8/14/2019 T5 B64 GAO Visa Docs 1 of 6 Fdr- 5-16-03 GAO Interview of FBI Re Distribution of Visa Revocation Cables 506

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9/11 Personal Privacy

Prepared by: Kate BrentzelDate Prepared: May 20, 2003Reviewed by: Type reviewer name hereIndex: Type bundle index hereDO C Number: 886033DO C Library: Type library name hereJo b Code:320172

Record of InterviewTitle Interview w ith T om R uocco on visa revocation cablesPurpose To discuss the internal distribution of visa revocation cableswithin FB IContact Method \ eContact PlaceContact Date May 16, 2003Participants FBI: Tom Ru occ o, Ac ting Special A ssistant to Steve McCraw,Assistant Director, Office of IntelligenceGAO: Kate BrentzelComments/Remarks:

I spoke with Tom Ruocco to establish which FBI unit receives State's revocation cables andwh ether that unit then distributes the cables to other units. W e had bee n trying to find an FBIofficial with this type of inform ation since early March but had not found someone knowledgeableabout this until we spoke to Tom Ruocco. M r. Ruocco's boss, Steve McC raw, asked him to lookinto cable distribution for us. Mr. Ruocco did some investigating to find ou t whe re these cables goin the FB I and passed along the following informa tion to me.

' !Mr. Ruoc co said that all cables that are addressed to the FBI go to the FBI's main com munication 1 center first inelectronic format. Cables that are not secret or top secret (revocationcablesare !'unclassified) becom e part of the Automated Case Supp ort (AC S) database. A paper copy of thecable goes to the country desk un it relevant to the cable (for example, if a Saudi man'svisa isrevoked, then the Saudi Arabia co untry desk wo uld receive this cable). He said that som e countrydesk units w ere located within the C ounterterrorism Division. The u nit that analyzes Saudi Arabia,for example, is in Counterterrorism.I had sent Mr. Ruoc co a spreadsheet with the names of the 240 individuals whose visas wererevoked, along with all of their relevant biographic data. I highlighted the individuals whoappeared to still be in the U nited States so that Mr. Ruocco could look into these cases first. Hesaid that he only had time to look into six cases but in all of these six cases he could verify that the ,revocation cable had been logged into ACS. He did not confirm whether hard copies of the cables ;were received in relevant country desks. / For exam ple, Mr. Ruocco said that he had entered the data that I had given him for #3 on ourspreadsheet (seedata binder D-2) into AC S. He said that the cable, w hich was dated July 23, 2002,was entered into AC S on July 23, 2002. In ACS he saw a copy of the w hole revocation cabledocument. He said that he also saw another entry in ACS on July 27 , 2002 from the Legal Attach ein Riyadh stating that Legal Attache had contacted the individual's family in Riyadh and that thefamily confirmed that the individua l was in the United State, studying.In the case of #10, the cable was dated July 22,2002 and was entered into ACS on July 22 , 2002.Mr.Ruocco saw an other entry on Sept. 30, 2002 from the Legal Attache at the post saying that he hadcontacted the individual's family an d that they said the individual was in the United States.Pagel Record of Interview

8/14/2019 T5 B64 GAO Visa Docs 1 of 6 Fdr- 5-16-03 GAO Interview of FBI Re Distribution of Visa Revocation Cables 506

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Prepared by: Kate BrentzelDate Prepared: May 20, 2003Reviewed by: Type reviewer name here

Index: Type bundle index hereDOC Number: 886033DOC Library: Type library name hereJob Code:320172

In the case of #14, the cable was dated July 23, 2002 and entered in ACS on July 23, 2002. Therewas also an entry f rom the Legal Attache onAugust 3, 2002 saying that he was checking into thecase and another entry from the Legal Attacheon Oct. 21,2002 saying that the individual's familyhad been contacted and they said he was in the United States, studying.In the case of #31, the revocation cable was dated August 1,2002 and entered into ACS on August3, 2002.In the case of #34, the cable was dated July 23, 2002 and entered into ACS on July 23, 2002.Anotherentry f rom the Legal Attache on August 8, 2002 said that the family had been contacted on July24,2002.Mr. Ruocco said that the cables must reach the Legal Attaches overseas because they areresponding to the cables and they are responding quickly.M r. Ruocco said that all FBI units use the ACS database; it is the bureau's main database to tellinvestigators if there is a case open on individuals. I asked Mr. Ruocco if the presence of thesecables in ACS would instigate action by investigators here in the United States. He said that therewould have to be a "lead" set in order for investigators in various units around the United States totake action. He said that he didn't see any "leads" in the six cases he looked into, although he onlysearched ACS for teletype (cable) responses, not for other types of information on the individuals.Mr. Ruocco said that since the cables do not specifically say "terrorism" that he thought it was lesslikely that the cables would set off alarms if received by FBI units. (Auditor's note: the cables saythat the visas are revoked for 212a3 or 212a3b, the sections of the INA which stipulate that theperson is a national security or terrorist risk, but FBIanalysts would have to know theirimmigration law to know this).Mr. Ruocco said that BICE (Bureauof Immigration and Customs Enforcement) would take thelead on revocation cases. He said he thought that even if an investigative unit saw the visarevocation cable in ACS, that the unit would probably not do anything unless there was already acase open on this person. He said that he would have to look through case files to see if there wereany open investigations on any of the individualson our list. Mr.Ruocco gave the list to theForeign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF) to see if the task force had all 240 names in theirConsolidated Tracking List. He said that the task force had hits for at least 86 names. 86were intheir TIPOFF list (which they get from State) and 5 in VGTOF (an FBI list). He said that the 5 inVGTOF may also be in TIPOFF, so we cannot assume that the number is 91 total. Mr.Ruocco saidthat this meant that the FTTTF already knew about 86 of these individuals. He was not able toconfirm whether the FTTTFknew that the individuals' visas were revoked.Mr. Ruocco said that FTTTFis only a tracking team - it supports investigators by compilinginformation and alerting investigators if necessary. Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTTF) are theunitswith the actual investigators.

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