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Vivarium

Volume 30

1992

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CONTENTS OF

VOLUME XXX

(1992)

William .

Courtenay

Introduction

1

Constant .

Mews

Nominalism

nd

Theology efore

Abaelard:NewLight nRoscelin f

Compigne

4

C.H.

Kneepkens

Nominalism

nd

Grammatical

heory

in

the

ate

Eleventh

nd

EarlyTwelfth

Centuries

n

Explorative

tudy

34

John

Marenbon

Vocalism

Nominalismnd

the

Commentaries

n the

Categoriesrom

the

arlier

Twelfth

entury

5

1

Sten

bbesen

What

MustOne

Have an

Opinion

About

62

C.G.

Normore

Abelard

nd the

chool

of

he

Nominales1

80

Y.

Iwakuma

Twelfth-Century

ominales he

Posthumous

chool

of

Peter

Abelard... 7

Christopher

.Martin

The

Logic

of

he

Nominales,

r,

The

Rise and

Fall

of mpossible

ositio

1

10

David

Luscombe

The

chool

of

Peter

Abelard

Revisited

127

Marcia

L. Colish

Peter

ombard nd

Abelard The

Opinio

Nominalium

nd Divine

Transcendence

139

William

.

Courtenay

Peter

fCapua

as a

Nominalist

157

Iwakuma ukio

and

Logico

Theological

chools

rom

he

Sten

Ebbesen

Second

Halfof

he

1

2th

Century

A

List

of

ources1

173

Twelfth-Century

ominalism

ibliography

21 1

Allen

Bck

Avicenna

Conception

f

he

Modalities 217

P.

Mack

Valla s

Dialectic n the

North :

Further

Commentaries

256

Reviews

276

Books

Received

284

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Vivarium

XX,

1

(1992)

INTRODUCTION

WILLIAM

J.

COURTENAY

The

papers

collected

in

this issue

represent

voices

(sometimes

divergent)

n a

renewed discussion over

the

origin

and

meaning

of

twelfth-century

ominalism.

Throughout

most

of the

present

entury

there was little

question

over

what

Nominalism

was

or when

and

through

whom t entered

philosophical

debate.

From the brief ccount

given

by

Johannes

Turmair

(Aventinus)

in

the

sixteenth

entury

to

the first ull-scale

tudy by

Josef

Reiners

in

1910,

Nominalism was

a

position

on

the

ontological

status

of

universal

concepts,

introduced

by Roscelin and modifiedby PeterAbelard, whichrejectedthe view

that

such

universais referred

o real

entities

or

corresponded

to com-

mon

natures that nhered

n

things res)

but

were instead

mere

names

or labels

(

nomina

that

referred o

linguistic

or

conceptual

entities.1

Scholarly

debate

focused

almost

entirely

on

differences

between

Roscelin and

Abelard,

and the

degree

to

which

the abel

Nominalism

was an

appropriate

description

for

Abelard s

position

on

universais.

Although

by

no

means the

last

word,

the

position

arrived at

by

Jean

Jolivet

n his

magisterial

Arts

du

langage

t

thologie

hez

Ablard nd

in

subsequent publications

was

to

substitute

Non-realism

in

place

of

Nominalism as

a

description

for Abelard s

thought.2

Two

developments

n the

1980s

fundamentally

ltered the

termsof

traditionaldiscussion.

The firstwas

the

gradual

collection of twelfth-

and

thirteenth-century

eferences o the

opinions

of the Nominales a

process begun

by

M.-D.

Chenu and

Arthur

Landgraf

earlier in

the

century

but

expanded significantly

hrough

the

manuscript

research

and editorial efforts

f scholars n the

Netherlands and

at

the

Institut

forgraeskog latinskMiddelalderfilologin Copenhagen.3 The second

was

the

suggestion,

foreshadowed

by

Chenu,

Landgraf,

and

Gabriel

Nuchelmans

and

independentlyproposed by

Calvin

Normore and

William

Courtenay

in

papers

written in

1986,

that the label

Nominales

and thus the

original meaning

of

nominalism

did

not

1

J.

Turmair,

nnales

ucum

oicarum

VI, c.3,

in

Smtliche

erke

vols.

2-3,

d. S.

Riezler,

ol.3

(Mnchen

884),

00-2;

Reiners

910.

2

Jolivet

969;

Jolivet

981.

3

Chenu

934,

935-36;

andgraf

943;

elster

944-46;

unt

1950;

De

Rijk

1962,

1967,1975,1988;Green-Pedersen977,1984;Braakhuis980;Kneepkens982,

1987;

Ebbesen,

redborg,

nd

Nielsen

983;

Ebbesen

nd

Iwakuma

983,

1990;

Iwakuma

992a.

1

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5/288

resultfrom

position

on

the

ontological

statusof universaisbut

rather

from

a

theory

f

propositions

as bearers

of

truth,

based on a

theory

of the

unity

of

nouns and

their

function

n

propositions.4Courtenay

took

the

further

tep

of

calling

into

question

Abelard s

relation to the

group

known

as

the Nominales nd

thus

his

relation to

nominalism.

The thrust

of

these two

papers

was

not to

dismiss

five

centuries of

historical/philosophical

onsensus but to raise

the

possibility

hat the

fifteenth-century

nderstanding

of

nominalism

adopted

and disse-

minated

through

Turmair

may

have been

incorrectly

uperimposed

on

the twelfth

entury,

nd

that both

the

original

meaning

of

the abel

and

the

role

played

by

Abelard

need

to be

re-examined

nd

proved

on

the basis ofa fresh eadingofall theevidence, instead ofassumingthe

validity

of the

traditional

view

and

fitting

he new

evidence

into

that

pre-established

picture.

To

facilitate nd

speed

up

this

endeavor,

it was

thought

desirable

for those involved

in

the

assembling

and

analysis

of

the

texts and

theses

of the Nominales s

well

as

those

challenging

he

traditionalview

should

meet

together

with

others

who

had

expertise

on these

issues

or

who

had

worked

on Abelard

and his school .

The

task at

hand was

to

abandon as much

as

possible

presuppositions

formed

by

the

tradi-

tional view and to construct pictureofthethoughtof theNominales

initially only

from

contemporary

references

to

their

opinions.

Through

the financial

support

of the National

Endowment for the

Humanities

and the

Burdick-Vary

funds

of

the Institutefor

Research

in

the

Humanities at

the

University

of

Wisconsin,

this

goal

was

realized

at

Madison,

Wisconsin on

October

3-5,

1991.

The

sequence

of

papers

as

presented

t the

conference

was

designed

to

move from

uestions

of

origin

and

background

n the

ate eleventh

and

early

twelfth enturies

to

the role of

Abelard,

the

opinions

of

the

Nominalesand

finally

o the

impact

on

theology

n the second halfof

the

twelfth

entury.

Much

of that

arrangement

has

been retained in

the

published sequence,

but the

present

rder

attempts

o

group pieces

on

the basis

of

the

interrelation

f content.The first wo

papers,

those

of

Mews

and

Kneepkens,

examine

issues in

the

pre-Abelardian

period,

respectively ogic

and

theology

in Roscelin and the

gram-

matical

background

forthe

theory

of

the

unity

of the

noun. The next

paper,

thatof

Marenbon,

directs

ts attention o

logic

and the

question

of universais

in

the

generation of Abelard.

The

theories

of the

4

Nuchelmans

973;

Normore

987;

Courtenay

1986],

991a.

2

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6/288

Nominales

n the third

uarter

of the

twelfth

entury

nd theirrelation-

ship

to

the

thought

f

Abelard

are

examined

by

Ebbesen,

Normore,

Iwakuma, and Martin. Finally,

the

theological

tradition

from

1140

to

1200

is

explored

by

Luscombe,

Colish,

and

Courtenay

from he

stand-

points,

respectively,

f the

followers

of

Abelard,

the

use

Lombard

makes

of

nominalist

theories,

and

the

place

of nominalism

in the

thought

of

Peter

of

Capua.

The

footnotes

of

all

articles

have been

simplified

ccording

to the

texts ssembled

by

Iwakuma

and

Ebbesen

as

well

as the

bibliography

t

the

end.

A

consensus

emerged

during

the conference

on

several

issues

a

result

that

might

otherwise

have

taken

years

to

achieve, First,

although hereasoningdifferedmong variousparticipants, herewas

agreement

that

the

labels

Nominalis

nd

Nominales

which

appear

in

texts

soon

after

1150,

designate

positions

and

persons

active

in

the

third

quarter

of

the twelfth

entury,

certainly

not

before

1140.

The

demise

of the

Nominales

s

an

active

school

was

variously

dated

from

C.1180

(Iwakuma)

to 1210

(Courtenay).

Second,

it was

accepted

that

the

origins

of the

Nominales

ie

in

the

closely

related

areas

of

ogic

and

grammar,

lthough

whether

hey

were natural

successors

to the

Vocales

(Iwakuma,

Ebbesen,

and

Marenbon)

or

represented

markedly

dif-

ferent pproach (Courtenay, and to some extentNormore) was not

resolved.

Third,

there

was also

agreement

that

whatever

meaning

lay

behind

the

abel,

it

did

have some

connection

with

Abelard,

although

the

precise

nature

of

that

relationship

remained

in

dispute.

Fourth,

what had

initially

eemed

opposing

views

on

origin,

namely

a

theory

about

universais

vs

a

theory

bout

nouns

and

propositions,

began

to

be seen

as

related elements

n

a

broader

and

more

complex system .

Which of

those

elements

was

more

important

or

he

origin

of the

abel

Nominales

however,

still

remained

in

dispute.

It is to be

expected and

probably

healthy)

that theauthorsofthese

papers,

each

privileging

nd

interpreting

slightly

ifferent

roup

of

source

texts,

hould

not

speak

with

one voice.

And the

complexity

f

their

reasoning

does not

easily

allow

them to

be

aligned

precisely

on

different

ides

of the unresolved

issues.

The

points

of

agreement,

however,

have

considerably

advanced

research on

the

origin

and

meaning

of nominalism

in the

twelfth

entury.

As

others

begin

to

study

the texts

assembled and

provisionally

nterpreted

here and

in

recentarticles istedin thebibliography, t is expected thatthe early

decades

of nominalism

and thus

the

history

of

an

important

philosophical

movement

will

come

into

better focus.

Madison,

Wisconsin

3

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7/288

Vivarium

XX,

1

(1992)

Nominalism

and

Theology

before

baelard:

New

Light

on Roscelin

of Compigne

CONSTANT

J.

MEWS

Roscelin

of

Compigne

is

commonly

remembered as one

of those

modern "heretics

of

dialectic'

who,

according

to St

Anselm,

"do

not

thinkuniversal

substances to be

anything

but

the

puff

f an

utterance

(flatum ocis),

who cannot

understand

colour

to be

other

than a

body,

or the wisdom of man different rom the soul."1 Anselm accused

Roscelin

of

blindly

applying

to

the

Trinity

an

inane

logic

that

denied

the real existence

of

universais. Roscelin

reportedly rgued

that the

Father,

Son

and

Holy

Spirit

had to

be

three

separate

things

n

God

if

one was not

to

argue

that

the

Father had become

incarnate with

the

Son.

Anselm

considered

such

speculation

both

logically

absurd and

spiritually

dangerous.

Anselm'

s

savage

summary,

delivered c.

1093,

has

been

instrumental

in

moulding subsequent

perception

of

Roscelin as an

unspiritual

logician a ' 'maverick' in the words ofRichard Southern.2A more

positive angle

on

his

achievement

was

presented

lmost

seventyyears

later

by

Otto

of

Freising,

who

remarked that

Roscelin was the

first

person

to

establish

the sententia

ocum

n

logic.3

Otto was

comparing

Abaelard'

s

rash

application

of this

doctrine to

theology

with the

pru-

dent

reflection f

Gilbert

of Poitiers on

the voces f trinitarian

elief.

Far

from

riticizing

Roscelin's

thought,

Otto

supportedprecisely

hat

definition

of the three divine

persons

as

three

things

which Anselm

1

Anselm,

e incarnationeerbi

henceforwardIV'>

ed.

F.S.

Schmitt,

nselmi

pera

Omnia

I,

Rome-Edinburgh

938-68,

I

9.20-10.1. or full iscussion

f

Anselm's

writing

bout

Roscelin,

ee Mews

1991,

55-97.Fuller

reatmentf

contemporary

testimony

bout

Roscelin,

s well s

arguments

or is

uthorship

fvarious

ritings

mentioned

n

this

aper

will e

put

forward

n

a

forthcomingtudy.

2

Cf. Richard

outhern,

n

Saint nselm.

Portrait

n

Landscape

Cambridge

990,

176:

"Roscelin

made nemies herever

e

went,

ut

he

was

rrepressible,

nd

he

touched

othing

hathe did not exacerbate. ar more

han ither

erengar

r

Abelard,

who

though

hey

oth

brought

xecrationnd

condemnation

n their

heads were

ssentially

ober nd

well-

ersed

heologians,

oscelin

was

always

causeofdissensionherevere went."

3

Otto f

Freising,

esta rederici

48,

ed. G. Waitz nd B. De

Simson,

annover-

Leipzig

912,

9.

4

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 30, NOS. 1-2, 1992

8/288

had

abhorred. In

Otto's

mind,

Abaelard

had blurred

the

substantial

distinction

between

persons

which

he considered Gilbert to

uphold.

Unlike

Anselm,

Otto

thought

that there was

nothing intrinsically

wrong

with

the new

emphasis

on voces n

logic.

Although

John

of

Salisbury

considered

Roscelin

a

logician

whose

opinions

on voces

ad

fallen

nto

oblivion,

Otto's

judgement

has tended

to

prevail.4

His

comments about Roscelin

and the sententia ocum

inspired

Aventinus

n

the

early

sixteenth

entury

o

identify

Roscelin

as

founder

of

4

'a new

way

of

philosophizing"

that came to

include

Abaelard,

Ockham, Buridan,

and Marsilius

of

Inghen.

Aventinus

considered

medieval

philosophy

to have

been an

inane

civil war

betweenrealists nd nominalists, nitiallynstigated yRoscelin.5The

mythology

which

subsequently developed

around

Roscelin

as

nominalist

"hero and

rebel" has shown

no

sign

of

abating,

notwith-

standing

Franois

Picaves

dissection

of

the

legend.6

In

focussing

on

nominalism as a

cohesive

school of

medieval

thought

prefiguring

"modern

philosophy",

we

are

heir

not

only

to

Aventinus'

reading

of

the

history

f

philosophy,

but

perhaps

to his

misreading

as

well.

Anselm

never

claimed that

Roscelin had

established a

new

school

of

dialectic,

only

that he

was

just

one of a

new breed

of

"modern"

dialecticians.The author of the HistoriaFrancica writing n the early

twelfth

entury,

noted

in a

less

polemical

vein

that

Roscelin,

like

Robert of

Paris

and

Arnulf

of

Laon,

was a

follower

f

a certain

John

who

taught

dialectic

to

be an

ars

vocalis. Robert of Paris

may

be the

4

Metalogicon

I

17

ed.

Webb

3).

5

Annales

ucum

oiariaeI

3,

ed.

S.

Riezler,

Munich

884,

I

200-2

initially

ub-

lished

ngolstadt

554].

Gerald

trauss

ommentsn his

ncounter ith ominalist

philosophers

n

Paris n

Historiann n

Age

f

Crisis. he

ife

ndWork

f ohannes

ven-

tinus

477-1534

Cambridge

ass.

1963,

3-5.

6 See for xample einrichhristian eier,Macht ndWahnwitzer egriffe.er

Ketzer

oscellinus,

alen

1974,

which

dds ittle o

Picaves

pioneering

oscelin

philosophe

t

holgien

'aprs

a

lgende

t

d'aprs

'histoireParis 91

2,

much

nlarged

versionf

he

1896

dition.

ee

tooEike-Henner .

Kluge,

Roscelin

nd he

Medieval

Problem

f

Universals

in:

Journal

f the

History

f

Philosophy,

4

1976),

405-14.

Medieval

ominalism

as ts

wn

not nconsiderable

iterature;

ormost

ecentiews

see

Normore

987,

01-17

nd

Courtenay

991a.

am

indebted

o

Courtenay

or

allowing

e

o ee

his

rticle

n

ypescript,

s for

he ame

eason

o

Yukio

wakuma,

who s

preparing

n

article n

Vocalesor

arly

ominalists.

7

Historia

rancicaed.

A.

Duchesne,

istoriae

rancorum

criptores

V,

Paris

1641,

9-

90

and

by

M.

Bouquet,

ecueiles

istoriens

esGaules

t

de

a

France

II,

Paris

781,

3:

4

'Hoc

tempore

am

n

divina

uam

n

humana

hilosophia

loruerunt

anfrancus

Cantuariorumpiscopus, uidoLangobardus, aingaudus eutonicus, runo

Remensis,

ui postea

itam

uxit

heremiticam.

n

dialctica

uoque

hi

potentes

extiterunt

ophistae:

oannes,

ui

eandem rtem

ophisticam

ocalem

sse

disseruit,

5

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 30, NOS. 1-2, 1992

9/288

Robert

who,

according

to

notes

attached

to the

Glosule n

Priscian

in

the

Chartres

MS

Bibl. mun.

209,

f.

86v,

held

that the

substantive

verb

did

not

4

'have

any

substances'

but

signifiedsubstantial dif-

ferences

f

a

thing.8

All

we know of

Arnulf f Laon

is

that

his

teaching

about

voces like

that

of

Roscelin,

was

satirised within a

poem

in

the

Codex Udalrici

9

I

will

come back

to

the

unknown

John

later in

my

paper.

While scholars have

often

glumly

lamented the

paucity

of

documentary

vidence

relating

o

early

nominalism,

want

to

suggest

that our sources

may

not

be

so

scarce,

if we

extend our

gaze

to

theology

and

grammar.

The Trinitarian

heology

f

Roscelin

Roscelin' s dialectic

and

theology

re

known

more

through

his

critics

than

through

his own words. Anselm

was

informed

of

his

argument

about the

Trinity

n 1090

by John,

a

highlyplaced

Roman cleric

and

formermonk of

Bee

sent

by

Pope

Urban

II

to

act

as advisor

to

Fulco,

the

newly

appointed

monastic

bishop

of Beau

vais.

He

reported

that

Roscelin

argued

thatthe

three

persons

could not be one

thing

or other-

wise

the Father must have

become incarnate

with the

Son.10 We can

Rotbertus

arisiacensis,

oscelinus

ompendiensis,

rnulfus

audunensis.

i

Ioannis uerunt

ectatores,

ui

etiam

uamplures

abueruntuditores."

8

Notes edited

by

Hunt

1941-43;

epr.

n

Collected

apers

1:

"Magister

ero

Ruobertus

ixit ocuerbum on

habere

ubstantias

liquas,

ed

potius

ubstantiales

diferentias

uiuslibetei

ignificare

e

qua predicatur

psum

ubiectum,

t

llasdif-

ferentias

sse

ctionemllius

erbi,

t

cum

dicimusHomo

est',

hie est'

significai

rationalitatem

t

mortalitatem,

t

n liis

imiliter."n this hartres

S,

see

below,

p.

14.

9

Ph.

Jaff,

ibliothecaerum

ermanicarum,

erlin

869,

V

187.

10

Anselm

eproduces

he

rgumentuoted yJohn

n

Epistola

28

ed.

Schmitt

II

270-71),lmosterbatimnDIV{ 282,285; I 4,6-9):"Si < + indeoDIV2> tres

personae

unt na

tantumes

t

non unt

res es

per

e

,

sicut

res

ngeli

ut

tres

nimae,

ta tarnent volntatet

potntia

mnino

int

dem:

rgo ater

t

piritus

anctus

umfilioncarnatus

st.'

"

In

Epistola

36

III 279)

to

Fulco,

ishop

f

Beauvais,

nselm mits he

yllogistic

form f

Roscelin's

rgument

n

order o make t

seem

venmore bsurd: dicit

n

deo tres

ersonas

sse

res

es b invicem

eparatas,

icut

unt res

ngeli,

tatarnen

ut sit

voluntas

t

potestas;

ut

patrem

t

spiritum

anctumsse

ncarnatum;

t tres

deos ere

osse

ici,

i

usus

dmitteret."illian

.

Evans' laim

n

Anselmnd

Talking

about odOxford

978,

8

that

Apparently

oscelin

ad

been

aying

hat

anfranc

and

Anselm

ad

both

greed

hat

he atherndthe

Holy

pirit

adbeen

ncarnate

with he

Son" is a

considerableistortionf the

rgumenteported

o Anselm.

Similarlynaccurates Southern'slaim StAnselm. Portrait176)thatRoscelin

"asserted hat

he hree

ersons

fthe

Trinity

ust

ither e so

separate

hat

hey

could

if

onvention

llowed)

e

said

o

be

three

ods;

r

o

unitedhat llthreemust

6

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 30, NOS. 1-2, 1992

10/288

only

ament that

Anselm

was unable to

find

ny

of

Roscelin' s

writings

which

might

have

explained

this

argument.

Roscelin's logic has similarly

been

made

notorious

by negative

caricature. Abaelard

mocked

as

4

'insane' his

opinion

that

no

thing

was

made

up

of

parts,

parts being

only

voces

ust

like

species

and

that

since a

house

was

nothing

ther

than

wall,

roof

nd

foundation,

f

one

of its

parts

was a

thing,

that

thing

would have

to

be

part

of

itself.11

Abaelard makes

Roscelin

look a

fool

by transforming

bsession

with

voces

nto

an

atomised

view of

reality

which failed

to

recognise

that

the

parts

were

only

a whole

when

oined together.

n

a letter o

the

bishop

of

Paris

(c.

1120)

Abaelard

similarly

ridiculed

his

teacher for

explain-

ing thescripturalwords "the partofa piece of fish" (Luke 24: 22) as

referring

o

part

of

a

vox

rather

than of

a

thing.12

Like

Anselm,

Abaelard wanted

to

present

Roscelin

as

an

incompetent

dialectician

whose insistence n

defining

erms s voces

ed to

conclusions

that

were

patently

bsurd.

In

the

face of such

a

bad

press,

can we

make

any

sense

of these

ideas?

The

only

document so

far

confidently

ttributed

to

Roscelin

is

a

long

and

angry

etter o

Abaelard,

castigating

his

ungrateful

upil

for

a

variety

of

offences,

f

which the

most serious

was to

minimise

the

differences etweenthe threepersonsoftheTrinity. t was identified

by

Schmeller within

a

BenediktbeuernMS

in 1849.

13

The malicious

have een ncarnaten Christ." oscelin

as

aying

hat

hey

ad

tobe three

hings

(not

hree

ods),

f

ne

was o

void

oncluding

hat

he

ather

ecamencarnate

ith

the on.

11

Dial.

554-5:

Fuit

utem,memini,

agisti

ostri

oscellini

am nsana ententia

ut nullam em

artibus

onstare

eliet,

ed

sicut

olis ocibus

pecies,

ta

et

partes

adscribebat.i

quis

utem em

llam

ue

domus

st,

ebus

liis,

ariete

cilicettfun-

damento,

onstare

iceret,

ali

psum

rgumentatione

mpugnabat:

i res

lla

que

est

paries,

ei

llius

ue

domus

st,

pars

it,

um

psa

domus ichil

liud it

uam pse

paries ttectumtfundamentum,rofectoariesui psius t ceterorumars rit.

At

vero dem

uomodo

ui

psius

ars

fuerit?

mplius:

mnis

pars>

naturaliter

prior

st uototo.

uomodo

utem

aries

rior

e et

liis

icetur,

um

e nullo

modo

prior

it?"

12

Epist.

4

ed. E.R.

Smits,

eterbelard.

etters

X-X1V,

roningen

983,

80:

"Hic

sicut

seudodialecticus,

taet

pseudochristianus,

um

n

Dialcticaua nullam

em

sed

olam

ocem

artes

struat,

ta

tdiuinam

aginam

mpudentereruertit,

t

eo

loco

quo

dicitur

ominus

artem iseis

ssi

comedisse,

artem

uius oeis

ue

est

piseis

ssi,

non

artem

ei

ntelligereogatur."

he textn

PL

178,

58D

s

corrupt.

This

was

possibly

veiled

uggestion

hatRoscelin as

skating

ear

Berengarian

heresy

n

his

xegesis

f

traditionaleucharistie"erse.

13

J.

A.

Schmeller

ublished

he

ext ith

rguments

or

ts

uthenticity

rom

unich,

Clm4643, f. 3v-99rs. xii) n theAbhandlungenerhilosophisch-philologischlasse er

Kniglich

ayerischen

kademie

er

Wissenschaften

d. 5.3

Munich

849, 87-210;

t

was

re-edited

y

Reiners 910

s

an

appendix,

2-80.

7

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 30, NOS. 1-2, 1992

11/288

8

insults n

this etter

have

tended to

attract

more

attention

han

its

solid

speculative

reflection.

Although

Reiners

re-editedthe

letter n

1910,

he

did not

analyse

its

contents,presumably

because

it did not touch

on what he

believed to be the

essence of

nominalism

universais

and

the

relationship

between

parts

and

whole.

The letter

s

mostly

about

the

argument

that

one

had

to

respect

the

plurality

of

persons

within

the

Trinity.14

Roscelin

was

fascinated

by

Augustine's

comment

that

what the

Greeks described

as

one

essence,

three

substances,

that

Latins

called

one

substance or

essence

and

three

persons.15

The

iden-

tification

f

person

and

substance made

sense

in

the

ight

of

Priscian's

definition hat

a

nomen

ignified

ubstance

and

quality.

In

the case

of

names applied of God:

any

nouns o not

ignify

ne

thing

nd

another,

hether

ccording

o

parts

r

to

qualities,

ut

hey

ignify

nly

ubstance

tself,

eitherivided

nto

arts

or

changedhroughualities.

We do

not

herefore

ignify

hrough

erson

nything

other han

hrough

ubstance

granted

hat

we

are accustomedutof

certain

habit f

peech

o

tripleerson

not

ubstance

as the

Greeks

re

ccustomedo

ri-

ple

ubstance

Neither

ndeed

s

tto be

saidthat

hey

rr

n

belief

n

the

rinity

because

heypeak

ifferently

rom

s,

for

hey

elieve he ame

s

us,

ince as

we

have

aid

person

substancer essence

ignify

ompletely

he

ame

thing

n

God. For n

speech

here

s

diversity,

n belief

nity;

therwisehere ould ot

be a

Church

mong

he

Greeks. or

f

hey

hemselves

ay

ne

hing y

peaking

thus, donot eewhywe iebysayinghe ame hing.16

Roscelin

does not

deny

the

unity

of

God

(as

Anselm

maintained),

but

emphasizes

that

plural

names

are

applied

out of

inguistic

onvention.

14

Augustine's

e

trinitate

s the

most

requently

ited

ork;

herere xtractsoo

rom

hisDe

baptismo

De

agone

hristiano,

e

coniugiis

dulterinisDe

Genesid

itteram,

e

anima

et ius

rigine,

n

ohannis

uangelium

ractatus

24

Epist.

47 De doctrina

hristiana.

ther

extracts

re

from:

rudentius,

eristephanon

Gregory,pistolae

Moralia

n

ob

Leo,

Sermo

2,

Ambrose,

e

fide

De

spiritu

ancto'

sidore,

tymologiaeJerome,

ontra

Vigilantium.15

Cf.

Epist.

d

Abaelardum,

d.

Remers

0,72,

74,

quoting

ugustine,

e

trinitateII

4

n. 7

(CCSL

50,

259).

See tooDe

trinitate8-9

CCSL

50,

216-7).

16

Epist.

d

Abaelardum,

d.

Reiners 2:

"Sciendumst

vero,

uod

n

ubstantiaanc-

tae

trinitatis

uaelibet

omina on liud t

aliud

ignificant,

ive

uantum

d

partes

si e

quantum

d

qualitates,

ed

psam

olam

on n

partes

ivisam

ec

per

ualitates

mutatam

ignificant

ubstantiam. on

igitur

per personam

liud

aliquid

significamus,uam

per

substantiam,

icet

ex

quadam

loquendi

onsuetudine

triplicare

oleamus

ersonam,

on

ubstantiam,

icut

raeci

riplicare

oientubstan-

tiam.

Neque

ero

icendum

st,

uod

n

fide

rinitatisrrent

riplicando

ubstantiam,

quia

icet liter

icant

uam

nos,

d tarnenredunt

uod

nos,

uia

sicut iximusive

persona

ive

ubstantia

ive

essentian deo

prorsus

dem

ignificant.

n

locutione

enim antum iversitasst, n fide nitas.Alioquinamnonesset pudGraecos

ecclesia. i autem

psi

ic

oquendo

erum

icunt,

uare

nos demdicendo

men-

tiamur,

onvideo."

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 30, NOS. 1-2, 1992

12/288

Following

Priscian's definition

ersona ignifies

substance,

although

not

in

God's case

-

a

quality,

as

this would

suggest

mutability

n

God.

The

argument

runs

diametrically

counter

to Abaelard's iden-

tification

f

a

divine

person

with

an

attribute ike

power

or wisdom.

We

use either

ingular

or

plural

names of

God

"only

on

behalf

of

the

wish of

speakers

to

whom such a

convention of

speech

is

pleasing".

In

language

that recalls

Abaelard's

summary

of his

teaching

on

parts,

Roscelin

argues:

When

herefore

e

vary

hese

ames

r

proffer

hemn the

ingular

r n

the

plural,

edo

this

ot

ecause

t

might

ignify

ne

hing

ather

han

nother,

ut

by

virtue

nly

f

hewill f

he

peakers

owhom

uch

habit f

peech

s

pleas-

ing.For f here ere ifferentartshereinGod] o asto peak f nepersonandanother

ubstance,

erhaps

here ould ea

reason

why

we

speak

f

one

thing

n

the

ingular,

nother

n

the

plural

s we

say

of

man

since

body

is

one

part,

he

oul

nother

that

here

s one

soul

but

many

odies

ecause

of the

different

arts

f

the

body;

but neither

s

there

ne

quality

ignified

througherson

or

another

hrough

ubstance

r

essence

because

as we

have

already

aid

in God

theres

completely

o

quality.17

There is an

inexorable

logic

to his

argument

that the

proper

names

'Father',

'Son'

and

'Holy

Spirit'

must each

signify

substance

f

none

signify quality.

This is not

anguage

about the

substance of

God,

but

discussion ofthreedifferent ominaeach ofwhichhad itsown identity,

as the

city

f

Rome

was Rome

and

water

was water.18

he

Greek defi-

nition

of

the

Trinity

as a

plurality

of

substances

appealed

because

it

fittedwith

Priscian's

definition f a

noun,

modified n

only

a

limited

way.

All

utterances

used of

God had

to

obey

the

rules of

language.

One of

these

rules

was the

every

noun,

even

those

used

of

God,

signified

substance.

Such

"grammatical

Platonism"

(to

use a

term

coined

by

Jean

Jolivet) might

be

uncomfortable o those

who

prefer

to

believe

with

Anselm that

modern

logicians

did

not

believe

in

17

bid.

3:

"Quando

rgo

aec

nomina

ariamusive

ingulariter

ive

luraliter

ro-

ferendo,

on

quia

aliudunum

uam

alterum

ignificet

oc

facimus,

ed

pro

sola

loquentium

olntate,

uibus

alis

oquendi

sus

omplacuit.

i enim

iversae

artes

ibi

essent,

t altera

ersona,

ltera

ubstantia

iceretur,

ortassis

atio

liqua

sset,

curunum

ingulariter,

lterum

luraliter

roferremus,

t

hominis,

uia

alia

pars

st

corpus,

lia

nima,

nam

nimam

icimus,

ed

plura orpora

ropter

orporisartes

diversas.

ed

eque

lia

qualitas

er

personam,

lia

per

ubstantiam

el

essentiam

sienificatur,uia

sicut am

diximus,

n

deo

nulla

prorsusualitas st."

18

bid.74:

"Quae

ergo

differentian

hac

pluralitate

ersonarum

ecundum

os,

substantiarumerosecundum raecos it,perquiramus. ihilenimaliudest

substantia

atris

uam

pater,

t

ubstantia

ilii

uam

filius,

icut rbs

Romae

Roma

est,

t

creatura

quae

aqua

est."

9

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 30, NOS. 1-2, 1992

13/288

universal substances.19

Roscelin

believed

that

words

signified

hings

t

a

very

iteral

evel.

He

wanted

to

respect

the

identity

f

every

proper

noun inventedby man. His propernouns are like the individualised

reliefs f

a

Romanesque capital,

each a human

utterance

ignifying

n

its

own

way

a substantial

realitybeyond.

Astonishingly

neither Schmeller nor

Reiners noticed

that

immediately

preceding

Roscelin's

letter in

the

Benediktbeuern

manuscript

ccur two

short

heological

ssays

closely

related

n

literary

style.

The

first

xplores

both

common

ground

and

differences etween

God

and

creation,

with

particular

reference o

the

Trinity,

definedas

a

plurality

of

things.

The

second,

inspired

by

a

homily

of

Augustine

on John, explains the contrastbetween Christ's special love forJohn

and Peter's

special

love

forChrist

n terms f

the

contrastbetween the

active life of this world and the

contemplative

ife of

the world

to

come.20

These are

the

only

theological

items within an

otherwise

secular

manuscript.21

The

first

ssay,

which we

shall

call

Notandum st

after

ts

incipit,

helps

explain

the

argument

criticized

by

St

Anselm. In some

things

God

and creation

are

similar:

ust

as

different

ccidents

of

the

same

substance

cannot

be

identified

with each

other,

so the

Father cannot

be identifiedwiththe Son or theHoly Spirit. In God however,unlike

creation,

the

divine

persons

are

not

divided between substance and

accident.

There is

a

trinity

n

God,

which

can

be described

as

three

persons

or

threeres.

The

authority

ited for

his

claim

is

the

Greek

def-

inition

of the

persons

as three

ousie

or substances.22The

underlying

19

Cf.

Jolivet,

966

and,

n relation

o

Abaelard,

olivet,

975a,

32-43.

olivet

examines

he

grammatical

oundations

f the

eaching

f

Bernard

f Chartres

n

substance

ithin

wider

urvey

f

he

problem

n

Elments

our

ne

tude

es

apports

entreagrammairet 'ontologieumoyengein:Sprachend rkenntnismMittelaltered.

A.

Zimmerman,

erlin

981

135-64. ll

hese

apers

ave een

eprinted

ithinis

Aspects

e

a

pense

divale.

blard.

octrines

u

angage

Paris

1987.

20

Augustine,

ract,

n

ohannem24

CCSL

36,

680).

am

ndebted

oAnne-Mane

Bouch

or

his

dentification.

21

These

exts ollow

n from

orks

l

Seneca

copied

n

the ame

hand),

he

letter

is followed

y

advice

on

casting

horoscope,

commentary

n

Boethius'

e

arithmetical

n

excerpt

rom

ugh

f

St Victor

n

the ivision

f

earning

nd

a

late

twelfth-century

reatise

f

ogic.

The

first

art

fClm

4643,

originally

separate

manuscript,

ontains

variety

f

historical

exts. or

n

edition

f hese

wo

exts,

anddiscussion

f

heir

uthorship,

ee

my

tudy

t

AnselmndRoscelin:

ome ew

exts

and

Their

mplications

/,

orthcoming

see

n.

1

above).

22f.91v: In istisonueniuntreatort reature.n alusdifferunt.am ncreatuns

uel erut

plures

ubstantie,

el

plures

artes,

el

plura

ccidentia

iusdem

ub-

stantie,

x

quo

pluralitas

st

bi.Hoc autem

on st

creatore.

am ndeo unt

10

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 30, NOS. 1-2, 1992

14/288

argument

s the

same as in

Roscelin's letter: with each divine

person

there s no

accidental

quality,

only

a distinct ubstance. Human

words

inevitably uggest plurality.Such language is farremoved from the

eternal

simplicity.

A

similar

antithesis s

central to an

anonymous

essay

found

within

a

Durham

Cathedral

manuscript

A.

IV.

15)

containing

the

first ook

of

Abaelard's

Theologia

hristianan

its

earliestknown

recension.23 his

text,

which

we shall call

Est

una after ts

incipit, explains

on rational

grounds

how

thereexisted

a

4

'one and

perfect

nity

n which

there s

a

certain

wonderful

rinity.'

The

images

used to

describe

this

trinity

are

unconventional. The

standard

Augustinin explanation,

developed by Boethius, had been that the three divine personswere

three

relations

within

God.

Est una

describes each

as differentiated

y

a habitudo a

term

used

by

Aristotle

n

the

Categories

o

describe

an

individual's

disposition.

Father',

'Son' and

'Holy

Spirit'

are

names

invented to

signify

hree

ineffable

distinctions n God.

Each s

described

ingly

s a

person;

ccording

o the

property

f the

Greek

language hey

re describeds three

ubstances.

orwhat ubstance

s for he

Greeks,

his s

sounded

y

Latins

s

person

and

these

hree

ersons

re

found

in certain

manuscripts

o be

spoken

f s

things,

ut

nfrequently.24

The author thenanswers theconundrum "if theFather and theHoly

Spirit

are of

the same

substance,

then

the

Son is

begotten

of the

substance

of the

Holy Spirit"

by

identifying

ach

attribute s

a

pro-

prium

f

each

person.

The

essay

closes with an

allusion to

Romans

1:

19-20: "To such

a

thoughtyou

may say

that the

philosophers

of

the

world rose

through

isible

created

things."

One

can

arrive at

the

doc-

trine of

the

Trinity

by

reflecting

n

categories

of

the

natural

world.

quedamria; omo iceref.92r)nonpotest,ec ntelligere.on unt res ubstan-

tie,

eque

res

artes,

eque

ria

ccidentia

iusdem

ubstantie.res

persone

el

tres

res

ici

potest.

oc

enim icit

utoritas.

reci icuntres

sie,

d est res

ubstantie,

sed

ccipiunt

ubstantias

ropersonis.

uid

autem

int

lle

persone

el

lle res

es,

explicari

on

otest.

am

neque

unt

ubstantia

eque

ccidens.

ed

n

deonon unt

inmediata

ubstantia,

t

accidens.ta

aliut

st

n

creatore,

liut

n

creaturis. ec est

mirumi

factor

sua factura

iffrt."

23

first

oted

his

extwithin

escription

f theDurham

MS

in

Peter

belard's

Theologia

hristiana

nd

Theologia

Scholarium'

e-examined,

n:

RTAM,

52

1985),

113-5,

although

n this

tudy

had

not

then ealised

hat t

was

followed

y

three ther

patristic

exts.

24

D

f.66v:

"

Persona

arnen icitur

e

hiset

singulariter

t

dicatur

rimo,

ersona

secundottertio;t tadicaturiipersonetetiam ecundumroprietatemrece

lingue

icuntur

res

ubstantie.

uod

enim st

pud

grecos

ubstantia

hoc

latinis

sonat

ersona

t

nueniunturste ii

persone

n

quibusdam

odicibusici es

sedrare."

11

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 30, NOS. 1-2, 1992

15/288

Its author

mitates

he

method

of

Anselm'

s

Monologion

initial reflec-

tion

on divine

unity

is transformed nto

reflection

n

the

necessary

plurality n God, to whichthe names of

4

persons' and 'substances' are

variously

applied

by

Greeks and

Latins. This

argument,

which St

Anselm

reminded

potential

criticshad been

upheld by

Augustine,

is

central to Notandum st nd to

Roscelin'

s

letter o Abaelard as

well as

to

Est una. Their common theme

is that

Father',

'Son' and

'Holy

Spirit'

are

each

proper

nouns

with

an

identity

s distinct

as

plural

substances

or

things.

Roscelin

picked

up

Anselm's

perception

(inspired

by

Augustine)

that

there were

different

ossible ways

of

describing

the ineffable ruthof the

divine

trinity.

However,

where

Anselm tended to emphasise the continuitybetween human and

divine

language,

Roscelin focussed on the

gulf

between human

language

and

divine

simplicity.

Person-things

nd

the

"Glosule"

on

Priscian

Where did

the idea

come

from,

o

reprehensible

o St

Anselm,

that

a divine

person

could

be

identifiedwith

a

thing?Although

these

texts

buttress heir

rgument by quoting

Augustine,

the

image

is

not

to

be

found in his

writings.

Even Abaelard in his Sic et Non

only

raked

up

one,

relatively

obscure text

by

Rufinus,

to

support

the claim.25

Anselm's invectivehas tended to make us search

for

ts

stimulus

n

his

dialectic,

in

particular

his

supposed

belief

that

ust

as

the world was

composed

of

radically

discrete

entities,

none of which

shared

a

com-

mon

or

universal

nature,

so

the three

divine

persons

were also

radically

discrete.

It is often

ssumed that

Roscelin

was not

a

serious

theologian.

Did not Abaelard mock his literalism in

considering

a

whole

(like

a

house) simply

as its

parts a wall,

roof and

foundation)

instead of

recognising

hat

the

parts

were

only

a

whole

when

they

were

joined

together?

uch

criticism an mislead

us

if

we

read

it as

a

guide

to

Roscelin'

s

ontology

rather

than as

a

comment

on

his

analysis

of

every

term,

genus,

species

or

part,

as a

vox Roscelin' s unstated

authority

n his letter to Abaelard

was

Priscian,

the

great

analyst

of

voces.

The names

Father,

Son

and

Holy Spirit,

are

voces

ach of

which

25

Only

n. 37

of

forty-two

xcerpts

n

q.

8

"Quod

non sit multitudoerum

n

trinitate...",

f he ic

t

Non ed.

B.

Boyer

nd

R.

McKeon,

hicago

976-77,

35

speaks fplural hings, ufinus, omm.nSymb. postolorumCCSL 20, 139):

"Quomodo

gnis

aelestis

enerai

x se

ipso plendorem

ucis t

producit

aporem,

et cum

int ria

n

rebus,

num unt

n

substantia,

ta

trinitasst

una maiestas."

12

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 30, NOS. 1-2, 1992

16/288

refers o

something

alled

either

person

by

the

Latins),

a

substance

(by

the

Greeks)

or a

thing.

As

this kind

of

person

could

not

signify

quality

in

God,

it had

to

signify

substance. This

theology

derives

from

rigorous cceptance

of the

universal

validity

of

Priscian's defini-

tion of

the

meaning

of

a noun.

Anselm classified

Roscelin

as

one of

those

4

modern dialecticians"

who

did not believe

that universali

ubstances

were

anything

but

a

flatum

ocis.

According

to the Historia

rancka

these

dialecticians

were

inspired

by John,

"who

taught

dialectic to

be a vocal art". The

seminal

author for

any speculative

discussion

of

voces n

the eleventh

century

was

Priscian,

whose

Institutiones

rammaticae

as

beginning

to

outstrip n popularitythe Arsmaior fDonatus, so beloved ofCarol-

in

gian

schoolmasters.

Was

Roscelin

inspired

by

contemporary

ialec-

tical

discussion of

Priscian'

s

grammatical

categories?

Anselm

refers

rather

disparagingly

o

such

inquiry

nto

Priscian' s ideas

at the

end of

the

De

grammatico

hen

he

complains

to his

disciple

of

"the

extent

to

which

dialecticians

n

our

times

are

at

loggerheads

about the

question

which

you put

whether

grammaticus

classified

by

Priscian both

as a

noun

and an

adjective,

was

a

substance or a

quality.26

The

De Gram-

matico as his

response

to such

debate. Are

these

the

same

dialecticians

as he warns against in theDe incarnationeerbi?

In

no other

eleventh-century

omposition

is

dialectical interest n

grammar

more

evidentthan n

the

anonymous

Glosule

n

books

I-XVI

of

the

nstitutiones

rammaticae.

ts author

s

concerned

throughout

with

the

causae

nventionum

f

the

individual

voces

iscussed

by

Priscian.27

The

earliest

complete

witness s

Cologne

Cathedral

MS

201,

probably

dating

from

he

ate

eleventh

entury.

ts

text

ontains a

recensiondif-

ferent

rom,

nd

possibly

earlier than

that

found

in

four

other

manu-

scripts,

all

from

the

early

twelfth

entury:

Metz,

Bibi.

mun.

1224,

ff. ra- 1Orbfr0meastern France; Paris, BN nouv.

acq.

lat.

1623,

26

De

Grammatico

ed.

Schmitt

168;

f.D. P.

Henry,

he

e

Grammatico

f

tAnselm

Notre-Dame

964,

p.

88-91.

27

The

mportance

f he

Glosule

as

first

ndicated

y

Hunt,

941-43.

ee

too:

Fred-

borg

1977;

d.,

Some

otes n

the

Grammar

f

William

f

Conchesin:

CIMAGL,

37

(1981),

1-41;

er

hapterpeculative

rammarin:A

Historyf

Twelfth-Century

hiloso-

phy

ed.

Peter

ronke,

ambridge

988,

specially

77-86.

or

what

ollows

n the

manuscript

nd

ncunable

raditionf

theGlosule

am

indebtedo

the

pioneering

discoveriesf

Margaret

ibson,

he

ollected

orks

f

riscian:

he

rinted

ditions

470-

1859 n:StudiMedievali,er.3a 18 1977), 49-60ndThe arlycholasticGlosule

to

riscian

'

Institutiones

rammaticae':he

ext

nd ts

nfluence

in:

bid.,

9

1979),

35-

54.

I

am

grateful

ooto

C.H.

Kneepkens

or

omment

n

its

ext.

13

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 30, NOS. 1-2, 1992

17/288

ff.

r-54v

an abbreviated

text from Saint-Benot-sur-

oire; Brussels,

Bibi.

roy.

3920,

ff.

12ra-vb

the prologue).

The now

destroyed

Char-

tresMS, Bibl. mun. 202, ff.lr-68v, ontained additionalpassages not

found

n

the other MSS.

None of these MSS

identify

n author

to the

Glosule.Our

only

attribution

s to

a

'

Johannes

de

aingre"

mentioned

in

the

colophon

to

the

1488

incunable edition of

Arrivabenus,

a

printer

f

Mantua

who relied on a

good

manuscriptvery

ike thatnow

in Metz.28

An

impossible

form

in

Latin,

de

aingre

ould

well be a

printer's

corruption

of

dei

gratia

the traditional

nterpretation

f the

name

John.

The

device

"by

him

whose

name means the

grace

of

God"

is used to

indicate the

author

of

another

very

nfluential

losule

on the Pauline epistles written n 1102 and closely related to those

attributed to

Bruno of Rheims

(also

concerned

with

the

causes of

words,

in

this

case

of

St

Paul).29

Whether

these two

glosule

re

by

the

same author

still has to

be

investigated.

There

is a

dry irony

n

the

author

of

a

Priscian

commentary

so concerned

with the

causes

of

words

being

identified

s

"John

by

the

grace

of God".

One

word

whose

cause

the

Glosule

s much

concerned

with,

s

'per-

son',

defined

by

Priscian

in relation to a verb:

the first s one who

speaks

about

himself,

ither

lone

or with

others;

the

second

is

the one

28

1488 nfoliated

reset

n

other

ditions,

.g.

1492

.

226;

1511f.

204):

"Iohannis

de

aingre:

ummos

ui

inter

xpositores

rammaticae

rcem

al. artem]

ossedit:

commentum

upermagno

risciani

oluminemnibus

esideratissimum

init.'

Cf.

Gibson,

he ollected

orks

f

riscian53 n. 14. The

Arrivabenusext

f

he

Glosule

is

accessible

hrough

microfilm

eproduction

f he 496-97

enice ditionf

Pris-

cian's

Opera

published

y

he

General

Microfilm

ompany

ithin

heireries

talian

Books

rinted

efore

601

Cambridge,

ass.

1980-,

Roll

463

item .

Subsequent

references

re to

the

Venice

511

dition,

eld

n the

RareBooks

oom

f

Rutgers

University

ibrary,

owhose taff

am

most

rateful.

nfortunately

ot

ll

editions

share

he ame

foliation.

29The nformationomes romhenitalubricoParis, N at.14442: Innomine

patris

t

filii

t

piritus

ancti.

ncipiuntur

los[u]le

pistolarumauli

b ilio idelicet

cuius

omen

ratia

ei

nterpretatur

n nno

uo cons[u]l ictaviensis

e

herusolima

rediit."

. Stoelen

otes

hat his

ould

nly

efer

o

William II of

Poitou,

uke

f

Aquitaine

086-1126,

ho eft

or

erusalem

n

1101,

utwas

present

t

Poitiersn

1

102,

es

ommentaires

cripturaires

ttribues

BrunoeChartreux

in:

RTAM,

25

1958),

177-247

t

186

n. 11. Stoelen

dits

long assage

romhis uthor

n the ucharist

in

Brunoe

Chartreux

Jean

ratiadei

t

a

*

Lettree .

Anselme'ur 'eucharistiein:

RTAM,

34

(1967),

18-83.

30

nstit.

ramm.

III

101,

ed. Keil

II 448:

"Sunt

gitur

ersonae

erborumres,

prima

st,

uae

de

se

oquitur

olavel um

liis,

t dico

icimus',

ecunda,

d

quam

loquitur,

e

psa

vel ola

vel

um

liis,

t

dicis

icitis',ertia,

e

qua

extra eet

llam,

adquamdirigitermonem,ositaoquiturrima,t dicit icun. tprimauidem

et

secunda

erborum

ersonae

initae

unt,

raesentes

nim

emonstrantur,

ertia

vero

nfinitast

taque get

plerumque

ronomine,

t definiatur."

14

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 30, NOS. 1-2, 1992

18/288

spoken

to

about

himself,

nd

the

third

s the one

spoken

about

apart

from neself nd the

person

being

addressed.30

Applying

the

Boethian

res-voxntithesis othe sensesof person' as used byPriscian, the com-

mentator onsiders

person'

as both realis

the

thingbeing

referred

o)

and vocalis

the

word

itself).

He

anticipates

his

explanation

of Pris-

cian's discussion

in

VIII

101,

with

a

remark

on VIII 66

about

the

relative

priority

f the first

erson

over

the other two

persons.

Here,

he

glosses

a

person

as a

thing.31

Could this

have

been the

point

of

departure

for

Roscelin's trinitarian

heology?

n the

Theologia

Summi

boni'

Abaelard refutes

Roscelin's definition of the

Trinity

as a

plurality

f

things

by

explaining

that

Priscian' s

definition f

person'

referred o threeproperties.32 e is here criticising n idea, not ust

of Roscelin

but

one

laid

down in

the Glosule.

The

commentator

explains

himself

more

fully

when

expounding

Priscian' definition

f

person'

in VIII

101:

The

word

erson

anbe

takenn

different

ays:

or

tmeans

certain

uality,

which

e

can call

personality

djacent

o the

hings

hemselves,

nd this

ro-

perly;

t

designates

hings articipating

n

that

uality

which

we call

persons

thankso the

hing

hich

hey

eceive;

t

[the

word

erson]

s also taken n

designation

f nother

uality, amely

f

ignifying

ersonal

hings

a

quality

adjacent

o

personal

erbs:

orwhen

say

4

'I

read' s

a

person"

do not

ay

thatnthis erb s thathingpersonality",atherhemeaningf hingsubja-

cent o

personality;

o

saying

4

1

read' s

a

person"

s

"signifying

personal

thing."33

31

cite heGlosule

ccording

o the

1502

ditione

,

corrected

here

ecessaryy

referenceo

the

Cologne

MS

(K).

K

35va

114v: Alia

similitudo

e ordine

er-

sonarum,

uod

dicit

icut n dictis liis

modis

raeponitur:

imiliter

rima ersona

praeponitur

liis

ersonis

ropter

ascausas:

uia er psam

id est

perprimam

ealem

significatam

b

ipsa

ostenditur

ecundaealis:

uia

ad

ipsam oquitur

rima

t tertia

realis:

uia

de

psa

oquitur,

t

uere

er

rimam

stenditur

ecunda

t

tertia: amnisi

sit

rima

ealis on rit

ecunda

el

tertia;

ondicit on sseres

uae

dicuntur

-unt

e)secundat ertiaersonatiam estructaa re uaediciturrima;ed ubhacpro-

prietate

on emanere

t

dicantur

ecunda

t

tertiaiue

si

non

it

)

alia res ubhac

proprietate

tdicatur

rima

t deo

tiam

reponiturrima

ersona

liis,

uia

omnis

(propriis )

causa fficiens

aturaliterst nte

ausatiua

d est nte

uos

ffectus."

32

TSum

I

108,

p.

153;

TchrII

175,

p.

261.

33

VIII 101 K

40vb

123v:

Sm/igitur

personae

erborum

res>]

Sciendum anc

uocem

ersona

iuersis

ccipi

modis:

ignificai

nim

uandam ualitatem,

uam

possumus

ocare

ersonalitatem

psis

rebus

diacentem,

t

hoc

proprie;

signt

etiam

es lia

qualitate

articipantesuas

solemus ocare

ersonas

ratia

ei

uam

suscipiunt;ccipitur

tiam

n

designatione

lterius

ualitatis

cilicet

ignificationis

rerum

ersonaJium

uae qualitas

diacet erbis

ersonalibus;

am

um

dico

"lego

est

persona"

on

dico

huicuerbo

nesse

ersonalitatem

em

llam

mmo

ignifica-tionemerumersonalitatiubiacentium,testdicere legoestpersona",d est

significans

em

ersonalem.

tem

ccipiturersona

ignificans

erba

ignificationem

rerum

ersonalium

articipantia.

15

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19/288

In

identifyingperson'

as both

'word' and

'thing',

the

commentator

was

trying

o

clarify

he reason

behind the

mposition

f this

particular

word. The first ersonwas both "that thingwhichspokeabout itself'

and,

as

a

word,

"that which

signified

thing

peaking

about

itself'.

One had

always

to ask

whether

person'

was

being

used

as

a

thing

or

as

a

word. "A

thing

s

the

cause of the vox ,34

In

this case the

person-

thing

was the

cause

of

the

word

'person'.

The

commentator

wanted

to

distinguish

word

from

hat which it

signified.By

twelfth-century

standards,

this

terminologymight

eem

clumsy,

but

it was an

attempt

all the

same.

The

commentatordid not

accept

some

people's

interpretation

hat

"about oneself" in Priscian's definition ad to enunciatean actionor

a

passion

about

oneself,

distinct

rom

he

first

erson

of the

pronoun.35

He

argued

that

the same

person lay

behind the

pronoun

as the

verb.

The

comen

ator

then

proferred

s the

opinion

of

"certain

people"

(i.e. himself)

he

explanation

he had

already

presented

s

his

own,

that

Priscian

was

referring

o

'person'

both as a

thing

and as a

word,

imposed

to

designate something

real.

Expanding

on

Priscian's

defini-

tion of

the first

nd

second

persons

as

finite,

he noted that

"I

read"

represents

he

speaker

as "You

read"

represents

he

one

spoken

to.

This was trueaccordingto themselves m/ eales or accordingto their

meaning

"

ut vocales"

The

third

person,

being

infinite

needed to

be

defined

by

a

pronoun

to be

a

finite

hing

n

itself.

The

commentator's

concern to

distinguish

the cause of

'person'

(i.e.

the

thing)

from

the word

itself s

only

one

example

of his

desire

to

establish the causes of those

voces

nalysed

by

Priscian. He

was

particularly

nterested

n

expanding

upon

those

often

brief

passages

in

which Priscian

tried to establish

philosophical

principles

to different

34

bid. "Cum

gitur

is

uattuor

odis t ine

ubio

equiuoce ersonaccipiatur:

duas

tantum

ignificationes

ersone

ic

tractat

riscianus,

cilicet

git

de

persona

secundum

ignificationem

K

designationem)

erum

ersonalitati

ubiectarumt n

designatione

erborum

uae

duae

significationes

unt i secundarie:

um

debet if-

finire

ersonam

t

uperiusoniugationem

iuidit

arn

er

rimam,

ecundamt er-

tiam:

n

qua

dicerem

K

41ra)

atis

nnuitur

iffinitio

ersonae.

am

personam

dicimus

ealem

uae

el de e

oquitur

uel ad

quam rima

oquitur

e

psa

uel de

qua

loquitur

rima

d

secundam,

ocalem erouocemhanc

personam

ignificantem.

Prima

st.Hie diffinit

rimam ersonam

t

secundumem

t secundumocem:

t

competenter

acit.

es enim st

ausauoeis: t

icdicit es lia st

rimaersona

uae

loquitur

id

est

uae

profert

ermonem

e

quocumque

abitm

iue

de e

iuede alio:

ecce ealis. rima oealis st uaesignificaiemoquenteme e, thanc obis nnuit

cum

dicit

uae oquitur

e e

id

est

profert

ocem e

significantem."

35

VIII

101

K

41ra

123v.

16

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 30, NOS. 1-2, 1992

20/288

parts

of

speech. Every

noun had

a

4

thing'

or res

s its cause.

This

prin-

ciple may help

us understand the

trinitarian

rgument

St Anselm

found so perplexing.While Priscianneverexplicitly dentified noun

with

thing,

he

did

say

that t was "a

part

of

speech

which

distributes

a common

or a

proper

(i.e. particular)

quality

of

subject

bodies or

things

to

each"

(II

22).

Priscian's

definition of

a

noun takes for

granted

the

primary

xistence of

subject

bodies or

things.

quality

is

what

these bodies or

things

hare.

When

explaining

that

t

was

proper

to

a noun

to

signify

ubstance

and

quality

[II 18],

the

commentator

observed that here Priscian was

not

using

substance

in

its

customary

sense of "a

thing

with

subsisting

ccident

",

but in a

broader

sense

of all essence. In his lengthygloss on the definition,he preferred o

use

substance to refer o

the

specific

thing:

[A

noun]

..

signifies

hat ubstanceor

whicht

wasfound

o

designate,

ither

separate

rom

nother

hroughny

roperty

r imilar

through

the

haring

of

nyproperty.

or

proper

ames re

found

nd

mposed

o that

hey lways

signify

ome

ertain

erson

eparate

rom

thers

hrough

ome

ertain

roper-

ties.

Proper

ouns

re

found o

designate

ubstancesn

that

hey

re

separate

in their

roperties.

..

Similarly

ommon

ames

ppellativa

are

found

o

designate

ubstances

imilaro

othersn

ny

uality,

s man

ignifies

any

ith

one

common

roperty,

amely

ationality

nd

mortality,

ecause ince

man

signifieshat ne smuch s this ne, t ignifiescertainommonropertyo

be n

ll,

nwhich

hey

gree.

ualities,

hats

properties,

re

he

special

ause

of

he

inding

fnouns.

or

f

nounswere

ound

nly

o

designate

ubstances,

so

many

ifferentouns

would e

superfluous,

ince his

name

substance"

would

uffice;

ut ince

ubstance

ignifieshings

n

s much

s

they

reor

xist

in

themselves

f aken

trictly,

t

determinesn

these

hings

either

orporality,

animation,

ensibility,

ationality,

hitenessr

blacknessr

nything

lse

f his

kind. t was

necessary

o

find

ifferentames

which

eterminedhese

ndother

different

ualities

n

things

hemselves.36

36

I

18K

13ra

24v:

Proprium

st

ominis

ignificare

ubstantiam

"... scilicet

ignificai

illamubstantiamdquamdesignandamst nuentum,eldiscretambaliaper li-

quam

proprietatem

el

similem

ommunionem

licuius

roprietatis.

ropria

nim

nominaic unt

nuentat

mposita

t

emperignifcent

liquam

ertam

ersonam

discretam

b

aliis

er

liquas

ertas

roprietates;

on

nim unt nuenta

ropter

if-

ferentiam

ubstantiarum,

ed

tantum

d discernendas

roprietates

n

substantiis

existentes,

t

potest

iderin

Socrate.

ocrates

ignificai

ertam

K

13rb)

ersonam

et

discretamb

aliisnon

n

ubstantia

sse ed

per

has

proprietatesuod

Sophronisci

filius

st,

uodpoeta

t

alia

huiusmodi;

um

nim adem

ubstantiait n

omnibus

hominis

ndiuiduis,

uia

omnis

omo st

nimal

ationale

ortale

t non

diffrant

nisi n

qualitatibus,

nuentaunt

ropria

omina d

designandas

ubstantiasn

hoc

quod

sunt

discretaen

suis

proprietatibus.

imiliter

ppellatiua

unt

nuenta d

designandas

ubstantias

imilesliis n

liqua ualitate,

thomo

ignificai

lures

um

unacommuniroprietate,cilicetumrationalitate,tmortalitate,uiacumhomo

tam

ene lium

uam

stum

ignificet,

ignificaiuandam

ommunem

roprietatem

esse in

omnibus,

n

qua

conueniunt.unt

ergo

qualitates,

d est

proprietates

17

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 30, NOS. 1-2, 1992

21/288

The commentator nsists

that substance

and

quality

are

not

signified

in the same

way,

as if both

substance and

quality

are

nouns. Rather

a noun names a substance:

because

t

[the

noun]

s

imposed

n

it,

while

ignifying

quality

ot

by

nomenclature,

ut

by

representing

nd

determining

n

relation

o a

substance.

For

this eason

very

oun

has

two

meanings,

ne

through

mposition

n the

substance,

he

ther

hroughepresentation

f

he

uality

f he

ubstance,

o

thatman'

signifies

he

hing

f

Socratesr ofother

men,

y

naming

t,

deter-

mining ationality

nd

mortality

bout

t

by representation.37

The

commentator

was aware that

his

interpretation

id

not

please

everybody.

Some wanted nouns

to name

substance

and

quality oined

together,

o that "Socrates"

was

the

name

both

of

the

substance and

of the accidents which informed t: "which is proved not to be by

many

and

various

arguments".38

The

refutation

f their

argument

praecipua

ausa nuentionisominum.

am

i

propter

olas ubstantias

esignandas

inuenirentur

omina,

uperflue

nuenta

ssent

ot

diuersa,

um

olum oc

nomen

substantiad

hoc

uficeret;

ed

quia

substantiaes antum

ignificat,

n

quantum

sunt,

el

per

se

existunti

proprie

ccipitur,

ec determinai

n

ipsis

rebus or-

poreitatem,

nimationem,ensibilitatem,

atonalit

tem,

lbedinemel

nigredinem

uel

aliquid

liud

huiusmodi,

ecesse

uit

nueniri omina iuersa

uae

has

diuersas

qualitates,

t aliashuiusmodi

n

psis

ebus eterminarent."

37

bid.

=

De Rijk,LM II.1,p. 228n.]: "Notandumsttamenuodnomen on

significat

ubstantiamt

ualitatem

nsimul

uncupatiue,

cilicettaut