Assessing the Role of Public Policy in Industrial Transitions:

How Distinct Regional Contexts Inform Comprehensive Planning

Nina Peluso, Michael Kearney, and Richard Lester

Working Paper SeriesThe Roosevelt Project Special Series

Roosevelt Project Report Sponsor

The Roosevelt Project participants thank the Emerson Collective for sponsoring this report and for their continued leadership on issues at the intersection of social justice and environmental stewardship.

AssessingtheRoleofPublicPolicyinIndustrialTransitions:HowDistinctRegionalContextsInformComprehensivePlanning

NinaPeluso1,MichaelKearney1,RichardLester1

1MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology

September2020

Abstract

Major industrial transitions in the United States led to highly divergentcommunity outcomes. As the nation transitions to a deeply decarbonizedeconomy,understandingthedriversofcommunitysuccessinthefaceofthesehistorical transitions is crucial. We examine historical US transitions andcorrespondingpolicyviaaseriesofliteraturereviewsandcasestudies.First,we examine literature around four key domains governing communitydevelopment.Then,weusehistoricaltransitionsinPittsburghandthePacificNorthwest to interrogate markers for regional success and geographicaldisparities.Finally,we investigatetherecentcaseof theUStransition fromincandescenttoLEDlightingtoidentifyspecificpolicyrecommendations.Ourfindingssuggestthat,ataregionallevel,policymakersshouldidentifydriversof community well-being, nurture strong ties between core institutions,carefully utilize economic development corporation structures, and usecautionwhenconsideringprivate-leddevelopmentinitiatives.

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1. IntroductionAsthethreatofclimatechangelooms,globalpolicymakersandtechnologistshaveturned

their attention to thevast arrayofmeasures to confront the challenge.Ashuman-driven

emissionsrise,alarge-scalerehauloftheglobalenergysystem,encompassingtheelectricity,

transportation,industrialandbuildingssectorsseemsimminent.

Withinthisglobalcontext,theUnitedStatesmustconsideramajorindustrialtransition

ona scaleandat apace that ithasneverexperienced.The transitionwill fundamentally

reshapecommunitiesandindividuallivelihoods.Theprosperityofthedomesticandglobal

communitiesalikereliesonthepoliciesadoptedbyfederal,state,andlocalgovernmentsin

thenearterm. Yet,policies thatbestspurpositiveenvironmentalchangecansitatcross

purposes with the goals of the industries that have long supported U.S. working

communities.

ConsidertheexperienceofAdamsCounty,Ohio.AdamsCounty,70milesfromCincinnati,

experiencedaneconomicboominthe1970sand1980sfollowingthecommissioningoftwo

coal-firedpowerplants.Atthetime,coal-firedpowerplantsdelivered80percentofOhio’s

electricpower.Alongwiththeplantscamejobs,fromhandlingheavymachineryintheyard,

tooperatingboilersandturbines,toensuringwaterqualityandregulatorycompliance.In

recentyearstheavailabilityofinexpensivenaturalgasandincreasedemissionsreduction

policieshavecombinedtomaketraditionalcoal-firedpowerplantslesseconomicallyviable.

In2017,AES,theowneroftheAdamsCountycoalplants,announcedthattheywouldshutter,

leaving the roughly 500 employees at the two plants jobless. In addition to worker

displacement, the plant closures created an acute budget crisis for Adams County – tax

revenuesfromtheplantsmadeup10percentofthecountybudget–alreadyundergreat

stressasthecriminaljusticesystemwasoverwhelmedbytheon-goingopioidepidemic.In

responsetobudgetarywoes, thecountywas forcedtocutspendingoneducation,among

otherpublicservices.(MacGillis2018).

Whiletheforthcomingenergytransitionisdaunting,itisbynomeansthefirstlarge-scale

industrial transition to occur with consequential distributive effects. Indeed, industrial

transitions are deeplywoven into the historical fabric of theUnited States. When these

transitions “succeed” they are held up as evidence of the American Dream, but not all

Americanshavesharedintheirbenefits.

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Communitiesacrossthecountryhaveexperiencedwidelyvaryingoutcomesduringand

intheaftermathof industrial transitions.A frequently-citedexample, inboththepopular

mediaandacademicinquiry,isthetransitionofthecoalindustryinWestVirginia,which

beganexperiencingemploymentvolatilityanddeclinewiththeGreatDepressionandthe

subsequent emergence of continuous miningmachines and strip mining. The industrial

fallout persists – at the beginning of the decline, Appalachian povertywas a “paradox, a

disturbingcontradictionofAmericanprosperity”(Thomas2010).Employmentincoalisno

longeraparadox,butratherapredeterminedsentence.Ina2017TimeMagazinearticle,Ted

Boettner,executivedirectoroftheWestVirginiaCenteronBudgetandPolicy,saidofcoal

industry employment, “There’s almost zero reason to be completely optimistic. It’s a

disservice to coal-mining communities to tell them they will have a mighty comeback”

(Worland2017).Inpopularmedia,theAppalachianstorylacksnuanceandovershadowsthe

experiences of many other U.S. regions that have successfully weathered industrial

transitions(forexample,post-textileNewEngland).Asregionsacrossthecountryfacethe

unique challenge of transitioning toward a decarbonized economy these historical

experiencesandtheirattendantoutcomesshouldinformfuturepolicymaking.

Inthispaper,weconsiderwhatwecanlearnfromthesehistoricaltransitionsaboutthe

roleofpublicpolicy.Whatpolicieshaveledtosuccessfulcommunityevolutioninthepast,

andwhatlessonsdotheyteachfortheforthcomingtransitiontoadecarbonizedeconomy?

Of course, these historical transitions are not directly comparable to a projected

decarbonized future. Rather, they provide a useful comparative baseline.We review the

literatureon industrial transitions, focusing inparticularon case studiesof the steel and

timberindustries,andidentifykeypolicydecisionsaffectingcommunityoutcomes.Wealso

consider the case of the lighting industry and the shift from traditional lighting to LED

technology.Wediscusshowmajorpolicyconcernsinearliertransitionsapplytothelighting

sector,andhowthelightingsectorcasecaninturninformthetransitiontoadecarbonized

future.Weareprimarilyinterestedinidentifyingbroadbestpracticesforpolicymakingand

corporateengagementthatwillhaveapositiveimpactonprosperityinthosecommunities

thataremostatriskofeconomicdislocationinadecarbonizedworld.Whenitisapparent

thatthosemethodsvarywidelyindifferentjurisdictionsweprovideguidingquestionsfor

policydevelopment.

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Section 2 summarizes the literature on industrial transitions, highlighting the broad

domainsstudiedinassociationwithsuccessfultransitions.Section3explorestwohistorical

cases toexamine the roleofpost-transitionpublicpolicy: thepost-steel reimaginationof

Pittsburgh,andtheimplementationoftheNorthwestForestPlaninthePacificNorthwest.

Section4presentsacasestudyofthetransitionfromtraditionallightingtoCFLstoLEDsand

four affected communities. Section 5 concludes with findings and recommendations for

policymakers.

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2. LiteratureReviewThis section provides a broad overview of our literature review on previous industrial

transitions, theprocessesthatsurroundedthem,andresultingcommunityoutcomes.The

literaturehighlights fourkey factorsbearingonoutcomes following industrial transition:

socialfabric,businesslandscape,humancapital,andthepolicyenvironment.

2.1ANoteonSuccessfulTransitions

Akey challenge in reviewing this literature isdeterminingwhatexactly constitutesa

successful transition.When considering communities and regions that have experienced

majorindustrialtransitionsitiseasytofallintothetrapofrelyingonanecdotalevidenceof

failure or success. If success is not well-defined, policymakers risk designing policy

predicatedonpasteffortsthathaven’tledtosubstantivegains.Forourpurposeshere,we

relyonthevastliteraturehighlightingthecomplexityofdefiningsuccessandconsiderthe

following:

1. Whatrepresentssuccess?

2. Whodoweconsiderwhenwediscusssuccess?

3. Areappropriatemeasuresofsuccessquantitative,qualitative,orboth?

4. HavemisapplicationsofsuccessmetricsledtoworseoutcomesforU.S.communities?

Someclearfoundationalmetricsacrosspolicyandeconomicdevelopmentliteratureare

GDP, employment, and incomeper capita.Thedevelopment literature tends to centeron

rising incomeasametric that implies regional success.BeyondGDPand income,Malizia

(1994)notesthatthepurposeofeconomicdevelopment“istoparticipateintheprocessof

nationalwealth creation for the benefit of local consumers and producers by facilitating

either the expansion of job opportunities and tax base or the redeployment of local

resources.” Malizia’s frame of reference focuses on building societal wealth and income

expresslyforthepurposeofincreasingjobopportunitiesandlocalresources.

Carley et. al.’s review ofmetrics for evaluating energy-based economic development

programshighlightsgapsinevaluationandsuggestsusingnon-economicevaluativemetrics

includingqualitativemeasuresofhealth,educational,cultural,political,andenvironmental

outcomes (Carley 2014). Similarly, using internal migration and place-based social and

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economic factors asmetrics can demonstrate divergent outcomes in small communities

facingtransition(Harrison2017).

2.2KeyDomainsandCapacitiesforTransition

Abroadliteratureinvestigateshowcommunitiesexperienceindustrialtransitions.This

literaturerevealsfourgeneralareas(ordomains)thatencompassmarkersofcommunity

health: human capital, business landscape, policy environment, and social fabric. Each

domainincludesmultiplesocietalattributesthataffectcommunityoutcomesandeachmay

drivesuccessinawaythatisdistinctfromtheothers.Ofcourse,thesedomainsoverlap,and

entailmanycomplementarities.

HumanCapitalmeasuresspecificlevelsofknowledgeorcapabilitywithinapopulation

andreflectshowthatknowledgeenablesactionorthelackofit.Theeconomicdevelopment

literatureemphasizeshumancapitalasafoundationalindicatorofdevelopmentoutcomes.

SimonandNardinelli’s2000paperonhumancapitalandurbangrowthshowsthatcities

thatbeginwithamoreknowledgeablepopulationtendtoperformbettereconomicallyin

the long run. Notably, such “knowledge spillovers” are generally limited to a specific

metropolitanarea-knowledgeismostproductiveintheregionwhereitisacquired.Lester

(2005)findsthatlocaltechnicalknowledgeisoftenenhancedbyuniversities,whosemost

importantcontribution,amonganarrayofroles,iseducation.

SimonandNardinellipointoutthattheimportanceofaknowledgeablepopulationbase

ismutableintheshortterm–theyusethe1920sautomobileindustrialboomasanexample

whereexplosiveindustrygrowthoverwhelmedanyregionalbenefitsfromaknowledgeable

populationbase–butconfirmthathumancapitaldriveseconomicgrowthinthelongrun.

Theyalso find thathumancapital is economicallymore consequential inmanufacturing-

basedeconomiesthannon-manufacturingones,thoughtheremaybereasontobelievethat

this relationship may have evolved more recently, particularly when considering newer

growth hubs such as SiliconValley orKendall Square,where technology and innovation

serveasthebackboneofthelocaleconomies.WhileSimonandNardinellidealprimarilywith

knowledgeattainmentasametric,awidevarietyofotherindicatorsalsomeasurehuman

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capital, including social insurance programs, union strength, apprenticeship training

programs,anduniversitypresence.

BusinessLandscapemeasuresthestrengthofprivateactors,theirtiestootherregional

players,andregionalsupportforbuildingandsustainingbusiness.Amongotherelements,

this domain includes public-private and private-private partnerships, industrial

diversification, industry location, state and regional business incentives, union-private

relationships,andthepresenceofforeignfirms.

Oneexampleofakeyfactordrivingindustriallocationislowcostenergy.Thereismuch

evidencetosuggestthat lowregionalenergycosts influencenewindustrialdevelopment.

Carlton(1983)foundthatenergycostsmotivatebusinesslocation.Morerecently,Kahnand

Mansur(2013) foundthatenergy-intensive industries(thebackboneofamanufacturing-

basedeconomy)locateincountieswithlowenergyprices.Thistrendcontinues,aslargedata

centersroutinelylocateincountieswithlowelectricityprices.Thepresenceofnewfirms

motivatedbylowenergycostscanhavesubstantialeffectonlocaleconomicdevelopment,

jobopportunities,andtheresultingbusinessatmosphereforpotentialnewentrants.

PolicyEnvironment.Thisdomainencompassespast,present, and futuregovernment

andindustryinitiativesatall levels:local,state,federal,andinternational.Importantly,in

addition to covering the policy environment, concerned with tangible structures for

policymaking, this category often overlaps with and informs the discussion of regional

politicalenvironment.

Neumann(2018)describestheimpactofurbanbrandingcampaignsonacity’spublic

image, citing 1970s New York and 1980s Pittsburgh as two citieswhere public officials

piloted programs to reimagine post-transition spaces. Neumann (2018) writes that

“Pittsburgh’spost-industrialrebrandingwasatriumph”,andherstoryservesasanexample

ofapolicyenvironmentthatenabledsuccessfulpost-industrialgrowth.Urbanbrandingof

this type represents one policy lever that leaders might use to target areas in need of

revitalization.

Business tax incentives are another commonly-used policy tool for economic

development,thoughevidenceoftheirvalueremainsambiguousintheacademicliterature.

Somestudiesshowthatstate-leveleconomicoutcomesarenotwell-correlatedwithstate

businessincentives(Bartik2017).Whileperceivedaswell-targeted,taxincentiveshaveseen

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mixed results in terms of encouraging business relocation or incentivizing economic

development(Button2019).Moreover,Buss(2001)highlightsalackofconsensusaround

themosteffectiveimplementationandincentivestructuresforsuchpolicies.

SocialFabric.Finally,understandingthesocialfabricofaregioniscriticaltostructuring

policywithrespecttosocialandculturalcontext(Armstrong2019).Thisdomainincludes

the nature of actor networks, the magnitude of public-private partnerships, key

demographicmarkers(racial,economic,religious,etc.),andhistoricalunioninvolvement.

Socialfabricindicatorsareusefulwhenstudyingtheinteractionsbetweendiverseactor

groups, as evidenced in the literature on public-private partnerships. In the context of

Pittsburgh steel, Giarratani and Houston (1989) wrote that while public-private

partnershipscanbeausefultoolforspurringeconomicgrowth,theydivertattentionfrom

effortstoshapetargetedgovernment-leddevelopmentpolicy.InPittsburgh,public-private

partnershipsdrovegrowthwhenmeasuredbytraditionalquantitativeindicators,butitis

uncleariftheyimprovedlivelihoodsonamorequalitativescale(e.g.,happiness,perception

ofmobility),andwhetherthosemixedoutcomeswerearesultofalackofattentiontothe

existingsocialfabric.

Armstrong(2019)reinforcestheimportanceofgovernmentattentiontosocialfabric–

assertingthatindustrialpolicyismostsuccessfulwhenstategovernmentsworktoconvene

andmonitorlocalactorcoalitions.Todevelopthisargument,hecomparesthetrajectoriesof

Pittsburgh,PAandCleveland,OHfollowingindustrialdecline.Armstrong(2019)arguesthat

PittsburghflourishedduetoanintentionaleffortbythePennsylvaniastategovernmentto

conveneandmonitoracoalitionofempoweredresearchuniversities todesignadetailed

localeconomicdevelopmentstrategy.Incontrast,theOhiostategovernmentputpoliciesin

place thatwere ripe for capture.Agroupofstrongprivate incumbent firms inCleveland

exploitedstateattemptsatdevelopmentpolicyandobstructedmulti-tieredchange.

Whenconsideringtheenergytransition,itiscrucialtorememberthatthenuancedsetof

communityfeaturesdoesnotlenditselftoaclearmappingofinputsandoutputs.The2005

reportfromtheMITIndustrialPerformanceCenteronuniversitiesandinnovationargues

that‘one-size-fits-all’approachestoeconomicdevelopmentfailtorecognizethediversityof

needsinindustrialcommunities(Lester2005).Indeed,inthiscontext,wheretheassetson

thegroundinanygivencommunityarehighlyspecific,thereisnoone-size-fits-allsolution,

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evenwithinthesamesector.Wemightexpect thatasuccessfulenergytransition inNew

MexicowilllookverydifferentfromenergytransitionsinMichigan,WyomingorLouisiana.

Forthisreason,aregionalapproachisessentialtomanagingfuturetransitions.

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3. IndustrialDecline&EconomicRecovery:TwoHistoricalCasesInthissection,weassessindustrialtransitionsinPittsburghandthePacificNorthwestand

the policy responses aimed at reshaping affected communities. Both cases reinforce key

pointsfromtheliteraturereviewandsimultaneouslyhighlightcomplexregionaldynamics

outsideofbroadunderstanding.

3.1TheRoleofStateandLocalPolicyinPittsburgh’sSteelTransition

OurfirstcaseofindustrialtransitionoutlinesthedownfalloftheU.S.steelindustry,its

impactonthePittsburghmetropolitanareainthe1970sand80s,andthearea’ssubsequent

policyefforts.U.S. steelproductionhit itspeak in1973,producinga totalof137million

metrictonsannually.Lessthanadecadelater,globalizationandadvancementsinproduction

technologyledtoanindustry-widerestructuringandproductiondroppedtoalowof67.7

millionmetrictons(Haller2005).ThecollapseofthesteelindustryintheMonValleywas

occasionedbyabroadsetofintersectingindustryinterests,laborclashes,and,ultimately,

full-scaleindustrialcollapse(Hoerr1988).1

Between1980and1986,regionalmanufacturingemploymentdroppedby42.6percent,

withnearlyhalfofthedropattributedtosteelproduction.Broaderregionalemployment,on

theotherhand,onlydeclinedbysevenpercent,buoyedbyexistingeconomicdevelopment

efforts tomotivate growth in the service and financial sectors (Detrick 1999). This shift

happenedacrossAlleghenyCounty,assteelproducersdisinvestedandlaidoffvastswaths

of theirworkforces (Giarratani 1989). The state of Pennsylvania and the Pittsburgh city

governmentfacedacrisisthatwasbothsocialandeconomic.Beforethedecline,Pittsburgh

relied heavily on a traditional model of public-private partnerships to drive economic

development.Inthefaceofindustrialcollapse,cityandstateleadersleveragedandadapted

thisstructuretobetterincorporatenewstakeholders,primarilyresearchuniversities,and

werehailedforleadingthecitythroughthestorm(Detrick1999).Fortyyearsaftertheinitial

1Similarly,SherryLeeLinkonandJohnRusso’s2002bookSteeltown,U.S.A.paintsapictureofthedevastationYoungstown,Ohiofacedinthefalloutofthesteelindustry(Linkon2002).

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decline, the question remains whether this reshaped public-private partnership model

adequately supported both human and industrial interests in Pittsburgh’s subsequent

growth.

Prior to thecollapseof thesteel industry,Pittsburgh longreliedonasetofeconomic

development policies spearheaded by the Allegheny Conference on Community

Developmentstartedinthe1940s,aprogrameventuallytermedRenaissanceI.Thisbusiness

growthcoalitionfocusedprimarilyonrealestatedevelopmentprojectsandenvironmental

improvementsindowntownPittsburgh(Detrick1999).Asthedeclineofthesteelindustry

becameapparent in1977, leadersreorganizedthatsamegroupforRenaissanceII,anew

effort involving local nonprofit organizations in continued downtown development and

communityrenewal.RenaissanceIIsoughttoempowercommunityorganizationsasliaisons

andcollaborators,butultimatelyfailedtochangetheunderlyingpowerstructuresinthecity

anditsoutlyingregions(Detrick).Still,redevelopmentinthecitycoreflourished.

In 1982, Pennsylvania’s Governor Richard Thornburgh introduced the Ben Franklin

Partnership, a state initiative designed to create links between universities and private

institutions.Itprovidedfundingforadvancedtechnologyprograms,includinganAdvanced

Technology Center led jointly by theUniversity of Pittsburgh (Pitt) and CarnegieMellon

University (CMU). Armstrong (2019) argues that the Ben Franklin Partnership and its

relatedstateprogramsassistedPittandCMUinovercomingdeepinstitutionaldifferences

which allowed them to form a partnership for broad expansion of university research

infrastructure.

TheleadersofPittandCMUwerecentraltoa1985coalitionthatincludedthemayorand

threecountycommissionersanddraftedStrategy21,along-termstrategicplancomprised

of eighteen infrastructure and real estate development projects across the region. The

strategyrequiredmorethan$400millioninstatefundingtosupplementbillionsinprivate

investment.Strategy21projectsencompassedairportrenovationandtechnologyparks,and

capitalized on Governor Thornburgh’s goal to spur statewide investment in advanced

technologies.Theeffortfurtherempoweredthecity’suniversitiesaslocalleadersdrivenby

areimaginingofthecity’sfutureasatechnologycenter.

Intheensuingyears,economicdevelopmenteffortswerecontinuallyaimedtowardthis

reimagined future. The Working Together Consortium charged the city with creating

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100,000 new jobs by 2000 via infrastructure grants (Detrick 1999). Pittsburgh public

schoolssawsubstantialinvestmentandbecameaparagonofpublicelementaryeducation

(Treadwell 1990). The guiding principle across the history of these programs was that

Pittsburgh sought to reimagine itself as a center for advanced technology and research

(Neumann2018).Ratherthanshoreupfuturesforthelegacysteelmillsandworkers,state

leaderspromotedanewsetofcommunityleaders–theresearchuniversities.

While this strategy saw success in image and by some metrics, the social support

resourcesforformersteelworkersandthoseinrelatedindustrieswerenotoftenbundled

intothosegrandeconomicplans(Neumann2018).Graham(2002)writesthat,inthewake

of job losses,unemployment insuranceandsocialbenefitswereprovided solelybygrass

rootsand religiousorganizations inPittsburgh.The communitywas forced tostepup to

provideservicesthatwerenotembodiedinPittsburgh’splanforfuturegrowth.Stateand

city efforts focused on impacted industries rather than blanket economic incentives,

identifiedbyTreado(2008)asfundamentaltothePittsburghstory.Asthecity’sserviceand

technologyeconomygrewandstate-wideproductivityflourished,medianincomestagnated

andpovertyratesoutsidethecitylimitsrose,particularlyforBlackAmericans(Neumann

2016). Pittsburgh went through a grand reimagining following the collapse of the steel

industry,butitremainsunclearwhetherstateandlocalleadersweresuccessfulinenriching

thelivesoftheexistingpopulation,orwhetherthatwasevenacentralmotivation.

3.2TheRoleofFederalandRegionalPolicyintheNorthwestTimberTransition

ThesecondexamplewehighlightisthetransitionofthePacificNorthwesteconomyaway

from timber harvest. The Northwest Forest Plan (NWFP) encompassed a set of federal

policiesadoptedin1994toregulateresourcemanagementfor24.5millionacresofforestin

Oregon,Washington,andnorthernCalifornia(“NorthwestForestPlan”2019)andaimedto

bothstaunchtheflowoftimberjoblossesandprotecttheendangeredNorthernSpottedOwl.

This example is particularly appropriate for comparative analysis in the context of deep

decarbonization, because both this historical transition and the impending clean energy

futurewillbesimultaneouslydrivenandaffectedbylarge-scalepolicy.

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From the1950s through the1980s, timberwas seenas the foundational industry for

rural communities in the Pacific Northwest – in some regions (such as southwestern

Oregon), timber jobs represented as much as 30 percent of total employment. Timber

employmentbegantodeclinethroughoutthe1980s,dueinparttomechanization,reduced

capitalinvestment,legacymillclosure,regionalrecessions,andlesseningdemandforwood

products. In 1990, to further jolt the industry, the Northern Spotted Owl received a

threatenedcharacterizationundertheU.S.EndangeredSpeciesActwhichledtoaslewof

court injunctions on timber harvest within the owl’s habitat. In 1994, the Clinton

AdministrationdevelopedtheNWFP,atwo-prongedpolicypackagetominimizeimpactson

owlhabitat and stabilize the flowofregional timber sales.Whether causedby the initial

threatenedcharacterizationoftheNorthernSpottedOwlorthelaterimplementationofthe

NWFPtheregioncontinuedtoseesteadydeclines in timberemploymentthroughoutthe

1990s,endangeringacoresourceofregionalprosperity.

Inconsideringthistransition,Carrollet.al(2000)emphasizethecomplexsocialcontext

thatsurroundedtimberworkers in thePacificNorthwest,andnotethat the“dynamicsof

attachmenttoplace,torurality,andtooccupation”intheregionweredifficulttodisentangle.

The timber industrywasonly one of several factors tying people to the region. Further,

Goodstein(1999)discussestheimportanceofadiversemarketeconomyoutsideoftimber,

its own type of safety net – as timber employment declined, regional employment

opportunitiesgrew.ThisfindingismirroredinCharnley’swork,whichshowsthatthemost

severeeffectsofthetransitionwerefeltbycommunitieslocatedwithinfivemilesoffederal

forest(i.e.,inrural,lessdiverselabormarkets).Incontrast,manycommunitiesintheregion

saw increased prosperity based on their proximity to major metropolitan areas,

transportation routes, or natural amenities that spurred tourism (Charnley 2008). The

regionasawholewasbuoyedbynewemploymentopportunitieswhileasmallportionof

timber-dependentcommunitieswereleftbehind.

SimultaneousinterventionsbytheU.S.BureauofLandManagement(BLM)andtheU.S.

Forest Service (USFS) offer a convenient comparison of divergent outcomes based on

regional context. Both landmanagement agencieswere required to oversee the planned

transitionfromatimber-basedeconomytoanewecosystemmanagementparadigm.USFS

budgetallocationsweredeterminedinlargepartbytimbersales,andasharvestscontinued

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todeclinetheagencysawanunexpecteddeepcutinfunding.Thisbudgetreductionseverely

limited the ability of USFS to provide goods and services to the communities it serves

(Charnley2008).From1993to2002,USFSlost36percentofitsworkforce(3,006positions)

andclosedordownsized23percentofitsregionaloffices.Astimberjobsdisappeared,sotoo

didagencyjobswithinUSFS.Pairedwiththedecliningworkforcewasdecliningfundingfor

procurementcontractspending,akeypathwayforemployinglocalworkers.In1991USFS

spent$103millionannuallyoncontractwork.By2002,only$33million.WhatUSFSdid

spendwasnottargetedtowardimpactedcommunities(Charnley2006).TheBureauofLand

Managementsawlossesaswell,butthebulkoftheirfundingwasnottiedtotimberreceipts,

and theagency startedwitha smallermandate.BLM lostonly13percentof its regional

workforce in the same timeperiod (166positions)andagency contract spending stayed

constant at $20million annually. Agency offices remained open, and BLM increased the

fundingallocatedtotheplanareawhichallowedlocalandstatemanagerstoappropriately

distributefundstoaffectedcommunities(Charnley2008).

ThomasMichaelPower(2006)arguesthatthePacificNorthwestcommunitiesmostin

need,thosethatwerestrongly“timberdependent”,wereseeingemploymentdeclineswell

beforetheimplementationoftheNWFP,andthatthePlanactually“erodedtheeffectiveness”

of the regional services (e.g.USFS) that couldhelp themmostbymaintainingwhat little

forest was left available to harvest. The responsibility of forest management and

revitalizationwasincreasinglyplacedinthehandsofnonprofitorindustrialactors,whohad

relativelylessexperienceinthedomain.WhilethecoreeconomicassumptionsoftheNWFP

were flawed, and federal efforts to stabilize regional communities failed to materialize,

entrepreneurial residents took the helm, and created their own economic opportunities

within the region (Power 2006). Communities most negatively impacted by the Plan,

particularly those in close proximity to forests, already experienced larger barriers to

upwardeconomicmobility.Charnley(2008)foundthatthemostresilientcommunitieswere

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those with close proximity to metropolitan or tourism areas or those with substantial

alternativeagriculturalindustry.2

Intheir2006review,Charnleyet.alcompileconclusionsaboutthesuccessoftheNWFP

across four goals related to socioeconomic success: (1) to produce a predictable levelof

timbersales,(2)tomaintainthestabilityoflocalandregionaleconomies,(3)toassistwith

long-termeconomicdevelopmentanddiversification,and(4)topromoteagencyandcitizen

collaborationinforestmanagement.

Thefirstgoal,regardingpredictabletimbersales,wasnotfullymetbyCharnley’s2006

paper,norbythepublishingofa25-yearmulti-authorreportoutliningtheplan’ssuccess

(Spies2019).Thesecondgoal,tomaintaineconomicstability,wasmorenebulousandalso

notexplicitlymet.In2006,Charnleyfoundthatanagency’sabilitytoprovidelocalstability

wasonlyasvaluableasthatagency’sfunding.Inessence,USFSprogramslackedthefunding

toprovidecommunitysupport,whileBLSmanagedtoachievepreliminarysuccess.By2019,

theNWFPareasawdiversificationinforest-relatedjobsstemmingfromtourismandrelated

ecosystemmanagement(Spies2019).

TheNorthwestEconomicAdjustmentInitiative(NEAI),alsodiscussedinGallagherand

Glasmeier(2020),wasdesignedtomeetthethirdgoaloflong-termeconomicdevelopment.

Unfortunately,NEAIwasbroadly considered ‘too little, too late’ tohelpdisplaced timber

workers.Similarly,jobretrainingprogramswerelimitedtosuchsmallpopulationsthatthe

mutedpositiveeffectsdidnotproducebroadimpacts(Daniels1998).

The Northwest Forest Plan did achieve its fourth goal to some extent, to promote

collaboration in forest management. Public support for forest management and strong

relationships between local community members and agencies have been valuable, if

community-dependent.Going forward,moreattentionwillbepaidtoagrowingminority

populationintheregionandaligningtribalintereststoecologicalgoals(Spies2019).

Oneofthekeyfindingsofthe25-yearassessmentreportisthatthelarge-scaleNWFP

monitoring program has been vital to the success of the program, in meeting both its

2 Charnley notes that, while the nontimber forest products industry remained stable, employment wasdominated by immigrant andmobile labor and didn’t provide comparable family-wage jobs for displacedtimberworkersorformeragencyemployees.

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ecologicalandsocioeconomicgoals(Spies2019).Somemonitoringprogramshavebeenleft

aside, and uncertainty persists, but the commitment to monitoring has allowed

policymakers, community leaders, and researchers to understand the complex regional

dynamicsaffectingsuchabroad-scaleprogram.

3.3CentralQuestionsRaisedbytheTransitionCases

Generally,policyinitiativesinthecontextofindustrialtransitionsarenotembodiedbyone

governmental or community effort, but rather by patchwork approaches to addressing

major economic change. Resulting divergent outcomes are clear in both the cases of

Pittsburgh’spost-steel transformationandtheNorthwestForestPlan.Eachpoint towell-

knownpolicymakingtacticsasleadingto“success”butmayalsoconflictwithsomeguiding

principles. Inmost cases, these conflicts arisebasedondiffering regional characteristics.

Below,weraiseseveralquestionsbroughtforwardbytheabovecases.

In both Pennsylvania and the Pacific Northwest, the largest policy programs were

centeredaroundtheexistingbusinesslandscape.InPittsburgh,theAlleghenyConferenceon

CommunityDevelopmentconvenedmajorresearchuniversitiestoleadthechargeonpublic-

private partnerships and strategic regional plans. These plans stimulated specific

infrastructuredevelopmenttoenablethegrowthofthefinanceandservicesectorswithin

thecity,leadingtoamorediversifiedeconomy.InthePacificNorthwest,ratherthanattempt

to transition the region away from timber harvest, the ClintonAdministration sought to

stabilize the flow of timber products produced and sold in the region. However, by the

implementationdate,timbersaleshadalreadydeclinedsubstantially.ThePacificNorthwest

later reimagined the role of its forests as the center of a local economy dominated by

ecosystemservicesandtourism.

Bothtransitionsmightbeconsideredsuccessfulbasedontheeconomicdiversification

thatresulted,butitisunclearwhethereitherslateofpoliciesachievedthegoalofmitigating

pooroutcomes for impactedworkers. InPittsburgh, integrating steelworkers intoa city

activelyreimaginedasanadvancedresearcheconomyinherentlyconflicted.Thecityrelied

heavilyonpublic-privatepartnershipsthatdidlittletoassistdisplacedsteelworkers.Inthe

NorthwestForestPlan,timberworkerswerenotvisiblyreskilledorputbacktoworkwithin

17

theircommunities.Rather,theregionsawupliftfromotherexternalindustries.Howthen

doesthis informthinkingaround industrial transitions in theenergyspace?Theregional

vision for the future seemsparamount,whether in advanced technologies or ecosystem

services. As the United States transitions away from traditional fossil fuels, how must

regionalleadersenvisiontheirfutureindustry?Economicdiversificationappearsimportant

forregionalstabilityinthesetwocases,alongwithaneventualunderstandingthatlegacy

workforcesmayfadeentirely.Howcanpolicymakersstructurecleanenergylegislationand

regulationwithrespectbothtotheexistingbusinesslandscapeandalsotheimaginedfuture?

Anotherkeythemeunderlyingthesetwocasesistheexistenceoflong-termconvening

and monitoring programs as a precedent to success. As Armstrong (2019) outlines,

convening local actors to collaborate with state government agencies, monitoring the

outcomes of any implemented policies, and adapting based on observation is vital to

ensuringstrongpolicyoutcomes.InthecaseofPittsburgh,thestategovernmentsuccessfully

convened and nurtured relationships between local actors. Further, they monitored the

progress of university-led development issues over a series of decades, allowing the

institutions to act as effective network liaisons. The Northwest Forest Plan initially saw

unintendedoutcomes,astheinitialpremisethattimberharvestwastheonlyimportantlink

betweenruralcommunitiesandlocalforestsprovedfalse.Thisoverlookedthesignificance

ofnaturalresourcesininfluencingbothtourismandlocaleconomicwell-being.However,

theNWFPwasdevelopedwithlong-termmonitoringinmindand,25yearshence,localand

regionalleaderscontinuetoadjustforestmanagementpolicieswithrespecttoanevolving

socialfabric.

Adecarbonizedenergyfuture,asenvisioned,issuretoinvolvebroadanddiffusepolicy

programs. These two cases point to the deep importance of effectively convening and

monitoringlocalactorsandpromptlyadaptingpolicytoreflectcurrentstatus.Howmight

Pittsburgh look if theStateofPennsylvaniahadfundedPittsburgh’sresearchuniversities

without oversight? Would the Pacific Northwest have weathered the decline of timber

withoutcarefulandpersistentattentiontoPlanoutcomes?

Withthesequestionsinmind,weturntothecaseoftheU.S.lightingindustryoverthe

pastseveraldecades–toinvestigatehowoneportionoftheenergyindustryhasresponded

todecliningdomesticdemandandsubsequentproductivity.

18

4. TheU.S.LightingIndustry:ACaseStudyIndustrial transitions occur within a wide array of geographic, political, and temporal

settings that are deeply influenced by macroeconomic and microeconomic activity and

technologicaldevelopments.Thesevariationscomplicatethetaskofevaluatingtheeffectsof

publicpoliciesontheoutcomesoftransitions.Forthisreason,studyingthetransitionofthe

lightingindustryfromincandescentbulbstoLEDsisparticularlyinformative.Thelighting

transitionoccurrednationallywithinarelativelyshorttimeframe(startingaround2012),

across disparate geographies, and involvingmany different firms.We are able to select

specificcasesthatisolatetheseexogenousfactors(time,geography,andpolitics),allowing

us to isolate the relevant regional policy activity that we want to study. The case is

particularlyrelevanttoastudyoffuturedecarbonizationbecauseitwasspurredbypublic

policy, specifically the development of U.S. national lighting standards. It also occurred

within a globalizing economic context, with intense pressures on the domestic lighting

industrycoming fromabroad.Thetransitionthereforerequiredmulti-leveredresponsive

policyaction,aswillthetransitiontoadecarbonizedfuture.

4.1 HistoryoftheLEDtransition

Lightbulbproduction intheUnitedStateshasdeclinedsteadilyover thepastseveral

decades (See Figure 1). The last U.S factory producing incandescent light bulbs, in

Winchester,Virginia,closed in2010.The fewfactories thathavetransitionedtospecialty

lightingorLEDbulbproductionarestruggling,andSylvania’sLEDVANCEfacility,northof

Pittsburgh,announced its impendingclosure inApril2019(Brady2019).Twokey forces

havedriventhedeclineofU.S.lightbulbmanufacturing:increasedinternationalproduction

andlightingefficiencyregulations.

19

Figure1.U.S.LampBulbProductionEmployment,1966-2006

Source:U.S.BureauofLaborStatistics

Lightingstandardswerefirstimplementedatthestatelevelintheearly2000s.Following

patchwork state-level enactment, bulbmanufacturers and advocatesworked together to

drive federal action on lighting standards. In 2007, Congress passed the Energy

Independence and Security Act (EISA), which required increased bulb efficiency of 25

percentby2014,effectivelyshutteringremainingincandescentbulbmanufacturers(Ungar

2015). This spurred a rapid transition away from incandescent bulbs, first to compact

fluorescents (CFLs), then to halogen bulbs and, beginning in 2015, to LEDs (NMRGroup

2018).

Figure2.A-lineBulbShipmentU.S.MarketShare,2011-2017

Source:NMRGroup,Inc.2018,NEMALampIndices

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Theselightingstandardsshooktheinternationalbulbmanufacturingstatusquo.When

the standards came into effect, China was the only producer of CFL bulbs. While U.S.

manufacturers eventually began to produce LED bulbs, they remain costlier to produce

domestically(Whoriskey2010).Thetraditionallightingandbulbmanufacturingindustryis

projectedtodecline“atanannualizedrateof9.8percent”overfiveyearsandinternational

imports, ledbyChinesemanufacturers,satisfyapproximately63percentofdomesticU.S.

demand.Ontheotherhand,theLEDindustryisprojectedtosee4.2percentgrowthin2019

alone (Holcomb2019).Halogenbulbs continue tobe shipped in regions thathave lower

efficiencystandardsasamarginallycheaperandmoreefficientreplacementtoincandescent

bulbs(NMRGroup2018).

WhilejobsinenergyefficiencysoaracrosstheUnitedStates,andintheefficientlighting

sector as a whole (2020 U.S. Energy), futures for communities with existing lighting

manufacturersareuncertain.JenniferDolan,theheadofgovernmentaffairsforLEDVANCE

spoketoindustryambiguityinthecontextofthePittsburghplantclosure,saying“There’sa

lotofuncertaintyinpolicy.There’salotofuncertaintyinthemarketplace.Everythingisjust

converging tomake it verydifficult in lighting.” (Brady2019) In the followingpages,we

examine the impact of policy, from the federal down to the community level, on groups

affected by the decline of traditional lighting manufacturing and the ascent of efficient

lighting.

4.2CaseStudies

WeselectedfourU.S.lightingmanufacturingsitesthatrepresentdifferentoutcomesin

thefaceofthebulbtransition.Thefirst,GE’sOhioLampPlant,inWarren,Ohio,wasoneof

theoldest lighting factories in theU.S. andwas shuttered in2014aftera longhistoryof

declining demand and a controversial union vote. The second, GE’s Circleville Plant, in

Circleville,Ohio,wasretrofittedtoproducehalogenbulbsinresponsetoincreasingnational

efficiencystandards,butultimatelyclosedin2016.Theclosureofeachoftheseplantstellsa

distinctstoryaboutworkerandunionparticipation,aswellaslocalandregionalresponse

todecliningmanufacturing.OurthirdcasestudyconsidersCree’sLEDlightingplantbased

inSturtevant,Wisconsin.Basedinthesmallestcommunitywestudied,theSturtevantplant

21

representsthecontinuedbuttenuoussuccessofMade-in-USALEDlighting.Cree’sotherkey

plant,inDurham,NorthCarolinaiscoveredbyourfourthcasestudy.Thisplant,whichhas

alreadytransitionedawayfromlightingtosemiconductors,sitsinadifferentgeographical

andbusinesslandscapethantheotherthreefactories,andbenefitsfromitscloseproximity

toastrongresearchinfrastructure.

Asoutlinedabove,thesecasesserveasatoolforisolatingsomeoftheexogenousfactors

thatmakestudyingindustrialtransitionssochallenging.Weexaminetwoplantsownedby

bothGEandCree,whichallowsustocompareoutcomesseparatefromandinfluencedby

firmownership.ThetwoGEplantsalsoallowustoexaminedivergentoutcomeswithinthe

samegeographicalregion(Ohio).Finally,amongthemanylightingplantsthatwestudied,

these four caseshappenwithin the same timeframe.We are thus able to investigate the

specificdrivingfactorsatbothfederalandregionallevelsacrossthisperiod.Ourcarefulcase

selection strengthens the comparativenatureofouranalysisbyaiming to isolate similar

cases.

GE’sOhioLampPlant,Warren,OH

Oneoftheoldesttraditionallightingfactories,theOhioLampPlantwasfoundedin1880

bythePackardBrothersandacquiredbyGeneralElectric(GE)in1903.Initshey-dayinthe

1970s,theplantemployed1200workers,andmaintainedastrongworkforcethroughthe

nationaldeclineoflighting,stillemploying600workersin2000.However,by2010,withan

acceleratingdeclineindemand,theplantemployedonly240workers(21WFMJ2013).

In2013,asdemandfor traditional lightingdroppedacrosstheU.S.,due inpartto the

EISA standards, GE threatened to shut down the plant (Tribune 2013). Threatenedwith

losingtheirjobs,someplantoperatorsdevelopedaplantoconverttheexistingproduction

linestomanufacturehalogenlamps.Inoneofthefewsucheventsrecorded,GEapproved

theirproposalandagreedtoreverseplanstoclosetheplant.Thelocalunion(IUE-CWALocal

722) negotiated an offer that included 15 percent wage concessions, wage freezes, and

personnelreductions,butultimatelykepttheplantopeninlinewiththeworkerproposal.

Inasurprisingturnofevents,thefactoryworkersultimatelyvotedtheproposaldownby

a narrowmargin of six votes. Older workers had the opportunity to cash in on strong

22

retirementbenefits,andtheynarrowlyoutweighedtheyounger,moreenthusiasticworkers.

The union and younger workers expressed disappointment, but legacy plant workers

ultimatelysawtheGEdealasaband-aid–onlypushingoutplantclosurebyacoupleofyears.

CarolHoffman, a longtimeLampPlantmechanicobserved, "Youaregoing tohaveyoung

peoplelosingtheirjobs.Theythinktheyaresavingtheirjobs,buttheywillbelaidoff.People

inthemiddlewillgodowntolowerpaygrade.It'snotaboutseniorityanymore."(Tribune

2013)

Bulb production at theOhio LampPlant ended in January 2014, and the factorywas

demolishedseveralmonthslater.ItwasthelastofsixGEplantsintheareatoclose(WFMJ

2014).Theplantclosureattractedbothlocalandstateattention,andCongressmanTimRyan

shared his support of the initial plan to keep the plant operational and subsequent

disappointmentatitsclosure.Warren,Ohiocityofficialsestimatedthattheclosurewould

result in an estimated loss of $280,000 in income taxes (WKBN27 2014). The largest

remainingemployersinWarrenaretheTrumbullCountyGovernment,ValleyCareHealth,

AVIFoodSystems(foodservice),OhioSecuritySystems,andWarrenCitySchools(Regional

2019).Accordingly, thecity turnedtoeconomicdevelopmentoptionsaimedatattracting

newbusinessviataxabatementincentives(WKBN272014).

In2017,itseemedthatsomeofthosedreamshadcometofruitionwhenChrisAllen,a

Warren native and the CEO of AutoParkIt, an automated parking solutions company,

announced an expansion in the city. Allen bought both theOhio LampPlant plot and an

adjacent shuttered auto parts factory. His plan for the facilitywasmulti-use, with some

manufacturingfunctions(Nelson2017).AsofSeptember2019,AutoParkIthadinvestedfour

milliondollars into facility improvements,hadundergonea full locational environmental

study,hired40-60employees,andhadareportedmonthlypayrollof$250,000.Allentook

advantage of the tax incentives offered by the city, and was reimbursed for the

environmentalstudybyJobsOhio,astate-runpublic-privateeconomicdevelopmentagency

(21WFMJ2019).

TheresponsetotheclosureofOhioLampPlantinWarren,Ohiowasaone-dimensional

push to incentivize new manufacturing in the same location. Warren’s economic

developmentmaterials trumpet the city as sitting at the “crossroadsof America”,within

reasonabledistanceoftenmajorU.S.metropolitanmarkets.Whilethecityhasn’tseenmajor

23

successinthemanufacturingarena,ithasn’tseenunprecedenteddeclineeither.Population

has been declining from its 2010 level of around 41,500, but slowly. Warren’s median

householdincomesitsat$29,241,substantiallylowerthanthenationalaverageof$63,179,

and the poverty rate is 34.6 percent (American FactFinder). The city’s identity revolves

around its manufacturing workforce and has suffered from the decades-long decline in

industry,driveninitiallybythefallofsteel.TheclosureoftheOhioLampPlantfollowsthat

pattern,thoughitdidn’tdramaticallyworsencommunitylivelihoods.

GE’sCirclevillePlant,Circleville,OH

TheCirclevillePlantwasfoundedin1948,andbyits50thanniversaryemployedmore

than 600 line workers. The Circleville Plant, owned by GE, manufactured primarily

fluorescent lamps, and specialized in producing a wide variety of sizes and shapes that

couldn’t be manufactured elsewhere in the United States (GE Circleville 1998). The

CirclevillePlantexperienceddeclinesthatmirroredthoseacrossthecountry in theearly

2010s. In 2013, following the failed conversion proposal at the Ohio Lamp Plant, GE

committedtoa$30millioninvestmentinincreasingproductionofsoftwhitehalogenlight

bulbs.Halogenbulbshadtheadvantageofbeingmarginallymoreenergyefficient,andGE

planned increasedproductionat theirCircleville,BucyrusandMattoonplants.Acrossthe

threeplants,GEprojectedanadditional150jobs,100ofwhichwouldbelocatedatCircleville

(GEtoInvest2013).

Thehalogenupgradewasmotivatedbyincreasedlightingefficiencystandardsandalso

byanewagreementbetweenGEandWalmart.Undertheagreement,GEwouldprovidesoft

whitehalogenbulbs tobe sold in3,400Walmart storesacross the country (GE to Invest

2013).In2013and2014,thecountyalsosawaresurgenceofonshoremanufacturing.Scott

Paul,thepresidentoftheAllianceforAmericanManufacturing,saidthatmanufacturingin

theU.S.justseemedto“makeeconomicsense”.JobsattheCirclevillePlantclimbedbackup

that year, and some lineworkerswere even featured in aMade-in-USA ad campaign by

Walmart(Gearino2014).

AslightingstandardspushedCFLandLEDsaleshigherandinternationalbulbproduction

proliferatedaround2014,thepriceofhalogenbulbsdroppedandGE’sCirclevilleoperations

24

became uneconomic. By 2016, the Circleville Plant was operating at 90 percent below

capacity,andGEannounceditsclosure.Workerswereofferedseverance,abenefitspackage,

and preferential treatment for employment at other GE plants. Approximately half of

Circleville’sworkerswereeligibletocollectretirementbenefits(Gearino2017).

The City of Circleville had a relatively new, but strong economic development

corporation, the Pickaway Progress Partnership, or P3, which covers Pickaway Country,

stretchingfromAppalachiatotheColumbusMetroArea.InCircleville,P3partneredwiththe

city government to provide income and net profit tax incentives through the City of

CirclevilleEconomicGrowthInitiative.Theirtaxincentivepackageappearstomirrorthose

inotherOhiocities(BusinessPrograms).By2017,P3crediteditselfwithcreating1,700jobs

andspurringonebilliondollarsincapitalinvestmentandhadreceivedover$49millionin

grantfunding(Collins2017).

TheCityofCircleville’s SafetyCommitteewasactively looking foranewuser for the

Circleville Plant site, but in the meantime focused on other avenues for attracting new

manufacturingjobs(Collins2019).InOctober2018,Sofidel,aleadingItaliansanitarytissue

manufacturer announced a $400 million investment in a new manufacturing plant in

Circleville. The new plant comprises both a papermill and a tissue conversion process.

Sofidelemployed300jobsattheplant’sinitiationandprojectedaneventual700positions.

Sofidel tookadvantageof the local tax incentivesandalsobenefitted from theSelectUSA

project, designed to promote foreign investments in the United States (Sofidel 2018).

Additionally,inMarch2019,DuPontannounceda$200millioninvestmenttoexpandtheir

existingCirclevilleoperationandadd50morepositionsontopoftheexisting500,allaying

communityconcernsaroundthefutureoftheplantinthefaceoftheDowChemical/DuPont

merger(Williams2019).

Circlevillefollowedasimilarstrategyofeconomicdevelopmentandbusinessincentive

structuresasWarren,butsawmoresuccess,likelyduetotheexistinggrowthofregional

actor networks. Circleville’s population rose 3.4 percent from 2010 to 2019, to 13,965.

Educational attainment is similar in both cities, but the median household income in

Circleville is substantially higher at $41,660, and its poverty rate ismuch lower at 23.1

percent(AmericanFactFinder).

25

CreeWisconsin,Sturtevant,WI

InAugust2011,Cree,anAmericanLEDmanufacturer,acquiredRuudLightingand its

manufacturing facility in Sturtevant,Wisconsin. Cree paid $525million to acquireRuud,

which manufactured LEDs and had a strong niche in the outdoor lighting market. In

Sturtevant,CreeplannedtoexpandRuud’smanufacturingfacilityby280,000squarefeet,

costingapproximately$24.5millionandprojectedtobring469newjobstothetownover

fouryears.Forthisproposedexpansion,Creereceivedincentivestotaling$8millionfrom

the Wisconsin Economic Development Corporation, Racine County, the Racine County

EconomicDevelopmentcorporation,andtheVillageofSturtevant(LEDsMagazine2011).

Further,theUSDepartmentofEnergyprovidedashowofsupporttoCreein2013,whenit

designated a $30 million grant to expand the firm’s manufacturing footprint in both

WisconsinandNorthCarolina(JournalTimes2013).

Onthesurface,itappearsthatCree’sinvestmentpaidoffforthevillageofSturtevant.As

of 2019, they employed approximately one thousand workers (JournalTimes 2019) and

wereoneofthethreelargestemployersinthevillage,allofwhicharemanufacturingfirms

(includingBRPUS,apowersportscompany,andAndisCompany,anelectricclippersand

trimmersmanufacturer)(LeadingEmployers).

However,Creehasbeenvolatileinrecentyears,anditisunclearwhetherstressonthe

companywilltranslatetolostjobsinSturtevant.In2016,Creesawcorporate-widelayoffs,

thoughtheywerelimitedintheSturtevantarea(Patch).In2018,theTrumpAdministration

announcedtariffsonLEDsthatthreatenedCree’sinternationalsupplychain,inthefaceof

alreadydeclininggrossmargins–downto26.4percentin2018from34.7percentin2016

(WSJ).Finally,in2019,Creeannouncedthatitwouldselloffitsentirelightingbusinessfor

$310million to Ideal Industries andwould transition its focus to semiconductors. As of

March 2019, there was no announcement regarding the impact on employees at the

Sturtevantlocation(JournalTimes2019).

Sturtevantisstablerightnowwithapopulationaround6,600,educationalattainment

andmedian incomehigh ($67,212), and the poverty rate around8.9 percent (American

FactFinder). Yet, its future remainsunclear, as theLEDlightingplant facesanuncertain

future.

26

CreeNorthCarolina,Durham,NC

Meanwhile,Cree’sothercentralfactory,locatedinDurham,NorthCarolina,amuchlarger

city, though touched by the rapid shift away from lighting, may not see negative

consequences for workers or the community. In 2015, Cree announced that it would

consolidateitstwoDurhamfactoriesintoone.MuchofCree’slightingbusinesswasalready

centeredinWisconsin,butDurhamcontinuedtobethecentralhubofCree’smanufacturing

operations,internationallyanddomestically(Ohnesoge2015).

Following the sale of its lighting business, Cree doubleddownon chip fabrication. In

2019, Cree announced a $1 billion investment in expanding its silicon carbide wafer

manufacturing capacity in Durham (Area Development 2019). This plan included a

partnershipstructurewithstateandlocalcommunityandfour-yearcollegestoimplement

trainingprogramsaimedatpreparingaworkforceforlong-term,highqualityemployment.

Further,CreeisinvestinginUtica,NewYorkviaapublic-privatepartnershipwiththestate

thatwillcomprisea$1billioninvestmentandcreate600localfull-timepositionsatanew

siliconcarbidewaferfactory(BusinessFacilities2019).SimilartoCree’seffortsinDurham,

theUticafacilitywillimplementatalentdevelopmentprograminpartnershipwiththeState

UniversityofNewYork(SUNY)system.

Durhamisamajorcitywithapopulationofapproximately274,000,withanextremely

high educational attainment rate (around 49 percent of the population has a bachelor’s

degree)andamedianhouseholdincomeof$55,851(AmericanFactFinder).Cree’sindividual

successasafirmlikelywillnotimpacttheoverallhealthofthecity,butthecityofDurham

does provide Cree with a strong set of resources and a fertile testing ground for the

expansionofitssemiconductormanufacturing.

4.3CentralFindingsfromtheLightingCases

Based on our examination of these four case studies,we have identified four central

conclusionsregardingpost-transitionstability.

Unioninvolvement.Aswithmanytraditionalmanufacturingoperations,unionsplaya

central role in the livelihoodsofworkersemployedat lightingplants. In these scenarios,

union involvement appears to consistently improveworker outcomes, evenwhenplants

27

close. In the Warren and Circleville cases, the unions were central to managing the

relationship with GE. InWarren, GE allowed a 60-day period following the initial plant

closureannouncementforunionsandemployeestosubmitideastomaketheplantmore

competitive.Theworkersdevelopedaplan soattractive thatGE reversed itsdecision to

close,anunprecedentedmove.InparalleltheIUE-CWALocal722inWarrenhadsuccessfully

negotiated strongwages – GE’s CEO had once calledworkers the highest-paid lightbulb

workers in theworld, and they earned $27 per hour (Ohio Lamp Plant). However, high

historicalwagesandstrongbenefits,negotiatedbythesameunionthatsupportedtheplant

conversionproject,ultimatelycontributedtotheplant’sclosure.

TheWarrenandCirclevilleplantsarebothbasedinOhio,bothownedbyGE,andwere

both faced with the same federal lighting policies. While workers at both plants were

representedbyaunion, theWarrenplant sawstrongeractionby local leaderswhile the

Circlevilleworkerswereleftwithbaselevelsupport.Ultimately,theWarrenworkerswere

abletoexercisemoreagencyandbenefitedfromastrongersetofnegotiatedprotections,

whiletheCirclevillecommunityfacedaslowanduncertaindecline.

Regionaleconomicdevelopmentcorporations&businessincentives.Inallfourof

thecaseswestudied,economicdevelopmentcorporationswereheavilyinvolvedinspurring

local investment. These organizations serve primarily to incentivize the development of

income and profit tax incentives, and in some cases partnerwithmanufacturers to find

sources of initial capital. At the local level, both the City of Circleville EconomicGrowth

Initiative and the Village of Sturtevant provided tax incentives for local manufacturing

development.Regionaleconomicdevelopmentcorporations,suchasthePickawayProgress

PartnershipinCirclevilleandtheRacineCountyEconomicDevelopmentCorporation,credit

themselves with effectively marketing their respective regions and creating beneficial

connections between industry and local government to fund expanded manufacturing.

Further, firms pursuing newmanufacturing in the place of traditional lighting leveraged

state-levelprograms(e.g.,theJobsOhiofundingofsiteenvironmentalstudiesinWarrenOhio

andtheStateofNewYorkpartnershipwithCreetofundthenewUticafacility).Ineachof

these communities, regardless of ownership, geography, or population, economic

developmentcorporationsservedasamechanismtodrivepoliciesthatpromotedbusiness

incentivesandsoughttocreateabusiness-friendlyenvironment.

28

Detrimentaleffectsofprivate-privatepartnerships.Circleville’sstoryisareminder

that private-private partnerships, while beneficial for the participating firms, may also

discount community longevity. The initial Made-in-USA partnership between GE and

Walmart led to a brief increase in employment, but ultimately failed to recognize the

impendingdeclineofdomesticlightingmanufacturing.Sturtevant,Wisconsinisasmalltown

thatishighlyreliantonafewkeymanufacturers.ThroughoutRuud’s,Cree’s,andnowIdeal

Industries’tenures,thefutureoftheSturtevantplanthasbeenopaqueandprovideslittle

long-term assurance to workers. Both communities, previously reliant on these private

actorsforsupport,anticipatefuturerelianceonsimilarindustrypartnerships.

Theeffectivenessofretrainingorcareersupportprograms.Ineverycase,inevery

geographyandeverycommunitysize,retrainingandcareersupportisplacedinthehands

ofthecorporations,whichmakestheprocessopaqueatbest.Thereisverylittleevidence

concerningwhat,ifanything,theseprogramshaveaddedfordisplacedworkers.Facilities

withproximity tostrong researchhubs can lessencorporate reliancebypartneringwith

universities to develop a more highly-skilled manufacturing line. For example, as Cree

transitioneditsDurhamfacilitytosemiconductorsitutilizedthenearbynetworkofcolleges

anduniversitiesandlookstobepursuingthesameapproachforitsnewfacilityinUtica.

29

5. ConclusionsandPolicyRecommendationsThetransitionfromincandescenttoLEDlightingmayseematfirstlikeyetanotherstory

of traditional industrial demise in the United States. Yet our four case studies suggest a

somewhatrosierpicture.Intheleastfruitfultransition,approximatelyhalfoftheemployees

attheOhioLampPlantenteredretirementuponplantclosure,whiletherestfoundother

manufacturingjobswithinacloseradius.Inamorepositivetransition,Creeleveragedits

earlysuccessinLEDlightingintosemiconductormanufacturingwithintheU.S.,leadingto

thegrowthofmoreaccessibleandmorehighly-skilled jobs.Thepresenceof strong local

unionsandregional economicdevelopment corporationshave shepherded thegrowthof

new business, though private-private partnerships demonstrated little recognition of

communitydevelopmentand the impactofretrainingprograms remainshidden.Beyond

thesepolicy considerations, lighting communitieshave consistentlybenefitted from their

geographicproximitytoothermanufacturingjobsormetropolitancenters.

5.1 Recommendations

Between our literature review and industrial transition and lighting case studieswe

concludethatpolicypackagesarestrongestwhentheyacknowledgedistinctregionalsocial

fabric and human capital, carefully structure policy to encourage cross-community

collaboration, and design policy with the particular business landscape in mind, while

avoidingoverrelianceonprivatefirms.Accordingly,wehavedevelopedasetofthreehigh-

levelrecommendationsforpolicymakerstokeepinmindwhenrespondingtotheimpending

energytransition.

Understand local competitive advantage. Knowledge of a community’s specific

skillsets and an understanding of the importance of geography is paramount to

managing a transition. Each community has its own characteristics, and policymakers

shouldbefullyawareofthese.Inourresearch,wefoundthatknowledgeofacommunity’s

specific skillsets and an understanding of driving geographical factors is paramount. For

example,lineworkersincommunitiesdominatedbylightingmanufacturinghavebeenable

tostepfromtraditionalbulbmanufacturingtoemploymentinadvancedbulborotherforms

ofproductionandmanufacturing.Incontrast,selectruraltimbercommunitiesinthePacific

30

Northwestfacedseverechallengesinchangingoccupationsandsawlittleassistancefrom

theregionalmarket-basedpolicyeffort.

Additionally,whilegeographicproximitytomajormetropolitanareashasbeenaboonto

displacedlightingandsteelworkers,lessobviousplace-basedsocialandeconomicfactors

drove success in some transitions. Take, for example, the many moderately remote

communitiesinthePacificNorthwestwhowereabletoleveragethenaturalbeautyoftheir

locationstoadvancetourism.Geography,existingskillsets,andotherunderlyingindicators

ofregionalsocialfabricshouldbeconsideredandinterrogatedaheadofpolicycreation.

Build ties between core institutions.Nearly every example of industrial transitionwe

investigatedbenefittedfromarobuststructureofcommunicationandtrustbetweenlocal

actors.Theabsenceof anyparticulargroupordominanceofone strong firmcan lead to

policycaptureandemergeintounintendedconsequences.TakethecaseofCleveland,Ohio,

where an existing network of private actors monopolized on attempts at economic

development and failed to include community organizations (Safford 2009) versus

Pittsburghwhichsuccessfullyleveragedanetworkofprivateactors,researchuniversities

andcommunityorganizationstoreimaginethecity.

Similarly, inSturtevant, the relianceona fewmajorprivate firmsand relative lackof

socialoreducationalassetsmakesthecommunity’sfutureuncertainwhereasinDurhamand

Utica,Cree ispartneringwithstategovernmentand localuniversities toprovideamulti-

organizational robust safety net. Policymakers should prioritize the creation and

maintenanceofstakeholdernetworksahead,during,andfollowingtheimplementationof

economicdevelopmentefforts.

Leverageeconomicdevelopmentcorporationsandpublic-privatepartnershipswith

caution.Bewarethecreationofprivate-privatepartnershipsorprivateinitiativesthat

do not consider long-term community benefits. Economic development corporations

featureheavilyinthecurrentsteadyorpositiveprogressduringthelightingtransition.They

canprovideusefulhubsforfacilitatingstrongnetworksandmaintainingtheprominenceof

regional knowledge.However, thework of economic development corporationsmust be

31

monitored, as the business tax incentives they promote are highly susceptible to policy

captureandmisuse.

The story of the Circleville lamp plant, and its overreliance on a private-private

partnershipbetweenGEandWalmartservesasawarningagainsttrustingsiloedfirm-led

policies. While often well-intentioned, private deals can be blind to community futures.

Across our literature review and case studies, public involvement was key to building

beneficialoutcomes.Whileprivateinitiativesmayplayacentralroleinsomepost-industrial

transitions,itisimportantthatpolicymakersstructureplansthatdonotrelytooheavilyon

them.

32

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