrding t Sellars (1963a,121), even thghrm an ontological pint viewthereticalentitiesexist in the same sense as bservatinal entities, rm anepiste-mological pint view a thereticaljustifcation is cmpletel dierentrm an bservatinal ne. r a theretical jsticatin is inerential(that is, in rder t prve smething ne has t make inerences rm

smething knwn independentl), while an bservatinal jsticatinis noninerential (that is, ne des nt have t invke the validit aninerence in rder t prve smething, as his reasn is, r example, thatne sees that it is s). Lets sa that I believe n inerential grnds thata certain gas will be the Ble-Charles law r even that tmrrwthe sn will rise, whereas I believe that this is red n nninerentialgrnds (namel, I see it).

Let me rther emphasize sch distinctins. Sppse that a TV setcan be switched n b pshing an bttn its remte cntrl. Sppse

that, initiall, a teenager switches n the TV based n the inerence II wish t watch Channel X, I mst psh bttn 1. As it happens, he

ver ten wishes t watch the ver ashinable Channel X. Ater repeti-tin and in virte the reward watching the ashinable channel,he becmes cnditined t switching the TV n b pshing each time


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the bttn 1 (as with a habit), even when he actall wants t watchChannel y (assciated with bttn 2), thgh in the latter case, aterswitching the TV n b pshing bttn 1 (as a cnditined respnse),he will then psh bttn 2 (in virte a practical inerence). In scha case, hwever, the teenager des nt have any reason at all t pshbttn 1, while he has a theoretical reasn, rather than an observationalne, t psh bttn 2.

Similarl, at the beginning, the Rlean Dick (taght b Jnes) hasinerential knwledge his wn thghts, based n behaviral evidence.Later, he becmes cnditined t respnd sitabl t the ccrrence his thghts, s that his knwledge them becmes pschlgicallnninerential. Nnetheless, in virte MB, sch knwledge relies n

behaviral grnds; cnseqentl, it is still epistemlgicall inerential.Therere,pace Sellars, Dick has nt actall becme like s, nt nlr the reasns I have prvided in the previs sectin bt als becaser knwledge r wn thghts, whatever ne might sa its ps-chlgical stats, is denitel nninerential epistemlgicall. In act,r nninerential sel-knwledge is based n nninerential grnds.r example, what right d I have r claiming that this is red? I see it.Similarl, what right d I have t claim that I am thinkingthat p? I have

sch a thght. on the cntrar, Dick claims that he is thinkingthat pmerel n behaviral grnds. Bt behaviral grnds are a sbclass theretical, inerential grnds. Hence, the are deepl dierent rmbservatinal, nninerential nes.

Ths, the mth Jnes ails. Cnsidered as an argment, the mth Jnes is nt valid, r it des nt scceed in prving its cnclsin:that is, that at the end the ctitis str, in the pst-Jnesean andpstcnditining scenari, Dick has becme like us (as ar as the capac-it t nninerentiall knw nes wn thghts is cncerned).

Let me brief qali tw pints. irst, m argment is nt qestin-begging against EPM, r the ntin epistemlgicall nninerentialknwledge is nt the inams ntin the given. ones epistem-lgicall nninerential knwledge smething is nt reqired t beepistemicall independent, indeeasible, and able t prvide epistemicspprt r all ther knwledge. A piece knwledge is epistemlgicallnninerential i ne can vindicate its stats as knwledge nt nl bactall invking the gdness an inerence t what is knwn rm

smething independentl within nes epistemic reach (see McDwell2010, 19). This characterizatin, hwever, is cmpatible with the l-lwing ideas: that nninerential knwledge reqires the capacity tmake inerences (as well as ther semantic and epistemic capacities);that sch nninerential knwledge is deeasible (r example, based



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n either theretical reasns r reliabilit cnsideratins); that schknwledge des nt cnstitte the ltimate crt appeal r all therepistemic claims.

Secnd, m analsis reveals Sellarss ambigs and misleading se the term reprt. Tpicall, a reprt is a speech act cnsisting in thebservatinal descriptin smething (EPM 3238). r example,the statement This is red is an bservatinal reprt. In EPM, hwever,Sellars bradens the meaning the term reprt, sggesting that re-prts are bth lingistic and mental acts (r example, the metathghtI am thinkingthat p is a reprt) and that a reprt is a direct respnset nes crrent sitatin (r example,Dicks cnditined respnse Iam thinkingthat p is a reprt) (EPM 35).

Ths, there are tw senses the wrd reprt, independent eachther. The rmer, rdinar sense reers t bservatinal reprts sch asThis is red. The latter, idisncratic, sense reers t mental (r lingistic)respnses t certain stimli. Mre imprtantl, the rmer expressesepistemologically nninerential knwledge, the latter nl expressespsychologically nninerential knwledge. one might bject that bser-vatinal reprts serve as the model r intrspective reprts. And likeall mdels, the mdel is nt an exact dplicate. This is tre. In sch a

case, hwever, i the mdel and the mdeled had dierentepistemologicalstatuses, the analg wld lse ne its essential prpses.

At an rate, the last sentence the dnouement (what began as alanguage with a purely theoretical use has gained a reporting role) ismisleadingl ambigs. Accrding t the pschlgical ntin, it is tre.

Accrding t the epistemlgical ntin, it is alse. Sellars describes asitatin in which Dick

(i) has acqired the capacit to report his wn thghts.

At the same time, hwever, he allws the reader t believe that

(ii) b acqiring sch reporting capacit Dick has becme like s.

This is nthing bt a cnjring trick, which hides that

(i) is tre nl i ne interprets reprt pschlgicall, while (ii)is tre nl i ne interprets reprting epistemlgicall;

ths interpreted, (i) des nt impl (ii) (and vice versa);

(ii) is what Sellars should have prved in the mth Jnes, whilewhat he actually prved is, at mst, (i).


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7. a mytHto KillamytH?

At the end EPM ( 63), Sellars writes, I have sed a mth t kill amththe Mth the Given, that is, the idea that there is, indeedmust be, a strctre particlar matter act sch that . . . each actcan nt nl be nninerentiall knwn t be the case, bt presppsesn ther knwledge either particlar matter act, r generaltrths (EPM 32). Des it llw that the ailre the mth Jnes(that I claim t have shwn abve) als ndermines Sellarss braderprject in EPM, namel, dismantling the Mth the Given? The answerltimatel depends n several cntrversial exegetical isses, which Ishall nl rghl describe rather than prperl assess.

DeVries and Triplett (2000, 1045, 178) regard the rst part EPM( 138) as the antindatinalistpars destruens the essa (shw-ing that nthing can at the same time be knwn and be epistemicallindependent), whereas the mth Jnes ( 4863) prvides a psitivenn-Cartesian view in the philsph mind. under sch an interpre-tatin, the ailre the mth Jnes des nt have an cnseqencer Sellarss general case against the Mth the Given.

Accrding t Brandm (1997; 2002, 34953), Sellarss master idea

in EPM is the s-called tw-pl accnt bservatin reprts, whichgives the scient cnditins nninerential knwledge (namel, hav-ing a reliable respnse and an inerential jsticatin it). Brandm(1997, 16768) regards sch an accntccrring in the rst hal EPM, bere r Rleans ancestrs cme t the sceneas sufcient tdismantle the idea that empirical knwledge has ndatins. Accrdingt Brandm (2002, 36264), hwever, Sellars rther relies n the tw-pl accnt in shwing hw the rmer Rleans acqire sel-knwledge.Ths, n Brandms view, althgh the mth Jnes plas an additinal

rle within the wider strateg EPM, its rle in the wider cntext is ntessential, s that its ailre wld nt ndermine what Brandm takest be Sellarss main argment against the Mth the Given (althghit ma give a cle that smething is ging wrng there).

Accrding t McDwell (2009a, 2009b), the mth Jnes has the es-sential prpse t cmplete the accnt experience that Sellars needst arge against traditinal empiricism, a deepl rted rm theMth the Given. Sch an accnt reqires explaining hw experience

can ield nninerential knwledge, bt nl in a wa that presppsesther knwledge matters act (see McDwell 2009a, 223). Accrdingt McDwell, Sellars ers the reqired pictre in EPM 1020, bthe has t endrse a prmissr nte, r he realizes that b speaking experiences as cntaining prpsitinal claims he ma seem t be



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kncking at clsed drs (EPM 16). As McDwell (2009a, 223) pintst, Sellars delivers n the prmissr nte at the end the rst phase the mth Jnes. r the ntin experiences cntaining prpsi-tinal claims derives rm Jness attribting the semantic categries maniest tterances t thghts (inclding perceptins) b analg. AsI have arged abve (see sectins 5 and 6), hwever, the mth Jnesdes nt shw that the Jnesean ntin thght can becme the versame noninerential ntin thght as we have. Cnseqentl, nderMcDwells interpretatin the ailre the mth Jnes jepardizesSellarss critiqe the Mth the Given.

Nw cnsider a less abstract descriptin giveness (sch as is in-vlved in certain sense-data theries): a act which presppses n

learning, n rming assciatins, n setting p stimls-respnsecnnectins (EPM 6). Sellars regards sch an idea as misleading, rit is clsel cnnected t the mistaken claim that the abilit t sensesense cntents is nacqired (EPM 6) r, mre generall, that thereare n ttall nlearned jstiing cgnitive skills. It is nt clear whatntin presupposition Sellars empls here (r example, presppsi-tin in a casal/tempral sense, presppsitin as cnceptal pririt ra prel lgical ntin presppsitin; see deVries and Triplett 2000,

6869), nr hw the ntin a totallyunlearned justiying cognitive skillshld be interpreted. under a certain interpretatin, against the Mth the Given Sellars reqires that ne shld accnt r eachparticular

jstiing skill in terms learning, rming assciatins, and s rth.Given this interpretatin, m rst bjectin t Sellarss argment in themth Jnes (see sectin 5 abve) can be seen as a tl r answeringSellarss criticism sch a ntin giveness. r we (nn-Rleans)have cntentl and jstied, bt nlearned, thght-ascriptin abili-ties concerning new thoughts. under a dierent interpretatin, hwever,

Sellars jst reqires that, generall speaking, ne cannt participatein the game giving and asking r reasns nless ne has acqiredsme cnceptal abilities. Sch a view, which is rghl eqivalent tthe claim that at least sme jstiing cgnitive skills mst be acqired,is nt challenged b m bjectin.6

University o Turin (Italy)

NoTES

1. Thgh in EPM Sellars deals with bth thghts and sensr impres-

sins, in this paper I shall cs jst n the case thghts.


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2. r smething similar n bth it is tre that p and a reers t a, see

Sellars (1962).

3. otherwise, i ne thinks, like deVries and Triplett (2000, 178), that Sell-

ars mth Jnes is nt a pre ctin and that Sellars pint reqires mre

than its mere lgical pssibilit, then Sellars has ailed n his wn terms, r

his str is nd deepl incmpatible with r best theries the histrical

develpment langage and hman cnceptal capacities. It seems t me,

hwever, that this exegesis des nt make clear wh Sellars calls the mth

Jnes a piece anthrplgical sciencefction (EPM 48, m italics).

4. r a dierent apprach t this isse, see Marras (1978).

5. In what llws, I will directl qte rm Sellars (196162) and Sellars

(1965). Hwever, r an expsitin Sellarss extensive crrespndence with

Hectr-Neri Castaeda n the philsph mind, see als Lehrer and Stern(2000).

6. I wish t thank Dieg Marcni r his help in interpreting Sellars and

r his cmments n this article.

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